tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post38470079559570915..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: On ethics, part IV: Virtue ethicsUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger63125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-24046417423752963982011-08-29T21:52:47.053-04:002011-08-29T21:52:47.053-04:00I hereby introduce a new fallacy: the "sounds...<b>I hereby introduce a new fallacy: the "sounds like the true Scotsman fallacy" fallacy.</b><br /><br />Touché... :-)<br /><br /><b>He can, but he can be wrong, as the example of the drug addict clearly (and, I would hope, uncontroversially) shows.</b><br /><br />Hm, don't know. Sure, it is not controversial that the drug addict is mistaken, and it initially seems like a compelling analogy with the case of the "successful asshole" (or SA), to coin an elegant technical term... But then again, can a case of brain poisoning be meaningfully compared with the SA's case? It does not seem right to me, at least. So, yes, while it is conceivable to think of a case where people think they are happy when they are actually not, I still don't see how I could justify saying that the SA is not <b>actually, really</b> happy, while criticizing the gay-haters who say the same thing about gay people. <br /><br />I guess I have to re-read your posts and think more about it... If I had time to read some books on it, that surely would help, but too many other, more vital things on my reading list right now. Bugger.J. Marcelo Alveshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09967299561849915314noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-61782833247126727272011-08-29T17:12:37.762-04:002011-08-29T17:12:37.762-04:00Joanna,
I try to stick to writing about things I ...Joanna,<br /><br />I try to stick to writing about things I actually know something about...Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-18333587677067646372011-08-29T15:03:40.662-04:002011-08-29T15:03:40.662-04:00Massimo, you neglected some pretty important virtu...Massimo, you neglected some pretty important virtue ethics texts and schools of thought here. Eg, the Bhagavad Gita. The Greeks were not the only ancient philosophers.Joanna Maselhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14213528673854230496noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-76573991035765395332011-08-29T09:14:24.219-04:002011-08-29T09:14:24.219-04:00J,
> Sounds like the "no true Scotsman&qu...J,<br /><br />> Sounds like the "no true Scotsman" fallacy to me, not convincing at all. <<br /><br />I hereby introduce a new fallacy: the "sounds like the true Scotsman fallacy" fallacy.<br /><br />> It is defining eudaimonia externally to the "bad guy", when it seems to me it should be internal to each person <<br /><br />It is, but remember that virtue ethics (like, actually, many other ethical theory) is also based on a theory of human nature, so it can't be only internal.<br /><br />> Why can't he feel truly happy/flourished/"eudaimonic", at least in his opinion? <<br /><br />He can, but he can be wrong, as the example of the drug addict clearly (and, I would hope, uncontroversially) shows.<br /><br />> what some conservative people say when they are criticizing gay people (I've seen that happen). They say such people only "seem" happy and fulfilled, but inside (or I've ever heard some say you can "see it deep in their eyes" or something stupid like that) they they are empty and blah, blah... <<br /><br />And they are wrong. But it doesn't follow that one cannot reasonably say that a person is not happy even though he thinks he is. Again, drug addict.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-29651695838033757172011-08-28T22:10:55.178-04:002011-08-28T22:10:55.178-04:00I'm late for the party, as usual... And lost, ...I'm late for the party, as usual... And lost, as you'll see below. :-)<br /><br /><b>for a virtue ethicist, someone who achieves material gains by acting in an non-virtuous way is literally sick, morally speaking, and cannot possibly achieve eudaimonia, regardless of how many riches he accumulates, or how “happy” he tells you (or himself) he is.</b><br /><br />Sounds like the "no true Scotsman" fallacy to me, not convincing at all. It is defining eudaimonia externally to the "bad guy", when it seems to me it should be internal to each person (even if similar amongst different people from the same culture). Why can't he feel <b>truly</b> happy/flourished/"eudaimonic", at least <b>in his opinion</b>? Does anything else count, if the goal is to achieve eudaimonia? <br /><br />Saying that someone "cannot possibly achieve eudaimonia" by doing so-and-so sounds like, say, what some conservative people say when they are criticizing gay people (I've seen that happen). They say such people only "seem" happy and fulfilled, but inside (or I've ever heard some say you can "see it deep in their eyes" or something stupid like that) they they are empty and blah, blah... Not at all associating any of you guys here with such moralists, of course, just giving a provocative (and maybe misguided?) analogy, heh.J. Marcelo Alveshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09967299561849915314noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-41105113885962568912011-08-27T19:41:20.921-04:002011-08-27T19:41:20.921-04:00@Greg
"I am taking that description one step ...@Greg<br />"I am taking that description one step further, and pointing out that "contact" with the environment does not equal "content" about the environment (or at least I am arguing for that position, I know there are a large class of philosophers who argue that mental content is entirely external)."<br /><br />The mental content assesses the external experience and reacts strategically internally according to what its evolution as a social species has taught it to decide to do in that external situation. And in one way or another, all organisms have evolved according to those social dictates of their species.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-7753170939589328972011-08-27T19:30:32.456-04:002011-08-27T19:30:32.456-04:00If all organisms have (as seems likely) evolved to...If all organisms have (as seems likely) evolved to consider the choice that most benefits the group as superior to the choice that most benefits themselves, they have in effect learned to benefit the group as the best way to benefit themselves. <br /><br />So if the argument was that the individual nevertheless in some fashion weighs its interests against that of the group, it doesn't do so with any serious expectation of going counter to what the group would have in the end required from it.<br /><br />And while these expectations may apply in a lesser degree to humans than to other species, they still tend to govern our predominately less than conscious cognitive processes.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-38351243250695022112011-08-27T18:21:38.992-04:002011-08-27T18:21:38.992-04:00Greg
>"Group trust determines self-trust m...Greg<br />>"Group trust determines self-trust much more often than the reverse."<br />What is "self-trust"?<br />>""contact" with the environment does not equal "content" about the environment"<br />What does this mean and what it's significance?<br />>" but the behavior itself stems from internal processes." <br />Of course. All behavior stems from the brain's processing.You must mean more.<br />>"That is what I mean by self interest. Any action stems from the internal processes of the organism engaging in it."<br />I agree that any action stems from the brain's processing. I disagree that this is a definition of, or description of, "self interest"DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-80324269156571991822011-08-27T16:24:17.256-04:002011-08-27T16:24:17.256-04:00"Yes, but at the same time, no. We are more i..."Yes, but at the same time, no. We are more interested in being trusted by the group, whether we deserve to be or not, than in finding ways to trust ourselves to successfully fool and fit in at the same time. <br />Group trust determines self-trust much more often than the reverse."<br /><br />That doesn't contradict my point Baron.<br /><br />DJD (and Baron), we're veering away from the moral issues here and getting into issues of consciousness and mental content. Even if what you're doing is a purely descriptive endeavor, my points still stand. What you are describing are the causal interactive processes that affect the decision making and behavior processes of an individual (or an organism if we want to get more fundamental). I agree with that description. I am taking that description one step further, and pointing out that "contact" with the environment does not equal "content" about the environment (or at least I am arguing for that position, I know there are a large class of philosophers who argue that mental content is entirely external). I am NOT arguing that these choices and decisions and embracements of virtues happen internally in a void separate from the environment and external influences. I am arguing that when we have a more comprehensive theory of persons and self, and consciousness and mental content, we have to address that difference I mention between content and contact. <br /><br />A choice happening in the present (or any behavior) necessarily stems from your current neurophysiological state. The reason your are in that state is in LARGE part due to your environmental interactions over time, to external factors, but the behavior itself stems from internal processes. That is what I mean by self interest. Any action stems from the internal processes of the organism engaging in it.Greg Nirshberghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00857237630029774354noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-6944459689833772852011-08-27T15:55:42.161-04:002011-08-27T15:55:42.161-04:00Baron
>"Yes, but at the same time, no. We ...Baron<br />>"Yes, but at the same time, no. We are more interested in being trusted by the group, whether we deserve to be or not"<br />I couldn't agree more.DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-65117242813262194772011-08-27T15:52:58.930-04:002011-08-27T15:52:58.930-04:00Greg
>"I might disagree with what specific...Greg<br />>"I might disagree with what specific things you deem to be the best virtues, but if you want to define them all by the benefit provided to the group, that's fine." I am not defining them. I am <br />describing how they tend to to come about and then are passed along to generation after generation.The phenomena of "internalization" goes a long way towards individuals believing that the particular "virtues" that they embrace are their own creations, their own choosing, etc.DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-9495735804174146282011-08-27T15:46:27.220-04:002011-08-27T15:46:27.220-04:00Greg
>" Whatever the answer, whatever amou...Greg<br />>" Whatever the answer, whatever amount of external justification you provide, in the end it is an internal reason that the decision stems from ..."<br />>" You seem to be talking more about the justification for which virtues to embody. <br /><br />No...I am not trying to "justify" anything. I am being purely descriptive. I am not talking about<br /> "justification for which virtues to embody."<br />I am describing the forces that cause us to "embody" (I guess you men 'embrace') some virtues and not others.<br />>"So I fundamentally root these matters in an internal perspective"<br />That "internal perspective" is greatly determined by all of those external forces AND your genetic/biological make-up.DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-21177504082945757642011-08-27T15:35:04.839-04:002011-08-27T15:35:04.839-04:00"Virtues can be handed down by the group, and..."Virtues can be handed down by the group, and be in service to the group, but it is the individual in the end that must choose to behave in such a way that exemplifies that virtue or not. And the reasons for that choice necessarily stem from self interest." <br />Yes, but at the same time, no. We are more interested in being trusted by the group, whether we deserve to be or not, than in finding ways to trust ourselves to successfully fool and fit in at the same time. <br />Group trust determines self-trust much more often than the reverse.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-64602596596967817222011-08-27T14:29:08.812-04:002011-08-27T14:29:08.812-04:00"but I have never thought of behaviors that s..."but I have never thought of behaviors that serve my own interests and increase my pleasure as a subject of virtue."<br /><br />"I have always viewed virtues and ideals as being generated by and dependent upon our social groups."<br /><br />"The internalized virtues exist because those behaviors are the behaviors that our group sees as virtuous behaviors."<br /><br />I don't think these are in contradiction. I think it's a sort of short sighted view of what I was getting at about self interest above. Virtues can be handed down by the group, and be in service to the group, but it is the individual in the end that must choose to behave in such a way that exemplifies that virtue or not. And the reasons for that choice necessarily stem from self interest. Sure, it might be handed down by the group, relayed by your parent, but the reason to take it to heart is why? Because you love your parent and you want to make them happy? Because you believe what they tell you? Because you're afraid of what they might do if you don't? Because you want to be liked by your peers? Because you don't want to be shamed? Because you care about their well being and flourishing? Whatever the answer, whatever amount of external justification you provide, in the end it is an internal reason that the decision stems from (this can often times be implicit, and does not have to be an explicitly defined reason). <br /><br />I might disagree with what specific things you deem to be the best virtues, but if you want to define them all by the benefit provided to the group, that's fine. I don't think it contradicts anything I've said. I'm trying to get at fundamental aspects about the nature of consciousness and mental content. About how cognition happens and where behavior stems from. About the nature of how decisions are made. You seem to be talking more about the justification for which virtues to embody. But like I mentioned above, all the external justification in the world still needs to be filtered through an internal cognitive process. So I fundamentally root these matters in an internal perspective, because it is that internal process that needs to embrace the external nature of these virtues.Greg Nirshberghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00857237630029774354noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-12246078955981114452011-08-27T11:02:12.060-04:002011-08-27T11:02:12.060-04:00DJD,
I'm not as ambitious as trying to discov...DJD,<br /><br />I'm not as ambitious as trying to discover or develop a moral system. I'm just trying to clarify my own thoughts about the panoply of proposals already out there.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-25282821272749881952011-08-26T20:09:19.231-04:002011-08-26T20:09:19.231-04:00Massimo
>"I actually don't think we ca...Massimo<br />>"I actually don't think we can learn much from evolutionary biology in this case. Biology sets the broader limits of human nature, but as Hume pointed out, human nature changes in response to what we today would call cultural evolution."<br />Does this hold for the moral system that you seek to develop or discover?DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-42087959863745385442011-08-26T20:06:31.506-04:002011-08-26T20:06:31.506-04:00Greg
>" Do you have a radically different ...Greg<br />>" Do you have a radically different definition of "virtue" that would contradict this sort of idea? So maybe you would say the following count as virtues: honesty, patience, intellectual curiosity, empathy, consideration for the consequences of your actions,etc."<br /> They are examples of what someone might count as virtues....behavior dispositions that serve our interest and produce pleasure, but I have never thought of behaviors that serve my own interests and increase my pleasure as a subject of virtue. Merely practical identification of behaviors that "work". Calling behaviors that we find will serve our interests and increase our<br />pleasure "virtuous" valorizes them, blesses them with some sort of "sacred" imprimiture that is not necessary. I have always viewed virtues and ideals as being generated by and dependent upon our social groups. They are handed down in our group over generations, but they can change from time to time depending upon the perceived needs and desires of the group. The individual then internalizes these virtues through inculcation and example by their parents, teachers and eventually their peer groups and role models. So...the ideals and virtues originate with the group....and we internalize them and seek to demonstrate them to the members of our social groups/peer groups. we do this because our evolutionary determined biology is structured so that we seek approval, respect, and status within our peer groups or society. The internalized virtues exist because those behaviors are the behaviors that our group sees as virtuous behaviors. They generally serve the interest of the group, or sometimes are simply respected. So....I cannot conceive of virtue as a personal matter....except that after internalizing our groups ideals....we begin to think of them as "our" ideals. This tendency seems to also be an evolved trait that ends up serving our own interest....although it usually ends up also serving the interests of the group. If it did not, that ideal or virtue would likely not exist as a virtue. And...the behavior is only "virtuous" because the group has so determined.<br />If one decides to try and figure out what behaviors that he shall see as virtuous, without any consideration for what the group has determined to be virtuous, I know of no way to accomplish this except by identifying what behavior best serves their own interest..how to increase their own pleasure, without any need for approval by the group, but at this point, why call these behaviors virtuous? Otherwise, I suppose one could choose a role model to copy...but on what grounds would one base their choice of role models. Someone we admire? But, why do we admire them? Because others admire them? It becomes circular.DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-76736851346277184632011-08-26T18:28:05.507-04:002011-08-26T18:28:05.507-04:00DJD,
I actually don't think we can learn much...DJD,<br /><br />I actually don't think we can learn much from evolutionary biology in this case. Biology sets the broader limits of human nature, but as Hume pointed out, human nature changes in response to what we today would call cultural evolution.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-6769724483493101482011-08-26T16:55:42.514-04:002011-08-26T16:55:42.514-04:00"It seems that you are talking about behavior..."It seems that you are talking about behavior and predispositions for certain behavior."<br /><br />In general, yes. Do you have a radically different definition of "virtue" that would contradict this sort of idea? So maybe you would say the following count as virtues: honesty, patience, intellectual curiosity, empathy, consideration for the consequences of your actions, etc...I would say those are all useful shorthands that we've come up with to describe more fundamental ways of interacting with the world, of orienting yourself towards the world. Behaving in certain ways and being disposed to behave in certain ways. <br /><br />"And...that only the behaviors and predispositions are instrumental in achieving our goals, which you identify primarily as "positive emotions", should be considered "virtuous" behavior"<br /><br />I wouldn't say "positive emotions" is primary, I think it's part and parcel with avoiding pain and seeking pleasure, certain aspects of social behavior, and the pattern recognition stuff I spoke about (think the "aha moment"). But I can see how you can argue that all of those things have a felt quality to them and could conceivably all fall under positive emotions. <br /><br />"Are seeing this in terms of individual behaviors that maximize their own goals, or individual behaviors that maximize others' goals, collective behaviors that maximize collective goals?"<br /><br />Well given the nature of consciousness and what seems to be the point of virtue ethics, I would say this is about maximizing your own goals. About a process of self development. Of becoming virtuous. It would seem to me that all actions by definition stem from self interest (not to be confused with the idea that all actions are selfish). So even the most seemingly altruistic acts, where I engage in an action for the benefit of others at the expense of myself in some way, I believe comes from self interest. Whether it's because it makes you happy, or because you believe it's right, or because you just couldn't bear to act in any other way. <br /><br />This ties in with your next question about sociality. We have this social nature in our primate evolutionary history that I believe makes certain ways of interacting more ontologically fulfilling, in terms of ways of interacting with family, and friends, and loved ones, with our tribes and groups, and hopefully eventually we can widen this net of compassion to embrace all of humanity. Had we not had this part of our evolutionary history...well, you might want to argue that social evolution is necessary for language and intelligence and higher order consciousness to arise...but the point is, without this feature of our evolutionary history, and thus our neurophysiology, these ways of interacting would not be inherently fulfilling. Mcuh of the reason we find pleasure and meaning in connecting with other, in loving other people, would not be possible without this evolutionary history. So, in the end everything stems from and is in service to promoting our own positive emotions, understanding that promoting positive states and emotions in others serves to further promote positive states in us. <br /><br />"How does knowledge of our evolutionary past and our resulting biology help improve our knowledge of what works and does not that we witness emperically....knowledge that has accumulated over centuries? Can you suggest an example?"<br /><br />I think information from evolution and biology provides internal constraints and boundary conditions on our theories of ethics. I think from there we need science and philosophy to determine empirically what works and doesn't within those constraints. I mean, how can it not inform ethics? If I hit someone over the head with a hammer repeatedly because I think it will help them feel good, I'm ignoring facts about our biology, which are the way they are because of our evolutionary history.Greg Nirshberghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00857237630029774354noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-60668049027219995042011-08-26T15:41:59.107-04:002011-08-26T15:41:59.107-04:00Massimo...
Even if we assume Aristotle's versi...Massimo...<br />Even if we assume Aristotle's version of eudaimonia is the best version...how do you see knowledge of evolution/biology help us improve on what we have already learned emperically regarding the behavior that does or does not produce eudaimonia. We see the fruits of our emperical past in the current tastes and desires that we have...that when acted upon instrumentally produces eudaimoni. How could it be otherwise. You get what you see. Evolved<br />tastes and behaviors that are "designed" to promote our evolutionary goals. Or, are you less interested in the goals and more interested in using the fullfilment of our proximate desires, tastes, as the goal of eudaimonics?DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-32606120834317683602011-08-26T15:27:35.690-04:002011-08-26T15:27:35.690-04:00Greg
Thank you you for that very articulate descri...Greg<br />Thank you you for that very articulate description of your views on this subject. <br />I have been trying to understand as clearly as I can what you have written.It seems that you are talking about behavior and predispositions for certain behavior. And...that only the behaviors and predispositions are instrumental in achieving our goals, which you identify primarily as "positive emotions", should be considered "virtuous" behavior. Are seeing this in terms of individual behaviors that maximize their own goals, or individual behaviors that maximize others' goals, collective behaviors that maximize collective goals? <br />When you speak of the "social nature" of our evolutionary history and promoting "positive emotions", do you men behavior that promotes other's positive emotions....or behavior that promotes our own positive emotions that we experience when we promote others positive emotions because evolution so designed us?<br />How does knowledge of our evolutionary past and our resulting biology help improve our knowledge of what works and does not that we witness emperically....knowledge that has accumulated over centuries? Can you suggest an example? <br />Thanks for helping me clarify my thoughts on this subject.DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-73254326959515699252011-08-26T08:03:36.353-04:002011-08-26T08:03:36.353-04:00DJD,
> Only if they adhere to Aristotle's ...DJD,<br /><br />> Only if they adhere to Aristotle's eudaimonic ethics. Why would they do that? <<br /><br />Because eudaimonia is what human beings strive for, whether they realize it or not. And if they purposely work against it, then they are sick, according to Aristotle, they are beings who go against their nature.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-52286983550151802652011-08-25T23:36:55.804-04:002011-08-25T23:36:55.804-04:00I should also caveat my response by pointing out t...I should also caveat my response by pointing out that I'm not speaking for Massimo. He might disagree with everything I said!Greg Nirshberghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00857237630029774354noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-87072763234391556932011-08-25T22:56:15.973-04:002011-08-25T22:56:15.973-04:00"Please give an example of a possible "j..."Please give an example of a possible "justification" for "virtues/goals/values....That would make more clear to me what you are getting at."<br /><br />Let me answer this last one and hopefully clarify a bit of what's referenced in your other posts along the way. <br /><br />I don't think I would say that virtues have some sort of real ontological nature. I think virtues are labels we put on, ascriptions we give, to certain collections of behaviors, or dispositions towards certain types of behavior. I see virtues as labels we give to bundles of human characteristics, cognitive and behavioral processes. So it's not really "the virtue" that I would want to promote, but really the more fundamental processes of interaction, while using the useful shorthand of "virtue" for ease of communication. Similarly to how I consider myself a proponent of evolutionary epistemology (temporal interactive process of variation and selection), but have a lot of sympathy for virtue epistemology as a higher level abstraction of this lower level process. <br /><br />So, if these processes of interacting can only be labeled virtues if they are in service of goals, and those goals are the codification of values, I want to say that we need justification for those values, to ultimately say that those processes of interaction (virtues) are in fact the "right" ones, or in my preferred terminology, ways of interacting that avoid error. <br /><br />I mentioned that I ground this in evolution/biology. So there are a few important grounding points. The first is simply the pleasure/plain distinction. The second is the nature of our emotional systems, specifically the felt quality of emotions, and the neurophysiological changes that occur as the result of emotions (I subscribe to the stance that emotions evolved sort of as heuristics for behavior). The third is in the social nature of our evolutionary history. Avoiding pain, engaging and promoting positive emotions, and certain social ways of interacting are ontologically more fulfilling than other ways of being. There are possibly others as well, such as the puzzle solving and pattern recognition benefits of our evolutionary history which I think make certain rational and intellectual pursuits ontologically fulfilling as well. <br /><br />So what I argue is basically that human beings have certain biological and psychological constraints on ways in which we can be in positive states and ways in which we can be in negative states. We can be in error, or not, of our own basic ontology. And so our values must at the very least respect these facts. <br /><br />So while yes, given the differences in human psychology and human neurophysiology, there might be different ways of interacting to promote "flourishing", I would argue there are constraints on how varied these ways of interacting can or should be. <br /><br />There are other things that need filling in here of course, and other things I didn't mention, but that's the basic gist I think.Greg Nirshberghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00857237630029774354noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-7803583691232720672011-08-25T20:13:38.058-04:002011-08-25T20:13:38.058-04:00Greg
>"It just says that we can't just...Greg<br />>"It just says that we can't just posit virtue ethics alone without also doing the metaethical exploration of justification for virtues/goals/values."<br />Please give an example of a possible "justification" for "virtues/goals/values....That would make more clear to me what you are getting at.DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.com