Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.
I get that the string theorist in this cartoon is acting hypocritically here, but his point about empirical verifiability seems pretty compelling, nonetheless.
I'm pretty much with you on this comic, but I think there is an important distinction between string theory and metaphysics. String theory might make testable predictions, or at least that was initially the hope. It mightn't work out that way, but I think true metaphysics is in principle untestable.
One thing that bothers me is that string theory is called a theory. Creationists often criticise evolution by natural selection on the grounds that it is "just a theory". The standard response to creationists is that a scientific theory is not a hypothesis but a body of knowledge that has passed many tests and has become accepted by the mainstream. Unfortunately, string theory does not meet these criteria.
But maybe string theory is not a scientific theory at all. It seems to me that string theory is a theory in the mathematical sense, like set theory. As such, it is possibly a valid field for theoretical exploration qua mathematics. It only becomes physics when it makes testable predictions.
Either way, while I don't think string theory is metaphysics, I agree with you that scientists ought not to be so dismissive of metaphysics.
But string theory is metaphysics only in the sense that speculation about UFOs, Atlantis, vampires, and Bigfoot is metaphysics.
Analytic philosophy is sometimes credited - properly I think - with reviving an epistemically responsible conception of metaphysics. On this conception metaphysics is and just is analysis of concepts related to 'reality' and 'existence'. Any speculation about the natural or supernatural structure of the world is excluded and left to science, mysticism, theology, and the New Age section of the bookstore.
The defining feature of metaphysics isn't empirical unfalsifiabity but the topic of conceptual analysis.
So, what are you saying? That they're engaging in metaphysics, not science? If so, then what they're doing actually qualifies as pseudoscience. (You can't weasel your way out of this one and argue that they're actually engaging in "metaphysically informed science.")
I think the slant that it is a form of mathematics controlled by reference to possible physics. While the theory itself is probably not testable (the latest relies on remarkably sensitive discernment of signal within noise which I tend to doubt) it may lead to more than speculation in time. That set of results may then cast back to the math and strongly suggest that something like that mathematics is actually the language of nature. There are many indirections in the quantum realm now. By definition and the strong nuclear force, certain quarks are never detected directly as we all know, so some of the strings are beneath or within these very quarks, whatever that may mean beyond the math. Hmmmm.
> I get that the string theorist in this cartoon is acting hypocritically here, but his point about empirical verifiability seems pretty compelling, nonetheless. <
Well, yes, but who would disagree? The point is precisely that he is being (a bit) hypocritical.
Philip,
> Scientists find a practical test for string theory. Jan 06, 2014 <
I’ll read the article, but forgive me for being slightly skeptical. It’s not like they haven’t said that before. A number of times…
DM,
> String theory might make testable predictions, or at least that was initially the hope. It mightn't work out that way, but I think true metaphysics is in principle untestable. <
Metaphysics, as Paul pointed out, isn’t *about* testability. No more than mathematics or logic are. But it is hypocritical for (some) physicists to belittle metaphysics because it doesn’t make testable predictions and yet gingerly engage in an activity they call science that also has failed (abysmally) to yield anything of the like.
> But maybe string theory is not a scientific theory at all. <
I tend to agree. But it is *presented* as a scientific theory.
Paul,
> The defining feature of metaphysics isn't empirical unfalsifiabity but the topic of conceptual analysis. <
Agreed, metaphysics is not about testability. But if metaphysics ever made testable predictions or was even testable in principle, then I feel it wouldn't be metaphysics but physics (or some other science). Do you disagree?
>But it is hypocritical for (some) physicists to belittle metaphysics because it doesn’t make testable predictions and yet gingerly engage in an activity they call science that also has failed (abysmally) to yield anything of the like.<
I agree they are wrong but I'm not sure I would call them hypocrites. If string theory is mathematics, then the only mistake they are making is calling it science. And perhaps they would be reasonably open to calling it mathematics until the point where it makes predictions.
But then these people are not at all anti-mathematics, even though abstract mathematics may not make make testable predictions. I think this is because abstract mathematics is not in the business of making claims about the real, physical universe, whereas metaphysics is. Their contempt for metaphysics is therefore not without foundation even though I disagree with it.
I would agree that string theory is just physics theorizing that may or may not be testable. At most it counts as metaphysics only in the perjorative sense of unscientific armchair cosmology, which has nothing to do with contemporary (analytic) metaphysics. (The point of my previous comment.)
The scientist in the cartoon is not necessarily hypocritical, in my view. Theories in physics should be testable, so why assume he inconsistently thinks string theory is valid speculation. Further, if by metaphysics he means Depak Chopra rather than Saul Kripke, his attitude toward metaphysics may be warranted.
Personally, I find more fault with the other character in the cartoon. Why does he think a scientist's view of philosophy is worth challenging? It's a bit unfair to take the scientist to task on something he presumably knows little about.
Massimo: The point is precisely that he is being (a bit) hypocritical.
OK, but is that the only point? or do you also mean to defend metaphysics and, by extension, string theory - as worthwhile pursuits? That's what's unclear to me.
Meh - apriori assumptions are not necessarily bad and scientists come up with hypotheses all the time. Its what happens next that differentiates science from other branches.
> But if metaphysics ever made testable predictions or was even testable in principle, then I feel it wouldn't be metaphysics but physics (or some other science). Do you disagree? <
Well, I’m not even sure what the question means. When mathematics makes testable predictions, does it stop being mathematics?
> I agree they are wrong but I'm not sure I would call them hypocrites. If string theory is mathematics, then the only mistake they are making is calling it science. <
And you think that’s a minor point?? Besides, the hypocrisy comes from a contemptuous rejection of an intellectual activity about which they know nothing (I seriously doubt Krauss has ever read a technical paper in metaphysics), on specious grounds that they fail to apply to what they themselves are doing.
mufi,
> do you also mean to defend metaphysics and, by extension, string theory - as worthwhile pursuits? <
Oh yes, I think they are both worthwhile pursuits, as long as we don’t call *either* of them science. The real problem with string theory, M-theory and similar is that physicists appear to be far more confident than they should that what they are doing is describing the world as it is, instead of speculating on the basis of mathematical structures that may or may not have anything to do with the physical world.
Deepak,
> Its what happens next that differentiates science from other branches. <
To quote you: meh. I know that, but string theory has been around for decades, and it hasn’t yet “differentiated” itself. How much longer are we going to focus this much effort and resources on it?
Paul,
> Theories in physics should be testable, so why assume he inconsistently thinks string theory is valid speculation. <
You may have missed the point. The scientist is hypocritical for the reason I outlined above, in response to DM.
> if by metaphysics he means Depak Chopra rather than Saul Kripke, his attitude toward metaphysics may be warranted. <
But if that’s what he means then he’s a colossal ignorant. It would be like someone criticizing astronomy and then clarifying that he meant the sort of astronomy his local astrologer deals in.
> Why does he think a scientist's view of philosophy is worth challenging? <
Because scientists could use a healthy dose of philosophical education, in my opinion.
> It's a bit unfair to take the scientist to task on something he presumably knows little about. <
Not when he pretends to know about it and even smugly pontificates about it. Just to be clear: the character on the left is me, the one on the right Lawrence Krauss…
>Well, I’m not even sure what the question means. When mathematics makes testable predictions, does it stop being mathematics?<
Good point. No, it doesn't stop being mathematics, but mathematics isn't metaphysics. My claim is that metaphysics which makes predictions is not metaphysics but physics. I made no such claim for math.
So, for an example of what the question means:
We seem to agree that Tegmark's MUH is more metaphysics than physics, largely on the basis that it doesn't really predict much and seems to be difficult to falsify. If Tegmark came up with a pretty solid prediction, I think we would then be happy to agree with him that it was physics. Are you with me now?
>And you think that’s a minor point??<
We seem to have this misunderstanding a lot. When I say something is "just semantics" or that this is the "only problem" with what these scientists are saying, I do not intend to minimise the importance of semantics or this problem. I am saying that other problems do not exist. "Just" and "only" mean "this and no other". They do not always mean "this is not important", but you always seem to interpret them this way. I'm not saying it's your fault, as I can certainly see why you would interpret it so.
I am at a loss as to how to express myself so as to avoid this confusion. If you have any suggestions let me know.
With regard to this issue, if the "only" problem is that they mislabel their mathematics as physics, they are not hypocrites but inconsistent and messy with their labels for concepts.
>Besides, the hypocrisy comes from a contemptuous rejection of an intellectual activity about which they know nothing<
I think that you are certainly right to call them out on this. I just don't know if I would call that hypocrisy. Hypocrisy would be when they criticise others for rejecting fields they know nothing about.
>on specious grounds that they fail to apply to what they themselves are doing.<
I'm not sure that this is true. Again, I contend that metaphysics which makes predictions is not metaphysics but physics. When they are criticising metaphysics, they are criticising a field which by definition can make no predictions. String theory is different. It is being developed in the hope that it can make predictions. Increasingly, physicists are directing their scorn at string theory precisely because these predictions are not forthcoming. This is not hypocrisy in my book.
Incidentally, if Lawrence Krauss is the target of the comic then it seems to be misdirected. Krauss seems to take a dim view of string theory for exactly the reasons you outline.
I will take your "no response" to and complete disregard of my comment as your way of conceding the point. And the point is namely this: If string theory is actually a metaphysical theory - not a scientific theory (as you have argued), then it qualifies as pseudoscience - "pseudoscience" as your fellow skeptic Michael Shermer defines the term. (You won't be able to weasel your way out of this pickle by attempting to make the lame argument that string theorists are actually engaging in "metaphysically informed science.")
No, you don't get to claim victory by default. My lack of response is indicative of the fact that I have limited patience with your repetitive, already addressed many times, claims. But believe what you like, of course.
And so what if string theory turns out to be a pseudoscience? As discussed in the introduction to book Massimo edited on pseudoscience, current science has been classified as pseudoscience and pseudoscience has been classified as science - time will tell about string theory.
Phlogiston theory is wrong, but its its initial proposers were not pseudoscientists.
String theory is not pseudoscience as practiced in 2014. It may be pseudoscience as practiced in 2064. Sciences can morph into pseudoscience if their adherents do not adapt to new evidence or abandon falsified ideas.
I take it that since you didn't reply to my last comment of January 5th on the MUH that you concede the argument and agree that the MUH is perfectly plausible, while the Lucas/Penrose argument is bunk.
> I take it that since you didn't reply to my last comment of January 5th on the MUH that you concede the argument and agree that the MUH is perfectly plausible, while the Lucas/Penrose argument is bunk. <
The only thing I concede is that it is not possible to have an honest and fair debate with individuals like yourself who are always "moving the goal posts" by redefining terms in a desperate attempt to score a point
All this talk about moving the goalposts is precisely why I invited you to start the conversation afresh with Conway's Game of Life as a model universe, to clarify what we were discussing.
But moving the goalposts was nothing to do with Lucas/Penrose. As far as I can see I tore your argument to pieces and you disappeared.
> But moving the goalposts was nothing to do with Lucas/Penrose. As far as I can see I tore your argument to pieces and you disappeared. <
You're deluding yourself.
Self-referential Gödelian statements in formal systems are examples of "strange loops" - paradoxical circularities called "tangled hierarchies" (in which the causal levels are infinitely intertwined). Something that is paradoxical cannot be resolved logically. And something that cannot be resolved logically is noncomputable. Moreover, something that involves infinite causal levels cannot be computable because it would require an infinite amount of time to process. . I have often asked the following question to proponents of strong AI: "What exactly to do you expect a sentient information-processing system to accomplish that an insentient infromation-processing system cannot?"
It would appear that they believe a sentient information-processing system can execute a logic-defying strange loop. But if it is "logic-defying," then it is noncomputable.
>Self-referential Gödelian statements in formal systems are examples of "strange loops" - paradoxical circularities called "tangled hierarchies"<
This is incorrect. They may be strange loops, in Douglas Hofstadter's sense, but they are not paradoxes. Godelian statements are statements expressed in terms of a formal system X equivalent to "This statement cannot be proven true in the formal system X". This is not a a paradox, because we can logically analyse it and prove that it is true by using tools beyond formal system X. This is unlike the sentence "This sentence is a lie", which genuinely does defy logical analysis.
Godel's theorems are applied to computers by the correct observation that computers are formal systems. The problem is that it is difficult to produce Godelian sentences. Only if you have the means of making such a sentence do you have the means of proving it to be true. Godel's theorems only show that a computer program cannot make its own Godelian sentence, but they do not show that a computer program could not make a Godelian sentence for another (presumably simpler) computer program. As such, Godel does not show that computer programs cannot perform precisely the same trick that humans do.
And it is also not true to suppose that Godel shows that humans can always perform the trick on a computer program. As I said, making these sentences is difficult, and it may be entirely impossible for any human to develop a Godel sentence for a complex computer program. Any computer program which has the same intelligence as a human being is certainly of this level. Since there is no reason to believe that a human could produce a Godel sentence for their own brain, humans are just as vulnerable to the Godel trick as computer programs, and the Lucas/Penrose argument fails.
Your side conversation has attracted my attention, yet I'm not even sure what you're talking about or how it's relevant to the topic of metaphysics and string theory.
I don't blame you if you're lost. This started as a very long exchange on Massimo's post on Max Tegmark's Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) a couple of weeks ago.
The exchange started out as a debate on whether Massimo was wrong about two things:
1) Whether wave/particle duality and the probability functions of quantum mechanics is enough to show that reality is in some respects not physical (Massimo and I think it is not a good argument, Alastair thinks it is) 2) Whether the MUH (and I guess String Theory) ought to be called pseudoscience (Massimo and I think no, Alastair thinks yes).
The conversation broadened to include a debate on several other topics.
1) Whether Alastair's concept of God is coherent (and in particular whether the concept of an infinitely great being is any more coherent than the concept of a greatest integer) 2) Whether the MUH accounts for causality 3) Whether Godel's incompleteness theorem shows that intelligence cannot be computational, as argued by Lucas and Penrose.
I'm bringing up the argument again because Alastair bailed on it. I'm using it to demonstrate how unreasonable he is being in claiming victory over Massimo simply because Massimo got tired of responding to him. It doesn't necessarily have a whole lot to do with this comic strip.
Alastair and I have clashed before, which might go a long way towards explaining my interest in your response to him - particularly if one recognizes human cognition as saturated with emotion, as I do.
Yet, as a self-identified agnostic on all matters metaphysical (God is only the tip of the iceberg), as well as a fan of embodied cognition/philosophy (in the Lakoff-Johnson genre), I may very well fall somewhere in the middle between your two positions...not that I'm prepared to say much more than that, here and now. After all, I see the blog-comment format as more of a soapbox than as an academic forum or court room.
I'm not censoring you, my friend. I am simply rejecting comments that contain insults rather than constructive points. It ought to be clear by now that I have a high degree of tolerance for your sarcasm, but that tolerance isn't unlimited.
Try to reformulate your thoughts using proper language and I'll be happy to let the posts through. Although I'm done responding to the same question you keep asking almost every post, I'm sure others will keep trying.
I still can't quite understand why this bothers you so much. Are you keeping score? Is it a game to see how many philosophers you can get to concede they have made a mistake? In this case there is really no evidence that anyone is mistaken - there seems to be genuine disagreement over the status of string theory..
> I still can't quite understand why this bothers you so much. <
I consider intellectual honesty to be a serious matter. Apparently you don't.
> In this case there is really no evidence that anyone is mistaken - there seems to be genuine disagreement over the status of string theory.. <
There's definitely evidence for intellectual dishonesty here. If you truly believe that an alleged scientific theory (e.g. string theory) is actually a metaphysical theory, then you are intellectually obligated (by the virtue of honesty) to acknowledge that such a theory qualifies as a pseudoscientific theory (by definition). Failure to do so on your part reveals a basic character flaw - namely, that you lack intellectual honesty. (Either that, or you lack the intellectual capacity to make the connection.) The evidence becomes especially damning when you are in the business of labeling other scientists and their theories as pseudoscientific.
I don't think Massimo has made a mistake in this case, and I'm sure he doesn't think so either.
Whoever is right or wrong, it shouldn't take too much imagination for you to put yourself in Massimo's shoes and realise this. From his perspective, you keep repeating an argument which makes no sense and demand that he acknowledges his mistake. This gets tiresome eventually, so he stops responding. This is not intellectual dishonesty.
From the perspective of some others on this blog, you appear to be just as "intellectual dishonest". It really does appear to me as if I have destroyed some of your arguments, particularly on Godel, and you have refused to acknowledge this.
I could have done what you are doing, and accused you of intellectual dishonesty. Instead, I just assume that you didn't buy my argument, (either because you don't understand it or because I have made some mistake), and you have tired of the apparently futile discussion.
I could also accuse you of intellectual dishonesty for resorting to accusations that I have "moved the goalposts" when I have done no such thing. What I described either accounts for causality or demonstrates that no causality is needed - it depends what is meant by causality. But because I don't intuitively know precisely what you mean by "causality", the flexibility of my interpretation of the term as I attempt to grasp your position is termed "moving the goalposts" and you abandon the conversation just when it could have been put on a fresh footing with a discussion of Conway's Game of Life as a model universe.
My point is that you may think you have established intellectual dishonesty but you haven't. Everyone has a point of view, and what looks dishonest from your perspective may not be from the perspective of your interlocutor. It's poor form to start crowing prematurely that you have won the argument simply because the other party has grown tired of you.
Seriously? Oh crap. Does he realize that falsificationism is a philosophical, not a scientific idea? And that philosophers have gone beyond it, like decades ago??
" Does he realize that falsificationism is a philosophical, not a scientific idea?"
yes - from his blog :
"My answer was “Falsifiability.” More of a philosophical idea than a scientific one, but an idea that is bandied about by lazy scientists far more than it is invoked by careful philosophers."
from his Edge opinion : "String theory and other approaches to quantum gravity involve phenomena that are likely to manifest themselves only at energies enormously higher than anything we have access to here on Earth. The cosmological multiverse and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics posit other realms that are impossible for us to access directly. Some scientists, leaning on Popper, have suggested that these theories are non-scientific because they are not falsifiable."
"The truth is the opposite. Whether or not we can observe them directly, the entities involved in these theories are either real or they are not. Refusing to contemplate their possible existence on the grounds of some a priori principle, even though they might play a crucial role in how the world works, is as non-scientific as it gets."
I don't think asking that a scientific theory be potentialy testable is the same thing as refusing to 'contemplate' the idea behind the proposed theory.
Like "The idea that geometry is the description of physical space is engrained in us, and might sound hard to get rid of it, but it is unavoidable; it is just a matter of time. Better get rid of it soon." (Carlo Rovelli, Theoretical Physicist)
I haven't read through all of them, but I didn't find anything there that was particularly novel or surprising.
I'd suggest actually reading what he says. He seems to respect philosophers, and recognises the history and the role of falisification in the history of science. He is mostly arguing that it's a blunt criterion and that the problem is more subtle than many scientists or amateur philosophers are willing to accept.
On his blog, he introduces the argument with the following paragraph:
"My answer was “Falsifiability.” More of a philosophical idea than a scientific one, but an idea that is bandied about by lazy scientists far more than it is invoked by careful philosophers. Thinking sensibly about the demarcation problem between science and non-science, especially these days, requires a bit more nuance than that."
The Edge website was down yesterday so I was reply from the excerpt on his blog. I have now read his piece. I still feels to me like it falls his view is biased to keeping the fringes of theorhetical physics on the science side of the science/philosophy line. He replaces falsifiable with 'definite ' & 'empirical'. Definite just means clear and unambiguous. Empirical is defined pretty loosely however so that string theory & many worlds hypotheses fit under his usage. Yes there is an interplay between theory & data, but when the theory can take a near infinite number forms (like string theory) how does that that effect the demarcation. I think Sean believes that 'in principal' string theory and many worlds interpretations are supported by the data. My view is that what we believe 'in principle' falls under philosophy.
The "mathematical universe hypothesis" is "metaphysically informed science" while "string theory" is "scientifically informed metaphysics."
Does that sound about right...Professor? Or, are you going to censor my comment? Declaring it too offensive because it exposes your contradictory argumentation on this subject matter? (Is that how it works?)
I would suggest, and I think that Massimo would agree, that the MUH is scientifically informed metaphysics and String Theory is a mathematical theory searching for some falsifiable physical predictions - a proto-hypothesis. I think he would disagree with both of your suggestions.
We would also both disagree with you that either constitute pseudoscience. If you think the definition from Shermer can qualify either as pseudoscience then Massimo and I simply disagree with the definition, or at least your interpretation of it.
There, that should be pretty clear. Can we drop this line of discussion now?
Excellent. In fact nowadays many scientists criticize string theory just because it's too theoretical/metaphysical and not empirically testable.
ReplyDeleteI get that the string theorist in this cartoon is acting hypocritically here, but his point about empirical verifiability seems pretty compelling, nonetheless.
ReplyDeleteScientists find a practical test for string theory
ReplyDeleteJan 06, 2014
phys.org/news/2014-01-scientists-theory.html
Hi Massimo,
ReplyDeleteI'm pretty much with you on this comic, but I think there is an important distinction between string theory and metaphysics. String theory might make testable predictions, or at least that was initially the hope. It mightn't work out that way, but I think true metaphysics is in principle untestable.
One thing that bothers me is that string theory is called a theory. Creationists often criticise evolution by natural selection on the grounds that it is "just a theory". The standard response to creationists is that a scientific theory is not a hypothesis but a body of knowledge that has passed many tests and has become accepted by the mainstream. Unfortunately, string theory does not meet these criteria.
But maybe string theory is not a scientific theory at all. It seems to me that string theory is a theory in the mathematical sense, like set theory. As such, it is possibly a valid field for theoretical exploration qua mathematics. It only becomes physics when it makes testable predictions.
Either way, while I don't think string theory is metaphysics, I agree with you that scientists ought not to be so dismissive of metaphysics.
But string theory is metaphysics only in the sense that speculation about UFOs, Atlantis, vampires, and Bigfoot is metaphysics.
ReplyDeleteAnalytic philosophy is sometimes credited - properly I think - with reviving an epistemically responsible conception of metaphysics. On this conception metaphysics is and just is analysis of concepts related to 'reality' and 'existence'. Any speculation about the natural or supernatural structure of the world is excluded and left to science, mysticism, theology, and the New Age section of the bookstore.
The defining feature of metaphysics isn't empirical unfalsifiabity but the topic of conceptual analysis.
Many scientists would agree that string theory is dangerously close to metaphysics and that includes some string theorist.
ReplyDeleteSo, what are you saying? That they're engaging in metaphysics, not science? If so, then what they're doing actually qualifies as pseudoscience. (You can't weasel your way out of this one and argue that they're actually engaging in "metaphysically informed science.")
ReplyDeleteI think the slant that it is a form of mathematics controlled by reference to possible physics. While the theory itself is probably not testable (the latest relies on remarkably sensitive discernment of signal within noise which I tend to doubt) it may lead to more than speculation in time. That set of results may then cast back to the math and strongly suggest that something like that mathematics is actually the language of nature. There are many indirections in the quantum realm now. By definition and the strong nuclear force, certain quarks are never detected directly as we all know, so some of the strings are beneath or within these very quarks, whatever that may mean beyond the math. Hmmmm.
ReplyDeletemufi,
ReplyDelete> I get that the string theorist in this cartoon is acting hypocritically here, but his point about empirical verifiability seems pretty compelling, nonetheless. <
Well, yes, but who would disagree? The point is precisely that he is being (a bit) hypocritical.
Philip,
> Scientists find a practical test for string theory. Jan 06, 2014 <
I’ll read the article, but forgive me for being slightly skeptical. It’s not like they haven’t said that before. A number of times…
DM,
> String theory might make testable predictions, or at least that was initially the hope. It mightn't work out that way, but I think true metaphysics is in principle untestable. <
Metaphysics, as Paul pointed out, isn’t *about* testability. No more than mathematics or logic are. But it is hypocritical for (some) physicists to belittle metaphysics because it doesn’t make testable predictions and yet gingerly engage in an activity they call science that also has failed (abysmally) to yield anything of the like.
> But maybe string theory is not a scientific theory at all. <
I tend to agree. But it is *presented* as a scientific theory.
Paul,
> The defining feature of metaphysics isn't empirical unfalsifiabity but the topic of conceptual analysis. <
Agreed, see my response to DM above.
Hi Massimo,
DeleteAgreed, metaphysics is not about testability. But if metaphysics ever made testable predictions or was even testable in principle, then I feel it wouldn't be metaphysics but physics (or some other science). Do you disagree?
>But it is hypocritical for (some) physicists to belittle metaphysics because it doesn’t make testable predictions and yet gingerly engage in an activity they call science that also has failed (abysmally) to yield anything of the like.<
I agree they are wrong but I'm not sure I would call them hypocrites. If string theory is mathematics, then the only mistake they are making is calling it science. And perhaps they would be reasonably open to calling it mathematics until the point where it makes predictions.
But then these people are not at all anti-mathematics, even though abstract mathematics may not make make testable predictions. I think this is because abstract mathematics is not in the business of making claims about the real, physical universe, whereas metaphysics is. Their contempt for metaphysics is therefore not without foundation even though I disagree with it.
I would agree that string theory is just physics theorizing that may or may not be testable. At most it counts as metaphysics only in the perjorative sense of unscientific armchair cosmology, which has nothing to do with contemporary (analytic) metaphysics. (The point of my previous comment.)
DeleteThe scientist in the cartoon is not necessarily hypocritical, in my view. Theories in physics should be testable, so why assume he inconsistently thinks string theory is valid speculation. Further, if by metaphysics he means Depak Chopra rather than Saul Kripke, his attitude toward metaphysics may be warranted.
Personally, I find more fault with the other character in the cartoon. Why does he think a scientist's view of philosophy is worth challenging? It's a bit unfair to take the scientist to task on something he presumably knows little about.
Massimo: The point is precisely that he is being (a bit) hypocritical.
ReplyDeleteOK, but is that the only point? or do you also mean to defend metaphysics and, by extension, string theory - as worthwhile pursuits? That's what's unclear to me.
Meh - apriori assumptions are not necessarily bad and scientists come up with hypotheses all the time. Its what happens next that differentiates science from other branches.
ReplyDeletePhysics is just a bunch of fake models anyway. Some, however, work.
DeleteDM,
ReplyDelete> But if metaphysics ever made testable predictions or was even testable in principle, then I feel it wouldn't be metaphysics but physics (or some other science). Do you disagree? <
Well, I’m not even sure what the question means. When mathematics makes testable predictions, does it stop being mathematics?
> I agree they are wrong but I'm not sure I would call them hypocrites. If string theory is mathematics, then the only mistake they are making is calling it science. <
And you think that’s a minor point?? Besides, the hypocrisy comes from a contemptuous rejection of an intellectual activity about which they know nothing (I seriously doubt Krauss has ever read a technical paper in metaphysics), on specious grounds that they fail to apply to what they themselves are doing.
mufi,
> do you also mean to defend metaphysics and, by extension, string theory - as worthwhile pursuits? <
Oh yes, I think they are both worthwhile pursuits, as long as we don’t call *either* of them science. The real problem with string theory, M-theory and similar is that physicists appear to be far more confident than they should that what they are doing is describing the world as it is, instead of speculating on the basis of mathematical structures that may or may not have anything to do with the physical world.
Deepak,
> Its what happens next that differentiates science from other branches. <
To quote you: meh. I know that, but string theory has been around for decades, and it hasn’t yet “differentiated” itself. How much longer are we going to focus this much effort and resources on it?
Paul,
> Theories in physics should be testable, so why assume he inconsistently thinks string theory is valid speculation. <
You may have missed the point. The scientist is hypocritical for the reason I outlined above, in response to DM.
> if by metaphysics he means Depak Chopra rather than Saul Kripke, his attitude toward metaphysics may be warranted. <
But if that’s what he means then he’s a colossal ignorant. It would be like someone criticizing astronomy and then clarifying that he meant the sort of astronomy his local astrologer deals in.
> Why does he think a scientist's view of philosophy is worth challenging? <
Because scientists could use a healthy dose of philosophical education, in my opinion.
> It's a bit unfair to take the scientist to task on something he presumably knows little about. <
Not when he pretends to know about it and even smugly pontificates about it. Just to be clear: the character on the left is me, the one on the right Lawrence Krauss…
Hi Massimo,
Delete>Well, I’m not even sure what the question means. When mathematics makes testable predictions, does it stop being mathematics?<
Good point. No, it doesn't stop being mathematics, but mathematics isn't metaphysics. My claim is that metaphysics which makes predictions is not metaphysics but physics. I made no such claim for math.
So, for an example of what the question means:
We seem to agree that Tegmark's MUH is more metaphysics than physics, largely on the basis that it doesn't really predict much and seems to be difficult to falsify. If Tegmark came up with a pretty solid prediction, I think we would then be happy to agree with him that it was physics. Are you with me now?
>And you think that’s a minor point??<
We seem to have this misunderstanding a lot. When I say something is "just semantics" or that this is the "only problem" with what these scientists are saying, I do not intend to minimise the importance of semantics or this problem. I am saying that other problems do not exist. "Just" and "only" mean "this and no other". They do not always mean "this is not important", but you always seem to interpret them this way. I'm not saying it's your fault, as I can certainly see why you would interpret it so.
I am at a loss as to how to express myself so as to avoid this confusion. If you have any suggestions let me know.
With regard to this issue, if the "only" problem is that they mislabel their mathematics as physics, they are not hypocrites but inconsistent and messy with their labels for concepts.
>Besides, the hypocrisy comes from a contemptuous rejection of an intellectual activity about which they know nothing<
I think that you are certainly right to call them out on this. I just don't know if I would call that hypocrisy. Hypocrisy would be when they criticise others for rejecting fields they know nothing about.
>on specious grounds that they fail to apply to what they themselves are doing.<
I'm not sure that this is true. Again, I contend that metaphysics which makes predictions is not metaphysics but physics. When they are criticising metaphysics, they are criticising a field which by definition can make no predictions. String theory is different. It is being developed in the hope that it can make predictions. Increasingly, physicists are directing their scorn at string theory precisely because these predictions are not forthcoming. This is not hypocrisy in my book.
Incidentally, if Lawrence Krauss is the target of the comic then it seems to be misdirected. Krauss seems to take a dim view of string theory for exactly the reasons you outline.
DeleteHave a read of this:
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2005/11/theory_of_anything.2.html
@ Massimo
ReplyDeleteI will take your "no response" to and complete disregard of my comment as your way of conceding the point. And the point is namely this: If string theory is actually a metaphysical theory - not a scientific theory (as you have argued), then it qualifies as pseudoscience - "pseudoscience" as your fellow skeptic Michael Shermer defines the term. (You won't be able to weasel your way out of this pickle by attempting to make the lame argument that string theorists are actually engaging in "metaphysically informed science.")
No, you don't get to claim victory by default. My lack of response is indicative of the fact that I have limited patience with your repetitive, already addressed many times, claims. But believe what you like, of course.
DeleteAnd so what if string theory turns out to be a pseudoscience? As discussed in the introduction to book Massimo edited on pseudoscience, current science has been classified as pseudoscience and pseudoscience has been classified as science - time will tell about string theory.
Delete@ michael fugate
Delete> And so what if string theory turns out to be a pseudoscience? <
Then Massimo will have to eat crow.
@Alastair
DeleteMassimo will not have to eat crow.
Phlogiston theory is wrong, but its its initial proposers were not pseudoscientists.
String theory is not pseudoscience as practiced in 2014. It may be pseudoscience as practiced in 2064. Sciences can morph into pseudoscience if their adherents do not adapt to new evidence or abandon falsified ideas.
By the way, Alastair:
DeleteI take it that since you didn't reply to my last comment of January 5th on the MUH that you concede the argument and agree that the MUH is perfectly plausible, while the Lucas/Penrose argument is bunk.
@ Disagreeable Me
Delete> I take it that since you didn't reply to my last comment of January 5th on the MUH that you concede the argument and agree that the MUH is perfectly plausible, while the Lucas/Penrose argument is bunk. <
The only thing I concede is that it is not possible to have an honest and fair debate with individuals like yourself who are always "moving the goal posts" by redefining terms in a desperate attempt to score a point
All this talk about moving the goalposts is precisely why I invited you to start the conversation afresh with Conway's Game of Life as a model universe, to clarify what we were discussing.
DeleteBut moving the goalposts was nothing to do with Lucas/Penrose. As far as I can see I tore your argument to pieces and you disappeared.
@ Disagreeable Me
Delete> But moving the goalposts was nothing to do with Lucas/Penrose. As far as I can see I tore your argument to pieces and you disappeared. <
You're deluding yourself.
Self-referential Gödelian statements in formal systems are examples of "strange loops" - paradoxical circularities called "tangled hierarchies" (in which the causal levels are infinitely intertwined). Something that is paradoxical cannot be resolved logically. And something that cannot be resolved logically is noncomputable. Moreover, something that involves infinite causal levels cannot be computable because it would require an infinite amount of time to process.
.
I have often asked the following question to proponents of strong AI: "What exactly to do you expect a sentient information-processing system to accomplish that an insentient infromation-processing system cannot?"
It would appear that they believe a sentient information-processing system can execute a logic-defying strange loop. But if it is "logic-defying," then it is noncomputable.
Hi Alastair,
Delete>Self-referential Gödelian statements in formal systems are examples of "strange loops" - paradoxical circularities called "tangled hierarchies"<
This is incorrect. They may be strange loops, in Douglas Hofstadter's sense, but they are not paradoxes. Godelian statements are statements expressed in terms of a formal system X equivalent to "This statement cannot be proven true in the formal system X". This is not a a paradox, because we can logically analyse it and prove that it is true by using tools beyond formal system X. This is unlike the sentence "This sentence is a lie", which genuinely does defy logical analysis.
Godel's theorems are applied to computers by the correct observation that computers are formal systems. The problem is that it is difficult to produce Godelian sentences. Only if you have the means of making such a sentence do you have the means of proving it to be true. Godel's theorems only show that a computer program cannot make its own Godelian sentence, but they do not show that a computer program could not make a Godelian sentence for another (presumably simpler) computer program. As such, Godel does not show that computer programs cannot perform precisely the same trick that humans do.
And it is also not true to suppose that Godel shows that humans can always perform the trick on a computer program. As I said, making these sentences is difficult, and it may be entirely impossible for any human to develop a Godel sentence for a complex computer program. Any computer program which has the same intelligence as a human being is certainly of this level. Since there is no reason to believe that a human could produce a Godel sentence for their own brain, humans are just as vulnerable to the Godel trick as computer programs, and the Lucas/Penrose argument fails.
DM & Alastair:
DeleteYour side conversation has attracted my attention, yet I'm not even sure what you're talking about or how it's relevant to the topic of metaphysics and string theory.
As Spock might say: My behavior is illogical.
Hi Mufi,
DeleteI don't blame you if you're lost. This started as a very long exchange on Massimo's post on Max Tegmark's Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) a couple of weeks ago.
The exchange started out as a debate on whether Massimo was wrong about two things:
1) Whether wave/particle duality and the probability functions of quantum mechanics is enough to show that reality is in some respects not physical (Massimo and I think it is not a good argument, Alastair thinks it is)
2) Whether the MUH (and I guess String Theory) ought to be called pseudoscience (Massimo and I think no, Alastair thinks yes).
The conversation broadened to include a debate on several other topics.
1) Whether Alastair's concept of God is coherent (and in particular whether the concept of an infinitely great being is any more coherent than the concept of a greatest integer)
2) Whether the MUH accounts for causality
3) Whether Godel's incompleteness theorem shows that intelligence cannot be computational, as argued by Lucas and Penrose.
I'm bringing up the argument again because Alastair bailed on it. I'm using it to demonstrate how unreasonable he is being in claiming victory over Massimo simply because Massimo got tired of responding to him. It doesn't necessarily have a whole lot to do with this comic strip.
Thanks for that summary, DH.
DeleteAlastair and I have clashed before, which might go a long way towards explaining my interest in your response to him - particularly if one recognizes human cognition as saturated with emotion, as I do.
Yet, as a self-identified agnostic on all matters metaphysical (God is only the tip of the iceberg), as well as a fan of embodied cognition/philosophy (in the Lakoff-Johnson genre), I may very well fall somewhere in the middle between your two positions...not that I'm prepared to say much more than that, here and now. After all, I see the blog-comment format as more of a soapbox than as an academic forum or court room.
So much for "rationally speaking", right? :-)
To Alastair,
ReplyDeleteI'm not censoring you, my friend. I am simply rejecting comments that contain insults rather than constructive points. It ought to be clear by now that I have a high degree of tolerance for your sarcasm, but that tolerance isn't unlimited.
Try to reformulate your thoughts using proper language and I'll be happy to let the posts through. Although I'm done responding to the same question you keep asking almost every post, I'm sure others will keep trying.
And so what if he has to eat crow? You've never been mistaken in anything?
ReplyDelete@ michael fugate
ReplyDelete> And so what if he has to eat crow? You've never been mistaken in anything? <
That's the problem. He can't acknowledge his mistakes.
I still can't quite understand why this bothers you so much. Are you keeping score? Is it a game to see how many philosophers you can get to concede they have made a mistake? In this case there is really no evidence that anyone is mistaken - there seems to be genuine disagreement over the status of string theory..
Delete@ michael fugate
Delete> I still can't quite understand why this bothers you so much. <
I consider intellectual honesty to be a serious matter. Apparently you don't.
> In this case there is really no evidence that anyone is mistaken - there seems to be genuine disagreement over the status of string theory.. <
There's definitely evidence for intellectual dishonesty here. If you truly believe that an alleged scientific theory (e.g. string theory) is actually a metaphysical theory, then you are intellectually obligated (by the virtue of honesty) to acknowledge that such a theory qualifies as a pseudoscientific theory (by definition). Failure to do so on your part reveals a basic character flaw - namely, that you lack intellectual honesty. (Either that, or you lack the intellectual capacity to make the connection.) The evidence becomes especially damning when you are in the business of labeling other scientists and their theories as pseudoscientific.
Hi Alastair,
DeleteI don't think Massimo has made a mistake in this case, and I'm sure he doesn't think so either.
Whoever is right or wrong, it shouldn't take too much imagination for you to put yourself in Massimo's shoes and realise this. From his perspective, you keep repeating an argument which makes no sense and demand that he acknowledges his mistake. This gets tiresome eventually, so he stops responding. This is not intellectual dishonesty.
From the perspective of some others on this blog, you appear to be just as "intellectual dishonest". It really does appear to me as if I have destroyed some of your arguments, particularly on Godel, and you have refused to acknowledge this.
I could have done what you are doing, and accused you of intellectual dishonesty. Instead, I just assume that you didn't buy my argument, (either because you don't understand it or because I have made some mistake), and you have tired of the apparently futile discussion.
I could also accuse you of intellectual dishonesty for resorting to accusations that I have "moved the goalposts" when I have done no such thing. What I described either accounts for causality or demonstrates that no causality is needed - it depends what is meant by causality. But because I don't intuitively know precisely what you mean by "causality", the flexibility of my interpretation of the term as I attempt to grasp your position is termed "moving the goalposts" and you abandon the conversation just when it could have been put on a fresh footing with a discussion of Conway's Game of Life as a model universe.
My point is that you may think you have established intellectual dishonesty but you haven't. Everyone has a point of view, and what looks dishonest from your perspective may not be from the perspective of your interlocutor. It's poor form to start crowing prematurely that you have won the argument simply because the other party has grown tired of you.
On this topic,
ReplyDeleteSean Carrol has an opinion on the 'Edge Annual Question' that I find hard to believe.
The question is “What scientific idea is ready for retirement?”, and Carrol picks falsifiablility. Wow! is all I can say to that one.
Seriously? Oh crap. Does he realize that falsificationism is a philosophical, not a scientific idea? And that philosophers have gone beyond it, like decades ago??
Delete" Does he realize that falsificationism is a philosophical, not a scientific idea?"
Deleteyes - from his blog :
"My answer was “Falsifiability.” More of a philosophical idea than a scientific one, but an idea that is bandied about by lazy scientists far more than it is invoked by careful philosophers."
from his Edge opinion :
"String theory and other approaches to quantum gravity involve phenomena that are likely to manifest themselves only at energies enormously higher than anything we have access to here on Earth. The cosmological multiverse and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics posit other realms that are impossible for us to access directly. Some scientists, leaning on Popper, have suggested that these theories are non-scientific because they are not falsifiable."
"The truth is the opposite. Whether or not we can observe them directly, the entities involved in these theories are either real or they are not. Refusing to contemplate their possible existence on the grounds of some a priori principle, even though they might play a crucial role in how the world works, is as non-scientific as it gets."
I don't think asking that a scientific theory be potentialy testable is the same thing as refusing to 'contemplate' the idea behind the proposed theory.
I read through some of the responses from the (176 !) edgy contributors to answering
DeleteWHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT?
Like "The idea that geometry is the description of physical space is engrained in us, and might sound hard to get rid of it, but it is unavoidable; it is just a matter of time. Better get rid of it soon." (Carlo Rovelli, Theoretical Physicist)
I haven't read through all of them, but I didn't find anything there that was particularly novel or surprising.
I'd suggest actually reading what he says. He seems to respect philosophers, and recognises the history and the role of falisification in the history of science. He is mostly arguing that it's a blunt criterion and that the problem is more subtle than many scientists or amateur philosophers are willing to accept.
DeleteOn his blog, he introduces the argument with the following paragraph:
"My answer was “Falsifiability.” More of a philosophical idea than a scientific one, but an idea that is bandied about by lazy scientists far more than it is invoked by careful philosophers. Thinking sensibly about the demarcation problem between science and non-science, especially these days, requires a bit more nuance than that."
His response in detail is here:
http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25322
The Edge website was down yesterday so I was reply from the excerpt on his blog. I have now read his piece. I still feels to me like it falls his view is biased to keeping the fringes of theorhetical physics on the science side of the science/philosophy line. He replaces falsifiable with 'definite ' & 'empirical'. Definite just means clear and unambiguous. Empirical is defined pretty loosely however so that string theory & many worlds hypotheses fit under his usage. Yes there is an interplay between theory & data, but when the theory can take a near infinite number forms (like string theory) how does that that effect the demarcation. I think Sean believes that 'in principal' string theory and many worlds interpretations are supported by the data. My view is that what we believe 'in principle' falls under philosophy.
DeleteSorry for all the spelling/grammar errors (even worse than usual). Comes from trying to comment quickly trying to get back to my work.
DeleteOkay. Let's summarize.
ReplyDeleteThe "mathematical universe hypothesis" is "metaphysically informed science" while "string theory" is "scientifically informed metaphysics."
Does that sound about right...Professor? Or, are you going to censor my comment? Declaring it too offensive because it exposes your contradictory argumentation on this subject matter? (Is that how it works?)
Hi Alastair,
DeleteI'm not sure Massimo is going to answer you.
I would suggest, and I think that Massimo would agree, that the MUH is scientifically informed metaphysics and String Theory is a mathematical theory searching for some falsifiable physical predictions - a proto-hypothesis. I think he would disagree with both of your suggestions.
We would also both disagree with you that either constitute pseudoscience. If you think the definition from Shermer can qualify either as pseudoscience then Massimo and I simply disagree with the definition, or at least your interpretation of it.
There, that should be pretty clear. Can we drop this line of discussion now?