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Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Saturday, June 29, 2013

Theories of truth

by Massimo Pigliucci

I have wanted to comment for some time about a number of available “theories of truth.” The occasion has now been presented by the fact that I am writing the fourth chapter of my new book (on whether and how philosophy makes progress, forthcoming from Chicago Press), which is about the surprisingly not-so-straightforward concept of progress (and truth) in science itself, the very discipline normally held to be the paragon of a truth seeking enterprise.

Every scientist I have talked to about these matters (though, of course, mine is an anecdotal sample, and actual sociological research would be welcome!), implicitly endorses what philosophers refer to as the Correspondence Theory of Truth (henceforth, CToT). This also likely captures the meaning of truth as understood by lay people. Interestingly, most philosophers up until modern times have also endorsed the CToT, and have done so without even bothering to produce arguments in its favor, since it is usually considered self-evident. Indeed, Descartes famously put it this way in his Letter to Mersenne: “I have never had any doubts about truth, because it seems a notion so transcendentally clear that nobody can be ignorant of it... the word ‘truth,’ in the strict sense, denotes the conformity of thought with its object.”

But what, exactly, is the CToT? Here is how Aristotle put it, in his Metaphysics: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.” Not exactly the most elegant rendition of it, but a concept that we find pretty much unchanged in Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Kant and several other medieval and early modern writers. Its modern rendition dates to the early days of analytic philosophy, and particularly to the work of G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. Truth, according to the CToT, is correspondence to facts: to say that statement / theory X is true just means that there is a factual state of affairs Y in the world that is as described by X. It seems pretty straightforward and hard to dispute, and yet much 20th century philosophy of science and epistemology has done just that: challenge the CToT with the aim of carefully unpacking the notions on which it is based, and — if necessary — to replace it with a better theory of truth.

The first problem lies in the very use of the word “truth.” It seems obvious what we mean if we say that, for instance, it is true that the planet Saturn has rings in orbit around its center of gravity. But it should be equally obvious what we mean when we say things like the Pythagorean theorem is true (within the framework of Euclidean geometry). And yet the two senses of the word “truth” here are quite distinct: the first refers to the sort of truth that can be ascertained (insofar as it can) via observation or experiment; the second one refers to truth that can be arrived at by deductive mathematical proof. We can also say that the law of the excluded middle — which says that either a proposition or its negation are true, but not both — is (logically) true within the framework of classical logic. This is related to, and yet somehow distinct, from the sense in which the Pythagorean theorem is true, and of course it is even more distinct from the business about Saturn and its rings. There are yet other situations in which we can reasonably and more or less uncontroversially say that something is true. For instance, according to every ethical system that I am aware of it is true that killing someone without reason is wrong. More esoterically, philosophers interested in possible world semantics and other types of modal logic may also wish to say that some statement or another is “true” of all nearby possible worlds, and so on.

The bottom line is that the concept of truth is in fact heterogeneous, so that we need to be careful about which sense we employ in any specific instance. Once appreciated, this is not an obstacle unless a scientistically inclined person wants to say, for instance, that moral truths are the same kind of truths as scientific ones. Needless to say, one easily encounters a number of such cavalier statements, which makes the point that the apparently obvious differences among the above mentioned meanings of truth do, in fact, need to be spelled out and constantly kept in mind. So, the CToT — within the specific context that interests us here — is limited to empirical-scientific truths about the way the world is and works. To speak of a CToT in the case of, say, mathematics or morality would be a highly metaphysically treacherous enterprise, one on which we are not going to embark (but see here).

Even if we are now clear that the CToT in science makes sense only for a restricted meaning of the word “fact” we still need to examine a number of objections and alternative proposals to the theory, as they will help appreciate why talk about progress in science is not quite as straightforward as one might think. There are several issues that have been raised about the soundness of the CToT, one of which is that it simply does not amount to a “theory” of any sort; it is rather a trivial statement, a vacuous platitude, and so forth. This is somewhat harsh, but not far from the mark, I think. The CToT really isn’t anything that we might reasonably label with the lofty term of “theory.” Then again, this doesn’t mean that it is either trivial or vacuous. I consider the CToT rather as a definition of what truth is, particularly in science (some philosophers refer to these situations as “mini-theories,” or perhaps better, “accounts”). Definitions are useful, if not necessarily explanatory, as they anchor our discussions and provide the starting point for further exploration.

Perhaps a more serious objection to the CToT is that it relies on the somewhat obscure concept of “correspondence,” which needs to be unpacked. One of the possible answers here is that defenders of the CToT can invoke the more precise (at least in mathematics) idea of isomorphism as the type of correspondence they have in mind. But — unlike in math — it is not at all straightforward to cash out what it means to say that there is an isomorphism between a theory (which is formulated in the abstract language of science) and a physical state of affairs in the world. This is a good point, but as Marian David retorts, this sort of problem holds for any type of semantic relation, not just for isomorphisms in the context of the CToT, and a discussion of that topic would veer too far into philosophy of language to be appropriate here.

Another way to take the measure of the CToT is to look at some of its principal rivals, as they have been put forth during the past several decades. One rival is a coherentist approach to truth, which replaces the idea of correspondence (with facts) with the idea of coherence (among propositions). This move works well, I suspect, for logic and mathematics (which are based on deductive logic, and where internal coherence is a required standard), but not for scientific theories. There are simply too many possible theories about the world that are coherent and yet do not actually describe the world as it is (or as we understand it to be) — a problem known in philosophy of science as the underdetermination of theory by the data, and one that from time to time actually plagues bona fide scientific theories, as it is currently the case with string theory in physics.

Another set of alternatives to the CToT is constituted by a number of pragmatic theories of truth, put forth by philosophers like Charles Peirce and William James. Famously, these two authors differed significantly, with James interested in a pluralist account of truth and Peirce more inclined toward a concept that works for a realist view of science. For Peirce scientific (or, more generally, empirical) investigation converges on the truth because our imperfect sensations are constrained by the real world out there, which leads to a sufficiently robust sense of “reality” while at the same time maintaining skepticism about specific empirical findings and theoretical constructs. Here is how Peirce characterizes the process (in The Essential Peirce):
So with all scientific research. Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion.
For Peirce, therefore, truth is an “opinion” that is destined to be agreed upon (eventually) by all inquirers, and the reason for this agreement is that the object of such opinion is reality. This is actually something that I think scientists and realist-inclined philosophers could live with. By contrast, I find James’ views irritatingly close to incoherence, or at least wishful thinking, as when he claims that truth is whatever proves to be good to believe, or when he defines truth as whatever is instrumental to our goals. It is by way of this sort of fuzzy thinking that James arrived at his (in)famous defense of theological beliefs: belief in God becomes “true” because “[it] yield religious comfort to a most respectable class of minds” (in Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking), which ought to be considered prima facie preposterous and accordingly dismissed. While some suggest that Bertrand Russell was a bit unfair to James when he said that the latter’s theory of truth committed him to the “truth” that Santa Clause exists, I am inclined to go with Bertie on this one.

A third alternative to the CToT is represented by one version or another of verificationism. This notion of course goes back at the least to the British empiricists, and particularly to Hume and his famous fork. As he famously put it in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:
All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic ... [which are] discoverable by the mere operation of thought ... Matters of fact, which are the second object of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. ... If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
(Note, of course, that strictly speaking Hume recognized two types of truths: empirical ones, subject to verificationism, and logical-mathematical ones, for which he seemed to adopt something like a coherence theory of truth.)

Verificationism, of course, had its heyday with the logical positivists of the early part of the 20th century, and fell out of favor after sustained criticisms by W.V.O. Quine, Hilary Putnam and others, although it is making a come back in the form of James Ladyman and Don Ross’s “non-positivist version.” Indeed, Ladyman and Ross are out to rescue metaphysics — the very discipline that logical positivists had ditched on the ground that it cannot abide by (their version of) the verification principle. So perhaps a modified incarnation of verificationism will still turn out to be viable after all.

I find a few other alternatives to the CToT to be far less palatable or promising, even though some of them have been all the rage of late in epistemology. For instance, the identity theory says that true propositions do not correspond to facts, they are facts. It is, however, not at all clear in what sense this is the case, unless we make recourse to a fairly radical kind of pluralism about facts themselves (i.e., one in which theories count as a category of facts), in which case the identity theory may turn out to have solved close to nothing. Or consider deflationist approaches to truth: according to the CToT, “Snow is white” is true if it corresponds to the fact that snow is white; for a deflationist, however, “Snow is white” is true if snow is (in fact) white. The move basically consists in dropping the “corresponds to” part of the CToT. The above mentioned David points out that many CToT statements are not at all so easily “deflated,” however; moreover, this particular debate seems to me to hinge on issues of semantics rather than on any “theory” of what it is for something to be true, rapidly approaching Ladyman and Ross’s “neo-Scholasticism” status (which is not meant to be a compliment).

A more interesting position, in my mind, is represented by alethic pluralism, according to which truth is multiply realizable. As David puts is: “truth is constituted by different properties for true propositions from different domains of discourse: by correspondence to fact for true propositions from the domain of scientific or everyday discourse about physical things; by some epistemic property, such as coherence or superassertibility, for true propositions from the domain of ethical and aesthetic discourse, and maybe by still other properties for other domains of discourse.” This essentially closes the circle, as alethic pluralism conjoins our discussion of theories of truth with our initial observation that “facts” come in a variety of flavors (empirical, mathematical, logical, ethical, etc.), with distinct flavors requiring distinct conceptions of what counts as true.

So, why do we care? Well, to begin with — and contra popular opinion (especially among scientists) — it turns out that it is not exactly straightforward to claim that science makes progress toward the truth about the natural world, because it is not clear that we have a good theory of truth to rely on; moreover, there are different conceptions of truth, some of which likely represent the best we can do to justify our intuitive sense that science does indeed make progress, but others that may constitute a better basis to judge progress (understood in a different fashion) in other fields — such as mathematics, logic, and of course, philosophy.

75 comments:

  1. Peirce would tell you that the most important aspect of "truth" is that it must include a description of the subject's purposes, whether they represent that thing's known or discerned intentions or those of some other entities that the subject finds it necessary at some point in the presence of its time to serve. And for whoever looks, these purposes will be found to be in an uncountable astronomical order; so that the whole of some thing's state of truth, even if ever knowable, will be in a constant state of change. Truth then is relative to every other truth, and never more discernible than a probability.

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  2. The trouble with defining truth is that in order for something to be true because of X it must already be "true" that it is in fact X. Peirce, Hegel, and Popper seem to be onto something, to me, when they opt for backing toward truth by eliminating or moving beyond things that are in some way false.

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    1. You remind me of this anecdote: A bystander asked an equestrian sculptor how he did it. The sculptor replied, “I just chip away everything that doesn't look like a horse.”

      Science just chips away everything that doesn't look like reality.

      /@

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    2. Correct above about Popper, but sadly incorrect above about science chipping away. It could do that, but it actually identifies bits of facts and assembles theories about the bits of facts rather than hypothesizing broadly inductively as Popper proposed, and being nicely chipped away.

      The key is to theorize with wide points of contact with facts for falsification, rather than continue paradigms begun from assembling bits of facts into theories. Otherwise we stagnate and proceed incrementally (and probably blind to context and vast potential).

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  3. If you can't find the truth, try these tips:

    1) Simplify, Einstein knew the solution was this Way.
    2) Study Nature, Michelangelo said it is true.
    3) Remove any theories, faiths, uncertainty, probabilities and or doubts. Descartes had a good method for this.
    4) Scientific measure has been proven to be only uncertain at best; remove it and see.
    5) Study Lincoln, Gandhi, and King; they fought and died for
    it.
    6) Truth is self-evident, Jefferson knew.
    7) If all else fails, just be true,
    8) Be One.

    =

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  4. It may not be straightforward to claim that science makes progress towards the truth but it is clear enough that science makes (or has made) progress. I don't know that you need a fully worked-out theory of truth in order to understand this.

    Because the concept of 'truth' has a certain rhetorical allure, perhaps it gets a bit more attention than it deserves. It's important and useful, of course, to clarify how the words 'true' and 'truth' are and can be used, but I think it's desirable to put the primary focus on the (admittedly related) concepts of progress – as Massimo seems to be doing in his book – and objectivity.

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  5. Mark,

    > but it is clear enough that science makes (or has made) progress. <

    Yes, as a scientist and philosopher of science I’m certainly not about to deny that. But the interesting point here is that it is more difficult than most scientists realize to actually cash out the concept of progress, since it in their mind it is inextricably connected to the concept of truth.

    Ant,

    > Science just chips away everything that doesn't look like reality. <

    Yes, at its best. But, again, the questions of philosophical interest are: how? And how do we know?

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  6. Truth in the Aristotelian sense is limited to the propositional logic, as the statements which constitute it are provably consistent. As soon as we add the natural numbers, this is no longer the case, as Gödel showed. Mathematicians, in practice, simply assume the non-absurdity of mathematics or, more precisely, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory plus the axiom of choice. So for the non-empirical systems of thought, truth, in the sense of contradiction being false, is provable for the prospositional logic and assumed for mathematics.

    For science, that kind of truth cannot even be assumed. A scientific theory is any formulation about observed or observable phenomena that includes empirically falsifiable claims. Since we can never know whether an anomaly might be found to falsify the theory, the best we can say for a theory is that it has not been falsified, not that it is true in the sense that asserting its negation leads to a logical absurdity. There is no use for the Aristotelian notion of truth beyond the need to communicate ideas in a non-contradictory manner, which only demands consistent use of language. I do not see the need to expand or redefine ‘true’” to accommodate scientific theories, when we really mean ‘good’ or ‘successful’.

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    1. B?

      And if A = B, and B = C, then A = C
      But what about B?
      They all look different to me, so what is truth,
      What can it B?
      Different or equal?
      What should it B?
      To B or not to B?
      That is the question.
      The Nature of B,
      Aristotle, Shakespeare and Me.

      =
      MJA

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  7. Great article. I've been waiting a long time to see an article here on Truth and the various theories on its exact nature. I would have to say that I think the Correspondance Theory is the most viable of all of the approaches, and I agree that some of the others (looking at you Deflationary/Redundancy Theories) aren't very helpful at all when it comes to contemplating what we mean when we say something is true.

    I do think, however, that CToT can also be incorporated into the mathematical/logical realms as well, and indeed, Massimo might be hinting as much with the link to the article on Mathematical Platonism from last year (one of the best articles I've read here, and one that aligns with my own beliefs as well). If it is the case that mathematical/logical/scientific truths could all be adequately encompassed by CToT, then that would leave things like morality/societal truths left. I myself take a somewhat non-cognitivist approach to morality and think that true/false distinctions might be meaningless. Or, more speculatively, they could somehow arise out of the objective mathematical/logical/scientific truths that are at the foundation of reality. In that case, those truths would themselves be described in the CToT framework as well.

    I wonder what any of your thoughts are on this possibility. I myself take the scientific and logico-mathematical worlds to be much closer to each other than some might think, especially at the deepest levels of reality. Morality and other more human conventions, however, might obviously resist being incorporated into the CToT to a greater degree. That being said, I would say the CToT advocate (for all domains of truth) might respond as the Non-Cognitivist would (its meaningless to assign those domains with true/false distinctions), or as a reductionist might (those societal/moral truths are somehow weakly emergent from the underlying truths in the M/L/S domain).

    I know that some (especially Massimo) might not be satisfied with either of those responses with respect to moral truth, but I would love to hear any thoughts/criticisms on this particular perspective.

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    1. I appreciated Massimo's article as well, and wonder if you and he have read Grisez, Boyle, & Finnis on "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends" (American Journal of Jurisprudence). There they define moral truth as "the integrity of the directiveness of practical knowledge," which while outside the scope of this comment to explain, emphasizes the future tense of moral truth: what is to be is what is to be done; do good and avoid evil; we won't know what that really means until we get there and start doing it; practical knowledge cannot derive from speculative knowledge.

      My point is that this shows how moral truth eludes the CToT and mathematics. Its embodiment will never exactly match a state of affairs, since its ultimate embodiment is ideal by definition, and therefore even the math equation would not know its target until it had reached it.

      I have by now butchered the position of Grisez et al., but wanted to share.

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  8. The "theory of truth" that makes sense to me is Huw Price's Truth as Convenient Friction ("we haven’t understood truth until we understand its role in the game we currently play") or the conversational theory of truth [youtube.com/watch?v=SvmmTZk8_Uo]. Truth is the process of iteratively more accurate or useful theories.



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  9. @pete: "Morality and other more human conventions, however, might obviously resist being incorporated into the CToT to a greater degree."
    Google this document and see why: "Truth and Serving the Biological Purpose."

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  10. Massimo,

    I take exception with the idea that 'truth' is heterogenous in meaning. I think if the one sees the differences between empirical, mathematical, and ethical truths as affecting the meaning of 'true' one is of thinking about 'truth' on too low a level of generality. It's like thinking that 'animal' has different meanings because of the diversity of animals: when we use 'animal' to refer to a giraffe, for example, we're not using the word in quite same way we use it when we use it to refer to elephants; after all, giraffes have long necks and elephants do not. So we should be careful!

    I favor the so-called deflationary theory of truth.

    'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.

    Critics of this theory say that it lacks explanatory power; it doesn't tell us the mechanism by which truth works. Well what if truth doesn't work by a mechanism and the notion that a greater explanation is possible is an illusion?

    The problem of a theory of truth is to answer the question:

    'S' is true if and only if ___?

    Where 'S' is an any well-formed sentence. Now the problem - or rather triviality - of any theory of truth other than the deflationary theory is that nothing placed on the right side of the above equivalence can be more than a more elaborate synonym of 'S' (without quotes). To illustrate:

    Deflationary theory:

    'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white.

    Other theories:

    'Snow is white' is true iff snow has the property of being white.
    'Snow is white' is true iff what is referred to by 'snow' has the property of being white.
    'Snow is white' is true iff what is referred to by 'snow' has the property expressed by the predicate 'is white'.
    'Snow is white' is true iff snow being white is a fact.
    'Snow is white' is true iff 'snow is white' corresponds to the fact that snow is white.
    (And so on.)

    Nothing on the right side of the above equivalences improves on 'snow is white' as an explanation of the condition under which 'Snow is white' is true. This is because they are all just alternative ways of unpacking the assertion that snow is white. That is, the theory of truth ends with the assertion that snow is white and the above alternatives are just semantic unpackings of that assertion. Even if one of these unpackings were true - and presumably one is true - it would not add to the explanation of truth; it would only explain the nature of the assertion that snow is white.

    This touches on the nature of explanations perhaps. Suppose a window is open and Ed wonders why. Bill says he opened it. Ed says that that explanation is unsatisfying and asks Bill *how* he opened the window. But in asking Bill how he opened the window, Ed is not getting a more detailed explanation of why the window is open. (continued below)

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  11. (continuation)

    The general problem with thinking there is more to truth than the deflationary theory is what might be described as "a slip into the metaphysical." This can be illustrated with the idea that "ethical truth" represents a particular problem of truth. (The same illustration could be given with respect to "mathematical truth.")

    We might be perplexed how it can be true that an action has the property of being ethically wrong. Actions having ethical properties is surely a different thing from walls having color properties. While walls have objective features in virtue of which they instantiate color properties, it is less clear that there is anything in actions that objectively warrant ethical properties. While wall color is in the natural realm, ethics is in the social realm. So when we talk about ethical statements being true, we're not quite talking about the same thing we're talking when we talk about walls having colors.

    The above reasoning is lost in metaphysics, and the deflationary theory of truth shows the way back onto the road. Concern about "ethical truth" ends with the fact that:

    'Action, A, is ethically wrong' is true iff action A is ethically wrong.

    With that out of the way, our focus can turn to what it means to assert than an action is ethically wrong. That is, truth is no longer an issue; the issue is the meaning of the predicate 'ethically wrong'.

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  12. Thank you always for your thoughtful and provoking writings.

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  13. Thank you always for your thoughtful and provoking writings

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  14. Massimo, thanks, your post is both useful and clear.

    I want to ask about moral truth.

    Why do you so starkly exclude morality as a subject with culturally useful truth of “the sort of truth that can be ascertained (insofar as it can) via observation or experiment”.

    Using normal criteria such as explanatory power, no contradictions with known facts, integration with the rest of science, and so forth, something like the following appears to be true in the normal provisional sense of science:

    “Moral behaviors are costly cooperation strategies for increasing the benefits of cooperation in groups.” Or as can be shown to be equivalent: “Morality solves the cross-species universal dilemma of how to obtain the benefits of cooperation without being exploited.”

    (The relevant data set for this science is culturally ‘moral’ behaviors that are motivated by 1) biologically based emotions such as empathy, loyalty, guilt, and indignation and 2) advocated by past and present enforced moral codes with all their diversity, contradictions, and even bizarreness.)

    Are you claiming such hypotheses about a cross-cultural universal function of morality are somehow necessarily “bad science”? I don’t see how that is possible.

    Perhaps what you mean is that such science necessarily cannot describe an imperative “moral means” that we are mysteriously obligated to use to achieve our goals for acting morally. There we agree. Also, all such hypotheses from the science of morality are necessarily silent on the ultimate goals of this cooperation produced by moral behaviors.

    But these two objections about imperative means and ultimate goals apply to all of science. This does not impede science’s culturally utility.

    For example, it should be culturally useful to understand when it is immoral to follow the Golden Rule, why superficially contradictory ‘Christian” virtues and ‘Greek” virtues are complimentary, not contradictory, why some societies have held it immoral to eat shrimp or not wear a burka, why in some moral systems it has been moral to murder people outside your group (perhaps contrary to your assertion?), and why our moral psychology provides sometimes puzzling judgments.

    The science of morality provides clear answers for all these questions. But more importantly, it defines the specific moral ‘means’ that shaped our social biology and cultural norms to make us such an incredibly successful species.

    I concur with what you said in the linked article which mentions Sam Harris, “A much more productive line of inquiry, it seems to me, is to combine the best of what both philosophy and science can offer in our struggle to make our world as just and moral as possible.”

    But by excluding morality from the realm of scientific truth, you are excluding the practical utility of science in defining moral codes. For groups that generally agree that moral codes ought to be enforced that increase “well-being” (however that is defined) and that “everyone deserves moral consideration”, the contribution of moral philosophy can be argued to be of secondary importance to science.

    When ultimate goals for enforcing moral codes have been defined, all that is left is the instrumental means of achieving those goals. Science dominates the field of defining instrumental means of achieving goals, perhaps even the ‘means’ we call moral codes.

    I am not sure how much we actually disagree.

    Might there be a future post devoted to “moral truth” that describes the truth that science can offer to help solve the very practical problem of molding moral codes (moral means) to better meet moral goals?

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    1. Can there be moral truths bereft of moral purposes? I'd like to see Massimo answer how and why.

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    2. Baron, I can give that a try. Like many questions in moral philosophy, the answer depends on what terms are intended to refer to.

      For example, if by “moral truths” we mean rules that are somehow intrinsically imperative, then I would say the answer is no, as I suspect you are thinking.

      But over the last 30 years or so, it has become obvious to people in the field (for example see Evolution, Games, and God, edited by Martin Nowak) that morality is a biological and cultural adaptation for increasing the benefits of cooperation in groups. No big surprise there.

      This truth about moral behavior is “the sort of truth that can be ascertained via observation or experiment”. But this scientific truth implies no imperative moral purpose. So yes, this kind of moral truth can and does exist independent of any imperative moral purpose.

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    3. "morality is a biological and cultural adaptation for increasing the benefits of cooperation in groups. No big surprise there."
      You realize of course that you just gave us your description of its purpose.

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  15. Zal,

    > There is no use for the Aristotelian notion of truth beyond the need to communicate ideas in a non-contradictory manner <

    Agreed, but the Aristotelian notion is far from being the only one on offer, even for logic.

    > I do not see the need to expand or redefine ‘true’” to accommodate scientific theories, when we really mean ‘good’ or ‘successful’. <

    Well, but then one can reasonably ask “good” or “successful” in what sense and according to what criteria, and as soon as you begin to address that you skirt again very close to *some* notion of truth.

    pete,

    > I myself take the scientific and logico-mathematical worlds to be much closer to each other than some might think, especially at the deepest levels of reality. <

    Agreed, see my posts on Ladyman and Ross’s philosophy of science.

    > Morality and other more human conventions, however, might obviously resist being incorporated into the CToT to a greater degree. <

    I don’t think there is a sense in which moral statements are “true” or “false.” But in my series on moral reasoning here I have put forth the notion that morality is both rooted in human nature and enhanced by our ability to reason logically. Which means that I may agree with the non-cognitivists (but only in a very limited sense) and that I reject the reductionist position.

    Paul,

    > I think if the one sees the differences between empirical, mathematical, and ethical truths as affecting the meaning of 'true' one is of thinking about 'truth' on too low a level of generality. <

    Maybe, but I’ve always been comfortable with pluralism, in a number of areas. At the very least it makes sense to distinguish between different kinds of “animals,” using your analogy.

    The deflationary “theory” leaves me cold, because I keep having the sneaking suspicion that it’s main difference with the CToT is a matter of pure semantics:

    > 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white. <

    Yeah, but the last “is” there looks suspiciously like “corresponds to the fact that...”

    > The above reasoning is lost in metaphysics, and the deflationary theory of truth shows the way back onto the road. Concern about "ethical truth" ends with the fact that: 'Action, A, is ethically wrong' is true iff action A is ethically wrong. <

    Yes, but that says close to precisely nothing, and obscures what I think are important distinctions between physical truths and moral truths. And I’m very interested in those distinctions.

    Mark,

    > Using normal criteria such as explanatory power, no contradictions with known facts, integration with the rest of science, and so forth, something like the following appears to be true in the normal provisional sense of science <

    I’ve already addressed this in several posts on Sam Harris and Michael Shermer (you can use their names as keywords here to find the pertinent posts).

    Baron,

    > Can there be moral truths bereft of moral purposes? I'd like to see Massimo answer how and why. <

    I have addressed this point a zillion times. I have *no* problem at all talking about purpose when it comes to humans and whatever other conscious, self-reflecting, beings there may be in the universe. I have a huge problem with imputing purpose to anything else. Queue your predictable responses...

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    1. Massimo, since I agree with your descriptions of Sam Harris’s and Michael Shermer’s logical errors, your referring me to those posts shows I am have failed, once again, to adequately communicate.

      How and specifically why instrumental oughts from the science of morality can be culturally useful in defining enforced moral codes seems a simple concept without any obvious logical error. I’ll have to work some more on how to describe it.

      In any event, I enjoy your posts and appreciate the opportunity to make comments.

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    2. Thanks for the response Massimo. And I absolutely agree that our rational nature allows for some form of universal morality that is "best" in a strong sense. I would approach this through a utilitarian framework (but I know you would not take this route). Might some type of utilitarianism be combined with the virtue ethics framework you defend? I think you raise some strong points with regard to virtue ethics, but I still think that one problem that could arise stems from the fact that virtues could be different in different societies.

      Despite its flaws, I still believe that Mill's utilitarian framework and its offshoots advances a strong defense for liberal societies with moral codes that lead to the best benefit for the majority of the society. I think that some philosophers are uncomfortable with it because of their ideological presuppositions, as they seek to avoid saying that one moral code is "superior" to another (harkening back to arguments for imperialism/colonialism). I don't think that utilitarianism says that at all, as evidenced by Mill's sincere desire to understand what is best for a society.

      That being said, I would definitely like to combine elements of utilitarianism with virtue ethics. If one set of virtues seems to lead to a best possible society (measured by some sort of metric or happiness scale), could we combine the two ethical approaches?

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    3. Massimo,

      >Maybe, but I’ve always been comfortable with pluralism, in a number of areas.<

      I'm comfortable with pluralism also, when it's appropriate. With regard to the meaning of 'true', I think it represents a needless metaphysical quagmire. Relatedly, I think you missed my point about animals. There are many kinds of animals, but the word 'animal' doesn't vary in meaning depending on the kind of animal referred to.

      I agree that the distinctions between empirical, mathematical, ethical, etc., truths are in important. It's just I don't think these differences imply a difference in the meaning of the word 'true' when applied to different kinds of truths. 'True' is on a different semantic level, with 'sentence' and 'predicate'.

      >Yeah, but the last “is” there looks suspiciously like “corresponds to the fact that...”<

      ? The deflationary theory is a correspondence theory in disguise because of the 'is' in the righthand 'snow is white'?

      >Yes, but that says close to precisely nothing, and obscures what I think are important distinctions between physical truths and moral truths.<

      I heartily agree that those are important distinctions. But we don't need an equivocal notion of 'true' to preserve that distinction any more than we need an equivocal notion of 'sentence' to do such. The relevant important distinctions are on the lower level of sentence content rather than on the more formal level at which 'true' operates.

      As to "'Action, A, is ethically wrong' is true iff action A is ethically wrong" saying close to precisely nothing, whether or not it says anything, it does, for me at least, clarify the role of 'true' in language: saying that a sentence is true is equivalent to asserting it, which means we can move beyond worry about the word 'true' to a worry about sentence content, etc., which is where the relevant important distinctions reside.

      I suspect that your view is based on taking the fact that there are different kinds of truths - in the sense that there are e.g. mathematic versus ethical truths - to mean that the word 'true' has different meanings. But does there being different kinds of sentences mean the word 'sentence' is equivocal?



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  16. Any analysis needs the absolute proviso at the outset that reality is our individual construct, different for you and me but probably quite similar, and very different from a dog. We construct it by a neuronal cycle changed by our actions and the world impacts, but containing that change for a unified representation of oneself within the world.

    Consequently, any 'reality' beyond our construct is unknowable, as our construct is the only means by which we can know anything ('I think therefore I am', meaning thought as our construct is primary, and therefore it follows that I exist to have it). That doesn't mean we can't use reasoning in our construct, as this piece shows, but progress needs creativity, and that's different from reasoning.

    The first task is to know one's own processes creating thoughts and the feelings they attend, so that we can have confidence in our constructs of what constitute facts, truths, or realities. I present a clear model for processes, how to control them, and their full capacities, in my free book at my site http://thehumandesign.net now in its third edition.

    Until we can understand our own processes of construction in objective terms that match our subjective experiences, we will always have too much confidence in our individual constructs (in reasoning) or too little (in creativity). It starts with self analysis to weed out one's own rubbish.

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    1. Please red "Fashionable Nonsense" (Alan Sokal) and "Fear of Knowledge" (Paul Boghossian) for piercing criticisms of Constructivism/Continental Philosophy viewpoints that bring little to the table.

      I think that anyone who subscribes to some sort of naturalized philosophy (which every philosopher should, as empirical evidence and science are vital to understand how the world works) would be hard pressed to support the idea that we all construct our own realities. If an Aboriginal tribe believes that the Sun shines due to Nuclear Fission, I think that any rational individual would think that absurd.

      I should note that this does not mean abstract objects do not exist. I myself am a Mathematical Realist. That being said, I subscribe to that view based on the deeply powerful connections we find between mathematics and the natural world (hence it is still a "natural" philosophy, rather than "supernatural."

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    2. You misunderstand completely. It is an absolute principle, as you can see from my post above. What is real for me is real for me, and what is real for a dog is real for a dog, which doesn't mean we cannot attempt to objectively rationalize and compare the value of any construct.

      One can present ideas such as yours to be criticized, as I am doing using my construct, which is a construct that using reasoning and logic, thus my dismantling of your reply. This has no bearing, of course, upon the absolute fact that everyone constructs and is responsible for their own ideas - whether copied from others or correct by others (as I am doing here).

      It couldn't be simpler. I suggest you read my book at http://thehumandesign.net ahead of the references you cite. It will evaporate your confusion, I'm sure, as your reply is shallow.

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    3. I have never accepted that there is really much difference between abstractions and extrapolations (like the existence of mathematical infinities) and the supernatural. Both require a leap of faith that is not needed, but brings comfort to some.

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    4. Sorry Phil but there's a huge difference between the idea of mathematical infinities and the supernatural. I don't need a leap of faith to believe in infinities when they are integral to almost every part of mathematics. Because mathematics is so integral to understanding the natural world, that acts as empirical support to the entire body of the mathematical universe (think set theory, number theory, group theory, etc...). Not to mention the Schrodinger equation (which is at the foundation of all of quantum mechanics) is formalized in an infinite dimensional Hilbert Space.

      No leaps are required, whereas believing in a personal God that answers prayers and influences the world is indeed a leap of faith. They are two very different things.

      Marcus I apologize but after taking a look at your website it looks to me like there is nothing in your book that would lead me to accept fact constructivism. Unfortunately it looks like a lot of rubbish and crackpot theorizing to me.

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    5. Website only? I hope that is not your standard for exploration and assessment. It is two paragraphs of explanation, and a diagram. The rest is admin. I am glad you said it though, as readers can assess the value of it when they realize the website contains very little but a download link to a 210 pages book (as opposed to 2 paragraphs). Anything specific about the 2 paragraphs, Pete?

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    6. pete, see Mycielski's theorem on the isomorphism between infinititary (T) and finitary (Fin(T)) theories:

      books.google.com/books?id=GvGqRYifGpMC&pg=PA273

      "If φ is a sentence in the language of T and φ' is a regular relativization of φ, then φ is a theorem of T if and only if φ' is a theorem of Fin(T)."

      It is an isomorphism in the sense proofs are one-to-one.

      One can do all of mathematics - all the subjects you mention above - in a finitary terms. It's a theorem that says so!

      Infinity is an unnecessary luxury.

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    7. Anything specific about the 2 brief paragraphs Pete? I'm sure my wording is general enough to suggests a download is worthwhile, but if you have a suggestion to make it more enticing, let me know. You have somehow formed a concluded judgment from those 2 paragraphs, but I would like to avoid others somehow making the same mistake, so any suggestions would be appreciated.

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    8. Are you there Pete to back out your outrageous comment about crackpots? I guess not. Anyone know why people react like that? I'm keeping psychological behavioural notes on patterns to anonymous internet exchanges.

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    9. Marcus -

      Apologies but I've been pretty busy these past few days. I'll tell you exactly what I garnered from your "2 paragraphs." One, you are a lawyer, and have no formal training in physics or philosophy (as you readily admit). I don't seem to find your work in any science journal, which is strange, since you claim to have discovered the "design" inherent in the Universe, something which many reputable scientists might want to delve into. All of this indicates that you don't have to slightest ability to formulate a theory of everything into a mathematically rigorous/consistent whole that is capable of explaining natural phenomena and predicting new ones.

      Second, I examined your book and found horribly vague and misinformed discussion on chemicals and the electromagnetic/gravitational forces. The language reminds me of a Continental philosopher detailing how 5 dimensional torii are relevant to neuroscience by drawing neat little geometric shapes and saying "See! It all works." This is not science, and I am sorry to say that it is highly likely that there is not one ounce of truth in your theory on natures "Design."

      Phil -

      I'm not sure about that theorem and what it really says about finite/infinite mathematical systems being isomorphic. I've never really gotten to advanced in logic (intro to deductive), so I won't say that you're wrong. I will say that if that were the case, however, I would expect to see much more debate on ultrafinitism's merit as a coherent and fruitful philosophy of mathematics (alas, much searching has revealed nothing). In addition, you seem to hold an anti-platonistic conception of mathematics, thinking ultrafinitism might make this possible. Ironically, Doron Zeilberger, a strong promoter of ultrafinitism, is a Platonist about mathematics. In addition, claiming that we can rid ourselves of infinity, even if possible in principle (and I don't think it actually is), does not rid you of explaining the patterns inherent in the finite systems of discrete mathematics.


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  17. Massimo wrote: "I have *no* problem at all talking about purpose when it comes to humans and whatever other conscious, self-reflecting, beings there may be in the universe."

    Ditto.

    I've thought quite a bit over 30 years now about what would be the code (some call it I-code) for a self-reflecting, conscious, free-willing robot. We will very probably make one of those before we ever meet other beings from another planet. One thing I'm certain (!) of is that its "brain" at some level takes (real) chances. (This is where I think Daniel Dennett is wrong.)

    Speaking of wrong, I just came across a new book "Darwin's Doubt" [darwinsdoubt.com] by a "Ph.D. in history and philosophy of science" (Cambridge) [en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_C._Meyer]. It's about intelligent design, of course, and "Will Debut at #7 on New York Times Hardcover Nonfiction Bestseller List". It will no doubt get a lot of press as it promotes the (non)-"truth" of ID.

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    1. The interesting thing about intelligent design is the design, and not whether there was a creator (for which there is no evidence at all). In my book referred to above, I explain how we are designed by nature to inevitably evolve on earth-type planets. My book present a completely logical analysis with many breakthroughs.

      Unfortunately, when people read comments such as the above, they baulk and think 'what a waste of time'. Sadly, they do not explore, perhaps lacking confidence in themselves or others to find such answers.

      The other thing true about religious thinkers (apart from there being some kind of design to our anatomy) is their dissatisfaction with current science in explaining the unlikely eventuality of human reasoning by evolution from 75% hydrogen and $25 helium after the Big Bang.

      It's a matter of taste, but I share their dissatisfaction, and their suspicion that humans are predetermined (by nature' laws in my model, rather than God's will), rather than amazing accidents with extraordinary abilities. What's more I reckon I have proven it in my book.

      So, be a little accepting of the dissatisfaction of religious types who suspect, correctly, that science has inadequate explanations on many levels. I turned to creativity with reference to well know facts, rather than well worn trails that have gone nowhere except into micro-technology and pharmacology in the past 50 years (or way-out 'something from nothing' theories in cosmology, which as almost as unlikely as the existence of God).

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    2. "The other thing true about religious thinkers (apart from there being some kind of design to our anatomy) is their dissatisfaction with current science in explaining the unlikely eventuality of human reasoning by evolution from 75% hydrogen and $25 helium after the Big Bang."

      I would think scientists are dissatisfied with current science - which is why we are always looking for new theory. But the religious-thinking "scientists" of the Discovery Institute kind are a different breed: They don't have a theory, are not interesting in finding one, and what they are really saying is that there is no theory at all to be found.

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    3. Its just as question of how far you wish to go with theory. They go so far as to suppose that the 'facts' they see around them have no possible scientific theories because they are unimpressed by what science has got so far. Scientists are more impressed, and certainly not dissatisfied to the point of saying no scientific theory is possible.

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  18. Well Massimo, at least I have you attributing purpose (or the possibility of having some) to "humans and whatever other conscious, self-reflecting, beings there may be in the universe." The serving of a human purpose by a non-conscious entity still baffles you I take it. As do what Peirce might see as the purposes of consistent universal forces, or those of the non self reflecting plants, and especially of the microbes that all we living things are made of.
    You've drawn a line somewhere between the living and the dead, without concern as to exactly where it's drawn or why. Is that really the purpose of philosophy - but wait, philosophy for you can't have a purpose, it can only serve our purposes. Except that service of a purpose by the non-conscious for the conscious doesn't seem to fit in your philosophy either.
    Was that predictable?

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    1. You might be amused by the idea that the only reason why this piece exists is because everyone has their own damn construct of reality! Thus, endless logical debate. It's interesting, as I pointed out initially above, that this real cause of the entire issue itself is not addressed - individual subjectivity and confidence as to what constitutes reality, from the personal contained constructs we each create.

      Continue the debate, or be creative and explode it by exploding the constructs at their source by explaining how people create their constructs. Much better to explode the process of constructing one's own 'realities', rather than having swirling debates that might or might not sway hard case dudes from their constructs.

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    2. People adapt to and reconstruct what have become the cultural constructs of the other people who in turn have reconstructed those of the animals they evolved from and on down the line.
      Regardless of what your book says that, based on the misconceptions you present, few if any may be inclined to read.

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    3. "...the only reason why this piece exists is because everyone has their own damn construct of reality!" How do you know (justified true belief) that your proposition (that everyone has their construct of reality) is true (that is, it coheres or corresponds with reality) in any objective sense? Isn't your proposition merely just a construct of reality? And if it is, how do you know it is true?

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    4. Exactly the issue, I don't. It is my construct of reality, just as your reply is yours. The logic follows from the argument set out above - that there are inevitable justifications of different positions, some better than others in your archaic terms of 'justified true belief' - and some that would throw out such terms by dismantling them before proposing them. They are better exploded as constructs of individuals by looking at individuals, rather than swirled about by scholasticism.

      It's better to speak of hypotheses as beliefs, and confirmations/falsifications a shaping truths/facts from them, and to apply Popper rather than slavishly following conventions of language - trying to progress by making logical connections between facts, rather than relying on a 'scholastic rational swirl' or measured facts badly cobbled into theories by adding one to another.

      You will have your own view of the logic of my construct here, but bear in mind that logical connections exist to provide valid explanations beyond "I measure the mass of a proton at x using y methods - thus a reliable fact". Facts are arrangements of other facts - and our interpretation of the value of those arrangements as new perspectives need to be respected beyond the capacities of specialist measurers to properly theorize about their measurements. Again, the limitations of constructs, requiring inclusion of the constructors in the analysis, to establish "why" they "believe" as they do to the fullest meaning.

      It's a quest that you did not extract from my posts or you would probably support it - a fuller "why". But then again many people are evasively private, or private for personal reasons they don't need to justify, and would prefer not to have a fuller "why" by self-analysis first. If so, they should stay out of robust public debate, or they will get shunted.

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    5. Baron, that reply is about as shallow as you could find. Don't worry about advising others to read or not read a book you haven't read, based on a reply like yours to my post. Your reply is that mind is mimicry - just bizarrely vague and adds nothing at all, to be "truthful". How could it logically follow that people should avoid my ideas when you present such arguments?

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    6. Excellent point Dave. This is why constructivism in general is entirely self defeating to begin with

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    7. Constructivism? Use plain English if you can Pete, it avoids slippery logic. Using the word 'construct' as Baron has, for example, is just a slippery descriptive for picking up this and that or refashioning this and that down the line from animals. It has little or no value to it, and merely continues a probably quite obvious narrative (that gets skewed) about survival in an environment. There is a good deal of mimicry, and we do inherit our traits, including an evolved capacity to reason - and so? That's all too basic and descriptive, and goes nowhere. Nothing new there, just narratives.

      I use 'construct' for the process of literal construction - building - of sufficiency in the brain for an experience of thoughts and feelings by which we claim to know 'the truth'. This is an entirely different usage, and deep in its context for understanding how functions within the world create awareness as a representation of those functions in the world, by finalization as a construct by that anatomy using neurons in the brain. Mind is an anatomical construct by anatomical construction, by processes that need to explored using the micro-technology and pharmacology we have developed in the past 50 years - it is a good way to use them both, with care. Baron's understanding seems very limited.

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    8. Oh, Dave, I don't know its true, that's the point.

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    9. Oh, and Dave, I don't know its true, that's the point. It's my construct by the processes set out above and subject to anatomical capacities beyond analysis in a brief paragraph here.

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    10. @Marcus:
      "Mind is an anatomical construct by anatomical construction, by processes that need to explored using the micro-technology and pharmacology --"

      So the mind is the anatomical construction rather than the brain? From which, when the work was done without its direction, the strategic system that we've called intelligence, and have erroneously believed had helped to construct the brain, somehow has spontaneously emerged instead? Depth arising from the shallows so to speak?

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    11. Not at all Baron, you haven't read any of the book or the answer would be obvious. There is no Neural Darwinism - Gerald Edelman - which continues the barely half-way approach of ex post Selection - magical neurons that 'somehow' produce something useful and continue to do so by being retained in mutations.

      The point is to see what can be constructed in the first place. Anatomies are the product of DNA simply shaping non living chemicals from a landscape into living anatomies. Those chemical capacities make up anatomy, and neurons are their facility and not free to evolve this and that magical potential for ideas.

      Ideas come for automatic brain and neuronal impulses serving a chemical anatomy that is structured for thought - anatomical capacities faithfully represented by neurons. No Neural Darwinism of trail and error, or Darwinism in a broader sense of trial & error. Just pre-existing chemical capacities fashioned regularly by DNA into anatomies with chemical capacities served by neurons.

      That's what a bit of clear thinking and writing can achieve. It explodes the somewhat confused and garbled account of mind you have proposed. I assume your account is your own theory - and it makes no sense at all because you haven't thought it through. Automatic neurons, yes, but manual functions within the world of thinking anatomies with a reasonable level free will from our comprehensive anatomical capacities.

      No charge, read the book.

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    12. @Marcus: "Ideas come for automatic brain and neuronal impulses serving a chemical anatomy that is structured for thought - - Just pre-existing chemical capacities fashioned regularly by DNA into anatomies with chemical capacities served by neurons."
      And so, Marcus, it seems you really believe "That's what a bit of clear thinking and writing can achieve."
      Are these ideas and the clear thinking you espouse intelligent? And if so, I ask, did these ideas require intelligence for their conception, and if so, I ask again, did this intelligence arise spontaneously from a mind that thinking or intelligence had no role at all in constructing? Or was all this accomplished with your "manual functions within the world of thinking anatomies"? Anatomies that think without having to evolve intelligence? As writing about clear thinking, that's about as clear as mud.
      And by the way, the concept of the mind as an emergent property of the brain is not, as you put it, my own theory. Which tells me you are far more ignorant of both the older or the newer theories regarding the evolution of our brains and minds than anyone had thought. It seemed earlier that you were simply dismissing the ideas of the past, while it seems now that you haven't been intelligently aware of them at all.

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    13. It is perfectly clear, but you are making ignorant assumptions about what chemicals contribute to intelligence, and you didn't read or understand my comments about evolution of intelligence. Rather than make silly assumptions, simply ask for help. I can only assume the garble you wrote about 'mind as copying' is your own theory or points to it, as there is no theory of mind that vacuous and uninformative. I evidently have a more thorough understanding of theories of mind than you do. But enough reply to your skewed confusions.

      To the point, for other readers, intelligence evolves from DNA shaping pre-existing environmental chemicals into anatomies. Those chemicals have capacities for production of awareness when facilitated by neurons representing their functions, eyes, ears, gut, feet, the lot. All are diverse chemical sites with inherent capacities represented by neurons. Evolution is merely construction by DNA, and predetermined by the chemicals it can use to build eyes, ears etc and their neurons. Evolution of intelligence follows directly from building a human to pre-existing capacities that have the necessary features to be brought out by neurons as 'intelligence'. Readers, don't underestimate the very structure of your anatomy and its features as actually being your state of mind (facilitated by neurons). Mind may exist across the entire anatomy, but latent until finalization in the brain from inputs in a unified representation binding their diversities.

      Baron, you clearly don't understand, and you are full of assumptions about my clear writing and other theories. The most that I can achieve in responding to you is to inform other readers. I won't copy & paste any of your wording, as it would just draw forth more of your muddy confusions. I will leave my reply at that, and let you dare to spend 5 minutes downloading and flipping through the book if you are game. Other readers are strongly recommended to do so, and to ignore any replies to my post to dissuade you, as they are terribly misconceived and it would utterly disastrous to progress to ignore my breakthroughs.

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    14. @Marcus: "To the point, for other readers, intelligence evolves from DNA shaping pre-existing environmental chemicals into anatomies."
      So the DNA acted intelligently to create intelligence that otherwise didn't exist in DNA to act on? I think you need to practice your logic a bit more to make that fly.
      Try working on this question and see where it gets you, logically: Was DNA accidentally constructed in an intelligent fashion?

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    15. You clearly have no understanding of neuroscience, so you have avoided that issue, but your understanding of DNA is just as inadequate, as is your logic. I will just highlight one of your regular meanderings into garbled misunderstandings leading to thick questions. "Was DNA accidentally constructed in an intelligent fashion?"

      That question shows an total ignorance of the laws of chemistry. Nothing in nature is 'accidental', everything is guided by particle & field capacities. Humans are (mostly) intelligent, but DNA is a natural chemical created by understandable but not well understood processes, and not intelligent, not an accident, and notr constructed other than by laws of chemistry.

      Somehow, for your own unknown reasons and reasoning, you have ignored the incredible complexity of the anatomy shaped by DNA and using environmental chemical capacities, enabling us to be intelligent. You then say, DNA made it, so DNA must be intelligent. Just ridiculous facile connections between words with no thought or logic in formulating questions.

      Read the book. No charge for this advice, its a good record of a case study in ignorance. I would prefer you don't reply any further as it is too tempting to correct your glaring misconceptions and preconceptions and waste further time. It's all in the book.

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    16. @Marcus: "Nothing in nature is 'accidental', everything is guided by particle & field capacities."
      Guided, if not by accident, would otherwise need to be done deliberately, no? But deliberately, by your reckoning, must require no intention, since if it did, there would seem to be a purpose needed for intention, and a strategy needed to carry the intention out. But by your reckoning again it wouldn't have to be an intelligent strategy, correct? In other words, particle and field capacities do guidance either with no strategies, or those that need no intelligence to either be created or operated. Did I get that right?

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    17. "DNA is a natural chemical created by understandable but not well understood processes, and not intelligent, not an accident, and notr constructed other than by laws of chemistry."
      Understandable but not well understood? Either logic or a bit of English is missing there.
      DNA, not intelligent and not an accident, but nevertheless constructed by the laws of chemistry, you say. In other words the laws of chemistry have no connection with intelligence and don't need to be intelligently applied. Leaving them as non-intelligent and just working for no particular reason in a remarkably consistent fashion at all times. Did I get that right?

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  19. Mark,

    > since I agree with your descriptions of Sam Harris’s and Michael Shermer’s logical errors, your referring me to those posts shows I am have failed, once again, to adequately communicate. <

    Sorry, but I really couldn’t parse an additional / distinct position from your previous comments.

    > How and specifically why instrumental oughts from the science of morality can be culturally useful in defining enforced moral codes seems a simple concept without any obvious logical error. <

    I don’t think there are instrumental oughts. I think we have values and preferences and *then* use science, instrumentally, to achieve them. I never said that science is irrelevant to ethics, but I don’t see how it is foundational to it.

    pete,

    > Might some type of utilitarianism be combined with the virtue ethics framework you defend? <

    Perhaps. I wrote an essay at RS attempting to combine virtue ethics (qua personal morality) with some type of communitarianism (a la John Rawls, qua social morality), so I’m not opposed to “mix and match” systems.

    > I still believe that Mill's utilitarian framework and its offshoots advances a strong defense for liberal societies with moral codes that lead to the best benefit for the majority of the society. <

    I actually think that a Rawlsian system does a better job at that, and Rawls was notoriously not a utilitarian.

    > some philosophers are uncomfortable with it because of their ideological presuppositions, as they seek to avoid saying that one moral code is "superior" to another (harkening back to arguments for imperialism/colonialism). <

    I have no problem with that. I’m on record saying that female genital mutilation is wrong, period (despite Michael Shermer’s recent attempt at presenting me as a moral relativist!).

    Paul,

    > I think you missed my point about animals. There are many kinds of animals, but the word 'animal' doesn't vary in meaning depending on the kind of animal referred to. <

    No, I got it, and I like the analogy. I just don’t think it holds for truth. I think it’s more constructive to think of the term as having multiple, only broadly related, meanings.

    > ?The deflationary theory is a correspondence theory in disguise because of the 'is' in the righthand 'snow is white'? <

    Well, I’m not sure what to make of the deflationary “theory.” First off, it doesn’t look like a “theory” of anything (nor, really, does the CToT). Second, one needs to cash out that crucial “is” and surely one way to do so may be that by “is” deflationary theorists mean that the sentence, ahem, “corresponds” (of course they wouldn’t use the term) to the facts...

    > saying that a sentence is true is equivalent to asserting it <

    But that seems far too weak to me. One can assert all sorts of things, but that doesn’t mean they are true, or even coherent.

    > does there being different kinds of sentences mean the word 'sentence' is equivocal? <

    Nice analogy, but again I’m not convinced. You seem to operate at a completely linguistic level, I’m interested in epistemology.

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    1. Thanks for the reply Massimo. I definitely have a soft spot for Rawls myself and I could see how that could lead to some sort of meshing of the two ethical theories.

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  20. Massimo,

    Your remark that you're "interested in epistemology" might clear up some confusions between you and Paul. I don't think most "theories" of truth (correspondence, coherence, deflationary, pluralistic, various axiomatic approaches, etc.) are supposed to be epistemological theories - they're metaphysical and/or semantic theories about *what truth is* (as opposed to theories about how we figure out which propositions are true). Of course, like most other metaphysical "theories" (or accounts, or whatever), they have epistemological *consequences*, but they aren't themselves statements about epistemology.

    This is why I agree with Paul that your argument for pluralism isn't very convincing (which is not to say that there aren't other, more convincing arguments). At most, you've shown us that some truths (or facts, or whatever) can be discovered one way (say, empirically) while others can be discovered another way (say, by mathematical reasoning). But it doesn't yet follow that there are multiple kinds of truths.

    Also, it's unfair to dismiss the deflationists on the grounds that they are only interested in semantics or language. The whole deflationist program is to convince you that *there's nothing more to truth* than its use as a linguistic device. You might very well disagree with this, but so far you've just begged the question against them.

    I think you misunderstand other deflationist claims as well. For example, you object to "saying that a sentence is true is equivalent to asserting it" on the grounds that "one can assert all sorts of things, but that doesn't mean they are true." But deflationists claims nothing of the sort. Rather, they're saying that adding the predicate "...is true" to a sentence doesn't change the content of what is said. For example, suppose I walk into the house and announce

    (1) "It's snowing outside!"
    (2) "It's true that it's snowing outside!"

    The deflationist claim is that (1) and (2) mean the same thing - adding "it's true that..." doesn't add any extra information to the sentence.

    Similarly, the deflationist says there's no difference between asking:

    (3) "Is it snowing outside?"
    (4) "Is it true that it's snowing outside?"


    In both cases, you're asking for the same exact thing - you want to know whether it's snowing.

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  21. By the way, I recognize that saying something like "truth is just a linguistic device" sounds like something a crazy postmodernist would say, but deflationists are very, very far from that sort of thing. In anything, the deflationists I know of tend to be empirically-minded naturalists (such as Blackburn and Gibbard).

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    Replies
    1. Truth is just.
      Just is equal.
      Equal is One.
      Mathematically the true equation (not theoretical) that unites everything is =
      The flaw in science is the uncertainty of measure;
      Nature is immeasurable.
      Once the flaw of uncertainty or measure is removed from the equation, = is the absolute that remains.
      Einstein's UFT.
      Truth is =
      Equal is One.
      Free at last...

      Delete
  22. Site censorship of my criticism of Dave's scholastic copying from Plato as making little or no progress is a poor use of discretion. Open up the debate to proper methods of enquiry over endless scholastic dead ends. Philosophy needs to step up if it wants the credibility of science. Socrates - sort yourself out, that's a better one.

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    Replies
    1. Marcus,

      I have no idea what you are talking about. I let through all your comments, there has been no "censorship" at all. But do recall that this isn't my day job, so sometimes comments will be approved when I have time, or come back from an evening with friends, OK?

      Delete
    2. No idea? Use literal phrases if you can.

      Delete
    3. Somehow lines were deleted from a posted reply. I will take your word for it being a glitch.

      Delete
    4. There is no way for me to edit comments. I can only accept or reject them in their entirety. And I rarely reject a comment.

      Delete
    5. Good news, please keep allowing the thoughtless borderline-troll replies to my posts, as they are good target practice for my logic.

      Delete
  23. C,

    > I don't think most "theories" of truth (correspondence, coherence, deflationary, pluralistic, various axiomatic approaches, etc.) are supposed to be epistemological theories - they're metaphysical and/or semantic theories about *what truth is* <

    You are correct, of course. But I am highly suspicious of any metaphysics that doesn’t make (deep) contact with epistemology.

    > At most, you've shown us that some truths (or facts, or whatever) can be discovered one way (say, empirically) while others can be discovered another way (say, by mathematical reasoning). But it doesn't yet follow that there are multiple kinds of truths. <

    Maybe not, but — again because of what I see as the necessary contact btw metaphysics and epistemology — I take the fact that different truths can be discovered with different methods (epistemology) to be at least an indicator of the possibility that they are ontologically distinct (metaphysics).

    > it's unfair to dismiss the deflationists on the grounds that they are only interested in semantics or language. The whole deflationist program is to convince you that *there's nothing more to truth* than its use as a linguistic device. <

    Again, you are correct, but the whole thing leaves me extremely cold. I think of deflationist “theories” as semantic games with little or no import on anything else.

    > they're saying that adding the predicate "...is true" to a sentence doesn't change the content of what is said. <

    Yes, but does anyone *actually* say things like “It's true that it's snowing outside!”? No, people say things like “It's snowing outside!” — in perfect accord with the deflationist take.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Truth:
      Empirically equal and mathematically = is One or the same.

      = is One

      Delete
  24. Oneday science will evolve their theories of uncertainty and discover the absolute; religion will see the light beyond their faiths and beliefs and find One; justice will be redefined as equality, and philosophy will finally know the truth. Oneday education will teach our children these lesson that unite them as well as us All, it will be called Truth 101 and Oneday the world will finally be free.

    ReplyDelete
  25. Massimo,

    I can't help thinking that all those alternatives to the Correspondence Theory of Truth are just foot notes to Aristotle's definition, not its competitors, each stressing one of its different aspects that the philosopher didn't mention, perhaps due to their evidence.

    Truth is a matter concerning exclusively the discourse in every instance, and Aristotle seems to be confident that if the propositions are filled with enough data from the described object, they will act as a 'second nature', say, the operations within the discourse should emulate those of the object. I think this is what all his work is up to: how to thoroughly fit the objects' data into the discourse.

    Romeyer-Dherbey uses a sort of archeology to show that truth as consensus is deduced from Protagoras' famous maxim on man as the measure of all things: a true masterpiece inside his (Romeyer-Dherbey's) book on the sophists. This naturally doesn't steal the value of Peirce's statement, which derives from the kernel of his work, a work in which he proposes how truth is woven from things to thoughts. His semiotics is a kind of anatomy of the correspondence between discourse and its objects and of how truth necessarily emerges from that correspondence. I'm confident that Aristotle wouldn't change a comma in Peirce's arguments. The idea of consensus seems perfectly exemplified and justified to me in events like this blog and the intense dialog established below its essays.

    I understand the deflationism as the effort to make sure that everything a theory holds is still there in the world or, better, if not so much, that things mentioned in a theory keep their original designations. It also reflects problems that philosophy faces when trying to interpret assumptions made with terms whose meanings cannot be reasonably understood out of their original context (this reminds me Romeyer-Dherbey digging for Protagoras' remains amongst the mistreatments the old sophist endured in the Thaetetus). Deflationism indeed should be a true companion to every philosopher deserving this name... isn't it?

    The identity approach reminds me Wittgenstein's opening propositions in his Tractatus: I have no real objections in assuming whatever we call things - or objects, or theory, or... - as facts, moreover if the theory is supposed to emulate the facts it points to. As an emulator of its object (or fact) it seems natural that any theory is also a fact that is theorized while theorizing in order to have established and assured its coherence - and coherence is another evident feature of the truth that Aristotle left untold.

    And, finally, the problem of the failed correspondence between a coherent proposition and anything it is trying to describe: how is it possible to happen? Insufficiency of data to fulfill the model? Bad, although coherent modeling? Absence of object? Bad aim? Anyway, from what is said on the coherence criteria of truth, as a rule of thumb we have: if coherence is not sufficient, it is, nonetheless, necessary to grant the truth value of a proposition that refers the physical world. What if a coherent proposition refers a mathematical or logical object? Does this rule of thumb applies in those cases? If so, does this mean that theories can address mathematical or logical objects whose existence is just hypothetical? Would there be any risk in those cases, if the theory succeeds in finding its target, to raise any doubt about the status of those objects, say, that they are discovered or invented? ...? ...? What true differences between physical and thinking objects do all those facts point to?

    (continues)

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  26. (continued)

    The problem of the 'independence' of mathematical objects is sometimes addressed in terms of invention and discovery: but what if we start thinking invention by means of discovery? As a matter of fact, every discovery falls under the category of things possible: so, nothing except what is likely can be discovered. Is it possible that inventions happen from nothing already discovered? If not, every invention is but a case of discovery and then every object, no matter where it can exist, is independent from the discoverer. But this doesn't imply those objects are dwelling in a realm different from the one the discoverer dwells.



    If the distinction between mathematical objects and physical ones is the occurrence of the latter in space-time, what's wrong in considering the mathematical objects as abstractions made from the physical objects? And as physical objects are no longer supposed to be projections of ideas dwelling in a different plane, then the abstractions made from them might reside somewhere, perhaps the same place of the universals, whose existence has been so much and uselessly debated throughout the ages since Aristotle: I can't help finding that platonic mathematical objects aren't anything except results obtained from world objects by the same process whereby the universals are obtained; so much that they are generally universalized in the same way, as we use the idea of triangle in general to talk about different triangle shapes. So, perhaps the universals are in fact sited in a still faraway plane, for, as they can apply to objects in the platonic world, ...

    ReplyDelete

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