* In defense of naturalism. As a naturalist, I find this defense pretty darn unconvincing.
* Keynes: the sunny economist.
* Is Texas about to give us yet another dangerous dumb ass for President?
* New Atheism: Kitcher better than Dawkins?
* When superstition kills via mind-body connection.
* My Amazon review of Martha Nussbaum's Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities.
* When neuroscientists and philosophers of mind clash.
* Stop talking about evil and do something about evildoers.
* Michelle Bachmann takes never ending liberties with reality.
* Epicureanism: the most important underestimated engine of the Renaissance?
* My interview with Gelf Magazine about humanism and skepticism.
* Here is how low CNN has sunk. Not to mention the Tea Party. Let's kill the uninsured.
* Corporations as bad spouses.
In the particular clash of one neuroscientist with one philosopher (or two, if an added comment is also included) that is mentioned in one of the above "picks", the outcome is the neuroscientist graciously surviving the objections (some of which he rightly calls "silly") moved against him, and the philosopher/s missing most of the points.
ReplyDeleteHector,
ReplyDeletenot at all. Both of them miss major points of the other, and it really doesn't help anyone to call the other side "silly."
Massimo, as I see it, what is called "silly" is the argument, not the person making it. As I was telling you the other day in some other context, persons deserve respect, but ideas don´t. And arguments should be about ideas, not about the people holding them.
ReplyDeleteI find this, from the seven questions link, fascinating:
ReplyDelete"However, humanists also tend to be more independent by nature, and find social support where it is most logical to find it: with friends and family. It is interesting to note that even religious people are far less likely to go to church once they develop interests and meaningful connections on their own"
I tried to search for some sort of reference about that but I just don't know what search terms will return related results. Do you have a reference to that? Thanks!
Hector,
ReplyDeleteagreed about the difference between persons and arguments. But, first, that particular argument wasn't silly at all - as Ramachandran would have understood had he bothered to actually pay attention to it. Second, Rama does dismiss the whole of philosophy by saying that "forging ahead is a concept alien to philosophers." Pretty anti-intellectual and ignorant, don't you think?
Regarding your interview: I think that the [Pop culture topic] and Philosophy series is (for the most part) underrated. If you can get past the occasional weak chapter, the books contain some truly thought-provoking gems. The question of whether or not Buffy's actions are moral or whether or not Skynet is fighting a just war are more engaging than dry philosophy textbooks. I've been reading them per your suggestion in a long ago post, so thanks!
ReplyDeleteMy highly recommended pick to go along with the Maureen Dowd piece at NYT, along the same lines (you'll appreciate the Ayn Rand dig):
ReplyDeletehttp://goo.gl/h70SG
Massimo - Okay, I'll bite back. Where are philosophers forging to?
ReplyDeleteOn "Evildoers and Us" (which is a great title to play around with), such a promising start that devolves into splitting the false dichotomy so show how great I am. Is Alan Wolfe a Titan or a tyke?
Massimo, Kitcher's not a "New Atheist," so I don't see how he can be a better one than Dawkins. Or, at least, that's how the column is structured. Saying he's a better Gnu than Dawkings would be like saying the St. Louis Cardinals being a better football team than the Dallas Cowboys.
ReplyDelete===
What did you not like about the naturalism article, in specific, as being "unconvincing"? I thought it was decent, though not much more than that.
===
Are there two magazines called The New Republic? I've seen a neoconservative screed called a magazine which says Israel is always right, and the US is always right as long as it remembers Israel is always right. I guess Alan Wolfe writes for the "other" New Republic, based on the magazine he describes.
Massimo, Rama wrote that "lesion method in neurology ... is not the usual way that biologists investigate function and structure” is quite silly. He is correct. The use of lesion method, without any doubt, is not unusual at all. Do you object to that?
ReplyDeleteNorwwgian,
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure what you meant by your comment on evildoers. As for the other issue:
> Okay, I'll bite back. Where are philosophers forging to? <
Well, see for instance my take here: http://goo.gl/gnpY4
In general, to claim that philosophers don't make progress is simply a clear reflection of one's ignorance of philosophical literature. To pretend that the only way for a discipline to make progress is the way science does it (as opposed to, say, history, or even literary criticism) is obnoxious scientism. Both of which are displayed by Ramachandran's response.
Gadfly,
> Saying he's a better Gnu than Dawkings would be like saying the St. Louis Cardinals being a better football team than the Dallas Cowboys. <
Not at all. Kitcher may not be "officially" a NA (who determines membership, anyway?), but they are most definitely playing the same game.
> What did you not like about the naturalism article, in specific, as being "unconvincing"? <
Besides the scientistic flavor of it, which I find increasingly nauseating, the author entirely sidestepped the question of the ontological status of mathematical objects, which was the previous author's (on the Stone) main reason to take naturalism with a grain of salt.
spike,
> Rama wrote that "lesion method in neurology ... is not the usual way that biologists investigate function and structure” is quite silly. He is correct. The use of lesion method, without any doubt, is not unusual at all. Do you object to that? <
No, I object to his mischaracterization of the book review, and to his going from a reasonable answer to specific criticism to general, downright ignorant, statements about philosophy.
Massimo, that is fair enough. McGinn made several valid critical points about Ramachandran's book. However he isn't any better in this exchange. He also felt compelled to extend reasonable (albeit unoriginal) criticism to general but uninformed attack on the kind of research program that Ramachandran specializes in. Several points he tried to make strike me as as downright ignorant. The "conspicuous prevalence [of lesion method] in brain studies" is one of them. He also mischaracterized how lesion studies are used to make inference about cognitive function. "Waking is what the legs do" is especially annoying. The legs do lots of things. Walking is not just the legs. There are lots of scientists working on walking (and locomotion in general). If they do what McGinn suggests that they do, ie. "just look at the legs", we'll never figure anything out. The functional/anatomical relationship between walking and legs is nowhere as transparent as McGinn says. This flawed and naive analogy undermines his main points about lesion studies.
ReplyDeleteStephen Greenblatt is doing the radio circuit for his new book The Swerve: How the World Became Modern.
ReplyDeleteHe was on WNYC a couple days ago, you can listen to the interview for free:
http://www.wnyc.org/shows/lopate/2011/sep/20/how-world-became-modern/
He’s a good, easygoing speaker, so it’s a worthwhile listen.
spike,
ReplyDeleteI don't disagree. My point was that they are *both* being somewhat unreasonable and dismissive, which is too bad.
The issue about research by lesion is a serious one, though. There has always been a similar debate in genetics, about artificially induced mutations. Rama is right that this is one legitimate way to do the research, but McGinn is also correct that it is coarse, and subject to interpretative oversimplification.
Massimo, just silly babbling on Evildoers. I'll read the 2009 post, in the meantime, I'm asking for the goal of philosophy, where progress is going. Not the method philosophy uses, the humanities are just alright with me. What I am getting at is "progress" doesn't really apply to the humanities. (Just as humans aren't really "progressing" towards anything that can be named either) It isn't predictive in any sense of the word, which is the important distinction between science and the humanities. That's not a value judgment. It just is. Thus "forging" and "progressing" shouldn't be used, lest the idea that the humanities can make "progress" will muddy our thinking.
ReplyDeleteBtw, finally finished the ethics series:
Nice work! That's highest praise from a Norwegian. Mark Erickson
Massimo, as you said the interpretation of lesion studies is not easy. But that is why they are accompanied by other research methods. Blindsight, for example, can be induced in normal subjects using TMS.
ReplyDeleteNorwegian,
ReplyDeletethanks for the kind words. I think of progress in philosophy as more similar to math or logic. One explores logical space, understands it better, and keeps eliminating certain possibilities. The space itself may be infinite (though that's potentially true of science as well), but that doesn't mean one cannot understand this as progress. It's just not empirical in nature.
For instance, in philosophy of science nobody defends logical positivism or naive falsificationism anymore, because we understand their limitations better and have moved to better conceptions of how science works. How is this different - again, apart from the fact that it is based on logic rather than empirical evidence - from physicists moving away from Newtonian mechanics and toward relativity?
spike,
ReplyDeleteyes, but it's still a coarse technique, and criticism still applies. Again, genetics too makes progress by way of additional techniques, but insofar one refers to lesion studies (or mutations) one needs to be careful. And Rama sometimes isn't.
Massimo
ReplyDeleteI am interested in your above statement that "except philosophy is based on logic rather than empiricism" In what way? Can you give an example?
I have thought that philosophy had become a discipline that primarily clarified...cleared the smoke and haze, etc.
Massimo, thanks. Given your review of Harris' book, I thought scientism might have been part of the critique, and I agree. I thought it was too optimistic, too, even if allowing for its scientism.
ReplyDelete====
Good answer to Norwegian on naive overuse of falsification. I see that primarily in liberal-critical religious people who still want to cling to metaphysical claims.
====
I don't think Kitcher is a Gnu, myself. Unless it's purely for "PR," Gutting's using the phrase "secular humanism" is part of my judgment. At the least, Gutting doesn't think he's a Gnu; of course, you don't always agree with Gutting, I know. James Wood's linked essay from the New Yorker also sets Kitcher *against* the Gnus. So, I'll have to disagree on this one.
BTW, for those who didn't click through, read the Wood essay: http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2011/08/15/110815crat_atlarge_wood?currentPage=all
DJD,
ReplyDelete> I am interested in your above statement that "except philosophy is based on logic rather than empiricism" In what way? Can you give an example? <
Everything that philosophers do has to do with logical reasoning (informed by empirical evidence when relevant, obviously), so anything you can think of that comes under the rubric of philosophy constitutes an example.
> I have thought that philosophy had become a discipline that primarily clarified...cleared the smoke and haze <
That's too narrow a view of philosophy, espoused only by Wittgenstein. And at any rate, how would you do even that without logic?
Massimo, fuhgitabodit. I've read many of your promotions about philosophy that appropriate math and logic. Just so you know, the methods and results of philosophy that are solely based on math and logic are explicitly the parts that I've never criticized.
ReplyDeleteThe idea I'm talking about is that "progress" implies not just "more," "better," or "newer." It implies movement on an observable scale - empirical results. You agree philosophy isn't empirical. So stop using "progress."
For instance, does string theory indicate "progress"? Another question, do the other humanities exhibit any empirical progress?
It's different because we use relativity to make stuff work. And it's also different in that Newtonian mechanics isn't made into a backward mode or method by figuring out relativity. It's still tremendously useful for lots and lots of things. I'm struck by your choice of this paradigmatic scientific revolution. The fact that you can't see why Newton-to-Einstein is different than logical positivism-to-(what I don't even know) speaks volumes to me (and not necessarily rationally).
Gadfly, Massimo didn't reply on naive overuse of falsification, he used naive falsification as an example.
Norwegian,
ReplyDeleteI honestly think you are entirely missing my point:
> the methods and results of philosophy that are solely based on math and logic are explicitly the parts that I've never criticized. <
All of philosophy is based on logic, and math is a subset of logic.
> It implies movement on an observable scale - empirical results. <
Well,if you *define* progress as inherently empirical then you win by default. But notice that then neither logic nor math make progress either, which I don't think is what you want to say.
> do the other humanities exhibit any empirical progress? <
Of course. Shakespearean scholarship, for instance, is much better today than it was decades or centuries ago.
> The fact that you can't see why Newton-to-Einstein is different than logical positivism-to-(what I don't even know) speaks volumes to me (and not necessarily rationally). <
But I think it is irrational to define progress as the kind of thing that only science can make, and then to complain that other fields "fail" to make the kind of progress that you have established by fiat they cannot make.
Massimo
ReplyDeleteSaying all of philosophy depends upon logic and empiricism does not really say much beyond we use reasoning in almost everything we do. Philosophy is also greatly involved in analysis of language usage and attempts at clarification of propositions and representation. Sure...there is some dependence upon reasoning....but little is gained by definitive logic of logical necessity, contradiction, and identity. Nothing comes out in terms of implications that does not already reside in assumptions. Assumptions rely on probable empirical findings that require verification....both for confirmation, both for verification and for clarifying meaning. The other main source of assumptions are authority...or stipulation. In these also, no implications can be derived by logic that are not already existing in the meaning of the assumptions. For instance...Assuming "we should strive for human flourishing" is stipulated...empirical knowledge then reveals various means that are instrumental in achieving this stipulated goal, and then can be used, if one chooses, in helping produce the goal. I don't know if this is "philosophy" or "science" and practical application. Somewhat like finding a cure and using it to bring about a desired goal. (curing a patients disease.)
Okay, I'll regroup and redouble my effort to get on the same page.
ReplyDeleteI guess I'll just respond to your points:
ReplyDelete"All of philosophy is based on logic, and math is a subset of logic." Well, duh. But obviously there is more to philosophy than logic, otherwise it wouldn't have thousands of college and university departments devoted to it. To take an old example, how is a categorical imperative just logic?
"then neither logic nor math make progress either, which I don't think is what you want to say." That's exactly what I want to say. I'm trying to get you to give up using the word "progress" to describe "more" and "new" abstract findings of philosophy, logic and math, all per se, but especially math. Math (and of course logic) helps to make progress in science. For instance, has string theory been "progress"?
My point is to stick with "is much better today" rather than use "progress" which absolutely means observable movement. You know Latin, right?
"then to complain that other fields 'fail' to make the kind of progress"
I didn't use the word "fail." Why did you put it in quotes? And in no way did I even imply more and new philosophy was a failure. I meant no negative connotation at all. (Besides the opportunity cost of the philosopher's time. I'm an economist by training. Does that clarify things?)
Norwegian,
ReplyDelete> But obviously there is more to philosophy than logic, otherwise it wouldn't have thousands of college and university departments devoted to it. <
No, philosophy is applied logic, formal and informal. And logic is taught in philosophy departments.
> "then neither logic nor math make progress either, which I don't think is what you want to say." That's exactly what I want to say. <
Then you are simply wrong. Math and logic do make progress in perfectly understandable and sensible ways, just not the ways of science. And if you define progress only in the latter way then you are using the word in an idiosyncratic and circular fashion.
> You know Latin, right? <
Yup.
Contra principia negantem non est disputandumab. Modus vivendi
ReplyDeleteMy friend, I'm not denying any principle, you are. (It should be "disputandum," by the way.)
ReplyDeleteI copied and pasted, I must have left "ab" from another attempt. I don't know Latin.
ReplyDeleteHere's an appropriate cartoon. I'm not that hard core, I'd pick the old woman in an instant.
The "naturalism" article seems to get off on the wrong foot by defining "naturalism," weirdly, as "the philosophical theory that treats science as our most reliable source of knowledge and scientific method as the most effective route to knowledge."
ReplyDeleteI had always regarded naturalism as primarily a set of ontological commitments (or the avoidance of bad ones), and it appears wikipedia agrees with me. But the author seems to see it as "science advancing ever forward."
Ian,
ReplyDeletewell, that Wikipedia agrees with you is a pretty weak argument, my friend ;-)
I think the author was really concerned with scientism, not naturalism per se. At any rate, he was responding to Rosenberger's article, using his concept of naturalism.