tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post1852869053541460305..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: The problem with suspiciously formed desiresUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger32125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-73618885757182694952013-10-24T14:40:12.169-04:002013-10-24T14:40:12.169-04:00@ Gadfly
> Well, per Wikipedia (among others) ...@ Gadfly<br /><br />> Well, per Wikipedia (among others) you're wrong about emergentism. <<br /><br />I'm right (not wrong) about emergentism. <i>All varieties of emergentism</i> <b>MIGHT</b> <i>strive to be compatible with physicalism</i>, but some varieties of emergentism - namely, <i>strong</i> emeregence - are <b>NOT</b> actually compatible with physicalism, <br /><br />To basically reiterate one of my previous posts: Emergentism (strong) is NOT compatible with reductionism. The Wiki citation below substantiates this claim. (Weak emergentism is compatible with reductionism; strong emergence is not. But strong emergence (not weak emergence) is the variety of emergence that is employed in the philosophy of mind in order to account for consciousness and/or free will.) <br /><br />"<i>The <b>antithesis of reductionism</b>, <b>emergentism</b> is the idea that increasingly complex structures in the world give rise to the "emergence" of new properties that are something over and above (i.e. can<b>NOT</b> be <b>reduced</b> to) their more basic constituents</i>." (source: Wikipedia: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism" rel="nofollow">Property dualism</a>)<br /><br />Emergence (strong) is the basis for property dualism, (I have already substantiated this.) Moreover, property dualism is also known as a form of "non-reductive physicalism." The Wiki citation below substantiates this claim. (We have already established that strong emergence is NOT compatible with reductionism.)<br /> <br />"<i>Non-reductive physicalism is the predominant contemporary form of property dualism according to which mental properties are mapped to neurobiological properties, but are not reducible to them. Non-reductive physicalism asserts that mind is not ontologically reducible to matter, in that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between the properties of mind and matter. It asserts that while mental states are physical in that they are caused by physical states, they are not ontologically reducible to physical states</i>." (source: Wikipedia: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism" rel="nofollow">Property dualism</a>)<br /><br />In a previous post, I asked you the following question: "<i>What form of dualism does not ultimately imply ontological dualism?</i>"<br /><br />It should be abundantly clear to you now that property dualism is a form of dualism that does indeed imply ontological dualism. And to reiterate an argument that I made in a previous post (an argument that still stands): "<i>If consciousness does not reduce to the physical, then it is not physical</i>." IOW, "non-reductive physicalism" is an oxymoron because it is inherently contradictory.<br /><br />> So, it appears you're wrong on one of the major premises of your argument. No wonder Massimo simply abandons threads with you after a while. <<br /><br />As you have now learned, all the premises to my argument are sound. The reason Massimo evades my arguments is the same reason why he is evading (and has evaded) this one; he knows that he can't refute it. He knows that, I know that, you know that, and anyone else here with a modicum of intellectual honesty knows that.<br /><br />> Related to that, if you see something in that link that supports the idea that Massimo supports substance dualism, or even openly supports property dualism, you're seeing something I don't. <<br /><br />This is where your reading comprehension skills leave something very much to be desired. To reiterate for the last time: I stated in a previous post that he "ENTERTAINS positions that smack of dualism." (Do you know what the term "entertains" means in this context?) Of course, he doesn't openly embrace emergentism (or the two stage model). He doesn't openly embrace any position on free will. But this only supports my earlier point: Massimo is ambiguous on the subject of free will. He's ambiguous because he cannot defend any version of free will that is compatible with physicalism (or materialism).Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-44394596265735622832013-10-24T10:08:11.950-04:002013-10-24T10:08:11.950-04:00Well, per Wikipedia (among others) you're wron...Well, per Wikipedia (among others) you're wrong about emergentism. I quote:<br /><br />" **All varieties** of emergentism strive to be compatible with physicalism, the theory that the universe is composed exclusively of physical entities, and in particular with the evidence relating changes in the brain with changes in mental functioning."<br /><br />https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergentism<br /><br />Now, Wiki does note that some varieties of emergentism may allow for property dualism, which it distinguishes from substance dualism.<br /><br />The Stanford Encyclopedia has broadly the same stance.<br /><br />http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/<br /><br />So, it appears you're wrong on one of the major premises of your argument. No wonder Massimo simply abandons threads with you after a while.<br /><br />Related to that, if you see something in that link that supports the idea that Massimo supports substance dualism, or even openly supports property dualism, you're seeing something I don't.<br /><br />That said, he mischaracterizes my belief. I don't believe in substance, or property, dualism, at least not a strong form of the latter.<br /><br />And, so, even more than what I said before, I'll pull a Massimo myself and not bother further. If you're going to misread him that much, and the other things I mentioned above ...<br /><br />Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-22828876741569678842013-10-23T15:59:17.337-04:002013-10-23T15:59:17.337-04:00@ Gadfly
> First, I don't think Massimo is...@ Gadfly<br /><br />> First, I don't think Massimo is a strong emergentist. My fault for not picking up on your distinction. My second fault for not pointing out that, again ... you're wrong! <<br /><br />You're reading comprehension skills leave something to be desired. I stated previously: <i>Massimo denies that he is a dualist, yet he seems to entertain positions that smack of dualism - e.g. the "two stage model of free will" and "emergentism."</i> Where does he <b>ENTERTAIN</b> these positions? In his blog post entitled "<a href="http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com/2012/01/on-free-will-response-to-readers.html" rel="nofollow">On free will, response to readers</a>"<br /><br />Strong emergentism (not weak emergentism) is the type of emergentism that is invoked in regards to consciousness and free will. (We're talking about free will here. Duh! So, I'm right and you're wrong.)<br /><br />> Should be rendered as:<br /><br />But the bottom line here is that (I beleive) my supported claims trump your unsupported denials. <<br /><br />I have yet to see you put forth anything that remotely resembles a counterargument. And until you do, there's really nothing for me to respond to.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-10152090419833633742013-10-23T14:21:15.748-04:002013-10-23T14:21:15.748-04:00First, I don't think Massimo is a strong emerg...First, I don't think Massimo is a strong emergentist. My fault for not picking up on your distinction. My second fault for not pointing out that, again ... you're wrong!<br /><br />Speaking of:<br /><br />>>But the bottom line here is that my supported claims trump your unsupported denials. <<<br /><br />Should be rendered as:<br /><br />But the bottom line here is that (I beleive) my supported claims trump your unsupported denials. Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-5766345073551724922013-10-22T16:24:25.296-04:002013-10-22T16:24:25.296-04:00@ Gadfly
I previously stated that "strong&qu...@ Gadfly<br /><br />I previously stated that "strong" <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence#Strong_and_weak_emergence" rel="nofollow">emergence</a> was the opposite of reductionism. (There is a difference between <i>weak</i> and <i>strong</i> emergence. Strong emergence is the variant that is generally invoked in the philosophy of mind.)<br /><br />"Usage of the notion "emergence" may generally be subdivided into two perspectives, that of "<b>weak emergence</b>" and "<b>strong emergence</b>". Weak emergence is a type of emergence in which the emergent property is <b>reducible</b> to its individual constituents. This is opposed to strong emergence, in which the emergent property is <b>irreducible</b> to its individual constituents." (emphasis mine) (source: Wikipedia: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence#Strong_and_weak_emergence" rel="nofollow">Emergence</a>)<br /><br />> And, no, the moral implications aren't the same. That, too, is based on that out-of-date thinking. <<br /><br />The moral implications are the same, regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. If determinism holds true, then every choice I make was ultimately predetermined and could not have been otherwise. If indeterminism holds true, then every choice I make ultimately reduces to some element of pure chance. I cannot be held anymore responsible (or any less responsible) for a choice or act that is ultimately the result of pure chance than I can for a choice or act that is ultimately predetermined by powers and forces external to "me." <br /><br />> And, with that, I'm (probably) done commenting on this thread. <<br /><br />Suit yourself. But the bottom line here is that my supported claims trump your unsupported denials. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-42205093205195309942013-10-22T10:54:36.323-04:002013-10-22T10:54:36.323-04:00Emergentism is not the opposite of reductionism. Y...Emergentism is not the opposite of reductionism. You, like Massimo, are thinking in terms of non-existent polarities.<br /><br />And, no, the moral implications aren't the same. That, too, is based on that out-of-date thinking.<br /><br />And, with that, I'm (probably) done commenting on this thread.<br /><br />Whether it's classical free willer Massimo, you from whatever the ultimate point of view, or classical determinist Jerry Coyne with his Gnu Atheism tonic as a chaser, there's a growing list of people that I wish would move beyond this outmoded structure.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-72692102187607108272013-10-22T10:51:57.539-04:002013-10-22T10:51:57.539-04:00Mark, good point about fears of "rational nih...Mark, good point about fears of "rational nihilism." This is part of why Massimo still holds on to old ideas about free will and a unitary consciousness. He's said as much in the past:<br /><br />"A)ny talk of free will and consciousness being illusions is a threat to humanism, since among humanist's cardinal principles are that we are responsible for our actions and that we can use reason as a guide to life."<br /><br />But, if reason tells us there's no unitary free willer, Massimo, then, that's where we have to head. We may still "act as if," to riff a bit on Hume, but, if there's ultimately no turtle of free will down at the bottom, there's no turtle of free will down at the bottom.<br /><br />And, Mark, I otherwise agree with you. Knowing more about how we actually do operate, rather than relying on out-of-date polarities, should be for our betterment.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-15895853874485007252013-10-22T09:57:29.271-04:002013-10-22T09:57:29.271-04:00Massimo,
>What was her "real" desire...Massimo,<br /><br />>What was her "real" desire?<<br /><br />The problem is, some of us don't believe that there are real desires. Not in the sense that real desires are the desires of the core self, while non-real desires are deviations from them induced by “external” factors, like chemicals or propaganda. Our desires are no less real if they are the products of genetics, the society we grew up in or of the chemicals we eat, swallow or imbibe. There is no core self.<br /><br />This entire discussion verges on the concept of “suspiciously-formed desires.” The term “suspiciously-formed” is a non-technical, informal concept. It seems to imply that nefarious conspiracies are involved. We actually know that there are, in fact, conspiracies working to affect our desires. Evil drug companies work hard to get us “addicted” to their products, actual dug lords do likewise and slightly-less-evil ad companies try to get us to desire useless junk. In such situations the term “suspiciously-formed desire” is justified and the use of rational (not to mention legal) methods is needed.<br /><br />In the absence of conspiracies, the situation is much less clear. If a principled doctor prescribes a powerful anti-depressant to a suicidal patient, he is certainly justified, even if the anti-depressant affects the patient's desires. In such situations, I would assume that the desires are not “suspiciously-derived.” They are, in fact, as “real” and “non-suspicious” as the desires produced by our genetics, our social influences or by the natural chemicals from the food we eat.<br />Filippo Nerihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01910861498359320434noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-36108316221966544482013-10-22T04:39:28.607-04:002013-10-22T04:39:28.607-04:00Massimo
Regarding the woman on anti-depressant dr...Massimo<br /><br />Regarding the woman on anti-depressant drugs who fell in and out of love with her husband: I am inclined to see most forms of romantic love and desire as suspiciously-formed – even without the drugs!<br /><br />> I really don’t think that’s what I meant when I was talking about rational nihilism. Please re-read more carefully.<<br /><br />I think I understood perfectly well what you were claiming about the possible influence of certain kinds of popular science writing. And some people may well respond in the way you describe. And I understood the point of your reference to probability and statistics.<br /><br />But I was making my own point. Namely, that the benefits of knowing how our brains can fool us would probably outweigh any negative consequences.<br /><br />In accordance with my slightly different view of rationality, I am inclined to put the focus more on behavior than debate (as important as rational debate can sometimes be); and also to emphasize the distinction between informal interpretation and argumentation, and the more reliable methods and core findings of the empirical and formal sciences.<br /><br />Generally speaking, I probably have what you would call scientistic tendencies. Though I often find myself in agreement with your positions, I lack your apparent faith in the power of discursive reason (especially when it comes to answering value-related questions and deciding between conflicting value-systems, codes of behavior, etc.).<br /><br />And, by the way, a couple of those quotes under 'Mark' in your reply were from Thomas's comments not mine. I try to put strict limits on my nitpicking, you know, and wouldn't want to be blamed for his as well as my own! :-)Mark Englishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506844097173520312noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-26155079744612054192013-10-21T23:42:58.089-04:002013-10-21T23:42:58.089-04:00@ Gadfly
> Oh, if THAT's your concern, no,...@ Gadfly<br /><br />> Oh, if THAT's your concern, no, I don't think he's a dualist at all. (That said, what type of dualism are we talking about? I assume ontological dualism, but I'm double-checking!) <<br /><br />What form of dualism does not ultimately imply ontological dualism?<br /><br />> (Also, emergentism has nothing to do with dualism; I don't know why you think it does.) <<br /><br /><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergentism" rel="nofollow">Emergentism</a> (strong) is the opposite of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductionism" rel="nofollow">reductionism</a>. And if consciousness does not reduce to the physical, then it is <i>not</i> physical. (It seems pretty simple to me.)<br /><br />> And, if you're still attached to that idea, then you need to read my link above, too. That whole issue is simply out of date. <<br /><br />The <i>moral</i> implications are the same regardless of whether <a href="http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/determinism" rel="nofollow">determinism</a> or <a href="http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indeterminism" rel="nofollow">indeterminism</a> holds true. However, the <i>metaphysical</i> implications may <i>not</i> be.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-16566460120606284702013-10-21T23:08:58.186-04:002013-10-21T23:08:58.186-04:00@ Massimo
> If you want to show off by writing...@ Massimo<br /><br />> If you want to show off by writing Italian quips, at least get it right: it’s “calmati,” not “calmiti.” <<br /><br /><i>Perdonami</i>.<br /><br />> And it’s got nothing to do with what I wrote. I assure you that I wasn’t upset, simply making an observation about your writings. <<br /><br />The bottom line is that you can't reconcile your position on <i>free will</i> with your naturalistic worldview (not unless your "naturalism" presupposes some kind of dualism or teleology).Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-8376319662448501372013-10-21T13:45:28.162-04:002013-10-21T13:45:28.162-04:00Mark,
> Firstly that we are able to identify i...Mark,<br /><br />> Firstly that we are able to identify in any reliable way "the source of a ... preference" in a real-life, non-experimental situation. <<br /><br />Not always, but there are plenty of non artificial examples where we can do it. The case of the woman who fell in and out of love with her husband at the time she began / stopped taking Prozac is both clear and interesting.<br /><br />> secondly with the word 'exactly'. It's just not possible, I would suggest, to postulate precise and clearcut rules for this sort of thing. <<br /><br />You may be a bit nitpicking here. It was just a rhetorical flourish in my part (and certainly not something Elga said).<br /><br />> Massimo, I don't know that I share your concerns about the dangers of 'rational nihilism'. Are people really at risk of becoming less rational if they appreciate the extent to which their choices are unconsciously driven? <<br /><br />I really don’t think that’s what I meant when I was talking about rational nihilism. Please re-read more carefully.<br /><br />> If someone offers me a peach and a pear, is there no distinction between responding "I desire the peach" or "I prefer the peach"? <<br /><br />Yes, there is, in the context you set up. Within the context of Elga’s discussion there was no ambiguity about the fact that he was using the terms interchangeably. But it was clear what he was referring to.<br /><br />> How did we get around to your remark about confirmation bias on the basis of your description of Elga's talk? <<br /><br />I thought it was pretty clear from the sentence itself, within the context of a discussion distinguishing rational thinking from rationalization.<br /><br />Alastair,<br /><br />> Calmiti. <<br /><br />If you want to show off by writing Italian quips, at least get it right: it’s “calmati,” not “calmiti.” And it’s got nothing to do with what I wrote. I assure you that I wasn’t upset, simply making an observation about your writings.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-28698097162514919102013-10-21T11:04:31.648-04:002013-10-21T11:04:31.648-04:00Oh, if THAT's your concern, no, I don't th...Oh, if THAT's your concern, no, I don't think he's a dualist at all. (That said, what type of dualism are we talking about? I assume ontological dualism, but I'm double-checking!) My concern with him, per my blog post, is that the whole idea of "free will vs. determinism" is outdated. (Also, emergentism has nothing to do with dualism; I don't know why you think it does.) And, if you're still attached to that idea, then you need to read my link above, too. That whole issue is simply out of date.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-733919280874168932013-10-20T14:34:34.215-04:002013-10-20T14:34:34.215-04:00@ Gadfly
It seems ambiguous to me. Can you clearl...@ Gadfly<br /><br />It seems ambiguous to me. Can you clearly state his position on the subject? (Massimo denies that he is a dualist, yet he seems to entertain positions that smack of dualism - e.g. the "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-stage_model_of_free_will" rel="nofollow">two stage model of free will</a>" and "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergentism" rel="nofollow">emergentism</a>.")Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-41140338399762256652013-10-19T22:46:33.636-04:002013-10-19T22:46:33.636-04:00Well, originally you mentioned "free will vs....Well, originally you mentioned "free will vs. determinism," not free will by itself. That said, per the link from my blog, what I have him saying about free will isn't ambiguous at all.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-2272235047975140252013-10-18T13:10:44.001-04:002013-10-18T13:10:44.001-04:00@ Massimo
> It would appear that you suffer fr...@ Massimo<br /><br />> It would appear that you suffer from a severe case of systematic misinterpretation of whatever I write. <<br /><br />Calmiti.<br /><br />> I just don't think that debate is productive at this point. If one doesn't believe in the human ability to make choices (volition) then there is no point in discussing anything at all with him, so I'm just not interested. <<br /><br />Whether or not our choices are <i>truly</i> voluntary is what is at issue here. So, if you're not willing to discuss that issue, then there is really no point of discussing "suspiciously formed desires." (You're not only suffering from analysis paralysis, but also from cognitive dissonance. (You can't reconcile your belief in free will with your belief in a mechanistic worldview where only efficient causes play a role.)Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-33416126544479771212013-10-18T11:31:37.792-04:002013-10-18T11:31:37.792-04:00@ Gadfly
Let me rephrase: Massimo's position ...@ Gadfly<br /><br />Let me rephrase: Massimo's position in regards to the subject matter of "<a href="http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/free%20will" rel="nofollow">free will</a>" is <i>ambiguous</i>.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-10152175382635283772013-10-18T09:22:17.586-04:002013-10-18T09:22:17.586-04:00>Instead of arguing from conclusions like "...>Instead of arguing from conclusions like "preacher= bad reasoning about science, and just move on" let's substitute "Georges Lemaître= bad reasoning about science" and see if we can simply move on.<br /><br />Massimo's original example was a probability-based heuristic. Most preachers are not remotely like Georges Lemaître.<br /><br />It's annoying when a statement expressed probabilistically gets anecdotal counterexamples thrown at it.ianpollockhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15579140807988796286noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-51754865928694125092013-10-18T05:23:05.205-04:002013-10-18T05:23:05.205-04:00Alastair,
> I got that impression by reading y...Alastair,<br /><br />> I got that impression by reading your blog post. It would appear that you're suffering from a fairly severe case of "analysis paralysis." <<br /><br />It would appear that you suffer from a severe case of systematic misinterpretation of whatever I write.<br /><br />> You always seem to be quite dismissal of the "free will vs. determinism" debate. Whether or not our choices are truly voluntary is what is at issue here. <<br /><br />I just don't think that debate is productive at this point. If one doesn't believe in the human ability to make choices (volition) then there is no point in discussing anything at all with him, so I'm just not interested.<br /><br />Filippo,<br /><br />> how good is the data showing someone “being better predisposed toward a date if you are nursing a warm rather than a cold drink.”? Five sigmas? I don't think so. <<br /><br />To be fair, that was my example, not Elga's. And no, we ain't talking about five sigmas. But do you really want to set the bar that high for social science?<br /><br />> Anti-depressants are, in fact, meant to change people's desires. <<br /><br />I know, but not necessarily in all the directions one may want. In Answers for Aristotle I discuss the case of a woman who fell out of love with her husband when she was on Prozac, only to recover her feelings when she stop taking it. What was her "real" desire? Good question...<br /><br />> Past choices do not necessarily imply that occasionally different choices do not arise from real desires (even if such desires are influenced by packaging.) One could have a real desire for variety, or for flashy packages. <<br /><br />Yes. Or the flashy package can be a marketing distraction that induces you to buy something you don't really want, when you consider the situation with more time to reflect on it.<br /><br />Thomas,<br /><br />> If I read this post correctly Elga seems to be addressing decision theory <<br /><br />I actually don't think so. Elga is interested in exploring the nature of human (sometimes conflicting) desires, not in finding out what the "best" decision is according to some kind of maximizing criterion.<br /><br />> It is evident to me that there is more Massimo than Elga in this post, and a rather testy Massimo at that. But that's Massimo. <<br /><br />You are wrong on the first count, and I think of myself as more ironic than testy... But that's just me.<br /><br />> The fact that it declares more than it delivers is obscured by imaginary cheerleaders waving pom poms in the background. <<br /><br />Uh?<br /><br />> the better questions are how did Haidt gets thrown into this post about Elga? Was he cited by Elga? <<br /><br />Not in the talk, Haidt came up in the ensuing discussion.<br /><br />> What about confirmation bias? <<br /><br />What about it?<br /><br />> particularly enjoy Massimo's and his tolerance of inane or inarticulate commentary, particularly my own. But this post is not up to the standards I've come to expect from him. <<br /><br />Well, you can't please everyone all the time. But thanks for the backhanded compliment... ;-)Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-71978741952965701642013-10-18T04:26:20.989-04:002013-10-18T04:26:20.989-04:00"... But philosophers being inclined to quest..."... But philosophers being inclined to question the apparently obvious, Elga raised the issue of when, exactly, is finding out the source of a stated preference rational ground for reassessing that preference."<br /><br />I have a problem with the assumptions here. Firstly that we are able to identify in any reliable way "the source of a ... preference" in a real-life, non-experimental situation. And secondly with the word 'exactly'. It's just not possible, I would suggest, to postulate precise and clearcut rules for this sort of thing. (Well, one can postulate rules, but will they be plausible? And where would their authority derive from – exactly?)<br /><br />And I agree with Richard Wein's (and Filippo Neri's) point about 'real' preferences, and also with RW's naturalistic take on what constitutes rational behavior.<br /><br />There is a broader issue here, I think, about fine distinctions (in this case, between different types of preferences, or grounds and sources, or suspiciously and non-suspiciously formed desires, etc.). The sorts of fine distinctions which are appropriate in scientific contexts are generally inappropriate in most real-life contexts, I would say. And misapplied fine distinctions can lead to the creation of artificial problems.<br /><br />All in all, Massimo, I don't know that I share your concerns about the dangers of 'rational nihilism'. Are people really at risk of becoming less rational if they appreciate the extent to which their choices are unconsciously driven?<br /><br />Quite the opposite, I would have thought. The more we know about how we really think, the more generally skeptical we will be about our convictions, etc. (A good thing, surely.)<br /><br />Or is there evidence that such knowledge actually has the effect of discouraging people from behaving in a rational way or from applying well-established rational or scientific principles (like probability theory) when appropriate?Mark Englishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506844097173520312noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-70708196262194611882013-10-17T23:33:16.502-04:002013-10-17T23:33:16.502-04:00Note that I put “free will” in quotes. Unfortunate...Note that I put “free will” in quotes. Unfortunately, any system exhibiting complex enough behavior to simulate “free will” has to operate near chaos, so that it will be sensitive to small perturbations. This is a standard result in the study of dynamical systems.<br />Filippo Nerihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01910861498359320434noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-75704639774061814452013-10-17T17:18:48.678-04:002013-10-17T17:18:48.678-04:00"The absurdity of what I would call the ratio..."The absurdity of what I would call the rational nihilism..." <br /><br />Very important point. We shouldn't throw the baby out if it has a blemish. But I do think the way to inoculate against this sort of nihilism is to not hide the weaknesses and shortcomings of rationalism. Rationalism gives slightly better odds than the house, but you're still going to lose a LOT. I think Marx was right that we are "species being" and so is our reasoning. We reason for and with others, and as long as our society is healthy our reasoning will be. Aaron Shurehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00837439765332783167noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-52308398407813894182013-10-17T17:08:11.993-04:002013-10-17T17:08:11.993-04:00>Unlike computers, the brain seems to be workin...>Unlike computers, the brain seems to be working on the edge of instability, so that small influences can have macroscopic effects on behavior. This is, of course, a necessary condition for some sort of “free will.”<br /><br />On the contrary, we would be more free in the important senses if our brains were less prone to normatively irrelevant influences.ianpollockhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15579140807988796286noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-74252362207676454292013-10-17T17:00:23.209-04:002013-10-17T17:00:23.209-04:00I have no idea where you got that idea. Per this b...I have no idea where you got that idea. Per this blog post of mine, Massimo's not "dismissive" of this dichotomy (sadly) at all. Would that he were. Click to read why he's not, in part: http://socraticgadfly.blogspot.com/2012/01/mu-to-free-will.htmlGadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-32504504368116581262013-10-17T16:59:32.497-04:002013-10-17T16:59:32.497-04:00Oh, Elga's compatible with multiple subselves ...Oh, Elga's compatible with multiple subselves (I prefer that phrase to multiple selves). But, he doesn't really "bring out" that issue. <br /><br />And, I'll get you sold on this issue, just like I'll detach you from 20th century ideas on free will vs. determinism. (Why Alastair thinks you're "dismissive" of the issue, I don't know.)Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.com