About Rationally Speaking


Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Thursday, August 29, 2013

Philosophy of Pseudoscience: reconsidering the demarcation problem

by Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry

[My colleague Maarten Boudry and I have recently published a collection of essays by a number of philosophers, sociologists, historians of science and skeptics about the so-called “demarcation problem,” the attempt to make sense of the complex landscape represented by science, pseudoscience, quasi-science, bad science and non-science. It was a fun project, and you can check the full results here. Below, just to wet your appetite a bit, I reprint the Introduction to the volume. Enjoy!]

Ever since Socrates, philosophers have been in the business of asking questions of the type “What is X?” The point has not always been to actually find out what X is, but rather to explore how we think about X, to bring up to the surface wrong ways of thinking about it, and hopefully in the process to achieve an increasingly better understanding of the matter at hand. In the early part of the twentieth century one of the most ambitious philosophers of science, Karl Popper, asked that very question in the specific case in which X = science. Popper termed this the “demarcation problem,” the quest for what distinguishes science from nonscience and pseudoscience (and, presumably, also the latter two from each other).

As the first chapters in this collection explain, Popper thought he had solved the demarcation problem by way of his criterion of falsifiability, a solution that seemed very convincing when he compared the eminently falsifiable theory of general relativity with the equally unfalsifiable theory of psycho- analysis (Freudian or otherwise). Modern philosophers—made more wary by widespread appreciation of the issues raised in this context by the works of Pierre Duhem and W. V. O. Quine—have come to the conclusion that Popper was a bit too quick in declaring victory. They recognize that science is not a unified type of activity and that an ever-changing continuous landscape may connect it with nonscientific endeavors.

Nonetheless, the contributors to this volume also think that Larry Laudan’s famous dismissal of the demarcation problem—almost three decades ago now—as an ill-conceived and even pernicious pseudoproblem, and of terms like “pseudoscience” as pieces of hollow rhetoric, was just as premature and misguided. Laudan may have forgotten Socrates’ lesson: even if we do not arrive at a neat and exceptionless formal definition of some X, based on a small set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, we may still come to learn a lot in the process. If we raise the bar for the demarcation project too high, settling for nothing less than a timeless and essential definition, a death pronouncement such as Laudan’s is all too easy to make. As Daniel Dennett put it in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (1995), “nothing complicated enough to be really interesting could have an essence.”

Philosophers and scientists readily recognize a pseudoscience when they see one. Of course, certain interesting borderline cases are hotly disputed among scientists and philosophers, but even Popper’s notorious critic Thomas Kuhn acknowledged that, despite their philosophical differences about demarcation, both of them were in remarkable agreement about paradigmatic cases, as were most of their colleagues. To argue that philosophers can neither spell out which criteria we implicitly rely on to tell science from pseudoscience, nor are able to evaluate and further refine those criteria, would be to relinquish one of the most foundational tasks of philosophy (what is knowledge? how do we attain it?). For too long, philosophers have been dwelling over technical problems and exceptions to formal demarcation criteria, only to rashly conclude that the demarcation problem is dead and that there is no such thing as “pseudoscience.” We think this is mistaken.

This volume testifies to a lively and constructive discussion about demarcationism among philosophers, sociologists, historians, and professional skeptics. By proposing something of a new philosophical subdiscipline, the Philosophy of Pseudoscience, we hope to convince those who have followed in Laudan’s footsteps that the term “pseudoscience” does single out something real that merits our attention. A ballpark demarcation of pseudoscience—with a lot of blanks to be filled in—is not difficult to come up with: if a theory strays from the epistemic desiderata of science by a sufficiently wide margin while being touted as scientific by its advocates, it is justifiably branded as pseudoscience.

The nature of science and the difference between science and pseudo- science are crucial topics for philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science for two fundamental reasons. First, science is having an ever-increasing impact in modern society. Science commands much public attention and prestige; it is funded at very high levels by governments and the private sector; its departments take more and more space and resources on university campuses; and its products may be beneficial to human welfare or bring about great destruction on a scale never before imaginable. It is therefore of compel- ling interest to all of us to understand the nature of science, its epistemic foundations, its limits, and even its power structure—which, of course, is precisely what philosophy, history, and sociology of science are set up to do.

Second, and in a complementary way, we also need a philosophical (and historical and sociological) understanding of the phenomenon of pseudoscience. The lack of interest for pseudoscience in some philosophical quarters derives from the tacit assumption that some ideas and theories are so obviously wrong that they are not even worth arguing about. Pseudoscience is still too often considered a harmless pastime indulged in by a relatively small number of people with an unusual penchant for mystery worship. This is far from the truth. In the form of creationism and its challenges to the study of evolution, pseudoscience has done great damage to public education in the United States and elsewhere; it has swindled people of billions of dollars in the form of “alternative” medicine like homeopathy; it has caused a lot of emotional distress, for example, to people who are told by mystics and assorted charlatans that they can talk with their dead loved ones. Conspiracy theories about AIDS, which are widespread in many African countries and even in the United States, have literally killed countless human beings throughout the world. Denialism about climate change, which seems to be ineradicable in conservative political circles, may even help to bring about a worldwide catastrophe. Dangerous cults and sects such as Scientology, which are based on pseudoscientific belief systems, continue to attract followers and wreak havoc in people’s lives. Even apart from the very real consequences of pseudoscience, we should pause to consider the huge amount of intellectual resources that are wasted in shoring up discredited theories like creationism, homeopathy, and psychoanalysis, not to mention the never-ending quest for evidence of the paranormal and the indefatigable activism of conspiracy theorists.

Pseudoscience can cause so much trouble in part because the public does not appreciate the difference between real science and something that masquerades as science. Pseudoscientists seem to win converts because of a combination of science parroting and of distrust of academic authorities, both of which appear to be particularly palatable to so many people. In addition, pseudoscience thrives because we have not fully come to grips yet with the cognitive, sociological, and epistemological roots of this phenomenon. This is why the demarcation problem is not only an exciting intellectual puzzle for philosophers and other scholars, but is one of the things that makes philosophy actually relevant to society. Philosophers, accordingly, do not just have a scholarly duty in this area, but ethical and social ones as well. For all these reasons, we asked some of the most prominent and original thinkers on science and pseudoscience to contribute to this edited volume. The result is a collection of twenty-four essays, grouped under six thematic sections, to help bring some order to a large, complex, and inherently interdisciplinary field.

In the first part on “the problem with the demarcation problem,” Massimo Pigliucci assesses in some detail Laudan’s objections to the research program and goes on to propose an approach based on a quantifiable ver- sion of Wittgensteinian family resemblance. In a similar vein, Martin Mahner suggests a cluster approach to demarcationism, drawing inspiration from the taxonomy of biological species, which does not yield to essentialist definitions either. James Ladyman deploys Harry Frankfurt’s famous analysis of “bullshit” to highlight the difference between pseudoscience and straightforward scientific fraud. Sven Hansson recasts the demarcation problem in terms of epistemic warrant and proposes an approach that views science as unified on an epistemological level, while still accounting for diversity in its methods. Maarten Boudry tries to clear up some confusion between what he calls genuine demarcation (the science/pseudoscience boundaries) and the “territorial” demarcation between science and other epistemic fields (philosophy, mathematics).

The second part deals with the history and sociology of pseudoscience. Thomas Nickles gets things started with a brief but comprehensive his- tory of the demarcation problem, which leads into Daniel Thurs and Ronald Numbers’s historical analysis of pseudoscience, which tracks down the coinage and currency of the term and explains its shifting meaning in tandem with the emerging historical identity of science. While we purposefully steered clear from the kind of sociology inspired by social constructivism and postmodernism—which we regard as a type of pseudodiscipline in its own right—sociologist Erich Goode provides an analysis of paranormalism as a “deviant discipline” violating the consensus of established science, while Noretta Koertge draws our attention to the characteristic social organization of pseudosciences as a means of highlighting the sociological dimension of the scientific endeavor.

The third part explores the territory marking the “borderlands” between science and pseudoscience. Carol Cleland and Sheralee Brindell deploy the idea of causal asymmetries in evidential reasoning to differentiate between what are sometime referred to as “hard” and “soft” sciences, and argue that misconceptions about this difference explain the higher incidence of pseudo- science and antiscience in the nonexperimental sciences. Professional skeptic of pseudoscience Michael Shermer looks at the demographics of pseudo- scientific belief and examines how the demarcation problem is treated in legal cases. In a surprising twist, Michael Ruse tells us of a time when the concept of evolution was in fact treated as pseudoscience and then popular science, before blossoming into a professional science, thus challenging a conception of demarcation in terms of timeless and purely formal principles.

Part 4, on science and the supernatural, begins with Evan Fales arguing that, contrary to recent philosophical arguments, the appeal to the supernatural should not be ruled out as science for methodological reasons, but rather because the notion of supernatural intervention probably suffers from fatal flaws. Meanwhile, Barbara Forrest enlists David Hume to help navigating the treacherous territory between science and religious pseudoscience and to assess the epistemic credentials of supernaturalism.

The fifth part of the volume focuses on the tactics deployed by “true believers” in pseudoscience, beginning with Jean Paul Van Bendegem’s discussion of the ethics of argumentation about pseudoscience, followed by Jesper Jerkert’s contention that alternative medicine can be evaluated scientifically— contra the immunizing strategies deployed by some of its most vocal supporters. Frank Cioffi, whose 2012 passing we mourn, summarizes his misgivings about Freudian psychoanalysis and argues that we should move beyond assessments of the testability and other logical properties of a theory, focusing instead on spurious claims of validation and other recurrent misdemeanors on the part of pseudoscientists. Donald Prothero describes the different strategies used by climate change “skeptics” and other denialists, outlining the links between new and “traditional” pseudosciences.

Finally, we close with a section examining the complex cognitive roots of pseudoscience. Stefaan Blancke and Johan De Smedt ask whether we actually evolved to be irrational, describing a number of evolved heuristics that are rational in ecologically relevant domains, but lead us astray in other contexts. Konrad Talmont-Kaminski explores the noncognitive functions of super- empirical beliefs and analyzes the different attitudes of science and pseudo- science toward intuitive beliefs. John Wilkins distinguishes between two mindsets about science and explores the cognitive styles relating to authority and tradition in both science and pseudoscience. Nicholas Shackel proposes that belief in pseudoscience may be partly explained in terms of idiosyncratic theories about the ethics of belief, and Filip Buekens ends the volume with a chapter on pseudohermeneutics and the illusion of understanding, drawing inspiration from the cognitive psychology and philosophy of intentional thinking.

This collection will certainly not represent the final word on the issue of demarcation. On the contrary, it is meant to renew and stimulate discussion in an area of philosophy of science that is both intrinsically interesting from an intellectual point of view and that, for once, can actually make philosophy directly relevant to people’s lives.

55 comments:

  1. Philosophy 101
    Science is a dice game of uncertainty or probability and Nature is absolute. One day soon the grey area of demarcation dividing them will be vanished by light and mankind will unite with Nature via a single simple truth. Equal is the Way!

    =

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  2. In my methods course, I spend a good deal of time covering the demarcation problem, what constitutes a paradigm and how they emerge, and the conduct of inquiry more generally. I'm excited to see this collection of essays come out. I've always wanted to offer a course on pseudoscience and the paranormal...just need to come up with a catchy course title like: "Ghosts, Goblins and Things that go Bump in the Night."

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  3. It is disappointing that the most relevant historical issue, scientific racism, doesn't seem to be addressed. Yes, the issue of genetic determinism also brings evolutionary psychology up as an issue for demarcation. It seems to me there are far too many pop science atrocities to ignore. Looking in another direction, is a study of demarcation issues that tackles psychoanalysis when religion-based therapies like Christian counseling, twelve-step programs, Focus on the Family, et al. are so vibrant, maybe even prevalent really delving into the relevant issues?

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    Replies
    1. Johnson,

      I hear you, but this isn't an encyclopedia of pseudoscience. We left individual authors - wh have been thinking about demarcation for a while - pretty much complete freedom to pick whatever topic they wanted to write about.

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  4. Comment:

    The difference between science and pseudoscience is apparently quite gray. Because if it were black and white, then there would be no "demarcation problem."

    Question:

    Do you think the so-called "professional skeptics" have a full appreciation for the demarcation problem?

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  5. At some approximation, there's a I know it when I see it aspect to what is pseudoscience. Intelligent Design comes to mind.

    I agree with Paul Krugman that "Austrian School" economics is pseudoscience. He convinces me, anyway.

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    1. Isn't evolution theory a creation theory of intelligent design? =

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    2. Some argue that - perhaps more so in regard to evolutionary psychology - the 'just so story'?

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  6. Surely the 'I know it when I see it' approach to what is 'pseudoscience' is a fundamental problem! It gives rise to subjective beliefs that are socially constructed (yes I said that!) and partial knowledge at best.

    My own field is in highlighting the unsoundness of psychogenic explanations for physical illnesses: the logical fallacies in reasoning, the errors in scientific method, the uncritical, unreflective turn to ideology that give rise to these diagnoses. Mine comes from a feminist, sociological perspective. One of the strengths of this perspective is the understanding of partial, situated knowledge and the ontological problem of claims to objectivity.

    The notion that 'I know it when I see it' as 'good enough' to define pseudoscience immediately raises the questions: WHO has the 'authority' to 'know it when they see it'? We then find ourselves dealing with claims to authority - always a quagmire of potential irrationality, especially when subjective insider/outsider demarcations are drawn in order to do so.

    Does the book address these problems?

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    1. @ Angela Kennedy

      > The notion that 'I know it when I see it' as 'good enough' to define pseudoscience immediately raises the questions: WHO has the 'authority' to 'know it when they see it'? <

      It would appear that professional skeptics (like Massimo Pugliucci) have been granted this authority by the AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of Science).

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    2. Ok - that someone should be 'granted authority' to do such a thing should set off alarm bells for the rational 'skeptic'...

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    3. @ Angela Kennedy

      > Ok - that someone should be 'granted authority' to do such a thing should set off alarm bells for the rational 'skeptic'... <

      That last comment was meant to be a little sarcastic. The point is that the demarcation between science and pseudoscience is not a black and white issue (even though Massimo, at times, makes dogmatic statements on what is and what is not science).

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    4. Ok - I wondered but I wasn't sure about you being sarcastic. You'd be surprised perhaps about what IS taken as 'authoritative' on faith in scientific insider circles (Yes I use the term 'insider').

      Personally I have big problems with the term 'pseudoscience'. It's an unstable term often used as an ad hominem (a bit like 'quack'), more than any useful definition of any discipline.

      Science' is also a human endeavour - so subject to various difficulties and instabilities in how it is carried out. It might be easier to establish 'facts' in some disciplines than others - but that doesn't mean scientific methods (of both induction and deduction, conjecture and refutation) are precluded in disciplines where ascertaining such facts, or indeed evidence, is difficult.

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  7. The soft sciences (psychology, sociology) are not real sciences, only the hard sciences (physics, chemistry) are. (The academy does classify biology as a hard science. So, I guess we would have to consider it a borderline field.)

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    1. So medicine, especially psychiatry, is therefore not a 'real' science?

      This is obviously a problem of demarcation due to subjective beliefs about 'hard' and 'real' (linguistic constructions) and even what 'science' is, let alone 'scientific method' etc.

      I'm not discussing these to be provocative: we have some real issues here which are rarely considered, unfortunately, especially by those claiming 'insider' authority as 'scientists'.

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    2. @ Angela Kennedy

      I made a typo in my previous post. I meant to say that "the academy does NOT classify biology as a hard science.)" (I'm sorry for any confusion this may have caused.)

      > So medicine, especially psychiatry, is therefore not a 'real' science? <

      I would argue that there is a spectrum.

      physics <=> chemistry <=> biology <=> psychology <=> sociology

      Medicine is obviously not an "exact" science, especially psychiatry. (I have more concerns with the practice of psychiatry than with the practice of psychotherapy. Apparently, Massimo does not.)

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    3. There are problems with your subjective 'spectrum' here. What are your criteria for defining something as a 'real' science, or 'more real' than another? Are you using 'exact' as a criteria? Are you privileging some disciplines of enquiry over another on this list (for example, why do you think psychology somehow is more 'real' a 'science' than sociology?)

      And what is a 'hard' science? Who decides, and how? What does 'hard' even mean?

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    4. Alastair,

      Re: 'The soft sciences (psychology, sociology) are not real sciences, only the hard sciences (physics, chemistry) are.'

      Why do you think this?

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    5. @ Cian Eamon Marley

      > What is an 'exact' science? <

      The hard sciences (physics, chemistry) are considered to be exact sciences.

      > Why do you think this? <

      I don't really think this, but others do. (My comment was meant to be somewhat facetious.)

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    6. @ Angela Kennedy

      > There are problems with your subjective 'spectrum' here. What are your criteria for defining something as a 'real' science, or 'more real' than another? Are you using 'exact' as a criteria? Are you privileging some disciplines of enquiry over another on this list (for example, why do you think psychology somehow is more 'real' a 'science' than sociology?) <

      The physical sciences (e.g. physics and chemistry) are considered to be the hard sciences; the social sciences (e.g. psychology and sociology) are considered to be the soft sciences; the life sciences (e.g. biology) falls somewhere in between the hard and soft sciences.

      The hard sciences are considered to be exact sciences because they basically employ mathematical models that enable for more accurate predictions.

      The 'harder' the science the more objective it is...the more likely it will lead to a consensus.

      The 'softer' the science is the more subjective it is...the less likely it will lead to a consensus.

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  8. Angela,

    > The notion that 'I know it when I see it' as 'good enough' to define pseudoscience immediately raises the questions: WHO has the 'authority' to 'know it when they see it'? <

    Agreed, but we are not talking about authority as in legal means. We are simply talking about people who spend time studying these things (philosophers, scientists) rendering their professional opinion. There is hardly anything to object to that, no?

    > So medicine, especially psychiatry, is therefore not a 'real' science? <

    It’s complicated. Medicine is actually a field in between a full fledged science and a practice. Just look at recent papers showing that a large number of medical research is hard to replicate satisfactorily. But I certainly wouldn’t call it pseudoscience.

    > especially by those claiming 'insider' authority as 'scientists'. <

    Not sure who you are referring to, but why are you putting “scientists” in scare quotes?

    Alastair,

    > Do you think the so-called "professional skeptics" have a full appreciation for the demarcation problem? <

    First off, there are very few professional skeptics. But no, I don’t think they do. That’s part of the reason Maarten and I put together this collection.

    > It would appear that professional skeptics (like Massimo Pugliucci) have been granted this authority by the AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of Science) <

    It would appear that your sarcasm is misplaced. I’m not a professional skeptic, I’m a philosopher and scientist. And nobody has granted me any authority. But do I have the right to voice my opinion in matters about which I put a lot of thought?

    > The soft sciences (psychology, sociology) are not real sciences, only the hard sciences (physics, chemistry) are. <

    Says who? Not in my book.

    > I meant to say that "the academy does NOT classify biology as a hard science.)" <

    You made a mistake, not a typo. “The academy” doesn’t exist as a body that makes that sort of decisions.

    > I have more concerns with the practice of psychiatry than with the practice of psychotherapy. Apparently, Massimo does not. <

    I think most types of psychotherapy are simply ineffective (there’s data on that). Psychiatry works, but there is the problem of Big Pharma, overmedication, etc.

    > even though Massimo, at times, makes dogmatic statements on what is and what is not science <

    Could you provide me with an example of a “dogmatic” statement, as opposed to a statement resulting from consideration of the evidence? Thanks.

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  9. Massimo,

    >but we are not talking about authority as in legal means. We are simply talking about people who spend time studying these things (philosophers, scientists) rendering their professional opinion. There is hardly anything to object to that, no?

    Actually, yes there is. Claims to authority and insider status are always problematic. The issue should be whether the notion that there is such a thing as pseudoscience is safe by established logic, not who has the right to (subjectively) call something pseudoscience because they did a degree or two. I'm a sociologist, and yes, I too have spent time studying these things. I'm rendering my professional opinion. But it doesn't mean I'm right, any more than you are, by my sheer authority. In the final analysis, it is whether my argument is plausible, or not, that is the issue (as it is with us all here, surely?)

    >It’s complicated. Medicine is actually a field in between a full fledged science and a practice. Just look at recent papers showing that a large number of medical research is hard to replicate satisfactorily. But I certainly wouldn’t call it pseudoscience.

    I should point out immediately that I'm actually perfectly aware how complicated the issue is. I used questions only as a way to facilitate others to think in a questioning way about these issues. I'm interested that you would not call medical research pseudoscience if it can't be replicated properly: so the question is, what do you think is 'pseudoscience'. What's the purpose of such a term (if not to discredit/trivialise)?

    >Not sure who you are referring to, but why are you putting “scientists” in scare quotes?

    I'm putting 'scientists' in scare quotes because it's often a contested term. Some people claim to be 'scientists' but others contest that. The fact that there is a term 'pseudoscience' demonstrates this problem.

    >I think most types of psychotherapy are simply ineffective (there’s data on that). Psychiatry works, but there is the problem of Big Pharma, overmedication, etc.

    I know you're answering Alastair - but I think it needs to be said that it can easily be argued that often psychiatry does NOT work, at least not to any scientific standard. The (valid) objections to DSM 5 is a case in point: historical incidences of psychiatry (lobotomies, psychopathologising hmosexuality in the DSM as just two examples) which show it is often wrong, and does not 'work' (if we are talking about patient safety) are others.

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    1. @ Angela Kennedy

      > so the question is, what do you think is 'pseudoscience'. What's the purpose of such a term (if not to discredit/trivialise)? <

      The term "pseudoscience" is a pejorative and (as you have pointed out) it is employed by skeptics to discredit an individual's work or a field.

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  10. @ Massimo

    > First off, there are very few professional skeptics. But no, I don’t think they do. That’s part of the reason Maarten and I put together this collection. <

    Please define a 'professional skeptic.'

    > It would appear that your sarcasm is misplaced. I’m not a professional skeptic, I’m a philosopher and scientist. <

    Is it not true that you sit on the advisory board to the NYC Skeptics?

    Does Richard Dawkins qualify as a 'professional skeptic?' (Dawkins held the chair as Oxford's Professor for the Public Understanding of Science). What about Daniel Dennett? Sam Harris? Susan Blackmore?

    > And nobody has granted me any authority. But do I have the right to voice my opinion in matters about which I put a lot of thought? <

    I never argued that you didn't have the right to voice your opinion. But you are using you position and stature in the academic and scientific community to promote a naturalistic worldview.

    > Says who? Not in my book. <

    Just for the sake of clarity. What is your stance on psychology? Is it a science?

    > You made a mistake, not a typo. “The academy” doesn’t exist as a body that makes that sort of decisions. <

    Academia (Latin for "academy") classifies biology as part of the life sciences, not the physical sciences (physics and chemistry).

    > I think most types of psychotherapy are simply ineffective (there’s data on that). Psychiatry works, but there is the problem of Big Pharma, overmedication, etc. <

    It would appear that psychiatry doesn't work much better than psychotherapy. (And the point I am making should be rather obvious - "drug therapy" is potentially more problematic than "talk therapy.")

    "In 1998, a meta-analysis of published antidepressant trials found that 75% of the effectiveness of anti-depressant medication is due to the placebo effect and other non-specific effects, rather than the treatment itself.[142]"

    (source: Wikipedia: Placebo)

    > Could you provide me with an example of a “dogmatic” statement, as opposed to a statement resulting from consideration of the evidence? Thanks. <

    Did you not state in the past that parapsychology is a pseudoscience (even though it is considered a science by the AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of Science))? (As I recall, you informed me that you were a member of the AAAS and would work to change parapsychology's status with that organization).

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  11. I agree entirely - nevertheless, these things need teasing out, because often these problems ARE taken simplistically.

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  12. The term "pseudotheory" seems useful*. Empirical science relates theories to observations (data). Some theories might be called "hard" when they make relatively precise predictions (like the Standard Model as it relates to data collected at the LHC), and others "soft" (like a theory in economics as it relates to economic statistics). ID seems like more of an anti-theory than a theory: It effectively says no theory exists. ESP is a discarded theory (no evidence of brain-to-brain signals has ever been found).

    * e.g. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/opinion/welcome-end-of-a-pseudotheory.html

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  13. >Conspiracy theories about AIDS, which are widespread in many African countries and even in the United States, have literally killed countless human beings throughout the world.<

    Yes, but it would be good to keep in mind that conspiracy theories would not be so believable (in the 3rd world in particular) were it not for the fact that governments and corporations do in fact engage in unethical and unlawful behavior.

    The U.S. recently ran a fake inoculation program in Pakistan in order to get DNA samples from people in the hopes of tracking bin Laden. The program left people, including children, with the false idea that they had been safeguarded against disease, when in fact they had not. The people who participated in the program were lied to and used.

    Also, corporations have used 3rd world people as uninformed guinea pigs for testing drugs.

    In short, not all the blame can be laid at the door of irrational thinking about drugs/inoculations. Third World people have good reason to be suspicious.

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  14. Angela,

    > Claims to authority and insider status are always problematic <

    I disagree. I know that's a common feminist approach, but I think it goes too far. Yes, sometimes claims of authority are problematic and should be scrutinized or rejected. But surely that's not always the case. I assume that if you suffer from toothache you go to a dentist. Why? Presumably because he has "authority": he is a (hopefully competent) license practitioner of a specialized craft. Why would that be a problem?

    > But it doesn't mean I'm right, any more than you are, by my sheer authority <

    But I never made that claim, so I'm not sure what you are objecting to. Whenever I criticize what I think is a pseudoscientific notion I do it on the basis of evidence and argument, not authority. That said, I'm not ashamed to point out that I have expertise about this sort of things, which is readily demonstrated by my long history of publication in the field.

    > I'm interested that you would not call medical research pseudoscience if it can't be replicated properly: so the question is, what do you think is 'pseudoscience' <

    First of all, quite a number of medical findings can and have been replicated. Second, pseudoscience typically refers to an activity that pretends to be scientific but whose theoretical and/or empirical findings are actually null. Homeopathy being the perfect example.

    > I'm putting 'scientists' in scare quotes because it's often a contested term. Some people claim to be 'scientists' but others contest that. <

    I'm having a problem seeing this. A scientist is someone with an advanced degree in science (typically) who does specialized research in an academic or private setting. That doesn't mean s/he is right on whatever she says, but the word seems to me to have pretty clear meaning. Could you provide me with examples of the contested attributions you are thinking of?

    > I think it needs to be said that it can easily be argued that often psychiatry does NOT work, at least not to any scientific standard <

    Yes, but there also are a number of instances in which it does work, especially when it comes to a number of neurological conditions that can be treated with drugs. That's what makes it a borderline / interesting field, rather than straight science (say, like physics) or pseudoscience (say, like astrology).

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  15. Alastair,

    > Please define a 'professional skeptic.' <

    Like in any profession: someone who does it full time and for a pay. Michael Shermer is an example, or Ken Frazier, the editor of Skeptical Inquirer.

    > Is it not true that you sit on the advisory board to the NYC Skeptics? <

    So? I'm neither paid for it, nor is it a full time position. Besides, NYCS is a volunteer organization.

    > Does Richard Dawkins qualify as a 'professional skeptic?' (Dawkins held the chair as Oxford's Professor for the Public Understanding of Science). What about Daniel Dennett? Sam Harris? Susan Blackmore <

    Are we going to go one person at a time? What's your point? At any rate: Dawkins, not really, he is a full time science writer who engages in skepticism part time (his academic position was, as you point out, in science education, not skepticism); Dennett: no, he is philosopher (yes, he does write part time about skepticism, as do I); Harris: yes, that's pretty much his chosen career. Blackmore: yes, at the least since she has left academia to become an independent scholar who focuses on pseudoscience.

    > But you are using you position and stature in the academic and scientific community to promote a naturalistic worldview. <

    And, precisely, what is objectionable in that?

    > Academia (Latin for "academy") classifies biology as part of the life sciences, not the physical sciences (physics and chemistry) <

    Thanks for the (superfluous, condescending) Latin lesson. So what? You are stating the obvious.

    > It would appear that psychiatry doesn't work much better than psychotherapy <

    I beg to differ.

    > Did you not state in the past that parapsychology is a pseudoscience (even though it is considered a science by the AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of Science))? (As I recall, you informed me that you were a member of the AAAS and would work to change parapsychology's status with that organization). <

    You recall incorrectly. I am a Fellow of the AAAS, but I never made any statement about changing their position on parapsychology. Could you provide me with a link to where they say that parapsychology is a science? I find that surprising.

    Tom,

    > In short, not all the blame can be laid at the door of irrational thinking about drugs/inoculations. Third World people have good reason to be suspicious. <

    You are right. But even the kind of example you cite doesn't justify the criminal behavior of, for instance, the South African government (until recently) toward its own citizens.

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    1. @ Massimo

      > I'm neither paid for it, nor is it a full time position. <

      But surely you are being compensated for your publication[s] on "pseudoscience." This would qualify you as a professional skeptic.

      Merriam-Webster defines "professional" as "participating for gain or livelihood in an activity or field of endeavor often engaged in by amateurs."

      > What's your point? <

      My point is that prominent "professional" skeptics (Dawkins, Blackmore, Dennett, Harris, Shermer) are guilty of engaging in pseudoscience (at least, according to your expert opinion on the subject matter). I find that somewhat ironic...laughable actually. (Dawkins, Blackmore and Dennett are proponents of "memetics"; Harris and Shermer are proponents of a "science of morality." And we both know that you have deemed these fields to be pseudoscience. Isn't that right?)

      > And, precisely, what is objectionable in that? <

      What I object to is that you seem to equate your promotion of naturalism and pseudoskeptism with educating the public on science. Naturalism and pseudoskepticism are not really part of science.

      > Thanks for the (superfluous, condescending) Latin lesson. So what? You are stating the obvious. <

      If I am stating the obvious, then why the hell are you objecting to the obvious?

      Previously you made the condescending objection (and I quote) "You made a mistake, not a typo. “The academy” doesn’t exist as a body that makes that sort of decisions."

      I didn't make a mistake. The academy (or the academic community, or academia) classifies biology as part of the life sciences, not the physical sciences (physics and chemistry).

      > I beg to differ. <

      I just provided you with evidence that antidepressants are not anymore effective than placebos. (It would appear that you are quite dismissal of evidence that does accord with your viewpoint.)

      > You recall incorrectly. I am a Fellow of the AAAS, but I never made any statement about changing their position on parapsychology. Could you provide me with a link to where they say that parapsychology is a science? I find that surprising. <

      "In 1969, under the direction of anthropologist Margaret Mead, the Parapsychological Association became affiliated with the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the largest general scientific society in the world.[25]"

      (source: Wikipedia: Parapsychology)

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  16. - @ Philip, Angela & Alastair. The "I know it when I see it" approach. That is indeed a fairly accurate description of how most scientists tell the difference between science & pseudoscience, but it does not mean that their say-so is a matter of subjective whim. Many scientists agree on the particulars: they sort the same doctrines in the same piles. The problem is that their judgement is largely intuitive and inchoate: they seem to be using similar criteria (hence their agreement on the particulars), but they find it hard to explicate them. That's exactly what you need philosophers for: analyzing the commonalities between different sciences and pseudosciences, abstracting away from the particulars and trying to come up with more or less general criteria. Some chess master also "see" an imminent checkmate. Surely that does not mean that they make stuff up, or that we are guilty of an "argument from authority" if we put trust in their judgement.

    - It goes without saying that medicine and psychology are sciences! Maybe the surest sign of their maturity is that they have their own respective pseudo-sciences, theories and practices that try to emulate their epistemic standing but completely fail to do so. Think about homeopathy, Freudian psychoanalysis, Scientology, reincarnation therapy. Methodological differences with the 'hard sciences', important though they may be, are inconsequential when compared to the huge difference in epistemic credentials between, say, penicillin and oscillococcinum (homeopathic).

    - @ Thomas Jones, you are right that we often realize only with hindsight which avenues of research were worth pursuing. In fact, it is reckless to discredit any truly novel idea as "pseudoscience", especially when its proponents are not even claiming that is is anything more than an exciting hypothesis or speculation. In common usage, the term “pseudoscience” refers to doctrines that are maintained in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. In the early days, phrenology or parapsychology were fairly respectable theories, until they collapsed under the weight of anomalies. People who are still on the wild goose chase for ‘psi’ forces, or who even claim that the evidence for 'psi' is already there but is being suppressed by a global conspiracy of orthodox science, deserve the label 'pseudoscience'. Not the early pioneers.

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    1. Well, of course those are rethorical terms, but my side-note on parapsychology was meant as an illustration, not as an attempt to convince you of its epistemic bankruptcy. I hope you don't need to be convinced of that.

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    2. Thomas,
      - My somewhat heavy-handed rhetoric seems to have detracted from the main point. "Wild goose change" means that the search for psi forces is most probably futile, because all previous attempts to find them have failed. It does not mean that we prejudge all psi research. In principle, science remains open to the possibility.
      - The polygraph is different because, for one thing, it would not upturn our current understanding of physics the way that psi forces would. So the prior probabilities are different. If you have moral objections against polygraphs, apart from the issue of their reliability, indeed you should not phrase them in terms of science/pseudoscience. The demarcation project, as you correctly point out, is primarily epistemological. You can have moral objections against nuclear power, but nuclear physics is most decidedly not pseudoscience. Indeed, your moral objections would be moot if it were.

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  17. Thomas,

    > My particular concern is with the proclivity to carve out territory, what is valid and what is foolish in terms of inquiry <

    Yes, that is a concern. But there are three points to demarcation projects: 1) the intellectual curiosity of what, epistemically, makes something a science, a pseudoscience, or something else; 2) the practical concern that we have limited resources (time, money), and we should be making prescriptive judgments (to the best of our knowledge) about what to pursue; and 3) the fact that some pseudoscientific practices actually hurt people (vaccine and HIV denialism, for instance) and therefore ought (morally) to be confronted.

    Alastair,

    > But surely you are being compensated for your publication[s] on "pseudoscience." This would qualify you as a professional skeptic. <

    At best a part time consultant. Regardless, what exactly hinges on this particular debate?

    > My point is that prominent "professional" skeptics (Dawkins, Blackmore, Dennett, Harris, Shermer) are guilty of engaging in pseudoscience <

    I don't see irony there, just disagreement. And one of my major points is that there is no sharp distinction between science and pseudoscience, but rather a lot of stuff in between. Not at all coincidentally, the areas you mention all fall in that grey territory, in my opinion.

    > What I object to is that you seem to equate your promotion of naturalism and pseudoskeptism with educating the public on science. Naturalism and pseudoskepticism are not really part of science <

    You seem to be confused. It is science that is part of naturalism, not the other way. And I honestly don't think that what I'm promoting is "pseudo" skepticism. But I suppose a proponent of Intelligent Design or UFOs would in fact characterize it that way.

    > I didn't make a mistake. The academy (or the academic community, or academia) classifies biology as part of the life sciences, not the physical sciences (physics and chemistry). <

    Yes you did. The "academy" is a loose term referring to all academic disciplines, not just sciences. There is no Central Committee sitting in judgment of what qualifies as hard or soft.

    > I just provided you with evidence that antidepressants are not anymore effective than placebos. <

    First of all, you copied a Wikipedia text, hardly "evidence." Second, you didn't read even that correctly. It is well known that the effects of antidepressants do include a substantial placebo effect, but not all of their effects are accounted by placebo, and of course that percentage varies with different medications.

    > In 1969, under the direction of anthropologist Margaret Mead, the Parapsychological Association became affiliated with the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the largest general scientific society in the world <

    Yeah, you are unfortunately right, let's count that as another black mark against Margaret Meade. Still, I never made any declaration to the effect that I would try to get AAAS to drop the PA. As you might be aware, these affiliations really count for close to nothing anyway.

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    1. @ Massimo

      > And one of my major points is that there is no sharp distinction between science and pseudoscience, but rather a lot of stuff in between. Not at all coincidentally, the areas you mention all fall in that grey territory, in my opinion. <

      Just for the sake of clarity. Are you now saying the scientific status of "memetics" and the "science of morality" is gray (even if you personally believe these fields fall on the pseudo side of the spectrum)?

      > You seem to be confused. It is science that is part of naturalism, not the other way. <

      I'm not confused. You're conflating "methodological naturalism" with "metaphysical naturalism." (Science employs methodological naturalism. And, even this is debatable according to Popper because the difference between the natural and the supernatural, between the physical and the metaphysical is ambiguous...hence the "demarcation problem.")

      > And I honestly don't think that what I'm promoting is "pseudo" skepticism. <

      You hold a position as a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry (CSI, formerly known as the CSICOP). That organization has been accused by one of its co-founders as engaging in pseudoskepticism.

      > Yes you did. The "academy" is a loose term referring to all academic disciplines, not just sciences. There is no Central Committee sitting in judgment of what qualifies as hard or soft. <

      I employed the term "the academy" to refer to the academic community or academia as whole, not as some "Central Committee." That being said, it is indisputable that biology is classified as part of the life sciences, not the physical sciences.

      > First of all, you copied a Wikipedia text, hardly "evidence." <

      That text was footnoted by a superscript (just in case you didn't notice). So, I'm afraid your attempt to discredit Wikipedia here (a clear case of your pseudoskepticism rearing its ugly face) is not going to fly. Here's the direct source...

      "Listening to Prozac but hearing placebo: A meta-analysis of antidepressant medication."

      > Second, you didn't read even that correctly. It is well known that the effects of antidepressants do include a substantial placebo effect, but not all of their effects are accounted by placebo, and of course that percentage varies with different medications. <

      Perhaps I should refresh your memory. I made the argument that "psychiarty doesn't appear to work much better than psychotherapy." If "75% of the effectiveness of anti-depressant medication is due to the placebo effect," then it doesn't appear that psychiarty works much better psychotherapy.

      > Still, I never made any declaration to the effect that I would try to get AAAS to drop the PA. As you might be aware, these affiliations really count for close to nothing anyway. <

      It didn't appear to me that you were ashamed of letting me know that you were a FELLOW (not a member) of the AAAS.

      Delete
  18. Thanks, Massimo--I work in science outreach media where it's sometimes easy to breeze past philosophical/historical/sociological questions in order to more rapidly (if not always accurately) produce characterizations of science & scientists for the public--all in the name of raising viewership, for shame... So it's exciting and inspiring to see fresh thoughts on the demarcation problem! (maybe I need to get out more?)

    A question/comment: If part of distinguishing science/pseudoscience/non-science involves asking "what is non-science," aren't you asking questions about art/culture/society/politics--which bring up personal rights & ethics, too? It's complicated as you and others have said, so I understand narrowing the scope of the topic to fit coherently into a book. (And considering that demarcation debates historically focused on the "science/pseudoscience" side, it's understandable for a current debate to remain focused there--but should it?) If all of that social/political complexity and context does indeed pertain to "philosophy of pseudoscience," then concerns (like Angela K's regarding "authority on defining the topic") don't seem to go too far at all...In which case, I'm wondering if you necessarily meant to suggest the only valid/professional opinions on "pseudoscience" should be those of "[presumably non-postmodernist] philosophers, scientists." Lakatos (philosopher-scientist) & Feyerabend (philosopher-artist? dare I ask what you call him?) had such a vivid dialog on the topic, so a naive/just-for-kicks question: if you had the chance, would you have wanted papers from both of them here? (Or would you say they're in the book in spirit/ghost/goblin? Metaphorically speaking, of course...)

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  19. Kate,

    > if you had the chance, would you have wanted papers from both of them here? <

    Yes, bot Feyerabend and Lakatos would definitely have been welcome, though I would have had my own sharp disagreements with the former! Indeed, even postmodernism (in moderation) is welcome to this debate, and once again, let me stress that I don't think that this is a debate to be reserved to academics. That said, Maarten and I did invite a couple of mo radically dissenting voices, but a few chapters didn't pass peer review.

    Alastair,

    > Are you now saying the scientific status of "memetics" and the "science of morality" is gray (even if you personally believe these fields fall on the pseudo side of the spectrum)? <

    I think I have been clear already, but he we go again: I think memetics is a sterile effort based on a superficial analogy. But it's not pseudoscience in the sense of, say, astrology. As for science and morality, please check what I've written several times about it on this blog: it clearly doesn't fit a science / pseudoscience divide, because it is about a different demarcation, the difference between science and philosophy.

    > You're conflating "methodological naturalism" with "metaphysical naturalism. <

    I'm doing no such thing at all. I'm perfectly aware of the distinction.

    > You hold a position as a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry (CSI, formerly known as the CSICOP). That organization has been accused by one of its co-founders as engaging in pseudoskepticism. <

    That's Truzzi's opinion. Clearly, I don't share it.

    > it is indisputable that biology is classified as part of the life sciences, not the physical sciences<

    And who the hell dispute that??

    > If "75% of the effectiveness of anti-depressant medication is due to the placebo effect," then it doesn't appear that psychiarty works much better psychotherapy. <

    It still does, considering that much psychotherapy (with the exception of behavioral therapy) doesn't seem to work at all.

    > It didn't appear to me that you were ashamed of letting me know that you were a FELLOW (not a member) of the AAAS <

    Why should I be ashamed of it? And what the hell does that have to do with anything?

    ReplyDelete
  20. $31 for the paperback and $17 for the kindle?! Yikes. I'm probably picking it up anyway, but yikes.

    ReplyDelete
  21. @ Massimo

    > But it's not pseudoscience in the sense of, say, astrology. <

    But the bottom line is that you regard memetics as a pseudoscience. Therefore, logical consistency forces you to acknowledge that Dawkins, Dennett, and Blackmore are promoting some form of pseudoscience.

    > I'm doing no such thing at all. I'm perfectly aware of the distinction. <

    You only pay lip service to the distinction.

    > That's Truzzi's opinion. Clearly, I don't share it. <

    I'm more inclined to share Truzzi's opinion...

    "Marcello Truzzi, one of CSICOP's co-founders, left the organization after only a short time, arguing that many of those involved “tend to block honest inquiry, in my opinion. Most of them are not agnostic toward claims of the paranormal; they are out to knock them. [...] When an experiment of the paranormal meets their requirements, then they move the goal posts.”[24] Truzzi coined the term pseudoskeptic to describe critics in whom he detected such an attitude.[25]" (source: Wikipedia: Committe for Skeptical Inquiry)

    > And who the hell dispute that?? <

    I'm glad that's settled. So, we now agree that the academy classifies biology as a life science, not a physical science.

    > It still does, considering that much psychotherapy (with the exception of behavioral therapy) doesn't seem to work at all. <

    The bottom line is that psychotherapy only has to work as well as a placebo in order to work as well as antidepressants. And when you factor into equation that psychotherapy doesn't have any side effects and addiction problems, it works better.

    "A new analysis has found that in the majority of trials conducted by drug companies in recent decades, sugar pills have done as WELL as -- or BETTER than -- antidepressants.." (source: "Against Depression, a Sugar Pill Is Hard to Beat" by Shankar Vedantam, Washington Post, Tuesday, May 7, 2002, Page A01)

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  22. @ Massimo

    > Why should I be ashamed of it? And what the hell does that have to do with anything? <

    Well, if "these affiliations (with the AAAS) really count for close to nothing anyway," then it doesn't appear that your affiliation (your fellowship) with the AAAS is something to brag about.

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  23. Angela,

    > Personally I have big problems with the term 'pseudoscience'. It's an unstable term often used as an ad hominem (a bit like 'quack'), more than any useful definition of any discipline. <

    Not sure what you mean by "unstable." Yes, as Maarten pointed out, something can begin as a worthwhile hypothesis to explore, then become pseudoscience if it is found to be groundless and yet some people insist in proposing it as viable. But that sort of "instability" should be welcome.

    And yes, the term is definitely pejorative, because philosophy of science is a prescriptive, not descriptive, discipline. But that's no different from labeling bad reasoning as "fallacious," which philosophers do all the time, with good reason.

    > what is a 'hard' science? Who decides, and how? What does 'hard' even mean? <

    Usually the term refers to mature sciences that are based on sophisticated theory (often couched in mathematical terms) and backed up by plenty of empirical evidence. Physics and chemistry, in that sense, are hard sciences. The social sciences tend to be considered "soft," though that's not necessarily a pejorative; it just indicates that the structure of their theoretical-empirical bases is not like that of physics or chemistry. Biology is typically thought to be somewhere in the middle.

    As for who makes these pronouncements, typically it is scientists and philosophers of science, that is, respectively, practitioners of those disciplines and people who study their epistemic structure.

    Dr. C,

    > $31 for the paperback and $17 for the kindle?! Yikes. I'm probably picking it up anyway, but yikes. <

    I hear you. We didn't set the price, and the volume is published by an academic press, not a commercial publisher with more financial means at its disposal. Besides, it's a big book...

    Alastair,

    > the bottom line is that you regard memetics as a pseudoscience. <

    No, I don't. I regard it as an uninformative metaphor.

    > You only pay lip service to the distinction. <

    Says who? You? It is a desperate rhetorical move to impugn one's motivations.

    > I'm more inclined to share Truzzi's opinion... <

    Suit yourself.

    > we now agree that the academy classifies biology as a life science, not a physical science <

    That phrase makes no sense. First, because "the academy" isn't a coherent body in the business of classifying things. Second, because biology is a life science by definition (as it ought to be clear from its Greek root: bio).

    > The bottom line is that psychotherapy only has to work as well as a placebo in order to work as well as antidepressants <

    No, that's not the bottom line, the statement is empirically incorrect.

    > if "these affiliations (with the AAAS) really count for close to nothing anyway," then it doesn't appear that your affiliation (your fellowship) with the AAAS is something to brag about <

    You have no idea of what you are talking about.

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    1. @ Massimo

      > No, I don't. I regard it as an uninformative metaphor. <

      Blackmore presented memetics as a science in her book "The Meme Machine." And since an "uninformative metaphor" doesn't qualify as science, then logically consistency forces you to characterize memetics as a pseudoscience. Unfortunately, it doesn't appear that you are particularly concern with logical consistency - at least, not in this context. And we both know why: it would be too embarrassing for you to acknowledge that prominent professional skeptics and professors charged with the authority of educating the public on science are themselves engaging in pseudoscience.

      Merriam-Webster defines "pseudoscience" as "a system of theories, assumptions, and methods erroneously regarded as scientific."

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    2. So Massimo is indulging in logical inconsistencies out of sheer desperation to save the face of Richard Dawkins? You have to savour the irony!

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  24. What is?

    The line between what is and what is not disappears when One removes any uncertainty or doubt. The process is called enlightenment, and Once removed, light or truth or is is all that remains. Descartes had a good method for thIS! =

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  25. Thomas,

    > This is neither delineation nor demarcation. It is just posturing and begging the question. <

    Well, Maarten's phrasing may have been over the top, but in terms of substance I think he's right. More than a century of research on parapsychology has turned up close to nothing. Time to definitely consign the enterprise to pseudoscience?

    Alastair,

    > since an "uninformative metaphor" doesn't qualify as science, then logically consistency forces you to characterize memetics as a pseudoscience <

    Only if you subscribe to a contrived dualism about science and pseudoscience, which should be abundantly clear that I don't. Then again, you don't seem to bother actually reading what I write, only scanning to uncover material for rhetorical usage.

    > Merriam-Webster defines "pseudoscience" as "a system of theories, assumptions, and methods erroneously regarded as scientific." <

    That definition is far too broad and vague. Read the book, it will do you good.

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  26. @ Massimo

    > Only if you subscribe to a contrived dualism about science and pseudoscience, which should be abundantly clear that I don't. Then again, you don't seem to bother actually reading what I write, only scanning to uncover material for rhetorical usage. <

    It seems to me that you see the demarcation between science and pseudoscience in binary terms when it comes to parapsychology.

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  27. Alastair,

    > It seems to me that you see the demarcation between science and pseudoscience in binary terms when it comes to parapsychology. <

    It seems to me that you are committing a category mistake here. The demarcation between science and pseudoscience is one issue, the specific question of whether parapsychology is best considered a pseudoscience is another. My answer to the first one: it's a complicated landscapes, with a few clear cases and a number of borderline ones. My answer to the second one: parapsychology has steadily moved from borderline to downright pseudoscience during the past century. Of course, this judgment can always be revised, if the evidence warrants it. But I seriously doubt it will.

    Thomas,

    > Embedded deeply in such discussions, though, is something that falls outside the distinction being made and that is: what subject matter is worthwhile pursuing and what approach to a subject matter is or is not off limits. <

    Well, that is a very good question, but frankly I don't think of it as embedded into the demarcation problem, as much as orthogonal to it. That question arises, of course, even within well established science. Is it worth spending millions to fund research on string theory, given how little it has yielded in terms of empirical results (zero)? What about funding grants to study the sexual habits of yet another tropical species of moth? And so on.

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    1. @ Massimo

      > It seems to me that you are committing a category mistake here. The demarcation between science and pseudoscience is one issue, the specific question of whether parapsychology is best considered a pseudoscience is another. My answer to the first one: it's a complicated landscapes, with a few clear cases and a number of borderline ones. My answer to the second one: parapsychology has steadily moved from borderline to downright pseudoscience during the past century. Of course, this judgment can always be revised, if the evidence warrants it. But I seriously doubt it will. <

      Well again, we have in the case of parapsychology (as in the case of memetics and the science of morality) several prominent skeptics (e.g Sam Harris and the late Carl Sagan (who coined the expression "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence") and several prominent scientists (e.g. physicists Brian Josephson (Nobel laureate) and the late David Bohm) who have expressed public support for parapsychology.

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    2. Alastair,

      > we have in the case of parapsychology (as in the case of memetics and the science of morality) several prominent skeptics (e.g Sam Harris and the late Carl Sagan (who coined the expression "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence") and several prominent scientists (e.g. physicists Brian Josephson (Nobel laureate) and the late David Bohm) who have expressed public support for parapsychology. <

      And, again, I don’t see what your point is. (I won’t quibble here on your list and what exactly those people said, it’s really irrelevant.) If your point is that some scientists and/or skeptics sometimes endorse questionable, and even downright false notions, welcome to the club, nobody disagrees with that. If your point is that I don’t dare criticize those people when they do, then you have simply not paid attention to what I actually write.

      Delete
    3. @ Massimo

      > If your point is that some scientists and/or skeptics sometimes endorse questionable, and even downright false notions, welcome to the club, nobody disagrees with that. <

      My point is that prominent (not just "some") skeptics and scientists have endorsed what you consider to be clearly a pseudoscience - namely, parapsychology.

      > If your point is that I don’t dare criticize those people when they do, then you have simply not paid attention to what I actually write. <

      Have you criticized Sam Harris, Carl Sagan, Brian Josephson, and David Bohm for endorsing what you consider to be pseudoscience? You tell me.

      Delete
  28. Interesting review of a lot of different perspectives. Look forward to reading the book!
    BTW one Ph.D. from UT? Why no reference to RS Hartman’s The Structure of Value? He taught phil of sci at UT Knoxville – died around 1972. He says what makes a natural science is its connection to math, and proposes a science of values which would be connected to his Formal Axiology, a math-like ‘calculus.’ Ever hear of him?
    William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.
    wjkellpro@aol.com

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  29. Sad, Massimo. It sounds corporatist or worse (it remembers me, within due proportions, the Galileo process and the 'demarcations' some well known governments still do). The mention of budget among the reasons to hunt the witches was simply nefarious, showing very well why current main stream science is this mess: investments.

    I'd think otherwise the role of true science: yes, for sure it must doubt, but rather its experiments and until they fit into its expectations of likeness, of consistency, not other attempts of knowledge and, if so, if necessary, not in this way. Science should be studying, for instance, why sometimes (I would say - so many times), those 'spurious' forms of science (I'd prefer knowledge, putting everything in a single bag) work. In the case of homeopathy, for instance, (I'm a witness of its capabilities) you'd say 'just placebo, if that much' and I'd think to myself 'why not a placebo medicine? why not study that?'.

    I doubt that public knowledge of official science is obliterated any way by 'pseudo' science: if people choose this last one, it could be based on cultural reasons or still on witnessing bad official science practice (that indeed exists and, yes, must be prevented).

    Finally, the text shows a sad subservience of philosophy towards not really science, but rich governments and overall investors.

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