About Rationally Speaking


Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Sunday, August 21, 2011

On ethics, part IV: Virtue ethics

by Massimo Pigliucci
[This post is part of an ongoing series on ethics in which Massimo is exploring and trying to clarify his own ideas about what is right and wrong, and why he thinks so. Part I was on meta-ethics; part II on consequentialism; part III on deontology.]
After my meta-ethical introduction to this series we have examined the two leading contender ethical theories of consequentialism and deontology. The third one is, of course, virtue ethics, which originated with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and was recently reintroduced to philosophy beginning with a classic paper by Elisabeth Anscombe in 1958.
The first, and perhaps more fundamental, thing to understand about virtue ethics is that it is concerned with a radically different sort of question from consequentialism and deontology, so much so that perhaps it is misleading to compare the three directly. While much modern moral philosophy regards the question of what is right as defining the field, virtue ethicists are interested in the question of how is one to live. Indeed, the suggestion has been made that Aristotle and most of the ancient Greeks would simply be puzzled by our way of thinking about ethics. Of course what is the best way to live, in the Greek-virtue ethicist sense, is not entirely decoupled from doing what is right and wrong, as the latter stems from the former.
Anscombe and other modern virtue ethicists (principally Bernard Williams and Alasdair MacIntyre), point out that one of the major consequences of shifting the question in ethics is that one is no longer forced to seek rigid, universal answers to “what’s the right thing to do?” but can instead appreciate the variety of ethical dilemmas and approach them from a more flexible perspective. Another way to put the difference is that while standard modern ethics is about laws (duties, rights), virtue ethics is about an individual’s character. If the individual has managed to develop a good character she will also tend to do the right thing.
Interestingly, Williams even draws a distinction between morality and ethics (which I have and will continue to use as synonymous, in agreement with most of the literature). For him, morality is about concepts such as duty (for instance in the case of deontology), while ethics is broader and accommodates a role for emotions, such as the special bonds one has with family members or friends. (We have seen that consequentialism in particular has a hard time with this aspect of ethics, and deontology fares only slight better.)
Virtue ethics, of course, derives its name from the prominent role played in it by the idea of virtue. Aristotle actually listed what he thought were the fundamental virtues of an ethical human being, and others have come up with different lists (there is some cross-cultural variation, of course, though less than one might think). The point isn’t really to quibble about which entries should or should not make the list, but to discuss what we might mean by the very concept of a virtuous human being. (Remember, of course, that this has absolutely nothing to do with the very different Christian concept of virtue, which is based on the very un-Greek ideas of humility and meekness.)
A virtue, then, is a moral character trait that we admire in those people who have it. Consider, for instance, courage: according to Aristotle to be courageous is to strike a balance between being rash or foolish and being a coward. Similarly, proper ambition is somewhere in between vanity and meekness (see? Not a Christian concept at all). Or take friendliness: it too manifests itself as being somewhere between obsequiousness and cantankerousness. And so on. The idea, of course, isn’t that there is a calculus of virtue according to which one can arrive at the precise golden mean, but rather that having a virtuous character means to be able to balance common human passions and attitudes in a way that is praiseworthy. If you are not comfortable with fuzzy concepts you will definitely not like virtue ethics.
Character for virtue ethicists is the reflection of an inner state of being, and that state develops and changes throughout one’s lifetime (which is why the Greeks thought that one cannot evaluate the goodness of a person’s life until the very end). Virtue ethics, as mentioned above, makes room for both philosophy and psychology, so there is a recognition that people start out with certain innate tendencies, and that these tendencies may be further shaped in a more or less virtuous direction during early development and then into adulthood. Moreover, there is also recognition for what Thomas Nagel famously called “moral luck”: while we have some control over what we do and the choices we make (especially as adults), much depends on having being born with certain combinations of genes rather than others, on having had particular parents rather than others, one type of education (or any education at all) over others, and so on. Again, if all of this sounds too mushy for you, welcome to what happens when you embrace the real human condition, as opposed to a cartoon version of it.
There are three major streaks of modern virtue ethics: eudaimonism, agent-based accounts, and ethics of care accounts. I focus mostly on the first one (which I find most congenial, and which is more in line with the original Aristotelian insight), but will comment briefly on the other two.
Eudaimonism refers to the Greek term eudaimonia, which loosely translates as happiness, or well being, or flourishing (I prefer the latter). It literally means to possess a good demon. Aristotle began by pointing out that most of what we do is a means to a particular end: we go to college because (among other things) we want a well paying job; we want the latter so that we can make a decent salary; and we want the latter so that we can buy a house, afford a vacation, pay for healthcare and so on. But why do we want all these things to begin with? Because we are pursuing the only thing that is an end in itself, and that thing is eudaimonia, a happy life.
Aristotle, perhaps predictably, thought that the highest form of eudaimonia is achieved through a contemplative life (i.e., ahem, the life of a philosopher...). He arrived at that conclusion not entirely arbitrarily: he asked himself what is the thing that distinguishes human beings from every other species on earth, and he answered: the use of reason. From there the leap to the idea that reasoning — and therefore the contemplative life — is the ultimate state of happiness wasn’t that big after all. (It should be added that plenty of other cultural traditions arrived at similar conclusions starting from very different premises: think of the contemplative life of Buddhist monks, or of Christian hermits. Of course the types of contemplation, its sources and its objectives are different from Aristotle’s.)
Modern virtue ethicists tend to have a more expansive and more pluralist view of eudaimonia, recognizing that there are many paths (though not arbitrarily so) to human flourishing. The crucial point is that none of these goes through bad character: for a virtue ethicist, someone who achieves material gains by acting in an non-virtuous way is literally sick, morally speaking, and cannot possibly achieve eudaimonia, regardless of how many riches he accumulates, or how “happy” he tells you (or himself) he is. (As an analogy, think of a drug addict, his insistence that he is happy when experiencing a high, and your reasonable dismissal of his concept of happiness. He is sick, and part of his sickness is found in his delusion that he is happy.)
Another crucial thing to understand about virtue ethics is that there is no contradiction between seeking virtue for one’s own sake (because it’s the path to eudaimonia) and acting right towards other people: the virtues are other-directed, and the concept embeds the intriguing idea that — contra much philosophical and psychological literature — there is no opposition between seeking one’s own and other people’s good. One way to think of this is that for a utilitarian, for instance, a virtue may be good in that it brings about certain consequences rather than others; for a eudaimonicist virtue is good because it is a constituent of eudaimonia, which is good in itself. (Mull that one over for a minute.)
The second incarnation of modern virtue ethics is known as an agent-based account of virtue (as opposed to the agent-focused account of Aristotle and co.). Michael Slote has developed the most prominent of these accounts, whereby the evaluation of actions depends on the inner life of the agents performing those actions. Think of this as virtue ethics by example: instead of trying to identify virtues and then figure out if someone is a virtuous person, agent-based accounts begin with people whose actions are admirable and try to figure out which virtues make them so.
Lastly, we have the ethics of care approach to virtue ethics, which is rooted in feminist concepts. The basic idea is that concepts like justice and autonomy (the standard concerns of most moral philosophy) are “masculine,” and that it is better to focus on “feminine” concerns such as nurturing, self-sacrifice, etc.
As I said, I’m not particularly sympathetic to either of these last two views. In the first case because I find it rather circular to identify virtues by way of seeking admirable people, and because I find the idea of looking into people’s inner lives somewhat suspicious, even potentially quasi-mystical. In the second case, I simply don’t think that there are inherently masculine or feminine concepts or attitudes, and that both, say, justice and nurturing ought to be part of any discussion of ethics.
There is, naturally, a standard set of objections to virtue ethics, accompanied by a stock of basic replies. Let’s examine them briefly.
To begin with, there is the issue of virtue ethics’ self-centeredness (because it concerns the individual’s eudaimonia), which seems at odds with the very idea of ethics. We have already seen what the virtue ethicist’s response is: the virtues are other-regarding, so that there is no contradiction between the pursuit of self-interest and the requirements of ethics. Indeed, the two are one and the same.
Second, there is the fact that virtue ethics does not provide us with specific guidance for action. While deontologists can invoke, say, Kant’s categorical imperative, and utilitarians appeal to the utility principle, it seems like virtue ethics can accommodate many different ways of acting and being virtuous. Again, however, that is supposed to be one of the major advantages that virtue ethics has according to modern authors like Anscombe. This is sometimes known as the “uncodifiability of ethics” thesis, according to which ethics isn’t the sort of thing where one can apply a simple set of rules and be done with it. Also, virtue ethicists point out that their approach does provide action for guidance: you want to emulate virtuous persons and model your own actions and character after them.
Lastly, we come to the above mentioned problem posed by moral luck. If so many things that lie outside of an agent’s control (genetic lottery, parents, education, socio-economic circumstances, etc.) affect that agent’s character, and hence her chances of pursuing eudaimonia, in what sense can we say the agent is praiseworthy (or not)? The response is that, once again, this is the way things are, and it makes sense for an ethical theory to take into account the actual human condition, not an idealized version of it.
One more note: clearly a potentially problematic aspect of virtue ethics is the very concept of virtue. But this concept shows up in other ethical systems as well, although it plays a different role in different systems. For instance, Kant wrote quite a bit about virtue in works like the Metaphysics of Morals or Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. The major difference is that for Kant virtue is a struggle against the emotions, while for virtue ethicists the two are in harmony in the virtuous person. Consequentialists also appeal to virtue, of course not as something valuable in itself, but rather as a means toward achieving good consequences.
Next: contractarianism.

63 comments:

  1. That's a nice post, Massimo.

    "Also, virtue ethicists point out that their approach does provide action for guidance: you want to emulate virtuous persons and model your own actions and character after them."

    "As I said, I’m not particularly sympathetic to either of these last two views. In the first case because I find it rather circular to identify virtues by way of seeking admirable people, and because I find the idea of looking into people’s inner lives somewhat suspicious, even potentially quasi-mystical."

    Well, it is not a bad point to start I think. Actually,

    "Also, virtue ethicists point out that their approach does provide action for guidance: you want to emulate virtuous persons and model your own actions and character after them."

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  2. Two thoughts: another possible response to the Kantian who says the virtue ethicist has no guidance is that the Kantian is only pretending to have a guide. Everyone who applies the Categorical Imperative is using their imperfect imagination to "reason" what it would be like if everyone acted thusly.

    Second, it's somewhat related to moral luck, I suppose, but a little different - what do you have to say to those who question the existence of a stable moral character?

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  3. Oscar,

    not sure if you were trying to point to a contradiction between my quotes, but I don't think there is any. I find the idea of looking at "inner lives" quite fuzzy, while following people by example is perfectly obvious.

    Dude,

    > what do you have to say to those who question the existence of a stable moral character? <

    Precisely what you guessed: it's part of the idea of moral luck. Of course - barring actual pathologies - Aristotle would expect one's character to improve and become more stable over time, if that person has embraced virtue ethics.

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  4. Your readers might be interested in taking this handy little quiz to help figure out which of the three ethical philosophies described so far best fits them, based on answers to questions. Entirely tongue-in-cheek of course:

    http://goo.gl/HsL3P

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  5. After years of considering myself a utilitarian I came over to virtue ethics (in part because of many of the reasons Massimo brought up in his consequentialism post).

    "If so many things that lie outside of an agent’s control (genetic lottery, parents, education, socio-economic circumstances, etc.) affect that agent’s character, and hence her chances of pursuing eudaimonia, in what sense can we say the agent is praiseworthy (or not)? The response is that, once again, this is the way things are, and it makes sense for an ethical theory to take into account the actual human condition, not an idealized version of it."

    I think there's actually a better response than this. But it takes a larger exploration of the role of moral responsibility and blame and praise. But briefly, my thoughts are this: If we accept that people behave differently based on their neurophysiology at the present time (I like this short hand because it encompasses both genetics and experience), and we also accept that through interaction and experience neurophysiology can change, then we can say the following; Praise and blame serve a functional role in our interactions with others, to allow them to themselves develop into virtuous people. We are helping to give them the tools to achieve eudaimonia, while also at the same time ourselves developing or living the virtue of concern for the well being of others. Praise on this account serves to promote certain types of behaviours in the future, whether in the individual being praised, or in others who see the praise given and want to emulate for a variety of social/cognitive reasons.

    Massimo, you might get into the following when and if you get into metaethics, but it seems to me that the real difficulty is in providing justification for our virtues (this is a general problem in all ethical theories). In the end, virtues are really just labels we place on certain ways of being, certain human characteristics or processes of interacting with the world. It seems to me that virtues can only be virtues though, if they are in service of certain goals, and goals come about as a codification or reflection of our values (whether implicit or explicit). So what we really need to justify are our values.

    Someone in another thread some time back brought up Phillipa Foot's "morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives", and I think that segways nicely with this conversation...but again, the problem with that paper was that it never tried to address what justification we have for those imperatives. Otherwise moral skepticism rears its ugly head. I personally try to root these issues in general epistemological questions, and a recourse to biology. But it's not exactly an easy task!

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  6. Massimo, another great post. You could call this the virtues of "genius," riffing on the original Latin meaning of the word. That said, I'm surprise to see nary a mention of the great classical Greek word "arete" in the whole post.

    Beyond that? One caveat below, at end.

    @TheDude: Per Dan Dennett's use of the word, I consider Kant's categorical imperative, or any similar deontology, a skyhook.

    @Massimo: To follow my original comment on your utilitarianism post, I consider utilitarianism a GREAT ethical system for a party of one ... because there's no disagreement on how to rank different utilitarian standards, etc. But, no man is an island.

    @Massimo, re this post. My one larger caveat is that Aristotle's eudaimonism DOES have a "moral lodestone" behind it, per the claim that, say, a drug user simply cannot be flourishing. Perhaps that's relatively true, though not totally true, about a drug user. Nonetheless, Aristotle or another eudaimonist is making a "traditional" modern moral value judgment in making such a statement, and therefore not precisely practicing virtue ethics.

    The lesser caveat? Isn't it arguable that man being a social animal (Aristotle's famous, and famously mistranslated statement) rather than the use of reason, is his observation about what most separates us from other critters? Of course, other than the mistranslation as "political," as modern evolutionary biology shows, if meant to contrast man to other animals, it's wrong, but that's a story for another day.

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  7. @E.J., tongue in cheek aside, definitions on that quiz aren't very precise at times. What does the word "serious" mean in asking how "serious" each lie is?
    Second, the Clinton "is" issue, as presented, mentions nothing about the politicized background, therefore skewing answers. (I totally agree with "Aristotle" on cases 1 and 2 but not here.) That, to a degree, then, gets back to Massimo, and in what context should we consider what is virtuous living? How should we define virtuous progress? Don't we need virtue goals to do that?
    On question 4, again, background is omitted; in this case, the background that the Romans were likely to crucify the mass of slaves anyway. And, I disagree with the interpretation of both Kant and Aristotle here. Kant would have still called this a lie; Aristotle, with his views on slavery vis-a-vis certain humans and their nature, probably would have said slaves couldn't practice virtue ethics.

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  8. Greg,

    > It seems to me that virtues can only be virtues though, if they are in service of certain goals, and goals come about as a codification or reflection of our values (whether implicit or explicit). So what we really need to justify are our values. <

    Indeed. I have touched on this in the past (and in the first post of this series). Ultimately, our values are rooted in the fact that we are social biological beings of a certain kind (i.e., in "human nature"). But we also need reflective thinking to further elaborate on those roots, just like our ability to think mathematically brought us well beyond a simple natural ability to count into the realm of sophisticated mathematics.

    Gadfly,

    > I'm surprise to see nary a mention of the great classical Greek word "arete" in the whole post. <

    Yes, that was on purpose. I think modern virtue ethics stays away from the elitist / aristocratic concept of "excellence," and instead focuses on betterment of all individuals.

    > My one larger caveat is that Aristotle's eudaimonism DOES have a "moral lodestone" behind it, per the claim that, say, a drug user simply cannot be flourishing. <

    I see your point, and yet I think most people would agree - regardless of what sort of ethics they embrace - that a lifetime as a drug addict isn't conducive to flourishing.

    > Isn't it arguable that man being a social animal (Aristotle's famous, and famously mistranslated statement) rather than the use of reason, is his observation about what most separates us from other critters? <

    Plenty of other animals are social. I think the problem is that there isn't *one* thing that sets us apart (i.e., the defines human nature), but several, including the ability for reason, to empathize, and yes, to live in large and complex social groups.

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  9. Sorry Massimo, I completely forgot that that first post was on metaethics! I couldn't remember you specifically talking about values, but looking back, I realize this is in essence what you were talking about when discussing the assumptions of an ethical system. My bad!

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  10. Massimo, I was just confused. Maybe it was just because how it is written the text. But I wanted to point out that you answer the question yourself, like a rethorical question. Otherwise, there would be a contradiction between these statements:

    "As I said, I’m not particularly sympathetic to either of these last two views. In the first case because I find it rather circular to identify virtues by way of seeking admirable people"

    And then, you mention the answer that supporters or virtue ethics give:

    "Also, virtue ethicists point out that their approach does provide action for guidance: you want to emulate virtuous persons and model your own actions and character after them."

    Actually, if you look for examples on other people, are not you because looking into people’s inner life?

    Then, what is mystical? looking into your inner life? looking into other's life? or...
    is there a way to look for example or admire virtuous people without getting mystical? Maybe I put those things together, and I should not.

    Sorry for the misunderstanding...

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  11. "Also, virtue ethicists point out that their approach does provide action for guidance: you want to emulate virtuous persons and model your own actions and character after them."

    Oh really? You mean the way that you see someone else act with your physically and culturally biased, inherently incomplete perceptions and the way that you remember them acting with your flawed memory? Not to mention the things in your mental image of them that your pareidolia-loving brain makes up from whole cloth to fill in the gaps? That is what you should be using as a guide for action?

    I found your post to be somewhat nebulously tautological jumping as it did from eudaimonia, to virtue to good to flourishing without ever really defining any of those words in concrete terms. Seems like a loquacious way of saying situational ethics to me.

    I say that because it seems somewhat odd to me that the rarefied concept of eudaimonia would include such behaviors as intentionally bumping into people on the sidewalk who are doing something which you find irritating (i.e. walking while texting). Not to mention referring to those unwilling or unable to pursue philosophical learning as 'pigs' and saying that they are incapable of 'true' happiness (as proclaimed by a philosopher who is certainly not an disinterested objective party in that particular discussion). I am still quite curious as to when you spent time in the sty with the rest of us proles so that you can say that you have that perspective and your happiness is more 'true'.

    An aside here - the fellow who is happy but living in a world of illusion (wife loves him when she really doesn't etc) is just as happy as the man content with reality as long as he never finds out that he is wrong. If he dies before he discovers the error then he dies a happy man.

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  12. Massimo
    > "A virtue then,is a moral character trait that is admired in those people who have it."
    Does that mean that whether a person has a virtuous character or not is dependent upon whether or not others admire their character?

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  13. Massimo, I agree on the elitist value of "arete." Glad you're on the same page.

    On the "lodestone" issue, how do you address it within the context of virtue ethics, beyond simple acknowledgement that it exists?

    On the "social," tis true about other animals, but they don't have the linguistic facility we do. What I'm really getting at is that not just virtue ethics, but all three options so far, per Hume's dictum and beyond, seem to be missing an emotional component.

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  14. "An aside here - the fellow who is happy but living in a world of illusion (wife loves him when she really doesn't etc) is just as happy as the man content with reality as long as he never finds out that he is wrong. If he dies before he discovers the error then he dies a happy man."

    I think your point is valid...to a point. Our experience of the world is an internal interpretive phenomena. If someone is delusional, and feels that someone loves them, we can make an argument that they are in a similar internal neural state as someone who is actually loved. Many truths we feel know about other people and our interactions with those other people are really just our interpretations of those people.

    BUT, I think we can take your argument a step further, and say that the types of interactions that would be possible between two people who really love each other, and the type where that love doesn't really exist can be different. There is a *possible* configuration that the delusional person can conceivably be in, that may not be reachable in principle without the real interactive opportunities presented by the types behaviors that a person who really loved him would engage in.

    But I do agree that in principle, your argument is one that needs to be addressed.

    "What I'm really getting at is that not just virtue ethics, but all three options so far, per Hume's dictum and beyond, seem to be missing an emotional component."

    Gadfly, I think virtue ethics certainly has a place for the emotional component. Like I mentioned above, the trick would be to provide epistemological justification for that virtue or for the emotional aspect of some virtue.

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  15. Greg, I'm partially with you on the emotional component. But, Aristotle wasn't a prime promoter of emotional living.

    That said, also, E.J., hasn't dropped back in here to address my comment on Aristotle and slavery. Not to go "all Thameron" on Massimo, but, I'd like to hear his take on it. How "relativistic" is virtue ethics, given that its putative founder certainly had "relativistic" views of the intrinsic worth of different social classes of human beings?

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  16. Gadfly
    >"How "relativistic" is virtue ethics, given that its putative founder certainly had "relativistic" views of the intrinsic worth of different social classes of human beings?"
    All moral systems are relative. They are relative to cultures...to each individual in that culture, to different times and current circumstances for that culture, to the genetic makeup of each individual, to each person's upbringing, to each persons place on the hierarchy, and on and on. It is even relative to the amount of serotonin in each individual's brain. The search for an objective moral system is a lost cause. It is fool's gold.

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  17. Gadfly, isn't that precisely what's great about philosophy? We're not tied to every specific statement of what previous philosophers have said, while still respecting their ideas and pursuits broadly.

    I can't speak for Massimo, but it seems to me that we can say that while Aristotle had beliefs that were in error which affected his thinking and conclusions on certain issues, the broad framework and approach to morality that he set up is still relevant today.

    Also, I don't think virtue ethics is relativistic. I think you can make an objective statement (well, maybe if you had all the relevant knowledge) for any given situation, but that yes, you might make a different or seemingly contradictory statement in a different situation. What's wrong with saying that moral decisions are situation specific? That's the point of virtue ethics right? That it's not a list of objective moral statements, but rather a set of processes and ways of interacting and coming to decisions, which we give the label of "virtues" to when these decision making processes and ways of interacting in the world are codified or exemplified through the decisions and actions of people.

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  18. Oscar,

    > if you look for examples on other people, are not you because looking into people’s inner life? <

    Well, you'd be looking at what they are doing, which presumably is a reflection of their "inner life" (whatever that is), but not at the latter directly. As for the connection between virtues and examples of virtuous people, I'd say that we need to think about what character traits are virtuous, then look for people with those traits and see what they do. There is a difference between a list of virtues and a list of (virtuous) actions.

    Thameron,

    > Oh really? You mean the way that you see someone else act with your physically and culturally biased, inherently incomplete perceptions and the way that you remember them acting with your flawed memory? Not to mention the things in your mental image of them that your pareidolia-loving brain makes up from whole cloth to fill in the gaps? <

    What are you after, a theory of ethics that is independent of human biases and frailties? Good luck with that.

    > jumping as it did from eudaimonia, to virtue to good to flourishing without ever really defining any of those words in concrete terms. Seems like a loquacious way of saying situational ethics to me. <

    I think you see more nebulosity than there is in the post, particularly since I've touched in several other places on eudaimonia. If by "situational" you mean that the right thing to do cannot be described by a simple rule, then yes, but the concept of virtue ethics is much more sophisticated than that.

    > I am still quite curious as to when you spent time in the sty with the rest of us proles so that you can say that you have that perspective and your happiness is more 'true'. <

    I'm not sure why you are taking this so seriously, but I grew up in a middle class family and have had friends (and still have relatives) who live an unreflective life, hardly ask any questions, don't read newspaper and the like. So, yes, I've experienced both, and Mill was right on that account.

    > the fellow who is happy but living in a world of illusion (wife loves him when she really doesn't etc) is just as happy as the man content with reality as long as he never finds out that he is wrong. If he dies before he discovers the error then he dies a happy man. <

    You are missing the point. He would still be pitied by most people because his entire life was a lie.

    Gadfly,

    > not just virtue ethics, but all three options so far, per Hume's dictum and beyond, seem to be missing an emotional component. <

    I disagree, virtue ethics incorporates human psychology, and explicitly human emotions. Indeed, some virtue ethicists use Hume's, rather than Aristotle's, conception of ethics.

    I thought I addressed the lodestone issue earlier, and see also my more recent comment to Thameron.

    > on Aristotle and slavery. Not to go "all Thameron" on Massimo, but, I'd like to hear his take on it. How "relativistic" is virtue ethics, given that its putative founder certainly had "relativistic" views of the intrinsic worth of different social classes of human beings? <

    Nobody is trying to make Aristotle (or anyone else) the beginning and end of all wisdom. Jefferson abhorred slavery, yet owned slaves. That's why modern virtue ethics is a (sophisticated) elaboration of the original version. You know, philosophy makes progress...

    DJD,

    > Does that mean that whether a person has a virtuous character or not is dependent upon whether or not others admire their character? <

    Not any more than whether someone is a good chess player depends on whether people admire his skills. People admire his skills *because* he is a good chess player.

    > The search for an objective moral system is a lost cause. It is fool's gold. <

    As in the past, you confuse objective with universal. There are no universal moral truths, there is objective moral reasoning.

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  19. Massimo
    > "Massimo is exploring and trying to clarify his own ideas "about what IS right and wrong", and why he thinks so."
    >"As in the past, you confuse objective with universal. There are no universal moral truths, there is objective moral reasoning.

    Your first statement suggests that you are trying to determine what you think is right and wrong, NOT merely demonstrating "objective reasoning". So again...I must ask for a response to my previous statement regarding the fact that there is no objective right or wrong. And "objective reasoning" is sterile if it does produce a conclusion....in this case...a conclusion regarding what IS right and wrong.

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  20. DJD,

    didn't we have this conversation already? I explained several times that what I mean by "right" and "wrong" is not some mystical universal truth, but simply the conditional truth that IF we wish to increase human well being / flourishing etc. THEN certain attitudes and courses of action are rational (as in instrumental rationality) and others aren't. That's objective reasoning, in my book.

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  21. Hey Massimo,

    What about Cyrenaicism?

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  22. Massimo
    >"IF we wish to increase human well being / flourishing etc. THEN certain attitudes and courses of action are rational (as in instrumental rationality) and others aren't.
    Firstly...You have identified a goal..meaningless at face value....that at some point you will need to articulate what is, and what is not "human flourishing". At that point, your named properties that you consider examples of human flourishing will become relative....non-objective goals. Until then, any attempt at discovering "rationally", the instruments for attainment is not possible. When it does become possible, the instrumental means that you discover and articulate will also not be objectively moral means....they too will be relative to all the entities that I previously mentioned. The only thing "rational" about the
    discovery of the means will be in a narrow, linear logic language game. The means will be relative to each of the other means...and relative morally to others. They may be in rational in that they each individually may logically or reasonably produce a specific identified outcome...but not objective or reasonable within the coherent system or with any additional consequences that they produce beyond the stipulated goal. The system, once it is fleshed-out, will reveal that it is as relative and non-objective as any other existing moral systems. And for the same reasons.

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  23. The questions "what IS moral or immoral"? "Or what IS virtuous" are being replaced with "what do we do with morals" and "what causes us to attribute virtue" and "what is the value of our values"?
    It no longer even makes sense to a growing number of philosophers to even ask "what is moral and what is not" Moral words are seen as speech acts. To understand morality without seeing it as something we are "doing" or trying to do when we assert moral propositions....in real life....in ordinary interactions....or in acts of rhetoric aimed at condemnation, praise, persuasion, etc. misses the function and evolution of moral language.

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  24. Attlee
    > "What about Cyrenaicism?"
    You have introduced another element of relativism into the subject of values. The time element. Is right now "better" than "later". The question of "what should one do" now carries choices about how far into the future we should be concerned about, just as the "ethic of care" includes the question of how far out the concentric circles of care should be considered when deciding "what to do"

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  25. Massimo ... agreed again, in general. That said, I wish you had incorporated more Hume and less Aristotle into your presentation of virtue ethics. Tis true that philosophical study evolves, so why not go with more evolved thought where applicable?

    DJD ... agreed that nothing is 100 percent absolute. That said, compared to, say, consequentialism, *how much* less relativistic is virtue ethics? And, given an Aristotle ... or a Kant with objectivism, on matters of ethical systems, how unfair ... or how fair ... is it to make reference to personal ethical issues of the founder/progenitor? (After all, not all classical Greeks were as unenlightened in some ways as Aristotle, though he was surely in the majority.)

    In light of that, Massimo, your answer to DJD citing chess was a non sequitur. It wasn't
    talking about the rules of chess and cheating, so it had no relevance to ethics. Skill (unless acquired unethically, like steroids in baseball) is value-neutral.

    So, where I'm coming from is that ... Aristotle's version of value ethics, at least, *should* be judged in part on the basis of Aristotle the person. That's yet another reason, isn't it, to lean more on Hume and less on Aristotle on this issue? (Not to mention, per your comment, that Hume was, in essence, the father of modern psychology in some ways.)

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  26. Massimo -

    Owen Flanagan has a good account of virtue ethics in his book, The Problem of the Soul - specifically the chapter "Ethics as Human Ecology."

    Have you read it?

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  27. In some peer groups, a person that can beat up others efficiently is a respected. It is a virtue to be able to beat up others. The person is thus seen as having a virtuous ability and character.
    Other peer groups (nerds) would not see him as virtuous.

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  28. DJD, both Massimo and I discussed above how our values, from which we craft our goals, by which we judge what types of behaviour are virtuous, can be grounded in evolution/biology and epistemology/reasoning.

    Any of these theories are only relativistic in so far as their metaethical base hasn't been unpacked.

    "So, where I'm coming from is that ... Aristotle's version of value ethics, at least, *should* be judged in part on the basis of Aristotle the person. That's yet another reason, isn't it, to lean more on Hume and less on Aristotle on this issue?"

    Gadfly, but Aristotle the person was who he was due in no small part to the environmental context he was embedded in, the sociocultural context if you will. He was working in some cases with a false set of assumptions and presuppositions that he wasn't aware of. Yes, we should be aware of that, and determine to what degree, if any, that affects our warrant for accepting his theory. But I don't think that it should automatically cause us to jump ship to Hume.*

    *Caveat, I'm not very familiar with Hume's ethical ideas.

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  29. DJD, very good point on "flourishing." Isn't that actually a utilitarian ethics value, with individuals defining for themselves what "flourishing" is?

    That was one of the biggest complaints I had against The IMmoral Landscape - Harris never defined what flourishing meant to him. That said, he was clearly writing from a utilitarian, not virtue ethics, position.

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  30. Attlee,

    > What about Cyrenaicism? <

    Far too much emphasis on hedonism. If anything, I prefer the Epicurean approach that replaced them.

    DJD,

    if you want a serious analysis of flourishing / well being, start here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being/#WelBeiVir

    The point that you keep missing is that it is an advantage of virtue ethics precisely not too define flourishing strictly. Yes, there are many paths to it which people can take. No, these are not infinite (e.g., they all include health, education, protection from physical harm, the freedom to pursue one's interests, etc.). So the idea is neither meaningless nor "relative" (whatever that means, in this context).

    Juno,

    > The Problem of the Soul - specifically the chapter "Ethics as Human Ecology." <

    Have not read it, thanks for the reference.

    Gadfly,

    > I wish you had incorporated more Hume and less Aristotle into your presentation of virtue ethics. Tis true that philosophical study evolves, so why not go with more evolved thought where applicable? <

    Because I find Hume's account to add relatively little, and hence be secondary, to that of standard virtue ethics. Incidentally, note that I actually concentrated on modern virtue ethics, not so much on Aristotle.

    > on "flourishing." Isn't that actually a utilitarian ethics value, with individuals defining for themselves what "flourishing" is? <

    No, the concept of eudaimonia is entirely distinct from the utilitarian idea of happiness. The latter is the goal of ethics, the former *is* intrinsically ethical, it is a way to be. Besides, virtue ethics isn't about maximization, it is about personal pursuit, a quest for self-improvement.

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  31. Gadfly
    >"DJD, very good point on "flourishing." Isn't that actually a utilitarian ethics value, with individuals defining for themselves what "flourishing" is?"
    I agree. It seems to be a theory that describes how a person or persons can identify a a desired goal....and then discover various instrumental means to achieving that goal. For example...A group decide they want to cross a river...they then come up with ideas about how best to accomplish this goal....what types of actions would be instrumental in getting them across the river. This is more akin to practical reasoning than it is to moral reasoning.

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  32. Greg
    >"DJD, both Massimo and I discussed above how our values, from which we craft our goals, by which we judge what types of behaviour are virtuous, can be grounded in evolution/biology and epistemology/reasoning."
    Yes..I agree. Everything we do or think is grounded in our evolution/biology and learning/reasoning, as well as the situation in which we find ourselves in terms of our relative status and economic condition, etc. So...those forces explain that a particular peer peer group may come to see some behaviors or abilities as virtuous, where another peer group would not. A person becoming a member of the peer group becomes aware of these peer group values, if they are not already. Their evolutionary/biological determined need for respect, admiration,acceptance, and status within the group causes them to gravitate to internalize those values and act on those perceived values in order to achieve their goals....which are acceptance, respect, admiration, and status, among other needs and desires (goals). So...virtue ethics must include an understanding of how virtues and values work AND why their are so many different virtues that individuals and peer groups differ about.

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  33. Massimo
    >"No, these are not infinite (e.g., they all include health, education, protection from physical harm, the freedom to pursue one's interests, etc.)."
    Firstly, it is difficult to differentiate whether, for instance, "education" is part of the goal (human flourishing), or one of the instrumental means of achieving, let's say, "freedom to pursue one's interests" And, "the ability to protect oneself from physical harm", may be best attained by embracing the peer group's values...including those virtues that would cause one to be respected and held high in status within the group. like being very capable at winning fights.) This is what I mean by 'relative'.

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  34. "So...virtue ethics must include an understanding of how virtues and values work AND why their are so many different virtues that individuals and peer groups differ about."

    Sure, are you saying virtue ethics cannot do this? The fact that we can make a descriptive statement about the many different value systems in the world doesn't argue against virtue ethics in any way. It just says that we can't just posit virtue ethics alone without also doing the metaethical exploration of justification for virtues/goals/values.

    This is needed in whichever ethical system you subscribe to, whether consequentialism or deontology or whatever. Some consequentialist goals may be hedonistic, or about bring about the most pain. Some deontological systems may have duties that involve torturing and murdering babies. The system may not contain contradictions, but itself be based on assumptions that we don't have warrant for, or that are in error.

    Or am I misunderstanding your point?

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  35. DJD,

    > it is difficult to differentiate whether, for instance, "education" is part of the goal (human flourishing), or one of the instrumental means of achieving <

    You keep not taking virtue ethics seriously, I think. Education is an integral part of eudaimonia, so that distinction does not apply.

    > "the ability to protect oneself from physical harm", may be best attained by embracing the peer group's values <

    Again, no, because the virtuous person would be able to recognize non eudaimonic values within the group and reject them.

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  36. Greg
    >"The fact that we can make a descriptive statement about the many different value systems in the world doesn't argue against virtue ethics in any way."
    Just as naturalistic understanding and description of the forces that account for human behavior (and character) have eroded belief in free will, blameworthiness, and praiseworthiness, so too, the understanding of and description of the forces that account for the virtuizing of character and behavior, understanding the etiology of virtues, can effect way we value or posit virtues....or if whether we continue understand them in the ethical/moral way we do now....or simply in a matter of fact behavioral engineering way.This is all part of Metaethical exploration and could result in a change in the way we attempt to justify them. We may justify them in much more practical, pragmatic terms.

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  37. greg
    >"Some consequentialist goals may be hedonistic, or about bring about the most pain. Some deontological systems may have duties that involve torturing and murdering babies. The system may not contain contradictions, but itself be based on assumptions that we don't have warrant for, or that are in error.
    Or am I misunderstanding your point?"
    Yes you are. My point is that with a better understanding of the causes and etiology of our virtuizing behavior, and a naturalistic account of what explains the choices we make, would likely remove the need for the type of "justification" that many feel the need for....as well as the "warrants" you suggest are needed. The conversation would change. We would talk about what virtues might be encouraged, as a practical matter, that would be "instrumental" in delivering the goals that we might agree to pursue...and perhaps develop a science of what virtues work best for whom and why...and what forces account for the behaviors or characters that each person, each peer group, each interest group, end up embracing as virtuous (or moral).
    We would realize that there was no ethereal model or universal goal we can call upon to justify or invalidate. They just are. We would become potential social engineers rather than moral philosophers.

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  38. Massimo
    >"Again, no, because the virtuous person would be able to recognize non eudaimonic values within the group and reject them."
    Only if they adhere to Aristotle's eudaimonic ethics. Why would they do that? There is no justification for doing so. Why would one desire be and act "virtuous" as determined by Aristotle? Would value would that have for the individual that did so? Make him feel prideful?
    Make him feel superior to others?

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  39. Greg
    >"It just says that we can't just posit virtue ethics alone without also doing the metaethical exploration of justification for virtues/goals/values."
    Please give an example of a possible "justification" for "virtues/goals/values....That would make more clear to me what you are getting at.

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  40. "Please give an example of a possible "justification" for "virtues/goals/values....That would make more clear to me what you are getting at."

    Let me answer this last one and hopefully clarify a bit of what's referenced in your other posts along the way.

    I don't think I would say that virtues have some sort of real ontological nature. I think virtues are labels we put on, ascriptions we give, to certain collections of behaviors, or dispositions towards certain types of behavior. I see virtues as labels we give to bundles of human characteristics, cognitive and behavioral processes. So it's not really "the virtue" that I would want to promote, but really the more fundamental processes of interaction, while using the useful shorthand of "virtue" for ease of communication. Similarly to how I consider myself a proponent of evolutionary epistemology (temporal interactive process of variation and selection), but have a lot of sympathy for virtue epistemology as a higher level abstraction of this lower level process.

    So, if these processes of interacting can only be labeled virtues if they are in service of goals, and those goals are the codification of values, I want to say that we need justification for those values, to ultimately say that those processes of interaction (virtues) are in fact the "right" ones, or in my preferred terminology, ways of interacting that avoid error.

    I mentioned that I ground this in evolution/biology. So there are a few important grounding points. The first is simply the pleasure/plain distinction. The second is the nature of our emotional systems, specifically the felt quality of emotions, and the neurophysiological changes that occur as the result of emotions (I subscribe to the stance that emotions evolved sort of as heuristics for behavior). The third is in the social nature of our evolutionary history. Avoiding pain, engaging and promoting positive emotions, and certain social ways of interacting are ontologically more fulfilling than other ways of being. There are possibly others as well, such as the puzzle solving and pattern recognition benefits of our evolutionary history which I think make certain rational and intellectual pursuits ontologically fulfilling as well.

    So what I argue is basically that human beings have certain biological and psychological constraints on ways in which we can be in positive states and ways in which we can be in negative states. We can be in error, or not, of our own basic ontology. And so our values must at the very least respect these facts.

    So while yes, given the differences in human psychology and human neurophysiology, there might be different ways of interacting to promote "flourishing", I would argue there are constraints on how varied these ways of interacting can or should be.

    There are other things that need filling in here of course, and other things I didn't mention, but that's the basic gist I think.

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  41. I should also caveat my response by pointing out that I'm not speaking for Massimo. He might disagree with everything I said!

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  42. DJD,

    > Only if they adhere to Aristotle's eudaimonic ethics. Why would they do that? <

    Because eudaimonia is what human beings strive for, whether they realize it or not. And if they purposely work against it, then they are sick, according to Aristotle, they are beings who go against their nature.

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  43. Greg
    Thank you you for that very articulate description of your views on this subject.
    I have been trying to understand as clearly as I can what you have written.It seems that you are talking about behavior and predispositions for certain behavior. And...that only the behaviors and predispositions are instrumental in achieving our goals, which you identify primarily as "positive emotions", should be considered "virtuous" behavior. Are seeing this in terms of individual behaviors that maximize their own goals, or individual behaviors that maximize others' goals, collective behaviors that maximize collective goals?
    When you speak of the "social nature" of our evolutionary history and promoting "positive emotions", do you men behavior that promotes other's positive emotions....or behavior that promotes our own positive emotions that we experience when we promote others positive emotions because evolution so designed us?
    How does knowledge of our evolutionary past and our resulting biology help improve our knowledge of what works and does not that we witness emperically....knowledge that has accumulated over centuries? Can you suggest an example?
    Thanks for helping me clarify my thoughts on this subject.

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  44. Massimo...
    Even if we assume Aristotle's version of eudaimonia is the best version...how do you see knowledge of evolution/biology help us improve on what we have already learned emperically regarding the behavior that does or does not produce eudaimonia. We see the fruits of our emperical past in the current tastes and desires that we have...that when acted upon instrumentally produces eudaimoni. How could it be otherwise. You get what you see. Evolved
    tastes and behaviors that are "designed" to promote our evolutionary goals. Or, are you less interested in the goals and more interested in using the fullfilment of our proximate desires, tastes, as the goal of eudaimonics?

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  45. "It seems that you are talking about behavior and predispositions for certain behavior."

    In general, yes. Do you have a radically different definition of "virtue" that would contradict this sort of idea? So maybe you would say the following count as virtues: honesty, patience, intellectual curiosity, empathy, consideration for the consequences of your actions, etc...I would say those are all useful shorthands that we've come up with to describe more fundamental ways of interacting with the world, of orienting yourself towards the world. Behaving in certain ways and being disposed to behave in certain ways.

    "And...that only the behaviors and predispositions are instrumental in achieving our goals, which you identify primarily as "positive emotions", should be considered "virtuous" behavior"

    I wouldn't say "positive emotions" is primary, I think it's part and parcel with avoiding pain and seeking pleasure, certain aspects of social behavior, and the pattern recognition stuff I spoke about (think the "aha moment"). But I can see how you can argue that all of those things have a felt quality to them and could conceivably all fall under positive emotions.

    "Are seeing this in terms of individual behaviors that maximize their own goals, or individual behaviors that maximize others' goals, collective behaviors that maximize collective goals?"

    Well given the nature of consciousness and what seems to be the point of virtue ethics, I would say this is about maximizing your own goals. About a process of self development. Of becoming virtuous. It would seem to me that all actions by definition stem from self interest (not to be confused with the idea that all actions are selfish). So even the most seemingly altruistic acts, where I engage in an action for the benefit of others at the expense of myself in some way, I believe comes from self interest. Whether it's because it makes you happy, or because you believe it's right, or because you just couldn't bear to act in any other way.

    This ties in with your next question about sociality. We have this social nature in our primate evolutionary history that I believe makes certain ways of interacting more ontologically fulfilling, in terms of ways of interacting with family, and friends, and loved ones, with our tribes and groups, and hopefully eventually we can widen this net of compassion to embrace all of humanity. Had we not had this part of our evolutionary history...well, you might want to argue that social evolution is necessary for language and intelligence and higher order consciousness to arise...but the point is, without this feature of our evolutionary history, and thus our neurophysiology, these ways of interacting would not be inherently fulfilling. Mcuh of the reason we find pleasure and meaning in connecting with other, in loving other people, would not be possible without this evolutionary history. So, in the end everything stems from and is in service to promoting our own positive emotions, understanding that promoting positive states and emotions in others serves to further promote positive states in us.

    "How does knowledge of our evolutionary past and our resulting biology help improve our knowledge of what works and does not that we witness emperically....knowledge that has accumulated over centuries? Can you suggest an example?"

    I think information from evolution and biology provides internal constraints and boundary conditions on our theories of ethics. I think from there we need science and philosophy to determine empirically what works and doesn't within those constraints. I mean, how can it not inform ethics? If I hit someone over the head with a hammer repeatedly because I think it will help them feel good, I'm ignoring facts about our biology, which are the way they are because of our evolutionary history.

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  46. DJD,

    I actually don't think we can learn much from evolutionary biology in this case. Biology sets the broader limits of human nature, but as Hume pointed out, human nature changes in response to what we today would call cultural evolution.

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  47. Greg
    >" Do you have a radically different definition of "virtue" that would contradict this sort of idea? So maybe you would say the following count as virtues: honesty, patience, intellectual curiosity, empathy, consideration for the consequences of your actions,etc."
    They are examples of what someone might count as virtues....behavior dispositions that serve our interest and produce pleasure, but I have never thought of behaviors that serve my own interests and increase my pleasure as a subject of virtue. Merely practical identification of behaviors that "work". Calling behaviors that we find will serve our interests and increase our
    pleasure "virtuous" valorizes them, blesses them with some sort of "sacred" imprimiture that is not necessary. I have always viewed virtues and ideals as being generated by and dependent upon our social groups. They are handed down in our group over generations, but they can change from time to time depending upon the perceived needs and desires of the group. The individual then internalizes these virtues through inculcation and example by their parents, teachers and eventually their peer groups and role models. So...the ideals and virtues originate with the group....and we internalize them and seek to demonstrate them to the members of our social groups/peer groups. we do this because our evolutionary determined biology is structured so that we seek approval, respect, and status within our peer groups or society. The internalized virtues exist because those behaviors are the behaviors that our group sees as virtuous behaviors. They generally serve the interest of the group, or sometimes are simply respected. So....I cannot conceive of virtue as a personal matter....except that after internalizing our groups ideals....we begin to think of them as "our" ideals. This tendency seems to also be an evolved trait that ends up serving our own interest....although it usually ends up also serving the interests of the group. If it did not, that ideal or virtue would likely not exist as a virtue. And...the behavior is only "virtuous" because the group has so determined.
    If one decides to try and figure out what behaviors that he shall see as virtuous, without any consideration for what the group has determined to be virtuous, I know of no way to accomplish this except by identifying what behavior best serves their own interest..how to increase their own pleasure, without any need for approval by the group, but at this point, why call these behaviors virtuous? Otherwise, I suppose one could choose a role model to copy...but on what grounds would one base their choice of role models. Someone we admire? But, why do we admire them? Because others admire them? It becomes circular.

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  48. Massimo
    >"I actually don't think we can learn much from evolutionary biology in this case. Biology sets the broader limits of human nature, but as Hume pointed out, human nature changes in response to what we today would call cultural evolution."
    Does this hold for the moral system that you seek to develop or discover?

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  49. DJD,

    I'm not as ambitious as trying to discover or develop a moral system. I'm just trying to clarify my own thoughts about the panoply of proposals already out there.

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  50. "but I have never thought of behaviors that serve my own interests and increase my pleasure as a subject of virtue."

    "I have always viewed virtues and ideals as being generated by and dependent upon our social groups."

    "The internalized virtues exist because those behaviors are the behaviors that our group sees as virtuous behaviors."

    I don't think these are in contradiction. I think it's a sort of short sighted view of what I was getting at about self interest above. Virtues can be handed down by the group, and be in service to the group, but it is the individual in the end that must choose to behave in such a way that exemplifies that virtue or not. And the reasons for that choice necessarily stem from self interest. Sure, it might be handed down by the group, relayed by your parent, but the reason to take it to heart is why? Because you love your parent and you want to make them happy? Because you believe what they tell you? Because you're afraid of what they might do if you don't? Because you want to be liked by your peers? Because you don't want to be shamed? Because you care about their well being and flourishing? Whatever the answer, whatever amount of external justification you provide, in the end it is an internal reason that the decision stems from (this can often times be implicit, and does not have to be an explicitly defined reason).

    I might disagree with what specific things you deem to be the best virtues, but if you want to define them all by the benefit provided to the group, that's fine. I don't think it contradicts anything I've said. I'm trying to get at fundamental aspects about the nature of consciousness and mental content. About how cognition happens and where behavior stems from. About the nature of how decisions are made. You seem to be talking more about the justification for which virtues to embody. But like I mentioned above, all the external justification in the world still needs to be filtered through an internal cognitive process. So I fundamentally root these matters in an internal perspective, because it is that internal process that needs to embrace the external nature of these virtues.

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  51. "Virtues can be handed down by the group, and be in service to the group, but it is the individual in the end that must choose to behave in such a way that exemplifies that virtue or not. And the reasons for that choice necessarily stem from self interest."
    Yes, but at the same time, no. We are more interested in being trusted by the group, whether we deserve to be or not, than in finding ways to trust ourselves to successfully fool and fit in at the same time.
    Group trust determines self-trust much more often than the reverse.

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  52. Greg
    >" Whatever the answer, whatever amount of external justification you provide, in the end it is an internal reason that the decision stems from ..."
    >" You seem to be talking more about the justification for which virtues to embody.

    No...I am not trying to "justify" anything. I am being purely descriptive. I am not talking about
    "justification for which virtues to embody."
    I am describing the forces that cause us to "embody" (I guess you men 'embrace') some virtues and not others.
    >"So I fundamentally root these matters in an internal perspective"
    That "internal perspective" is greatly determined by all of those external forces AND your genetic/biological make-up.

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  53. Greg
    >"I might disagree with what specific things you deem to be the best virtues, but if you want to define them all by the benefit provided to the group, that's fine." I am not defining them. I am
    describing how they tend to to come about and then are passed along to generation after generation.The phenomena of "internalization" goes a long way towards individuals believing that the particular "virtues" that they embrace are their own creations, their own choosing, etc.

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  54. Baron
    >"Yes, but at the same time, no. We are more interested in being trusted by the group, whether we deserve to be or not"
    I couldn't agree more.

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  55. "Yes, but at the same time, no. We are more interested in being trusted by the group, whether we deserve to be or not, than in finding ways to trust ourselves to successfully fool and fit in at the same time.
    Group trust determines self-trust much more often than the reverse."

    That doesn't contradict my point Baron.

    DJD (and Baron), we're veering away from the moral issues here and getting into issues of consciousness and mental content. Even if what you're doing is a purely descriptive endeavor, my points still stand. What you are describing are the causal interactive processes that affect the decision making and behavior processes of an individual (or an organism if we want to get more fundamental). I agree with that description. I am taking that description one step further, and pointing out that "contact" with the environment does not equal "content" about the environment (or at least I am arguing for that position, I know there are a large class of philosophers who argue that mental content is entirely external). I am NOT arguing that these choices and decisions and embracements of virtues happen internally in a void separate from the environment and external influences. I am arguing that when we have a more comprehensive theory of persons and self, and consciousness and mental content, we have to address that difference I mention between content and contact.

    A choice happening in the present (or any behavior) necessarily stems from your current neurophysiological state. The reason your are in that state is in LARGE part due to your environmental interactions over time, to external factors, but the behavior itself stems from internal processes. That is what I mean by self interest. Any action stems from the internal processes of the organism engaging in it.

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  56. Greg
    >"Group trust determines self-trust much more often than the reverse."
    What is "self-trust"?
    >""contact" with the environment does not equal "content" about the environment"
    What does this mean and what it's significance?
    >" but the behavior itself stems from internal processes."
    Of course. All behavior stems from the brain's processing.You must mean more.
    >"That is what I mean by self interest. Any action stems from the internal processes of the organism engaging in it."
    I agree that any action stems from the brain's processing. I disagree that this is a definition of, or description of, "self interest"

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  57. If all organisms have (as seems likely) evolved to consider the choice that most benefits the group as superior to the choice that most benefits themselves, they have in effect learned to benefit the group as the best way to benefit themselves.

    So if the argument was that the individual nevertheless in some fashion weighs its interests against that of the group, it doesn't do so with any serious expectation of going counter to what the group would have in the end required from it.

    And while these expectations may apply in a lesser degree to humans than to other species, they still tend to govern our predominately less than conscious cognitive processes.

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  58. @Greg
    "I am taking that description one step further, and pointing out that "contact" with the environment does not equal "content" about the environment (or at least I am arguing for that position, I know there are a large class of philosophers who argue that mental content is entirely external)."

    The mental content assesses the external experience and reacts strategically internally according to what its evolution as a social species has taught it to decide to do in that external situation. And in one way or another, all organisms have evolved according to those social dictates of their species.

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  59. I'm late for the party, as usual... And lost, as you'll see below. :-)

    for a virtue ethicist, someone who achieves material gains by acting in an non-virtuous way is literally sick, morally speaking, and cannot possibly achieve eudaimonia, regardless of how many riches he accumulates, or how “happy” he tells you (or himself) he is.

    Sounds like the "no true Scotsman" fallacy to me, not convincing at all. It is defining eudaimonia externally to the "bad guy", when it seems to me it should be internal to each person (even if similar amongst different people from the same culture). Why can't he feel truly happy/flourished/"eudaimonic", at least in his opinion? Does anything else count, if the goal is to achieve eudaimonia?

    Saying that someone "cannot possibly achieve eudaimonia" by doing so-and-so sounds like, say, what some conservative people say when they are criticizing gay people (I've seen that happen). They say such people only "seem" happy and fulfilled, but inside (or I've ever heard some say you can "see it deep in their eyes" or something stupid like that) they they are empty and blah, blah... Not at all associating any of you guys here with such moralists, of course, just giving a provocative (and maybe misguided?) analogy, heh.

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  60. J,

    > Sounds like the "no true Scotsman" fallacy to me, not convincing at all. <

    I hereby introduce a new fallacy: the "sounds like the true Scotsman fallacy" fallacy.

    > It is defining eudaimonia externally to the "bad guy", when it seems to me it should be internal to each person <

    It is, but remember that virtue ethics (like, actually, many other ethical theory) is also based on a theory of human nature, so it can't be only internal.

    > Why can't he feel truly happy/flourished/"eudaimonic", at least in his opinion? <

    He can, but he can be wrong, as the example of the drug addict clearly (and, I would hope, uncontroversially) shows.

    > what some conservative people say when they are criticizing gay people (I've seen that happen). They say such people only "seem" happy and fulfilled, but inside (or I've ever heard some say you can "see it deep in their eyes" or something stupid like that) they they are empty and blah, blah... <

    And they are wrong. But it doesn't follow that one cannot reasonably say that a person is not happy even though he thinks he is. Again, drug addict.

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  61. Massimo, you neglected some pretty important virtue ethics texts and schools of thought here. Eg, the Bhagavad Gita. The Greeks were not the only ancient philosophers.

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  62. Joanna,

    I try to stick to writing about things I actually know something about...

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  63. I hereby introduce a new fallacy: the "sounds like the true Scotsman fallacy" fallacy.

    Touché... :-)

    He can, but he can be wrong, as the example of the drug addict clearly (and, I would hope, uncontroversially) shows.

    Hm, don't know. Sure, it is not controversial that the drug addict is mistaken, and it initially seems like a compelling analogy with the case of the "successful asshole" (or SA), to coin an elegant technical term... But then again, can a case of brain poisoning be meaningfully compared with the SA's case? It does not seem right to me, at least. So, yes, while it is conceivable to think of a case where people think they are happy when they are actually not, I still don't see how I could justify saying that the SA is not actually, really happy, while criticizing the gay-haters who say the same thing about gay people.

    I guess I have to re-read your posts and think more about it... If I had time to read some books on it, that surely would help, but too many other, more vital things on my reading list right now. Bugger.

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