About Rationally Speaking


Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Friday, October 25, 2013

Objective moral truth? Thoughts on Carrier’s take — Part I

by Massimo Pigliucci

I’m getting a little tired of writing about the relationship between science and philosophy when it comes to ethics, as I’ve made my views abundantly clear on this blog and elsewhere. Nonetheless, more than one of my readers has exorted me to take on Richard Carrier’s arguments to the effect that science can answer moral questions, as these arguments are allegedly much better than those advanced by more prominent skeptics, such as Sam Harris and Michael Shermer.

I took a look in particular at a recent post by Carrier where he summarizes his views after my debate with Shermer and the commentary about it provided by Ophelia Benson. Indeed, Carrier is significantly more careful (less sloppy?) than either Harris or Shermer, though I think he ultimately still misses the mark. Before proceeding, a couple of caveats: no, this is not going to be a comprehensive response to everything Carrier has written about this topic. The guy writes too much, is too long winded, far too obnoxious for me to be able to withstand reading him for more than a few minutes at a time, and frankly my interest in the subject matter just isn’t strong enough to overcome all of the above. Moreover, mine is not an attempt to engage Carrier directly (again, for the above mentioned reasons), and if he doesn’t like it that’s just too bad. I am writing this because I try to be sensitive to my readers’ requests and opinions, and for my own edification. Accordingly, this will be the last post on this topic for a while, and certainly the only one dealing with Carrier.

To begin with, then, a quick recap of my own views, with which Carrier’s take is to be contrasted. I think ethics is an exercise in applied rationality, specifically it is the activity that uses logic and general argumentation to explore the consequences of our actions toward each other in an attempt to provide us with guidance on the many occasions in which our values or intentions clash. Like all exercises in applied rationality it welcomes and indeed requires empirical input. There is no moral philosophy to be done in a vacuum. Some of this input comes from everyday knowledge or observation, other may come from “science,” by which I mean the sort of highly structured activity that comprises research in biology, physics, psychology, neuroscience, and so forth. I explicitly reject as empty the much broader concept of science notoriously espoused by people like Harris, Shermer, Krauss and so forth — which basically equates science with any bit of empirical information no matter how trivial or disconnected from a theoretical framework. Again, if you don’t like it, so be it, but at least I’m clarifying what I think in the hope of avoiding tiresome talking past each other because of semantic incomprehension. Further, I do not believe in “objective” moral truths in anything like the sense that there objectively is such a thing as the planet Saturn, or even in the (different) sense that mathematical truths are objective. Ethics is a human creation, it likely originated as a set of prosocial instincts that we share with other social primates, and it further evolved by a mix of cultural practice and rational discourse.

Phew. Now let’s turn to Carrier’s summary of his own positions. The first task he sets for himself is to rephrase Harris’ (and Shermer’s) argument in a more intelligible and defensible way (at which he does indeed succeed). Here is the result, verbatim:
Premise 1. Morals and values are physically dependent (without remainder) on the nature of any would-be moral agent (such that given the nature of an agent, a certain set of values will necessarily obtain, and those values will then entail a certain set of morals). 
Premise 2. By its own intrinsic nature, the most overriding value any conscious agent will have is for maximizing its own well-being and reducing its own suffering. This includes not just actual present well-being and suffering, but also the risk factors for them (an agent will have an overriding interest in reducing the risk of its suffering as well as its actual suffering; and likewise in increasing the probability of its long-term well-being as well as its present well-being). 
Premise 3. All of the above is constrained (and thus determined) by natural physical laws and objects (the furniture of the universe and how it behaves). 
Premise 4. The nature of an agent, the desires of conscious beings, and the laws of nature are all matters of fact subjectable to empirical scientific inquiry and discovery. (Whether this has been done or not; i.e. this is a claim to what science could do, not to what science has already done.) 
Conclusion:  Therefore, there are scientifically objective (and empirically discernible) right and wrong answers in all questions of moral fact and value (i.e. what values people have, and what morals those values entail when placed in conjunction with the facts.
Carrier reassures us that the full argument on which the above summary is based is deductively valid, as testified by “four philosophy professors” who examined it before it was published in a chapter of The End of Christianity (ed. by John Loftus), which Carrier, in his own inimitable style, tells us ought to be required reading for anyone engaging in this sort of debate. Whatever. I find it ironic that later on in the same essay Carrier disparages the academic peer review process, apparently except in the case of his own papers. [He says, and I quote: “Academic peer review (for books and journals in philosophy) simply does not look for, nor even rewards, best cases. They just publish any rubbish that meets their minimal standards (and those standards are not very high, relatively to where they could be).”]

I actually think there is plenty wrong with Carrier’s argument as summarized above, in that several more (currently hidden) premises or clarifications need to be added in order to really make it deductively valid. But it doesn’t matter, for two reasons: first, I don’t think that formal syllogistic reasoning like this can settle complex and fuzzy issues like the ones under discussion; second, several of Carrier’s premises can be challenged, which even he admits would dispatch his argument regardless of its alleged formal validity.

Let us then start with Premise 1: “Morals and values are physically dependent on the nature of any would-be moral agent.” This is trivially true, unless one is a mystical dualist of some sort. But notice that it doesn’t really purchase as much as Carrier seems to think. To see this, turn it into this alternative phrase, dealing with mathematics rather than ethics:

M1: Mathematical objects and truths are physically dependent on the nature of any would-be mathematically thinking agent.

Indeed, but I think we would agree that this observation cannot possibly be used in an argument aiming at proving that science (as opposed to mathematics) is how we discover those objects and truths.

On to premise 2 (though I remind the reader that all that is needed to dismantle Carrier’s logical house of cards is a serious challenge to just one of his premises, any one would do): “By its own intrinsic nature, the most overriding value any conscious agent will have is for maximizing its own well-being and reducing its own suffering.” Let us set aside what Carrier may mean by the “intrinsic nature” of the moral agent. I take it that he is telling us about the most overriding values of said agent because he wants to use such values as the basis for his concept of morality (as in: a behavior is moral if it maximizes the agent’s well-being and reduces his suffering). He doesn’t actually say so, hence my suspicion above that there are hidden premises and further clarifications needed to make his argument fly. But surely this is a very particular, and highly debatable, conception of morality. Indeed — dare I say it? — it sounds almost Randian (as in the infamous Ayn Rand)! (Boy, is Carrier not going to like this parallel!) Kant certainly would reject it, and so would a virtue ethicist like myself, though on different grounds. Indeed, even a utilitarian should deny that this is a good way to think of morality, because though utilitarians are indeed concerned with maximizing “well being” and minimizing suffering, they are talking at the societal, not necessarily the individual level. So we are 2 for 2 as far as the number of problematic premises in Carrier’s argument.

What about P3? Well, it says: “All of the above is constrained (and thus determined) by natural physical laws and objects,” which is an increasingly popular position among skeptics. But of course the parenthetical statement doesn’t necessarily follow, and if it did it would put a hard stop to any further conversation. There is no question that the laws of physics constrain everything that happens in the universe: regardless of how complex and intelligent you are, you ain’t gonna violate the principle of conservation of energy, or the second principle of thermodynamics. But constraint isn’t synonymous with determination, as the latter is a much stronger statement that is still open to debate (and about which I’m pretty much agnostic

Moreover — and this is a point that provides me with constant amusement — if one really thinks that human actions are rigidly determined from the conditions that obtained at the Big Bang (which, unless I seriously misread him, is what Carrier is implying) then there is no coherent sense in which it is worth having any discussion at all about what is right or wrong: we will do whatever we are destined to do (I guess including the writing of pretentious philosophical posts and sarcastic responses!) and that’s the end of the matter. That, of course, is why I prefer to entirely sidestep the so-called free will debate and assume that human beings have a capacity of volition — we can make autonomous (which of course doesn’t mean a-causal) decisions. Otherwise, any talk of morality is empty gibberish.

Finally, premise 4: “The nature of an agent, the desires of conscious beings, and the laws of nature are all matters of fact subjectable to empirical scientific inquiry and discovery.” Well, yes they are, but there are two huge caveats here. First, is Carrier attempting to turn ethics from a prescriptive into a descriptive discipline? It would appear so, but that move comes at a high price, since one can no longer talk about “ought,” just of “is.” Carrier does take this challenge on in the latter part of his essay, borrowing heavily from the work of philosopher Philippa Foot (perhaps best known for having invented the idea of trolley thought experiments). I will get back to Foot and her contribution in the second part of this post.

Second, note that we can again substitute our rational mathematician to Carrier’s moral agent. P4 would remain true, but it would also be irrelevant to the idea that empirical science is going to provide us with the answers we are seeking (for the same reason I brought in when commenting on P1). Lastly, even if we agree that empirical evidence is indeed germane to ethical reasoning (and I think it is), it will still underdetermine it for the simple reason that logical-conceptual space (in which ethical reasoning moves) is much broader than empirical space (in which science operates). What this means, simply put, is that we could agree on all the relevant empirical facts and still disagree on their moral valence, depending on our ranking of values, or on our general ethical framework (i.e., depending on our meta-ethical position).

Let us take stock, then. I think I have good reasons to think that Carrier’s formal argument actually relies on a number of additional hidden premises, and that therefore it is not at all clear whether it is valid. More crucially, every single one of his five premises can be reasonably (and, I think, successfully) challenged. Which means that I don’t really need to add anything else to my case against Carrier’s pretension of having “demonstrated” that science can answer moral questions. But there is indeed something more, and perhaps more interesting, to be said about his essay. I will do so in a few days...

65 comments:

  1. I appreciate that you are taking the time to address Carrier's argument. I think his take is interesting, and I haven't yet seen a critique of it. However, I think you actually misinterpreted part of his post: Carrier actually says that it was the more detailed version of the argument presented in his chapter in "The End of Christianity"--and not the informally phrased version of the blog post--that he formally proved, and it was that version of the argument that was peer-reviewed by four philosophy professors. Carrier's chapter in "The End of Christianity" is indeed a long one, and I understand you're reluctant to read it if you find his style tedious (personally, I rather like it), but if you'd like, I could type up the formal arguments he includes in the appendix to his chapter and send them to you.

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    1. Björn,

      thanks for the comment. Yes, I should have been more clear about the difference btw the full argument and the summary. I have modified the main text accordingly.

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  2. Massimo,

    I find difficult to take seriously anybody who talks of maximization without noticing that it is impossible to maximize more than one variable at a time. Even the formula “maximizing its own well-being and reducing its own suffering” is either impossible to realize or redundant.

    If “suffering” is defined as the negative of “ well-being”, it is trivially true that when “well-being” is maximized, then “suffering” is automatically minimized. In this case the second part of the formula is redundant. If instead “suffering” is defined independently from “well-being”, the formula is useless, because, maximizing “well-being” will completely determine the solution and nothing can be done to further reduce “suffering”.

    The situation gets much worst when maximizing the “well-being” of multiple agents is concerned. Since it is impossible to maximize the “well-being” of everyone, one needs to introduce some sort of “average” or “sum-of-the-squares” “well-being” to be maximized. The particular formula used to compute this “average well-being” has to be obtained from one's ethical principles and so it cannot be used as an input to the derivation of a science-based ethics.

    For instance a Randian agent will give weight one to its own “well-being” and zero to everyone's else's. A strictly egalitarian agent will give the same weight to everyone, etc.

    Even when just one agent is involved, there is the problem that “well-being” is time-dependent, and so one has to weight the present “well-being” against the future. For instance an extra drink tonight may increase my present “well-being”, but the resulting hangover will decrease my “well-being” and increase my “suffering” tomorrow morning.

    Carrier's formulation does not seem to address any of these obvious problems.

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    1. Well said.

      I would add that well-being is probably not a single value either. There's ecstasy, contentment, fulfillment, hope, development, moment-to-moment happiness, etc. Probably a number of other components that we don't even have names for, a little like the way the "umami" was only recognised relatively recently even though it forms an integral part of our perception of taste.

      The idea that there's a single variable "well-being" which we can hope to maximise even in an individual seems to me to be naive.

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    2. I find difficult to take seriously anybody who talks of maximization without noticing that it is impossible to maximize more than one variable at a time.
      Oh good - you dont take engineering seriously as a discipline then? we do talk about maximising efficiency (itself decided based on multiple variables like performance, flexibility, cost etc.) Supposedly it cant be done - except we do it all the time.

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    3. Note that I said you can't optimize MORE than one variable at the time. You can, of course, optimize one variable, with all sort of additional constraints (identities and inequalities.) However, it is not possible to optimize two variables. For instance, it is not possible to do what management always asks for: maximize performance AND minimize cost. What is possible is, for instance, to maximize performance with the constraints that the cost is less than $50M each, and that the thing fits in the cargo bay of a C-17.

      This implies that "maximum happiness for the maximum number of people" is a mathematically impossible goal, for instance. Achieving some minimum happiness (or an upper bound on suffering) for the largest possible number of people is a mathematically well-defined problem.

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  3. Thanks, Massimo.

    I am by no means in agreement with Carrier or other modern consequentialists (which is what they are) but I think there is a more convincing (or at least convincing to me) argument in support of the position that they provide. It is quite simple:

    1. Life on earth is of fundamental value
    2. It is highly probable that much of life on earth will be intentionally or unintentionally rubbed out over the next few centuries
    3. The best hedge against intentional/unintentional rubbing out is moral homogeneity
    4. Science (generally defined) is the most universal cultural practice on earth
    5. Science is the best available framework for building a moral homogeneity

    Entirely dependent on some empirical assertions that I can't back up, and 5 doesn't necessarily follow, but it's still a more compelling argument to me.

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    1. Hi niwiyi,

      How do you defend the proposition that life is of fundamental value?

      How do you defend the proposition that life will be wiped out in the next few centuries?

      How do you defend the proposition that moral homogeneity is the best hedge? In fact, moral heterogeneity seems to me to be a better bet because then at least some of the diverse moral systems that develop might succeed in promoting life on earth, whereas if there is only one moral system then all our eggs are in one basket.

      Religion is arguably a more universal cultural practice than science.

      Finally, there is general disagreement on how to use science to build a moral homogeneity. There's more than one way to do it. Science can tell us that fetuses are human beings with sensitivity and with many of their characteristics as potential persons already determined, but it can also tell us they are essentially mindless. So how does that help us to resolve the abortion debate?

      It's far from quite simple!

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    2. I certainly would agree with premiss 3. I don't think you have even empirically-based assertions.

      And, by analogy from non-moral homogeneity, the knife cuts the other way. Indeed, from the evidence of animal and plant die-offs, concerns about monocrop agriculture, etc., if there's anything empirical, it argues by analogy against this premiss.

      I'm with Disagreable's critique of premiss 4.

      Premiss 5 certainly has nothing empirical behind it, and given the weakness of other premisses, falls in the spirit, at least, of circular reasoning from where I stand. Iranian mullahs might argue for religious fundamentalism.

      Beyond that, you don't define "best" in that premiss. So, even if I grant the validity of that premiss, do you mean "morally best" or "most efficient"?

      Premiss 5 is, IMO, nothing other than circular reasoning

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    3. DM:

      Universal value life: it's an arbitrary starting point, but a reasonable one, isn't it?

      End of world: an ever-increasing kill efficiency rate. That is, it is taking less and less labour to kill more and more people (life) over time. I think it perfectly credible to argue that there will be ice-9 (or it's equivalent) within 100 years. The higher the kill efficiency, the fewer and fewer megalomaniacs needed to commiserate over global destruction. As the ratio of killers to potentially killed approaches 0, the probability of our demise approaches 1.

      Religions are universal only insofar as they are pretty well all universally incommensurable. On the other hand, I can communicate with a Chinese, Brazilian and Kenyan scientist in, more or less, the same scientific language (even if we couldn't speak the same language). They can (and have!) read what I do and assessed it's rigour and scientific value.

      How to use science for moral homogeneity: Well that IS a hard question that I can't answer. Neither can Harris or Carrier or the rest of the neurobioconsequentialists (TM). If you read the introductory paragraph to my post, you'll note that I merely stated that I think my argument is more convincing than theirs. They have to frame their arguments in terms of well being or something related. So they have to define well-being, map it perfectly to human mental states and then resolve the multi-criteria optimization problem raised by Filippo Neri above. I think my starting points (1 and 2) are easier to accept and work with

      At any rate, I still think it's all dumb.

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    4. Hi niwiyi,

      I'll grant that there may be an argument to back up what you're saying. I'm only making the point that it's not really that simple, and it's far from obvious to me that your approach is any more successful than Carrier's or Harris's.

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  4. I find your reticence to accept objective moral truths curious, Massimo. Often when you describe your ethical position to people who are proposing "a science of morality", you behave as if there are moral "truths" (such as the wrongness of sexual mutilation regardless of culture in your debate Shermer), but when you further criticize them, you often bring up a contrast between their desire for an objective morality (defined by them as a scientific enterprise) by iterating your meta-ethical view of moral antirealism. However, I think this view weakens your argument and often confuses those who disagree with you, since under such a view, your view of ethics as applied rationality seems irrelevant, since if there are no moral truths to discover, and the only reason we engage in ethics is because of its evolutionary legacy and its indispensibility for complex modern societies, why can't science offer a descriptive account of this kind of "morality"? I guess what I'm trying to convey is that your reluctance to commit to the idea that there is a truth value to moral statements such as "Murder is wrong" makes your case less convincing.

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    1. Hi Korey,

      "why can't science offer a descriptive account of this kind of "morality""

      There certainly are moral truths in a descriptive sense. I'm sure Massimo would agree. There's nothing wrong with an anthropological science of morality seeking to catalogue the different views of right and wrong found among humans.

      But just because there are no objective normative moral "oughts" doesn't mean that we can't use rationality to guide our morality. We can accept as axioms certain ideas, such as the utilitarian "we ought to seek to improve human well-being" or the virtues that Massimo would espouse and then use reason to assess our different options in the light of these axioms.

      The point about there being no objective moral truths is that it's not possible in principle to determine which axioms are the right ones. All are equally valid.

      But if you and I agree that causing harm to people is wrong, then we can conclude that given that axiom, sexual mutilation is wrong regardless of culture.

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    2. > But if you and I agree that causing harm to people is wrong, then we can conclude that given that axiom, sexual mutilation is wrong regardless of culture.

      Yes, the problem would be then that people from different cultures who don't agree with that premise that causing harm is wrong, or that other premises have an overriding priority over not causing harm like sexual purity, can never be persuaded by any evidence or argument.

      I also find it suspicious that the "greatest" moral philosophers who defended universal moral values , probably with the exception of utilitarian philosophers, always ended up concluding that those universal moral values correspond to the customs and prejudices of the culture on which they lived.

      I think moral psychology is the science to go when describing this kind of morality, and from what I've read on the subject, it ends up putting the burden of proof on moral realists.

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    3. I think we're on the same page, paco.

      My point is that if any two people agree on some basic premises regarding morality, the correct application of those axioms then becomes a topic amenable to rational discussion.

      However, if people don't agree on the fundamentals, as you have illustrated, then there's not probably not too much point trying to defend a particular moral view.

      If you acknowledge that agreement on fundamentals allows moral philosophy to be productive, then I think we're in complete accord.

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  5. Spell check: Rather than "phew" it should be pew.

    And to clear the air: For science to determine anything, first and foremost it must understand its own self-proven uncertainty or fallibility, the problem is measure. Beyond their probabilities of measure and doubt is the absolute. Nature subjectively is immeasurable whereas Nature objectively without a doubt simply and justly is.

    Glad to help =

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  6. Hi Massimo,

    Really great to read your thoughts on this. I sent a few comments Dr. Carrier's way to try to explain to him where I saw the problems with his argument, but I didn't make much headway, got frustrated with it and gave up. In particular, it was a little annoying that he refused to answer my most important arguments directly and instead generally insisted that I get his book. (Which I did, but the wrong one, unfortunately).

    Anyway, there is a lot of window dressing and unnecessary elaboration in Carrier's argument, and I think you've focused on much of this. I don't think I really go along with your particular objections too much. In particular, I don't think that it is true that "Mathematical objects and truths are physically dependent on the nature of any would-be mathematically thinking agent." This statement rings false to any mathematical Platonist, so even if it might be defended from a non-Platonist stance it's far from obviously true.

    The core of Dr Carrier's argument is very very simple.

    1. Morality is about what you ought to do.
    2. Any rational agent ought to act so as to satisfy its desires and goals. Any other action would be irrational, and so the satisfaction of desires and goals is the ultimate "ought", and all other "oughts" are subordinate to this.
    3. Therefore, objective moral truths concern what choices a well-informed rational agent would make so as to achieve satisfaction, and these are empirical facts which we can only determine with science and reason.

    Seems quite Randian.

    But I think Carrier is less selfish than Rand. He really believes that the only way to be happy and satisfied with life is to help others and to behave in a manner most of us would call moral. This is why he thinks that morality can be reconciled with concern only for one's own interests. He sees altruism as rewarding, and unenlightened selfishness as a recipe for misery.

    He thinks psychopaths are making an error when they act immorally because their choices cut them off from genuine, rewarding human relationships. He thinks slave-owners are in error because the cognitive dissonance arising from realising that slaves have a legitimate reason to kill them is worse than the benefit they get from the slavery.

    I think he is wrong. I think psychopaths don't value human relationships in the same way as most people do, and some psychopaths may get genuinely more fulfilling lives from behaving immorally than they would from acting morally. I also think that many slave-owners were perfectly happy to accept that slaves had a justification for murder as long as they continued to reap the rewards of slavery.

    Carrier's response to this argument is that if this is the case, then what he has shown with his cast-iron irrefutable peer-reviewed valid argument is that then it is simply an empirical question as to whether these objections are true. If they are, then it would indeed be moral for the slave-owner to own slaves, but he doubts that this is the case.

    I think this is ridiculous, because no definition of morality that allows even the possibility that slave-owning is acceptable can be morality at all. He has defined something all right, but it ain't morality.

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    1. I think you nail one problem with Carrier. Like most Gnu Atheists, in my opinion, he overestimates the rationality of human nature. Per points in your second comment, I think the determinism/fatalism is hair-splitting. Of course, I'm on record as rejecting the whole classically framed idea of free will (or volitionism or whatever) vs. determinism issue anyway. We, or whatever particular version of we is in the saddle at the time of a particular point of decision, act on an action-by-action basis. The degree to which a particular act has volition involved (note "degree"; the polarities idea of the classical issue is another reason I reject it) is something that must be determined for that particular action.

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  7. Hi Massimo,

    In addition to addressing Carrier's arguments, I wanted to make two points to you where I think you are slightly mistaken.

    Firstly, I think Carrier's argument is fundamentally different from Harris's, even though he doesn't see it himself. I think Harris's position is actually much more reasonable.

    Harris simply asserts that it is true that morality is about maximising the well-being of conscious creatures. He offers no evidence for this other than that it seems to be what everyone agrees on. Taking this as his essential premise, the rest of his argument is relatively reasonable and straightforward, although there certainly are one or two issues.

    The only major problem I have with Harris's argument is therefore that he has nothing to provide the ultimate foundation for his supposed objective moral framework other than this assertion, although I don't actually disagree much with his assertion myself.

    Carrier's argument is completely different. He thinks morality is certainly about maximising one's own well-being, but that maximising the well-being of others is necessary to achieve this. I've already spelled out why I disagree with this, and I think Carrier's argument is much weaker than Harris's.

    The second point of disagreement is on the implications of determinism for an interest in the philosophy of morality. You say we're going to do what we're going to do, and there's no point talking about it.

    But there's no point in even saying this unless you think we have at least the free will necessary to see your point and agree with you, perhaps staying out of the free will and morality debates altogether.

    But, no, we don't need free will. Your statement might be able to deterministically affect our behaviour and cause us not to engage in pointless debates about free will just like any other mechanical cause might. However, the same is true of debates on free will and moral philosophy. If the universe is deterministic, we're going to have these debates anyway, even if they are pointless, but what's more, these debates may have further effects down the line, perhaps even being causal in moral improvement and a betterment of the human race.

    Determinism is not the same as fatalism. We can accept determinism and yet strive to do what we can to improve our lot.

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  8. About the mathematically thinking agent (which certainly wouldn't be me, haha): I don't think this is a good analogy. Mathematics holds true whether or not there is any thinking agent or not. Before life developed on Earth or anywhere else in the universe, 1 + 1 already equaled 2.

    There was no "right" or "wrong" behavior, though, because there was no animal which had any desires. This actually underscores your point. Mathematics deals with facts of logic, ethics deals with (if anything) how we WANT things to be, and secondarily the behaviors conducive to the desired states of affair.

    Thus, ethics is subjective, mathematics and science are objective. It is fear and the desire for certainty that make us search for objective moral truths. Ultimately I think it is better to be honest and admit that there are no such truths. It doesn't need to keep us from seeking a consensus on moral issues. Perhaps it's the best starting point for that, really.

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    1. I’m not sure I understand the distinction your making in terms of mathematics and ethics. Mathematics, like ethics, are verbal formulations of human beings so neither exist without humans. However, I think when you say mathematics holds true without any thinking agent, you mean that what mathematics (as a human activity) points to or describes in the world (i.e. scientific laws) holds true without the agent. An easy example of this would be the law of gravity working exactly the same without any thinking agent. We may not have math as a linguistic device to describe gravity but the effect still is there.

      This I think is fine but I don’t see how you go from there to say that ethics is not objective based on the above. To give a comparison example, human biology would also not hold true independent of humans. The same is true for ethics as ethics is a property only relevant to thinking agents. As a result, I don’t see why if you wouldn’t use the same logic to say biology is not objective (or perhaps you would, I shouldn’t assume), why would you use that logic to say ethics is not objective?

      Note, I’m not necessarily convinced Ethics is objective but at the very least, I’m confused about the example you provided and the logic behind it.

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  9. "Further, I do not believe in “objective” moral truths in anything like the sense that there objectively is such a thing as the planet Saturn, or even in the (different) sense that mathematical truths are objective."

    Do you think we'll ever be able to reduce altruism to an algorithm? Given, there would be an army of conditionals.

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  10. The above comment that M1 is highly contentious, not just with unreconstructed Platonists, but the many mathematical Platonists (and ontological structural realists too I think,) If it's contentious, it's not trivial.

    Also, it seems to me that the premise buys quite a lot. Morals are determined by values which are determined by nature, It may be materialistic and deterministic, but both are significant claims, however unpopular they are with acceptable philosophers. There appears to be a distinction between morals as social transactions and values as individual predispostions but it's not at all clear that this constitutes a hidden assumption.

    As to the rest of the thread, there's too much writing, it's too long-winded and sadly some is too obnoxious to bother with, given the limits to my interest in the conventional wisdom.

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  11. which basically equates science with any bit of empirical information no matter how trivial or disconnected from a theoretical framework.
    Do you have any link where you elaborate why you disagree (sorry not a regular follower and dont know what google fu I should use)? I'd think that any information that is empirical in nature is inherently subject to science and a theoretical framework.

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  12. "Premise 2. By its own intrinsic nature, the most overriding value any conscious agent will have is for maximizing its own well-being and reducing its own suffering. "

    This could easily justify murdering someone for having cut you off in traffic if you could do it without getting caught. So the question to be asked is whether this is a moral value or something else.

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  13. Korey,

    > you behave as if there are moral "truths" ... iterating your meta-ethical view of moral antirealism <

    Others have already commented on this, but I’m not clear what the problem is. To continue the (partial!) analogy with mathematics, one can easily be an anti-realist and yet believe that there are such things as mathematical truths, no? Why would it be different in the case of ethics?

    MJA,

    > Spell check: Rather than "phew" it should be pew. <

    No, I really meant “phew,” as in an exclamation of relief.

    DM,

    > In particular, I don't think that it is true that "Mathematical objects and truths are physically dependent on the nature of any would-be mathematically thinking agent." <

    Don’t read too much in that analogy. All I meant was that in order to think of mathematical objects and truths one has to have a physical brain. Which I take it is all Carrier means with his analogous assertion in the case of moral truths. As you know, I’m sympathetic to mathematical Platonism (in fact, I’m beginning to think of myself as a mathematical realist and as an agnostic about moral realism / antirealism).

    > Seems quite Randian. <

    No kidding. Which is ironic, since I’m pretty sure Carrier hates Rand.

    > He thinks psychopaths are making an error when they act immorally <

    If so that tells you how little he understands about human psychology and psychopathology.

    > then it would indeed be moral for the slave-owner to own slaves, but he doubts that this is the case <

    But that, of course, is precisely what worries me (a lot) about attempts to reduce ethics to science. Which is why I’m spelling so much e-ink about it...

    > Harris simply asserts that it is true that morality is about maximising the well-being of conscious creatures. He offers no evidence for this other than that it seems to be what everyone agrees on. Taking this as his essential premise, the rest of his argument is relatively reasonable and straightforward <

    Straightforwardly wrong, you mean. I’m not sure about the extend to which Carrier’s and Harris’ arguments are really the same, but they sure seem very similar to me, as Carrier himself says. At any rate, if you read Harris’ book even somewhat superficially you’ll see that it is riddled with logical holes the size of a freight train.

    > But there's no point in even saying this unless you think we have at least the free will necessary to see your point and agree with you, perhaps staying out of the free will and morality debates altogether. <

    Which is exactly my take, at the moment.

    > Determinism is not the same as fatalism. <

    Technically you are right. But I always thought that’s a distinction without a difference.

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    1. Hi Massimo,

      "All I meant was that in order to think of mathematical objects and truths one has to have a physical brain. Which I take it is all Carrier means with his analogous assertion in the case of moral truths. "

      That's not what he means though.

      He doesn't mean that we need brains to think about morals. He means that the nature of human brains, our emotions, drives, aptitudes, likes and dislikes are critical for understanding morality. Were we different creatures, with a different evolutionary history, then what is right and wrong for us would be different. As it happens, we are social and enjoy helping each other, so what is moral for us is to help each other etc.

      He's still wrong overall, but not really on this point, in my view.

      "Which is ironic, since I’m pretty sure Carrier hates Rand."

      True, but then I explained why his view is actually different from Rand's. He's advocating altruism, not selfishness, because altruism feels good and will lead to greater life satisfaction. That's enough to distinguish him from Rand, in my view.

      "> then it would indeed be moral for the slave-owner to own slaves, but he doubts that this is the case <

      But that, of course, is precisely what worries me (a lot) about attempts to reduce ethics to science. Which is why I’m spelling so much e-ink about it..."

      I think it's a problem with Carrier's approach, but not with Harris's. Carrier places the ultimate goal to be to maximise one's own satisfaction. That leaves us open to accepting slavery and other cruelties. Harris places the ultimate goal to be to maximise the overall well-being of all conscious creatures. That seems to me to be more benign, and less likely to lead to abhorrent conclusions.

      Which is why I prefer Harris to Carrier, although ultimately I disagree with both.

      "Straightforwardly wrong, you mean ... if you read Harris’ book even somewhat superficially you’ll see that it is riddled with logical holes the size of a freight train."

      I really don't think it's that bad, in principle. In practice, I'm not sure it gets us anywhere. There are difficulties in quantifying well-being and in defining what kind of well-being we're talking about, and in figuring out whether we want to improve average well-being or total well-being, and what counts as an entity worthy of consideration - animals (and which animals), future generations, etc. In principle, though, it seems OK to me, once we accept his basic unfounded premise.

      "I’m not sure about the extend to which Carrier’s and Harris’ arguments are really the same, but they sure seem very similar to me, as Carrier himself says"

      I think the resemblance is superficial. Carrier thinks Harris's view is just a more incoherent version of his own, but I think it's fundamentally different in how it establishes the foundation for morality. Harris proposes a reasonably benign and plausible axiom as a brute fact, whereas Carrier presents a syllogism which leads to an absurd and in my view incorrect conclusion.

      I guess both views are reasonably similar in practice, however, quantifying "well-being" (Harris) or "satisfaction" (Carrier) in order to determine the best outcomes. However Harris remains focused on the well-being of all, whereas Carrier is focused on the satisfaction of the individual.

      "> Determinism is not the same as fatalism. <

      Technically you are right. But I always thought that’s a distinction without a difference."

      I strongly disagree, but I guess it's off-topic. Perhaps you'll post on this at some future date?

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  14. gun,

    > I don't think this is a good analogy. Mathematics holds true whether or not there is any thinking agent or not. <

    Don’t read too much in the analogy, see my comment above.

    > ethics is subjective, mathematics and science are objective <

    Not exactly, depending on what you mean by “subjective.” I’ll address this point in part II of the essay, while talking about Philippa Foot.

    Deepak,

    > Do you have any link where you elaborate why you disagree (sorry not a regular follower and dont know what google fu I should use)? I'd think that any information that is empirical in nature is inherently subject to science and a theoretical framework. <

    I’ve addressed this issue several times. Search “science and philosophy” on this blog, or check my “A Skeptics’ Skeptic” collection on Amazon, or the first chapter of Answers for Aristotle. Unless you broaden the definition of science so much that it becomes meaningless, the fact that I’m now sipping my favorite Italian drink is not a scientific assertion. Even though it is empirical and could be embedded in a “theoretical” framework (but why bother?).

    Jerry,

    > This could easily justify murdering someone for having cut you off in traffic if you could do it without getting caught. So the question to be asked is whether this is a moral value or something else. <

    Precisely.

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  15. "...then there is no coherent sense in which it is worth having any discussion at all about what is right or wrong: we will do whatever we are destined to do (I guess including the writing of pretentious philosophical posts and sarcastic responses!) and that’s the end of the matter." Yes! But this understates the problem; if we can only do what we are deterministically destined to do, then there is no point in any discussion about ANYTHING, because we will only think what we are destined to think, regardless of whether it is true or false, regardless of whether we think there are good or bad reasons supporting it. In short, determinism is incompatible with rationality.

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    1. Hi Phiwilli,

      I strongly disagree.

      As I vaguely explained before, determinism just accepts that the future is inevitable, that everything is caused by prior causes in a straightforward way.

      However that doesn't mean we don't affect the future. Quite the reverse. What we do now affects the future as part of that chain of causation. Accepting fatalism and doing nothing to prevent disasters allows those disasters to happen. Denying fatalism and working to avoid the disasters may cause them not to happen.

      Similarly, what we discuss now forms part of the chain of causation that influences our thoughts tomorrow. What we think tomorrow is deterministically destined precisely because of our discussions today - (and today's discussions are destined because of events leading up to them yesterday). To say there is no point in talking about anything is therefore to miss the point entirely.

      Determinism says that outcomes are inevitable, but it doesn't tell us which outcomes. Adopting a fatalistic attitude is to fail to act to achieve favourable outcomes, so fatalism is irrational. Those who are predetermined to be fatalistic are therefore predetermined to have more negative outcomes, and those like me who understand that determinism does not entail fatalism are predestined to have more positive outcomes and to explain to other people why determinism does not entail fatalism.

      If we really knew what was going to happen, then perhaps fatalism might make sense, since nothing we do could ultimately change the outcome. But that would be a paradox, because knowing the future would entail backwards causation, changing your current behaviour based on future events. However, as current behaviour forms part of the causal chain which determines the future, then of course we could change the future after all. Knowing the future entails this contradiction, which is probably why nature doesn't seem to allow it!

      In any case, it seems clear to me that determinism is entirely compatible with rationality.

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    2. Hi Disagreeable!
      You seem to infer that I advocated fatalism ("nothing we do makes any difference" sort of view) but I did not - fatalism is not in my post! As you point out, things we do have big effects; I agree. Maybe an analogy would clarify my position. Suppose a computer that, due to hardware or software glitches (doesn't matter which) regularly does some computations incorrectly. That's analogous to our behavior and thoughts being determined by our biology plus environment; the computer's output is determined by its hardware & software plus environmental input (usually via the keyboard). How could the computer itself ascertain (a little - anthropomorphism here, it's an analogy) whether its computations are correct or incorrect? It couldn't; it just computes what it's programmed to compute, be it correct or incorrect. If determinism is true, that's our situation. We just think what we're "programmed" to think, regardless of whether it's true or false,and we have no way of finding whether or determined thoughts are right or wrong - but of course we may be programmed to think that we can!

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    3. I didn't take you to be a fatalist, I took you to be denying determinism. I need to deny fatalism however to show why I think determinism is compatible with fatalism, as I see no problem with determinism a priori apart from possible conflict with findings from quantum mechanics (although there are interpretations of QM which are deterministic).

      What you say about our inability to know the correctness of our reasoning process is true regardless of determinism. Even if we had libertarian free will, with our decisions guided by an immortal soul, there would be no way to know if our reasoning was correct, because we cannot form any conclusions without using that reasoning. It's a completely different question from determinism and fatalism.

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  16. I still think that all this is much simpler. Although the distinction between scientific and non-scientific facts appears artificial to me, and I thus do consider science to be the communal knowledge-generating enterprise that deals with any and all empirical matters, there still remains the is-ought problem. Science is descriptive, not normative. And that is that.

    At best, science can say: If you do X, we will all die, but if you do Y, we will all live happily without disease and poverty. Or: If you do X, you will be very unhappy, but if you do Y, you will maximize fulfillment of your desires. But it does not follow as a matter of scientific observation that one should therefore do Y.

    For that, you need to add values, or goals. And once again, science can provide scientific observations: you have values A and goals B. But once again, it does not follow as a matter of scientific observations that one should have A and B. Why is that so hard to understand?

    ---

    I just looked again at Carrier's linked essay, and this kind of paragraph is precisely why I cannot stand reading him for long:

    It might not be immediately obvious how the conclusion (item 5) follows necessarily from those premises (items 1-4), but it does. I think it should be evident to any observer of just this list of propositions, who thinks about it carefully enough. But I formally prove it (by deductive logical syllogism) in a chapter on this topic that was peer reviewed by four professors of philosophy: Richard Carrier, “Moral Facts Naturally Exist (and Science Could Find Them),” in The End of Christianity (ed. John Loftus; Prometheus Books 2011), pp. 333-64, 420-29. That should be required reading for anyone who wants to challenge this conclusion (for even more of my discussion of this thesis, in print and online, see the links provided in my article on Shermer vs. Pigliucci).

    If I am ever that full of myself, please pour a bucket of cold water over me.

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  17. @ Massimo

    > This is trivially true, unless one is a mystical dualist of some sort. <

    Do you consider all forms of dualism to be mystical? If not, then what exactly is the difference between mystical dualism and non-mystical dualism?

    >
    M1: Mathematical objects and truths are physically dependent on the nature of any would-be mathematically thinking agent.

    Indeed <

    Indeed? What about the mathematical objects you posited in your brand of mathematical Platonism? Do they depend on the nature of a mathematically-thinking agent?

    > There is no question that the laws of physics constrain everything that happens in the universe: regardless of how complex and intelligent you are, you ain’t gonna violate the principle of conservation of energy, or the second principle of thermodynamics. <

    This is not exactly true. The law of the conservation of energy is always being violated.

    "Quantum mechanics allows, and indeed requires, temporary violations of conservation of energy, so one particle can become a pair of heavier particles (the so-called virtual particles), which quickly rejoin into the original particle as if they had never been there." (source: "Are virtual particles really constantly popping in and out of existence?" by Gordon Kane, October 9, 2006 edition of "Scientific American")

    > But constraint isn’t synonymous with determination, as the latter is a much stronger statement that is still open to debate (and about which I’m pretty much agnostic. <

    What exactly are you agnostic about? We know that everything is not physically determined. Quantum indeterminism is a scientifically established fact.

    > Moreover — and this is a point that provides me with constant amusement — if one really thinks that human actions are rigidly determined from the conditions that obtained at the Big Bang (which, unless I seriously misread him, is what Carrier is implying) then there is no coherent sense in which it is worth having any discussion at all about what is right or wrong: we will do whatever we are destined to do (I guess including the writing of pretentious philosophical posts and sarcastic responses!) and that’s the end of the matter <

    The moral implications are the same, regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. If determinism holds true, then every choice I make was ultimately predetermined and could not have been otherwise. If indeterminism holds true, then every choice I make ultimately reduces to some element of pure chance. I cannot be held anymore responsible for a choice or act that is ultimately the result of pure chance than I can for a choice or act that is ultimately predetermined by powers and forces external to "me."

    > That, of course, is why I prefer to entirely sidestep the so-called free will debate and assume that human beings have a capacity of volition — we can make autonomous (which of course doesn’t mean a-causal) decisions. Otherwise, any talk of morality is empty gibberish. <

    It would appear to me that you "sidestep" ("evade" would probably be a more appropriate word-choice here) the debate because you can't articulate any kind of position on free will that doesn't presuppose some kind of dualism and/or final cause (teleology).

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  18. Disagreeable,

    I would disagree with your claim that all axioms are equally valid. Even in mathematics, where there are many different possible axioms to choose from, there are still certain axioms that are not valid in any meaningful sense. If I attempt to construct a mathematical system on the basis of the axiom 1=2 for example, it is highly unlikely that I would succeed at constructing a mathematical system. Even if I did construct a system out of such an axiom, I don't think we could reasonably call it mathematics. This implies that some axioms are a necessary condition for certain concepts, which means for all intents and purposes there are "right" axioms to accept or at least there are wrong ones. Similarly, If I choose as an axiom that murder is a moral good, whatever system I'm constructing could not reasonably be called a morality

    Massimo,

    I'm rather agnostic on whether it is defensible to be anti-realist about mathematics, but still believe that there are mathematical truths, but that's another discussion entirely. The problem that I failed to articulate properly is that your notion of ethics is essentially a moral realist position----that under the appropriate domains in which morality exists as a phenomena, it is possible for moral truths to exist. As far as my understanding goes, moral realism as discussed in meta-ethics today does not entail any particular ontological commitment to what grounds the phenomena of morality, only that whatever grounds it, it is possible for moral claims to have a truth value. Thus when you, Massimo, say that you are an anti-realist, you are actually only claiming that you are an anti-realist about certain claims about the ontological status of morality and the attempts to ground objective morality from those non-existent groundings (like supernatural entities). But anti-realism about morality (the thesis that there are no moral truths because there is no such thing as morality) would not even grant you your restricted notion of ethics and morality and entails more radical nihilist conceptions of ethics like error theory, which claim that morality doesn't exist in any sense (even in the sense that you propose), thus making claims about moral truths are in error, and non-cognitivism, which claim that all talk of morality is meaningless and incoherent, which is so far removed from your view that I don't see what you gain by describing yourself as such, since your notion already describes morality as something real (under the qualifications that you propose), and thus something where it is possible to discover truths about .

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    1. Hi Korey,

      I do think that all axioms are equally valid. But if you're starting an entirely new mathematical system with the axiom that 1=2, then those are just symbols. If you start with that as an axiom, the semantics of one or more of those symbols must be different. Equality for example simply does not mean in that system what it means in standard mathematical notation. As such, I see no problem with establishing such a mathematical system.

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  19. >Moreover — and this is a point that provides me with constant amusement — if one really thinks that human actions are rigidly determined from the conditions that obtained at the Big Bang (which, unless I seriously misread him, is what Carrier is implying) then there is no coherent sense in which it is worth having any discussion at all about what is right or wrong

    If find it amusing that you find this amusing. The only way this can be amusing is if you think moral agents are not part of the physical universe. But they are a part of the physical universe. So even if human actions are rigidly determined from the conditions obtained at the Big Bang, it makes perfect sense to talk about right and wrong because we ourselves are part of the physical universe and act as physical causes. What we decide to do might be ultimately predetermined, but arguments other people make are among those things that do that predetermination. That's the view other philosophers hold and that's why they talk about right and wrong. You should have no reason to find it amusing.

    >Mathematical objects and truths are physically dependent on the nature of any would-be mathematically thinking agent.

    No you can't make this statement. This is just false. The reason mathematics is objective is precisely because the validity of its claims are not dependent on those who are doing it. Given the axioms we use, 1 + 1 is 2 even in another universe with no living beings. That's why nobody tries to determine mathematical truths via science. Morals and values are just not like that.

    Other than that, Carrier doesn't overcome the is-ought problem, though he has done a good job hiding it, and you are absolutely right to point that out. Having said that, I'd like a short answer from you to the following question. Killing innocent people is wrong. Why?


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  20. DM,

    > He doesn't mean that we need brains to think about morals. He means that the nature of human brains, our emotions, drives, aptitudes, likes and dislikes are critical for understanding morality. <

    I disagree. If that’s all he means, then that is a trivial statement.

    > Were we different creatures, with a different evolutionary history, then what is right and wrong for us would be different. <

    Again, no kidding.

    > He's advocating altruism, not selfishness, because altruism feels good and will lead to greater life satisfaction. That's enough to distinguish him from Rand, in my view. <

    Well, no. If you read his bit about *individual* well being and *individual* suffering, there is nothing, in principle, to distinguish him from Rand. Yes, he can state a personal preference for altruism, but it is not at all clear how it follows from what he actually writes.

    > Harris places the ultimate goal to be to maximise the overall well-being of all conscious creatures. That seems to me to be more benign, and less likely to lead to abhorrent conclusions. <

    Yeah, except when you take seriously the logical consequences of that sort of naive utilitarianism...

    Alex,

    > once again, it does not follow as a matter of scientific observations that one should have A and B. Why is that so hard to understand? <

    I hear you...

    Alastair,

    > Do you consider all forms of dualism to be mystical? <

    No, it is possible in principle to demonstrate dualism on scientific grounds, so it is not a mystical notion by definition.

    > What about the mathematical objects you posited in your brand of mathematical Platonism? Do they depend on the nature of a mathematically-thinking agent? <

    Here we go again with your purposely obtuse understanding of what I write. The parallel with mathematics in this context is simply to show that one can think of other non-physical truths that do nonetheless require a physical brain to be understood. That, and only that, is the meaning of physical dependence in the quoted sentence.

    > The law of the conservation of energy is always being violated. <

    Your own quote says “temporarily,” the balance *must* be re-established immediately. It changes nothing concerning my argument.

    > We know that everything is not physically determined. Quantum indeterminism is a scientifically established fact. <

    Not at all. First off, quantum mechanical theory is based on deterministic equations; second, there are perfectly deterministic *interpretations* of the theory itself. So, no, it’s an open question.

    I will keep ignoring your fixation with free will, since I have written plenty about it in the past, and it is just not productive to bring it up every darn time one talks about morality.

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    1. Hi Massimo,

      "I disagree. If that’s all he means, then that is a trivial statement."

      I really think you're wrong here. Even if it is trivial, it is much less so than the interpretation you grant, which is that we need a brain to think about morality.

      What Carrier is saying is less trivial. Say we encounter aliens who eat their babies or reproduce through rape. Many moral realists would regard these aliens as immoral. Carrier would not. He would probably think that it makes more sense to assess the morality of those aliens in the context of their biology. This is not trivial and entirely reasonable to my mind.

      "Yes, he can state a personal preference for altruism, but it is not at all clear how it follows from what he actually writes."

      He's not merely stating a personal preference for altruism. It is his belief that for all humans happiness and fulfillment are only achievable through living good, moral lives with meaningful relationships and altruism. He's wrong, but this distinguishes him from Rand.

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  21. Korey,

    > The problem that I failed to articulate properly is that your notion of ethics is essentially a moral realist position----that under the appropriate domains in which morality exists as a phenomena, it is possible for moral truths to exist. <

    Not exactly. As I’ve written on this blog, I consider ethics to be an exercise in “if...then” thinking, so that moral “truths” are really better thought of as the logical consequences of certain assumptions / axioms about how we are to behave. Interestingly, this is also where Carrier goes later in his essay, when he brings up Philippa Foot. More on part II, as I said.

    The rest of your comment about realism / anti-realism is, I think, pretty much on target. Yes, I am “antirealist” only in a very narrow conception of “reality,” when it comes to ethics. But as I said just above, the approach to ethics that I favor really doesn’t fit with the realist / anti-realist straightjacket, unless we agree on specific meanings of words like “real” and “truth.”

    brainoil,

    > If find it amusing that you find this amusing. The only way this can be amusing is if you think moral agents are not part of the physical universe. But they are a part of the physical universe. <

    But you, and others here, seem to equate physicalism with fundamental reductionism. That equation, as far as I’m concerned, is still very much open to questioning, and it certainly doesn’t follow from any empirically based scientific theory. (And remember that I’m not even necessarily a physicalist, just a naturalist — see my sympathy for mathematical Platonism.)

    > What we decide to do might be ultimately predetermined <

    Do you not catch the oxymoronic meaning of that sentence?

    > This is just false. The reason mathematics is objective is precisely because the validity of its claims are not dependent on those who are doing it. <

    I explained above the narrow meaning of that sentence. It should have been phrased something like “mathematical truths cannot be perceived or understood other than by physical agents.”

    > That's why nobody tries to determine mathematical truths via science. Morals and values are just not like that. <

    I tend to agree, but even that’s not settled at all (not if you are a moral realist in the same sense in which one can be a mathematical realist).

    > I'd like a short answer from you to the following question. Killing innocent people is wrong. Why? <

    The answer depends on which ethical framework one adopts (e.g., deontological, utilitarian, virtue ethics, etc.). Since I am a virtue ethicist, I would say that killing innocent people is the mark of a badly flawed character, which in turn is likely the result of bad family and societal upbringing (or of a psychopathology).

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    1. "
      > What we decide to do might be ultimately predetermined <

      Do you not catch the oxymoronic meaning of that sentence?"

      It's not oxymoronic at all if you take a broader definition of decision than you seem to take. We can talk about a chess computer choosing a move. We can talk about an automatic trading algorithm deciding to sell some shares. When talking to free-will deniers, you should interpret them to be using these terms in this deterministic sense. There is no contradiction.

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    2. >But you, and others here, seem to equate physicalism with fundamental reductionism. That equation, as far as I’m concerned, is still very much open to questioning, and it certainly doesn’t follow from any empirically based scientific theory.

      Of course we do, and with good reason. You have questioned that, but whether that's correct or not is irrelevant here. The point is, given what we think is true (that actions of moral agents are rigidly determined by the conditions obtained at the Big Bang and the exception-less laws of physics), it still makes perfect sense to talk about right and wrong. You shouldn't find it amusing that determinists talk about right and wrong because given what they believe, it still makes sense to talk about right and wrong.

      >Do you not catch the oxymoronic meaning of that sentence?

      I think Disagreeable Me has clarified the determinist position here. When we say we decide, we mean something like, if (1 < x ){}.

      >mathematical truths cannot be perceived or understood other than by physical agents

      There's a huge difference between that statement and the statement you made earlier that "Mathematical objects and truths are physically dependent on the nature of any would-be mathematically thinking agent." There's even a bigger difference between that and saying "Morals and values are physically dependent on the nature of any would-be moral agent ". If you had physical-feature-X, and lived in another universe, you'd think "killing humans is right" and it'd be perfectly valid. But 1 + 1 would still be 2.

      Note here that nowhere I said that I'm a mathematical platonist. Nowhere I said that mathematical objects exist out there.

      >I tend to agree, but even that’s not settled at all (not if you are a moral realist in the same sense in which one can be a mathematical realist).

      Of course, if you are a moral realist, which brings us to,

      >The answer depends on which ethical framework one adopts (e.g., deontological, utilitarian, virtue ethics, etc.). Since I am a virtue ethicist,....

      I've read some of the other comments here and you are really confusing lot of people here, including myself. On one hand, you vehemently denounce postmodernists for being cultural and moral relativists and saying stuff like given our moral framework, killing Jews in gas chambers is wrong, but it might not be the case given another moral framework and no framework is more right or wrong than another. But then you go ahead say the exact same thing.

      So if it all depends on which framework you choose, why can't I develop a new, logically coherent framework that allows me to kill Jews, and kill Jews? Both you and the postmodernists would not want me to kill Jews, and both you and the postmodernists would say the exact same thing: "I know killing Jews is right according to your moral framework. But it's wrong according to mine. It's not that my framework is any more right than yours. But since it's the framework I have adopted, I'm going to have to lock you up to prevent genocide."

      Have I got that right, or would you say something the different to whatever it is that postmodernists say?



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  22. Every subject is about programs, from math to physics to sociology to ethics, and therefore contingent. (In the expression "Given the axioms we use, 1 + 1 is 2", the giveaway phrase is "axioms we use". Who are "we", and what "axioms"? "S(0)+S(0)=S(S(0))" is a theorem of PA. One proves that statement. Or one could formulate it another language, like the lambda calculus.) And if one is like Seth Lloyd, everything (nature itself) is a (quantum) program.

    What determines the success of (human-made) programs (e.g. moral programs)? What works.

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  23. Disagreeable,

    I think I understand what you are saying. Would you say that all axioms are equally valid in every possible world?

    Massimo,

    That response seems fair. Just wanted to say I've really learned a lot from your blog, it's really helped me develop my thoughts on a lot of topics. And you chastising philosophically naive scientists and atheists is always fun :)

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    1. Hi Korey,

      Yes, all axioms are valid no matter what world we are in. However, some axioms will be more useful for describing that particular world. Axioms which actually describe the world perfectly essentially constitute the laws of physics for that world.

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  24. @ Massimo

    > No, it is possible in principle to demonstrate dualism on scientific grounds, so it is not a mystical notion by definition. <

    Interesting.

    Question: Is it possible to demonstrate physicalism (materialism) on scientific grounds?

    > Here we go again with your purposely obtuse understanding of what I write. The parallel with mathematics in this context is simply to show that one can think of other non-physical truths that do nonetheless require a physical brain to be understood. That, and only that, is the meaning of physical dependence in the quoted sentence. <

    Firstly, you might consider the very real possibility that my so-called misunderstanding was due to your failure to properly communicate. Secondly, if you do not believe in any objective moral standard or insight, then what is your basis to rationally argue for what is right or wrong. (You seem to tacitly presuppose some kind of objective basis every time you make a moral argument.)

    > Your own quote says “temporarily,” the balance *must* be re-established immediately. It changes nothing concerning my argument. <

    A temporary violation is still a violation. And if you seriously doubt that, then I suggest the next time you are pulled over by a traffic officer for a speeding violation that you use your above rationale and see how far that gets you. (By the way, these temporary violations are ALWAYS occurring everywhere in the universe. There are no exceptions.)

    > Not at all. First off, quantum mechanical theory is based on deterministic equations; <

    The indeterminism comes with the collapse of the wave function.

    > second, there are perfectly deterministic *interpretations* of the theory itself. So, no, it’s an open question. <

    I cited the standard interpretation (the one that is accepted by the majority of physicists). Which interpretations are you referring to?

    > I will keep ignoring your fixation with free will, since I have written plenty about it in the past, and it is just not productive to bring it up every darn time one talks about morality. <

    Translation: "I can't articulate any kind of position on free will that doesn't presuppose some kind of dualism and/or final cause (teleology). Neither can I refute your argument that the moral implications are same, irrespective of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. Therefore, I will attempt to use this evasive ploy and hope that no one will notice."

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  25. I'm just baffled by his claim that most philosophers don't know or take notice of Philippa Foot. According to Kieran Healy's data, she's among the top cited philosophers of the past 20 years (and he wasn't even focusing on ethics journals).

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  26. Hi, Massimo. Thanks for taking the time to post about Carrier.

    I'm sympathetic both to the idea of "objective" moral truths and to the idea of hypothetical imperatives.

    The basic idea of objective moral truths is that being a complex system eligible for natural selection physically entails some set of values (survival being the most obvious one). My argument with Carrier is whether we can say with confidence that this set of values is both large and universal enough to do anything meaningful with. If science has to analyze each individual moral situation to come up with an answer, it's not going to be of much use.

    The benefit of hypothetical imperatives is that it provides a common way to express practical, aesthetic and moral propositions. This dislodges moral propositions from a pedestal that's been a hindrance (see Nagel's latest for a great example) and also helps make moral propositions more explicit. The question here is whether hypothetical imperatives aren't just side-stepping the meta-ethical question (i.e., how we decide what values we *ought* to hold).

    The maximizing of an individual's satisfaction thing is my biggest beef with Carrier. Beyond it's Randian-ness, and beyond the psychopath question (which I don't think he answered convincingly), I think there are real-world systems in which individual organisms are maximally satisfied by causing harm. Carrier argues that causing this sort of harm harms the entire system which makes the society worse, which comes back to reduce one's own satisfaction (he uses the example of a Mexican police officer deciding to take bribes and how that makes Mexico a supposedly low-satisfaction society). But I don't think this is true in practice. The fact that "defect-on-the-sucker" is the highest reward in the Prisoner's Dilemma is not arbitrary -- many real-life situations have this sort of payoff. If you're basing moral truth solely on your own satisfaction, thinking about how the world would be if everyone did the harmful things you do is irrelevant. If the consequences of your actions don't come back to harm you personally (If you're a Mexican cop living the high-satisfaction high-life off the bribes you receive) it doesn't matter how crappy society is for others.

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  27. @ brainoil, Massimo

    >> I'd like a short answer from you to the following question. Killing innocent people is wrong. Why? <

    The answer depends on which ethical framework one adopts (e.g., deontological, utilitarian, virtue ethics, etc.). Since I am a virtue ethicist, I would say that killing innocent people is the mark of a badly flawed character, which in turn is likely the result of bad family and societal upbringing (or of a psychopathology).<

    This is a good question. The answer, however, is terrible. In fact, it is not an answer, but an attempt to change the subject from why killing innocent people is wrong to why some people do such evil things. At best, “virtue ethics” seems to assert that ethics is just a matter of good breeding, like etiquette: killing innocent people is a sign of poor upbringing, like using the wrong fork with dessert, only a little worst.

    I find the idea that ethics is simply a super etiquette strongly disturbing. Consequently, I am sympathetic with attempts to formulate a realist, objective (in the sense of independent from people's opinions) version of ethics. “Scientific ethic,” despite the obvious problems, at least tries to meet these objectivity requirements. As in the case of genital mutilation, I'd like to think that some things are wrong because they are wrong, independently from the rules of any particular society.

    I think that Carrier's ideas as expressed in the work “Sense and Goodness Without God” (I am presently reading it) deserve a fairer treatment that the one they receive in the present post. Nobody seems to have read Carrier's extended arguments.

    @ Alastair,

    >A temporary violation is still a violation. And if you seriously doubt that, then I suggest the next time you are pulled over by a traffic officer for a speeding violation that you use your above rationale and see how far that gets you.<

    I will try to answer for the last time. According to QM, it takes time to measure energy accurately. The “violations” of energy conservation are not observable because of this.

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    1. Hi Filippo,

      I'm actually reading Sense and Goodness Without God right now myself. I'm making very slow progress, because it isn't exactly a page turner, and often go for days without reading any of it, but I'll get through it. I'd be interested in discussing his moral ideas with you some time after we both finish it. Unfortunately, I understand from Carrier himself that his moral framework is only fully developed in The End of Christianity.

      So far, SaGwG is very methodical and clearly trying to be robust, however I find there are many points where I think he is wrong. I don't find his thoughts on cosmology particularly convincing. I also think he is underestimating and oversimplifying the problems facing AI, and too rooted in physicalism (as opposed to say, mathematical Platonism). I haven't got to chapters on morality yet, but I think I already understand his views from engaging with him online.

      Personally, I am not a moral realist, however I understand your sympathy with attempts to formulate a realist objective ethics. It would be very interesting if such a thing is possible, and a great discovery for mankind. However, I really think that such endeavours are doomed to failure, and just because it would be great if it were possible doesn't mean that it is.

      I do think that moral intuitions are pretty much on the same footing as aesthetic preferences, but that doesn't mean that we cannot hold and promote our own views with conviction, so moral and societal collapse doesn't have to follow from moral anti-realism.

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    2. @Filippo,

      >I am sympathetic with attempts to formulate a realist, objective (in the sense of independent from people's opinions) version of ethics.

      That project, if I had to bet, is bound to fail. Besides, when people say they wish for such ethics, they imagine that that version of ethics would be close to their own. But that's not necessarily the case. But it's clear to me that no argument could ever convince me that killing innocent people for fun is right. If your objective version of ethics ends up telling killing innocent people for fun is right, I'd just reject it. I bet the people who want to subjugate women would feel the same way too if the objective version of ethics ended up saying subjugating women is bad. Both me and the guy who wants to subjugate women will happily choose to be morally wrong. It's that old problem with god given morality all over again.

      Frankly though, all this talk is irrelevant in real life because we all act as if we were moral realists.




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    3. @ brainoil,

      Congrats, these are really brilliant arguments. It will take me some time to adequately digest them.

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  28. I will be interested to see your take on Foot. I was recently fortunate to have taken a graduate seminar taught by a virtue ethicist close to Foot, in which we read Natural Goodness. The originality and depth of her thoughts continue to amaze me, and (I think) it can only be a good thing that Carrier recognizes that.

    I wasn't sure at first whether I agreed with his point about her position in NG being one of a system of hypothetical imperatives, but as I've thought about it more I can see that this is at least plausible; and Foot herself seems a bit on the fence (e.g., in Rationality and Goodness) about whether or not she really is committed to a virtue ethics.

    That she wants to ground her ethical position in facts about the natural world is not in question, I don't believe, but her way of going about this will be of no comfort to anyone in the vein of e.g. Harris or Shermer who is looking for support of an ethical position that is reducible to scientific facts. Her thoughts on what "natural" consists in (and rationality, for that matter) will be uncomfortable for that audience.

    (I don't know much about Carrier's thoughts nor where he wants to take his argument, so I'll reserve judgment on that matter.)

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  29. @ Filippo Neri

    > I will try to answer for the last time. According to QM, it takes time to measure energy accurately. The “violations” of energy conservation are not observable because of this. <

    I will remind you that I cited a physicist to support my claim.

    "Quantum mechanics ALLOWS, and indeed REQUIRES, TEMPORARY VIOLATIONS OF CONSERVATION OF ENERGY, so one particle can become a pair of heavier particles (the so-called virtual particles), which quickly rejoin into the original particle as if they had never been there." (source: "Are virtual particles really constantly popping in and out of existence?" by Gordon Kane, October 9, 2006 edition of "Scientific American")

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    1. I have a PhD in physics (NYU) and this issue is covered in most elementary textbooks on QM under the heading "energy-time uncertainty principle." You are using an out-of-context citation from a SA article. Note that Kane does not say that the "temporary violations of conservation of energy" are measurable.

      Besides, this issue does not affect the first two laws of thermodynamics: the fluctuations average-out in the thermodynamic limit. In this sense, the first two laws are valid in all relativistic quantum field theories and even in most theories of quantum gravity, like string theory (because of the AdS/CFT correspondence.)

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    2. @ Filippo Neri

      > Note that Kane does not say that the "temporary violations of conservation of energy" are measurable. <

      No, Kane doesn't say that they are measurable. But that doesn't negate the fact he did say that "Quantum mechanics ALLOWS, and indeed REQUIRES, TEMPORARY VIOLATIONS OF CONSERVATION OF ENERGY,"

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  30. Premise 2: There is a host of science research (social and biological) that suggests large groups of non-human kin could not have been formed if that had been the operating principle of members of the earliest human groups. And a rational calculus might override the interests of any individual. It might be objectively improve the quality of life and reproductive success of my relatives and long-term group continuity if I (let's say I am Emperor Atarxus the Loony Cannibal Pyromaniac) cease to exist right away.

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  31. @ Massimo

    > Moreover — and this is a point that provides me with constant amusement — if one really thinks that human actions are rigidly determined from the conditions that obtained at the Big Bang (which, unless I seriously misread him, is what Carrier is implying) then there is no coherent sense in which it is worth having any discussion at all about what is right or wrong: we will do whatever we are destined to do (I guess including the writing of pretentious philosophical posts and sarcastic responses!) and that’s the end of the matter. That, of course, is why I prefer to entirely sidestep the so-called free will debate and assume that human beings have a capacity of volition — we can make autonomous (which of course doesn’t mean a-causal) decisions. Otherwise, any talk of morality is empty gibberish. <

    What I find amusing is your oxymoronic belief in some kind of "nonphysical physicalism." Your above post clearly suggests that you do not believe in physical determinism. It also suggests that you believe you have some kind of "autonomous" decision-making capacity - a capacity that is apparently causa sui.

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    1. Alastair

      Why would an autonomous decision-making capacity of a human brain be seen as causa sui? The human brain and its capabilities have evolved, and the brain has a power supply. The capabilities are grounded in a physical structure – they do not appear sans that structure. Nor do they appear sans the power supply.

      To say that it ‘causes itself’ is quite naive.

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    2. @ David Span

      > Why would an autonomous decision-making capacity of a human brain be seen as causa sui? <

      The term "causa sui" means "something which is generated within itself." So, if you believe that your will (decision-making capacity) is autonomous (that it has the capacity to respond or react independently of the whole - the whole physically-determined causal web), then you believe it is something which is generated within yourself. (Massimo apparently subscribes in "non-reductive physicalism" - which is inherently self-contradictory.)

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    3. I didn’t know we had to be so formal, but anyway...

      @Alastair F. Paisley

      The decision-making capabilities are the product of a physical brain, and brains operate causally. It isn’t separated from the physical web. No brain = no decision making (and no consciousness or mind more generally). Which sits fine with a physicalist account. No contradiction.

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  32. Great article Massimo. And thanks for clearing up what you meant about mathematical truths and how they need to be "understood" by thinking agents, despite being objective and mind-independent (which we Platonists take for granted). It's unfortunate that we can never really come up with a view on moral correctness that we can consider the objectively correct one, but I still hope that, in the same sense one can construct an objective prior in Bayesian statistics, we might be able to guide ourselves through rational inquiry and scientific data to the best possible moral edifice. You know I'm an advocate of a utilitarian framework myself, but I am very open to incorporating value ethics and other ways of thinking into the framework as well.

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  33. The premises addressed above are Carrier's reformulation of Harris' argument. About them he wrote "But exactly what those premises assert is unclear in Harris’s hands (even as I have reworded them)." I suppose you could argue that Carrier is putting across his own views under Harris' more famous name. I suppose that is kind of obnoxious when you think of it, and therefore Carrier has indeed been refuted.

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  34. I think Massimo Pigliucci definition of ethic is closely related to my interpretation of philosophy.

    Rationality is the root cause for morality. One need not be a religious person or brought up with educated parents to have good morals. Our behaviors are the outcome of social relativism. Our actions are not always the outcome of our rational decisions, we sometimes act to fit in. But we use our rationality to draw a logical conclusion to evaluate what we deem possible and reasonable.

    He said " I think ethics is an exercise in applied rationality, specifically it is the activity that uses logic and general argumentation to explore the consequences of our actions toward each other in an attempt to provide us with guidance on the many occasions in which our values or intentions clash."

    Philosophy:

    Philosophy is the process of attaching reason to a proven logic for the purpose of delivering a message that is grounded in truthfulness or imply a supposition that is probable. In that sense, if the logic cannot be proven true, the message, no matter how attractive it may be is Not philosophy.

    Therefore, philosophy is time sensitive because ideas are influenced by events elevated by causation due to a change in time. In that sense, I conclude that philosophy is our time comprehended in thoughts when the proposed reason for the argument obeys the laws of logic.

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    1. Hi James,

      >Rationality is the root cause for morality.<

      I don't think I agree with this. I think it's possible to be perfectly rational while being entirely immoral. Do you disagree?

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