About Rationally Speaking


Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Wednesday, October 16, 2013

The problem with suspiciously formed desires


by Massimo Pigliucci

A recent talk by Adam Elga (Princeton University) at CUNY’s Graduate Center made me think a bit about what the author calls “suspiciously formed desires.” For instance, suppose you suddenly find your old circle of friends stale and uninteresting, and begin to gravitate toward new people. But then you realize to your horror that the change in your social preferences just happened to coincide with the time you started taking anti-depressants (there are documented cases of this sort of effect on various aspects of one’s emotional life, see Chapter 11 of Answers for Aristotle).

Or, to use another of Elga’s examples, consider studies that show that subjects are more likely to call back a confederate for a proposed date if they have recently shared a disturbing experience — like walking on a suspended bridge — with said confederate. (Other examples, discussed in Answers, include being better predisposed toward a date if you are nursing a warm rather than a cold drink. Useful tip!)

These sorts of situations, and many others, immediately lead people — if and when they find out — to be skeptical of their preferences precisely because the sources of such preferences seem suspicious. But philosophers being inclined to question the apparently obvious, Elga raised the issue of when, exactly, is finding out the source of a stated preference rational ground for reassessing that preference.

Elga rejects the tempting answer (when that preference derives from a suspicious source), thinking that there is more to the story. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that sources don't matter, and that the only rational grounds for reassessment are:

1. When the new information is evidence against a claim on which the preference essentially depends;

2. When there is evidence that the stated preference goes against one’s real preference;

3. When there is evidence that the stated preference is in tension with one’s preferences and the tension should be resolved in favor of the other preferences.

For instance, let’s say you find out that an assassin has somehow implanted in you a preference for drinking whatever glass of water happens to be on your desk. This may be good evidence that that particular water is poisonous, so you do have rational reasons to question your preference (this falls under case 1).

Or (case 2), you generally prefer caffeinated coffee, but on this morning you ask for decaf because, say, the decaf cup has an eye catching picture. The decaf choice goes against your considered judgment, since your real preference is for caffeinated java, so you have rational grounds to revise your decision.

Or (case 3), a jealous acquaintance applies peer pressure to make you buy a flashy outfit in the hope that you will look silly and embarrass yourself in front of your friends. Turns out you actually like the idea of occasionally wearing flashy outfits, but you also really really hate the idea of being embarrassed in front of your friends. Both preferences are actually yours, but they are in conflict, and one is more important to you than the other, so the conflict should be resolved in favor of the most cogent preference.

Elga concludes that only when at least one of the the three above-mentioned rational grounds for reassessing your preference are present should one in fact re-evaluate. The mere fact that the preference is induced by a suspicious source is not a necessarily compelling factor. Why, then, do people so often think it is? Because, as a matter of empirical experience (as opposed to logical necessity), suspicious influences do correlate fairly highly with the presence of rational grounds (of types 1-3 above) to reassess one’s preferences.

Elga’s position is that once you eliminate rational reasons for reassessment, the suspiciousness of the source simply doesn’t matter. The attentive reader may have caught a similarity between Elga’s approach and the idea of a genetic fallacy. The latter is a type of informal logical fallacy according to which it is not rational to reject an argument merely on the basis of who advanced it. For instance, I should not dismiss an argument about intelligent design just because it comes from a well known evangelical preacher. I have to engage with the argument itself, independently of the source.

However, both cases (preferences induced by suspicious sources and genetic fallacy) are instances in which there is both a problem on strictly formal rational grounds and also a reasonable heuristic at play that people reasonably use as guidance for practical action. Consider the genetic fallacy first: yes, it is logically fallacious to reject the preachers’ argument only on the grounds that it is advanced by a creationist. But if I have a limited amount of time to engage in discussions about intelligent design, it is rational for me to deploy the approximate equation: preacher = bad reasoning about science, and just move on. After all, we all have a life to live and more interesting or pleasurable things to do!

Similarly with the cases Elga considers: as he himself pointed out during the talk, often the suspiciousness of the source of a preference does indicate something questionable about that preference. But not always: it could be, for instance, that your preference for new circles of friends came about because of genuine changes in the way you value people, and only coincidentally happened at the same time you started taking anti-depressants. Or even better, the anti-depressants may have allowed you to see things in a way you had not considered before, and that you retain as a genuine preference even after you have gotten off the medication.

There is another issue to consider in the context of the above discussion: your preferences do have to come from somewhere, and it may not always be clear what counts as a “suspicious” source. For instance, suppose that my preference for classical symphonic over modern atonal music originates from early exposure to the former but not the latter during my childhood. Am I therefore rationally compelled to revisit my preference, since I have reason to believe that it wasn’t the result of a considered choice based on a deep understanding and evaluation of the musical character of both types of performance? I don’t think so. And what about preferences of taste, or sexual orientation, that may be tracked back to early development, or perhaps even to genetic influences? Am I supposed to reconsider them because they were, in a sense, “implanted” in me rather than freely chosen? (And just in case you are wondering, one doesn’t need to get into endless discussions about free will in order to entertain these questions, a standard notion of human volition will do.)

The most general point to take away from Elga’s preoccupation with the sources of our choices came up during the discussion following his talk. He reminded his audience of the difference between the source (pretty much in causal terms) of a given preference, and the grounds for that preference. His basic idea is that regardless of the source, the grounds need to be rationally assessed.

This in turns has reminded me of much literature coming out of the social sciences of late (e.g., the work of Jonathan Haidt, about which I have, ahem, contrasting thoughts, shall we say). The general shape of the relevant papers goes something like this: “we thought that X was the result of rational deliberation, but it turns out that people can be primed to make choices about X in all sorts of ways that bypass conscious thinking, therefore we act irrationally about X.” This is a “rationalization vs rationality” type of argument that tends to augment the importance of social-psychological factors and diminish the relevance of critical thinking and rational deliberation. You think you are assessing evidence about climate change rationally? Ah! Haven’t you heard of confirmation bias, my friend?

The problem with this sort of approach — which confuses Elga’s source vs grounds distinction — is that people may begin to think that it is simply not worth it to insist on rationality, because you know human beings will do what human beings do, and they’ll find a way to rationalize their choices nonetheless. The absurdity of what I would call the rational nihilism mistake should be obvious if one considers a slightly different example: it is a well known fact that people don’t naturally think very well when it comes to assessing the probabilities of different scenarios (witness the success of the gambling industry). But it would be absurd to claim that therefore it is useless to teach statistics and probability theory. On the contrary: it is all the more necessary, precisely as a way to combat our flawed heuristics and develop a more disciplined way to think through our problems rather than go with our “gut feelings.”

So, if you discover that the source of a preference you happen to have is indeed suspicious, by all means, go ahead and critically re-evaluate that preference according to Elga’s criteria. But you should probably do that also in a number of cases in which the source of your preference is benign. And more generally you should engage in an assessment of the grounds for your beliefs whenever the game is worth the candle, and quite independently of the source of those beliefs.

32 comments:

  1. @ Massimo

    Do you believe it is desirable that you live your life on completely rational grounds?

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  2. I think basing this issue on as narrow of grounds as Elga does ignores the canary in the coal mine: That we are not a single, unitary self. What if "new desire X" is actually the "real" desire of some subself of mine that, for whatever reasons, has come to the forefront? Shouldn't my real "quest" be to look at why this subself has now come to the forefront?

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  3. Massimo,

    Quite so. We can't be constantly subjecting our intuitive judgements to conscious scrutiny, and even when we do there's no guarantee we'll get the right answer. All we can do is our best, and conscious scrutiny of our beliefs is an important part of that, however fallible it is.

    I think part of the problem is that our traditional ideas of rationality are misguided. We tend to see rational belief as primarily a matter of making valid arguments. On a more naturalised view, rational belief is primarily a matter of non-conscious judgement, with the use of arguments being the tip of the iceberg. After all, animals manage very well without arguments. The use of arguments is a valuable tool that we would be foolish to give up. But it isn't the whole of rational belief, or even the primary source. From time to time people notice the flaws in the traditional view: another case is the problem of induction. And if they can't see an alternative to the traditional view, that may lead them to give up on rationality or knowledge altogether.

    In the case of preferences, I would say there's no such thing as a "real" preference. There are just preferences operating at different levels and in different ways, and sometimes coming into conflict with each other. A more reflective part of me may prefer to be slim, while a more instinctive part prefers to eat chocolate cake. There's no right answer as to which preference I should favour. But when I'm thinking about longer-term outcomes, it's the more reflective part which tends to be in the driving seat.

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  4. Great post! Elga is always a great source of interesting problems.

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  5. Alastair,

    > Do you believe it is desirable that you live your life on completely rational grounds? <

    Obviously not. Where did you get that idea?

    Gadfly,

    > What if "new desire X" is actually the "real" desire of some subself of mine that, for whatever reasons, has come to the forefront? Shouldn't my real "quest" be to look at why this subself has now come to the forefront? <

    I don't believe in multiple selves (unless one has serious neurological disorders), but actually Elga's take is perfectly compatible with the sort of situation you envision. It falls under case 3, re-examine desires whenever there is a conflict in one's overall web of preferences.

    Richard,

    > On a more naturalised view, rational belief is primarily a matter of non-conscious judgement, with the use of arguments being the tip of the iceberg. After all, animals manage very well without arguments. <

    But that's because other animals are incapable of rational arguments. I do think that the reason we are the only technological species on the planet (yes, for good and for ill) is because of our ability for conscious and rational thinking.

    > The use of arguments is a valuable tool that we would be foolish to give up. But it isn't the whole of rational belief, or even the primary source. <

    Depends on what you mean. If by rational argument you mean strictly formal logical arguments you are of course right. But if you mean generally relying on rational thinking, then I'm not sure what else is available outside that which can still be called rational.

    > A more reflective part of me may prefer to be slim, while a more instinctive part prefers to eat chocolate cake. <

    Yeah, been there done that ;-) But that sort of case, again, falls under category 3 in Elga's scheme.

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    1. Oh, Elga's compatible with multiple subselves (I prefer that phrase to multiple selves). But, he doesn't really "bring out" that issue.

      And, I'll get you sold on this issue, just like I'll detach you from 20th century ideas on free will vs. determinism. (Why Alastair thinks you're "dismissive" of the issue, I don't know.)

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  6. @ Massimo

    > Where did you get that idea? <

    I got that impression by reading your blog post. It would appear that you're suffering from a fairly severe case of "analysis paralysis."

    > (And just in case you are wondering, one doesn’t need to get into endless discussions about free will in order to entertain these questions, a standard notion of human volition will do.) <

    You always seem to be quite dismissal of the "free will vs. determinism" debate. Whether or not our choices are truly voluntary is what is at issue here. So, our notion of what constitutes free will is relevant to subject matter at hand.

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    1. I have no idea where you got that idea. Per this blog post of mine, Massimo's not "dismissive" of this dichotomy (sadly) at all. Would that he were. Click to read why he's not, in part: http://socraticgadfly.blogspot.com/2012/01/mu-to-free-will.html

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    2. @ Gadfly

      Let me rephrase: Massimo's position in regards to the subject matter of "free will" is ambiguous.

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    3. Well, originally you mentioned "free will vs. determinism," not free will by itself. That said, per the link from my blog, what I have him saying about free will isn't ambiguous at all.

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    4. @ Gadfly

      It seems ambiguous to me. Can you clearly state his position on the subject? (Massimo denies that he is a dualist, yet he seems to entertain positions that smack of dualism - e.g. the "two stage model of free will" and "emergentism.")

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    5. Oh, if THAT's your concern, no, I don't think he's a dualist at all. (That said, what type of dualism are we talking about? I assume ontological dualism, but I'm double-checking!) My concern with him, per my blog post, is that the whole idea of "free will vs. determinism" is outdated. (Also, emergentism has nothing to do with dualism; I don't know why you think it does.) And, if you're still attached to that idea, then you need to read my link above, too. That whole issue is simply out of date.

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    6. @ Gadfly

      > Oh, if THAT's your concern, no, I don't think he's a dualist at all. (That said, what type of dualism are we talking about? I assume ontological dualism, but I'm double-checking!) <

      What form of dualism does not ultimately imply ontological dualism?

      > (Also, emergentism has nothing to do with dualism; I don't know why you think it does.) <

      Emergentism (strong) is the opposite of reductionism. And if consciousness does not reduce to the physical, then it is not physical. (It seems pretty simple to me.)

      > And, if you're still attached to that idea, then you need to read my link above, too. That whole issue is simply out of date. <

      The moral implications are the same regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. However, the metaphysical implications may not be.

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    7. Emergentism is not the opposite of reductionism. You, like Massimo, are thinking in terms of non-existent polarities.

      And, no, the moral implications aren't the same. That, too, is based on that out-of-date thinking.

      And, with that, I'm (probably) done commenting on this thread.

      Whether it's classical free willer Massimo, you from whatever the ultimate point of view, or classical determinist Jerry Coyne with his Gnu Atheism tonic as a chaser, there's a growing list of people that I wish would move beyond this outmoded structure.

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    8. @ Gadfly

      I previously stated that "strong" emergence was the opposite of reductionism. (There is a difference between weak and strong emergence. Strong emergence is the variant that is generally invoked in the philosophy of mind.)

      "Usage of the notion "emergence" may generally be subdivided into two perspectives, that of "weak emergence" and "strong emergence". Weak emergence is a type of emergence in which the emergent property is reducible to its individual constituents. This is opposed to strong emergence, in which the emergent property is irreducible to its individual constituents." (emphasis mine) (source: Wikipedia: Emergence)

      > And, no, the moral implications aren't the same. That, too, is based on that out-of-date thinking. <

      The moral implications are the same, regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. If determinism holds true, then every choice I make was ultimately predetermined and could not have been otherwise. If indeterminism holds true, then every choice I make ultimately reduces to some element of pure chance. I cannot be held anymore responsible (or any less responsible) for a choice or act that is ultimately the result of pure chance than I can for a choice or act that is ultimately predetermined by powers and forces external to "me."

      > And, with that, I'm (probably) done commenting on this thread. <

      Suit yourself. But the bottom line here is that my supported claims trump your unsupported denials.

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    9. First, I don't think Massimo is a strong emergentist. My fault for not picking up on your distinction. My second fault for not pointing out that, again ... you're wrong!

      Speaking of:

      >>But the bottom line here is that my supported claims trump your unsupported denials. <<

      Should be rendered as:

      But the bottom line here is that (I beleive) my supported claims trump your unsupported denials.

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    10. @ Gadfly

      > First, I don't think Massimo is a strong emergentist. My fault for not picking up on your distinction. My second fault for not pointing out that, again ... you're wrong! <

      You're reading comprehension skills leave something to be desired. I stated previously: Massimo denies that he is a dualist, yet he seems to entertain positions that smack of dualism - e.g. the "two stage model of free will" and "emergentism." Where does he ENTERTAIN these positions? In his blog post entitled "On free will, response to readers"

      Strong emergentism (not weak emergentism) is the type of emergentism that is invoked in regards to consciousness and free will. (We're talking about free will here. Duh! So, I'm right and you're wrong.)

      > Should be rendered as:

      But the bottom line here is that (I beleive) my supported claims trump your unsupported denials. <

      I have yet to see you put forth anything that remotely resembles a counterargument. And until you do, there's really nothing for me to respond to.

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    11. Well, per Wikipedia (among others) you're wrong about emergentism. I quote:

      " **All varieties** of emergentism strive to be compatible with physicalism, the theory that the universe is composed exclusively of physical entities, and in particular with the evidence relating changes in the brain with changes in mental functioning."

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergentism

      Now, Wiki does note that some varieties of emergentism may allow for property dualism, which it distinguishes from substance dualism.

      The Stanford Encyclopedia has broadly the same stance.

      http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/

      So, it appears you're wrong on one of the major premises of your argument. No wonder Massimo simply abandons threads with you after a while.

      Related to that, if you see something in that link that supports the idea that Massimo supports substance dualism, or even openly supports property dualism, you're seeing something I don't.

      That said, he mischaracterizes my belief. I don't believe in substance, or property, dualism, at least not a strong form of the latter.

      And, so, even more than what I said before, I'll pull a Massimo myself and not bother further. If you're going to misread him that much, and the other things I mentioned above ...

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    12. @ Gadfly

      > Well, per Wikipedia (among others) you're wrong about emergentism. <

      I'm right (not wrong) about emergentism. All varieties of emergentism MIGHT strive to be compatible with physicalism, but some varieties of emergentism - namely, strong emeregence - are NOT actually compatible with physicalism,

      To basically reiterate one of my previous posts: Emergentism (strong) is NOT compatible with reductionism. The Wiki citation below substantiates this claim. (Weak emergentism is compatible with reductionism; strong emergence is not. But strong emergence (not weak emergence) is the variety of emergence that is employed in the philosophy of mind in order to account for consciousness and/or free will.)

      "The antithesis of reductionism, emergentism is the idea that increasingly complex structures in the world give rise to the "emergence" of new properties that are something over and above (i.e. canNOT be reduced to) their more basic constituents." (source: Wikipedia: Property dualism)

      Emergence (strong) is the basis for property dualism, (I have already substantiated this.) Moreover, property dualism is also known as a form of "non-reductive physicalism." The Wiki citation below substantiates this claim. (We have already established that strong emergence is NOT compatible with reductionism.)

      "Non-reductive physicalism is the predominant contemporary form of property dualism according to which mental properties are mapped to neurobiological properties, but are not reducible to them. Non-reductive physicalism asserts that mind is not ontologically reducible to matter, in that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between the properties of mind and matter. It asserts that while mental states are physical in that they are caused by physical states, they are not ontologically reducible to physical states." (source: Wikipedia: Property dualism)

      In a previous post, I asked you the following question: "What form of dualism does not ultimately imply ontological dualism?"

      It should be abundantly clear to you now that property dualism is a form of dualism that does indeed imply ontological dualism. And to reiterate an argument that I made in a previous post (an argument that still stands): "If consciousness does not reduce to the physical, then it is not physical." IOW, "non-reductive physicalism" is an oxymoron because it is inherently contradictory.

      > So, it appears you're wrong on one of the major premises of your argument. No wonder Massimo simply abandons threads with you after a while. <

      As you have now learned, all the premises to my argument are sound. The reason Massimo evades my arguments is the same reason why he is evading (and has evaded) this one; he knows that he can't refute it. He knows that, I know that, you know that, and anyone else here with a modicum of intellectual honesty knows that.

      > Related to that, if you see something in that link that supports the idea that Massimo supports substance dualism, or even openly supports property dualism, you're seeing something I don't. <

      This is where your reading comprehension skills leave something very much to be desired. To reiterate for the last time: I stated in a previous post that he "ENTERTAINS positions that smack of dualism." (Do you know what the term "entertains" means in this context?) Of course, he doesn't openly embrace emergentism (or the two stage model). He doesn't openly embrace any position on free will. But this only supports my earlier point: Massimo is ambiguous on the subject of free will. He's ambiguous because he cannot defend any version of free will that is compatible with physicalism (or materialism).

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  7. Massimo,

    Great post (as usual.) Here are some questions and observations I have about Elga's talk.

    How good is the data? This is always a problem with psychological research. For instance, how good is the data showing someone “being better predisposed toward a date if you are nursing a warm rather than a cold drink.”? Five sigmas? I don't think so.

    Anti-depressants are, in fact, meant to change people's desires. Very depressed people often REALLY want to kill themselves. Anti-depressants are meant to change that. Powerful anti-depressants are widely over-prescribed (the usual problem with big pharma,) but there are situations when they are lifesavers.

    I have a real problem with case 2. “Real preference” seems to be an arbitrary concept. Your example gives an “usual preference,” not a “real” one. Past choices do not necessarily imply that occasionally different choices do not arise from real desires (even if such desires are influenced by packaging.) One could have a real desire for variety, or for flashy packages.

    In conclusion, very interesting problems. I cannot help noticing that these observations show how unlike a computer the human brain really is. Unlike computers, the brain seems to be working on the edge of instability, so that small influences can have macroscopic effects on behavior. This is, of course, a necessary condition for some sort of “free will.”

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    1. >Unlike computers, the brain seems to be working on the edge of instability, so that small influences can have macroscopic effects on behavior. This is, of course, a necessary condition for some sort of “free will.”

      On the contrary, we would be more free in the important senses if our brains were less prone to normatively irrelevant influences.

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    2. Note that I put “free will” in quotes. Unfortunately, any system exhibiting complex enough behavior to simulate “free will” has to operate near chaos, so that it will be sensitive to small perturbations. This is a standard result in the study of dynamical systems.

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  8. "The absurdity of what I would call the rational nihilism..."

    Very important point. We shouldn't throw the baby out if it has a blemish. But I do think the way to inoculate against this sort of nihilism is to not hide the weaknesses and shortcomings of rationalism. Rationalism gives slightly better odds than the house, but you're still going to lose a LOT. I think Marx was right that we are "species being" and so is our reasoning. We reason for and with others, and as long as our society is healthy our reasoning will be.

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  9. "... But philosophers being inclined to question the apparently obvious, Elga raised the issue of when, exactly, is finding out the source of a stated preference rational ground for reassessing that preference."

    I have a problem with the assumptions here. Firstly that we are able to identify in any reliable way "the source of a ... preference" in a real-life, non-experimental situation. And secondly with the word 'exactly'. It's just not possible, I would suggest, to postulate precise and clearcut rules for this sort of thing. (Well, one can postulate rules, but will they be plausible? And where would their authority derive from – exactly?)

    And I agree with Richard Wein's (and Filippo Neri's) point about 'real' preferences, and also with RW's naturalistic take on what constitutes rational behavior.

    There is a broader issue here, I think, about fine distinctions (in this case, between different types of preferences, or grounds and sources, or suspiciously and non-suspiciously formed desires, etc.). The sorts of fine distinctions which are appropriate in scientific contexts are generally inappropriate in most real-life contexts, I would say. And misapplied fine distinctions can lead to the creation of artificial problems.

    All in all, Massimo, I don't know that I share your concerns about the dangers of 'rational nihilism'. Are people really at risk of becoming less rational if they appreciate the extent to which their choices are unconsciously driven?

    Quite the opposite, I would have thought. The more we know about how we really think, the more generally skeptical we will be about our convictions, etc. (A good thing, surely.)

    Or is there evidence that such knowledge actually has the effect of discouraging people from behaving in a rational way or from applying well-established rational or scientific principles (like probability theory) when appropriate?

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    1. Mark, good point about fears of "rational nihilism." This is part of why Massimo still holds on to old ideas about free will and a unitary consciousness. He's said as much in the past:

      "A)ny talk of free will and consciousness being illusions is a threat to humanism, since among humanist's cardinal principles are that we are responsible for our actions and that we can use reason as a guide to life."

      But, if reason tells us there's no unitary free willer, Massimo, then, that's where we have to head. We may still "act as if," to riff a bit on Hume, but, if there's ultimately no turtle of free will down at the bottom, there's no turtle of free will down at the bottom.

      And, Mark, I otherwise agree with you. Knowing more about how we actually do operate, rather than relying on out-of-date polarities, should be for our betterment.

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  10. Alastair,

    > I got that impression by reading your blog post. It would appear that you're suffering from a fairly severe case of "analysis paralysis." <

    It would appear that you suffer from a severe case of systematic misinterpretation of whatever I write.

    > You always seem to be quite dismissal of the "free will vs. determinism" debate. Whether or not our choices are truly voluntary is what is at issue here. <

    I just don't think that debate is productive at this point. If one doesn't believe in the human ability to make choices (volition) then there is no point in discussing anything at all with him, so I'm just not interested.

    Filippo,

    > how good is the data showing someone “being better predisposed toward a date if you are nursing a warm rather than a cold drink.”? Five sigmas? I don't think so. <

    To be fair, that was my example, not Elga's. And no, we ain't talking about five sigmas. But do you really want to set the bar that high for social science?

    > Anti-depressants are, in fact, meant to change people's desires. <

    I know, but not necessarily in all the directions one may want. In Answers for Aristotle I discuss the case of a woman who fell out of love with her husband when she was on Prozac, only to recover her feelings when she stop taking it. What was her "real" desire? Good question...

    > Past choices do not necessarily imply that occasionally different choices do not arise from real desires (even if such desires are influenced by packaging.) One could have a real desire for variety, or for flashy packages. <

    Yes. Or the flashy package can be a marketing distraction that induces you to buy something you don't really want, when you consider the situation with more time to reflect on it.

    Thomas,

    > If I read this post correctly Elga seems to be addressing decision theory <

    I actually don't think so. Elga is interested in exploring the nature of human (sometimes conflicting) desires, not in finding out what the "best" decision is according to some kind of maximizing criterion.

    > It is evident to me that there is more Massimo than Elga in this post, and a rather testy Massimo at that. But that's Massimo. <

    You are wrong on the first count, and I think of myself as more ironic than testy... But that's just me.

    > The fact that it declares more than it delivers is obscured by imaginary cheerleaders waving pom poms in the background. <

    Uh?

    > the better questions are how did Haidt gets thrown into this post about Elga? Was he cited by Elga? <

    Not in the talk, Haidt came up in the ensuing discussion.

    > What about confirmation bias? <

    What about it?

    > particularly enjoy Massimo's and his tolerance of inane or inarticulate commentary, particularly my own. But this post is not up to the standards I've come to expect from him. <

    Well, you can't please everyone all the time. But thanks for the backhanded compliment... ;-)

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    1. @ Massimo

      > It would appear that you suffer from a severe case of systematic misinterpretation of whatever I write. <

      Calmiti.

      > I just don't think that debate is productive at this point. If one doesn't believe in the human ability to make choices (volition) then there is no point in discussing anything at all with him, so I'm just not interested. <

      Whether or not our choices are truly voluntary is what is at issue here. So, if you're not willing to discuss that issue, then there is really no point of discussing "suspiciously formed desires." (You're not only suffering from analysis paralysis, but also from cognitive dissonance. (You can't reconcile your belief in free will with your belief in a mechanistic worldview where only efficient causes play a role.)

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  11. >Instead of arguing from conclusions like "preacher= bad reasoning about science, and just move on" let's substitute "Georges Lemaître= bad reasoning about science" and see if we can simply move on.

    Massimo's original example was a probability-based heuristic. Most preachers are not remotely like Georges Lemaître.

    It's annoying when a statement expressed probabilistically gets anecdotal counterexamples thrown at it.

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  12. Mark,

    > Firstly that we are able to identify in any reliable way "the source of a ... preference" in a real-life, non-experimental situation. <

    Not always, but there are plenty of non artificial examples where we can do it. The case of the woman who fell in and out of love with her husband at the time she began / stopped taking Prozac is both clear and interesting.

    > secondly with the word 'exactly'. It's just not possible, I would suggest, to postulate precise and clearcut rules for this sort of thing. <

    You may be a bit nitpicking here. It was just a rhetorical flourish in my part (and certainly not something Elga said).

    > Massimo, I don't know that I share your concerns about the dangers of 'rational nihilism'. Are people really at risk of becoming less rational if they appreciate the extent to which their choices are unconsciously driven? <

    I really don’t think that’s what I meant when I was talking about rational nihilism. Please re-read more carefully.

    > If someone offers me a peach and a pear, is there no distinction between responding "I desire the peach" or "I prefer the peach"? <

    Yes, there is, in the context you set up. Within the context of Elga’s discussion there was no ambiguity about the fact that he was using the terms interchangeably. But it was clear what he was referring to.

    > How did we get around to your remark about confirmation bias on the basis of your description of Elga's talk? <

    I thought it was pretty clear from the sentence itself, within the context of a discussion distinguishing rational thinking from rationalization.

    Alastair,

    > Calmiti. <

    If you want to show off by writing Italian quips, at least get it right: it’s “calmati,” not “calmiti.” And it’s got nothing to do with what I wrote. I assure you that I wasn’t upset, simply making an observation about your writings.

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  13. @ Massimo

    > If you want to show off by writing Italian quips, at least get it right: it’s “calmati,” not “calmiti.” <

    Perdonami.

    > And it’s got nothing to do with what I wrote. I assure you that I wasn’t upset, simply making an observation about your writings. <

    The bottom line is that you can't reconcile your position on free will with your naturalistic worldview (not unless your "naturalism" presupposes some kind of dualism or teleology).

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  14. Massimo

    Regarding the woman on anti-depressant drugs who fell in and out of love with her husband: I am inclined to see most forms of romantic love and desire as suspiciously-formed – even without the drugs!

    > I really don’t think that’s what I meant when I was talking about rational nihilism. Please re-read more carefully.<

    I think I understood perfectly well what you were claiming about the possible influence of certain kinds of popular science writing. And some people may well respond in the way you describe. And I understood the point of your reference to probability and statistics.

    But I was making my own point. Namely, that the benefits of knowing how our brains can fool us would probably outweigh any negative consequences.

    In accordance with my slightly different view of rationality, I am inclined to put the focus more on behavior than debate (as important as rational debate can sometimes be); and also to emphasize the distinction between informal interpretation and argumentation, and the more reliable methods and core findings of the empirical and formal sciences.

    Generally speaking, I probably have what you would call scientistic tendencies. Though I often find myself in agreement with your positions, I lack your apparent faith in the power of discursive reason (especially when it comes to answering value-related questions and deciding between conflicting value-systems, codes of behavior, etc.).

    And, by the way, a couple of those quotes under 'Mark' in your reply were from Thomas's comments not mine. I try to put strict limits on my nitpicking, you know, and wouldn't want to be blamed for his as well as my own! :-)

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  15. Massimo,

    >What was her "real" desire?<

    The problem is, some of us don't believe that there are real desires. Not in the sense that real desires are the desires of the core self, while non-real desires are deviations from them induced by “external” factors, like chemicals or propaganda. Our desires are no less real if they are the products of genetics, the society we grew up in or of the chemicals we eat, swallow or imbibe. There is no core self.

    This entire discussion verges on the concept of “suspiciously-formed desires.” The term “suspiciously-formed” is a non-technical, informal concept. It seems to imply that nefarious conspiracies are involved. We actually know that there are, in fact, conspiracies working to affect our desires. Evil drug companies work hard to get us “addicted” to their products, actual dug lords do likewise and slightly-less-evil ad companies try to get us to desire useless junk. In such situations the term “suspiciously-formed desire” is justified and the use of rational (not to mention legal) methods is needed.

    In the absence of conspiracies, the situation is much less clear. If a principled doctor prescribes a powerful anti-depressant to a suicidal patient, he is certainly justified, even if the anti-depressant affects the patient's desires. In such situations, I would assume that the desires are not “suspiciously-derived.” They are, in fact, as “real” and “non-suspicious” as the desires produced by our genetics, our social influences or by the natural chemicals from the food we eat.

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