About Rationally Speaking


Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Friday, August 09, 2013

Evolutionary psychology, Jerry Coyne, Robert Kurzban, and the so-called creationism of the mind

by Massimo Pigliucci

Time to take a break from philosophy of mind and get back to evolutionary psychology. The occasion originates from a recent post by evopsych researcher Robert Kurzban, on what he calls "creationism of the mind." There Kurzban excoriates our good old friend, PZ Myers for some apparently silly criticisms he leveled at the field. Kurzban goes on commending Jerry Coyne for having recently seen the light, becoming a supporter of the field. Contra to what some of my seasoned readers may expect, this is going to be neither a defense of PZ, nor an attack on Coyne. But I doubt Kurzban is going to like it anyway (about Jerry, I'm not taking bets).

Let's start with Kurzban's criticism of Myers, whom he tags with the obviously disdainful label of creationist of the mind. According to Kurzban, the latter is someone who subscribes "to the view that the theory of evolution by natural selection ought to be used to inform the study of the traits and behaviors of every living thing on the planet except the bits of the human mind that cause behavior, especially social behavior." I'm pretty sure no evolutionary biologist actually subscribes to this rather strawmanly view, including PZ, but let's proceed. Kurzban further characterizes this brand new type of "creationists" thusly: "Like creationists full stop, creationists of the mind take their positions for reasons other than looking at the relevant evidence. This is clear from the emotion that pervades their remarks about the discipline." Uhm, ok, though it is worth noting that this bit of rhetoric comes from someone who has by this point indulged in a pretty emotional characterization of his own opponents. [Note: I've got nothing against being emotional; to me it means one gives a damn. But you ought not to belittle your opponents for the same kind of behavior you yourself indulge in.]

What exactly did Myers say that so railed Kurzban? Apparently he stated that evolutionary biologists assume a one-to-one causal mapping of genes to behavior, proceeding to dismiss the field on the grounds that such an assumption is in fact ridiculously simplistic (it is). Well, if PZ did say that, he was also attacking a straw man. But the problem of genotype-phenotype mapping is, in fact, a rather big one for evopsych researchers, more so than for pretty much any other evolutionary biologist, because such mapping (i.e., the details of how phenotypes are causally related to genotypes) is made much more complex in humans by the existence of an enormous amount of behavioral plasticity, much of which is induced by a pesky little thing called culture, and all of which makes it pretty difficult (though not necessarily impossible) to test adaptive hypotheses about modern human behavior.

After having dismissed Myers, Kurzban moves on to some good news for evopsych: Jerry Coyne's alleged "conversion" to the field: "Jerry Coyne’s conversion I think serves as a powerful example. His journey from staunch critic to defender of the discipline illustrates that smart people who know a lot about biology can be persuaded. Some of the field’s critics might be induced to read the primary literature, as Coyne did. More deeply, Coyne’s public change of heart, I think, will make it easier for others to say they were wrong." (Note the use of religiously inspired terminology, such as "conversion" and "journey.")

But did Jerry change his position so dramatically? I went and checked what he actually wrote, and it doesn't sound at all like what Kurzban so enthusiastically described. Jerry confirms his (harsh) criticism of evopsych researchers like Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer (them of "rape is an adaptive strategy" fame), as well as of much of "pop" evopsych (citing as one of the most ridiculous recent examples David Brooks' latest book - essentially a Republican fantasy of how things are and therefore ought to be in the world).

Nonetheless, Coyne continues, the field is, ahem, evolving, and getting better. There are some serious researchers who actually pay attention to the testability of their hypotheses, and who try to be careful about what they say when they write for the public. I don't know many critics - either within biology or in philosophy of science - who would disagree with that kind of cautious assessment. When Jonathan Kaplan and I wrote about evopsych in our Making Sense of Evolution we were careful to draw exactly the same distinctions that Jerry draws. I know there are misguided postmodernists out there who reject evopsych no matter what, but most thoughtful commentators have never done that, just like current critics of the excesses of neuroscience do not thereby dismiss it as phrenology.

That said, I still don't think Jerry's criticism of evopsych goes far enough, for one very important - but also, I would think, very obvious - reason: human beings really do present special challenges when it comes to the scientific study of their behavior, especially of the evolution of that behavior.

To get us started, let's look at some of the entries in Jerry's list of recent successes (or at least examples of progress) in evopsych. Some are obvious and hard to dispute: incest avoidance, innate fear of dangerous animals, parent-offspring conflicts, and the like. As Kaplan and I (and plenty of others) have pointed out, these are the areas where evopsych is at its strongest because the target behaviors are common among mammals, or at least primates. Which means that phylogenetic comparative analyses - one of the best hypothesis testing tools at the disposal of evolutionary biologists - work well.

Other examples are a bit odd. Jerry mentions, for instance, the evolution of sexual dimorphism (differences in size between male and female) and the evolution of concealed ovulation in human females. These are actually morphological, not behavioral traits, though they certainly influence behavior (and perhaps have been historically influenced by behavior). One needs to be careful about not unduly expanding the domain of evopsych to include every human trait, or it becomes too easy to claim success. (For instance: yeah, human females evolved larger breasts than men because they nurse their babies. I doubt even a postmodernist would try to culturally relativize that one!)

Jerry also mentions traits that are variable within the human species (as opposed to the classical focus of evopsych, human universals), for instance offspring numbers across societies, or physical and physiological differences among ethnic groups (though, again, why would the latter count as behavior is a bit puzzling). Kaplan and I also highlighted this area (systematic variation within Homo sapiens) as potentially fruitful for evopsych, though caution needs to be exercised because some of these traits (e.g., offspring number) could vary at least in part as a result of cultural forces, not genetic evolution (just think of the differences between, say, some fundamentalist religious groups and many mainstream ones: in societies where the former are in significant numbers the birthrate will be much higher than in societies where religious fundamentalism is numerically insignificant, but I would guess that culture, rather than genetics, is doing much of the work here).

Jerry also counts as a success for evopsych research on gene-culture co-evolution, as in the famous case of lactose intolerance. Which is odd, because that approach is usually seen as significantly distinct from evopsych (it's based on the extension of standard population genetics models to cultural evolution), and at any rate has had somewhat limited success (there aren't that many documented cases around, other than the oft-cited lactose intolerance).

Things become seriously iffy with yet another group of examples advanced by Jerry as positive entries in the evopsych column: the evolution of language and the evolution of morality. Steven Pinker's interesting speculations aside, we really don't have much of a hold on the evolution of language, for the simple reason that it is a classical worst case scenario for evopsych: it is unique to humans (yes, yes, other animals communicate, but language is a whole different beast) and not really variable within humans - except for pathologies - which means that comparative phylogenetic studies are out; so, of course, is the fossil record (except insofar that tells us when we evolved the anatomy necessary for language); and, needless to say, we have no access to direct measurements of relevant selective pressures. Yes, something can be learned by the study of the (very complex) genetics underlying language abilities, but it is hard to see how one can significantly move away from the sort of "just-so" stories for which evopsych is infamous. (If these stories are instead presented as untested but reasonable scenarios, then it's a different matter.)

As for morality, I am the first to agree that Frans de  Waal-type studies with other primates provide the basis for interesting speculations on how it evolved, but let's remember that his comparative studies are based on an extremely reduced number of species, that these species are pretty distantly related to us, and that they show very significant differences among themselves in terms of prosocial and pre-moral behavior. Not to mention that human morality is exceedingly more complicated than any animal equivalent because, you guessed it, of cultural evolution.

Which brings me to the crucial point where I disagree with Jerry about evopsych, in this case (which is unusual, believe me) in the sense that I am more conservative than he is. As Jerry puts it in his post: "My position has always been that good evolutionary psychology should
meet the evidentiary standards of papers on the evolutionary significance of behavior in other animals ... Those who dismiss evolutionary psychology on the grounds that it’s mere 'storytelling' ... if they are to be consistent, they must also dismiss any studies of the evolutionary basis of animal behavior."

Well, no, that's really moving the bar too low. Sure, evopsych research has to meet at the very least the standards of research on animal behavior (and believe me, a number of evopsych studies don't, though some certainly do). But human beings are far more complex and flexible (the technical term is plastic) in their behavior, and far less beholden to their genetic leash, than any other species on the planet, largely of course because of the power of cultural evolution. That means that evopsych researchers need to be much more careful in their studies than animal behaviorists, for precisely the same reasons that research psychologists get a lot more headaches while carrying out their work than their colleagues studying mice or fruit flies.

So, I agree with Jerry that it is silly to reject evopsych outright. It is a borderline field that can easily produce crap as well as good stuff. Therefor, criticism from the outside is vital in keeping evopsych tilting away from the former and increasingly toward the latter. But a rejection of certain conclusions alleged by evopsych does not at all require an equal rejection of animal behavior research. The standards ought to be higher.

195 comments:

  1. Hi Massimo,

    Glad to say that on this occasion, I think you are spot on. Great article!

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    1. I thought so as well. From my outsider's perspective it seems like evopsych has a lot of potential, but also inhabits an epistemic and political minefield.

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  2. Did you read this?

    Dennett: - I propose that we call them “mind creationists"

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  3. >Human beings are ... far less beholden to their genetic leash<

    Nice analogy. Behaviourally, while we still feel the tug of the genetic leash, the rest of the animal world are in the grip a genetic harness.

    It was an act of liberation that freed our minds from the genetic harness and once that happened it started functioning according to new rules. Reaching back into evolutionary theory to explain these new rules is not particularly helpful. We need new theory because these are new rules with no precedent in evolutionary history.

    So no, the mind was not created, it was liberated and from there on continued in an act of self-creation.

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    2. Baron, it will take a lot of science to answer that question. The present debate proves how very little is known. In time a 'neuro-cognitive-Einstein' will appear on the scene with dazzling new scientific insights that explain the process and transform our understanding just as Darwin transformed the understanding of the development of life.

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    4. One can recognise an effect without understanding its cause. Science afterall, is an attempt to determine and understand the causes of observed effects.

      Examples are dark energy and dark matter. We recognise their effects but we don't understand what they are or how they operate. As always, science will take us there.

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    6. Baron,
      may I remind you of Massimo's words:
      >Human beings are ... far less beholden to their genetic leash<

      Now here is a strange thing. My mind roams freely over the vast constellation of human knowledge and aesthetics. One moment I delight in the ineffable poetry of Rupert Brook and Siegfried Sassoon then I delight in some deep C++ algorithms. Yes, my mind is liberated from the confines of my genetic heritage. I grant you that I still feel the tugs of my genetic leash, as Massimo so aptly put it.

      My delightful and highly intelligent Jack Russell sleeps beside me in his dog basket. For all his intelligence and biddability, he is mostly constrained in a genetic harness. The contrast between us could not be greater.

      Yes, I do indeed feel liberated.

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    8. Baron, the simple fact that we disagree as we do, without sight and sound of each other just goes to show how liberated our minds have become. My mind does more than just feel liberated (delightful as that feeling is) but my behaviour reflects that liberation.

      If you wish to insist your mind is not liberated then please be my guest but don't include me in your prison.

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    9. My mind was liberated from religious prison. Does that count?

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    10. "Human beings are ... far less beholden to their genetic leash"

      Is this an accurate statement? Is really there something in any life form that is not tied to its genes? Perhaps the word 'culture' is weighting to much in our considerations, for in a sense it doesn't means more than a collection of habits or procedures that happen to be too common. And yes, if I'm not mistaken, behaviors influence genes as well as genes determine (or favor) behaviors, isn't it? So, as seen as just behaviors and not as cultures, the other animals' are subjected to this same principle of mutual influence in genes/behaviors relationship.

      Then, I don't know if simpler than otherwise, I believe that consider culture as a kind of collection of behaviors specific (and perhaps not precisely so) of humans would be at least a more 'true' approach to the problem.

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    11. Waldemar, was that an argument in favor of other animals having cultural communicative systems, because it's my position that neither can exist without the other, and that includes every thing in nature that in any way at all communicates (except for Gods that seem to be both in and out of nature).

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    12. Baron, I'm not exactly taking the 'animal culture' side, although we know that to some extent a lot of research is done in this respect. To me it's also obvious that everything in the world is connected - weren't that so, we couldn't even think of science, I imagine. My point is: whatever way we define culture, if it is behavior and if behavior is linked to the genes, then culture must be genetic too. And as behavior is also able to influence the genes, I think it doesn't matter if it is a whale or a human behavior, say, both work the same way. It's just a matter of concepts: it seems that sometimes, as in this example, culture is not considered as just behavior.

      Perhaps another simple way to state the problem is: our behavior is way more complex than the whale's and so more difficult to track back to the genes. But there comes 'complexity' and so how to correctly infer that something is more or less complex than something else? The problem goes forever from question to question, it seems.

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    13. No, culture is not considered as behavior at all. It is considered as the medium through which our behaviors are taught, imitated, learned, regulated, proscribed, etc. It's part of the evolutionary process of biological forms that have survived by sharing information, and evolving as each part of a group effort accordingly There'd be no successful cell division without the sharing of learned strategies, and no multicellular information sharing systems without the communicative systems they developed. Newer forms of sexual and other reproductive systems have found ways to share information within family groups, and pass it on to their prodigy. Our various oral and written language systems (not to mention our technical appurtenances) have become the most sophisticated communicative methods for establishing our cultures yet devised, but all biological systems have had some version of a symbolic language system from the start.
      We understand the modern system of storing and providing information and call it culture, but we've been wrong to think that it was in any way an invention of the more intelligent creatures, and did not exist in creatures who, prior to some arbitrary point in the past, had no such capacity for such a learning instrument, and no prior need of it.

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    14. And aren't all those things you related under the concept of culture behaviors? Yes, I agree that culture is not 'a' behavior, for that is obvious. Instead, as you showed, it's a collection of behaviors. The problem, originally, was the above statement on we humans not being too tied to our genes due, for instance, to culture. Perhaps culture interacts more strikingly with the genes than non cultural behaviors, but our dependence on culture must be tied to genetic explanations. I'm not trying to say that smoking a cigarette is determined by genes, no, or not directly, in a similar way the amazing adaptation of animals like dogs and cats to our environment is not expressly prescribed in their genes - or so I suppose. Then, as it seems obvious to me, linking behaviors to genes is just a matter of defining what should be the fundamental in terms of behavior and so make the remaining link to the derived ones. Not an easy work, I'm sure.

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    15. No, no, culture is not a collection of the behaviors. Behaviors are the actionable elements of behavioral functions.
      Behaviors are learned, right? So what is it you learn before you can even know what to do and how to do it?
      The information as to what to do and when and how and why to do it.
      That's meaningful information about behavior, not the behavior itself. Behavior is an accomplishment of the form and function that has a use for it.
      And culture is the necessary informational function of a group of biological forms.

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    16. If I'm understanding you, you're telling me that culture is not only a human produce, and perhaps - as supposed by some scholars - of some few other species.

      I decidedly need to hear more from you about your theses to be sure I understand what you mean. Please, tell me more.

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    17. If you look at all my comments on this site, you'll see that I've pretty much covered the waterfront and more than once, as far as my opinions on culture are concerned.
      And 'twas pretty much a waste of time as well.

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  4. Massimo, I think you put to much emphasis on Kurzban's description of Myers as "creationist of the mind", a term he used for not better one and he also retracted from it later. His response was very civil and to the point, while Myers was far more emotional and less coherent (at some point Myers called Kurzban a twit).

    The larger point thought, is the Myers attacks are mostly of straw man or has nothing to do with ev psych specifically. Most of his criticism, as Kurzban pointed out so eloquently, is against psychological studies or even the whole social sciences. Kurzban also shows how inconsistent his criticism of ev psych is, since the same "problems" that he points out against ev psych, are not directed at studies in animal behavior and behavioral ecology that biologists do.

    I also don't understand why focus mostly on the bad studies. I think that you mentioned in one of the podcasts Sturgeon's Law, that says that 90% of all studies are crap. It's easy to pick bad science but it seems to me, that when talking about ev psych, these studies are perceived as representative of the field. Moreover, in most cases, critic attack the "pop" ev psych which are not really the actual studies, but how they are reported in the popular media. I don't see any other field where the focus in almost entirely on what is considered the worse studies. Coyne just tries to change it by focusing on the good studies.

    And I think Rob Kurzban would be a great guess for a future podcast. Many people, including you (though your criticism is much more balanced than most others) attack ev psych, but rarely do you engage in direct conversation with a leading researcher in the field. I believe that this could be very illuminating talk, and even if you still disagree, at least the points of disagreements would be much clearer.

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  5. There is something strange about a field called 'evolutionary psychology'. Human brains were made by evolution, but what those brains (as they ended up to be via evolution) happen to be able to do is make new cultural code, and what that new code can be may not necessarily be informed by what Australopithecus afarensis brains could do, for example. Our brains have the ability to make new culture in a more general way (as a result of evolution) than chimp brains make new culture (if they do at all). Maybe now-extinct hominids' brains could do something in between. So I have a hard time grasping the significance of the field.

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    1. >...what those brains (as they ended up to be via evolution) happen to be able to do is make new cultural code, and what that new code can be may not necessarily be informed by what Australopithecus afarensis brains could do...

      This is stating it much too strongly, I think. Surely what our minds & cultures can do is at least *informed* by their evolutionary history!

      Consider for an easy example how different would be the ethical & political theorizing of an intelligent species of eusocial insects like ants, or a solitary species like sea turtles!

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    2. It would interesting to see what the writings (literature, mathematics, etc.) of intelligent insects or turtles would look like.

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    4. The key word is 'intelligent'. There is no intelligent culture without writing.

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    6. Baron, I think Philip has got it right. The key thing about culture is its ability to grow, accumulate and for this accumulation to be transmitted. Culture assumes a quasi-independent existence.

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    7. Not only does he have it wrong, you have it even wronger.
      Primitive man for example carried representations of his culture in his axe, saw it in his understanding of other animals, retained that understanding by drawing animal and human pictures on cave walls, etc., etc.
      No life forms exist without a form of culture and no culture exits without a form of intelligence in the individual members of the group that share that culture.
      There is no group adaptation without the communication that cultural artifacts represent. There would be no biological evolution without it.
      Quasi-independent culture is like your quasi independent god, it lives in your imagination.

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    8. Nope, Philip has got it right except in one detail. He said writing when I think he should have said language. Culture was transmitted in narrative form before the development of writing. But narrative depends on memory which places severe limits on the development and transmission of culture. The first big step in the development of culture was language and oral narrative but the huge step was writing. I completely support Philip.

      Your definition of culture is so broad that it is totally useless. Of course you may use language in any way you please but it is not at all useful.

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    9. Baron, if you doubt quasi-independent culture then I advise you to please visit your local lending library. Borrow a book and as you travel home you may reflect on the nature of the quasi-independent culture you are travelling home with.

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    10. So now you're saying that there are forms of life that have no cultures because they have no memories?
      And which book in my local library should I refer to? The bible?
      I prefer the books that I already have in my own library, such as those by James A Shapiro, Steven Rose, Mary Midgely, and so forth.

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    11. Baron, you are free to define culture as broadly as you wish. But such a broad definition is not terribly useful.

      As for books, may I recommend the Booker Prize winners, you cannot possibly go wrong there. When you read them you will be experiencing the fruits of a quasi-independent culture. I also especially recommend Rupert Brook and Siegfried Sassoon. They portray vividly the fruits of aggression.

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    12. If you mean Rupert Brooke, I was reading him before you were likely born. And we've had similar South Seas adventures. As to aggression, I can out agress you any day. It's in my culture.

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    13. The history of writing could have begun 9,000 years ago with incised "counting tokens" (if you don't count cave wall paintings before that, which I don't think many do). "Around 4100-3800 BCE, the tokens began to be symbols that could be impressed or inscribed in clay to represent a record of land, grain or cattle and a written language was beginning to develop." What writing gives the species is the ability to build on the past and generate new culture in a way that passing only spoken "stories" to the next generation may not.

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    14. Of course it was writing that allowed humans to think at a higher abstract level than any other known animal. But at a strategic level, there are creatures that might possibly beat us.
      And then consider this: In many ways we were intelligently constructed by bacteria, intelligently held together by them, intelligently motivated and operated and intelligently protected by them as well. Our intelligence has evolved from theirs, but without theirs and its varieties having also evolved, our intelligence would have no legs to stand on.

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  6. As an example of plasticity and cultural feedbacks on genetics, there's this recent study:
    http://toi.in/sPc1FY
    Looking at the establishment and maintenance of the caste system in India through intermarriage between groups. Though I suppose Coyne could argue 'that's just sympatry'....

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  7. Massimo,

    While you make some valid points, I believe you continue to unfairly mischaracterize evo psych. When it comes to language, I - and many other scholars - am sufficiently impressed by the ease, sophistication, precocity, and precision with which children learn language that I am fairly confident in saying that it is an adaptation. What it is an adaptation for is evident: communicating information about the physical and social environment. We need not indulge ourselves in pleistocene storytelling to agree on this point. And here is the main idea you are missing in your analysis: the difference between function and history. While I know nothing about the phylogeny of language, I can still say with confidence that its function is to acquire and communicate information to others. And since natural selection is the only process in the universe that can give rise to this kind of functionality, I can infer that language evolved by natural selection. Similarly, I don't need to know the evolutionary precursors of fear, jealousy, disgust, anger, etc. to make plausible guesses about their adaptive functions (if they have any) and test those guesses in the lab. There is nothing in this enterprise that corresponds to what anyone might call "storytelling," in fact, it is better characterized as "reverse-engineering." This brand of adaptationism, with its emphasis on function and with minimal assumptions about phylogeny (the same way physiologists study the functions of bodily organs, and the same way behavioral ecologists study animal behavior), is what is most commonly practiced by evolutionary psychologists, and what is, unfortunately, absent from your critique.

    Further, your argument that humans require a special kind of rigor that goes beyond the study of other animals is flawed. First, saying that "humans are far less beholden to their genetic leash" implicitly erects a false dichotomy between biology and culture. Second, the leash metaphor is a terrible metaphor, as it evokes a multitude of wrong ideas, namely that 1) genes directly cause or influence behavior, 2) genes are a kind of person-like entity that can "tug" on the leash of behavior to promote their interests, 3) there is a "person" (soul?) in our heads that is somehow separate from our biology that can "resist" the tug of the leash. To say that humans are "less beholden to their genetic leash" is either false or so deeply confused as to be meaningless. Yes our brains are more plastic than other animals, and yes our brains are more sensitive to certain aspects of the environment (e.g. culture), but those facts in and of themselves do not suggest that the human brain is anymore difficult to understand in terms of evolution as any other biological organ. In fact, the stunning sophistication with which our brains translate diverse cultural inputs into nuanced behavioral outputs suggests that we ought to pay more, not less attention to natural selection as a guiding force in the evolution of the brain. The adaptive complexity of the brain cries out for an adaptationist approach, and I don't see why increased plasticity should militate against such an approach. Plasticity, after all, is subject to natural selection just like anything else and can either be adaptive or maladaptive. Studying human plasticity in adaptationist terms (e.g. from a life history perspective) is a worthy and necessary project, and you have (again, unfortunately) provided no arguments why this project should not be undertaken. Of course, evo psych is far from perfect and can benefit from constructive criticism, but this critique (along with your other critiques) misses the point on many levels and is bound to help no one.


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    1. Hi David

      >Yes our brains are more plastic than other animals, and yes our brains are more sensitive to certain aspects of the environment (e.g. culture), but those facts in and of themselves do not suggest that the human brain is anymore difficult to understand in terms of evolution as any other biological organ.<

      I think this is precisely why they're more difficult to understand. When so much of human behaviour is learned or otherwise interfered with by culture, of course it's more difficult to understand which behaviours are directly influenced by genes and which are not.

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    2. That would certainly be the case if the focus of evo psych was behavior and not the psychological mechanisms that cause behavior; hence the name "evo psych" and not "evo behavior." The point is that no behaviors are "directly influenced by genes"; rather, they are only very indirectly influenced by genes. That is to say, genes build brains, and it is brains, not genes, that cause behaviors. Therefore, the evolutionary analysis should be applied to the brain, not the behavior. And when analysis is applied to the brain, the dichotomy between "learned" and "evolved" breaks down, because the learning mechanisms themselves evolved and can potentially be understood as adaptations.

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    3. @David
      "In fact, the stunning sophistication with which our brains translate diverse cultural inputs into nuanced behavioral outputs suggests that we ought to pay more, not less attention to natural selection as a guiding force in the evolution of the brain. The adaptive complexity of the brain cries out for an adaptationist approach"

      There you go, almost. Culture evolves in the minds of its constituents, right? But natural selection seen as a guiding force rather than a guided force seems suspect.

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    4. @Baron

      "Culture evolves in the minds of its constituents, right?"

      Sort of. I prefer to talk about culture "adapting to" rather than "evolving in" the minds of its constituents. Culture is a type of information; the brain evolved to process that information. The most plausible way that information can evolve is by becoming more and more easily processed, stored, and transmitted by brains. This can happen via number of different routes: 1) the information becomes more and more useful (e.g. technology), 2) the information becomes more and more "catchy" or memorable, 3) the information becomes more and more tailored to exploit a particular psychological mechanism (e.g. our "cuteness detectors" that track neotenous features which came to be exploited by stuffed animals), etc.

      Not sure what you mean by natural selection as a "guided" force rather than a "guiding" force. I didn't mean to imply that natural selection is currently guiding our behavior in any straightforward way; I don't think it is. The only point I was making was that a brain capable of so deftly interacting with complex culture is an improbable arrangement of matter to come about by chance, and it therefore demands an adaptationist account.

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    5. > The point is that no behaviors are "directly influenced by genes"; rather, they are only very indirectly influenced by genes<

      Ok, I'll grant you that the causative powers of the genes are not literally direct (which is why I chose the weak word "influence"), but it's much more likely to have a simple mapping in animals driven largely by instinct than we're likely to see in humans.

      >because the learning mechanisms themselves evolved and can potentially be understood as adaptations.<

      Of course it can, no question.

      The problem is the relationship between genes and the observed behaviour (which is all we have to go on when inferring the underlying psychology) is much more straightforward in animals without culture. So while much of our psychology is the result of natural selection, an awful lot of it is down to culture too. It might well be *possible* to separate the two but it's not easy.

      To say that it's no more difficult to apply evopsych to humans (which is what you seem to be implying) is just not supported by the facts.

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    6. If you use the term "natural selection" it certainly implies a selection made by nature, when adaptation more accurately would seem to be caused by our mental functions.
      And information must be meaningful to be adaptive, so in the end the meaning must come from whatever creatures are the communicating components of the culture, a biological function for group communication which can't exist outside of each creatures equivalent of a brain.

      But yes, this arrangement of matter doesn't come about by chance, as our cognitive processes have in effect created their communicative culture through their continually evolving learning processes. The culture may appear to be the evolving force, but it's more likely the evolutionary result of the continual necessity for adaptive change.

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    7. @David, "Studying human plasticity in adaptationist terms (e.g. from a life history perspective) is a worthy and necessary project, and you have (again, unfortunately) provided no arguments why this project should not be undertaken."
      You're definitely on the right track, but you need to look farther ahead than Dawkins and Pinker to understand the function of adaptive behavior. Yes, the study of psychology has to involve the study of behavioral motivation, and the evolution of its motivating strategies could not have been accomplished by the stochasticity that both Dawkins and Pinker very strongly believe in.

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  8. Gil,

    > The larger point thought, is the Myers attacks are mostly of straw man or has nothing to do with ev psych specifically. <

    I hope you didn’t take my post as a defense of anything PZ said. I only brought it up to set up the context of Kurzban’s post and my commentary.

    > I also don't understand why focus mostly on the bad studies. <

    For two reasons: firts, evopsych seems to have turned out an inordinately high number of them; second, because evopsych claims are about human social behavior, which means they have political consequences, which in turn means the bar ought to be higher.

    > Moreover, in most cases, critic attack the "pop" ev psych which are not really the actual studies, but how they are reported in the popular media. <

    That is correct, and I point that out in the post. But a good number of evopsych researchers themselves are responsible for those reports and/or overblown claims. They should clean their act much better.

    David,

    > When it comes to language, I - and many other scholars - am sufficiently impressed by the ease, sophistication, precocity, and precision with which children learn language that I am fairly confident in saying that it is an adaptation. <

    I don’t think I doubted that, but that doesn’t mean we have any particularly good insight on how or why it came about. That, by the way, goes for much more obvious human characteristics, like the brain itself. It’s clearly an adaptation, but there continues to be disagreement about which selective factors brought it about. In both cases this is because the data dramatically under-determine the proposed hypotheses, a problem that is particularly relevant to a lot of evopsych research.

    > While I know nothing about the phylogeny of language, I can still say with confidence that its function is to acquire and communicate information to others <

    True, but I’m sure you are also familiar with the difference between current and ancestral function (e.g., the example of the evolution of birds’ feathers, with Coyne himself brings up). Moreover, “communication” is a bit too generic: other primates don’t seem to need to be able to write Shakespeare’s sonnets in order to communicate, why do we?

    > There is nothing in this enterprise that corresponds to what anyone might call "storytelling," in fact, it is better characterized as "reverse-engineering." <

    Yes, but reverse engineering is a treacherous approach in evolutionary biology, again because of the stochasticity of evolutionary history, as well as because of the redundancy of biological structures (remember Gould and Lewontin’s famous “spandrels” paper).

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    1. Massimo,

      You write, in regard to the evolution of language:

      "...that doesn’t mean we have any particularly good insight on how or why it came about."

      And that is exactly my point. You don't need to understand the evolutionary history or phylogeny of a trait to study it from an adaptationist perspective, anymore than you need to understand the phylogeny of fear to understand that it is an adaptation for avoiding danger. Thus your argument that evo psych is less scientific because of the lack of extant species with which to compare humans is flawed.

      "I’m sure you are also familiar with the difference between current and ancestral function."

      Of course I am, and like many behavioral ecologists and evolutionary psychologists, I find it to be a banal and irrelevant distinction. *Every* trait that has a function that originated from traits that had other functions. The distinction is completely unhelpful.

      "Yes, but reverse engineering is a treacherous approach in evolutionary biology..."

      I disagree. It is an extremely illuminating and scientifically fruitful approach (see Darwin's Dangerous Idea, The Triumph of Sociobiology, or any basic textbook in Behavioral Ecology, Animal Behavior, or Evolutionary Psychology).

      Finally, you write:

      "evopsych claims are about human social behavior, which means they have political consequences, which in turn means the bar ought to be higher."

      I disagree. The political implications of evopsych claims are either overblown or nonexistent, as was cogently argued by Steven Pinker in The Blank Slate.

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    2. Massimo:

      "second, because evopsych claims are about human social behavior, which means they have political consequences, which in turn means the bar ought to be higher."

      We should also note, of course, that this excludes large swathes of social-scientific research, since that research is both motivated by and conforms to progressive liberal values. Hence, although such research has political consequences, those consequences fit well with a liberal political outlook, and therefore we should accept their results much less critically, as it is a priori true that no individuals or groups could in principle be harmed by the political consequences which may flow from such research, even if it is ideologically biased.

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    3. I agree with David’s stance on reverse-engineering. I suspect that many of the critics of evolutionary psychology overlook the promise of reverse-engineering the cognitive architecture of the human mind. Psychological adaptations are vastly improbable arrangements of matter, and the only anti-entropic force in the known universe capable of the hill climbing that can yield such complex functional organization is natural selection. Furthermore, the more complicated the functional co-ordination of an adaptation, the better the odds that its adaptive rationale(s) can be gleaned. (This of course does not mean that it is easy to conduct adaptationist research programs in psychology, or that the various types of supplementary evidence should be ignored, or even that we should assume that every psychological adaptation is sufficiently functionally complex to be easy to reverse-engineer, inter alia.) Compare for instance the Acheulean hand axe with the apparent psychological adaptation for language: the former has an overall structure which underdetermines its function(s) (there are multiple postulated rationales that have been offered in the literature, any one of which could conceivably be true, or perhaps all), whereas the latter, at least at the broad level, has a fairly straightforward function (as argued in books such as Steven Pinker’s The Language Instinct).

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    4. Django,
      >since that research is both motivated by and conforms to progressive liberal values...therefore we should accept their results much less critically<

      The thing that truly matters is research motivated by and conforming with TRUTH.

      To bias science according to political orientation is unthinkably bad. Truth is value neutral, any other stance is plainly dishonest.

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    5. "Moreover, “communication” is a bit too generic: other primates don’t seem to need to be able to write Shakespeare’s sonnets in order to communicate, why do we?"


      Massimo, perhaps you know a work by a dutch historian, Huizinga, on an interesting hypothesis for the origin of culture: play. The book is Homo Ludens and proposes that the game is not a cultural product, but the behavior from which culture is weaved. And when he says 'culture', he means everything. Worth a reading as well as the ones of some of his successors, like Caillois.

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  9. David,

    > First, saying that "humans are far less beholden to their genetic leash" implicitly erects a false dichotomy between biology and culture. <

    No, it doesn’t. Certainly culture is made possible by biology, but if you think that humans are not dramatically different in that respect from any other species on the planet you haven’t been much around said planet.

    > the leash metaphor is a terrible metaphor <

    It’s just a turn of phrase. My specialty as an evolutionary biologist is gene-environment interactions, so I can assure I’m aware of the many nuances involved here.

    > Yes our brains are more plastic than other animals, and yes our brains are more sensitive to certain aspects of the environment (e.g. culture), but those facts in and of themselves do not suggest that the human brain is anymore difficult to understand in terms of evolution as any other biological organ <

    I think you are very much mistake on this.

    > Plasticity, after all, is subject to natural selection just like anything else and can either be adaptive or maladaptive. <

    I know, I wrote a book about it: http://goo.gl/nAfMDL

    > Studying human plasticity in adaptationist terms (e.g. from a life history perspective) is a worthy and necessary project, and you have (again, unfortunately) provided no arguments why this project should not be undertaken <

    Better than that: I never said it “shouldn’t” be done. I just said one should be particularly careful while doing it.

    > That would certainly be the case if the focus of evo psych was behavior and not the psychological mechanisms that cause behavior; hence the name "evo psych" and not "evo behavior." <

    I think you are mistaken. Evopsych doesn’t study the brain at all (that’s the province of neuro-anatomy), it only studies behaviors that originate from that brain.

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    3. Massimo,

      Rather than actually engaging with any of my arguments, you seem content to either trumpet your credentials (e.g. "I know, I wrote a book on it," "I can assure you I'm aware of the many nuances involved") or flat-out dismiss what I'm saying without argument (e.g. "I think you are very much mistaken on this.") This doesn't seem like the kind of response that belongs on a blog called "rationally speaking."

      Further, you are simply wrong when you write:

      "Evopsych doesn’t study the brain at all (that’s the province of neuro-anatomy), it only studies behaviors that originate from that brain."

      Evolutionary psychology studies the cognitive programs that are instantiated in the brain, just like the rest of cognitive science. (Note how it's called "cognitive" science and not "behavioral" science). The only difference is that evo psych's investigations are informed by evolutionary theory. If you had paid more than a passing glance to any of the founding texts of evo psych, or any of the current studies being done in the field, you would know this.

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    4. Very good to and fro, David, I enjoyed that. I have been trying to draw the regulars here onto straighter paths of logic, without much success. They may censure this post, but in the hope it gets through, you might enjoy my free book on this subject at http://thehumandesign.net

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    5. Humans less constrained by a genetics than other creatures? Genetics as a leash? I could have sworn I explained the role and relevance of evolutionary psychology a year ago, and I am not going to repeat it all again, but I can correct you.

      Genetics is not a leash. It's a constraint, very obviously, and I think you use the leash analogy to make a colourful distinction from other animals, as if we are less...constrained?

      An awkward use of a loaded analogy, but let's say you mean we are less constrained. But I say we are just as constrained but less niche structured, perhaps that's what you mean? We are just as constrained, and we mutate and get sick etc. but out structure is very reasonable, literally.

      So what? That's not genetic constraint. It's the same genetics and biological constraints to living, but with reasoning thrown in. Perhaps that's what you mean. It's difficult to work out, with sloppy analogies.

      Assuming that's the case, and? You want to know what creates reasoning from mutations, the step to apes, or other steps down the line? The step to apes is one to look at, but I think you need to look instead at how settled genetics evolves neurons as representatives of chemical functions, in humans, first.

      Back to square one. Entity in world mutating chemical functions with neurons for their representations of themselves in the world. Read my book. Logic, and no bollocks (as our British friends like David Hume like to say).

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    6. I didn't intend to linger. but that's guff about evolutionary psychology. It extends fundamentally to brain research, as all adaptive moves are motor reactions to sensory inputs from environment, and that process is not merely blindly accepted, it is investigated.

      Plasticity is interesting and there can be no doubt that our immediate copying capacities far outstrip animals' niche copying, even allowing lovely birdsong. A result of more cortices, bigger ones, more processing, or better processing? Where does Plasticity fit in?

      Plasticity is merely the integration of impulses for coordinated functions. Assumptions that other functions are working in seamless coordination, by concomitant neural networking. And? Are we better at that than other animals? Is that more or better processing, by your definition?

      No point going around in circles with vague definitions. If you tighten them up like Socrates, we might get somewhere. I assume you put Plasticity in the better category, rather than the more category of processing, but I put it in both categories. Pay attention, the more can make the better even better in a particular brain change at humans.

      You are into areas you seem to barely understand, and even I need to be careful with my terms here. A bird in a niche would prioritize its sensory inputs, to literally feel a niche, while human use the motor to present options to the sensory, for schemes. Motor control, rather than sensory basking.

      This is a qualitatively different experience, of control and independence, and requires a particular kind of plasticity applied in sensory-motor balance rather than sensory and back to sensory. Greater plasticity by any definition, and not the same process. More processing of that kind in humans unlocks Plastic potential beyond its application or tendency in other species.

      Deep, hard to pick up, but easy to read in my book. Like steering the Titanic to safer waters, this, and the rudder is stuck. That's three gongs so far. I will retire before the cockcrow.

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  10. @Disagreeable me

    "The problem is the relationship between genes and the observed behaviour (which is all we have to go on when inferring the underlying psychology) is much more straightforward in animals without culture."

    I disagree twice:

    1) The relationship between genes and behavior is not "all we have to go on when inferring the underlying psychology." In fact, it is not what any psychologist "goes on" when studying the brain. What psychologists typically do is study the patterned relationship between inputs and outputs of the brain and construct computational models of the mechanisms that receive those inputs and produce those outputs. For instance, the inputs to one system in the brain include visual images of snakes and spiders, and the outputs include heightened blood pressure, heart rate, and focused attention. The "fear system" is a computational model of what is in the head that does these things, and this model can be revised with empirical evidence and, increasingly, mapped onto actual structures in the brain. Genes need not be involved in this analysis *at all*. Evolutionary psychologists simply do this same kind of work, except that their hypothesized mechanisms are informed by evolutionary theory and the logic of adaptationism.

    2) This type of analysis is not "much more straightforward" in animals without culture. In fact, this type of analysis, typically conducted within the field of cognitive ecology, is often extremely complex, requiring extremely hard work to unravel. Do you think, for instance, that echolocation or celestial navigation is "much more straightforward" than, say, human mate choice? All cognitive adaptations are complex in their own rite, and just because some of our cognitive adaptations evolved to mesh with cultural input does not make them any more or less straightforward. Why should adaptations to cultural environments be inherently more difficult to understand than adaptations to auditory or celestial environments? All adaptations are complex and sophisticated; that's why they're such a fascinating area of research.


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    1. Very good, David, no issue with your comments on 1 or 2, I think we are going to be friends.

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    2. (Recommented to fix an error)

      Hi David,

      I have to say that I don't see how (1) disagrees with what I said. My phrasing was perhaps ambiguous, so you appear to be attacking a position I didn't mean to promote.

      I'm not saying that evopsych people use genes to infer psychology. When I said "the relationship between genes and the observed behaviour (which is all we have to go on...)", the parenthetical "which" was intended to refer to "the observed behaviour", and not "the relationship between genes and the observed behaviour". All the empirical evidence you discuss in this paragraph is behavioural, and so perfectly consistent with my position.

      >Do you think, for instance, that echolocation or celestial navigation is "much more straightforward" than, say, human mate choice?<

      As for your objection (2), I think you're subtly missing my point. I'm not saying that behaviours and cognitive systems in animals without culture are inherently simpler, I'm saying that their relationship to the naturally selected genetic inheritance and thus evolutionary pressures is more straightforward.

      When discussing celestial navigation or echolocation it is absolutely obvious that these are adaptive systems which have evolved because they aid the animal in getting from A to B under various conditions. If you want to explain why men are attracted to women with large breasts, on the other hand, it's much harder (but not impossible) to be sure whether any observed effects are the result of natural selection or culture.

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    3. Hi Disagreeable,

      Yea, I missed what you were saying with (1). My bad.

      In regard to (2), fair point on the "large breast" issue, though I don't think the distinction goes as far as you suggest. Say you're studying celestial navigation in birds and you're wondering whether all birds are hard-wired to track certain constellations, or whether birds track different constellations contingent on where and when they grew up. Nobody doubts that birds have a celestial navigation system; the question is, how does the system work? How open-ended is it?

      Similarly, with the "large breast" issue, nobody doubts that humans have a mating system that attracts them to certain people more than others. The question is, how does the system work? How open-ended is it? Are all men hard-wired to prefer certain features of women, like large breasts? Or do men come to prefer different features of women contingent on where and when they grew up? Note how this is exactly the same type of question posed in the celestial navigation example.

      The point is, when the focus is on the mate attraction system, rather than a particular feature of that system (being attracted to large breasts), the question of whether its genetic or cultural is meaningless. Obviously its going to take input from the environment to function properly; the question is, how much so? How open-ended should we expect it to be given its function? What is it's function, anyways? And is it even one system, as opposed to two (e.g. one for short-term flings and one for long-term relationships)? What kind of system(s) should we expect natural selection to have endowed us with given what we know about our evolutionary history? These are the questions that good evo psychologists ask. And they aim to answer them with the tools of cognitive science, developmental psychology, game theory, and cross-cultural research. Only bad evo psychologists ask questions like "are men genetically programmed to like big breasts?" and hope to answer it in any kind of straightforward way.

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    4. Hi David,

      >Yea, I missed what you were saying with (1). My bad. <

      Well, in fairness, it was ambiguous :)

      >Say you're studying celestial navigation in birds and you're wondering whether all birds are hard-wired to track certain constellations, or whether birds track different constellations contingent on where and when they grew up.<

      This is a perfect illustration of my point! The celestial navigation system becomes harder to understand in the context of evolution if bird "culture" may have influenced it.

      So, to the extent that any animal has culture, the relationship between what is innate and what is observed is more complicated, which makes evo psych as applied to humans particularly tricky.

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    5. Hi Disagreeable,

      I don't see why adaptations should be harder to understand the more contingent they are on features of the environment; every adaptation presents its own unique scientific challenges, regardless of how it works. Spider web-spinning may not be contingent on any features of the environment, but that doesn't mean it's any less difficult to understand; on the contrary (just read Climbing Mount Improbable by Dawkins). But for the sake of argument, let's grant that it is more difficult to understand adaptations when they're contingent on the environment. My point is that contingency on the environment is not a unique feature of human adaptations; it is present all throughout the animal kingdom. Thus, the argument that human brains are somehow distinct and special and more difficult to study than any other brain in the animal kingdom, or indeed any other adaptation in the animal kingdom, is wrong and probably stems from a kind of human exceptionalism. Cultural environments are no more inherently complex than auditory environments, visual environments, celestial environments, physical environments, social environments, etc. Show me why culture is more complex than the ever-shifting electromagnetic spectrum or the flurry of vibrations inside of a bat-filled cave and I'll buy your argument. But I don't think that argument can be made.

      Further, you continue to erect a false dichotomy between "innate" and "learned." The dichotomy does not exist in any straightforward way, as many philosophers have argued successfully. And the most plausible way for any kind of "culture" (bird or otherwise) to influence an adaptation is if the adaptation was "prepared" by evolution to be influenced by that cultural feature. I'm not influenced by the squeaks of bats because my auditory apparatus did not evolve to detect them. Bats are not influenced by our speech because they did not evolve to detect it. Thus, the influence of "culture" is not an *alternative* to adaptation, but is in fact an integral part of any adaptationist claim.

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    6. Hi David,

      Firstly, I'd like to say that my interpretation of your celestial navigation example was probably incorrect. I initially thought about it as birds learning navigation techniques from each other (culture), whereas what you had intended probably had more to do with the effect of latitude on the night sky.

      >Further, you continue to erect a false dichotomy between "innate" and "learned." <

      I know it's not simple, but there is something of a spectrum there, and, complexities aside, there is a certain sense in which one can say that certain things are innate (e.g. the ability to acquire language) and some things are not (e.g. the ability to speak English).

      I'm not trying to propose a simplistic world view, but just because there are complexities and differences of degree doesn't mean that everything is the same.

      -------

      On the larger topic, I think a problem might be that we have different conceptions of what evopsych is. I'm quite prepared to defer to you on this, as you seem to know what you're talking about. I seem to get most of my evopsych talk from sites like pharyngula where perhaps unfairly bad examples of it are frequently discussed.

      In particular, I am under the (mis?)apprehension that evopsych is mostly about explaining certain behaviour in terms of historical evolutionary pressures. You, on the other hand, seem to take a broader view that I find difficult to distinguish from psychology in general, where what we're ultimately seeking to do is simply explain and predict behaviour.

      >Cultural environments are no more inherently complex than auditory environments, visual environments, celestial environments, physical environments, social environments, etc.<

      I'm not sure what the distinction between cultural environment and social environment might be.

      In any case, I have to say I disagree, because cultural environments are affected by their own pressures and evolve over time in a very complex and unpredictable way. This is not surprising, as societies have as their fundamental units the human individual, whereas physical systems are built on the comparatively simple laws of physics.

      And this is why I find it hard to reconcile the notion that humans are no more problematic to work with than other animals with my understanding of evopsych. The unique complexity and unpredictability of human culture makes an inordinate amount of human behaviour entirely contingent, perhaps even random from the point of view of a neutral observer.

      As such. it seems to me that it is a very tricky job to identify which behaviours are best explained in terms of evolutionary pressures and which are down to the vagaries of culture.

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    7. Hi Disagreeable,

      "In particular, I am under the (mis?)apprehension that evopsych is mostly about explaining certain behaviour in terms of historical evolutionary pressures."

      Yes, that is a misapprehension. Evo pych is just regular psych, except that the hypotheses are derived from evolutionary theory.

      "You, on the other hand, seem to take a broader view that I find difficult to distinguish from psychology in general, where what we're ultimately seeking to do is simply explain and predict behaviour."

      That "broader view" is not just my view but the view of the people who call themselves evolutionary psychologists. For what it's worth, I'm one of them; I'm currently working on my PhD in the field.

      Here are some good summaries of the field:

      http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.137.3163&rep=rep1&type=pdf

      http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homepage/group/busslab/pdffiles/evolutionary_psychology_AP_2010.pdf

      http://www.anth.ucsb.edu/projects/human/evpsychfaq.html

      And yes, P.Z. Meyers has an extremely biased, ignorant, and incorrect view of the field. If you'd like to get a more balanced opinion on these issues, I recommend Rob Kurzban's "Evolutionary Psychology Blog," as well as Ed Clint's "Incredulous." Ed Clint is a prominent member of the skeptic/freethinker movement and also might otherwise appeal to you.

      We may not get past our disagreements on the complexity of human culture, but just a few quick remarks:

      "Cultural environments are affected by their own pressures and evolve over time in a very complex and unpredictable way."

      I agree but so does the sonic environment in a bat cave. The chaotic flurry of vibrations of thousands of bats, insects, mice, wind, droppings, etc. is unfathomably complex and unpredictable, and it is every bit as dependent upon the movements, calls, flight patterns, and hunting strategies of the myriad bats and insects as human cultures are by the myriad humans that constitute them. I really don't think it's any different, though I admit it's a bit counterintuitive to think about.

      In any case I don't buy your distinction between language acquisition as innate and speaking english as learned. Speaking english depends on innate learning mechanisms and couldn't be possible without them. We only learn the types of things our brains have evolved to learn. Any complete explanation of any psychological phenomenon must inevitably appeal to both "innate" psychological mechanisms and the environmental input they evolved to process. One cannot be understood without the other.

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    8. David - I've noticed that in the atheist/skeptic blogosphere the coverage of evo psych is overwhelmingly negative and it rarely ever gets properly defended. I've read your comments in this thread and thought they were pretty amazing - have you thought of maybe starting a blog?

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    9. @David:
      "I don't see why adaptations should be harder to understand the more contingent they are on features of the environment;"
      "(just read Climbing Mount Improbable by Dawkins)."
      Those two snippets don't match at all when you realize that Dawkins saw the environment as an after the fact element of selection rather than before the fact.
      In addition, Dawkins would not have seen any of these behavioral adaptations as heritable (because that's what we're talking about, the motivational aspects of behaviors). Dawkins in fact invented memes to get around the heritablity problem of learned behaviors.
      Sooner or later, you're going to have to disavow these Dawkinisms to progress, but of course, the Massimos and other such public stance takers will like you even less as a result.

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    10. @David

      I suspect you've gone from this conversation. I was travelling myself so am replying a little late. Thanks for your insight

      >"In particular, I am under the (mis?)apprehension that evopsych is mostly about explaining certain behaviour in terms of historical evolutionary pressures."

      Yes, that is a misapprehension. Evo pych is just regular psych, except that the hypotheses are derived from evolutionary theory.
      <
      If there's a difference between my interpretation of evo psych and yours, it's a subtle one, and I don't see it.

      I thank you for the links explaining further and may look into it if I have time.

      Good points on the developing sonic environment in a bat cave, though I still think culture is more complex and unpredictable.

      >In any case I don't buy your distinction between language acquisition as innate and speaking english as learned. Speaking english depends on innate learning mechanisms and couldn't be possible without them. <

      I think you miss my point. What's innate is the ability to acquire language. This facilitates the learning of English. Of course the learning depends on the innate mechanisms, this is abundantly clear and in fact the reason I chose this example. Nevertheless, you are not born speaking a specific language. Some observed behavioural phenomena, such as the specific words we use to represent specific objects, are better understood in terms of culture rather than genetics (although genetics ultimately enables all behaviours).

      The point is that if we were alien biologists studying a population comprised only of English speakers, it might be difficult to tell if our genes could support languages other than English or whether the fact that we speak English is a historical accident. In order to use evopsych effectively, it seems to me that you need to know which is the case.

      Thanks for the exchange.

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  11. Massimo, I am not sure there are more bad studies in ev psych than in any other field, and more important, not the ones that are published by experts in the field. Just because someone, without a proper background, publishes a paper that has evolutionary explanation in it, does not make it any representative of the field. As you probably know, there are infinite number of journals today that one can publish almost anything.

    For what I know, most ev psych papers are very careful in drawing their conclusions and very few of them contain the outrages claims you hear in the media. In fact, even you made a slightly exaggerated claim here regarding the famous "rape" book by Thornhill and Palmer. In the book, Palmer present the opinion that rape is a by product and not an adaptation, contra to Thornhill.

    Also, I am not sure that I agree with you that such studies should have higher bar. I think that researchers should be careful in their conclusions (as I believe most of them are), but if they have done a study in par with other research, why should they hold it back? That way you not only create a bias towards publishing studies from only one side, but you also make it very difficult for researchers to get published and put them in disadvantage compared to their peers. Just imagine a new researcher that want to study rape or any other hot topic from evolutionary perspective. Should he or she be scared because the results are misinterpreted? Few people will research these topics and they would remain understudied. I believe the scientific committee should decide what is good and what's bad.

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  12. @ Massimo

    > So, I agree with Jerry that it is silly to reject evopsych outright. It is a borderline field that can easily produce crap as well as good stuff. <

    What is your opinion of "memetics?" It seems to have a lot more explanatory power (in regards to cultural evolution - language, morality, etc.) than evolutionary psychology.

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    1. @ Disagreeable Me

      > He doesn't like it! <

      But we know that you do.

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    2. Yes, I'm quite open to the idea of memes as a useful concept in discussions of cultural evolution, however I'm much less convinced of it as a practical science, for example because there's no clearly defined unit of inheritance.

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    3. @ Disagreeable Me

      > however I'm much less convinced of it as a practical science, for example because there's no clearly defined unit of inheritance. <

      You could have made the same argument of Darwin's theory of natural selection when "The Origin of Species" was first published.

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    4. @Alistair

      Sure! Your point being? It certainly doesn't prove that memetics will be fruitful. Again, I'm doubtful, not dismissing.

      But there's some differences between natural selection and memetics.

      1) There was and is every reason to believe there *is* a unit of genetic inheritance. It's very hard to see how there could a unit of memetic inheritance.
      2) Natural selection explains design driven by dumb natural forces. Memetics explains the development and spreading of ideas promoted by intelligent beings. It's much more complicated as a result.

      So, while I do think it is a good analogy and sometimes a useful and even correct way to think about the spread of ideas, I really don't see it leading to the same kinds of breakthroughs that we have got from genetics.

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    5. @ Disagreeable Me

      > Sure! Your point being? It certainly doesn't prove that memetics will be fruitful. Again, I'm doubtful, not dismissing. <

      The point being that you would have been wrong on the prospects of Darwin's theory.

      Also, Blackmore has made one prediction in regards to human imitation that has already been validated.

      "Her [Blackmore's] prediction on the central role played by imitation as the cultural replicator and the neural structures that must be unique to humans in order to facilitate them have recently been given further support by research on mirror neurons and the differences in extent of these structures between humans and the presumed closest branch of simian ancestors.[20]" (source: Wikipedia: Susan Blackmore)

      "There was and is every reason to believe there *is* a unit of genetic inheritance. It's very hard to see how there could a unit of memetic inheritance "

      Both genes and memes can be described in terms of "information."

      A meme is "a unit of information residing in a brain." - Richard Dawkins

      "2) Natural selection explains design driven by dumb natural forces. Memetics explains the development and spreading of ideas promoted by intelligent beings. It's much more complicated as a result."

      Natural selection and memetic selection are exactly the same in this respect.

      "We once thought that biological design needed a creator, but we now know that natural selection can do all the designing on its own. Similarly, we once thought that human design required a conscious designer inside us, but we now know that memetic selection can do it on its own." (source: pg. 242, "The Meme Machine" by Susan Blackmore)

      Delete
    6. "Natural selection explains design driven by dumb natural forces."
      "Natural selection and memetic selection are exactly the same in this respect."

      Dumb?

      Delete
    7. Hi Alastair:

      >The point being that you would have been wrong on the prospects of Darwin's theory.<

      Again, so what? Just because Darwin was right doesn't mean Blackmore is right. And just because I doubt the usefulness of memetics now doesn't mean that I wouldn't have supported Darwin then. For the reasons I've mentioned, the two are quite different theories.

      >have recently been given further support by research on mirror neurons and the differences in extent of these structures between humans and the presumed closest branch of simian ancestors.[20]<

      Hmm. That seems to be only one way of interpreting this evidence. I'm not sure this counts as a prediction.

      >Both genes and memes can be described in terms of "information."<

      Of course they can. But genes are represented by specific sequences of codons in the brain, codons that can be analysed, copied and interfered with in the lab. Memes have no such direct physical units of information. There is no sense in which you can tell me how many bits of information a given meme contains, but you could do this for a given gene.

      >Natural selection and memetic selection are exactly the same in this respect.<

      It seems we're talking about different things. You seem to be entertaining the idea of memes as being crucial to understanding human intelligence and consciousness, which I gather is what Blackmore proposes in The Meme Machine (I haven't read it). I'm not familiar with this idea, but on the face of it it seems unlikely to me.

      I'm talking about how culture changes and evolves as memes spread throughout the population with differential rates of propagation, so that we tend to end up with the most common memes being those which best encourage their own promotion.

      The difference between cultural evolution and biological evolution is that intelligent agents (us) are directly and deliberately guiding the course of cultural evolution, whereas this is not the case for biological evolution.

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    8. @Baron P
      >Dumb?<
      Unintelligent.

      I have no interest in debating with you again how an unintelligent process like evolution can give rise to intelligent creatures like us. If you want a defense of my point of view, just read a book by any prominent evolutionary biologist.

      Delete
    9. Disagreeable:
      I've read Lifelines by Steven Rose and and more importantly, Evolution, a View from the 21st Century, James A Shapiro, downloadable from here:
      http://shapiro.bsd.uchicago.edu/evolution21.shtml

      They find your point of view as indefensible, and I'm sure you knew that.

      explain |ikˈsplān|
      verb [ reporting verb ]
      make (an idea, situation, or problem) clear to someone by describing it in more detail or revealing relevant facts or ideas.
      And I repeat, you have never explained HOW an unintelligent process can gave rise to an intelligent creature. Never. Period.

      Delete
    10. @ Disagreeable Me

      > Again, so what? Just because Darwin was right doesn't mean Blackmore is right. And just because I doubt the usefulness of memetics now doesn't mean that I wouldn't have supported Darwin then. <

      Previously you stated..."I'm much less convinced of it [memetics] as a practical science, for example because there's no clearly defined unit of inheritance. "

      Well, guess what? There was "no clearly defined unit of inheritance" when Darwin published "The Origin of the Species." So, the very same argument that you have employed to undermine Blackmore's theory of memetic selection could have been leveled against Darwin's theory of natural selection. (You can't have it both ways.)

      > Hmm. That seems to be only one way of interpreting this evidence. I'm not sure this counts as a prediction. <

      "I [Susan Blackmore] would not be surprised if specific neurons were found that carry out some of the basic tasks of imitation." (source: pg. 81, "The Meme Machine" by Susan Blackmore)

      These specific neurons have been found. They're called "mirror neurons."

      > Of course they can. But genes are represented by specific sequences of codons in the brain, codons that can be analysed, copied and interfered with in the lab. Memes have no such direct physical units of information. There is no sense in which you can tell me how many bits of information a given meme contains, but you could do this for a given gene. <

      Darwin's "The Origin of Species" was published in 1859. However, we did not understand the structure of DNA until 1950's.

      "We may get a long way with the general principles of memetic selection without understanding the brain mechanisms it relies on." (source: pg. 57, "The Meme Machine" by Susan Blackmore)

      > The difference between cultural evolution and biological evolution is that intelligent agents (us) are directly and deliberately guiding the course of cultural evolution, whereas this is not the case for biological evolution. <

      Neither genetic evolution nor memetic evolution requires the guiding of an intelligent agent. You apparently believe that you have a "self" that can exert some kind of causal effect in the world. As such, you qualify as a "creationist of the mind."

      Delete
    11. @ Baron P

      > "Natural selection explains design driven by dumb natural forces."
      "Natural selection and memetic selection are exactly the same in this respect." <

      You got it! Neither natural selection nor memetic selection requires the guiding light of an intelligent agent. What this means is that the design of the human eyeball as well as the design of a pocket watch are both the results of a blind evolutionary process.

      Delete
    12. Dawkins invented memes to try to get around the neoDarwinian belief that learned behaviors were not heritable, even though it was obvious that instinctive behaviors were. He never came up with an explanation of why instinctive behaviors were, except that they were somehow naturally selected non-intelligently, and intelligently learned behaviors somehow weren't naturally selectable.
      Blackwell and other pseudo-scientists then jumped on the meme bandwagon and see no reason to get off.

      Delete
    13. @Alastair,
      "Neither natural selection nor memetic selection requires the guiding light of an intelligent agent. What this means is that the design of the human eyeball as well as the design of a pocket watch are both the results of a blind evolutionary process."
      I've always been curious as to how those items learned to be intelligently used. But of course if you knew, you'd tell me.

      Delete
    14. @ Baron P

      > Dawkins invented memes to try to get around the neoDarwinian belief that learned behaviors were not heritable, even though it was obvious that instinctive behaviors were. <

      Dawkins invented the term in order to explain how Darwinian principles could be applied to other forms of evolution, not just biological evolution.

      Delete
    15. @Alastair
      >So, the very same argument that you have employed to undermine Blackmore's theory of memetic selection could have been leveled against Darwin's theory of natural selection.<

      >Darwin's "The Origin of Species" was published in 1859. However, we did not understand the structure of DNA until 1950's. <

      I know.

      But it's inconceivable that there's anything analogous to the genetic code for memes. There is no straightforward encoding of ideas in a human brain, whatever the encoding is, you know it's going to be complex, subtle and that each human brain is going to represent ideas differently.

      Anyway, I think the point I'm making is more applicable to genetics than to Darwin, in any case. If you want to talk about analogies to Darwin, then my other argument which maintains that memes are produced by intelligent minds is more applicable.

      On Blackmore's prediction of mirror neurons, your quote does provide evidence for that, so I concede the point. (Although actually I have rather a different interpretation for what mirror neurons mean, but I'm not an expert so I'll leave that for now).

      > You apparently believe that you have a "self" that can exert some kind of causal effect in the world. As such, you qualify as a "creationist of the mind."<

      Stop throwing this accusation around so liberally. It becomes increasingly difficult to know what you mean when everyone is a creationist of the mind. I'm nothing of the sort. I believe the mind arises from the computations going on in the brain. That's what my "self" is, an aggregation of computational processes. That doesn't mean that the product of these processes is not an intelligent agent.

      Delete
    16. @ Disagreeable Me

      > Stop throwing this accusation around so liberally. It becomes increasingly difficult to know what you mean when everyone is a creationist of the mind. <

      Not everyone subscribes to "creationism of the mind." (e.g. Susan Blackmore doesn't; Sam Harris doesn't.)

      > I'm nothing of the sort. I believe the mind arises from the computations going on in the brain. That's what my "self" is, an aggregation of computational processes. That doesn't mean that the product of these processes is not an intelligent agent. <

      (The following is a copy of my last post to Massimo. It is applicable here.)

      Someone who believes that an intelligent agent is required to explain the apparent design we see in living organisms is termed a "creationist." Right?

      Someone who believes that an intelligent agent is required to explain the apparent design we see in human artifacts can be appropriately termed a "creationist of the mind." Why? Because he believes that an intelligent agent is required to explain human thought-processes and creativity.

      Memetic theory employs Darwinian principles (random variation and selection) to explain human thought-processes and creativity. As such, it holds that there is no intelligent agent guiding human thought-processes and creativity. Our thoughts are simply the result of an evolutionary process blindly playing itself out. The notion that we have a "self" that acts as some kind of causal agent (a.k.a. free will) is an illusion. If you believe that you have a self that employs free will in order to guide your thought-processes and creativity, then you qualify as a "creationist of the mind."

      "We once thought that biological design needed a creator, but we now know that natural selection can do all the designing on its own. Similarly, we once thought that human design required a conscious designer inside us, but we now know that memetic selection can do it on its own." (source: pg. 242, "The Meme Machine" by Susan Blackmore)

      Delete
    17. @Alastair
      >Someone who believes that an intelligent agent is required to explain the apparent design we see in living organisms is termed a "creationist." Right?

      Someone who believes that an intelligent agent is required to explain the apparent design we see in human artifacts can be appropriately termed a "creationist of the mind."<

      No, if you followed the analogy then that would be a "creationist of human artifacts", which I suppose I am. I think human artifacts were designed and created.

      >As such, it holds that there is no intelligent agent guiding human thought-processes and creativity.<

      You're missing the point. Even if memetic theory were correct (which I'm not denying as I haven't read the book), there's still an intelligent agent, it's just that it's created by the interaction of the memes. You shouldn't derail discussions all the time just because someone mentions the idea that humans are intelligent agents.

      >If you believe that you have a self that employs free will in order to guide your thought-processes and creativity, then you qualify as a "creationist of the mind."<

      I don't believe in free will. I don't believe in a central self. I think that there are a lot of processes going on in the mind and that the self arises from the interaction of those processes. This view is broad enough that it's probably compatible with memetic theory.

      Delete
    18. @ Disagreeable Me

      > No, if you followed the analogy then that would be a "creationist of human artifacts", which I suppose I am. I think human artifacts were designed and created. <

      The bottom line is that philosophical naturalism necessarily demands that all apparent design in nature (be it human eyeballs or pocket watches) be explained in terms of blind natural processes. (Blackmore's naturalism is logically consistent; yours is not.)

      > You're missing the point. Even if memetic theory were correct (which I'm not denying as I haven't read the book), there's still an intelligent agent, it's just that it's created by the interaction of the memes. You shouldn't derail discussions all the time just because someone mentions the idea that humans are intelligent agents. <

      You qualify as a "creationist of the mind." (You believe that agency is required to explain human thought-processes. A true evolutionist would be able to account for the APPARENT intelligence that human beings exhibit by invoking Darwinian processes.)

      > I don't believe in free will. I don't believe in a central self. I think that there are a lot of processes going on in the mind and that the self arises from the interaction of those processes. This view is broad enough that it's probably compatible with memetic theory. <

      It's seems to me that you are wavering.

      By the way, Blackmore calls out Dawkins on this issue.

      Delete
    19. @Alastair

      I'm not wavering, I was never a "creationist of the mind" in the first place!

      An intelligent agent is an actor that takes input from the environment and makes changes to the environment according to some sophisticated information processing. By this definition, humans are clearly intelligent agents.

      By your account, what Blackmore offers is an explanation of how it is that we are intelligent agents, not a denial of our intelligent agency.

      I remain unconvinced about Blackmore's thesis, but perhaps reading her book would change my mind.

      Delete
    20. @ Disagreeable Me

      > What Blackmore offers is an explanation of how it is that we are intelligent agents, not a denial of our intelligent agency <

      Incorrect. Blackmore employs Darwinian processes to explain the organized complexity exhibited in a pocket watch even as Dawkins employs Darwinian processes to explain the organized complexity exhibited in a human eyeball.

      "I (Susan Blackmore) want to emphasise that consciousness cannot do anything. The subjectivity, the 'what it's like to be me now' is not a force, or a CAUSAL AGENT, that can make things happen." (emphasis mine) (source: pg. 238, "The Meme Machine" by Susan Blackmore)

      "The whole point about evolutionary theory is that you do not need anyone to direct it, least of all consciously." (source: pg. 239, "The Meme Machine" by Susan Blackmore)

      I can properly characterize you as a "creationist/IDer." Why? Because you believe it is necessary to invoke an intelligent agent to account for the organized complexity we see in pocket watches.

      Delete
    21. @Alastair

      >> What Blackmore offers is an explanation of how it is that we are intelligent agents, not a denial of our intelligent agency <

      Incorrect. Blackmore employs Darwinian processes to explain the organized complexity exhibited in a pocket watch even as Dawkins employs Darwinian processes to explain the organized complexity exhibited in a human eyeball.
      <

      Again, I have to disagree. I don't see your explanation as a contradiction of what I said. It's perfectly compatible. I think you're missing the point that an intelligent agent may just be an entity that supervenes on a process of natural selection applied to memes.

      Not that I buy that, but it's a view that synthesises both your views and mine. The two views are compatible.

      In short, please stop calling me a creationist of the mind. I'm not because I do think that the mind is explainable in terms of basic non-mystical stuff (memes or otherwise), unlike real creationists who think that you need God to explain the design in nature.

      I certainly don't think that the explanatory buck stops with intelligent agency.

      Delete
    22. @ Disagreeable Me

      > Again, I have to disagree. I don't see your explanation as a contradiction of what I said. It's perfectly compatible. <

      Previously you argued: "What Blackmore offers is an explanation of how it is that we are intelligent agents, not a denial of our intelligent agency."

      This is INCORRECT. Blackmore emphatically and unequivocally DENIES intelligent agency! (I've read her book. You, by your own admission, have not. I know what she has written. You do not. Moreover, I have cited her to prove my claim.)

      > I think you're missing the point that an intelligent agent may just be an entity that supervenes on a process of natural selection applied to memes. <

      The point is that you believe an intelligent agent must be posited in order to explain why there are pocket watches in the world. As such, you qualify as a "creationist." (By the way, you have already conceded that you qualify as a "creationist of human artifacts." So, I fail to see why you are continuing to argue the point.)

      Delete
    23. @Alastair

      Your description of Blackmore's thesis is not consistent with a denial of human agency. If that's what she's arguing you're not presenting her argument very well. I suspect it's more likely that you're misunderstanding me or her, or that I'm misunderstanding you.

      >By the way, you have already conceded that you qualify as a "creationist of human artifacts." So, I fail to see why you are continuing to argue the point.<

      Because human artifacts are created by humans. This should not be surprising or controversial. I'm not advocating any mystical position with regard to how or why humans do these actions. It could even be by means of memetic selection.

      This is why I just don't get your position - you seem to me to be denying that humans have agency, a position which is patent nonsense. Either you don't understand what agency means, you are too stubborn to admit you are wrong, or you're trolling. I'm honestly not sure which is true.

      Delete
    24. @Alastair

      Let me spell it out by giving you the dictionary definitions, from Merriam Webster.

      Agency: the capacity, condition, or state of acting or of exerting power

      People can act and can exert power, hence they are agents. This is irrefutable.

      Intelligent: the ability to apply knowledge to manipulate one's environment or to think abstractly as measured by objective criteria

      Humans are clearly intelligent.

      Hence, humans are intelligent agents. The reason I am 99% sure that Blackmore is not denying this, even though I have not read her book, is that she is not regarded as a nutcase. Furthermore, the quotations you have provided from her book do not support what you seem to be saying. Instead, they seem to be denying the role of consciousness.

      But note that I'm only asserting that humans are intelligent agents, not defending the role of consciousness in decision making.

      The explanation *has* to be that you are misunderstanding me or I am misunderstanding you.

      Delete
    25. @ Disagreeable Me

      > Your description of Blackmore's thesis is not consistent with a denial of human agency. If that's what she's arguing you're not presenting her argument very well. I suspect it's more likely that you're misunderstanding me or her, or that I'm misunderstanding you. <

      I will say this for the last time. Blackmore emphatically and unequivocally DENIES intelligent agency! The following quote makes this perfectly clear.

      "The self is not the initiator of actions, it does not 'have' consciousness, and it does not 'do' the deliberating. There is no truth in the idea of an inner self inside my body that controls the body and is conscious. Since this is false, so is the idea of my conscious self having free will." (source: pg. 237, "The Meme Machine" by Susan Blackmore)

      > Because human artifacts are created by humans. This should not be surprising or controversial. I'm not advocating any mystical position with regard to how or why humans do these actions. It could even be by means of memetic selection. <

      Both memetic selection and natural selection explain how organized complexity (something that appears to be designed) can come about without invoking an intelligent agent. If you argue otherwise, then you clearly do not understand evolutionary theory. That you believe an intelligent agent is required to explain how pocket watches came about qualifies you as a "creationist." (On the naturalistic worldview, everything (this would necessarily include pocket watches) must be the result of BLIND natural processes. To argue otherwise is to argue against the naturalistic worldview.)

      > This is why I just don't get your position - you seem to me to be denying that humans have agency, a position which is patent nonsense. Either you don't understand what agency means, you are too stubborn to admit you are wrong, or you're trolling. I'm honestly not sure which is true. <

      Agency presupposes "free will." To deny free will (which you have) is to deny agency. (Logic dictates this much.) If there is no agency, then there is no free will. If there is no free will, then there is no agency. Duh!

      "Free will is when 'I' consciously, freely, and deliberately decide to do something, and do it. In other words 'I' must be the agent for it to count as free will." (source: pg. 237, "The Meme Machine" by Susan Blackmore)

      Delete
    26. @Alistaire

      I think Blackmore's point is to deny there actually exists in humans something called 'the self', and by extension she is also denying the existence of the 'conscious self', or the 'acting self'. I don't see that she meant to imply anything about the presence or absence of concepts like agency, intelligence, or intelligent agents, as those terms are usually defined or as they may be defined in various scientific contexts.

      "Neither natural selection nor memetic selection requires the guiding light of an intelligent agent"

      Would it be closer to what you intend worded this way:

      "Neither natural selection nor memetic selection requires the guiding light of an supernatural agent"

      Delete
    27. @ Disagreeable Me

      > People can act and can exert power, hence they are agents. This is irrefutable. <

      If there is no free will, then there is no agency. If there is no agency, then there is no free will. It really is that simple.

      > Humans are clearly intelligent. <

      What you call intelligence is merely the blind processes of memetic evolution playing itself out. Unfortunately, you are so wedded to the dogma of "creationism," that you are incapable of intellectually grasping this simple explanation.

      Delete
    28. @ Marc Levesque

      > I think Blackmore's point is to deny there actually exists in humans something called 'the self', and by extension she is also denying the existence of the 'conscious self', or the 'acting self'. I don't see that she meant to imply anything about the presence or absence of concepts like agency, intelligence, or intelligent agents, as those terms are usually defined or as they may be defined in various scientific contexts. <

      Well, if there is no "conscious self" that is "acting," then there is no agent. (Sometimes the obvious must be explicitly stated because there are those amongst us who would obfuscate the issue.)

      Blackmore emphatically and unequivocally denies agency.

      "I [Susan Blackmore] want to EMPHASISE that consciousness cannot do anything. The subjectivity, the 'what it's like to be me now' is NOT a force, or a CAUSAL AGENT, that can make things happen." (emphasis mine) (source: pg. 238, "The Meme Machine" by Susan Blackmore)

      > Would it be closer to what you intend worded this way:

      "Neither natural selection nor memetic selection requires the guiding light of an supernatural agent" <

      No, it would not be closer. The term "selection" in both "natural selection" and "memetic selection" is meant to be figurative or metaphorical, not literal.
      If there is no free will, then there is no agent. Belief in free will is a belief that explicitly (or implicitly) presupposes the supernatural. Why? Because it posits a causal agent that transcends the natural (physical) world by definition.

      Merriam-Webster defines "free will" as "freedom of humans to make choices that are NOT determined by PRIOR CAUSES or by divine intervention."

      Delete
    29. @Alastair

      Again, it's clear to me that our positions are entirely compatible. You're just using a non-standard interpretation of agency.

      I don't believe in free will. I don't believe in a central self somewhere within the brain. I don't think consciousness is a particularly coherent phenomenon.

      An agent does not have to have consciousness. An agent does not have to have free will. An agent is just something that acts in response to stimuli. Even a thermostat could arguably be considered to be an agent. A Google webcrawler might be a better example.

      So, once again, I am not a creationist of the mind, because I don't need free will, consciousness etc to explain the artifacts that humans create. I am totally on board with the idea that all human behaviour can be boiled down to simple mechanical phenomena, and memetic selection, as far as I can tell, is compatible with this.

      So again, please stop calling me a creationist of the mind.

      Delete
    30. @ Disagreeable Me

      > An agent does not have to have consciousness. An agent does not have to have free will. An agent is just something that acts in response to stimuli. Even a thermostat could arguably be considered to be an agent. <

      You're pathetic. You're merely playing a semantical game (based on the metaphorical nature of language) in a vain attempt to divert attention away from the fact that your position is indefensible. "No free will...no agency. No agency...no free will."

      Delete
    31. >You're pathetic.<

      Way to lower the tone.

      >"No free will...no agency. No agency...no free will."<

      Where are you getting this from? This is an assertion that has nothing to do with the meaning of the word "agency" as I understand it.

      I'm not playing a semantic game, I'm trying to explain my position, which is compatible with yours.

      You are using a very idiosyncratic definition of "agent" which makes talking to you on this very difficult. This was not clear to me until quite recently. I even gave you dictionary definitions to help to explain my position.

      Now that I understand what you mean by "agent" and you understand what I mean why can't you accept that
      our positions are compatible and we just misunderstood each other?

      I other words, what is it about my *position* that you find so indefensible?

      Delete
    32. @ Disagreeable Me

      > I'm not playing a semantic game, I'm trying to explain my position, which is compatible with yours. <

      The honorable thing for you do at this time is to simply concede the point.

      Delete
    33. Concede what point?

      I mean, I am dumbfounded. I have no idea on what basis you think you have proven any point except that you don't know what "agent" means.

      Delete
    34. @Alastair

      I'm still convinced there's been some misunderstanding.

      Can I ask you please to articulate what it is that you think my position is or was? Do you think my position has changed, and I'm denying it, or do you think I still hold a position that you disagree with?

      Delete
    35. @Alastair

      I was mixing up Suzan Blackmore with someone else, I assumed she was in a field like game theory, cog-psyc, or artificial intelligence. So I read-up on her, and it now appears pretty clear to me she does not only not believe in the self, she also does not believe in a religious soul or a mind (a mind as often assumed in mind-brain duality or mind-body duality) and clearly does not believe they are a, or the, source of human agency, or that that kind of agency exist in the first place. So I stand corrected, in a scientific field (assuming philosophy can be considered a scientific field) the word agency may refer to concepts that are very similar to concepts like creationism. But agency, when the word is defined in that way, is not implied by the words intelligence or agent, or an expression like 'intelligent agent', in philosophy, biology, computer science, or any field as far as I can tell.

      So, independently of the subject of your arguments with Disagreeable Me or Massimo, I think a proposition like "Someone who believes that an intelligent agent is required to explain the apparent design we see in human artifacts can be appropriately termed a 'creationist of the mind.' " does not follow from your previous arguments, or makes sense on its own.

      Delete
    36. @ Marc Lévesque

      > So I read-up on her [Susan Blackmore], and it now appears pretty clear to me she does not only not believe in the self, she also does not believe in a religious soul or a mind (a mind as often assumed in mind-brain duality or mind-body duality) and clearly does not believe they are a, or the, source of human agency, or that that kind of agency exist in the first place. <

      That's correct. (Note that you said that "kind of agency". That kind of agent refers to "intelligent agency.")

      > So I stand corrected, in a scientific field (assuming philosophy can be considered a scientific field) the word agency may refer to concepts that are very similar to concepts like creationism. But agency, when the word is defined in that way, is not implied by the words intelligence or agent, or an expression like 'intelligent agent', in philosophy, biology, computer science, or any field as far as I can tell. <

      We are talking about intelligent agents, not chemical agents. (You know that, I know that, "Disagreeable Me" knows that.)

      > So, independently of the subject of your arguments with Disagreeable Me or Massimo, I think a proposition like "Someone who believes that an intelligent agent is required to explain the apparent design we see in human artifacts can be appropriately termed a 'creationist of the mind.' " does not follow from your previous arguments, or makes sense on its own. <

      To reiterate: "We are talking about intelligent agents, not chemical agents. (You know that, I know that, "Disagreeable Me" knows that.)"

      To comment any further on your argument (an argument which you have obviously borrowed from "Disagreeable Me" in a lame attempt to "save face") is to give it a modicum of respect that it certainly does not deserve.

      Delete
    37. >We are talking about intelligent agents, not chemical agents. (You know that, I know that, "Disagreeable Me" knows that.)<

      Of course!

      But intelligent agents don't have to have free will or consciousness. At least I have not before come into contact with the view that they did, apart from those who you would call "creationists of the mind" at least.

      Please, I entreat you, can you please explain to me what you think my position is? I just don't understand the vitriol, as our positions seem to me to be broadly compatible.

      Delete
    38. @Alastair

      It's hard to discuss when words or expressions shift definition along the way, or are not well defined from the start, especially when non-standard definitions are used. I think it's called equivocation.

      Delete
  13. If I might venture a kind and gentle comment of my own, not too robust as I don't wish to offend sensibilities.

    Inputs from diverse receptors are tabulated in the brain, pattern matching by any other description, computation if you like, but only as neural computation and qualitatively unlike bits and bobs of wire. In process, it is matching dynamic changing inputs from entity in world with networks of past and potential patterns a-u-t-o-m-a-t-i-c-a-l-l-y (for emphasis).

    No doubt neurons have wonderful capacities to represent entity in world as finalized awareness, but automatic. There is no Homunculus in there thinking about feelings and directing itself and us by its will. The onus is on receptor sites themselves to fashion awareness by their changeable inputs in an intact, contained, continual, cycle of inputs to outputs and back again, that's you in the world...hello.

    You can try to make objective comparisons with computational models, but unless you recognize the chemistry of site receptors in all their diversity, and how they extend to a brain for their automatic networking and finalization, you are squatting in the bush.

    I can tell you all about this stuff, not wishing to offend anyone, as it is a different view, and that can be hard to stomach, understandably so. Paradigms and entrenchments are de rigeur, and I am out of step. My book is free at http://thehumandesign.net Pardon my intrusion.

    Marcus

    ReplyDelete
  14. Gil,

    > Just because someone, without a proper background, publishes a paper that has evolutionary explanation in it, does not make it any representative of the field <

    True, but I disagree on your reading of the literature: evopsych has more problems than usual, both in the primary and the popular literature.

    > In the book, Palmer present the opinion that rape is a by product and not an adaptation, contra to Thornhill. <

    I know, I interviewed them. My point is that neither has a leg to stand on about the evolution of rape in humans, and they should therefore never have written that book to begin with.

    > I am not sure that I agree with you that such studies should have higher bar. <

    I think that should apply any time science has direct social or policy implications. We raise the bar for medical research, why not in this case? You don’t think we have enough social problems and discrimination without people going around blabbering alleged scientific notions about rape, racial differences, gender differences and the like?

    > Should he or she be scared because the results are misinterpreted? <

    No, but they should be particularly careful, especially when the mis- or over-interpretation comes from the researchers themselves.

    Alastair,

    > What is your opinion of "memetics?" <

    Significantly lower than my opinion of evopsych: http://goo.gl/VbWGuc

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  15. David,

    > you seem content to either trumpet your credentials ... or flat-out dismiss what I'm saying without argument <

    I have presented my arguments both on this blog and in technical books (referenced on this page). You didn’t bring up any additional arguments that I could see. As for my credentials, I thought they were relevant, just to avoid getting yet another Evolution 101 lesson, which I am often the receiver of on this blog, remarkably.

    > Evolutionary psychology studies the cognitive programs that are instantiated in the brain, just like the rest of cognitive science. <

    That is NOT studying the brain (as in: its anatomy), it is studying behavior. The brain doesn’t have “programs,” it only has structures that make people prone to certain behavior, within certain social contexts.

    > You don't need to understand the evolutionary history or phylogeny of a trait to study it from an adaptationist perspective <

    And I never said that. So far as I can see there are three major strategies to study adaptations: phylogenetic comparative analyses; direct measurements on natural selection in the field; or comparative analyses based on the fossil record. (You can add molecular data, but even those need a comparative framework.) The problem with evopsych is that it is exceedingly difficult to get assess to any of the above, in most cases. Hence my call for caution. I thought that was reasonable.

    > *Every* trait that has a function that originated from traits that had other functions. The distinction is completely unhelpful. <

    That’s ought to be news for any professional evolutionary biologist. Take the evolution of feathers. You think it’s irrelevant whether they originated for, say, thermoregulation and later got recycled for flight? Isn’t the point of evolutionary analyses precisely to distinguish these kinds of alternatives?

    > It is an extremely illuminating and scientifically fruitful approach (see Darwin's Dangerous Idea, The Triumph of Sociobiology) <

    I’m afraid I take my distance from Dennett on this (and other things, e.g., memes). And I can’t think of any triumph of sociobiology. Indeed, the field got so embarrassing that it had to be renamed (as evolutionary psychology).

    > The political implications of evopsych claims are either overblown or nonexistent, as was cogently argued by Steven Pinker in The Blank Slate. <

    Pinker argued that alright, but not cogently, I’m afraid. (More on his non-cogent arguments this coming Monday.)

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    1. Massimo,

      I sincerely appreciate the replies and look forward to your post on Pinker. I have a few more points, though.

      I believe you are being misleading when you write:

      "So far as I can see there are three major strategies to study adaptations: phylogenetic comparative analyses; direct measurements on natural selection in the field; or comparative analyses based on the fossil record."

      You conspicuously left out a key way to study adaptations, and that is by constructing models of putative selection pressures (e.g. via game theory) and looking for evidence of "special design" in the trait, as laid out by George Williams, John Maynard Smith, Dawkins, etc. This is not a trivial research strategy to casually leave out of your list; this is the very foundation of thousands of studies in behavioral ecology, animal behavior, cognitive ecology, studies of adaptive morphology, and of course, evolutionary psychology. It's fine if you take issue with this strategy; it's certainly not a perfect approach (no approach is). But to not even mention it when it is the *central* point of contention in debates over evo psych is to disingenuously make your case seem more airtight than it is. I'm curious, do you consider behavioral ecology to be bad science because it makes little use of those three strategies?

      Finally, you seem to be misunderstanding what the goal of evo psych is. The goal is no different than non-evo psych: to understand how the mind works - i.e. construct a complete causal/computational model of all the faculties of the mind and how they interact. The central goal of evo psych is *not* to reconstruct the evolutionary history of homo sapiens; that's an entirely separate goal (however unfeasible) best conducted by archeologists and comparative biologists. The only contention of evo psych is that we ought to use evolutionary theory to guide investigations into the workings of mind and to organize findings into a coherent framework (e.g. in terms of putative adaptations, byproducts, noise, etc.). While phylogeny, fossils, and selection measurements may be helpful in this regard; they are not the sine qua non of this research, and the relative unavailability of these tools does not, as you suggest, render evo psych less scientific.

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  16. Django,

    > We should also note, of course, that this excludes large swathes of social-scientific research, since that research is both motivated by and conforms to progressive liberal values. <

    As I said above, I think that *any* research that has direct social or policy implications ought to be done particularly carefully, and it should meet a higher standard of rigor — precisely because it has the potential to directly affect the lives of millions of people. And no, I don’t think that liberal-progressive leaning studies get a free pass either, and I say this as a staunch liberal-progressive.

    > I agree with David’s stance on reverse-engineering. I suspect that many of the critics of evolutionary psychology overlook the promise of reverse-engineering the cognitive architecture of the human mind. <

    Forgot to address that (and David, there really was no need to remind me of Darwin, I’ve read him). As a general approach reverse engineering is problematic in biology, because of the complexity, non-linearity, redundancy and historical contingency of biological processes. Let me put it differently: since there was no engineer in charge, it is at the least problematic to try to figure out how a trait evolved based on what it currently does. Yes, in some cases this strategy is reasonable and successful, but it cannot be used as a general approach. Again, I’m not dismissing evopsych, I’m simply calling for caution here.

    > the more complicated the functional co-ordination of an adaptation, the better the odds that its adaptive rationale(s) can be gleaned. <

    It depends on what you mean by “complicated” and how you measure complexity. But remember that the point here isn’t just to guess that trait X was likely the result of adaptation. Anyone can do that. If you want to do *science* about it you need to come up with empirical data backing up a sophisticated hypotheses about selective forces and the like. That’s a bit more difficult.

    > whereas the latter, at least at the broad level, has a fairly straightforward function (as argued in books such as Steven Pinker’s The Language Instinct). <

    Nobody doubts that language is an adaptation (as I already mentioned). But for what? What’s this “straightforward” function you talk about? If it was basic communication, why did we need to go so much further than the other apes? What’s the evolutionary advantage of being able to solve Fermat’s Last Theorem, or write Shakespearian-like sonnets? We can make conjectures about this, but robust science should go a bit further than mere conjectures, no?

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  17. After reading this article I was thinking about human experimentation and what it might be like from the guinea pig's perspective.

    Let's just say there is this hypothetical situation where there are evopsych researchers that have decided to start experimenting on you and you've realized that reasoning and pleading with them wont help you, as the human guinea pig, to get out of the situation and you've reasoned that trying to 'play their games' in order to get out of your cage would just encourage these psychopathic scientists to put you through more games and experimentation not less.

    Would you feel that you would prefer to sacrifice yourself for 'the advancement of science' in order to test someone else's theory of how the human mind works, or would you start trying to go to people you thought were friends for help, or would you try to just kill yourself off so that their work wouldn't be used on other humans, or would you eventually just give in to the brutal oppression that would be necessary to conduct such experiments and accept the sort of 1984 big brother world you now live in?

    It seem's that until you find people who would be willing to give their lives for a evopsych research and remain consistently in favor of the experimentation their entire lives, or if you decide that you do not care about the immorality of enslaving people for your experimentation, you're not going to be able to do much but never ending speculation.

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  18. Masimo, I disagree regarding your point that "I think that should apply any time science has direct social or policy implications. We raise the bar for medical research, why not in this case? You don’t think we have enough social problems and discrimination without people going around blabbering alleged scientific notions about rape, racial differences, gender differences and the like?"

    The reason I disagree is because there is a clear different between medical studies and behavioral research. Bad medical research leads to harmful treatments directly, but bad behavioral research does not. Bad ev psych research only would lead to discrimination and so on, if the people reading this articles are misinterpreting or misusing the results. Assuming no researcher believe that any observable different should lead to different individual treatment, I don't see why the researcher is to blame and not the person misusing it. The public should be educated on how to read and understand papers. Unless there is a clear and immediate possible harm, I don't think we should limit any publication. The consequences are that if someone doesn't find a sex difference in any trait, this would be an "acceptable" publication because there is no possible harm, while the opposite would be harder to publish. this creates a clear bias in publication and research that sets the bar very high to publish any research about any differences. Who would say what is the criteria to publish such a paper?

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  19. @ Massimo

    > Significantly lower than my opinion of evopsych <

    I think the label "creationist of the mind" may also apply to you.

    "We once thought that biological design needed a creator, but we now know that natural selection can do all the designing on its own. Similarly, we once thought that human design required a conscious designer inside us, but we now know that memetic selection can do it on its own."

    (source: pg. 242, "The Meme Machine" by Susan Blackmore)

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    2. @ Baron P

      Here's the difference. Sociobiology/Evolutionary psychology is based on what is in the best interest for the genes; memetics is based on what is in the best interest for the memes.

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    3. I'm not sure you're right about the evopsych best interest theory, but if you're right about the memes acting in their own best interest, that makes the Blackmore version even goofier. On the other hand I won't argue the point with you as this is one occasion where the more parsimonious assumption mantra makes sense. Instinctive functions that learn and adapt heritable behaviors are dealt with quite well by the self-engineering crowd.

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    4. Alistair,
      >but we now know that memetic selection can do it on its own.<

      But we don't know that. It is simply an hypothesis that is not holding up at all well against rigorous examination.

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    5. Alistair,
      >Similarly, we once thought that human design required a conscious designer inside us<

      But that's just the point, we do have a conscious designer inside us.

      It is us.

      We are conscious, we make decisions, choices, etc. Those conscious decisions, choices, whatever, have radically reshaped ourselves and our world in a way that is not easily accounted for by the ideas of traditional evolution.

      Evolution has been a wonderfully powerful explanation that accounts for everything up until the evolution of the primitive mind. From there on the development of the mind seems to have preceded by different rules.

      You are arguing that since evolution explains everything until the development of the primitive mind that the further development of the mind must necessarily also be explained by evolution.

      But that is not a logical necessity at all. The arrival of intelligent, self-aware, language-using consciousness has introduced a wholly new element into the process that has radically transformed the further development of the mind.

      We must be open to the possibility of new scientific paradigms and not allow ourselves to be trapped by old scientific paradigms.

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    6. Alistair,
      >I think the label "creationist of the mind" may also apply to you<

      The use of pejorative terms is not helpful and contributes nothing to the debate.

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    7. @ Peter DO Smith

      > We are conscious, we make DECISIONS, CHOICES, etc. Those conscious decisions, choices, whatever, have radically reshaped ourselves and our world in a way that is not easily accounted for by the ideas of traditional evolution. (emphasis mine) <

      The "two-tage model of free will" is the only (somewhat) intelligible model of (libertarian) free will. (Personally, I am leaning towards (strong) "incompatiblism" in regards to free will - incompatible with not only determinism but also indeterminism.) The two-stage model involves the same principles of Darwinian evolution - namely random variation (the freedom aspect) and natural selection (the will aspect). This dovetails perfectly with memetic theory (as well as quantum mechanics).

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    8. @ Peter DO Smith

      > The use of pejorative terms is not helpful and contributes nothing to the debate. <

      The term "creationist of the mind" is an apt description for someone who subscribes to the belief that human beings exhibit free will and a capacity for creativity.

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    9. @ Peter DO Smith

      > Evolution has been a wonderfully powerful explanation that accounts for everything up until the evolution of the primitive mind. From there on the development of the mind seems to have preceded by different rules.

      You are arguing that since evolution explains everything until the development of the primitive mind that the further development of the mind must necessarily also be explained by evolution.

      But that is not a logical necessity at all. The arrival of intelligent, self-aware, language-using consciousness has introduced a wholly new element into the process that has radically transformed the further development of the mind. <

      I partially agree with you. I am arguing that genetic evolution explains biological evolution up to a point. But with the advent of human language, a second replicator (i.e. the meme) is needed to the explain cultural evolution.

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    10. @ Peter DO Smith

      > We must be open to the possibility of new scientific paradigms and not allow ourselves to be trapped by old scientific paradigms. <

      I'm very open.

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    12. @ Baron P

      > Two supernaturalists explaining how biological evolution cannot be naturally explained. I.e., an evolving consciousness is not natural and must come from either a celestial source or a conscious function that is entirely separate from the forms it serves. But why not have that floating function be an artifact of a godlike culture and be done with it, I say <

      This depends on how you define "naturalism." If you define naturalism as compatible with a nonmaterialist worldview, then I qualify as a naturalist. At any rate, I am not a materialist.

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    13. Baron, deliberate misconstrual of another person's position is plainly dishonest. And if you wish to contest that see my statement at the end of Massimo's last post. You have read that statement, you know what my position is but you insist on attributing something to me that I did not say. That is plainly dishonest.

      Here it is again, for your convenience

      Disagreeable,
      >...but it is God that gave us consciousness (and that consciousness has a supernatural element<

      No, I don't believe that at all. God created us through the laws of nature so every facility we have is explainable through evolution and related laws of nature.

      There will be natural explanations for everything for the simple reason that the laws of nature are the means that God realises his purpose. Science is religion's best friend, it reveals how God did his work.

      Since God created the laws of nature no other conclusion is possible(if you believe in God).

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    14. @ Peter DO Smith

      > Since God created the laws of nature no other conclusion is possible(if you believe in God) <

      Just curious. Do you believe the so-called "laws of nature" are immutable?

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    16. Alistair,
      that is very hard to know. The resultant system has to remain coherent and that seems to require that the laws of nature are stable. The best that I can say is that this is an assumption based on our history and scientific experience. It has certainly never been found that the laws of nature change.

      It has been said that the laws of nature reflect the attributes of God, in which case they are immutable.

      What is your position?

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    17. Peter, You're now resorting to the desperate tactic of accusing an honest construal of what your comments amount to as being dishonest? Try to show with our accepted forms of logic where dishonesty entered the picture?
      A person who avoids any discussion of the logical possibilities of a God is hardly qualified to call an argument against his God inspired dogma dishonest.

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    18. @ Peter DO Smith

      > The best that I can say is that this is an assumption based on our history and scientific experience. It has certainly never been found that the laws of nature change. <

      Physicist Lawrence Krauss seems to suggest that there might be some evidence that they have changed.

      "Are The Laws of Nature Constant" ("A Closer to Truth" video interview between Robert L. Kuhn and Lawrence Krauss)

      > What is your position? <

      I think the so-called "laws of nature" might be more like the "habits of nature."

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    19. Alistair,
      at this link you can see more about the relationship between the laws of nature and the attributes of God:
      http://bit.ly/14FTHYa

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    20. Did you mean this link, Mr. Honest to God?
      http://bit.ly/Z8JIW1

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    21. Alistair,
      the 'habits of nature' video is fascinating. It raises the question of why nature has these habits, why are they so consistent and why are they so exactly mathematical? There would have to be a super law called the Law of Habit that gives all other laws their properties.

      I lean to another viewpoint. The laws of nature are a manifestation of God, an aspect of God. When we experience the laws of nature we are experiencing God. This is how we can make sense of the notion that God is simultaneously everywhere and that God is omnipotent.
      Mathematical Platonism is one of the attributes of God and this gives the laws of nature their mathematical underpinning.

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    22. And now we have Alistair resorting to the scientific acumen of Rupert Sheldrake. But see: http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Rupert_Sheldrake

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    23. Alistair,
      my views might seem like a variation on panpsychism but it is much more than that. If God were simply the laws of nature then that would be a form of panpsychism. But I believe that is only one aspect of God and that God has the additional properties revealed to us by Christianity. That is a rational, caring entity that has a purpose for us and has expectations of us.

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    24. @ Peter DO Smith

      > the 'habits of nature' video is fascinating. It raises the question of why nature has these habits, why are they so consistent and why are they so exactly mathematical? There would have to be a super law called the Law of Habit that gives all other laws their properties. <

      Dennett (@ 2:45) raised that question. And Sheldrake responded to it by saying that "there is a principle of habit in nature, but without specific content. In other words, the law would simply be self-organizing patterns through repetition would become more probable. But it wouldn't say which self-organizing principles come into being. There would be a radical contingency.."

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    25. @ Peter DO Smith

      > Mathematical Platonism is one of the attributes of God and this gives the laws of nature their mathematical underpinning. <

      Do you see mathematics as exhibiting some kind of causal efficacy?

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    26. (Probably about as much as Sheldrake's future does, but nobody asked me.)

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    27. Alistair,
      I think of it as both being a logical necessity and a reflection of the nature of God. The causal efficacy of the laws of nature derive from the will of God.

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    28. @ Peter DO Smith

      > I think of it as both being a logical necessity and a reflection of the nature of God. The causal efficacy of the laws of nature derive from the will of God. <

      This sounds like "occasionalism." Do you believe that everything that happens is an act of God?

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    29. @Alistair,
      >Do you believe that everything that happens is an act of God?<

      No, not directly.
      The easiest way to explain it is by way of analogy. Take the well known school experiment of the magnet beneath a sheet of paper and on top of the paper you have iron filings. They arrange themselves in a pattern according to the magnetic lines of force.

      The iron filings represent the particles and fields in nature, making up the universe we experience. The patterns are the observable order of the universe. The sheet of paper is our information horizon.
      The magnetic lines of force represent the laws of nature and they are a property of the magnet.
      The magnet represents God and just as the magnetic lines of force are a property of the magnet, so too are the laws of nature a property of God.

      From this understanding God does not directly will each event any more than the magnet wills the position of each iron filing. The events are the inevitable consequence of the laws of nature which are the inevitable consequence of the nature of God.

      This is a crude analogy that does not take into account many things like free will, motion and randomness but it gets my main points across. Incidentally, the materialist 'iron filing' thinks that the iron filings just happen, by good chance, to fall into the right patterns(the descriptive view of the laws of nature) and there is nothing beyond the sheet of paper.

      I have to admit that these ideas derived from a discussion with a Jesuit philosopher priest. We were discussing the issue of whether God could change the laws of nature and he contended this was not possible, God does not change his own nature. I disagreed with him then but now I agree with him. To further complicate matters I believe in a heavily modified form of Origenism which my Jesuit philosopher would most certainly disavow.

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    30. @ Peter DO Smith

      > From this understanding God does not directly will each event any more than the magnet wills the position of each iron filing. The events are the inevitable consequence of the laws of nature which are the inevitable consequence of the nature of God. <

      If God ultimately determined the laws of nature (i.e. the "nature of nature"), then God ultimately determines everything that happens in the world.

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    31. @Alastair,
      >If God ultimately determined the laws of nature (i.e. the "nature of nature"), then God ultimately determines everything that happens in the world.<

      Yes, I can agree with that except where human choices are concerned. We are endowed with free will which means that God does not determine our choices. In other words I do not believe in predestination. I also think there are very good reasons for God granting us free will.

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    33. @ Peter DO Smith

      > We are endowed with free will which means that God does not determine our choices. <

      I believe there are only two possibilities: Either "determinism" is true, or "indeterminism" is. (If you believe there is another option, then please share it.)

      If determinism is true, then every choice we make could not have been otherwise.

      If indeterminism is true, then our decision-making ultimately reduces to some element of chance.

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    34. Alastair,
      >I believe there are only two possibilities: Either "determinism" is true, or "indeterminism" is.<

      Well, there is 'compatibilism' but I think it fudges the issue. The importance of the belief in compatibilism is it shows how strong our belief is in free will. Even our noted atheist physicist, Sean Carroll, feels compelled to go for compatibilism.

      So the first argument for free will is its evident reality in our lives. Given that, I suggest the burden of proof has to be with those who deny free will. The experiments offered up so far, such as Libet, are entirely unconvincing.

      I also think there are two other powerful arguments for free will, the existence of consciousness and the unlimited accretion of knowledge.

      The heart of the argument against free will is a 'I can't possibly imagine how it could work' position. But not being able to imagine how it could work is not a disproof. It is merely a statement that our knowledge is very incomplete, which has always been true.

      Right now we don't have the foggiest idea of what dark energy and dark matter are but their existence is widely accepted.

      I agree the operation of free will is puzzling, indeed a great mystery, but that is not sufficient reason to reject it. Science has revealed a great many mysteries and in time science will explain them though it might be a very long time.

      Finally we need to accept that science is uncovering boundaries beyond which science cannot go. A very good example of that is the Big Bang. It has created an information horizon and there is no realistic prospect of penetrating that horizon. That is now the domain of philosophy no matter how much Hawking and Krauss speculate. Their speculations are now philosophy clothed as science.

      If we uncover one boundary to science then we need to accept that there could possibly be other boundaries to science. Free-willing consciousness might just possibly be another such boundary. The only way to know is to aggressively pursue the science as far as it can go. For reasons already stated (my magnet-filing-paper argument) I am not arguing for supernaturalism. By my definition supernaturalism is impossible.

      There are huge metaphysical prejudices against free will and I think this is what really drives the current climate of free will denialism, not the science (which is negligible).

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    35. Alastair,
      >I believe there are only two possibilities: Either "determinism" is true, or "indeterminism" is.<

      Just to clarify. To say that there are barriers beyond which our scientific enquiry cannot go is not a statement that the laws of nature do not operate there. It merely says that our methods of enquiry cannot determine the laws of nature beyond the boundary. As you know, I am fully committed to the belief that the laws of nature rationally and consistently operate everywhere all the time, without any exceptions.

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    36. @ Peter DO Smith

      > Well, there is 'compatibilism' but I think it fudges the issue. <

      There is "INcompatiblism" (strong) which holds that the notion of free will is incompatible with both "determinism" and "indeterminism" for reasons I have already stated.

      If determinism is true, then every choice we make could not have been otherwise.

      If indeterminism is true, then the only reason "why we could have done otherwise" must ultimately reduce to chance.

      So, regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true, the implications for free will and morality/ethics are exactly the same.

      (If you believe there are any options other than determinism or indeterminism, then please share them with me.)

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    37. Alistair,
      my position is much simpler than that.
      The reality of free will is evident in our experience and one can make strong supporting arguments for it. We are unable to explain it in terms of today's science but then for that matter, neither can we explain consciousness but no one doubts it.

      Science is a very, very long way from pronouncing a definitive judgement in this matter so we have every reason for adopting the default position of believing our experience in the same way we believe in our consciousness.

      In a strictly materialistic, deterministic world consciousness is an anomaly that makes no sense whatsoever. We don't have the vaguest inkling of an idea of how inanimate molecules can create a self-aware, conscious, intelligent, introspective awareness.

      But it has happened and attaching to it the label 'emergent', as is usually done, is a con-job that disguises the non-explanation.

      In just the same way free will makes no sense but it has happened.

      That it it doesn't make sense only means our science is much too primitive to explain it.

      I repeat my earlier assertion, that free will denialism has its roots in powerful metaphysical prejudices.

      Finally I ask you, in the absence of free will what possible role is there for consciousness? If my actions automatically flow from preceding conditions then in effect I am a powerless driver in my vehicle. Why do I need to be conscious when my actions will happen regardless? Even stranger, if I am a powerless observer why do I need to possess the illusion that I am in control of my actions?

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    38. @ Peter DO Smith

      > my position is much simpler than that. <

      You're entirely missing the point. If God does not ultimately determine everything that happens, then this implies that indeterminism holds true. (Remember, there are two only two metaphysical positions here: either determinism holds true, or indeterminism does. There are no other options.) And if indeterminism holds true, then this implies some events are random. (Whether or not God has endowed us with free will doesn't change these implications!)

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  20. Could human language ability have been a byproduct of evolving a more accurate throwing ability?

    If so, language ability was enabled by evolution of something unrelated.

    That's what William Calvin [ http://williamcalvin.com/ ] wrote about some years ago.

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    2. Philip,
      It is an intriguing idea. But there is good evidence that we evolved as persistence hunters, running our prey to exhaustion and then killing them.

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  21. So, where has this advanced in the past day? No response to any of my direct or rhetorical questions. I assume humorous rhetoric is not de rigeur, and leads to all valid issues being shunned holus bolus? Weak tactic in my case, because none of it is rhetorical, they are just unanswerable by Massimo even though they are basic. I'm still in the dark about your meaning of "Plasticity" or "genetic leash", Massimo, they are so vague as to be meaningless by my analysis above.

    I hope psychologists in future review blogs for the human tendency to cut ones' nose off to spite ones' face. I'm an unrepentant genius and you guys probably can't stand my broadcasting of it. That's my reading of total ignorance despite advice.

    So to issues at hand, unanswered or otherwise. Let's just pull apart a defeatist nonsense by Massimo:

    "As a general approach reverse engineering is problematic in biology, because of the complexity, non-linearity, redundancy and historical contingency of biological processes. Let me put it differently: since there was no engineer in charge, it is at the least problematic to try to figure out how a trait evolved based on what it currently does. Yes, in some cases this strategy is reasonable and successful, but it cannot be used as a general approach."

    No need for caution Massimo. Let the scales lift from your eyes. That happens in the course of learning, and you are about to learn here (as you would not dare skim my book) that there is a complete basis for reverse engineering of anatomy, if you have the correct referents.

    Ah, correct perspective, looking at the correct level, and correct events on that level, to see the certainties at work! Eureka. It's called getting to the nub and not being a circular defeatists. Break out of your circularity by introducing new rational ideas. That's what this site is ....supposed... to be all about.

    You have a specific inevitable chemical arrangement as an anatomy that (I repeat for the maybe 20th time at this site) determines all of the functions and conscious capacities of humans. You haven't done the work to reduce down and down and down to the correct level of explanation. that's all. Good news, I've written a free book to explain it all in language a child could understand at http://thehumandesign.net

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  22. Before the cockcrow, let me advise you on reductionism. It's bollocks. Reduce down to protons and electrons to build human rubbish, mostly. There are already existing wholes worth explaining without reducing down to build human rubbish as wholes.

    Not wanting to deviate, but Emergence is rubbish too. A whole is a whole, and the relevance of constituents is removed by their intactness as a whole - thus ..granite! Safe constituents are particles and fields from a Big Bang aggregating thereafter and making very different wholes as they do so.

    This relates to reductionism because reducing down is fraught as an explanation of any whole. As above, a whole is a whole. You can only reduce down to protons and electrons, which are no explanation of anatomies (or granite for that matter) as specific wholes, and only good for building human rubbish.

    So, the moral from this tale is to explain existing wholes such as human anatomies and maybe neurons as intact structures, rather than being an industrial nut job or nut & bolt job, so to speak. For anatomy, this means reduction to DNA engineering anatomical construction in landscapes, which reduces to DNA engineering of chemicals of that landscape.

    Above protons & electrons, and above DNA (due to an explicable regularity of its use of chemicals for construction - to remove it as a variable), there is a revealing level of "constituents" that is not fraught with the lost statistical trails of reductionist construction from electrons & protons to humans. Chemicals of the landscape.

    I have educated you on reductionist traps and Emergent nonsense, and before you even knew they were traps and nonsense, I have solved both by locating a safe "constituent" from which to build anatomies and by which to explain them as wholes. Chemicals of the landscape. Have I lost you in my ingenuity? Probably.




    unless you

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  23. David,

    > You conspicuously left out a key way to study adaptations, and that is by constructing models of putative selection pressures (e.g. via game theory) and looking for evidence of "special design" in the trait, as laid out by George Williams, John Maynard Smith, Dawkins <

    I left it out on purpose, since it is one of the least reliable ones, as even Williams agreed in the latest edition of his book on natural selection. The problem, again, is that natural selection is no engineer, so it would be like trying to reverse engineer a Rube Goldberg machine. (Incidentally, let’s leave Dawkins out of this. I know many people think of him as a prominent evolutionary biologist, but the guy hasn’t published a paper in the technical literature since the early ‘80s).

    > I'm curious, do you consider behavioral ecology to be bad science because it makes little use of those three strategies? <

    No, and I don’t think you are correct about behavioral ecologists not using comparative methods. The problem, again, is specific to humans, for the various reasons I’ve already mentioned.

    > The goal is no different than non-evo psych: to understand how the mind works - i.e. construct a complete causal/computational model of all the faculties of the mind and how they interact. The central goal of evo psych is *not* to reconstruct the evolutionary history of homo sapiens <

    I believe you are entirely mistaken on this. “Evolutionary” psychology is concerned with evolution. If you want to know how the brain/mind work now, I suggest you turn to neurobiology.

    Gil,

    > The reason I disagree is because there is a clear different between medical studies and behavioral research. Bad medical research leads to harmful treatments directly, but bad behavioral research does not. <

    It does when that behavioral research is about issues that concern gender or race differences, rape, etc. etc. I see no difference at all.

    > I don't see why the researcher is to blame and not the person misusing it. <

    Because it is too often the *researchers* themselves who often make inflated claims. Or do not vigorously challenge the misapplication of their findings by the popular press. Evopsych is not alone here, another culprit is to be found in certain aspects of neuroscience.

    > Unless there is a clear and immediate possible harm <

    Why immediate? On the contrary, I find this sort of harm particularly troublesome precisely because it reinforces stereotypes that take generations to combat.

    Alastair,

    > I think the label "creationist of the mind" may also apply to you. <

    I find the Meme Machine one of the most overrated books written in the past few decades, sorry.

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    1. Massimo,

      I wanted to be done with this discussion, but I feel compelled to correct your errors:

      "I don’t think you are correct about behavioral ecologists not using comparative methods."

      OK. Let's look at the latest issue of the Journal of Behavioral Ecology. There is one paper that uses phylogenetic methods out of 25. Everything else looks like straight up behavioral experiments on single species. Now let's look at the copy of "Evolutionary Behavioral Ecology" sitting on my shelf. There is one chapter on phylogeny out of 31. The rest of the chapters include perennial topics like "mate choice," "cooperation," and "signaling," all of which can and have been fruitfully applied to human beings using the same approach. So I'll ask you again, do you think that 95% behavioral ecology is bad science?

      "I believe you are entirely mistaken on this. “Evolutionary” psychology is concerned with evolution. If you want to know how the brain/mind work now, I suggest you turn to neurobiology."

      Again, false. See a recent article in Psych Review entitled "Evolutionary Psychology: New Perspectives on Cognition and Motivation."

      Here's a nice quote:

      "We present recent empirical examples that illustrate how this approach [evo psych] has been used to discover new features of attention, categorization, reasoning, learning, emotion, and motivation."

      Hm, seems like those examples all fit nicely under the rubric of "how the brain/mind works".

      And here's a few quotes from one of the founding texts of evo psych, "The Adapted Mind" (which I'm assuming you haven't read):

      "Evolutionary psychology is psychology informed by the fact that the inherited
      architecture of the human mind is the product of the evolutionary process."

      "...the contributors [of this volume] have focused on...questions such as: What kinds of information are available in the environment for a psychological mechanism designed for habitat selection, or mate selection, or parenting to use? Is there evidence that this information is used? If so, how is it evaluated? What kinds of affective reactions does it generate? How do people reason about this information? What information do they find memorable? What kinds of information are easy to learn? What kinds of decision rules guide human behavior? What kinds of cross-cultural patterns will these mechanisms produce? What kinds of information will they cause to be socially transmitted?"

      Wow, those seem like straight-up psychological questions to me. Nothing about reconstructing evolution there.

      And here's one from "The Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology" (again, assuming you haven't read):

      "Our job is to reverse-engineer its [the mind's] components: to dissect its computational architecture into functionally isolable information processing units—programs—and to determine how these units operate, both computationally and
      physically."

      Can't get much clearer than that. Nothing here about modeling all the evolutionary precursors and pathways that led to modern homo sapiens. Seems like basically using evolutionary biology to build theories about how the mind works.

      Perhaps you ought to read up a bit on the field; I think you'll encounter many surprises. Though this would probably be a good thing to do before you go about repeatedly criticizing it in a public forum.

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  24. So Massimo, how and who is to decide what study could be harmful socially? is a study that finds women to have superior math ability to men is OK to publish because it goes against a stereotype? what about a study that finds women to have better verbal abilities? Is it also OK to publish it even thought it is a stereotype, because it is not against women allegedly?

    I find it very problematic that some studies will get easier path for publications just because they are of concern for certain people (who exactly these people would be?). This introduces more biases into the scientific research and would cause many researchers not to pursue controversial topics since they won't be able to publish them.

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    1. Personally, I think it's fine to publish them, but they should be taken with a grain of salt, especially by policy makers.

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    2. Gil, the rule is simply that of good science.
      How many studies have you seen based on 60 undergraduate students drawn from the psychology faculty?
      Really? How can we generalize from such a select sample of immature youngsters to the general population? The field is polluted with these kinds of studies for the only reason that it is quick and easy to do.

      Population studies are incredibly fickle because of researcher bias and sample selection effects. They are hard to replicate and frequently contradict each other.

      At the very minimum, such studies can only be given credence when they are replicated by independent researchers.

      A good example of the pitfalls is a recent study on prison inmates of the Prisoner's Dilemma. They were more cooperative than expected. What do you expect? Prison inmates are conditioned to be cooperative with fellow inmates. It is a matter of survival. But how would they behave before conviction and incarceration? At this stage they are deeply afraid of what might happen. Will they still be so cooperative when so fearful of the consequences?

      It was a questionable study design. This is why we have to insist on high standards.

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    3. Peter, I completely agree with you that science itself should be the deciding factor. However, I am not exactly sure what your definition of good science is. A sample of 60 students can be very reasonable depending on the research question. I don't think that anyone think that 60 subjects of any kind is representative of the whole population, but that should not exclude a researcher from publishing such study. After all, no one can have a large enough sample in one study to cover all the people in the world but when different researchers publish with a variety of samples than we can have a clearer idea what is going on. If you reject each study for its own, then nothing could be publishable. Of course, researchers should be careful in their conclusions but I don't see (as Massimo implies), more careless studies and interpretations coming from ev psych researchers.

      Most studies add just incremental knowledge to the literature but as you said correctly, if we won't know about the different studies and how they contradict each other, it would be much harder to get to any generalized conclusions.

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    4. Gil, in general I agree with Massimo, although this point be very interesting to start a debate on science ethics. The protests he made above are surely grounded on misused hypotheses or unfounded statements. But what if science finds out something that endorses prejudices? Must she publicize it? Under what conditions? And, on the other side, what to do with precipitous scientists?

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    5. prejudice |ˈprejədəs|
      noun
      1 preconceived opinion that is not based on reason or actual experience
      If East Asians turn out to be undeniably of higher average intelligence than Caucasians, should that be published, or would it be endorsing prejudice or debunking prejudice?

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  25. @ Massimo

    > I find the Meme Machine one of the most overrated books written in the past few decades, sorry. <

    But the point is that you qualify as a "creationist of the mind." You subscribe to the belief that human beings exhibit free will and have an innate capacity for spontaneous creativity - a belief which doesn't exactly mesh with a strictly naturalistic (physicalistic) worldview.

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  26. Heaven forbid I should get a reply.

    Massimo, you are so way off track as to be obstructive to progress. Read my free book at http://thehumandesign.net and stop dodging the issues raised.

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  27. I just read your replies to David, Massimo. They are so misguided as to be ridiculous, so in truth you are probably not an obstruction, rather an irrelevancy.

    No self-respecting scientist with an eye to progress would take your replies seriously, as they simply dodge and repeat the same silly stuff over and over again.

    Sad, just sad, or sick. Its open to interpretation either way, its so weak.

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  28. Gil,

    > So Massimo, how and who is to decide what study could be harmful socially? is a study that finds women to have superior math ability to men is OK to publish because it goes against a stereotype? <

    Forgive me, but I find the question to be astoundingly naive. Let me put it to you like this: which of the following social problems is real? 1) Women still have not achieved equality with men; 2) Men do not have enough power in modern society. The studies that should be evaluated carefully are those that may do harm to underprivileged groups, obviously.

    > This introduces more biases into the scientific research and would cause many researchers not to pursue controversial topics since they won't be able to publish them. <

    Tough. It’s time to abandon the simplistic Enlightenment view that science is a-moral and interested only in the pursuit of truth. When it has social consequences those consequences ought to be part of the equation.

    Alastair,

    > But the point is that you qualify as a "creationist of the mind." You subscribe to the belief that human beings exhibit free will and have an innate capacity for spontaneous creativity - a belief which doesn't exactly mesh with a strictly naturalistic (physicalistic) worldview <

    Even if you are describing my views accurately (and you aren’t) I fail to see what on earth does this have to do with memetics. On free will, I’ve written enough for now, so please take a look at the several entries on that topic at Rationally Speaking.

    Waldemar,

    > Is this an accurate statement? Is really there something in any life form that is not tied to its genes? <

    Who said anything about *not* being affected by genes? But genes are only one of many sources of causality for animal behavior in general, and in the case of humans they do play a demonstrably smaller role than, say, in ants. This isn’t speculation, it’s a pretty basic point in gene-environment interaction studies.

    Marcus,

    > Massimo, you are so way off track as to be obstructive to progress. Read my free book at http://thehumandesign.net and stop dodging the issues raised. <

    I’ve perused your web site, and as far as I can tell it is full of utter nonsense. Which may explain why — according to the preface to your own book — you “have been unable to secure any feedback from media, academia, or government, except for one medico from Canada with publishing suggestions.” No shit. Now, I have been indulging your self-promotion here for some time, but please try to keep it within reasonable bounds, and in particular keep your tone done, or I will have to ban you from commenting. Thanks.

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    1. Massimo, indeed it is a naive question, but it still stands. Who will decide what stereotype is harmful or not? But the larger point is that not scientist decide the social consequences but the society as a whole. Their role is, in my opinion, to reveal the truth as best as they can describe it, and to be careful in their assessments and interpretations. Just because other people misuse scientific research should not limit the scientists themselves. The real meaning of science should be explained to the public but burying it, does not do any good.

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    3. Massimo, thanks for your answer and please, in spite of your limited time to our silly questions, tell me if those results aren't reflecting just the current limitations of the knowledge on genome in general and in particular the human one. I fear that if genetics is condemned at being never able to draw a picture of behavior possibilities - even of complex animals like us - there will be a permanent breach for hypotheses like the one of the 'meme' (which I decidedly love, but as just fiction) or something worse. Am I wrong?

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  29. Evopsych

    David,

    > Let's look at the latest issue of the Journal of Behavioral Ecology. There is one paper that uses phylogenetic methods out of 25. <

    First off, surely you know that one can do comparative analyses without them being explicitly phylogenetic in nature. The difference with humans is that there are very few species to compare us to. Second, you are looking at Behavioral *Ecology*, so I’m not surprised that many papers there don’t take an evolutionary perspective. But I thought you were interested in human *evolutionary* psychology, not just ecology. Surely you are aware of the distinction (of both questions and methods) between the two.

    > The rest of the chapters include perennial topics like "mate choice," "cooperation," and "signaling," all of which can and have been fruitfully applied to human beings using the same approach <

    Yes, my point has been over and over that the bar is higher for human applications, because of conscious human decisions and of culture — neither one of which apply to most animal studies.

    > "We present recent empirical examples that illustrate how this approach [evo psych] has been used to discover new features of attention, categorization, reasoning, learning, emotion, and motivation." Hm, seems like those examples all fit nicely under the rubric of "how the brain/mind works". <

    No, you are simply equivocating on the terms here. All you are listing are behaviors, and my point was precisely that evopsych is focused on behaviors, not on how the brain produces those behaviors (what I meant by “how the brain works”).

    > "Evolutionary psychology is psychology informed by the fact that the inherited
    architecture of the human mind is the product of the evolutionary process." <

    Never denied that, so?

    > Wow, those seem like straight-up psychological questions to me. Nothing about reconstructing evolution there. <

    If it’s got nothing to do with evolution, why call it evolutionary psychology, just so that you can claim Darwin’s mantel for free?

    > Our job is to reverse-engineer its [the mind's] components: to dissect its computational architecture into functionally isolable information processing units—programs <

    You might have noticed that I have a very low opinion of computationalism of the mind, so this quote doesn’t help my esteem of the evopsych research program.

    > Seems like basically using evolutionary biology to build theories about how the mind works. <

    There you go again with the equivocation.

    > Perhaps you ought to read up a bit on the field; I think you'll encounter many surprises. <

    And perhaps you ought to pay closer attention to what I actually write instead of running off to make points that are either irrelevant to my arguments or are based on equivocating about terms used in the discussion.

    Gil,

    > Who will decide what stereotype is harmful or not? But the larger point is that not scientist decide the social consequences but the society as a whole. <

    Correct, which is why we are having this discussion in a public forum. The more narrow response to your question is: scientists themselves and, failing that, other scholars who are competent about science and its implications, e.g., philosophers of science. And of course those are precisely the two main sources of criticism of evopsych so far.

    > Just because other people misuse scientific research should not limit the scientists themselves. <

    I know this is almost an article of faith within academia, but why not? Funding for scientific research, especially basic research, comes in large part from the public purse. Why should the public therefore not have a say in how such money is spent? Indeed, it does: NSF has to go to Congress every year for re-authorization, as it should be.

    This will be my last comment on this thread. I apologize, but the Pinker one is heating up, and there is only so much time during the day...

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    1. Massimo,

      "First off, surely you know that one can do comparative analyses without them being explicitly phylogenetic in nature."

      Well if your standards for "comparative analyses" are that lax, then most of evo psych (e.g. mating, sexual conflict, parenting, cooperation, aggression, social bonding) is, according to you, "comparative." All I'm looking for is consistency here. Only 2 of the 34 chapters in "The Handbook of Evo Psych" are on topics unique to humans. So shall I conclude that you are OK with *most* of the topics studied by evo psych? If so, this would seem to contradict your broad opposition to the field.

      "Second, you are looking at Behavioral *Ecology*, so I’m not surprised that many papers there don’t take an evolutionary perspective. But I thought you were interested in human *evolutionary* psychology, not just ecology."

      Wow, I'm surprised that I have to explain this to you, but Behavioral Ecology is *intrinsically* evolutionary, and so are all the studies conducted in its name. Here's the definition from wikipedia: "Behavioral ecology is the study of the *evolutionary basis* for animal behavior due to ecological pressures." There simply are *no* studies in behavioral ecology that do not take an evolutionary perspective.

      "All you are listing are behaviors, and my point was precisely that evopsych is focused on behaviors, not on how the brain produces those behaviors (what I meant by “how the brain works”)."

      Evo psych uses behavior to make *inferences* about the underlying neural mechanisms, and the focus is ultimately on those mechanisms. Are you suggesting that such inferences can't be made? If so, you would be throwing the entire field of cognitive science under the bus. If that is truly your position, you owe it to your readers to be honest about it, because it is quite a radical position.

      "If it’s got nothing to do with evolution, why call it evolutionary psychology, just so that you can claim Darwin’s mantel for free?"

      It's called evolutionary psychology because hypotheses about psychological mechanisms are derived from *evolutionary theory* (e.g. parental investment, reciprocal altruism, life history theory, etc.). Are you suggesting that these scholars not be upfront about the theoretical framework they use to guide their research?

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  30. That;s OK Massimo, I understand you have a limited time to respond. I just want to say this: the main problem is that scientists cannot agree on many things and it's especially crucial in regard to new and innovative science (not just ev psych). What you say is already happening. NSF and others tend to fund mainstream science or "safer" science and i am not sure that's the best way to advance science. The big danger is that social norms would drive research and the results would be biased because of that.

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  31. @ Massimo

    > Even if you are describing my views accurately (and you aren’t) I fail to see what on earth does this have to do with memetics. On free will, I’ve written enough for now, so please take a look at the several entries on that topic at Rationally Speaking. <

    What does "this" have to do with memetics? Let me elaborate.

    Someone who believes that an intelligent agent is required to explain the apparent design we see in living organisms is termed a "creationist." Right?

    Someone who believes that an intelligent agent is required to explain the apparent design we see in human artifacts can be appropriately termed a "creationist of the mind." Why? Because he believes that an intelligent agent is required to explain human thought-processes and creativity.

    Memetic theory employs Darwinian principles (random variation and selection) to explain human thought-processes and creativity. As such, it holds that there is no intelligent agent guiding human thought-processes and creativity. Our thoughts are simply the result of an evolutionary process blindly playing itself out. The notion that we have a "self" that acts as some kind of causal agent (a.k.a. free will) is an illusion. If you believe that you have a self that employs free will in order to guide your thought-processes and creativity, then you qualify as a "creationist of the mind."

    "We once thought that biological design needed a creator, but we now know that natural selection can do all the designing on its own. Similarly, we once thought that human design required a conscious designer inside us, but we now know that memetic selection can do it on its own." (source: pg. 242, "The Meme Machine" by Susan Blackmore)

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    1. "Someone who believes that an intelligent agent is required to explain the apparent design we see in human artifacts"

      I'm wondering how you are defining intelligent here.

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  32. "If you believe that you have a self that employs free will in order to guide your thought-processes and creativity, then you qualify as a "creationist of the mind.""
    That's one of the most illogical comments yet made here. Even if Massimo believed that, which I doubt, it's in no way analogous to a creationists belief that God was in charge of creation, and that minus god, there couldn't be any. And if you are referring to a godless creationist, then what does this have to do with the mind that has evolved to create meaningfulness as opposed to one that otherwise couldn't be called a mind to begin with.

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    1. @ Baron P

      > "If you believe that you have a self that employs free will in order to guide your thought-processes and creativity, then you qualify as a "creationist of the mind.""
      That's one of the most illogical comments yet made here. Even if Massimo believed that, which I doubt, it's in no way analogous to a creationists belief that God was in charge of creation, and that minus god, there couldn't be any. And if you are referring to a godless creationist, then what does this have to do with the mind that has evolved to create meaningfulness as opposed to one that otherwise couldn't be called a mind to begin with. <

      He believes that an intelligent agent is required to explain the apparent design we see in a human artifact such as a pocket watch. (Naturalism demands that the watchmaker must be blind.)

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    2. Alistair,
      Actually it's my understanding that the blind watchmaker was an analogy for mother nature's allegedly blind selection process, and had no connection with a real watch and a real blind watchmaker required to accidentally design and make it.
      Or do you you really think that even the first actual earthen watch had to, or could have, or would have, been designed and made by a blind maker?

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    4. @ Baron P

      > Actually it's my understanding that the blind watchmaker was an analogy for mother nature's allegedly blind selection process, and had no connection with a real watch and a real blind watchmaker required to accidentally design and make it. <

      I believe you are correct.

      > Or do you you really think that even the first actual earthen watch had to, or could have, or would have, been designed and made by a blind maker? <

      I believe that any individual who subscribes to philosophical naturalism must deem all things to be the result of blind natural processes. (This would include pocket watches as well as human eyeballs. There are no exceptions. Logical consistency dictates this much.)

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    5. @ Baron P

      > In fact do you really think that the Dawkins analogy made any sense at all, and that every mechanism in existence, if not on earth then in the universe in general, that appears to operate with intelligent consequences, has been granted that marvelously complex ability by accident? <

      Naturalism demands that we characterize all watchmakers as blind. There are no exceptions. IOW, any evidence for intelligent agency must be deemed purely illusory.

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    7. "O Brethren, actions do exist, and also their consequences, but the person that acts does not." - Gautama Buddha

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  33. That said, I still don't think Jerry's criticism of evopsych goes far enough, for one very important - but also, I would think, very obvious - reason: human beings really do present special challenges when it comes to the scientific study of their behavior, especially of the evolution of that behavior.

    Indeed that's the case. But my issue with this argument is that at least some of evolutionary psychology's critics apply it differentially, applying this standard to evolutionary psychology, but then conveniently forgetting that standard when it comes to explanations from sociology and social psychology that they favor.

    I see that argument as applying to behavioral/social science across the board, and it's an argument for accepting the findings of behavioral sciences more cautiously and provisionally than those of some of the more tightly controlled "hard" sciences. Which, BTW, is why I get particularly miffed when I hear calls for to limit the availability or even censor video games, pornography, movies with violent content, etc based on a subset of behavioral studies claiming dire effects.

    A related problem is that behavioral sciences don't have a good central theory/paradigm of human behavior that's equivalent to evolutionary biology or quantum physics, and you end up with fields where vastly different approaches are considered more or less equal in terms of truth value, and adherence is simply a question of partisan affiliation. (And, true, this happens in hard science, including physics, but at least in those fields such question tend to be settled based on empirical evidence after a few generations.) Unfortunately, it often comes down to politics, with sociological approaches generally favored by progressive/leftist folks and more biological approaches favored those with classical liberal or conservative leanings. I think this in no small part explains PZ Myers' stance on evolutionary psychology, as he's proven himself over the last few years as someone who starts with a strong ideological commitment and works out his arguments from there.

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  34. Massimo, you write:

    > I think you are mistaken. Evopsych doesn’t study the brain at all (that’s the province of neuro-anatomy), it only studies behaviors that originate from that brain.

    This is profoundly wrong, and the source of much misplaced criticism. By way of illustration, here's the very first sentence of what should be the very first piece of primary literature that anybody who wants to learn about EP should read: "The goal of research in evolutionary psychology is to discover and understand the design of the human mind." Note that it says "..the design of the human mind", not "the evolutionary history of the human mind". The same opening paragraph goes on to state that "[EP] is not an area of study, like vision, reasoning, or social behavior. It is a way of thinking about psychology that can be applied to any topic within it."

    The text in question is entitled "Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer", and it's written by Tooby and Cosmides, the field's founders**. You'll find that the various textbooks in the area make the same point: that the raison d'etre of the field is to use evolutionary thinking to generate hypotheses and hence learn about the various psychological mechanisms that make up the human mind. It is *not* to uncover evolutionary history (not that phylogeny isn't interesting, but studying it is replete with problems, as you have pointed out, and which EPists are well aware of.)

    Do these facts change your assessment of the field? (Hint: they should.) If not, why not?

    ** Here's the link: http://www.cep.ucsb.edu/primer.html

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