[Julia's Note: This was certainly meant as friendly, but not as an attack! I'm just explaining an interesting controversy in the field.]
(1) My disagreement with Massimo in the show begins around 20:30 and seems, in retrospect, to be primarily due to my characterization of appeals to intuition as a “rule of inference” among philosophers. Massimo (I believe) took “rule of inference” to refer to a formal rule of deduction, and replied that philosophers do not disagree about formal logic, whereas I was using “rule of inference” to mean, basically, “philosophical methodology.”
(2) George Bealer (1996). A priori knowledge and the scope of philosophy.
(3) Sosa, E. (1998). ‘Minimal Intuition’, in M. De Paul and W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
(4) Timothy Williamson (2004). Philosphical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism About Judgement.
(5) Talbot, Brian (2009). How to Use Intuitions in Philosophy.
(6) Harrison, J. (1967). “Ethical Objectivism,” In P. Edwards (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vols. 3-4, pp. 71-75).
(7) Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica.
(8) Putnam, Hilary (1995). Renewing Philosophy.
(9) Harman, G. (1999). “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the fundamental Attribution Error,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New Series), 119: 316–31.