* Hmm, turns out ethical philosophers aren't more ethical than other kinds of philosophers...
* Listen carefully. A good example of why libertarians live in a parallel (and fanciful) universe.
* Email panic...
* How studying tweets allows us to follow people's changes in mood. Pretty much the same across cultures.
* Jon Stewart to Republican voters: you are seriously confused.
* Practical philosophy...
* More on the challenges of naturalism.
* A precis of Pinker's new book, in case you don't feel like reading the whole shebang.
Brooks' column has a lot of evidence against it, which shows that empathy is not only necessary for moral motivation, but its main ingredient (e.g. see this review in Psychology Today, Dan Ariely's The Upside of Irrationality, and virtually anything on the topic by Antonio Damasio or Simon Baron-Cohen).
ReplyDeleteWhy would I want to read another book of Pop Ev Psych blatherings by Pinker? (Who, on WWII and death rates, "cooked the books" by claiming the population back then was 6 bil, not 2 bil.)
ReplyDelete"treatment of racial minorities, women, children, and animals."...I sincerely hope he's right about the other categories, but he's wrong if he thinks animals are on the receiving end of ever less violence at humans hands - quite the reverse is true: millions and billions of animals of all types are killed for human caprices every year, more than at any other time in history.
ReplyDeleteMassimo,
ReplyDeleteI read your article 'Mathematical Platonism' in Philosophy Now magazine (Issue 84) and I agree that mathematical truth poses problems for a proper naturalistic (or, if you prefer, physicalist) worldview. Amongst other issues, Williamson also identifies mathematical truths as being problematic for the naturalist. (Briefly, on Williamson, I find that his implicit definition of naturalism to be far too narrow: e.g., he divorces history from science broadly when, pace Quine, I would identify history as being on the applied end [along with engineering, medicine, etc.] of the scientific continuum [philosophy, mathematics, theoretical physics and biology, etc., would be on the more abstract end].)
Truth, as commonly conceived, is a relationship between language and an extra-linguistic reality. Thus, 'Belfast is in Northern Ireland' is true because of certain objective social and geographical arrangements that obtain in the British Isles. What, however, is the extra-linguistic reality that corresponds to the truth of '15 + 5 = 20'?
If one holds to a correspondence theory of truth, and that '15 + 5 = 20' is true, then one ipso facto consents to the objective existence of mathematical objects. Thus, as you note, by implication one must reject physicalism.
However, whilst problematic, I do not see this as being insolubly so. For example, Jody Azzouni (Tufts) and Hartry Field (NYU) both present what at first blush seem to be plausible alternatives to mathematical realism. Field, e.g., defends fictionalism concerning mathematical objects: mathematical truths are useful but not literally true- not in the way that 'Belfast is in Northern Ireland' is literally true.
Personally, I would want to argue for intuitionism (an unfortunate and misleading name), which holds that the truth of a mathematical statement is to be determined not by the conditions under which it is true, in the sense that truth is conceived of as a relationship with an external-reality, but rather by its proof conditions, where 'proof' is a mental construction of a certain kind- in this sense a constructive mathematical proof.
P.S. Perhaps in the near future you can expound upon your article in Philosophy Now here at the blog.
Per a commenter on Michael Shermer's SkepticBlog review of Pinker's book, to explain my comment on WWII above:
ReplyDelete>>There are some real glaring problems with this line of thinking that has not been mentioned in these comments or by Mr. Shermer. the first being the problem of numbers. to say that this century has had less violent deaths than centuries past by comparison of death rates to population rates is flawed. the world population has exploded this century. the population rate during WWII was not six billion it was closer to two billion. this leaves us with a violent death rate much closer to that of centuries past than that given by Pinker.
second i would like to point out the book, On Killing, by Dave Grossman. in his book he talks about the killing rates, no fire rates, and training and propaganda of state entities that counter act human being’s desires not to kill each other. Grossman asserts that states make people more violent and use psychological methods to decrease soldiers resistance to killing. well worth a read.<<
John Horgan, though liking the book overall, has other concerns: http://www.slate.com/articles/Arts/books/2011/10/steven_pinker_s_the_better_angels_of_our_nature_why_should_you_b.html
The Brooks article is attempting to address the "limits of empathy," but many of the examples used are situations in which empathy is not aroused. I don't think that many would argue with the idea that empathy alone is not sufficient, nor that empathy cannot be overridden by other feelings/thoughts. The argument that he was attempting to make is that empathy is overrated, and I don't think he was successful
ReplyDeleteWhether empathy is sufficient or necessary for morality is greatly determined by how a person is using the word 'morality'. There is a tendency to change the meaning of the word morality over time in such a way as to allow "feelings" to be included. Traditionally, the concept of morality included commands....then duties...then expectations...just a few examples. Now....the idea of "caring" about others is entering the usage of 'morality' as though one is acting morally if one "cares" about others. Whether caring is enough to qualify as acting morally....or being some grounding for morality...simply comes down to one's usage of the word 'moral'.
ReplyDeleteEamon,
ReplyDeleteat some point I will return to the topic on the blog. For now, a couple of points: first, yes, I think mathematics (and logic) is a problem for physicalism, not for naturalism, if one understands the latter more broadly. After all, even if mathematical "objects" were real in some sense of the term, they still would be natural.
Second, I'll have to look more closely at the two counter-moves you propose, but they strike me initially as playing on words more than addressing the substantive issue. For instance, take fictionalism. Nobody maintains that mathematical truths are so in the same way in which "Belfast is in Northern Ireland" is true. But they are true nonetheless, in a very strong sense of the term. As for intuitionism (yes, an unfortunate term indeed!), again, nobody is arguing that mathematical truths are such when compared to an external reality, but we still need to explain the strong sense that they are far from arbitrary or subjective.
Gadfly,
ReplyDeleteI'm reading the Edge article now, and I do find problems with it, though it seems to me Pinker also makes some good points. So far what strikes me as most interesting, actually, is that if he is right his conclusions undermine a lot of the popularity of evolutionary psychology: as it turns out, cultural evolution can make a huge difference, our genetic propensities be damned...
Just as a postscript to my earlier comment on the Brooks column, Dan Ariely (coincidentally) just posted a new video to YouTube, based on Chapter 9 of his book, Upside of Irrationality, called "On Empathy and Emotion."
ReplyDeleteThe line that stands out for me is:
The key to action is not thoughtful deliberation; it's emotion. And, in fact, when we get people to do thoughtful deliberation, the emotion can actually turn off and we care less.
Still, however moved I am to lend my help to the victim(s) of some terrible tragedy (be it a natural disaster, disease, famine, or war), I think I'll stick to thoughtful deliberation when it comes to deciding what kind of action I can personally afford (e.g. without sacrificing my other responsibilities).
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteAgreed. You are correct that mathematical (and logical) truth are more problems for physicalism and not for a broad naturalism. Which is why most logicians and mathematicians whom I know are not physicalists but self-identify as naturalists. In this respects I am very much in the minority amongst logicians.
Re: 'but we still need to explain the strong sense that they are far from arbitrary or subjective.'
Very true. But I am not convinced we cannot do this within a physicalist worldview. At any rate, I look forward to discussing this further in the future on the blog.
Re: the metaphysics of math, I plead agnostic.
ReplyDeleteHowever, I think that a cognitive-scientific approach has generated some useful hypotheses here (e.g. concerning the metaphorical basis of mathematical concepts) - even if mathematicians and philosophers resist this approach (e.g. see Where Mathematics Comes From).
Mufi,
ReplyDelete'Useful hypotheses' you say? Useful for whom if not for mathematicians, logicians, theoretical scientists, and philosophers of logic, mathematics, and science, the precise bunch who have refuted Lakoff and Nunez via raised eyebrows and disinterest?
I fail to see the import of 'Where Mathematics Comes From'. Besides, it seems to me that we have much better reason to believe that mathematical statements are objectively true than we have to believe that any hypothesis advanced by Lakoff and Nunez is true.
mufi,
ReplyDeleteI'm with Hume on this: morality is not possible without emotions, but reason gives you guidance on the best course of action.
Eamon: Useful to those of us who care to learn or teach how the human brain/body acquires or constructs concepts. That these particular concepts may have lasting "objective" meaning (not to mention practical utility) need not have any metaphysical implications at all (platonic realism notwithstanding).
ReplyDeleteAnd sorry if I don't share your opinion that Lakoff & Nunez's work has been "refuted", rather than, say, dismissed by those who "do not appreciate the insights of cognitive science."
Mufi,
ReplyDeleteCognitive science can tell us how the human brain is constructed so as to allow for various forms of abstract thought. Evolutionary and molecular biology can tell us how the human brain evolved to be able to think abstractly. But neither cognitive science nor evolutionary and molecular biology can tell us whether mathematical objects or other abstracta exist.
I will re-emphasize. Mathematical and logical truths are on much sure epistemological grounds than the findings of the biological science is or can ever hope to be.
Eamon: But neither cognitive science nor evolutionary and molecular biology can tell us whether mathematical objects or other abstracta exist.
ReplyDeleteNor, for thay matter, can the sciences tell us whether or not God exists. But they can provide explanations for various phenomena, which do not depend on that presupposition.
Mathematical and logical truths are on much sure epistemological grounds than the findings of the biological science is or can ever hope to be.
You make it sound like a biological understanding of math (e.g. how our species acquired the innate ability to subitize and/or how the brain unconsciously applies conceptual metaphor to build advanced mathematical concepts from basic arithmetic) would somehow change or undermine our confidence in the results of actually doing the math. Need I state that I don't see that happening?
What emotion should we rely upon to choose which emotions we should use to inform our morality? We have many different emotions. Which shall we "turn into" moral status? How shall we choose?
ReplyDeleteMathematics cannot deduce the why of anything.
ReplyDeleteBaron
ReplyDeleteMathematics cannot deduce anything that is not already stipulated. Like logic....it is purely tautological....empty except for what we insert....and we get no more out than we put in.
Baron P
ReplyDeleteRe: 'Mathematics cannot deduce the why of anything.'
Of course mathematics can. Alexis Bouvard deduced the why of Uranus' anomalous orbit: Neptune.
However, I suspect by 'why' you meant something more akin to purpose or cosmic significance, in which case I would dismiss your statement as meaningless.
Mufi,
I take your point, but a primary thesis of Lakoff and Nunez's is that mathematical statements are not true in any objective, mind independent sense. One of my points is that we have much better reason to believe mathematical truths are objective, mind independent truths than that any empirical hypothesis advanced by Lakoff and Nunez to explain why mathematical truths are not objective, mind independent truths is true.
DJD,
ReplyDeleteThough I agree with you in principle, you make the matter seem unnecessarily mundane. Much of what we 'get out' is of great surprise!
"Morality" is only a word and can be defined any which way. That we conventionally use it to characterize one set of behavior vs. another (e.g. pro-social vs. anti-social or empathetic vs. apathetic) is normally taken for granted in research into the biological and psychological bases of morality. Whether we should use the word that way is, I suppose, a challenge for philosophers, but I've yet to hear a persuasive argument against the current (pro-social, empathetic) convention.
ReplyDeletemufi
ReplyDeleteWhat emotion should we rely upon to choose which emotions we should use to inform our morality? We have many different emotions. Which shall we "turn into" moral status? How shall we choose? Empathy? Why?
DJD, I disagree that it's like, or the equivalent, of logic. Logic is defined as the formal systematic study of the principles of valid inference and correct reasoning.
ReplyDeleteMathematics is logical but not to the point of drawing inference.
mufi,
ReplyDelete> "Morality" is only a word and can be defined any which way. <
Well, yes, just like any other word. The question isn't about the word, it's about the concept behind it.
Baron,
> Logic is defined as the formal systematic study of the principles of valid inference and correct reasoning. Mathematics is logical but not to the point of drawing inference. <
I think you are confusing logic with epistemology. The latter does what you describe, logic does what Eamon says it does. Indeed, it makes perfect sense to think of math as a particular type of logic.
I'm using the standard definition of logic, which mathematics serves as a measurement tool. Mathematics can't reason, however, without the help of other symbolic means. Numeric symbolism alone can't cut it.
ReplyDeleteI know that pedants such as Eamon won't understand this, but then they (as he's admitted) don't see any purpose to the universe having what appear to be laws, etc.
mufi
ReplyDeleteWe have many different emotions. Which shall we "turn into" moral status? How shall we choose? We have known about the existence of empathy for a long time....It has just recently become christened by "moral entrepreneurs" as the new savior of mankind... Another ideologically motivated movement... this time the new "morality" is championed by egalitarians
Baron
ReplyDeleteThe problem is that there is a difference between a "logical deduction" that necessarily follows and is based upon identity ...and an "inference", which is based upon similarity and hypothesis formation.
All forms of logic are in the end inferential.
ReplyDeleteBaron
ReplyDeleteI forgot to add the word 'inductive' in front of inference.
I have been cultivating a view of mathematics that is grounded in physicalism. The fundamental laws underneath what we call "math" are grounded in the properties of our universe. For instance, Pauli's Exclusionary Principle corresponds to the axiom that set elements are distinguishable, particle-particle interactions lead to logic, etc.
ReplyDeleteThe "unreasonable effectiveness" of math is then much less unreasonable: math is suited for describing the universe because math is a reflection of the universe's laws.
DJD: It has just recently become christened by "moral entrepreneurs" as the new savior of mankind... Another ideologically motivated movement... this time the new "morality" is championed by egalitarians.
ReplyDeleteKnowing Brooks, that might very well be the hidden message of his column, but his source (viz. that paper by philosopher Jesse Prinz), if anything, champions egalitarianism (among other moral ideals); for example:
If, in contrast [to feeling "empathic sadness for those who are adversely affected" -jm], critics of inequality get angry or “uppity” (as the anger of the oppressed is called), more radical change may be actively sought.
Looks like Brooks didn't do justice to his source.
Math is descriptive and confirmative, etc. It's not, however, curious as to why.
ReplyDeleteSharkey,
ReplyDelete> The "unreasonable effectiveness" of math is then much less unreasonable: math is suited for describing the universe because math is a reflection of the universe's laws. <
That seems to me to be begging the question: why would math "reflect" the laws of physics? And what about the huge amount of math that simply doesn't make any contact with empirical reality?
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteMath "reflects" the laws of physics because it was developed by observing the physical world. Counting objects, observing differences between groups, investigating space, describing changes in time, etc. There are lots of different types of "math" (ie, different fundamental axioms and logical systems that are consistent), but we only use the math that corresponds to our universe.
Math that doesn't make any contact with empirical reality? You'll have to give an example of what you're describing; math "makes contact with empirical reality" when there is a correspondence/isomorphism between those mathematical axioms and reality. For instance, geometry rests upon the axioms of points, lines, etc; reality corresponds to geometry when there are stand-ins for those axioms.
But, even given a non-contacted math, it is using the standard foundation of sets and logic, which has a correspondence to reality. In a sense, the correspondence then becomes, "this logical proof corresponds to a physically-valid state change of a certain particle system". It should be obvious that the universe supports a correspondence between logic and physics: we're communicating using a device that is built upon that very principle...
Sharkey: I would agree with you insofar as math (in particular our concepts of objects, collections, and lines) is grounded in sensory-motor experience as it develops in interaction with an environment. But that's still a far stretch from "the universe's laws", which we can of course model mathematically, but not necessarily correctly.
ReplyDeletemufi
ReplyDelete>"Knowing Brooks, that might very well be the hidden message of his column, but his source (viz. that paper by philosopher Jesse Prinz), if anything, champions egalitarianism (among other moral ideals)"
I am not contesting who or who is not supporting egalitarianism. I am suggesting that the empathy is being selected out from other emotions as the one that shall be christened a "moral behavior" rather than merely one emotion among many....and that the impetus for this attempt at moral genesis or creation is the urge among egalitarians to be able to find some moral grounding for their ideology. They aren't happy with "I care". They also want to be able to tell others that they "should" care....just like themselves. Having an emotion is not the same as "we ought" to have that emotion and be motivated by it....any more than having the emotion of anger suggests that we "ought" to feel and act on that emotion. Just because they are both evolutionarily and biologically determined does not inform us about what we "ought" to do or about what is the "good".
mufi,
ReplyDeleteMath, amongst other things, is the study of consistency. Assuming the universe is consistent, then it makes sense that math would be both a tool for explaining the universe, as well as be a reflection of those laws.
I'm not saying that we have the universe figured out, but the mere existence of math and logic doesn't rule out physicalism. It's not a far stretch to go from the universe's laws, to addition. As I mentioned before, it's a straightforward result of the exclusionary principle for fermions; 1 plus 1 is always 2, because two fermions are always distinguishable. Consistency can then take us a fair distance from that starting place.
However, if we were beings that lived in a boson world, our math would likely be quite different...
Fwiw, I’m inclined to agree with Eamon’s first post (at last we agree on something, Eamon! –at least mostly, see below.) It reminds of the difference between two math profs I had. I had one for my entire analysis sequence, and he always discussed what we were doing as a construction (and not just for proofs that proceed “by construction”) – we crafted axiom sets and extrapolated from them implications that satisfied our sense of logic. Truth was simply an assignment of symbols, and we started from the ground up with truth tables. If it turned out it was useful for the real world, that’s nice, but beside the point, which was (to use my own phrasing) simply our own satisfaction. The other one (my prob prof) had a highly impassioned, abrupt spiel about how we were exploring reality, and sounded to me like a Platonist (although, I’m not sure since I couldn’t entirely follow him).
ReplyDeleteI’m more sympathetic with my analysis prof’s view. I don’t see how mathematics imperils physicalism. I can’t be as precise as Eamon since I don’t know this literature, apart from a passing familiarity with the correspondence and some other theories of truth. Nonetheless, if it is possible to construe math as a mental construction of a particular type (and how could it not be?), it seems to me that the burden is on the mathematical realists to show that either that possibility is wrong or that that mental construction is not purely a brain construction – since the “realists” (who seem anti-reality to me) are the ones with the extraordinary claim. In any case, even if math “truths” do not correspond to something physical in the brain, I would turn to alethic pluralism or some such long before I turned to the mystical Platonism.
Again, I’m not looking for any long exchange; I’m quite confident you (Eamon and Massimo) can discuss the topic more fruitfully and insightfully than I can. Nonetheless, it seems to me that appealing to the non-arbitrariness of math is a strange way to proceed, since there are a variety of ways you can construct the axiom sets, both for math and logic (which even has dialetheism now). I’m more inclined to see, say, traditional and constructivist mathematics (“constructivist” being a somewhat unfortunate term given how I’ve already used the word in a slightly different way here) as both individually acceptable as mathematical objects (mental constructs), and leave the question to which is more realistic (applicable to/descriptive of real-world problems) to empiricism.
I should add, I hesitate to say they’re “mind independent,” as Eamon later terms it, since I’m not quite sure of that phrase’s import in a physicalist context. It could just be that physics or whatever has constrained our brains to think in particular ways and that’s why we see the same mathematics across cultures.
DJD, you should look up the definition (or definitions) of empathy before you argue on the basis that it's one emotion among many. It isn't an emotion to begin with.
ReplyDeleteDJD: Having an emotion is not the same as "we ought" to have that emotion and be motivated by it...
ReplyDeleteExcept that psychopaths play a useful role here in that they demonstrate how individuals who "suffer from a profound deficit in moral competence" (quoting Prinz, again) also "lack emotions that facilitate moral education as well as the emotions that constitute moral judgments."
In other words, morality is so grounded in emotion (generally speaking) that to lack emotion is a serious risk factor for immorality (or the behaviors that we commonly associate with these terms, like those of known pscychopaths).
Prinz does not challenge this picture so much as extend it beyond empathy, as you can tell from his concluding sentence: "When confronted with moral offenses, it’s not enough to commiserate with victims. We should get uppity."
I must admit: He's got a point.
Sharkey,
ReplyDelete> Math "reflects" the laws of physics because it was developed by observing the physical world. <
Much math was most certainly not developed that way. Take imaginary numbers, which had absolutely no practical application until they became fundamental for logical circuits. That is the sort of spectacular effectiveness of math that puzzles me.
> Math that doesn't make any contact with empirical reality? <
I did not say that. I said that most theoretical math doesn't, as you can see by perusing any textbook in advanced mathematics.
> even given a non-contacted math, it is using the standard foundation of sets and logic, which has a correspondence to reality. <
Actually, no. The same exact problem holds for logic, not surprisingly if one thinks of math as a subset of logic.
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteImaginary numbers are a result of consistently extending the concept of a number into a second dimension. Whether they had a practical application or not, they were based upon the fundamental axioms of math. What's more, the reason they have a "practical application" is due to the correspondence between trigonometry and imaginary numbers, via Euler's formula, and trig corresponds to waves. Logical circuits could still be described using complicated trig formulas; it's just that exponentials are easier to work with.
> I said that most theoretical math doesn't, as you can see by perusing any textbook in advanced mathematics.
I've perused a few advanced mathematical textbooks, and I'm coming up short with examples. Even category theory, which is semi-jokingly described as "abstract nonsense", has contacts with empirical reality. For instance, it helps with describing relationships between knot theory and quantum systems. Topology, non-Euclidean geometry, group theory, game theory, all have correspondences with reality.
> The same exact problem holds for logic, not surprisingly if one thinks of math as a subset of logic.
Logic does have a correspondence to reality; what you call "logic" is a subset of the valid transformations of physical systems. Church and Turing showed this to be true of classical systems, and Feynman and Deutsch showed it for quantum systems. Think about it: you do logic with your brain, which is a physical system. And when you do meta-logic, you're still using that same physical system, just operating over a different set of symbols/brain-states.
I'm not claiming math developed this way explicitly. Rather, I'm claiming that math *had* to reflect the universe as it developed, because the universe is consistent, and math is consistent.
mufi
ReplyDelete>"Except that psychopaths play a useful role here in that they demonstrate how individuals who "suffer from a profound deficit in moral competence" (quoting Prinz, again) also "lack emotions that facilitate moral education as well as the emotions that constitute moral judgments." Funny that the quote you cite is from Prinz...who made a strong argument in his paper that empathy is not necessary for moral learning or judgment. Prinz: "Therefore, the deficit in moral competence can be explained without appeal to the empathy deficit."
mufi
ReplyDelete> "When confronted with moral offenses, it’s not enough to commiserate with victims. We should get uppity." "I must admit: He's got a point."
Perhaps he has a point of relying on the anger emotion to show our disapproval of an action...but he does not rely upon anger as a way to determine what is moral or immoral. Also, he rejects empathy as an emotion that we can or should rely upon for learning or judging the morality of an action.
We could not have derived either logic or its mathematical subset from an inconsistently regulated (i.e., unregulated) universe. We thus "know" intuitively that universal systems either regulate themselves or much less likely are omnipotently regulated. But we don't know how regulation is accomplished or why.
ReplyDeleteOur logic will allow us to hypothesize in this regard and our math will help to support our anticipatory predictions.
Baron
ReplyDeleteThere is nothing special about logic....and we don't need a regulated universe in or to derive it. The first person that said "A bachelor is an unmarried man" and realized that this was not a fact discovered in the universe...but simply a stipulated definition,discovered the basis for logic. It is tautologically true that all bachelors are unmarried men...because we define bachelor as such. That is all there is to the basis of logic.
Also, empathy IS necessary for any sort of accuracy in making moral judgments. It's NOT an emotion per se, it's part of a detection and assessment system as to another's potential and emotionally driven behavior.
ReplyDeletePsychopaths (by nature or nurture) essentially lack the ability to correctly make empathetic assessments. They consequently misjudge the moral consequences to themselves (as well as to others) for their actions.
And there would be no culture in which our moral consequences are determined without the biological evolution of empathetic systems.
DJD,
ReplyDeleteLogic wouldn't work in an unregulated universe - it's that simple.
DJD: Perhaps he has a point of relying on the anger emotion to show our disapproval of an action...but he does not rely upon anger as a way to determine what is moral or immoral.
ReplyDeleteWhat do you suppose that Prinz relies upon for determining what is moral or immoral? Reason? Sure, but then if Hume was correct that reason is the "slave of the passions" (as I believe the scientific research bears out), then appeal to emotion in these matters is not optional - it's required.
Sharkey: Our positions are closer than you think. But I do wish to make a distinction between a human model of the universe - which is partly inherited and partly acquired (i.e. because "it works", not because "it's true) - and the "thing itself", which has eluded us for most of history and, to some extent, likely always will.
ReplyDeleteBaron
ReplyDeletePerhaps we are talking about two different things. logic as I understand it...and logic as you understand it. The only kind I am familiar with is tautological logic. Do you know of or understand logic in other than tautologically driven,necessary conclusions?
Yes, but then I'm not a strict determinist.
ReplyDeletemufi
ReplyDelete>"What do you suppose that Prinz relies upon for determining what is moral or immoral? Reason? Sure, but then if Hume was correct that reason is the "slave of the passions" (as I believe the scientific research bears out), then appeal to emotion in these matters is not optional - it's required."
To really understand the phenomenon of what we
loosely refer to as 'morality'...one must grasp that it is not a thing...We all try to control others' behavior....justify our own behavior...judge and criticize others' behavior...and we rely upon our cultures norms as well as our own interpretations of these norms and our interpretations of actions, which we try to match up to norms that are accepted by others in our culture. Perhaps the best way to understand morality is to understand the 'practice' and use of morality....much like understanding law is to understand the practice and use of law. Answering why certain laws became laws is a clue as to the answer to what
why certain morals became conventions in our culture. Look....either you believe that there is objective morality or you don't. If you don't....then give up the chase. Quit looking for grounds...if in fact you don't believe in the existence of objective morality. It is like an atheist trying to find a replacement for god.
mufi
ReplyDelete>"then appeal to emotion in these matters is not optional - it's required."
Perhaps a more clear response is "Who cares what our emotions are doing"? Are we to accept any urges caused by our emotions as "moral" urges....or signs of what is or is not moral? Of course not. So what is all this attempt to tie emotions to morality about anyway. It seems it is a last gasp effort to discover some "objective" grounding for morality....so that some can say...."Look here...THIS is what is moral...and here's why."
mufi,
ReplyDeleteI think we're in agreement. As some would say, "the map is not the territory"; however, the map is a pretty good reflection of the territory.
PS: Although Prinz's piece is worth reading (e.g. as a critical assessment of empathy's role and limitations in moral judgment and motivation), it's hardly the last word on the matter. As that review of Brooks' column in Psychology Today put it: "A more nuanced interpretation is that empathy is necessary but may not be sufficient. There are many other factors influencing our social behavior as well."
ReplyDeleteSharkey,
ReplyDelete> Imaginary numbers are a result of consistently extending the concept of a number into a second dimension <
I know, but they were not developed *because* they corresponded to anything physical, and it's a bit too simplistic to say that they simply represent a second dimension, as if it were analogous to physical dimensions.
> Even category theory, which is semi-jokingly described as "abstract nonsense", has contacts with empirical reality <
Indeed, which is why people keep talking about the unreasonable effectiveness of math. The point is that most math theory - unlike theory in science - is *not* developed with that aim in mind.
> Logic does have a correspondence to reality; what you call "logic" is a subset of the valid transformations of physical systems. <
I wonder where you got that. Again, much logic has been and keep being developed without any direct reference to physical systems. And yet it applies remarkably well to those systems.
> Think about it: you do logic with your brain, which is a physical system. <
Sorry but that has a non sequitur that has nothing to do with this discussion.
> I'm not claiming math developed this way explicitly. Rather, I'm claiming that math *had* to reflect the universe as it developed, because the universe is consistent, and math is consistent. <
On that we agree, but this explains nothing about the effectiveness of math, it simply restates. The problem for physicalism (but not for naturalism) remains.
Massimo,
ReplyDelete> I wonder where you got [the idea that logic is a subset of physical transformations].
I "got that" from studying logic and physical systems for years. Axiomatic logic is a set of transformations from initial states to final states, obeying a set of rules. We call the rules that get results "logic", but they have their basis in the physical properties of the universe.
> Re: imaginary numbers developed independently of investigation of the physical world.
Imaginary numbers were developed in the process of solving cubic polynomial equations. Polynomial equations show up in physical systems all the time. This isn't because of some mystical link, rather it's because the universe has physical systems that are in polynomial relationships. If the universe works one way in relation to quadratic relationships, and the universe is consistent, then it's not surprising that the universe continues to work in relation to cubic, quartic, quintic,... relations.
It's possible that there is a real discontinuity in the universe, maybe quantum mechanics and general relativity are dichotomous, and therefore my ideas are completely out to lunch. That's yet to be decided.
> Re: category theory and unreasonable effectiveness
Category theory has contact with the physical world because its set of axioms are so small. All one needs is objects, arrows between objects (corresponding to some relationship), and a few constraints on those relationships (identity and composition). Many physical systems show those properties, so category theory was developed (either explicitly or implicitly) to explain them. For instance, category theory developed from algebraic topology, which is the (abstract) study of spacial deformations.
> Re: brain as logical system = non-sequitur
Why is this a non-sequitur? Logic isn't a "thing", logic is a process that is carried out by information processing agents. If your brain stops processing states, you don't do logic anymore.
> Again, much logic has been and keep being developed without any direct reference to physical systems. And yet it applies remarkably well to those systems.
I'm not sure which logics you are referring to that were developed without direct reference to physical systems. Modal logic? Temporal logic? Linear logic? Propositional? First-order predicate? Second-order predicate? All are rooted in questions about the real world, and then appropriately abstracted.
Baron
ReplyDelete>"Yes, but then I'm not a strict determinist."
What does determinism or lack thereof have to do with logic?
mufi
ReplyDelete>"A more nuanced interpretation is that empathy is necessary but may not be sufficient. There are many other factors influencing our social behavior as well."
Empathy is not necessary either. All that is necessary is fear of disapproval ...and desire for approval. Our ability to "internalize" what we have learned is also helpful.
Sharkey
ReplyDelete>"All are rooted in questions about the real world, and then appropriately abstracted."
How is it that "If it is true that all bachelors are are single men.....then If X is a bachelor...then X is an unmarried man" is "rooted in questions about the real world"?
mufi
ReplyDeleteFrom the article you cited above:
"In these cases, empathy is quite enough as a motivator for "costly" action"
Notice that the author is saying that empathy is enough for motivating "costly actions"....not "moral actions" Empathy has little to do with morality...nor does it suffice to explain or motivate moral actions.
DJD,
ReplyDeleteMen, unmarried or otherwise, are part of the real world last time I checked.
The forall construct works, because we can have groups of 'things' in the universe, these things are distinguishable, and if all members of a collection share a property, then a specific member of the group must have that property. Properties are observations of physical systems. Logical implication is an observation of the relationship between two physical systems.
Logic abstracts away from the concrete physical manifestations, but that's only a change of scenery. Under the hood, abstract logic is performed via concrete, physical artifacts: neurons, transistors, entangled photons, etc.
You don't see how logic could be any different, because you can't imagine the (classical) universe to be any different. Try learning about non-intuitive physical systems, like relativity or quantum mechanics, and think about what logic would look like if temporal ordering wasn't consistent, or if properties of things weren't concrete.
Basically, the search for the Theory of Everything is a search for a 'logic' that would work as well for classical, relativistic and quantum mechanical settings.
DJD asked "What does determinism or lack thereof have to do with logic?"
ReplyDeleteAll logic in a fully deterministic universe would have been deemed to be true by necessity.
Baron
ReplyDelete>"All logic in a fully deterministic universe would have been deemed to be true by necessity."
It matters not whether in a deterministic universe or non-deterministic universe. Logic works by necessity. The necessity of definition.
Logic does not have to reflect anything at all in the universe. If I stipulate that whenever X.Y Then.....Whenever X.Y
I never have to say what X or Y represent.And I can then further see that If no Y...there cannot be X. No universe necessary.
Sharkey
ReplyDelete>"Logical implication is an observation of the relationship between two physical systems."
I need no observation in order to say that "IF it is true that whenever P.Q....then If p.Q
It also follows that "no Q.no P
DJD, if all you have to illustrate logic is a series of definitions, you have at best an elementary example of reliable consistency in the universe.
ReplyDeleteBut tautologies alone are not examples of logic, not even (in my view) of its simplest deductive forms.
Actually, unless P and Q represent physical systems, P and Q are not the same simply because they are different symbols with no other meaning.
ReplyDeleteSharkey,
ReplyDeletewe keep talking past each other, seems to me, so this will be my last comment on this topic. We actually don't disagree that much on what is going on, but on the meaning of what is going on. Math and logic clearly got started when people began to abstract properties from physical reality. The issue is that after that much math and logic are developed independently of that reality (what you call "abstraction"), and yet somehow keep an astounding ability to be useful to science. This is very different for science itself, whose theories always develop while tracking very closely physical reality.
Baron,
the point is precisely that P and Q can stand for anything at all, and yet the deductive conclusion still holds.
DJD: Empathy has little to do with morality...nor does it suffice to explain or motivate moral actions.
ReplyDeleteNot even Prinz' analysis goes that far, as he concludes: "...in the moral domain, we should regard empathy with caution, given empathetic biases, and recognize that it cannot serve the central motivational role in driving prosocial behavior. Perhaps empathy has a place in morality, but other emotions may be much more important: emotions such as guilt and anger." But, like I said, Prinz is not the last word on the matter.
Nor, for that matter are Ariely, Damasio, or Baron-Cohen the last words, but they more or less place empathy in the driver's seat when it comes to moral judgment and motivation. One might think that their profession (as cognitive scientists, broadly speaking) biases them in this regard, but then we also have "sentimentalist" philosophers like Hume (e.g. "Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.") to draw upon.
My own (provisional, layman's) take on all of this is that, while not every action that we commonly deem "moral" requires empathy (e.g. if we approve of its consequences), individuals who are weak or lacking in empathy (e.g. narcissists and, let alone, psychopaths) face special behavioral challenges that are morally significant.
@Massimo,
ReplyDelete"Baron,
the point is precisely that P and Q can stand for anything at all, and yet the deductive conclusion still holds."
That would be true if they stood for something other than themselves, but I took DJD's argument to be that they didn't have to stand for anything.
Perhaps I misread it.
Baron
ReplyDelete> "but I took DJD's argument to be that they didn't have to stand for anything.
Perhaps I misread it."
You did not misread it. There is no need for the symbols to "stand for anything".
Then you are reducing logic to a state of arbitrariness, no?
ReplyDeleteBaron
ReplyDelete>"Then you are reducing logic to a state of arbitrariness, no?"
What does that mean?
arbitrary |ˈärbiˌtrerē|
ReplyDeleteadjective
based on random choice or personal whim, rather than any reason or system : his mealtimes were entirely arbitrary.
• (of power or a ruling body) unrestrained and autocratic in the use of authority : arbitrary rule by King and bishops has been made impossible.
• Mathematics (of a constant or other quantity) of unspecified value.
DERIVATIVES
arbitrarily |ˌärbiˈtre(ə)rəlē| adverb
arbitrariness noun
ORIGIN late Middle English (in the sense [dependent on one's will or pleasure, discretionary] ): from Latin arbitrarius, from arbiter ‘judge, supreme ruler,’ perhaps influenced by French arbitraire.
Mufi
ReplyDeleteI am not clear what you perceive the value of empathy to be when it comes to morality. Do you see it's value in terms of it's being used as a means to inculcating certain moral beliefs/attitudes? In selecting which behaviors to objectify as moral or immoral? Do you want to train young children to become more empathetic because you think it is moral to have empathy and act on empathy?
Baron
ReplyDeleteI was interested in what you were using the sentence "Then you are reducing logic to a state of arbitrariness, no?" to mean.
Words don't mean....people mean things with words.
And normally with sentences. What are YOU trying to communicate with that sentence?
That you don't have a clue as to what logic entails, means, consists of, was meant to accomplish, and in the end was fashioned to predict.
ReplyDeleteDJD: I'll respond with a lengthier quote from Prinz:
ReplyDeletePsychopaths are also poor at recognizing emotions, especially fear and sadness—and recognition deficits are known to be correlated with deficits in emotional experience (Blair et al., 2002). These affective abnormalities could explain both the low levels of empathy in psychopaths and the lack of moral competence. Empathy requires a disposition to experience emotions appropriate for another person, and a person with shallow affect and poor emotional recognition will have a diminished capacity for empathy as a result. The emotion deficit will also make an individual comparatively insensitive to common methods of moral education: they will be relatively indifferent to punishment, because they have low levels of fear, and they will be unmoved by love withdrawal, because they have low levels of sadness. They will also have a diminished capacity for emotions like guilt, which seem to have sadness as a component (Prinz, 2004), and moral anger. So psychopaths will lack emotions that facilitate moral education as well as the emotions that constitute moral judgments on the model that I outlined in the previous section. Therefore, the deficit in moral competence can be explained without appeal to the empathy deficit.
It's an empirical question whether or not an empathy deficit is causal or accidental to psychopathy and other personality disorders (e.g. narcissism). Prinz suggests the latter, but like I said, he's not the last word on the matter. (Nor is psychology his area of expertise.)
But note that even Prinz acknowledges that certain emotions "facilitate moral education" and "constitute moral judgments." If so (as sentimentalist theories of moral judgment and related empirical research suggest), then certain emotions are of moral significance.
Can emotions be trained? I think so, but I'm sure that there are limitations here (both biological and cultural).
Baron
ReplyDelete>"That you don't have a clue as to what logic entails, means, consists of, was meant to accomplish, and in the end was fashioned to predict."
What was logic fashioned to predict?
Who fashioned it?
Mufi
ReplyDeleteI was not asking what Prinz thought. I was asking what YOU thought. Also...I was not asking about psychopaths. What are YOUR thoughts on the following?
Is your interest in empathy because of it's value in terms of it's being used as a means to inculcating certain moral beliefs/attitudes?
In selecting which behaviors to objectify as moral or immoral?
Do you want to train young children to become more empathetic because you think it is moral to have empathy and act on empathy?
What value do you see in trying to connect empathy to moral values?
Logic (from the Greek λογική logikē) is the formal systematic study of the principles of valid inference and correct reasoning. Reasoning in turn is the power of the mind to think, understand, and form judgments by a process of both formal and informal logic.
ReplyDeleteAll minds, human or otherwise, are reasonable predictive power systems. All biological actions are made based on mindfully predictive assessments of their probable success.
So that the basis of the development of formal logic was the need from the biological get-go to reliably predict the most likely consequences of any and all actions. The Greeks (and Persians, etc.) went looking for more and more certainty but other than in the tautologies that you seem to consider as the be-all and end-all of logic, never quite found it.
DJD: I have an interest in moral philosophy. To the extent that empathy is pertinent to that topic (not to mention others), I have an interest in empathy, as well.
ReplyDeletemufi
ReplyDeleteIf I want to understand what a person is saying, I find it valuable to to know where they are going...or trying to go. There is so much that is unsaid...but lies as silent implications... "implictures" in Grice's words. I guess I am trying to understand what you are saying in terms of what possible implications you see your stated beliefs as having.
Baron
ReplyDeleteI agree with you regarding that logical "inferences" that we are wired to have a tendency to draw. I have been referencing logic "implications"...which is tautological in nature...and thus is not connected to to serving any adaptive needs.Necessity only exists in tautologies. Probabilities are predicted by inferences(inductive inferences).
DJD: I don't know how you will solve any real world problems using tautological implications that are unconnected to real world physicality, but perhaps that's not what you wanted to do to begin with.
ReplyDeleteBaron
ReplyDelete>" I don't know how you will solve any real world problems using tautological implications that are unconnected to real world physicality"
I mostly use analogy and inference. If something has yellow feet and quacks....maybe it also has feathers...So I look for evidence that it has feathers. Or...I sometime "guess" that it might be a duck...so then I look for evidence that supports my guess. I don't know of any other way to make sense out of "real world physicality. Is there another way of which I am unaware?
Look for evidence that it might be a wolf in duck's clothing.
ReplyDeleteBaron
ReplyDelete>"Look for evidence that it might be a wolf in duck's clothing."
Why a wolf? Why not any number of other possibilities?
I'd start with the wolf, but that's just me.
ReplyDeleteBaron
ReplyDeleteDoes that choice indicate the possible presence of paranoia...or maybe "conspiracy theory syndrome?"