A new eugenics?

by Massimo Pigliucci

Eugenics was the idea, proposed initially by Francis Galton (Darwin’s cousin), that humanity should apply its ingenuity — and particularly the new science of heredity — to its evolutionary betterment. After all, we have put quite a bit of thought and effort into improving plants and animals, why not turn the same degree of attention to our own species?

Because we would be playing God, is a common objection. But arguably we have been playing god since we invented fire, and besides, there are no gods, so that argument isn’t going to fly. Still, it soon became apparent that eugenics was a horrible idea. Between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th several states had passed eugenic-inspired laws in the United States, three of which were upheld by the Supreme Court, resulting in the forced sterilization of 60,000 people. In writing the US Supreme Court decision in 1927 (which passed with a stunning 8-1 vote), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. infamously said that “three generations of imbeciles are enough,” referring to the family tree of the plaintiff, Carrie Buck, who had been declared “feeble-minded” by the State of Virginia. The law allowing that state to enforce sterilization remained on the books until 1974.

And of course, we all know to what heights (so to speak) the Nazis brought the whole idea of eugenic betterment of the human race. Interestingly, and somewhat logically, even, some of the Nazis tried at Nuremberg actually cited the American laws on eugenics in their defense. It didn’t work.

There is much more to be said about the history of eugenics, of course, but this minimal background suffices to bring us to an interesting article I read recently, penned by Julian Savulescu for the Practical Ethics blog. Savulescu discusses an ongoing controversy in Germany about genetic testing of human embryos. The Leopoldina, Germany’s equivalent of the National Academy of Sciences, has recommended genetic testing of pre-implant embryos, to screen for serious and incurable defects. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has agreed to allow a parliamentary vote on this issue, but also said that she personally supports a ban on this type of testing. Her fear is that the testing would quickly lead to “designer babies,” i.e. to parents making choices about their unborn offspring based not on knowledge about serious disease, but simply because they happen to prefer a particular height or eye color.

Here is where Savulescu’s article becomes interesting. He infers from Merkel’s comments (and many similar others) that people tend to think of selecting traits like eye color as eugenics, while acting to avoid incurable disease is not considered eugenics. He argues that this is exactly wrong: eugenics, as he points out, means “well born,” so eugenicists have historically been concerned with eliminating traits that would harm society (Wendell Holmes’ “three generation of imbeciles”), not with simple aesthetic choices. As Savulescu puts it: “[eugenics] is selecting embryos which are better, in this context, have better lives. Being healthy rather than sick is ‘better.’ Having blond hair and blue eyes is not in any plausible sense ‘better,’ even if people mistakenly think so.”

He has a point, I think. And there is another, related aspect of discussions about eugenics that should be at the forefront of our consideration: what was particularly objectionable about American and Nazi early 20th century eugenics is that the state, not individuals, were to make decisions about who could reproduce and who couldn’t. Savulescu continues: “to grant procreative liberty is the only way to avoid the objectionable form of eugenics that the Nazis practiced.” In other words, it makes all the difference in the world if it is an individual couple who decides to have or not have a baby, or if it is the state that imposes a particular reproductive choice on its citizenry.

So far so good, but then Savulescu expands his argument to a point where I begin to feel somewhat uncomfortable. He says: “[procreative liberty] involves the freedom to choose a child with red hair or blond hair or no hair.” But wait a minute, Savulescu has suddenly sneaked into his argument for procreative liberty the assumption that all choices in this area are on the same level. But while it is hard to object to action aimed at avoiding devastating diseases, it is not quite so obvious to me what arguments favor the idea of designer babies. The first intervention can be justified, for instance, on consequentialist grounds because it reduces the pain and suffering of both the child and the parents. The second intervention is analogous to shopping for a new bag, or a new car, which means that it commodifies the act of conceiving a baby, thus degrading its importance. I’m not saying that that in itself is sufficient to make it illegal, but the ethics of it is different, and that difference cannot simply be swept under the broad rug of “procreative liberty.”

Let me make this clear: commodification isn’t the kind of thing that laws ought to regulate. If people want to buy more bags or cars, or prefer red to blue bags or cars, so be it, there is not much of an ethical issue involved, and certainly no legal one. But designing babies is to treat them as objects, not as human beings, and there are a couple of strong philosophical traditions in ethics that go squarely against that (I’m thinking, obviously, of Kant’s categorical imperative, as well as of virtue ethics; not sure what a consequentialist would say about this, probably she would remain neutral on the issue).

Commodification of human beings has historically produced all sorts of bad stuff, from slavery to exploitative prostitution, and arguably to war (after all, we are using our soldiers as means to gain access to power, resources, territory, etc.). Do we really want to expand commodification’s range to our next generation from the moment of conception?

And of course, there is the issue of access. Across-the-board “procreative liberty” of the type envisioned by Savulescu will cost money because it requires considerable resources. Genetic screening for major diseases is a good thing both for the individuals involved and for society at large, so it is easy to see how it should be paid for by public health care systems (not in the US, naturally, but certainly in Europe). But designing babies would obviously be entirely a matter of aesthetic choice, not supportable via public funding, and therefore accessible only to those parents who could afford it.

Now, imagine that these parents decide to purchase the ability to produce babies that have the type of characteristics that will make them more successful in society: taller, more handsome, blue eyed, blonde, more symmetrical, whatever. We have just created yet another way for the privileged to augment and pass their privileges to the next generation — in this case literally through their genes, not just as real estate or bank accounts. That would quickly lead to an even further divide between the haves and the have-nots, more inequality, more injustice, possibly, in the long run, even two different species (why not design your babies so that they can’t breed with certain types of undesirables, for instance?). Is that the sort of society that Savulescu is willing to envision in the name of his total procreative liberty? That begins to sounds like the libertarian version of the eugenic ideal, something potentially only slightly less nightmarish than the early 20th century original.