About Rationally Speaking


Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Friday, August 26, 2011

On ethics, part V: Contractarianism

by Massimo Pigliucci

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[This post is part of an ongoing series on ethics in which Massimo is exploring and trying to clarify his own ideas about what is right and wrong, and why he thinks so. Part I was on meta-ethics; part II on consequentialism; part III on deontology; part IV on virtue ethics.]
After my meta-ethical introduction to this series, we have examined the obvious contenders in moral philosophy: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. An important distinction to remember among them is that the first two address the question of what is right/wrong, while the latter deals with the question of what sort of life we should live, or what kind of person we should aspire to be.
In the next two installments (before the grand finale!) we shift questions again, taking a look at contractarianism and egalitarianism, which are really political philosophical approaches, more than strictly speaking ethical: they deal with the question of how to build a just society. Of course, as Plato argued in the Republic, there is a tight relationship between morality at the individual level and justice at the level of society.
Speaking of Plato, he was actually the first to take up the idea of a social contract, in both the above mentioned Republic and in the Crito, one of the dialogues that deals with Socrates’ death penalty. Plato actually takes different positions in the two cases, though commentators have argued that they are not mutually contradictory, but should instead be seen in a hierarchical fashion. In the Crito Socrates explains why he has to accept Athens’ death sentence, even though he does have a chance to escape. He says that he owes his life and all he has been able to do to the fact that Athens is governed by the Laws, and that it would therefore be unfair for him to disobey the Laws when it is no longer convenient to follow them, even though the citizens of Athens are thereby about to commit an injustice. Essentially, Socrates is saying that he is party to a social contract, and that he is bound by it even when things don’t go well for him.
In the Republic, however, Socrates is somewhat more cautious about the idea of a social contract. In that dialogue, his friend Glaucon makes the argument that laws are put in place so that people are restrained from committing injustices, which they would naturally be inclined to do if there were no consequences to their behavior (this is the famous problem of Gyges’ ring). Socrates replies that justice is worth having for its own sake, and that just men are happy men (in perfect agreement with virtue ethic’s eudaimonism, which we saw in this series' previous post). I think it’s obvious why Socrates does not contradict himself between the two dialogues, as there is no logical inconsistency in saying that one is bound by the laws, and yet that justice is a good in its own right (though it does raise the question of what one is to do when confronted with unjust laws).
Still, social contract theory in philosophy doesn’t really get off the ground until the big three: Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. This is obviously not the place for an even superficial examination of their respective philosophies (but follow the links if you want to get started in that direction), but a minimalist treatment is necessary.
Hobbes is, of course, famous for his view that life in the “state of nature” for humanity was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” Consequently, Hobbes thought that people rationally decided to enter a social contract in order to be able to pursuit their life in safety (this, like most social contract theories, is a thought experiment, not an account of actual historical events). Hobbes also concluded that people need a strong power to keep them in order, the Sovereign. He thus managed to simultaneously undermine the theory of divine rights of kings while rejecting calls for power sharing between the monarchy and parliament in 17th century England. (He had witnessed the English civil war of 1642-1648, which pitted Charles I against Oliver Cromwell.)
For Locke, the state of nature was a very different affair from the one envisaged by Hobbes. According to Locke, pre-contract human beings were able to live in complete freedom without others interfering in the conduct of their affairs (you could think of this as a type of libertarian paradise). The problem, according to Locke, is that the state of nature can easily devolve into a state of war, as soon as disputes arise about private property. If that happens, might would make right, since there is no civil authority capable of resolving disputes. Hence the necessity of government. The kind of government envisaged by Locke however, was again very different from what Hobbes had in mind. Locke dramatically influenced the American founding fathers, particularly Jefferson, so it is no surprise to find out that he thought that a civil society had to be based on the kind of division of powers (legislative, judicial and executive) that was soon to be implemented in the American Constitution. Importantly, Locke also maintained that should the government devolve into tyranny, the people would have reason — and arguably even a moral duty — to revolt against it. Which, as we know, led to the original tea party (the one in Boston).
Rousseau had not just one, but two theories of social contracts, one actually meant to be an historical account, the other an argument for how things should be instead. The state of nature for Rousseau was characterized by peaceful, largely solitary and uncomplicated lives, with nature providing what people needed. Problems started to occur with population growth, because needs became more pressing, people started living in groups, and they introduced division of labor. The latter in turn made leisure time possible (horror!), which caused people to compare themselves to others and develop feelings of envy (as always, it’s hard to keep up with the Joneses). The coup de grace for the human species was the invention of private property (take that, libertarians), which further encouraged greed and inequality. A natural social contract emerged from this situation which, while claiming fairness, is actually an instrument of the powerful to maintain their privileged position (he’s got a point there).
So much for Rousseau’s ideas about the actual course of human history. What about his prescription? Rousseau famously argued that the way to achieve a fair social contract is by direct democracy, which can be practiced only in small groups. That is because people in small groups know each other and it is easier to hold individuals to their promises, as well as to make them accountable for their behavior. This means that the modern state is for Rousseau precisely the way human beings ought not to live.
After the big three contractarians, we arrive at the 20th century, with the towering figure of John Rawls. I have devoted other posts on Rationally Speaking to Rawls’ political philosophy, and I set aside for him an entire chapter of my forthcoming book (The Intelligent Person’s Guide to the Meaning of Life, BasicBooks, New York). So again only a sketch will be provided here.
Rawls’ conception of human nature is that we are rational and compassionate people. His emphasis on rationality (and on the concepts of duties and rights) have contributed to label his political philosophy as “Kantian,” though I really don’t think that too much of a big deal should be made of this (he is certainly no utilitarian, however). Rawls’ thought experiment in social contractarianism is exceedingly original: he invites us to imagine that we are about to enter a discussion on how to structure society while being positioned behind a “veil of ignorance.” That is, we don’t know anything about what sort of people we are going to be once the veil is lifted and society gets moving. We may be male, female, or transgender; black, white or some other ethnicity; smart or not so smart; physically powerful or weak; have access to a large inheritance or not; have a lucky genetic constitution or one prone to disease; and so forth. The question, then, becomes what sort of society would a rational human being agree to if s/he had no access to that sort of personal information.
Rawls concludes that we would want to build a society based on two fundamental principles: a) each individual should have as much liberty as possible, provided that everyone is granted the same liberties; and b) social-economic inequality is justified only if all have equal access to increased resources and if such inequality is advantageous for all, particularly for the least fortunate members of society. It is crucial to understand that the two principles are not on the same footing: the first one takes precedence because civil liberties are more important than economic advantages (China need not apply, for the moment). This theory is often referred to as the idea that justice is fairness. Incidentally, what Rawls describes is an awful lot like what international surveys indicate many people do indeed prefer.
The following table summarizes the crucial characteristics of the social contract theories discussed above:

philosopher
initial state
theory of human nature
type of contract
Hobbes
war of all against all
people are rational egoists
strong central power
Locke
complete liberty to pursue life
people seek freedom, but may act with force
division of legislative, judicial and executive powers
Rousseau
idyllic, simple life, few needs
people are accountable when they know each other
direct democracy in small groups
Rawls
veil of ignorance
people are rational and compassionate
society based on the two principles of justice

The first thing to note about contractarianism is that it usually begins with a particular theory of human nature. I consider this an advantage, as I do not think that ethics makes any sense outside of the specifics of biology and society (i.e., there is no “view from nowhere” in ethics). All ethical theories assume some theory of human nature, but contractarians (as well as virtue ethicists) are more explicit about it.
Second, the range of solutions proposed by contractarians to the question of what structures do we want to build into our society range widely, from Hobbes’ absolutism to Rawls’ egalitarianism, from Rousseau’s advocacy of direct democracy to Locke’s views about division of powers in representative democracies.
Third, in terms of actual implementation, Hobbes’ is still practiced in a large number of countries in the world, though the trend for the past couple of centuries has been away from autocratic governments (and we should note that authoritarian countries tend to have the lowest index of human development); Locke’s is at the basis of the American and most European systems; Rousseau’s was practiced in ancient Athens (and led, among other things, to the death of Socrates and the disastrous Sicilian expedition that determined the fall of Athens and the victory of Sparta); and Rawls’ is approximated by northern European countries.
There are, naturally, plenty of critiques of contractarianism as an approach (as opposed to critiques of individual contractarian proposals). Broadly speaking, they fall into two categories: those originating within feminist philosophy, and those arising from race-conscious approaches. Indeed, the two are actually related, as for instance in the race conscious work of Charles Mills (The Racial Contract, 1997), which was heavily influenced by the feminist Carole Pateman (The Sexual Contract, 1988).
I don’t have time to get into any of this, and frankly I have little interest in doing so. While both feminist and race conscious writers have exceedingly valid points when they argue that as a matter of fact many contractarians were writing from within a white-male dominated culture and largely speaking to white males, there is no reason in principle why the systems proposed by Locke, Rousseau or Rawls couldn’t accommodate both genders and all ethnicities (indeed, Rawls does that very explicitly). As for Hobbes, well, he thought everyone ought to submit to the Sovereign anyway, regardless of gender and race.
Next: egalitarianism.

76 comments:

  1. Here are two SEP articles, one on Contractarianism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism/) and one on Game Theory and Ethics (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-ethics/).

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  2. Most excellent! Something concrete at last. Contracts indeed although they don't seem to have taken the next logical step and realize (as George Carlin and I have) that we don't have rights. All we have are terms. There are plenty of people in the jails for failing to recognize someone's 'right' to life, but they are certainly subject to the terms of the contract i.e. 'if you murder someone and are caught and convicted you will spend your life in jail and/or be executed'.

    The flights of fancy that these fellows took about previous states of the human species is interesting. Were any of them practicing anthropologists or were they just making something up that suited whatever point they were trying to make?

    There are some things we can be pretty sure of about past humans though. Compared to other predators of a similar size humans are slow and weak. Human beings are slow to mature and require care for an extended period to reach adulthood. Previous humans lived at the mercy of an environment which had none. Maybe some South Sea islanders lived in the equivalent of paradise, but most people did not. Finding ways to not be at the mercy of nature was a priority. Humans which don't find a way to get along and co-operate die. Those that do survive. Both reason and co-operation have their place in that history.

    I wonder how they would have reacted these days when it is the environment which is in danger (climate change, mass extinctions due to habitat loss etc.) rather than the humans. Let's hope that we can become the 'noble civilized'.

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  3. Thameron,

    I hope you realize that George Carlin was sarcastic when he said that we the people don't have rights...

    And if you read the post carefully you will see that most contractarians do not mean their description of the state of nature as an actual historical account. The exception is Rousseau, which actually I think got some of the basic ideas right.

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  4. Massimo,

    Rousseau's "basic ideas" of past human societies are problematic from an anthropological perspective (and so I am sympathetic to Thameron's critique of their baseless notions of other societies).

    You write that division of labor made leisure time possible; however, ethnographic and ethnohistorical accounts demonstrate that many subsistence-based forager societies have more leisure time than more "complex" societies. I'm thinking particularly of Marshall Sahlin's "Original Affluent Society" (http://www.eco-action.org/dt/affluent.html) here, and other anthropologists such as Richard Lee, who studied among the !Kung. Anthropologists have found that foragers generally spend 3-5 hours per day gathering food for sustenance. That's 3-5 hours per day of "work" as opposed to a standard 8-hour work day in American society.

    So, I think he got the "basic ideas" about leisure time, as well as his views about the social evolution of human societies, absolutely wrong. At least, it's not backed up by anthropological research.

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  5. Far be it from me to tell you what to do, but as a pragmatist I think it would be really interesting to see your description of pragmatic ethics.

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  6. Rawls is so wrong that, per the classical expression oriented by Victor Weisskopf in quantum physics, he's "not even wrong."

    Walter Kaufmann, in "Without Guilt and Justice," totally eviscerates him, and really shows his version of contractarianism, at least, to be quite parallel to utilitarianism. From there, the evisceration gets easy. There's no way to find, derive or logically create an all-encompassing standard for either rehabilitative or punitive justice. And, without that, Rawls falls apart.

    I can't recommend Kaufmann's book enough.

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  7. Will,

    I'm certainly not going to defend Rousseau's ideas on early human societies. And of course it's not fair to accuse him of "getting it wrong" considering that he wrote much earlier than any serious anthropological study was conducted on the matter.

    That said, I think his analysis of the negative impact of division of labor, private property and life in larger groups still has merits, quite apart of his suggestion about leisure time.

    Lowenthal,

    I'm not planning to write specifically on pragmatism. What in particular do you think is interesting / worth discussing about it in this context?

    Gadfly,

    I actually find Rawls' ideas (especially as modified in his later work) particularly compelling. What is it you find objectionable about them?

    And no way Rawls can be seriously construed as a utilitarian. His ideas are all about rights and duties, which are alien to utilitarian thinking and very much in the deontological tradition (which is why many philosophers - including Rawls himself - think of this work as "Kantian," though only broadly construed).

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  8. Massimo,

    Fair enough; however, I don't know what else you would call it besides "getting it wrong" since he was, well, wrong. But perhaps that is just semantics.

    As far as his other criticisms, I agree they are quite convincing--especially his conclusions about large social groups.

    Thanks for the article. Looking forward to the last installments. ;)

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  9. While I would certainly hesitate (to say the least) to describe the veil of ignorance thought experiment (let alone Rawls himself) as "utilitarian", I can sort-of see why someone might associate its appeal to rational self interest (as in: how would I prefer that society deal with me if I were to wind up as some poor schmuck?) with that tradition.

    Whatever normative category the veil of ignorance best fits with, (like the Golden Rule) it hits me at a guttural level.

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  10. @Massimo ... I didn't say Rawls was a utilitarian. I did say that his fairness-based ideas on justice are like utilitarianism in that they simply cannot be all encompassing. Whether in rehabilitative or redistributive justice, different people will have different ideas of "fairness," but Rawls thinks this can all be put in a straitjacket. That's parallel to the utilitarian idea that we can and will all agree on what is the greatest good for the greatest number ... or, even, to riff on your virtue ethics post, that we'll all agree what "flourishing" is.

    But, the parallel with utilitarianism that way is quite clear, to me.

    And, I don't know who all you will put under your "egalitarian" post, or what criteria you use to define "egalitarian" ethics, but, actually, Rawls would fall under that general rubric, to me, as much as under deontology.

    Anyway, to the degree he was a deontologist, he relies overly much on the belief in an innate high level of human rationality, the idea that we will magically agree on "fairness" issues, in context of justice or other things. Again, like utilitarianism.

    In fact, that was one of the things (among many) I found wrong with IMmoral Landscape; and, IIRC, I think you mentioned that a bit in your Amazon review too.

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  11. Out of curiosity, I googled Walter Kaufmann and found his book "Without Guilt & Justice" online, http://taimur.org/kaufmann/wgaj/

    Having perused it, I have little positive to report, but as I'm not looking for any long exchange I'll leave it to others who might want to weigh in.

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  12. Massimo,

    I think that pragmatic ethics are interesting in that they don't claim to be normative unlike deontology, consequentialism, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. One of my favorite things about it that most would mistake for postmodernism is that it acknowledges that an action may be moral in one age but not another. I think that the entire philosophy is glanced over too much in general but I feel that Dewey provides convincing arguments in "Human Nature and Conduct" when he compares ethics to science in that it's only gradually asymptotic towards truth. Arguably, I'm a bit more skeptical of radical empiricism than James but I feel that Rorty and Putnam are closer to the point.

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  13. Phaedo is the dialogue concerning Socrates execution and death, not Crito

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  14. mufi,

    I often think that people cry "utilitarianism" because they have too broad a conception of it. For instance, there is nothing intrinsically utilitarian about rational self interest; nor is it the case that just because the general goal of ethics is human well being that automatically makes the whole enterprise utilitarian.

    Gadfly,

    > Rawls thinks this can all be put in a straitjacket. That's parallel to the utilitarian idea that we can and will all agree on what is the greatest good for the greatest number <

    That's an incredibly superficial similarity, the two approaches are otherwise exceedingly different.

    > he relies overly much on the belief in an innate high level of human rationality, the idea that we will magically agree on "fairness" issues <

    No, he is simply saying that rational people would have to agree with his two principles of justice. He is not guessing how many people will, in fact, behave rationally. A fundamental difference.

    Lowenthal,

    I would agree that ethics changes over time, though I attribute that to both our increased understanding of it and to the very change of human nature brought about by cultural evolution (a la Hume). I don't think the analogy with science can be pushed too far though. As for Rorty, I must admit that every time I hear his name I reach for my metaphorical gun. The guy went far too postmodernist, and even betrayed the ideas of pragmatism, in the opinion of a number of philosophers.

    Kostas,

    > Phaedo is the dialogue concerning Socrates execution and death, not Crito <

    Yes, but the Crito is where Socrates makes the social contract-like argument about why he cannot accept ways out of the death penalty.

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  15. Massimo: I often think that people cry "utilitarianism" because they have too broad a conception of it.

    For that matter, what's broader than the concept of virtue? or duty? I think the problem here lies not with the lay person's sense of right and wrong or good or bad, which no single normative theory (be it utilitarian, deontological, or virtue-ethical) adequately describes, but rather with the philosopher's tendency to exclude whatever evidence does not adequately fit his/her pet theory. No wonder even trained philosophers (like the one you criticized in an earlier post) throw their hands up in frustration over the whole enterprise.

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  16. mufi,

    I really don't get the impression that philosophers have a "tendency to exclude whatever evidence does not adequately fit his/her pet theory." No more than scientists or anyone else. That's why there are open discussions about these issues, we improve our understanding by having others challenging our ideas.

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  17. Massimo: I apologize for the ranting portion of my last comment. Here's a do-over attempt:

    I agree that "there is nothing intrinsically utilitarian about rational self interest", which is why I expressed my earlier comment in terms of mental association, rather than logical entailment or necessity.

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  18. Nice post!

    Just something about Rawl's approach...

    "..social-economic inequality is justified only if all have equal access to increased resources and if such inequality is advantageous for all, particularly for the least fortunate members of society"

    -How on earth inequality could be advantageous for someone?

    It is not difficul to to think that this sort of statement has been risen race-conscious approaches.

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  19. Massimo
    >"No, he is simply saying that rational people would have to agree with his two principles of justice."
    What caused Rawls to believe rational people would "have" to agree with his two principles? Did he really believe that these vague principles logically followed from what he thought would be found behind the veil? Also, what he concluded would be found behind the veil and use to "logically" or inferentially
    conclude his two principles was not an a prior truth. It had to be somehow discovered through a logical or inferential means from empirical or other a priori truths. And after all...there are many very rational philosophers that differ with Rawl's methodology and "findings".

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  20. DJD, excellent thoughts. As I said above, that's part of how Kaufmann finds Rawls is simply wrong.

    And, I think the similarity with utilitarianism runs deeper, Massimo. Rawls' focus on fairness, which is even more core than his principles of justice, is, if not utilitarian in a narrow sense, at least somewhat consequentialist. That said, you noted yourself that he also has a deontological strain.

    Anyway, I await your attempts to defend him more under the "fairness" post you said is forthcoming.

    I still, like (I think) DJD, find him highly overrated.

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  21. If Rawls eliminates all differences in biological make up, and all emotions and sense of caring, not even for one's own security and desires, all sentience....what would cause them to ,make one choice as opposed to another? And if he did allow
    for sentience and feelings...how would Rawls allow for the differences in individuals differing levels and qualities of felt emotions and needs?
    Some individuals have high serotonin, high dopamine, and other chemicals and hormones than others...and have different levels of confidence, anxiety, concern for security, strength of desires, and on and on. They each will be caused to make different choices.And if this sentience is not allowed...what WOULD cause choices to be made.

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  22. DJD & Gadfly,

    Read Rawls for yourselves.(Rarely do people read Rawls before they begin to dismiss his ideas.)

    ICARO,

    Re: 'How on earth inequality could be advantageous for someone?'

    E.g. Doctors ought to make comparatively large salaries. The large salaries would provide positive inducement for bright individuals, who may otherwise find alternative employment, to enter the medical profession.

    Rawls would go on to say that if the medical profession did not attract able individuals, the overall quality of medical care would certainly decrease, thus bringing about a loss to all involved, but especially for the least advantaged.

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  23. DJD,

    > What caused Rawls to believe rational people would "have" to agree with his two principles? <

    Once again, people take the idea of moral compulsion as analogous to the compulsion of gravity. The idea is that people would agree IF they behaved rationally. There is no guarantee that people behave rationally, as even a superficial perusal of the news will readily confirm.

    > there are many very rational philosophers that differ with Rawl's methodology and "findings" <

    I'm getting annoyed at the implicit or explicit smirking of philosophy. People, get a grip if you like to engage in a serious intellectual dialogue. First of all, there is the possibility that even rational people are wrong on some issues. Second, rationality doesn't guarantee that there is only one reasonable solution to a set of problems. So I don't see the contradiction at all.

    > If Rawls eliminates all differences in biological make up, and all emotions and sense of caring, not even for one's own security and desires, all sentience....what would cause them to ,make one choice as opposed to another? <

    You are really not taking this seriously, my friend. The idea is to temporality ignore, not eliminate, that sort of information, so that you would make a decision based on the idea that you may not win at the genetic-social lottery. It seems perfectly sensible and hardly objectionable to me.

    > Some individuals have high serotonin, high dopamine, and other chemicals and hormones than others...and have different levels of confidence, anxiety, concern for security, strength of desires, and on and on. <

    That has precisely nothing to do with the idea of a veil of ignorance.

    Gadfly,

    > As I said above, that's part of how Kaufmann finds Rawls is simply wrong <

    And yet you refuse to enlighten the rest of us as to why precisely Rawls is wrong.

    > Rawls' focus on fairness, which is even more core than his principles of justice, is, if not utilitarian in a narrow sense, at least somewhat consequentialist. <

    You really ought to read Rawls. Sorry that my quick treatment generated this much confusion.

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  24. Massimo: ...rationality doesn't guarantee that there is only one reasonable solution to a set of problems

    I certainly agree. And, for my part in the "implicit or explicit smirking of philosophy" (for which I've already apologized), I think my first comment on the Consequentialism post still sums up my position.

    To clarify some more: I greatly appreciate how philosophers (like yourself) have explored the rational (and emotional) limits of various normative theories. But, especially when paired with the results of cognitive science and moral psychology, my hunch from all of this is that no attempt at a monolithic theory (be it utilitarian, deontological, or virtue-ethical) is likely to be completely satisfying, although any one of them may seem relatively more so, depending on the situation.

    That said, I'm waiting on a copy of Talyor's Intro to Virtue Ethics to arrive at the library, based on your recommendation.

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  25. DJD,
    Re: 'If Rawls eliminates... [all] sense of caring, not even for one's own security and desires, all sentience....what would cause them to make one choice as opposed to another?'

    This is not entirely correct. In the original position behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls postulates rationally self-interested agents who have a reasonable grasp of economics.

    Given our self-interest and our ignorance concerning our socio-economic position in society, Rawls believes plausibly that we would (indeed, ought to) agree to certain fair procedures via which rights, recognitions, monetary remuneration, etc., would be distributed. An example of a fair procedure for distribution would be two self-interested people who agree that one cuts the pizza whilst the other distributes the slices.

    Gadfly,

    Rawls is about as committed to utilitarianism as modern neo-classical economics is committed to a base conception of homo economicus, which is to say not at all.

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  26. Eamon: I would readily agree that an economic model per se is not necessarily "committed to a base conception of homo economicus." But it's at least debatable whether or not a more psychologically realistic model (e.g. one that's compatible with the discoveries of behavioral and information economics) would still deserve to be called "neoclassical", given that school's historical association with the homo economicus concept.

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  27. Eamon
    >"This is not entirely correct. In the original position behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls postulates rationally self-interested agents who have a reasonable grasp of economics."
    My point is that Rawls requires attitude (awareness of, sense of self interest to suggested possibilities..Even granted knowledge of economics, the differences in a person's willingness to take risks, for instance,will influence their choice. Individuals with a strong sense of confidence that they are potential "winners", or those that have very high "anxiety" thresholds, may be influenced by these attitudes, and be more apt to to favor a system where they can compete for status and rewards. Also, HIS knowledge of economics may cause him to desire just the reverse of what Rawls might have suspected. Shall we sacrifice prosperity for all in order to gain Rawl's suspected outcome? Also....the importance of "freedom" may vary from individual...not because of theoretical models, but because of an individuals' variety of traits.Some individuals have a rebellious character or temperament....some are highly confident...some have no fear. Some insist on no bonds that restrict their choices and behavior. There IS no impartial observer.

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  28. Massimo
    >"Once again, people take the idea of moral compulsion as analogous to the compulsion of gravity."
    What does "moral compulsion" have to do with this discussion....or with Rawls. I thought that this was about a "rational" approach reaching a conclusion.

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  29. massimo
    >"you would make a decision based on the idea that you may not win at the genetic-social lottery."
    But, the person behind the veil may have already won the genetic lottery. This would influence his choice. If you rule out our genetic, biological, psychological make-up....what are you left with to make a choice. Rawls would have to find some "middle of the road" type person, or some kind of "non-person" to make the choice.

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  30. Massimo
    >"I'm getting annoyed at the implicit or explicit smirking of philosophy"
    Why do you find the use of the term 'philosophers'
    annoying.
    Since Wittgenstein et al, philosophy has been seen greatly as having the job of clarification. Once there has been clarification of a question...it generally becomes clear that one of the branches of science would best answer the question.....unless it turns out to be a problem of logic....a place where nothing comes out that was not already there.

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  31. mufi,

    > when paired with the results of cognitive science and moral psychology, my hunch from all of this is that no attempt at a monolithic theory (be it utilitarian, deontological, or virtue-ethical) is likely to be completely satisfying <

    First off, I really don't see how psychology is going to tell us how we should live (as opposed to how we do or like to live). And what on earth is moral psychology? Sounds like a category mistake to me. Second, this whole series is precisely about *not* going for "monolithic" approaches, though again I see too many people here dismiss a lot of philosophy without paying the courtesy to actually read about it, let alone understand it.

    > I'm waiting on a copy of Talyor's Intro to Virtue Ethics to arrive at the library, based on your recommendation <

    It's an interesting book, but be ready to cringe at his pervasive elitism...

    DJD,

    > What does "moral compulsion" have to do with this discussion <

    You brought it up when you asked why Rawls thought rationally people would *have* to agree with his theory. *Have* is compulsory, is it not?

    > But, the person behind the veil may have already won the genetic lottery. This would influence his choice <

    You don't seem to understand the idea of the veil experiment: *by definition* nobody would know whether they won the genetic (or social) lottery.

    > Why do you find the use of the term 'philosophers' annoying. <

    I don't, I find the constant smirking *at* philosophers engage in by some commenters on this blog increasingly annoying. Please read carefully my comments before responding.

    > Since Wittgenstein et al, philosophy has been seen greatly as having the job of clarification. Once there has been clarification of a question...it generally becomes clear that one of the branches of science would best answer the question <

    Says who? Wittgenstein himself certainly didn't hold the view that once thing are clarified science will take over. And I think Wittgenstein's view of philosophy is far too impoverished to be the whole story.

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  32. Massimo
    >"First off, I really don't see how psychology is going to tell us how we should live (as opposed to how we do or like to live)."
    Can our evolutionary/biological makeup help us in this regard"?

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  33. And what on earth is moral psychology?

    Here's a reference that might interest you (given the source), but I think of the trolley experiments as an example, which we discussed in an earlier thread.

    I don't mean to suggest that a descriptive account of how we actually function in specific moral dilemmas is prescriptive (as in: that's how one ought to function in those situations, according to some standard or ideal). But then anyone (philosopher or otherwise) who wishes to alter those functions in any significant way has, at least in my opinion, some seriously explaining to do.

    this whole series is precisely about *not* going for "monolithic" approaches

    I was under the impression that you were building up to virtue ethics as the "one to beat" among the main normative theories (with perhaps a Rawlsian-egalitarian complement in the political domain). Sorry if I was mistaken.

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  34. Massimo
    Massimo stated:
    "No, he is simply saying that rational people would have to agree with his two principles of justice"
    DJD said:
    What caused Rawls to believe rational people would "have" to agree with his two principles?
    Massimo responded:
    Once again, people take the idea of moral compulsion as analogous to the compulsion of gravity.
    DJD responded:
    What does "moral compulsion" have to do with this discussion....or with Rawls. I thought that this was about a "rational" approach reaching a conclusion.
    Massimo responded:
    You brought it up when you asked why Rawls thought rationally people would *have* to agree with his theory. *Have* is compulsory, is it not?
    DJD responds:
    I did not bring up "moral" compulsion. You did.
    I asked why people would "have to agree" if they were rational persons. I was inquiring why they would find Rawls rational argument undeniable.

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  35. Massimo
    DJD said:
    "And after all...there are many very rational philosophers that differ with Rawl's methodology and "findings".
    Massimo said:
    I find the constant smirking *at* philosophers engage in by some commenters on this blog increasingly annoying."
    DJD responds: I did not use the word pholosophers in a derogatory way.... The use was positive.

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  36. Massimo
    >" Wittgenstein himself certainly didn't hold the view that once thing are clarified science will take over."
    Actually, he did. He felt that if a proposition could not be clarified in such a way as to be a candidate for scientific method...that it was not actually a proposition. It was some other form of speech act, not an assertion of a fact.

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  37. @Eamon ... I've read Rawls as well as Kaufmann's comments about Rawls. That said, Kaufmann was more thorough in his deconstruction than I was when I had read Rawls earlier; why shouldn't I cite Kaufmann if I agree with him?

    And, although Wittgenstein kicked against being associated w/logical positivists ... his stance toward clarification and science? DJD has got it right, I think.

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  38. mufi,

    I know and and written about philosophically informed experiments in cognitive science. My point was that they tell us about the how's of moral reasoning, they don't tell us how to reason morally. It's like showing that parts X and Y of the brain are involved in mathematical reasoning. Fascinating, but it says nothing about whether or not Fermat's Last Theorem is correct. But judging from the rest of your comment we actually agree on this.

    > I was under the impression that you were building up to virtue ethics as the "one to beat" among the main normative theories (with perhaps a Rawlsian-egalitarian complement in the political domain). <

    Yes, I am actually leaning in that direction, though we still have the essay on egalitarianism to get through. Even so, considering that Rawls' theory is Kantian and virtue ethics has nothing to do with Kant, my proposal wouldn't be "monolithic," right?

    DJD,

    > Can our evolutionary/biological makeup help us in this regard? <

    In the same way in which cognitive research on moral reasoning does, see my response to muff above.

    About Wittgenstein:

    > Actually, he did. He felt that if a proposition could not be clarified in such a way as to be a candidate for scientific method...that it was not actually a proposition. It was some other form of speech act, not an assertion of a fact. <

    You are thinking of the first Wittgenstein, which was thoroughly repudiated by the second Wittgenstein. And at any rate, despite some suggestion to the contrary, philosophy did not end with Wittgenstein.

    Gadfly,

    > I've read Rawls as well as Kaufmann's comments about Rawls. That said, Kaufmann was more thorough in his deconstruction than I was when I had read Rawls earlier; why shouldn't I cite Kaufmann if I agree with him? <

    You should, it would be even better if you agreed to summarize what you found so convincing in Kaufmann and so unconvincing in Rawls, as I asked already a couple of times.

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  39. Even so, considering that Rawls' theory is Kantian and virtue ethics has nothing to do with Kant, my proposal wouldn't be "monolithic," right?

    OK, so you do not seek a monolithic approach. Do you think that's true of moral philosophy, in general?

    BTW, I started Intro to Virtue Ethics last night. I only mention this here because Taylor has so far been way more critical of moral philosophy (particularly its Christian influence, even among post-Christian thinkers) than any comment that I've read here. Perhaps he's earned that right, but I'm just sayin'.

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  40. Massimo
    "You are thinking of the first Wittgenstein, which was thoroughly repudiated by the second Wittgenstein. And at any rate, despite some suggestion to the contrary, philosophy did not end with Wittgenstein."
    If you read his Philosophical Investigations and later writings or interpretations, especially his discussions about Language Games and "Don't ask the meaning, ask the use" where he discusses that language is used to do things.....not just mean things.....and that understanding words and sentences was greatly aided by understanding what the speaker was using the word or sentence to "do". He rejected the idea that any usage of words other than for propositions was "meaningless". He instead believed that other usages were simply different language games and different types of speech acts. He also did not scrap all of the ideas of the Logical Positivists. Primarily, just the idea that if the sentence could not theoretically be tested and confirmed that it was meaningless. Later, those sentences simply became non-propositional speech acts...which were best understood (meaning) by looking at the "use" of the sentence or word. John Austin and many others took it from there.

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  41. Massimo
    "You don't seem to understand the idea of the veil experiment: *by definition* nobody would know whether they won the genetic (or social) lottery."
    This is one of the flaws in Rawls' excercise or theory. If Rawls has no idea about human nature, or the basic needs, desires, emotions, or "nature" of the individual making the choices...how can Rawls imagine what choices his individual will make....and what makes him think that a man with no nature, no qualities, could ever makle a choice? What would the choice be based upon? what would cause one choice rather than another?

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  42. mufi,

    > OK, so you do not seek a monolithic approach. Do you think that's true of moral philosophy, in general? <

    Hard to say. The contemporary literature in moral philosophy is nuanced, complex, and includes quite a few calls for pluralist approaches. But even the "monolithic" systems are useful, I think, as departure points for discussion. Sort of like ideal conditions in physics...

    DJD,

    I'm familiar with Wittgenstein's ideas about language games. None of that amounts to your suggestion that according to Wittgenstein philosophical problems beyond issues of clarification are going to be solved by science. For one thing, Wittgenstein was very weary of science. Moreover, as I said before, he was certainly an influential philosopher, but far from being the last word on this, or anything else, for that matter.

    > If Rawls has no idea about human nature, or the basic needs, desires, emotions, or "nature" of the individual making the choices...how can Rawls imagine what choices his individual will make <

    You *really* ought to read Rawls, don't just rely on one paragraph I wrote about him. Of course he has a theory of human nature. Of course the people behind the veil know of human desires. What they don't know is what kind of advantages and disadvantages they personally will enjoy in terms of natural and social endowments. A totally different issue from what you are talking about.

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  43. Massimo
    >"your suggestion that according to Wittgenstein philosophical problems beyond issues of clarification are going to be solved by science"
    I did not say that.
    I said: " He felt that if a proposition could not be clarified in such a way as to be a candidate for scientific method...that it was not actually a proposition." Huge difference.

    DJD said:
    But, the person behind the veil may have already won the genetic lottery. This would influence his choice"
    > "Of course the people behind the veil know of human desires. What they don't know is what kind of advantages and disadvantages they personally will enjoy in terms of natural and social endowments. A totally different issue from what you are talking about."
    My point is that they are aware of their own human desires, their own biologically determined feelings, emotions, preferences, thresholds of anxiety, confidence in themselves, etc.This is a real person....with real biologically determined differences from other individuals...and these differences in something as simple as high serotonin brain content might make them more risk oriented, more confident, less inclined to favor security over freedom, have a more rebellious nature....or perhaps a high normal level of dopamine...making them have a reward seeking nature. The bottom line is that Rawls cannot posit a non-person....with no sentience...no sense of their own natures...their own preferences....their own TEMPERAMANTS. It is well known that different individuals that have different temperaments, make different choices. What type person will Rawls choose? Some person like himself? And, after the new "fair" system is in place...there will be many that are happy and content...and others that will be discontented....because they favor freedom over security or equality of material goods.

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  44. Massimo
    >"Of course the people behind the veil know of human desires. What they don't know is what kind of advantages and disadvantages they personally will enjoy in terms of natural and social endowments."
    Of course they do...they can pretty much make an educated guess about their chances under various types of government. And even if their choice is not made by careful reasoning about their chances, given their self awareness....they will be unconsciously influenced by their biological temperament.

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  45. DJD: they will be unconsciously influenced by their biological temperament.

    Granted. For that matter, they will also likely be influenced by their cultural upbringing (a point which I think Michael Sandel made in his Justice book and series). But the veil may also have an influence of its own, which can be tested empirically (e.g. see this paper).

    That aside, there is plenty of evidence that people value equality (e.g. see this article, which suggests that Americans actually would prefer a wealth distribution like that of Sweden), even if how they envision it does not exactly fit a Rawlsian model.

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  46. DJD,

    > they can pretty much make an educated guess about their chances under various types of government. And even if their choice is not made by careful reasoning about their chances, given their self awareness....they will be unconsciously influenced by their biological temperament. <

    One more time: please take Rawls seriously instead of making up your own version of what he says. The point is precisely that people will reason about what societal structure will be most fair because they will not be able to construct one that gives them an advantage, because they don't know which bio-social advantages they will have. I really don't know how else to explain this concept, sorry.

    > My point is that they are aware of their own human desires, their own biologically determined feelings, emotions, preferences, thresholds of anxiety, confidence in themselves <

    Yes, of course. How is that in any way a problem for Rawls?

    > I did not say that.
    I said: " He felt that if a proposition could not be clarified in such a way as to be a candidate for scientific method...that it was not actually a proposition." Huge difference. <

    Actually, you said:

    > Since Wittgenstein et al, philosophy has been seen greatly as having the job of clarification. Once there has been clarification of a question...it generally becomes clear that one of the branches of science would best answer the question. <

    I took that to be too much of a narrowing of philosophy. But then you added:

    > unless it turns out to be a problem of logic....a place where nothing comes out that was not already there. <

    That's not the way I would characterize logic, but if what you are saying is that science deals with empirically answerable questions while philosophy concentrates on issues of logic, well, yes, no philosopher would object to that.

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  47. Massimo
    Your two responses below appear to directly conflict with each other. Perhaps you mean something different Than my interpretation of what you are saying when you say 'bio-social advantages' That is precisely what I am referring to when I say that the have a nature....and they are aware of their nature. They may be more willing to take more risks because of their temperament, or morality may already be part of their being and identity. Rawl's had to posit, in his mind anyway, some type of personality, some type of inclinations and temperament, etc. They "type" of being will effect the type of choice.

    These are the seemingly contradictory statements which I refered to above.
    Massimo said> "because they don't know which bio-social advantages they will have."
    DJD said:
    My point is that they are aware of their own human desires, their own biologically determined feelings, emotions, preferences, thresholds of anxiety, confidence in themselves"
    Massimo replied:
    "Yes, of course."

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  48. Massimo
    I suggest you read all of my comments regarding Wittgenstein before you make up your mind about my knowledge of or lack thereof regarding the later Wittgenstein.

    Here is just one of my comments:
    "He felt that if a proposition could not be clarified in such a way as to be a candidate for scientific method...that it was not actually a proposition. It was some other form of speech act, not an assertion of a fact."

    Wittgenstein, like Nietzsche, said many, many separate things...similar to aphorisms. It takes a good deal of study to understand what they are saying.
    If one reads some of his followers' writings....they shed light on his later writings...Austin, Searle, Grice, also some of his contemporaries, such as Weisman.

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  49. Mufi
    >"That aside, there is plenty of evidence that people value equality (e.g. see this article, which suggests that Americans actually would prefer a wealth distribution like that of Sweden), even if how they envision it does not exactly fit a Rawlsian model."
    The article fails to explain why there is such a gulf between their findings and that which they would find if they looked at the real world....where choices must be made, where there are competing interests....there exist huge divisions on this very subject...and this "ethereal", theoretical "study" points out what is wrong with all these neo-Rawlsian attempts to justify egalitarianism....and government redistribution.

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  50. DJD: I personally have no methodological grounds to dismiss either study, which is why I referenced them. If you do, then so be it.

    But I think it's clear from the Norton & Ariely study (e.g. Figure 2) that Americans tend to greatly underestimate the degree of actual inequality. That might help to explain part of the "gulf" that you refer to, but only in the USA. In other developed nations (e.g. the Nordic countries, Japan, & Canada), the actual wealth distributions are relatively egalitarian.

    But these are just descriptions, and are not necessarily related to whatever policies that Rawls or his followers might prescribe.

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  51. Mufi
    What I was driving at is that these people were asked theoretical questions about what they thought was the "ideal" wealth distribution. No mention of the trade offs. No mention of the tax increases that would be needed to redistribute...no mention of the slowing of economic growth and income growths that would occur as a result of the tax and redistribution of incomes and assets. Just about everyone I know would prefer to see equal incomes and assets in a "perfect" world, where there are no trade offs. It would be better to look at the real world. Look at what people say that disagree with each other about the trade offs and sacrifices needed to improve the current distribution significantly. Experimental philosophy, including the asking people what they would do if faced with the classic "trolley" problem, does not reflect moral behavior, moral judgment, and moral choices in the real world. If one wants to study morality...one should "go and look". See what people actually do with morality....how they use it...why there is so much lack of agreement, etc.

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  52. DJD,

    there is no contradiction between having a temperament etc and being put in a (hypothetical) position where you do not know whether you will be handsome or ugly (biological), or rich or poor (social).

    I read all your comments about Wittgenstein, and I pointed out that I disagree with what you clearly stated in the very first comment. After that you kept changing subject when you referred to W., but I kept referring to your original comment.

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  53. DJD: I agree with you only insofar as the American subjects of the Norton & Ariely study would not likely agree to just any policy prescription aimed at reducing economic inequality. For that matter, neither would I, although the reason that I mentioned those other "developed nations" is because they are: (a) actual (as opposed to ideal) examples of relatively egalitarian countries (again, relative to the USA); and (b) they are "developed", not only in typical economic terms (e.g. per capita GDP), but also in terms of various other measures of social well-being (e.g. infant mortality, literacy, crime, etc.), where they often out-score the USA.

    As for your general comment about moral psychology, I would be very surprised if such thought experiments were not at all predictive of actual behavior, but that too is an empirical question, which seems considerably more difficult to test for (e.g. given the dearth of actual trolley-like situations).

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  54. PS: Of course, there are behavioral experiments (e.g. using different variants of the ultimatum game), which also tell us something about our moral instincts and intuitions. But I suppose that, if one insists that only behaviors in the field are "real-world" enough to be meaningful, then one could look for pertinent field research (e.g. in anthropology and/or sociology to observe how various societies conceive justice and how they enforce it in custom and law). That's certainly a valid approach, although I believe that lab research is valid, too.

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  55. Mufi
    Good comments. I'm not clear on one of your statements. When you said: "which also tell us something about our moral instincts and intuitions." Did you mean actual Moral instincts",
    or were you referring to our evolved traits that play a role in or allow for the development of morality?

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  56. Massimo
    > "there is no contradiction between having a temperament etc and being put in a (hypothetical) position where you do not know whether you will be handsome or ugly (biological), or rich or poor (social)."
    I believe there would be a problem, as temperament and many other traits play a role in making choices. And the person behind the veil will be making choices about the kind of world HE would like to live in, not what kind of world some NOBODY would like to live in.There is no neutral chooser.

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  57. DJD: Did you mean actual Moral instincts",
    or were you referring to our evolved traits that play a role in or allow for the development of morality?


    When I think of "moral instincts", I think of certain evolved traits, like those primatologist Frans de Waal speaks of in regard to nonhuman species: "sympathy, empathy, reciprocity, a willingness to follow social rules." (source)

    But then I also think of those evolved traits as "actual moral instincts" (cultural variability notwithstanding), so I'm not sure that I've chosen one option over the other.

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  58. Mufi
    Sympathy and empathy are emotions. Having empathy....caring about others is natural. Caring is a far cry from "you ought" to care for others. We simply do care. It's our natural make-up.
    The same with all of our evolved traits. Morality develops when we decide which traits we "ought" to
    encourage and praise....and which evolved traits we decide to discourage and condemn. That we naturally 'care' is no rational ground for saying that we "ought" to care....any more than that we naturally strike out in anger or some kids are naturally bullies, is no ground for rationally concluding that we "ought" to be bullies or strike out in anger. thou "ought" or "ought not" is the stuff of morality. And we "use" moral argumentation in order to get our way...justify our actions, criticize others, to create rationales for trying to "force" legislation that we favor, etc. But, the bottom line is that morality is the tool that social groups use to encourage some behaviors and discourage others. And what the want to encourage/discourage is the source of our brand of morality. Nietzsche had it right in saying "Ask the value of values. Ask the value of each moral belief held and supported by social groups".

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  59. DJD: A related thought occurred to me shortly after I posted my last comment - namely, that both my and de Waal's description of those emotional and behavioral traits as "moral" presupposes a conception of morality that may not be universally shared. That said, I suppose that a less philosophically loaded description of them would simply be "pro-social."

    Still, in today's culture (viz. in the developed "West"), I think many (if not most) folks would agree that such traits are "good" (as in: desirable and praiseworthy). But I would agree with you insofar as that position may or may not hold up under rational analysis. (Indeed, as I near the end of Taylor's Intro to Virtue Ethics, I doubt whether the ancient Greek thinkers would have regarded those traits as particularly "moral.")

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  60. Massimo
    Leaving aside any questions about the temperament or differences in moral identity of the person behind the veil....What will they be allowed to know? Economics, history, psychology,etc.?

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  61. Massimo
    It seems as though Rawls was weened on Marx. He limits what he seeks to have others focus on in determining "fairness" primarily in terms of distribution of material goods or other types of status distribution. He goes another step in the Marxian tradition by assuming that the "veil" will conceal the person's knowledge of their potential position in the status ladder, primarily income. Marx thought that individuals and groups always made political choices and embraced ideologies based upon their position in society.But this is not the case. Many make choices based upon their moral identity, their knowledge of economics, their religion, their understanding of political philosophy, history of types of political/economic systems that failed, etc....so the veil would not matter. That he thought it would matter shows his limited concept about how individuals choose the kind of political? economical system they would choose to live in, or that they thought would be the best system for most people to live in.
    He apparently had internalized the ideology of egalitarianism and now thought is was THE MOST important ideal.

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  62. Massimo
    What would be your response to the following....which is similar to others that have criticized Rawls?
    Rawls limits what he seeks to have others focus on in determining "fairness" primarily in terms of distribution of material goods or other types of status distribution. He also assumes that the "veil" will conceal the person's knowledge of their potential position in the status ladder, primarily income. Many individuals make choices based upon their moral identity, their knowledge of economics, their religion, their understanding of political philosophy, history of types of political/economic systems that failed, etc....so the veil would not matter. That he thought it would matter shows his limited concept about how individuals choose the kind of political/economical system they would choose to live in, or that they thought would be the best system for most people to live in.
    He apparently had internalized the ideology of egalitarianism and now thought it was THE MOST important ideal.

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  63. DJD,

    I don't know which "others" you are referring to, but nobody who has actually read Rawls would say that he " seeks to have others focus on in determining "fairness" primarily in terms of distribution of material goods or other types of status distribution."

    As for people's moral identities, etc., that - again - is not the point. The point is that people will not know whether they will be in a position of advantage or not. For instance, a Christian will know he is a Christian, but will not know whether the society in which he'll find himself will be majority Christian (favorable) or not (unfavorable). If he acts rationally therefore, he will want a society where no religion can impose itself upon the others.

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  64. Massimo
    We've been here. You said that indeed they would be sentient, feel emotions, have a particular temperament. That may or may not be accurate.....I have read that it is not allowed under Rawl's criteria. If it is not, then we end up with a non-person, with no awareness of their own identity, desire preferences, no moral ideas whatsoever,etc.

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  65. Yes, we have been here before, and you insist in missing the point: personalities are allowed; knowledge of one's lot is not. Really, the distinction should be clear.

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  66. Massimo
    If what you say is correct....then the real person, with real temperaments, moral identities,
    and different views about how to live the "good" life, will make different choices than some other real person....even if they have no clue about their future standing in a future society. Why would you not agree with that?

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  67. Because a choice dictated by temperament would be irrational. Remember, this is about rational choice, not picking your flavor of the month.

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  68. Massimo
    "Rational choice" cannot be made unless it starts with preferences, values, desires, etc. It is not possible. There must be an objective. Is the person behind the veil supposed to have knowledge of some universal set of preferences, values, and desires? Also, how about knowledge of what is workable vs. non-workable?

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  69. DJD,

    I'm honestly not sure why I'm having such a hard time explaining this concept here. Of course we have preferences, values, etc. But the idea is that *rational self-interest* would make you choose a society structured in as fair way as possible (i.e., where no group has inherent advantages) precisely because you don't know (from behind the veil) whether your preferences, values, etc. will be in the minority or not. I really can't explain it better than this.

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  70. Massimo
    You have explained it very well. And I understand what you are asserting, very well. It is simply the case that you are wrong. Or, at least I am convinced you are wrong. You assume that everyone would see their self interest as being identical.
    Any "real" person may see their self interest differently than another "real" person. Some may "feel" that they can win under any type of system, no matter what their initial condition or position. Others may have a low self confidence and may have a low fear threshold and have experienced the pain of low self-esteem caused by loss of status, or very low status. Also... the "real" person's moral identity may be such that the whole idea of a system that the whole enterprise of seeking equality is corrupting to the soul. Many Rawls critics have written along this line, as well as other arguments. You insist on simply responding to my arguments as the result of my just not "getting it"....or that I have simply not understood what you or Rawls have said. Please try harder to understand my argument....and respond to my argument with the knowledge that I am very aware that the veil will keep the individual from having a clue about what condition or position
    they may inherit in any possible system.

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  71. DJD,

    well, at this point I actually have to conclude that you simply don't get it. To say that "Some may 'feel' that they can win under any type of system, no matter what their initial condition or position" you are talking about irrational behavior. The whole premise here is that *rational* people will agree to Rawls' suggestions. There is no accounting for irrationality, once you go in that direction *no* system will make sense.

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  72. Massimo
    There is no "rational" starting point. 'Rational'
    implies "a rational approach to achieving ones objective". Who is going to define that objective?
    Is going to be some nebulous objective like "human flourishing" or something more specific like "having a higher status than most"?Or, perhaps you will assume that everyone already agrees on what is "fair" and "just". To choose rationally, there must be a premise or an objective.

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  73. mufi,

    "Whatever normative category the veil of ignorance best fits with, (like the Golden Rule) it hits me at a guttural level."

    What's wrong with the golden rule? If I understand well (that you meant that there were something wrong).

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  74. Massimo
    I think you will enjoy this web page. Or, maybe not. It details main criticisms made by noted philosophers over the years.
    http://ivr-enc.info/index.php?title=H._John_Rawls:_Some_Main_Lines_of_Criticism&printable=yes
    My particular criticism is best expressed by Michael Sandel:
    "It is descriptively inaccurate and normatively unattractive because people neither are nor should aspire to be deracinated agents capable of choosing any and all of their commitments as if from some unsituated point of view of pure practical reason. What troubles Sandel is Rawls’s identification of moral personhood with the two basic moral powers or capacities, rather than with some determinate set of ends. On Sandel’s view, Rawls conceives of persons as little more than a metaphysical capacity to choose, all form and no substance."

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  75. Massimo
    The simplest way to express how Rawls proposal is fatally flawed is the following:
    If the man in the original position is not allowed to know anything...not about himself, his temperament, his moral preferences, his desires and aspirations,about others aspirations and preferences, about human nature, etc. then there is no grounds to even begin to think about what is rational or not rational.There are no objectives to think rationally about or any way to rationally create objectives.
    If on the other hand, he is allowed to know everything there is to know....except his position or condition or place in the society behind the veil, everyone will decide differentl about what is rational or not....based upon what type of life they want to live....a hermit with books who cares not about material goods, a person that wants to escape the social interactions that cause one to feel the need to seek status, impress others, struggle to attain more material goods than others or have more power than others or better reputation than others,Etc. He may not be concerned about security....in fact he may detest the very thought of people allowing their lives to be controlled by the need for security, wealth, admiration, etc.
    And, if someone made the argument that he is supposed to choose based upon what he thinks some average person would desire, who could possibly do that. And he cannot simply reason in a vacuum....a rational person can only make rational choices about the means....not the ends.

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