by Massimo Pigliucci
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| www.scientificamerican.com |
One of the things I had pointed out is that there seems to be a clear inconsistency in the writings of several people who deny free will, since they also regularly add that it is good that we realize how things really are, because this is going to improve our lives, behaviors etc. Some readers thought there was no contradiction. For instance, here is what pin pin said:
> “Haves” and “oughts” and “shoulds” are exhortations that can change the desires of the people you are exhorting. If you think a certain set of people have bad desires (i.e. desires that would make the world a worse place), you can try to use moral language to mold those desires into better desires. <
As a matter of empirical psychology this is certainly the case, but I think there is an equivocation about the word “change” here. Does this mean that people have a choice of some sort, or simply that we are all Pavlovian automata that can be conditioned to do whatever the environment (including our fellow human beings) sets us up to do? The latter — I wager — is what Coyne, Rosenberg et al. really mean, and yet their language simply doesn’t seem to be able to avoid volitional connotations.
Several readers of course brought up dualism, even accusing me of being a crypto-dualist. Here is Gadfly:
> If there's no Cartesian meaner, there's no Cartesian free willer. <
True enough, but this assumes that the only way to meaningfully talk about volition (again, my and others’ preferred term instead of the metaphysically loaded “free will”) is in dualistic terms, a position that has been rejected pretty much by all compatibilist philosophers, from Dennett down.
The twin “isms” of reductionism and determinism have, of course, played a major role throughout the discussion. as Matthew Putman wrote:
> Certainly science, not just neurobiology, deals with causation all of the time, and that can be carried over to notions of freewill. ... I see no reason why a physical structure such as the brain should be any different than the filled polymer system. ... When we study the brain experimentally, either with animal models, or postmortem, we find very predicable behavior of neurons, and glia cells. <
He then goes on to invoke the specter of Descartes, again. But there are several issues lurking within the above quotes. To begin with, there is a free use of the concept of causality which, as I pointed out in my original post, is far from being clear at all, and of course is most definitely extra-scientific, meaning that science can only help itself to it, not investigate it empirically. Second, it is interesting to see that Matthew cannot conceive of a significant difference between filled polymers and brains, despite the obvious fact that brains, and not filled polymers, are alive, thinking, feeling, etc. Please do not take this as an argument for vitalism, it most definitely isn’t what I mean. But I find that that line of argument is somewhat question-begging: we are trying to figure out how chunks of matter can behave in such drastically different ways from other chunks of matter, so to point out the obvious (that they are all chunks of matter) hardly helps moving the debate forward. And of course, as someone commented in response to Matthew, it is no surprise that postmortem brains are just as inert as polymers. What interests us is what happens before they become postmortem.
Gadfly also highlighted something that I took for granted, but evidently I shouldn’t have:
> Belief in free will is ALSO arguably not a scientific proposition. It certainly is no more provable right now than is the denial of free will. <
Indeed. But my beef with Coyne is that he is the one making the strong claim that free will denial is a scientific proposition. I am not at all making the symmetrical claim that affirmation of free will is demonstrated by science, only the neutral one that science has precious little (okay, pretty much nothing) to say about free will.
Which brings me to comments questioning my view of science itself. For instance, elik says:
> If I interpret correctly, you have placed counterfactual language into the realm of unscientific metaphysical speculation. I doubt you would consider statements e.g. “were it below 20 degrees yesterday, the surface of this pond would have frozen over” to be unscientific. <
No, I do not think that all counterfactual language is non scientific (to use the term “unscientific” is pejorative, and I don’t think that only science is in the business of knowledge and understanding). But I think it uncontroversial that some counterfactual reasoning has nothing to do with science (think of purely logical or mathematical questions). To consider elik’s specific example, the reason that particular counterfactual is convincing is because established science already tells us a lot about the state transitional properties of water in relation to temperature. No such knowledge is available in the case of determinism, reductionism and their implications for free will.
Along similar lines, Matthew Clark opined:
> Of course we can’t actually perform this experiment, but the deterministic claim rests on the rather robust intuition that similar causes produce similar effects. <
The crucial part here is “we can’t actually perform the experiment,” which means that we are doing philosophy, not science. And there are very decent philosophical arguments against determinism (and reductionism, which is also implied by this sort of claim). Moreover, what is at issue here is precisely whether “the same causes” are at work. Physics would have to have established causal closure in order to argue that, and it most definitely hasn’t. (Another way to put this is that everything in the universe behaves in a way that has to be compatible with the known laws of physics. This says nothing about whether those laws as we understand them comprise all there is to know about how the universe works.)
elik, along with several other readers, also asks the recurring question:
> How does quantum indeterminacy help free will, for example? <
Well, one way it may help is through two-stage models, which have been mentioned during this and a previous discussion thread. But I am not staking my agnosticism on these or any other explanation for volition, I am simply pointing out that, contra popular (in some quarters) opinion, there are options out there. (Interestingly, very few readers took me up on another possibility: that of truly emergent properties, which is yet another question that at the moment — and perhaps permanently — cannot be resolved by science. We know that there are emergent properties, but we don’t know if they appear to be so because of our epistemic limitations or because they truly do represent novel behaviors of matter when certain complexity and organizational conditions are met.)
elik (not picking on him/her, I assure you!) also used a thought experiment to argue against free will, bringing up the possibility of The Device, a machine capable of predicting the content of an essay several minutes in advance of the essay being written. Intriguing, but besides the obvious fact that such experimental demonstration hasn’t been done by anyone (again, undermining Jerry’s claim that it is science that refutes free will), this conflates predictability with free will. As my CUNY colleague Jesse Prinz pointed out during a recent roundtable on this topic, we can already predict a lot of things about how people will behave under certain circumstances using standard psychology and certainly without having to settle the question of free will.
Why, in the end, do I think there is a problem that Jerry et al. are missing or ignoring? Again, Matthew Clark:
> What we seem not to observe, given our ever increasing ability to control for causal factors in experimental situations, are inexplicable departures from these regularities. <
Of course we do observe departures from regularities, it’s called human behavior! Yes, as I mentioned above, it is predictable to a point, but it is nothing like the movement of planets or the behavior of polymers. And there is, of course, the first person experience of making decisions after deliberation. That experience constitutes data (albeit not of the controlled fashion that would make them amenable to straightforward scientific investigation), and that data that needs to be explained, not explained away. My problem with Jerry’s position is that it is a form of eliminativism, a position in philosophy (not science!) of mind made popular by Paul and Patricia Churchland. When the Churchlands provocatively say that pain “just is” the firing of neuronal C-fibers they only begin to explain the subjective experience of pain. Yes, without the C-fibers we wouldn’t feel pain, but there is a huge difference between saying that the C-fibers are necessary for feeling pain (which we could express as: other conditions ... > C-fibers > pain) and saying that firing C-fibers are the same thing as pain (C-fibers = pain). So too with eliminativism about free will: yes, we need the laws of physics to be able to make decisions, nor can we make decisions that violate said laws. But this is not at all the same as saying that therefore decision making is an illusion brought about by physics, no more than pain is an illusion courtesy of C-fiber firing.
Regarding Matthew Putman, "When we study the brain experimentally, either with animal models, or postmortem, we find very predicable behavior of neurons, and glia cells."
ReplyDeleteThere is a very good paper by J.R. Lucas entitled, "Minds, Machines and Goedel". In it, Lucas claims that, due to Goedel's Theorem, we can never, not even in principle, have a mechanical model of the mind.
I agree that the introspective feeling of willing decisions is a kind of evidence for free will, albeit not very strong evidence (psychology has shown us that introspection is fallible). However, Sam Harris makes the interesting point that if you really take the time to focus attention on your own consciousness, i.e. through meditative practices, you will in fact come to the opposite conclusion, that free will does not exist. If you pay enough attention to your conscious experience, you will find that your thoughts spring forth unbidden and unwilled, that you have no control over what pops into your consciousness, and that there exists no unified "you" for which they appear. If you cannot will the thoughts and plans and images leading up to your decision, then how can you be responsible for your decision? It is an interesting argument, and it may well rob the free-will proponents of the best weapon they have: their introspection.
ReplyDeleteI would like to define the concept of free will as an agent's ability to transform the world. Free will is the influence an agent does exert on the world versus the influence that the world has on the agent. More precisely, an agent can make free decisions if its internal stability can withstand external influences to a greater extent than the external influences can withstand its influence.
ReplyDeleteThe degree to which an agent qualifies as free is dependent on the extent to which it satisfies the following criteria:
* Its goals and internal decision procedures are stable under environmental influences.
* It does exert goal-oriented, specific and orderly influence on the environment.
* The complexity of transformation by which it shapes the outside environment (in which it is embedded), does outplay the environmental influence on itself.
Free will is a middleman.
Consciousness between cause and effect.
The intelligent refinement of causation into an effective agent.
The sun at your back - your shadow in front.
You are the shadow player.
Nevertheless, to claim sovereignty is trying to get ahead of your own shadow.
You imprint reality with a pattern of volition. But not without its implicit consent.
You have free will if you experience, or possess, a greater extent of freedom proportional to the amount of influence and effectiveness of control you exert over the environment versus the environment over you.
Here is an example. Children and some mentally handicapped people are not responsible in the same way that healthy adults are responsible for their actions. They cannot give consent or enter into legally binding contracts. One of the reasons for this is that they lack control, are easily influenced by others. Healthy humans exert a higher control than children and handicapped people.
'Free' in what sense? Free of what? Free of prior causes of events within the brain? Entirely free (i.e. uncaused by other activity in the brain)? Or only in a localised sense that the most recent and localised causes of my action took place in the matter in my head.
DeleteSo our conscious mind is flighty, often or usually not in control (sometimes it is because we can use it to do complicated things, like write a book - or even raise an arm). Why the hang-up on the conscious mind when the whole mind is who we are? So what if a lot of what we do goes on is "under the hood?" We are our brain, the conscious as well as unconscious aspects. If we don't have free will someone else is writing the books and raising our arms and I can't imagine who that is.
ReplyDeleteAlexander Kruel
ReplyDeleteIf everyone can create their own definition of "free will"....how can we ever start talking rationally about whether or not "it" exists, whatever "it" is.
Free will exists in the sense that we can feel like making conscious choices about things in our life. So, as an experience that isn't concrete, and that only makes sense in the context of consciousness, it exists.
ReplyDeleteAt the same time, it's a fact that our choices (the outcome of volition) depend on previous states of our mind and experiences, which are influenced by external factors, like our upbringing. Psychology can make general predictions on the behaviour of human beings, and actual behaviour may vary due to infinite irrepeatable external factors that influence the mind at the very moment of "choice". We can never ever have the very same initial state to make an experiment that demonstrates directly the existence of determinism in the human mind (as the mind itself changes with time and experiences), but we can infer it indirectly.
Studies with twins is a source of indirect evidence. Here's the introduction of an article in Time Magazine, which unfortunately I don't have access to: "Like many identical twins reared apart, Jim Lewis and Jim Springer found they had been leading eerily similar lives. Separated four weeks after birth in 1940, the Jim twins grew up 45 miles apart in Ohio and were reunited in 1979. Eventually they discovered that both drove the same model blue Chevrolet, chain-smoked Salems, chewed their fingernails and owned dogs named Toy. Each had spent a good deal of time vacationing at the same three-block strip of beach in Florida. More important, when tested for such personality traits as flexibility, self-control and sociability, the twins responded almost exactly alike."
This means that even with the infinite external variations they were subject to, the "mind system" is robust enough to respond similarly given enough similar initial conditions (including the same genetic makeup). Similar enough to name their dogs the same, actually!
The only reason why the mind can't be predicted in the same fashion as planetary movement, is because of its complexity. Even if science can't currently (or ever) prove the inexistence of free will, the indirect evidence (Psychology's general pattern predictions, twin studies...) moves the needle of probability against it.
@Alexander Kruel The agent's capabilities and tendencies are formed by its upbringing and genetic makeup. Even psychological resilience can be explained in those terms, and it's heritability can be measured: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18251671
ReplyDeleteOh good, redefining stuff, much more interesting than a debate using words so loaded with meaning, the language of these arguments could be almost as effective without the verbs.
ReplyDeleteHats off to you, Alexander - keep redefining.
'Free Will': 'free'... something about having ability. 'will': something about wanting. Having the ability to want stuff. Do we have that ability? Yes, we do.
If you are a CNN/FOX/MSNBC news junkie, what a great day for philosophers and scientists today!
The TV screen on my elevator (similar to those in some public transportation) in which I get daily doses of media stars, guides to effective work habits and the like, had a bit about how Plato's idea of human's innate 'knowledge' of physics may have been proven by a study on babies announced this week. Plato! on the elevator! I had no opinion on what people know or don't know, but was so happy to see this guy's name up there.
And at the newsstand, the latest from Fermilab, Illinois, where someone is conducting a large experiment to try and buttress the claim that ours is a world of information, nothing more. Here I do have a view. Information - knocking down one 'rationalist' at a time! I have no idea what anyone means when they use the term rationality.
Just to be fair about definitions - let's go with 'information' as anything that to an observer, can be distinguished from another thing.
Also - re the blog's many comments, well this stuff is fascinating, even if 'free will' debates seem less productive than debates about reality, information and the like.
@DaveS
DeleteIn the case of 'free will'...redefining it is simply changing the debate. It's saying "I don't want to discuss whether there is free will or not. I want to discuss something altogether different. If it's altogether different, why call it 'free will'. It's like debating the existence of god and someone changes the definition of god to mean 'trees'. Well now,...there ARE trees. Does this say something about whether god exists or is simply a cultural creation?
@DJD - yes to changing the debate, but no to the negative implication there. It's not so much the complexity of the free will question, it is the volume of questions raised by the many concepts triggered by the words 'free will'. You end up asking yourself what does free mean, what does will mean, and unfortunately not often enough in Western philosophy, who are we talking about? who is this mythical singleton of a person with or without 'free will'? His existence is surely in question if there is no observer, and elements of her brain are not necessarily spatially located in her skull. They can be millions of miles away, courtesy PRE-20th century science, during which the 'field' gravity was found to work light-years on the 'matter' in question, and no finding in 20-century science gave comfort to those who thought otherwise.
DeleteRe trees vs gods, well when you talk, you make up the rules. But by saying there ARE trees you're in a bit of a fix because you and I might agree the trees but a pencil? made out of a tree? might so hate the origin of its birth that it disagrees the notion and deny the tree's existence. Some of us do the same thing with gods. Then there is concept of economic equilibrium, which both you, me and the pencil could safely assume has no clue as to what a tree is, and absolutely no reason to assume its existence.
When we open our hearts and minds to the idea that many many physicists are trying to impart on the unwashed intelligentsia, that all is information, we solve so many philosophical problems it is dizzying.
I agree w/Massimo in that there are career implications here for folks in academia with unorthodox ideas - they need to be careful or damn good at what they do. But espousing all is info because matter, energy, and fields are simply manifestations of something else? I've been doing this for 35 years, found out that professionals in the field and not just armchair babblers like me are pushing the idea with as much gusto as they are pushing the meaningless of objective reality, and do not think it will be long until this is accepted thought.
@buttheadrulesagain
ReplyDelete> The agent's capabilities and tendencies are formed by its upbringing and genetic makeup.
"A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants." — Arthur Schopenhauer
Free will does not and cannot be defined as the ability to make decisions without cause, random or unpredictable decisions. All those qualities, although partly present in complex systems, would contradict the notion of willful intent. What we want, and therefore do, must be based on reasonable ground. Random convulsions do not satisfy our notion of volition. It is defined as purposive striving and thus has to have a reason, it has to be a result of causal relationships.
I must admit however that my definition of free will does only work once you arbitrarily define a system, at a certain point in time, to be an entity within an environment, contrary to being the environment.
The universe really just exists. And it appears to us that it is unfolding because we are part of it. We appear to each other to be free and intelligent because we believe that we are not part of it.
Nevertheless, I think it might after all be a useful definition when it comes to science, psychology and law. It might also very well address our understanding of being free agents.
Don't get me wrong though, I believe that we can do without the notion of free will just fine. People still have to go to jail to protect society, to educate them and because a general policy of deterrence is useful. Responsibility is not necessary.
@DJD
> If everyone can create their own definition of "free will"....how can we ever start talking rationally about whether or not "it" exists, whatever "it" is.
We can talk rationally about the existence of various definitions. But since there is no agreed upon definition in the first place, we can't talk about if "free will" does or does not exist. All we know for sure is that the concept does exist.
Alex, I don't follow you. You wrote, "People still have to go to jail to protect society, to educate them and because a general policy of deterrence is useful. Responsibility is not necessary."
DeleteWithout the notion of FW/Responsibility, what is the point of trying to deter people by sending them to jail? Indeed, how can we even *help* ourselves sending them or not sending them to jail -- it is out of our control, as is the criminal out of control when he commits the crime.
If we are not conscious actors, why bother with anything? Just sit back and watch it unfold as if you were watching a movie and had no conscious input as to whether E.T. phones home or not. Why try to influence anything?
Can someone out there help me to understand the role of quantum theory in this debate?
DeleteIs not a deterministic universe one in which *any* system will behave in exactly one predictable way given a particular input? Assuming that I am not trying to prove free will, but only claiming that determinism is not proven, is it not sufficient to show that not *all* phenomena are deterministic? Are we agreed that if there is a single phenomena that cannot be determined in advance then the universe cannot be known to be deterministic?
If, according to Heisenberg, we do not know the position of an electron, and what is more, it is the very nature of our universe that we cannot know it and never will, then how can the position of an electron be said to be deterministic? Or, if we cannot know in advance if a particular photon will pass through slot "A" or slot "B" in the double slit experiment and never will be able to determine this information, then how can we assert that all phenomena are determined in advance?
Please note, that these are not things that are merely inconvenient to know -- things that *can* be determined given sensitive enough instruments, or enough time, or additional knowledge. Rather, they are things that we *know* we cannot know, in principle, by the very structure of the universe.
Doesn't non-predictability = non-deterministic? If so, then where is the controversy? There are clearly things in the universe that are non-predictable.
Tom, the point is that you don't want to become a victim of crime and that there are are measures to reduce the probability of it happening to you.
DeleteAt the end of the day it doesn't really matter if everything is determined (strong determinism), everything happens anyhow (many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics; spatial infinity), or if it is always ethically indifferent what you do (infinite ethics. What matters is that you would feel really bad, and stupid, for not trying :-)
> ...it is out of our control...
What is out of our control is not to care, not to be bothered, not to be affected.
You are going to shy away from fire and act in self-defense if someone tries to hurt you.
For the same reasons you are going to send people to jail.
Free will or responsibility isn't necessary. Just like evolution never had a choice in evolving humans and cannot be held responsible for the countless atrocities it caused.
Tom, just because something is computationally intractable doesn't mean it is not deterministic.
DeleteWhat really matters to you is not if someone is able to predict that you are going to drink water during the next few days, but that you are capable to do so. What matters is that nothing stops you to satisfy your thirst. What matters is that you are free to do what you want.
That you want to drink water in the first place is not a matter of choice. You don't even care about that. You solely care about being able to satisfy your needs and realize your goals. And I think that is the only reasonable, necessary and desired definition of free will that exists. To be free to realize what you want.
And that is also where predictability becomes an important aspect. If you are able to predict that you are unable to realize a certain goal, then you are not free to do. But most of the time we do not know if we will be able to realize our goals. We are unable to predict our success. That's why we have to try. Uncertainty allows us to feel capable.
Ask yourself, what is it that you want to be "free from"? You just want to be "free to". To be free to do what you want. You do not want to be free from the constraints of mathematics, physics and rationality. You want to be constrained by reason, sanity and rules. You don't want to be free in any sense that contradicts determinism. What you want is potentiality, enough room, enough resources to possible realize your goals.
@Alexander "We can talk rationally about the existence of various definitions. But since there is no agreed upon definition in the first place, we can't talk about if "free will" does or does not exist. All we know for sure is that the concept does exist. There is and has been for a very long time, an understanding that the discussion regarding 'free will' has centered on whether humans' actions, are events....events that are caused or determined by previous events. That our behavior is not uncaused....etc. You seem to have have suggested that by this definition....you doubt that there is 'free will'.
DeleteReply
@DJD "There is and has been for a very long time, an understanding that the discussion regarding 'free will' has centered on whether humans' actions, are events....events that are caused or determined by previous events."
DeleteWell, I haven't read up on the history of the debate. As I previously wrote, I think that the notion of willful intent has to be defined as purposive striving and that therefore our actions have to be determined by previous events, e.g. reasoning. It seems outright crazy to me to denote or associate something that was not caused with the word "will". Which is of course completely independent from the possibility of nondeterminism.
You could, I guess, introduce timeless physics at this point. If this universe was a giant simulation and that if it was to halt and then resume, after some indexical measure of causal steps used by those outside of it, then I wouldn't notice it. Therefore if you remove the notion of an outside world there ceases to be any measure of how many causal steps it took until I continued my relational measure of progression.
I don't expect the 2012 U.S. presidential elections to have happened but to happen next, where "to happen" and "to have happened" internally marks the sequential order of steps indexed by consecutive timestamps. But if all points in configuration space are timeless and my consciousness experience is not a causal continuum then...hell I don't know.
@Alex K.: Your wrote, "just because something is computationally intractable doesn't mean it is not deterministic."
DeleteAh! But the examples from QM that I've mentioned are much more than "intractable" -- they are *impossible* to determine, and we *know* they are impossible to determine. As, I've written previously, it's not as if the information can be determined when we get more exact measuring instruments, or gain more knowledge. The information is known to be *forever* beyond our reach. It is inherent in the structure of our universe. Don't look for a break-through to come tomorrow. We will *never* be able to
predict where an electron is, or which slot the photon passes through. So the claim that the universe is
deterministic is patently false.
It's as if someone made the claim that there is no number bigger than three.
What about four?
Well, number four is difficult to deal with, but we shall be able to explain the number four in the future.
Nonsense! Four is bigger than three and always will be. It is a counter-example that blows the theory to pieces. The same can be said for QM and determinism.
Yes, causal volition beats contra-causal free will!
ReplyDeletehttp://skepticicality.blogspot.com
@Alexander Kruel I think that the only sense in which people like Jerry Coyne say that there's no free will, is what you just said: "it has to be a result of causal relationships"; behaviour (choices and thoughts included) can, in principle, be explained by previous causes. That we can't predict someone's behaviour step by step, inch by inch, due to an unsurmountable amount of data (though finite), doesn't forbid us to infer determinism in the mind by indirect evidence, like what I mentioned before.
ReplyDeleteI agree that this fact doesn't mean that we should dismiss criminal behaviour. Punishment is useful to mantain order, and make people think twice before doing wrong stuff.
Massimo admits that free will can't be proved to exist, but being a 50%-50% agnostic about the matter isn't reasonable. For me it's like 80-20 in favor of determinism (made up number, I know).
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteI thank you for your responses.
The point of `the Device' was not `the conflation of predictability with free will'. I threw in the example of artificial humans who are self-unawaredly incapable of making certain decisions to illustrate this. Rather, I was addressing your claim that neurobiology could not resolve free will as counterfactually defined. As I said - and you agreed - counterfactual definitions can be analyzed by testing the underlying rationale. Both parts of your response to me address the same object.
I seem to have misinterpreted: you appear to be talking about the current state of the evidence, not any in-principle limitation of science to resolve (that particular definition of) free will. If that's the case, than there's no need to further discuss Dr. Pimpcane's research.
By now it seems solipsistic to ask, but I'm still interested in whether you have any comment on what a `reasonable' prior probability of free will would look like. You describe yourself as agnostic on the question, but I'm wondering *how* agnostic.
(For future reference, I'm not in any `et al' attached to Dr. Coyne. My reasons for rejecting free will have little to do with determinism/indeterminism.)
A note on the artificial humans:
ReplyDeleteNothing about this scenario resolves determinism/indeterminism, reductionism/emergentism, and all other such noises. One can slightly modify it so that predictability is also unimportant. My problems with free will are deeper than these notions.
The thesis that "free-will" doesn't exist comes from logic, not from empirical psychology or indeed any human science. Owing to Massimo's continued prevarications and suppression of comments, I repeat here the link to a purely logical exposition of the incoherence of the very notion of "free-will". If Strawson's argument is correct, it follows that the considerations entertained by Massimo are vacuous:
ReplyDeletehttp://www.naturalism.org/strawson.htm
Attlee,
ReplyDeleteI don't "prevaricate," I exercise my right to keep the discourse on this blog to a minimum of civility, a standard that you have often failed to meet. Hence the "suppression" of some of your comments.
Massimo
ReplyDeleteDo Strawson's views on free will and determinism....if true and generally accepted...pose a threat to Humanism? In what ways?
And I exercise my right to elevate the discourse to a maximum of intellectual rigor. So!, why not try rebutting the argument?
ReplyDeleteBravo Dr. Pigliucci! Please maintain high standards on this site. Spirited discussion, yes! Uncivil comments, no!
ReplyDeleteMassimo: As a former moderator, I feel obliged to admit that your tolerance for nonsense (and - how shall I put it? trolls? jerks?) is greater than mine was. As admirable as that trait can be (i.e. from a free-expression POV), I also trust your editorial judgment.
ReplyDeleteGreat posts lately, btw. I'm now slowly working my way through that SEP entry on emergent properties.
The point of my comparison to polymers is not to be insulting to humans (or other living beings), but a filled system is not completely passive. There is percolation of nanoparticles, which when activated with electrical impulses (or heat)and can behave in quit different and powerful ways. There are ways to store and release information. In other words materials can have algorithms applied to them, the way the brains can have stimulus. Both can store and retrieve memory. And both are materials. Philosophically I see no difference, it is only a matter of relative complexity.
ReplyDeleteI had a more eloquent response than this typed out, but somehow I accidentally deleted it. Oh well...
ReplyDeleteFirst of all, Attlee - Strawson's argument succumbs to many of the same attacks Dr. Pigliucci makes against Coyne. Even though Strawson purports to make his argument on purely logical grounds, and Coyne on empirical grounds, they're really not very different at all. Strawson gives a cursory nod to indeterminism but immediately concludes that it's a red herring. Pigliucci, who brought up two-stage models as a plausible explanation of free will, probably disagrees.
I think Strawson's argument is limited by his assumption that determinism and randomness exhaust the possibilities. He provides no justification for this assumption. His justification is presumably the "Mind Argument" of Peter van Inwagen. (Coyne implied the related "Consequence Argument" in his piece, which is strange given his distaste for philosophy.) If we were to rewind things and you did something differently, the difference has to be random, the argument goes - and that rules out moral responsibility, since we don't like to be "random agents". To me, that argument only holds if one can build a stable probability distribution of outcomes. Otherwise, the decisions aren't truly "random".
Even ignoring "souls" and the supernatural, it's not too hard to imagine alternate possibilities. Penrose and Hameroff have their ideas, although I find them pretty sketchy; Stuart Kauffman has his theory, too, although I also find that sketchy. Scott Aaronson, a well-respected computer scientist, has tossed into the ring an interesting reconception of the problem that doesn't rely on exotic physics. See http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/2011/09/19/free-will-and-quantum-clones-how-your-choices-today-affect-the-universe-at-its-origin/ and click "slides here".
Personally, I take a rather instrumentalist view of science. We should try to do useful things and make predictions rather than trying to access some kind of "ultimate reality", whatever that phrase means. I take it that nobody is going to access metaphysical truth anyway, let alone empirically - and that's really not what science is for. The nature of reality is relevant for free will, I think (meaning that I reject Strawson's argument that free will is logically incoherent), but I also don't think science can really tell us a whole lot about free will. It doesn't make sense to assign probabilities to the chance that we have free will, for the same reason we can't set odds on the reality of the external world. So basically, I think this discussion is valuable purely because it's interesting, not because it's going anywhere.
"I think Strawson's argument is limited by his assumption that determinism and randomness exhaust the possibilities. He provides no justification for this assumption"
DeleteThis begs the question as to what alternative premise you (or Massimo, or anyone) could offer. "Self-determination" won't do, because - as Strawson explains - to self-determine one's reasons requires an infinite regress of self-determined choices to have the reasons one has for choosing to have the reasons one has. Logically, self-determination is the sine qua non of "free-will" but it is an unfulfillable condition. We may therefore evaluate the cogency of Strawson's case against "free-will" irrespective of whichever theory of mind may be held.
To talk of "self-determination" as needing an infinite regress of self-determined choices is begging the question - if a "self-determined" decision really needed an infinite regress of "self-determined" choices, it wouldn't be "self-determined" at all!
DeleteI don't adhere to the Cartesian idea of souls, but it's a common argument that "Even if substance dualism is true, aren't souls still held to causal rules? Doesn't that rule out free will?" The whole point is that they aren't! A decision made by the "soul", if one believes in a free-willing soul, would be acausal, but also not random. (Not necessarily entirely acausal - obviously there are physical "inputs" into the decision - but the point is that it's not entirely caused. This brings up the mind/body interaction problem, but that's irrelevant for now.)
The same principle could be applied to materialistic proposals of free will. If you were to run Coyne's (really van Inwagen's) "rewinding experiment" and find that there were instances in which you simply could not build a stable probability distribution of the outcomes, you would have to conclude that the decisions are neither determined nor random, killing Strawson's dichotomy. Whether or not this implies free will is irrelevant, and whether or not materialistic accounts of free will are possible (or souls exist) is also irrelevant. Point is, Strawson builds a false dichotomy.
Two things I should clarify before you reply:
Delete1. When I say that Strawson's notion of self-determination is confused, that's because his notion of self-determination is, to me, a form of determinism. This should not be taken to argue that self-determination is incoherent because any such notion must really be deterministic. That's what Strawson's arguing. What I argue is that Strawson doesn't really show self-determination is incoherent; he just misuses the term "self-determination" in such a way that it implies determinism.
Talking about "souls" is easy, even if souls don't exist, so I'll go back to that. The argument that souls must be determined, because the people who have those souls have wants and desires that must be the result of determinism, is silly. Why? Because a free-willing soul could ignore all those wants and desires without being caused to do so. It could act in a manner incongruous to all its previous experience, or go along with its previous experience, and the decision between all these options is non-random. If this situation I just described is logically possible (even if not physically possible), then Strawson's argument that free will is incoherent falls apart. I believe it is logically possible for there to be non-determined, non-random events, and I think Scott Aaronson's presentation, which I cited above, provides an interesting materialistic foundation for that kind of discussion.
2. Any supposed conflict between the "acausality" or "insufficient causality" of certain decisions should not be taken to violate the supposed causal closure of the universe. Causality is a concept with many meanings; the meanings implied by my discussion are different from those used when talking about causal closure. To be perfectly honest, I can't entirely articulate what I mean, which just means I'm not a good philosopher. (I'm fine with that; it's not my job.) I can only hope others will understand what I mean without my having to be explicit. (In any case, causal closure is not as solid as often expected.)
The above stream of pontifications only serves to strengthen Strawson's argument. What could it possibly mean for an act to be neither determined nor random? If "free-will" is neither determined nor random, what is the mechanism wherewith "free-will" actually operates?
DeleteIn the absence of a logically coherent third alternative, the claim of false dichotomy reduces to a mere evasion.
DeleteI'm not convinced you actually read my comments.
DeleteAgain: For something to be either deterministic or random would imply that if you ran the "rewinding experiment" over and over (something we don't have the luxury of doing, but you get the point), then there would either be the same outcome every time (deterministic), or it would settle into a stable probability distribution (random). If neither of these happen (i.e. there is no *stable* probability distribution), the outcome is neither deterministic nor random, by definition. That's a logically coherent third alternative.
It doesn't matter to me how "free will" operates, or if it exists (although read Scott Aaronson's presentation that I linked to for such a suggestion); all that I'm arguing is that the concept is logically coherent. If that is the case, then Dr. Pigliucci's strong case that science can't really tell us much about it will relegate the idea that there is no free will to the same bin of metaphysical speculation as the idea that there is no external world.
Your reply bears out the cogency of Strawson's argument, for what is unpredictable is random by definition.
DeleteWhat is unpredictable is random by definition? That's obviously not true. Chaos is unpredictable but deterministic. We can also find predictable things that are indeterministic.
DeleteThe problem with Strawson's argument is his equation of "acausal" with "random". "Random" has a very specific mathematical meaning. I just gave you an example of a potential system that is neither random nor deterministic; you have not even tried to rebut that.
Your words cluster at the brink of unmeaning. Precisely what is the mechanism or procedure whereby indeterminate variables lacking probability distribution function can be distinguished from randomized outcomes?
DeleteThe fact that you talk about "variables" shows you're still thinking in terms of probability. The thing is, there is a very clear mathematical difference between randomness and the non-causality I suggest. In terms of computational complexity, randomness and determinism are both BPP; what I'm talking about is most of the rest of complexity classes.
DeleteBut when you ask for a practical mechanism to distinguish them, you turn your logic-based argument into an empirical one. The fact is that we don't have the privilege to go back in time and run trials over and over; that makes Jerry Coyne's claim metaphysical, not scientific. But if someone makes the counter-intuitive claim that we do not have free will of any sort, that person has the burden of proof, with respect to someone like me who takes an agnostic position.
However, for one practical suggestion for to distinguish them, look at Scott Aaronson's presentation above, which it seems you still have not read.
"Your words cluster at the brink of unmeaning." - You say this, but I get the feeling that it's only because you don't know how to provide an effective rebuttal. My argument is based on the mathematical definition of randomness; Strawson's is based on playing with words.
In any case, one would think a hard determinist like you, who doesn't believe in moral responsibility, would be a little more polite. :P
Playing fast and loose with the terminology is your (and Massimo's) stratagem of choice. First you asserted that indeterminate unpredictability is the mechanism of "free-will" -- without explaining how unpredictability is logically distinct from random chance. All you've done now is swap the concept of unpredictability for the expression "non-causality". Ironically, in so doing you commit yourself to the premises of the dichotomy in question -- if you think otherwise, you will need to explain how actions entirely devoid of causal conditions don't amount to sheer randomness.
DeleteOkay, let's break this down:
DeleteRandom = probability distribution
No probability distribution = NOT RANDOM
Got it?
Okay, good.
Now, if something is determined, it also has a probability distribution, just that one particular outcome has a probability of 1.
Therefore, if we cannot even talk in terms of probability for an event X occurring, it is neither determined nor random.
Also, unpredictability has nothing to do with randomness. There are unpredictable processes that are entirely deterministic. Using the word "unpredictable" is a real example of playing fast and loose with the terminology.
Good, so can you or can you not articulate the input that would allow us to discriminate distribution-free events from overtly randomized outcomes? What is the logical nature of this (putative) difference?
DeleteI will again repeat what I have already said:
DeleteUntil you find a way to rewind time, there is absolutely no way to perform the "rewinding experiment" Coyne, and others before him, have proposed. That's exactly why Dr. Pigliucci said this is a metaphysical question. There's no scientific way to test it and reach any degree of certainty, which is why claims that free will absolutely does not exist are silly.
The closest you can get, from a materialist perspective, is to extrapolate from laws of physics what would probably happen. I linked Scott Aaronson's presentation above for one physical way that there could be actions for which it's simply impossible to make a probability distribution. It seems you still refuse to read it.
Mathematically (and hence logically), there's a world of difference. If something is random, then it's a simple probabilistic fact that the more times you perform the "rewinding experiment", the closer the outcomes will converge to a certain probability distribution. If the outcomes do not converge, then it does not make sense to talk in terms of "randomness" or "probability" - nor is it determined.
It seems to me that you have no desire to engage my actual arguments, as shown by the fact that you have asked the same question several times, even after I answered it. If you refuse to actually read and think about my answers, I can't see any possible benefit of continuing to discuss this with you - in which case I'll leave.
If you rewound time, either the exact same thing would happen again, because it would be determined by the same exact antecedent conditions; or, something different would happen on account of random eventuation -- those are the only two logically possible outcomes and neither is consistent with "free will"; so, being unable to perform the experiment is irrelevant.
Delete"It seems to me that you have no desire to engage my actual arguments"
DeleteIt doesn't help that you haven't been able to specify in precise terms how a non-mechanistic component could enable decisions that are more than deterministic or random -- or whether the notion of such a component is even logically conceivable. E.g., what makes the decision happen? On your account the answer is - nothing. What are the inputs to the decision and why are they not the result of antecedent conditions? If they are not the result of antecedent conditions, how can they be said to have anything to do with me? and if the inputs have nothing to do with me, how does that allow for the postulation of "free-will"? What criterion is logically sufficient to distinguish distribution-free actions from random actions? Repeatedly intoning "neither random nor deterministic" doesn't explain the mechanism of indeterministic unpredictability that would not result in random output.
Shan surrenders -- care to give it a shot Massimo? I'll recast it: what are the inputs to the "non-random, non-deterministic" part of the decision? How are these inputs processed in such a way that is "neither random nor deterministic"? how might one make a decision using inputs that are not strictly a result of antecedent conditions but not random? is such a "decision" even logically conceivable?
Delete"If you rewound time, either the exact same thing would happen again, because it would be determined by the same exact antecedent conditions; or, something different would happen on account of random eventuation -- those are the only two logically possible outcomes and neither is consistent with "free will"; so, being unable to perform the experiment is irrelevant."
DeleteBut here's the thing: To say that having a different outcome would make it "random" is denying the whole point of free will. The whole point is that you can choose differently, and that doesn't make it random.
What Attlee evidently fails to understand is that "random" is a mathematical term.
"It doesn't help that you haven't been able to specify in precise terms how a non-mechanistic component could enable decisions that are more than deterministic or random -- or whether the notion of such a component is even logically conceivable."
I don't have to hand you a physical explanation on a platter to prove the idea is logically coherent. I already gave you a specific mathematical description of what such a thing would look like, which you seem unable to process. But if you want a physical possibility, I already directed you multiple times to Scott Aaronson's presentation, and you refused to read it. Maybe you're scared of being proven wrong? Even the famous Conway-Kochen free will theorem makes a clear distinction between randomness and the kind of behavior being described, which is neither random not determined.
"What criterion is logically sufficient to distinguish distribution-free actions from random actions?"
Again: One is governed by a probability distribution. One isn't. Do I need to repeat that again?
"I don't have to hand you a physical explanation on a platter to prove the idea is logically coherent"
DeleteWhat are the inputs to the "non-random, non-deterministic" part of the decision? How are these inputs processed in such a way that is "neither random nor deterministic"? how might one make a decision using inputs that are not strictly a result of antecedent conditions but not random?
"One is governed by a probability distribution. One isn't. Do I need to repeat that again?"
Mathematically, if the input is not governed by a probability distribution - i.e. if no probability distribution can describe the possible outcomes - then all conceivable outcomes are equiprobable. What then is "non-random" about an equiprobable event? i.e., how do outcomes that are not known and for which no probability distribution can be assigned differ from the output of a random generator?
Perhaps it's a mistake to assume the Laplace principle of insufficient reason -- evidently there is some contestation as to whether equipossibility implies equiprobability. Logically, we are concerned with a set of equal possibilities. Possibly it's more mathematically correct to say that if no probability distribution is available, we simply do not know the likelihood that an event may take place at all. Whichever the case, my question -- "how do outcomes that are not known and for which no probability distribution can be assigned differ from the output of a random generator?" -- still stands.
Delete"What are the inputs to the "non-random, non-deterministic" part of the decision? How are these inputs processed in such a way that is "neither random nor deterministic"? how might one make a decision using inputs that are not strictly a result of antecedent conditions but not random?"
DeleteThat's not a question that's possible to answer until we actually identify a particular mechanism we find plausible. The problem is that Strawson's argument tempts libertarians into the trap of believing that they must commit either to some kind of impossible causal vacuum, or to say that the decision is made by the agent's desires and beliefs - which is really determinism in disguise. But I find Strawson's argument with respect to the impossibility of self-determination to be more of a language game than anything else - in particular, because he never describes what the self-determination he supposedly refutes would entail!
It is difficult to counter an argument that X is impossible if the argument doesn't even say what X is.
I realize that this is not an entirely satisfying explanation - in particular, that I still leave unanswered what seems to be a fundamental question. I reject the question "What causes a freely willed decision?" as meaningless, but this leaves open the questions "How can we then suppose that the agent is responsible for the decision? Isn't the agent just the confluence of all the causal forces that have operated on him, that determine his desires? And if an agent doesn't act in accordance with any of his desires, how is he free?" I leave this for someone smarter than me, since I'm not a philosopher and I had no ambition of trying to answer this question. (I have seen some proposed "solutions" but I'm ambivalent about them.) The only role I hoped to play in this discussion was to demonstrate the possibility of non-determined, non-random events, which leaves a hole in Strawson's argument.
In any case, Strawson argues that self-determination would require an infinite regress of self-determined actions. Yet if time is continuous, this is theoretically possible in a finite amount of time! We could imagine a standardized time frame from 0 to 1, such that the final decision was made at time 1, and all decisions made at time 1/n are caused by a decision at time 1/(2n). Of course, this is counter-intuitive, but that's not my concern anyway. :P
One more note: One reason I've sometimes been vague in our discussions is that it's hard to talk about libertarian free will in a way that's inclusive of all opinions on the topic. For example, I could try to frame the question as, "Is it possible to make decisions that are not wholly caused by the sum of all the prior influences (environmental or genetic) on oneself?" But some would disagree with this way of framing the question. Theologians might have us believe that it's a matter of picking good vs. evil in some kind of causal vacuum, but I don't accept that characterization.
DeleteThere are those, like the philosopher of science Carl Hoefer, who even believe that some kind of libertarian free will is possible even under determinism. I'll admit I couldn't understand his paper, but Dr. Pigliucci evidently thought it was interesting.
Basically, what I'm saying is that there's a lot of baggage tied into our conception of what free will would entail. In particular, we have to get around linguistic notions of "cause", which some have suggested is a mostly useless notion anyway. Not being a philosopher, I don't know how to overcome these complexities of language - so even if I had a crystal-clear image in my mind of what libertarian free will was, I wouldn't be able to express it to you!
I can understand if you think this is some kind of cheap excuse to weasel out of this argument, but what I'm saying is basically that this debate won't be resolved until we can resolve the language issue of what we mean by terms like "causality", "time", "self-determination", etc. And maybe by then, the problem will have "gone away". (I've read a paper which argued that the whole "free will" issue is a Wittgensteinian non-problem which admits no resolution.)
By the way, I noticed you were defending Plantinga's EAAN elsewhere. What do you think of the analogue against determinism - namely, that if our cognitive faculties are entirely determined, then we have no reason to trust their accuracy?
"That's not a question that's possible to answer until we actually identify a particular mechanism we find plausible."
DeleteLogically there can be no mechanism.
"But I find Strawson's argument with respect to the impossibility of self-determination to be more of a language game than anything else - in particular, because he never describes what the self-determination he supposedly refutes would entail!"
As repeatedly stressed, it's the completion of an interminable regress of decisions to have the desires (or motives or reasons or intentions or preferences) one has.
"The only role I hoped to play in this discussion was to demonstrate the possibility of non-determined, non-random events . . ."
The only alternative to a determined or random event is a self-determined event. But self-determination is a mindless absurdity, so there is no way to demonstrate the possibility of non-determined, non-random events.
It's impossible to give an independent vindication of the claim that our cognitive faculties are trustworthy.
DeleteMeaning, there are no non-arbitrary grounds by which to choose between - on the one hand - a logically coherent theology which enshrines the Great Pumpkin as the creator of the universe and - on the other hand - evolutionary naturalism.
DeleteContrary to Plantinga, properly basic refers to beliefs that are groundless.
Delete"The only alternative to a determined or random event is a self-determined event. But self-determination is a mindless absurdity, so there is no way to demonstrate the possibility of non-determined, non-random events."
DeleteI just gave you a few theoretical (and non-absurd) examples of events that are neither random nor determined. But by what you say, they must then be self-determined.
And again, I will repeat: If the results of the rewinding experiment do not converge to a certain probability distribution, the event is not random. Surely you are familiar with the mathematical notion of convergence?
"As repeatedly stressed, it's the completion of an interminable regress of decisions to have the desires (or motives or reasons or intentions or preferences) one has."
That's a terrible definition, one that Strawson simply pulls out of the air to further the notion that such a thing must be impossible. I've given both examples where self-determining acts would not require infinite regress, and arguments that such infinite regress is not logically impossible.
"Logically there can be no mechanism."
I have already poked out holes in Strawson's argument. If you want to establish this, you will need to patch it up.
That is, unless you want to be like the Mysterians of free will, like Colin McGinn and Thomas Nagel, who say free will exists but can never be explained, at least not by us.
"It's impossible to give an independent vindication of the claim that our cognitive faculties are trustworthy."
So are there non-arbitrary grounds to trust arguments for either free will or determinism over the other, then?
"I just gave you a few theoretical (and non-absurd) examples of events that are neither random nor determined. But by what you say, they must then be self-determined"
DeleteA self-determined event is not an example of a "non-random, non-determined" event -- it's an example of a logically impossible proposition - cf. "square-triangles exist".
"And again, I will repeat"
And again, I will ask: how do outcomes that are not known and for which no probability distribution can be established differ from the output of a random generator? Forget about convergence - what is the INPUT to the decision? Until you can answer this question for yourself in a logical fashion, you needn't bother replying.
"I've given both examples where self-determining acts would not require infinite regress, and arguments that such infinite regress is not logically impossible"
Your "examples" are utterly fallacious - as attested by your own admission that we can't "actually identify a particular mechanism". Indeed, without a mechanism there is no such thing as an example.
"So are there non-arbitrary grounds to trust arguments for either free will or determinism over the other, then?"
DeleteLet me put it this way - no.
"Your "examples" are utterly fallacious - as attested by your own admission that we can't "actually identify a particular mechanism". Indeed, without a mechanism there is no such thing as an example."
DeleteWell, I gave you examples of non-random, non-deterministic events. That they are neither random nor deterministic is indisputable - they represent a sort of ontological (not epistemic) Knightian uncertainty. You did not show me how the examples I provided (e.g. from Scott Aaronson's presentation) were fallacious - instead, you said they were by definition, which I didn't find convincing.
You were the one who said that a non-random, non-deterministic event had to be self-determined. I made no claims either way about that. But since non-random, non-deterministic events are a logical possibility - as I demonstrated - then by your statement, self-determined events are a logical possibility. But you would not permit this for reasons that are still not clear to me.
Here's how this discussion has gone so far, from my perspective.
You: Tables can't exist, but if they were possible, they would be green.
Me: Here's a table. By what you just said, it must be green.
You: That can't be a table, because tables don't exist.
"Let me put it this way - no."
Then I guess this discussion is over, if, as you say, there's no non-arbitrary reason to favor either one.
So I'm out. Good night.
"Well, I gave you examples of non-random, non-deterministic events"
DeleteNo, you gave me an example of a self-contradictory concept.
"That they are neither random nor deterministic is indisputable"
Save it for the Society for Philosophy of Agency.
"they represent a sort of ontological (not epistemic) Knightian uncertainty"
Ah, so you plead ignorance, eh?
"You did not show me how the examples I provided (e.g. from Scott Aaronson's presentation) were fallacious - instead, you said they were by definition, which I didn't find convincing"
They're fallacious by definition because your definition of "non-random, non-determined" is self-contradictory. I submit that this is clear to you, and that you are merely prevaricating in the interest of not conceding defeat.
"You were the one who said that a non-random, non-deterministic event had to be self-determined"
No, I said that was the premise implicit in your rejection of the dichotomy.
"then by your statement, self-determined events are a logical possibility"
No.
"But you would not permit this for reasons that are still not clear to me"
A likely story.
"But since non-random, non-deterministic events are a logical possibility - as I demonstrated"
So far the only meaning given to the expression "non-random, non-deterministic" is that no probability distribution can be attached to the expectation of an outcome. It follows then, that if "non-random, non-deterministic" were a logically possible proposition, we would be able to compute the difference between distribution-free events and the outcomes of, say, a random generator. Being able to furnish the input is what enables us to compute the difference. This you have failed to do.
Pleading uncertainty undermines your pretensions to having "demonstrated" anything other than the cogency of Strawson's argument.
DeleteDJD,
ReplyDelete> Do Strawson's views on free will and determinism....if true and generally accepted...pose a threat to Humanism? In what ways? <
Well, they are not generally accepted, and I don't think he is right. However, yes, any talk of free will and consciousness being illusions is a threat to humanism, since among humanist's cardinal principles are that we are responsible for our actions and that we can use reason as a guide to life.
As a long-time Jamesian pragmatist/pluralist, I've greatly enjoyed this discussion. Would you agree that much of this restates points William James made 125 years ago in "The Dilemma of Determinism"?
DeleteEarly in that essay, for example, James wrote: "The principle of causality, for example, -- what is it but a postulate, an empty name covering simply a demand that the sequence of events shall one day manifest a deeper kind of belonging of one thing with another than the mere arbitrary juxtaposition which now phenomenally appears? It is as much an altar to an unknown god as the one that Saint Paul found at Athens."
Well, then, per the ways in which I've previously chastised Joseph Hoffmann, humanism, whether explicitly secular or not, without embracing scientism, needs to embrace scientific advances.
DeleteThat said, me add a book with some great thoughts on this issue, that influenced me long ago, from the philosophical side, not the psychological or neuroscience one.
It's Walter Kaufmann's "Without Guilt and Justice." It blows much of this free-willer side's focus on guilt/responsibility out of the water. NOT in a deterministic sense, but in other ways. In his own fashion, Kaufmann says "mu" to these issues too.
Massimo, I'm honored to be cited by you. And, I agree that "volition" may be a less "loaded" term. I definitely agree that issues of "emergent properties" will be an important part of this discussion.
ReplyDeleteThat said, I disagree with the idea that if one takes my line (and that of Daniel Wegner and others) and rejects a "Cartesian free willer" (or "Cartesian volitioner" if you will) that one must go down the road of dualism.
Again, the problem in this discussion too often is that it is presented as "free will" (or "volition") VERSUS "determinism."
And again, to that "versus," having first seen the word in "Goedel, Escher, Bach," I say "MU." http://socraticgadfly.blogspot.com/2012/01/mu-to-free-will.html
Let's stop, stop, stop with the "versus."
Volition and determinism are NOT two polarities. They're two ends of a continuum, and human actions usually fall somewhere in the middle of this continuum.
Whether at the big picture level, or, that of individual actions, it's not free will VERSUS determinism at all. They are not two polarities with nothing in between.
Instead, we're usually acting on a mix of more conscious choice and more constrained subconscious drives, with the breaking point, whether 75 percent free will/25 percent determinism, 40 percent free will/60 percent determinism,
varying from situation to situation for a person AND varying from person to person in the same situation, too!
Really, it's time to reframe this whole issue for our current era. And, in looking at both ends of the continuum, it's time to be more charitable to the different types of determinism that are out there.
For example, I reject, overall, an update idea of Democritus' atomistic determinism. But, per the examples I cited above about human nature, I have plenty of sympathy for a "softer" psychological determinism.
Your approach to free will reminds me of physicist Sean Carroll's approach to the matter. He declares himself a compatibilist, but says that free will is coherent in the same way baseball is coherent - both come from structures made of particles subject to causal laws, but neither is a concept coherent at the level of those particles. They only make sense at higher levels. So if hard determinists accept baseball as real, why don't they accept free will as real?
DeleteI disagree with Carroll in that I think libertarian free will is logically coherent (even if not real). But I think he has a good idea. It's probably been said before him, too.
You talk about acting out of a mix of conscious choices and subconscious desires. Just out of curiosity, what exactly do you mean when you assign percentages to these? Do you include things like keeping one's heart beating? I wouldn't want to "freely will" that anyway, or it would take up all my attention. Also, what do you mean by determinism in the context of this argument? It seems like you're referring more to unconscious decisions than uncaused decisions.
I also think opening discussion to different kinds of determinism is good. If truly emergent properties (that cannot be reduced to the parts and their interactions) do exist, higher levels of determinism, if they exist, may become very relevant.
On the percentages, I mean that on any human action of a sufficient complexity, without trying to be too precise, we might call it X percent volition and Y percent determinism. And, due to individuals' different psychological make-ups, the X and Y percentages for two different people in the same situation will vary.
DeleteAnd, no, I'm not referring to unconscious vs. uncaused decisions. Per Dennett (and many another disciple of Gilbert Ryle), if consciousness arises from a percolation of various subselves, we're always going to be more conscious at times, less conscious at others. Those various subselves, to get back to your idea of "levels," may have some subconscious equivalent of free will, but ... since there's not a unitary conscious self, there's no unitary free willer. (Although Dennett himself refuses to draw that logical conclusion.)
No, I don't include things like heartbeat. Per your reference to "levels," some things are so below the level of consciousness that I say "mu-squared" to discussing them in terms of free will vs. determinism.
I have to admit, I'm still not clear on what you mean by "free will." It seems like you're articulating a compatibilist viewpoint, but if you were, you would say X percent volition and 100% determinism. The fact that volition seems to be, for you, separate from determinism would indicate that it's indeterministic. But later in the post, you seem to go back to the compatibilist view.
DeleteWould you mind clarifying?
As far as I can see right now,there exist a hole bunch of human cultures in this planet. Some of those distinct cultures had developed in very similar environmental conditions, and some of the similar cultures had developed in very distinct environmental conditions. So, environmental conditions don't determine the kind of culture that will emerge in human societies that habit them (although they sure play some role).
ReplyDeleteFrom this, we can conclude that (at least) some of the main differences between human cultures are produced by the free action of their human members. Then, if a being is able to act freely, it is pretty probable that it is able to think freely, and if a being is able to think freely (for at least some brief period of time) then volition does occurs.
Ergo volition exist.
Kant (or maybe Collingwood when talking about Kant) once gave the following example:
When some people decide to marry, they are freely deciding this (lets ignore the cases in which one marry without free choosing it). In this case, the couple decided freely to joint in marring, but for the ayes of an exterior observer, they may be acting as is expected to do in their society; for him, this couple will not be marrying because of a free choose, but because of a cultural imposition. And the retractos of volition may argue that this is a clear example of why free will doesn't exist. Well, in that case, I ( as a defender of Volition) will be force to ask the following question: So, if Volition doesn't exist, where the hell did that particular culture got the "idea" of marriage from?
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteI am simply pointing out that, contra popular (in some quarters) opinion, there are options out there. (Interestingly, very few readers took me up on another possibility: that of truly emergent properties, which is yet another question that at the moment — and perhaps permanently — cannot be resolved by science. We know that there are emergent properties, but we don’t know if they appear to be so because of our epistemic limitations or because they truly do represent novel behaviors of matter when certain complexity and organizational conditions are met.)
I quite agree that emergent properties are a strong contender in providing a useful handle on these questions of free will and consciousness in general. Although not a particularly tractable concept – at least to me, there appear to be some fairly solid examples of them that, I find anyway, can be a useful entry point. For example, Lee Smolin in his The Trouble with Physics – which I think you commented on or recommended at one time – argued that the phenomenon of phonons qualified as an emergent property that is not at all reducible to its component parts – at least from what I’ve been able to comprehend.
The indicated article [in Wikipedia] has a nice illustration by which a group of particles in a structure can vibrate at the same frequency, though at different phases, such that, if I understand the process at least somewhat correctly, the composite has, as a consequence of that process, unique particle-like properties which can be described by “the wave–particle duality of quantum mechanics” – although I’m not sure what the consequences of that might be.
But how one might get from that to the apparently required – if free will is to be viable and workable concept – autonomous causal agent is decidedly moot, but not beyond the range of some speculation, at least somewhat anchored in reality. For example, you probably know that Cantor’s diagonalization method was used heavily – I think – in some of Alan Turing’s research on the limits of algorithmic calculations. But it was essentially used as a way, given a set of numbers – generally infinite from I can see which seems somewhat problematic to my limited understanding, to generate another number that was entirely different from any of the given set. Which seems to be essentially what takes place in the coalescing of multiple particles in phase into a larger one: the whole is quite a bit more than simply the sum of the parts as a result of a particular set of interactions.
So, by that token one might argue that each of us, as conscious entities, are composed of many elements, each of which is a consequence, even a strictly deterministic one, of a great many external factors, yet because of the binding of all of those into a cohesive whole – through the magic of consciousness, which happens here at step two – we are strictly acausal and autonomous agents – at least to some limited degree of freedom which is suggested by the article; really sort of local maxima in the fitness landscape – and possess free will – again within some defined limits and which are sensitive to perturbations of various sorts – as a consequence of which we can initiate sequences of external events that are not at all the algorithmically determinable results of the elements we are composed of.
But another equally moot point, and probably the most problematic one, is the question of just what interrelations of those components manifests the phenomenon of consciousness, what is the keystone that holds that overarching phenomenon in place. But emergence certainly seems to provide a useful avenue to approach it.
I have to take issue with the ever so slight change in verbiage from free will to volition, accompanied by the assertion, on the one hand, that it is proper to do so as they are essentially the same, and yet, on the other hand, making the change precisely because of the metaphysical implications in the use of the "free will".
ReplyDeleteThe interesting thing is that by realizing that some do conflate the two, one also realizes where the difference of opinion my lie.
If one takes volition to mean the ability to recognize that different outcomes are available depending on the choice one makes, than obviously volition is present.....not free will.
I think the point missed again here, as in all your posts on this, is that even emergent phenomena is evidenced to be circumvented by non-consciously based cognitive and behavioral biases. It's the same with quantum indeterminacy in 2 stage systems. If either of these were truly effective in the way you seem to hope, there would be no predisposition like the kind we see (e.g. right sided bias). Even if emergent phenomena or stochastic factors derail the train, they will merely push it off onto *another track going in the same direction*- in fact, it might even be a track that *more readily satisfies the bias than the original track*, further entrenching the agent.
ReplyDeleteTo try to frame our non-conscious selves as 'willers' from there would be disingenuous, unless (as I said before), you're OK with ascribing guilt to sleepwalkers. Ubiquity doesn't solve the identity problem either ('it's called human behavior'); there is still more or less physiological influence on our choices.
Perhaps I missed it, but no one has brought up Abigail Marsh's work showing genetic predisposition for utilitarian evaluation and Greg Berns' work identifying different areas of the brain for utilitarian evaluations and 'sacred values.' When one part of the brain is stronger than the other (or a genetic propensity is higher for longer or shorter alleles of that seratonin transporter), does this create a propensity for that type of moral evaluation? There's no guarantee for a fair game here. At some point, even meaningful freedom fails to be the kind of equalizer we seek to justify the cosmos.
Consider the AI analogy. Let's say a chess robot is somehow given a limited amount of self-awareness. It recognizes that it 'desires' to follow certain heuristics, yet doesn't realize that it has prime directives to which it is acting in accord(because its awareness is limited, just as ours is, because too much awareness is/was evolutionarily too taxing).
ReplyDeleteNow, let's say that the robot is given some randomized software as well that it (in the case of humans, has evolved to) switch on when it's advantageous to be 'creative' (this is not always the case, as V.S. Ramachandran notes, you don't want your surgeon getting unnecessarily creative). Does this make the robot (or human) free, as two stage advocates want? No, it's merely a temporary instance of the so called 'standard problem of indeterminacy,' then it goes back to its directives again. Even if this is switching back and forth between the directive program and the random program very very rapidly and constantly and there are more options for choices, we are still not free, because we are back to the directive software again. Ultimately, we are merely aware to a limited degree. It really is just an epistemic issue.
NOW, human behavior... do determinists merely confuse the causation/correlation? I think this is just the compatibilist's narrowing of their focus to belie certain constraints. Consider a healthy person v. a paralyzed person- are they equally free? Why should fundamental mental constraints be any different (e.g. the freedom to choose how they evaluate paradigmatically)- aren't certain defining mental features contingent upon physical/physiological ones? You don't think this is scientific evidence that has anything to do with free will? Freedom is autonomy and we are only as autonomous as our awareness dictates.
I can understand why compatibilists won't surrender to the notion that we experience the cosmos like ghosts of ghosts- ephemeral sparks riding in these needy bodies like roller-coasters until we disappear forever. It's never been evolutionarily adaptable to feel too out of control. As Thomas Metzinger and others said, we have evolved just the right amount of awareness for adaptability, and now we are compelled to see beyond it, but EVEN FOR THAT we have an (intuitive) directive not to do so- to frame it as 'freedom' in a strange confabulatory way. Is this pragmatic illusionism the favorable way to go, considering the studies about determinism aversion? Maybe, but I think we've also evolved to push the envelope on the back burner (to combine metaphors) and eventually everyone will get to try a cup of that tea as the science gets better and better.
How about this: A volition (¿or volitive?) process is one that generates it own rules.
ReplyDeleteIn that sense we may be able to found patterns in freely chosen things, but only because they follow their own created rules.
I insist that volition may be easier to understand in a cultural scale.
@JorgeLaris The way I see it, once you are compelled to act, you are at the whim of causal forces and everything is ad hoc.
ReplyDeleteBut what exactly compels you to act and where does it came from?
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