Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.
I'm interested in your take on this question but these videos are agonizing. I suffered through an earlier one but constantly calling each other out by their pretentious (and laboriously slow) names really wore on me. And when this video started off the same way and they had the characters talk with such stilted phrasing I screamed and closed the tab in frustration. Any grade-school kid could read a whole paragraph in the time they needlessly and pretentiously drone out "Sim-pli-ci-o" or mumble their empty filler phrases ("Sam Harris thinks, for instance, ..").
ReplyDeleteCan you at least post the text of the dialogue so we can scan through it?
Nice, short and simple explanation with which I'm completely in agreement. Although, maybe it would've been better if you didn't mention Harris by name and just discuss his ideas.
ReplyDeleteTyro,
ReplyDeletesorry, there apparently are two diametrically opposite reactions to the robots. Some people love them, some hate them. If that's any consolation, you keep company to Julia...
Daneel,
thanks, I wanted to mention Harris' book explicitly because that's what's making the round these days. I hope you've noticed that there is no personal attack there, just a criticism of his ideas.
Massimo - if this video system is like others, you have to type in the dialog, right? Can you then paste a script below the video so that everyone can be happy?
ReplyDeleteI'm sorry for being so aggressive in my first response.
Let me first say, I love this blog and as a biologist who only recently came out of the closet as a lover of philosophy, I've found it immensely helpful. So I raise these questions in the spirit of friendly inquiry, not as an Harris acolyte dogmatically defending him.
ReplyDeleteHaving just read The Moral Landscape, I'm not sure you address the points Harris is making in his book. I also think he deals with your criticisms, whether absolutely or not, I'm not yet sure.
For one thing, he seems to be using the word science in the broad sense, encompassing the natural and social sciences, as well the rational disciplines like philosophy and mathematics. Some of your criticisms only apply to 'science' in the narrow sense. I also think he addresses the question of is/ought with his analogy to health.
As for criticisms of utilitarianism you've made in the past when referring to his arguments, I really don't see how they apply. For example, you suggested in a podcast that if 'science' showed slavery to be good for society overall, then Harris would be forced to accept that slavery is moral (I may be paraphrasing poorly.) While this argument is a valid criticism of a crude utilitarian calculus, it does not apply to Harris. He clearly holds individual well being to be primary (serial killers excepted of course.) Similarly, one of the bloggers on this site suggested that even if 'science' showed corporal punishment to be beneficial to the healthy development of a child, it would still be wrong because inflicting pain on children is always wrong. But as the example of emergency surgery without anaesthetic illustrates, most of us do accept some pain as necessary given a beneficial outcome. Those who state corporal punishment would still be wrong, do so because they already believe it is harmful and does no good to children. This is begging the question, the reason we think it wrong is because empirical experience and scientific research seems to support us. If however, impeccable research demonstrated that a few sharp raps on the knuckles or an occasional lashing during childhood really did produce happier, kinder, healthier adults (which I doubt), we would be bad parents if we didn't use corporal punishment, however distasteful we found it. Harris is pointing out that our moral intuitions can be wrong. Given that we desire some end (which like the foundations of science, we must accept ab initio), there are empirically right and wrong ways of acheiving those ends.
I am ill equipped to thoroughly analyse the arguments, but I feel the discussion would be greatly helped if we all first read the book rather than argue against 2nd hand caricatures.
(That might have sounded harsh: let me repeat, Massimo is my role model.)
Tyro,
ReplyDeleteno big deal. Concerning publishing the text of the dialogue, as it turns out, once the movie is created the XTranormal site does not allow you to see or edit any further. I would have to write the dialogue outside of the system and then copy/paste it, which would slow me down (I do these things rather on the fly). Besides, people wouldn't be watching the video if I published the whole thing, would they? ;-)
ABRamin,
ReplyDeletethanks for the kind words. A fuller analysis of Harris' paper is forthcoming in Skeptic (and Michael Shermer tells me it will be released also as eSkeptic, I'll post the link). Right now a few comments on some of your specific points:
> For one thing, he seems to be using the word science in the broad sense, encompassing the natural and social sciences, as well the rational disciplines like philosophy and mathematics. Some of your criticisms only apply to 'science' in the narrow sense. I also think he addresses the question of is/ought with his analogy to health. <
That is entirely correct, since I do think that a combination of science (strict sense) and philosophy are sufficient to account for moral judgment. But then why talk about science? Readers of his book, I suspect, mean something quite different by that term, not including logic, math or philosophy. And I still don't see what neurobiology has to do with moral judgment (except in the sense of telling us how the brain operates under those conditions, which is an entirely different point, as Harris himself readily acknowledges).
> While this argument is a valid criticism of a crude utilitarian calculus, it does not apply to Harris. He clearly holds individual well being to be primary (serial killers excepted of course.) <
But then he is not a utilitarian. He is now invoking a mix of utilitarianism and deontology. Which is fine, but he owes it to his readers to tell them exactly why he takes that particular (philosophical) position.
> Those who state corporal punishment would still be wrong, do so because they already believe it is harmful and does no good to children. This is begging the question, the reason we think it wrong is because empirical experience and scientific research seems to support us. <
You (and Harris) are free to take that position, but that's also a philosophical stand, informed but not determined by science.
> Given that we desire some end (which like the foundations of science, we must accept ab initio), there are empirically right and wrong ways of acheiving those ends. <
Again, correct. But no philosopher has ever denied that science isn't useful instrumentally to achieve the ends we wish to achieve. But the discussion about those ends is outside the purview of science, because it depends on our choices of values, not on empirical facts.
Besides, people wouldn't be watching the video if I published the whole thing, would they?
ReplyDeleteIf that's the case then save us the agony and save yourself the effort and just give us the text. If some people would get additional benefit from watching the video then no, people would watch the video.
And lets face it, many people like me won't watch the whole thing anyway so it's a question of what's more important - pressuring people to listen to five minutes of computer generate voices or coaxing people to learn philosophy?
Tyro,
ReplyDeletec'mon, many people do seem to enjoy the videos, and this blog provides plenty of other reading material. Let me experiment with different media. Besides, Hypatia is really sexy...
But then he is not a utilitarian. He is now invoking a mix of utilitarianism and deontology. Which is fine, but he owes it to his readers to tell them exactly why he takes that particular (philosophical) position.
ReplyDeleteWhere do you get the idea that he's a utilitarian or explicitly advocating this position? About the closest he comes in the book is to say that he's a consequentialist and mentions utilitarianism only in the footnotes.
Have you read his book?
> Those who state corporal punishment would still be wrong, do so because they already believe it is harmful and does no good to children. This is begging the question, the reason we think it wrong is because empirical experience and scientific research seems to support us. <
You (and Harris) are free to take that position, but that's also a philosophical stand, informed but not determined by science.
Harris has a section called "Science and Philosophy" where he directly confronts this issue and deals with this reaction.
Tyro,
ReplyDeleteyes I've read the book. Utilitarianism is a (the major) form of consequentialism. Either way, once you start invoking rights you are out of the consequentialist framework.
No, he does not address the problem at all, he just talks about it. The reality is smuggled in a endnote to the introduction, where he admits that what he means by science is broader than commonly understood. That's equivocation, a logical fallacy.
Either way, once you start invoking rights you are out of the consequentialist framework.
ReplyDeleteThat would be an interesting discussion but since individual rights are barely mentioned in the book I don't see how it affects his thesis.
No, he does not address the problem at all, he just talks about it.
Is this some semantic game of yours? All books just "talk" about issues, is there some other way of addressing problems? He discusses the common view that philosophy is what drives moral beliefs and then argues (persuasively) that no, in fact is is science which is driving. Just as science "informs" religion, science informs philosophy. Empirical observations are in the driving seat, and science is how we gather and analyse these observations.
As for your blithe dismissal of the corporal punishment example, Harris does talk about questions like this and no, he does not fall back on philosophy but on science. He talks specifically about retribution & punishment in criminal justice and he does deal specifically with the question of child rearing. Whether corporal punishment works and whether it produces "better" people are scientific questions not philosophical ones! They are certainly difficult ones so perhaps philosophers step in where science fears to tread but this but this does not mean it is the domain of philosophy any more than difficult questions are the domain of religion.
The reality is smuggled in a endnote to the introduction, where he admits that what he means by science is broader than commonly understood. That's equivocation, a logical fallacy.
Don't be absurd, of course it isn't the equivocation fallacy. He defines his terms clearly, it is a usage that is acceptable to practising scientists and philosophers (eg: Coyne & Blackford) and most importantly he does not rely on or attempt to smuggle in any associations we have to the word "science" that is inappropriate to his definition. You may say that his definition is overly broad which is fine but that is no reason to start flinging accusations like this around.
Tyro, I suggest you tone it down a notch or two. I am neither playing semantic games nor am I being absurd, I'm simply disagreeing with your take on Harris' book.
ReplyDelete> All books just "talk" about issues, is there some other way of addressing problems? He discusses the common view that philosophy is what drives moral beliefs and then argues (persuasively) that no, in fact is is science which is driving. Just as science "informs" religion, science informs philosophy. <
What I meant was that he does *not* argue the point persuasively at all (again, full review coming soon). And I think it is rather bizarre to say that religion and philosophy are on the same level, as implied by your quote here. (If you did not mean it, then I suggest you pick your analogies more carefully.)
> Whether corporal punishment works and whether it produces "better" people are scientific questions not philosophical ones! <
Only if you accept the principles that corporal punishment is an acceptable violation of children's rights, and only if you take a consequentialist view. Needless to say, both of those positions are philosophical, and precede any pertinent empirical evidence.
> it isn't the equivocation fallacy. He defines his terms clearly, it is a usage that is acceptable to practising scientists and philosophers (eg: Coyne & Blackford) <
It *is* equivocation when one uses the term science throughout the book and only notices in an endnote that oh, by the way, by science I don't mean what most people mean. Coyne and Blackford are anomalies in this respect, and even Blackford is more cautious than Harris and Coyne. Incidentally, Coyne being a scientist moved by the same scientistic impetus that moves Harris, it doesn't surprise me at all that he endorses an expansive view of science. But science, both historically and in current practice, most definitely does *not* include all forms of reasonable knowledge - which is what would be necessary to make Harris' argument fly.
Harris tries to avoid even acknowledging that utilitarianism is a debatable philosophical position held by particular individuals. He tries to pass it off as "obviously" true, if you will. In this sense, he thinks that even more is obviously real about morality than Massimo does. In the past, Massimo has compared moral skepticism to radical skepticism; he takes it as just, like, obviously true that moral truth exists. Harris goes farther: 'not only, is it, like, obvious that moral truth exists, man, but also, like, there's this thing called "happiness," and man, you just know it when you see it, you know? You just know. Like, when Muslim women wear veils, you just, like, know that's not real happiness, man.'
ReplyDeletePhilosophy is as much a quarrel over what should be considered obvious as it is a rational enterprise. I don't think it's intuitively obvious that moral truth exists at all. Massimo does. Harris does, and thinks it's also equally obvious that Utilitarianism is the right stance.
Ritchie, good points, but I do not actually think that the existence of moral truths (which I actually like to refer to by the milder non-arbitrary moral judgments) is obvious at all. I just think there are good arguments for that position. And of course you are entirely right about utilitarianism.
ReplyDeleteI dont think Harris would find your objections particularly challenging. I find his analogy between health and well being pretty convincing. Science can give us an objective way of increasing health (and at the same time redefine the meaning of health) but whether you choose to accept that as a worthwhile goal is up to you indeed. None of all this matters to someone who's taking a position like that just like no nitpicky philosophical objection would matter to someone who's trying to improve the state of medicine. Harris is being pragmatic here and i think we might need a little bit more of that. Whats funny is that i actually disagree with him for several reasons the most important of which is that increasing well being isnt what we intuitively understand as "morality" but a different loosely related concept and that he insists on shoving under the carpet problems pertaining to his definition of it such as the "zerosumgame-ness" of well being. It seems obvious that we should be striving towards shifting its distribution towards higher values but how would that affect its median value, the range or the dispersion? What shape would its distribution have to have? There are several value judgments that have to be made there so even that isnt entirely scientific. I could bring many more objections to the table...but i wont :)
ReplyDeleteMassimo, you said recently:
ReplyDelete"moral skepticism is undefeatable, just like any kind of radical skepticism. That sort of position is simply best ignored."
So you don't think that moral realism is obviously correct, but you think that arguments against moral realism should be ignored? This seems to mean that you think moral realism is not clearly correct, but we should believe it anyway.
I think that some clarification on your part is clearly called for!
Tyro, I suggest you tone it down a notch or two.
ReplyDeleteI'd be glad to if you don't start slinging accusations of fallacies without some substantial defence.
Only if you accept the principles that corporal punishment is an acceptable violation of children's rights, and only if you take a consequentialist view.
He is *not* arguing for corporal punishment so I don't understand why you think that he needs to think that it is an acceptable violation.
It *is* equivocation when one uses the term science throughout the book and only notices in an endnote that oh, by the way, by science I don't mean what most people mean
His meaning is hardly vague and there's little attempt to smuggle in meaning. You need to back that claim up.
As for this "oh, by the way" redefinition accusation, dictionary.com has the definition of science as:
2. systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation.
You can harrumph and say that learned philosophers know that this is inaccurate and it merely reflects what the plebs believe but as this is a popular book it is not equivocation to use the popular meanings of the word.
So yeah, if you're saying Harris needs to watch what he says, it would sure be helpful if you do the same. To level these accusations when a generous and reasonable interpretation would contradict your claims seems preposterous.
Tyro, interesting that you took offense at my comment on logical fallacies, which was clearly directed to Harris, not you. I did not realize you had such an emotional commitment to this issue. I do stand by my claim, however: I think that the entire book is based on that equivocation, which is likely why Harris smuggled his definition of science in an endnote instead of opening with a chapter discussing it.
ReplyDeleteKostas, what can I say, one man's nitpicking is another man's attempt at conceptual clarity... ;-)
Ritchie, I do owe you a clarification. So in my mind there is a distinction among moral skepticism, anti-realism and realism. You may not buy the distinction between the two, however. As for my opinion of realism, give me some points for being open minded here: I am not claiming that I know moral realism to be true, I am making the more modest statement that I find the arguments for realism more compelling than those in favor of anti-realism.
Damnit i knew i shouldnt have used that word !
ReplyDeleteBut still just because philosophers find those distinctions useful or important that doesnt mean necessarily that Harris has to address or acknowledge them. He can pretty much gloss over them by saying something like "i take it for granted" which is more or less what he does anyway. So if you dont share the same premises the whole point is moot.
lost me at "2 + 2 = 4" being some sort of empirical fact.
ReplyDeleteDave,
ReplyDelete"Hypatia's" point was precisely that not all facts are empirical, 2+2=4 being an obvious example.
Sorry - meant to say objective, not empirical.
ReplyDeleteSome people have spent a lot of time and effort inventing worlds where 2+2=5. Would have thought Simplicio could spend at least 15 -30 seconds worrying about whether the existence of objectivity before the monotonicity turned to morality.
I don't agree that 2+2=4 isn't empirical. If I have two marbles and add two more, then I count them, I expect there will be 4. If there were not, I'd reject "2+2=4" as being meaningless.
ReplyDeleteKostas, yes, I think Harris does have to address philosophers' objections, if he wants to be taken seriously from an intellectual standpoint. His project is to overhaul standard positions in philosophy, backed up by a huge literature. But he says (again, in an endnote!) that he finds philosophical terms too boring, and he gives only that reason for not engaging the literature. That strikes me as just bizarre and undermining his credibility.
ReplyDeleteGreg, you can *verify* that 2+2=4 empirically, but if you understand arithmetics you do not need the empirical verification. And of course there is no empirical verification of, say, Fermat's theorem, and yet it is objectively true.
Dave, I've never heard of possible worlds where 2+2=5. If one stipulates a decimal system (obviously), then there are no exceptions, period. And if the system is, say, binary, then there are other objective truths about that system that do not require any empirical verification.
Greg, that's an interesting point you make. I would say that statements like "2+2=4" can be interpreted in more than one way. In everyday use a speaker may well be thinking about physical objects, and in that context it may be reasonable to say that it is (at least to some degree) an empirical statement. On the other hand, mathematicians tend to abstract such statements from any physical context and think of mathemtical symbols as representing purely abstract entities. Mathematical axiomatizations (such as Peano's axiomatization of the natural numbers) define the meaning of mathematical symbols without any reference to the real world.
ReplyDeleteNote that while I might refer to these as two interpretations, I don't mean to imply that any particular utterance of "2+2=4" must be interpreted one way or the other. The meanings of words are a consequence of the mental processes that cause us to utter them and the effect they have on listeners. These processes are complex and multi-threaded so a given utterance can have elements of more than one meaning.
Philosophers tend to make a distinction between analytic and synthetic facts, the latter being roughly equivalent to empirical facts. My view is that this is a useful distinction, but a fuzzy one. There is no clear line of demarcation.
Perhaps we can imagine a world in which every time an object comes into the proximity of three other objects, it's magically duplicated, so there are now five objects in that proximity. Perhaps the inhabitants of that world would construct a mathematical system in which 2+2=5. But then their mathematical terms (particularly "+") would not mean the same as ours. If they get around to axiomatizing their system, they would come up with axioms not equivalent to ours.
Within our own world, mathematicians can invent new systems of mathematics, with revised axioms. I seem to remember reading that someone came up with a system of arithmetic where "2+2=5". If so, I doubt it had any practical application. But I think the discovery that space is curved has created a practical use for non-Euclidean reaxiomatizations of geometry. Still, such reaxiomatizations don't change any facts. They create a new language, in which different facts can be expressed, or the same facts expressed in different symbols.
"if you understand arithmetics you do not need the empirical verification"
ReplyDeleteEven so, this is merely something defined to be true. Is it true that Harry Potter attends Hogwarts? This sort of truth is only truth in an imaginary world, not a real one. Referring to that sort of truth as "truth" is, to me, a form of equivocation.
Now, I suppose one could argue that morality is also an imaginary concept and hence is closer to mathematics, and I would buy into the argument when expressed that way. However, pretty much all arguments I've seen advanced by philosophers about ethics rely at some level on human intuition, which, to me, moves it back into the realm of empiricism.
Greg, good point, but mathematicians also rely on intuition (and scientists too, for that matter). But intuition is never - not even in ethics - the end of the matter. You then need logical (math, ethics) or empirical (science) arguments to verify or validate your intuitions.
ReplyDelete"But intuition is never - not even in ethics - the end of the matter. "
ReplyDeleteIn one of your critiques of Sam Harris, you said this:
"because my moral intuition (yes, that’s what I’m going to call it, deal with it) tells me that purposefully inflicting pain on children is wrong, regardless of whatever the empirical evidence says."
This, to me, sounds as if intuition trumps empirical fact. And I agree that this is the way it must be, because pretty much everyone will reject an ethical system that just feels wrong. The primary contribution that scientific investigation can make is to allow us to throw moral questions into a different mental bucket so that different types of intuition can act on the question. For instance, your views on abortion are affected by whether or not you throw a fetus into the "person" category. Anything that can persuade you to make this categorization pretty much determines your views on abortion without fundamentally affecting your moral framework.
Intuition is a vague term. The best sense I can make of it is that it refers to beliefs (or potential beliefs) not examined by conscious scrutiny. As rational people (and particularly as sceptics) we know that the best chance of having true beliefs comes from subjecting our beliefs to conscious rational scrutiny as far as we reasonably can. When I subject my moral realist intuition to careful scrutiny I find reason to reject it, and to accept a moral error theory instead.
ReplyDeleteHaving said that, even our conscious rational scrutiny involves some intuition! Even if we accept that deductive logic doesn't involve any intuitive leaps (and even that's questionable), the fact is that we cannot reduce empirical inference to a purely deductive process. At some points we have to make intuitive leaps. Still, the point of conscious rational scrutiny, as I see it, is to reduce such leaps to a minimum.
Greg, I think you're right that most people (even philosophers) will reject an ethical system that feels wrong. I think that's why most philosophers are moral realists. The intuition of moral realism is a very hard one to reject. Perhaps I have a head start because I'm not a very moral person!
Greg:
ReplyDelete"I don't agree that 2+2=4 isn't empirical. If I have two marbles and add two more, then I count them, I expect there will be 4. If there were not, I'd reject "2+2=4" as being meaningless."
Bertrand Russell in The Problems Of Philosophy made the distinction between abstracts like mathematics and empirical data. For instance you may familiarise yourself with 2+2=4 empirically, but you don't need to put apples with two apples over and over again to see if you result in four. Likewise if you put two and two bananas together the same thing holds true. As such, this is a different form of knowledge to empirical knowledge, even if both abstracts and empirical observations initially come through the senses.
Another example would be that you could measure the sides of a triangle to be 180°, but you could never empirically demonstrate that all triangles (in Euclidian geometry) add up to 180°. After all, could you ever derive Ï€ as an irrational number through measurement of a circle? ;)
Richard, you can formulate a simpler version of "2 + 2= 5" from a finding about 30 years ago called "The Third Effect" - forgot who wrote it up etc... but the jist of it was when 2 objects are combined, a third object is created. So 1 + 1 = 3 is fairly simple to imagine (your first child, the addition of any two objects = the original two objects plus the "result of the addition".
ReplyDeleteIt's also similar to 1 + 1 = 1 (marriage, Russian dressing=ketchup+mayo,....)
Anyway, using the 1+1=3 take on the third effect, two things + two things = 4 things + the result of the addition, making 5 things in our 'counting world'.
The problem with counting things is that what may seem like two distinct objects to you might not seem that way to others.
Greg, right, I do consider *that* particular intuition pretty much in no need of defense. Again, like mathematicians consider 2+2=4 hardly in need of formal proof.
ReplyDeleteAs for empirical facts, I think they can inform and refine our ethical intuitions, as in the case of abortion that you mention. But the "test" of ethical intuitions comes through reasoned discourse, not science.
Richard, intuition is far less vague a term than people think. There is research in cognitive science on intuition, which shows for instance that it is domain specific, and that it becomes more and more reliable after thousands of hours of practice at a particular task (chess, math teaching, what have you). There is, however, no generic sense of intuition, as in "I'm an intuitive person."
Also, I actually doubt that most philosophers are moral realists, there is a good number who are not.
Dave, those examples seem to me to have nothing to do with mathematics, but to be the result of equivocation (as in 1+1 = 1 when it comes to marriage; obviously the sum of two people is still two, but there is also a new entity that we call "the couple").
ReplyDeleteKel: The problem with converting empirical to the abstract is that the abstraction assumes so much more than can be conveyed (in this case) by an equation. Or for that matter any other form of communication of the abstraction. One person's equivocation is another person's interpretation of the missing context.
ReplyDeleteSo after you have added up those bananas many times over, and feel comfortable enough with things like 'plus' and 'equal' symbols to describe operations on bananas, you may one day find yourself in a place where not more than one particular thing can exist at a time, and addition of like objects is incomprehensible, because there are no like objects.
Just saying - mathematics was invented to describe our world, as were morals.
DaveS, you say, "Just saying - mathematics was invented to describe our world, as were morals."
ReplyDeleteThe trouble is that morals do not describe the world at all. This is a critical point that Massimo has passed by. Mathematics is used to describe the way the world is, whereas morals are used to tell people what to do and/or make them feel guilty. They have no descriptive role whatsoever. They don't help us understand reality--they are purely prescriptive in nature.
"Also, I actually doubt that most philosophers are moral realists, there is a good number who are not."
ReplyDeleteMassimo, I was going by the PhilPapers survey from 2009, which gave these results:
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
Accept or lean toward: moral realism: 525 / 931 (56.3%)
Accept or lean toward: moral anti-realism: 258 / 931 (27.7%)
Other: 148 / 931 (15.8%)
I found the result a bit surprising.
Richard, yeah, I've seen the survey. The problem is that it's a voluntary one, not conducted according to standard social science methods, so I'm not sure at all how reliable it is.
ReplyDelete>But the "test" of ethical intuitions comes through reasoned discourse, not science.<
ReplyDeleteI largely agree with your overall perspective on the subject, but it appears that you put extra value on this "test." The problem is you cannot have an effective "test" (reasoned discourse) without coming to some level of agreement on the facts (this is where science comes into play). I agree that with all the facts on the table people could still disagree in certain situations... but most of the time this is not the source of disagreement. There is often no agreement on the facts (or the facts are not even discussed), so reasoned discourse is not possible.
cc, I go into this in more detail in the forthcoming Skeptic review. What I meant was that the "test" lies in the analysis of the logic of a given ethical reasoning. But yes, science is most certainly informative for specific ethical questions, it just can't tell us what values to hold.
ReplyDeleteRichie - I see your point. But still claim mathematics and morals are both inventions. One being descriptive - applying to events that have taken place, the other predictive - applying to things that seem to have not taken place.
ReplyDeleteNot sure what you mean by 'reality'. Using that word and its cousins 'object' and 'objectivity', now that's equivocation.
Re 2+2=4 & empiricism
ReplyDeleteMy wife is a school teacher and she was saying how hard the kids found math even when it involved "real life". I think that math become more difficult when made real, not less. It is inherently abstract as the earlier example with relationships & whatnot.
Here's another example: I have a slice of pie and I cut it in two, how many slices of pie do I have? Have I used multiplication, addition, subtraction or division?
I have two slices that are 1/2 the size of the original so maybe I divided the slice into two. But since I started with one slice and ended up with two, maybe I used multiplication. Or since I had one slice and I cut off only one more, maybe I used addition (or did I subtract from the original)? What is "a slice" - is it standardized to my original size or can any size be a slice?
It's a little like the old puzzle: if it takes one man five hours to dig a hole, how long does it take to dig half a hole? A: you can't dig half a hole, so division fails.
None of these are problems with math but with how we map the abstract, absolute world of mathematics to our fuzzy reality.
That said, I still don't know how math is supposed to be relevant to morals. Anyone shed some light here?
Tyro, my point in bringing up math was simply to show that not all objective "facts" (in the broad sense of the term) are empirical in nature. And that therefore science isn't the only appropriate approach to knowledge and reason.
ReplyDeleteMassimo,
ReplyDeleteAnd that therefore science isn't the only appropriate approach to knowledge and reason.
I can think of a few reasons why math is exceptional - it deals with abstractions (ethics do not), it is purely deductive (ethics are not).
Was math used as a starting example to then show why ethics can not be addressed scientifically or was the presence of exceptions the entire argument? Because Harris did present arguments for why value and moral questions are actually empirical, scientific questions. Pointing to math doesn't seem to be much of a refutation.
Tyro, that was part of my argument, specifically to counter Harris' claim that if there is a matter of fact, then it is science. I think math (and logic) succeed in making that point. The point was never that there are no differences between ethics and math (or logic).
ReplyDeleteI found Harris' positive arguments incredibly weak, frankly, and I deal with them in some detail in the forthcoming Skeptic review.
What does moral realism say about abortion? One camp has women choosing what happens to themselves. Another camp pretends to fight for the unborn, but like those who say they believe in one particular god or another but have not established direct communications, have never bothered taking a poll of babies in wombs, and asking them (1) Would you like to go through the pain and trauma of childbirth or (2) end your 9 month life in a painless manner? The poll results would probably match a similar poll of those in advanced years who choose to control the way they end their allotted 3.5 score.
ReplyDeleteI think there is no case to be made for moral realism because it uses the word 'real', an increasingly meaningless word.
Tyro: I would also like to know which of Harris's actual arguments you found convincing.
ReplyDeleteRitchie,
ReplyDeleteThe arguments that Harris made which I find provisionally convincing are:
* moral decisions are grounded in science (observing/predicting the effects of actions)
* the existence of conflicting moral claims is no more lethal to empirical morals than the blind, unthinking claims of Creationists are fatal to evolution.
* some moral statements are better than others, and this can be a scientific decision
* there are multiple peaks in the moral landscape and two moral claims may take us to two different peaks. The inability to scientifically distinguish between two good, valuable moral stances doesn't necessarily undermine Harris's argument
* there is such a thing as a "good life" and a "bad life", and these can be empirically distinguished
* our morals guide us to the good life and away from the bad life (there are abberations, the YEC of the moral community)
* the answers to many of these moral questions may be difficult to answer but the answers do exist and they would be scientific
I'm interested in opposing views and countering his claims. I think waving "equivocation fallacy" is as unthinkingly juvenile as when some fundie whines about ad hominem because they were called names without taking the precocious seconds to ask whether the name calling was fundamental or tangential to the argument - Harris's definition of science has nothing to do with his arguments. I'm sure in time some good counters will come out and I'll be better able to see how Harris holds up but right now I see a lot of pluses in his category and few minuses.
Tyro, I'm really getting tired of getting insulted on my blog. Harris clearly equivocates, you simply don't want to admit it.
ReplyDeleteAs for the substance of your latest comment, I actually agree with part of it, but those are not arguments, they are conclusions or simple declarative statements.
Massimo - Ritchie asked me to say what I agreed with so yes, I gave a simple list. If there are places he disputes, I'll give a shot at a defence and see if it gets shot down. I didn't intend it as an argument!
ReplyDeleteIf Harris is using a bad definition, I'd like to hear how this affects his argument and conclusions - a key aspect to committing a fallacy I'm sure you'd agree. If it's "clear", then it shouldn't take much to sketch it out. I'm not denying any evidence or argument that you've presented - I'm saying that there hasn't been any evidence or argument.
Tyro:
ReplyDeleteNone of the points you summarize are even arguments for Harris' main thesis. They are all either mere reiterations of Harris' thesis or concomitant aspects of his view of morality. None of them serve a thesis-supporting role at all.
Not responding to anyone in particular, but I have been doing a bit of reading (and watching) regarding intuition lately. Stich, at Rutgers, has done quite a bit of work on it. Some links for those interested:
ReplyDeletehttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1683066
http://www.philostv.com/tamar-gendler-and-stephen-stich/
Tyro, actually Ritchie asked you for which arguments by Harris convinced you, not for a list of points of agreement.
ReplyDeleteHarris is defining "science" in an endnote to the introduction, so that it includes pretty much everything that we think of as science, philosophy and logic under his umbrella. That clearly is *not* what most people (including most scientists) think of when they read the word "science" in a book. That's equivocation, and it is particularly suspicious that he tucked it into an endnote.
@ Ritchie - Are you asking why Harris convinced me or what he convinced me of? If you're asking why I felt one of his arguments was persuasive can you start by telling me which of his argument specifically you're talking about?
ReplyDelete@ Massimo - yes, you've said that and I've quoted a dictionary which shows that Harris's definition is appropriate for a popular book. Regardless, the textbook definition of the equivocation fallacy isn't to chose an unconventional definition but when "The same word is used with two different meanings."
That's just Logic 101 and you haven't even hinted at occasions where he has done this.
Tyro: your dictionary definition does not show anything of the sort.
ReplyDelete"2. systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation."
By this definition, Philosophy and everyday reasoning are not scientific.
By this definition, Philosophy and everyday reasoning are not scientific.
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure what you mean or where you're going with that. Would you care to expand?
If Harris uses the word "science" throughout his book without bringing forth his non-standard use of the term--his non-standard definition--he is equivocating. Giving one's alternate definition of a highly important term in a footnote is simply not good enough. To use the word "science" expansively, to refer not only to what we normally call science but also to just about any rational mode of inquiry, is to use it differently from how it is normally used. You seemed to suggest that Harris was using the term "science" normally by using it in his particularly broad sense. You were wrong about that.
ReplyDelete2+2=4 empirically? Not unless you'd call a tautological approximation empirical.
ReplyDeleteIf Harris uses the word "science" throughout his book without bringing forth his non-standard use of the term--his non-standard definition--he is equivocating. Giving one's alternate definition of a highly important term in a footnote is simply not good enough.
ReplyDeleteYou say it isn't good enough. Good enough for what? If he is using one definition consistently throughout the book then it is not a logical fallacy. That's how the fallacy works and no one - not you nor Massimo - has shown him commit this.
He may be guilty of some bad editing or writing but not of a fallacy. I found that the definition was pretty clear from the context and I haven't heard any other complaints so I doubt it's even that big of an editorial issue but whatever, it doesn't matter so for the sake of the argument I'll agree that it should be made clearer.
And since you (and others) may not know what this footnote actually says (and may not want to take Massimo's word that it's egregious), here is Harris's actual footnote:
For the purposes of this discussion, I do not intend to make a hard distinction between “science” and other intellectual contexts in which we discuss “facts”—e.g., history. For instance, it is a fact that John F. Kennedy was assassinated. Facts of this kind fall within the context of “science,” broadly construed as our best effort to form a rational account of empirical reality. Granted, one doesn’t generally think of events like assassinations as “scientific” facts, but the murder of President Kennedy is as fully corroborated a fact as can be found anywhere, and it would betray a profoundly unscientific frame of mind to deny that it occurred. I think “science,” therefore, should be considered a specialized branch of a larger effort to form true beliefs about events in our world.
This may be broader than Massimo thinks of it but it is certainly within the scope of the dictionary definition I presented and it's not as over-broad as some make it out to be. It certainly isn't so broad that it undermines any arguments nor acts as a logical fallacy.
Tyro, so you think it's standard practice to consider history as part of science? What, exactly, would *not* count as science, then?
ReplyDeleteMassimo,
ReplyDeleteDisciplines like history and even biology, archaeology, and cosmology have a mix of the white lab-coat and test-tube style of science plus application, data gathering and hypothesizing. I would assume that you would lump cosmology and geology in with the sciences but I don't see any sharp dividing line between how people discern facts about the past in history versus how they discern facts about the past in geology. As Harris is doing, one can see the defining characteristics of science as the methods we use to discover facts about the world through rational, empirical investigation. All of the frills and dressing - peer review, repeatability, etc - are techniques we use to avoid fallacies like wishful thinking but the clothes do not make the man.
When talking about whether history was a science, you said that Jarred Diamond is doing science but I would think that the work people did to uncover, analyze and systematize artifacts and draw conclusions about the past is also science. What do we know about the Caesars and how do we know it? Answering those questions sounds like science to me.
Again, you can disagree which is fine but what we've got is a disagreement over a word, not a fallacy which would undermine an argument.
Massimo, I think that you would have done best to note that, in this case, Harris is committing an informal logical fallacy.
ReplyDeleteEquivocation in the formal sense is, of course, related to equivocation in the informal sense. They are similar. But I think in this case, Harris is equivocating in the informal sense.
Ritchie, yes, I did mean it as an informal fallacy, that's what equivocation is.
ReplyDeleteTyro, no, the disagreement is conceptual and substantial, but apparently impossible to settle. Oh well.
Massimo: isn't there such a thing as equivocation in the formal sense? I was under the impression that equivocation in the formal sense is "using the same symbol for two different propositions," whereas the informal sense is more like "using the ambiguities of word-meanings to create a false impression."
ReplyDeleteBut maybe I know nuttin.
Ritchie, oh that's just a straightforward mistake, not usually defined as a fallacy.
ReplyDeleteIf something is a fallacy then it is a method which takes true premises and reaches a false conclusion.
ReplyDeleteAbout.com describes it as:
Here, a single term is used with two or more meanings in the same argument. The basic form of this fallacy is:
a. Premise: [statement(s) using term X in sense 1]
b. Premise: [statement using term X in sense 2] AND/OR Conclusion: [statement using term X in sense 2]
eg: 1. It is well known that the average family has 2.5 children (premise #1). Well, Jane's family is very average (premise #2), so they must have 2.5 children (conclusion).
eg 2. It is wrong to kill innocent human beings. (premise #1) Fetuses are innocent human beings. (premise #2) Therefore, it is wrong to kill fetuses. (conclusion)
It isn't hard to show that the term innocent human being is being used in more than one sense here.
Onegoodmove.org gives the examples:
Criminal actions are illegal, and all murder trials are criminal actions, thus all murder trials are illegal. (Here the term "criminal actions" is used with two different meanings. Example borrowed from Copi.)
What I hear Massimo & Richie arguing is that Harris is using "science" in a (to them) surprising and unconventional way. As a minimum, equivocation requires that Harris would jump between two different definitions which he does not do.
And for it to be a logical fallacy, this jump between two different definitions would have to be integral to his argument which it is not.
Baron P: Everything is empirical. There is no object, no abstract, not even facts. Why? Because all these things require context. Context that was created by observers.
ReplyDeleteSam Harris (or whoever wrote that footnote): It is not a fact that JFK was assassinated. It is an assumption held by most, and very few know what happened. But even for those who 'know what happened', as with intuition, events came from external sources into their brains, and based on their experience with the world up until that point, they decided to 'believe' JFK was assassinated.
If you understand this, then you understand why gods in 'fact' must 'exist'. They exist because people believe in them, full stop.
Tyro:
ReplyDeleteHarris indeed is using the word "science" two different ways, because he uses the word so that readers interpret the word to mean what it usually means, unless they happen to read the footnote. But just to hold back his critics, he has his sneaky footnote in the end where he gives his alternate definition of "science." This is a standard defensive method of equivocation: make a ridiculous argument, but have a back-up definition of a key term in case someone actually objects to your statements.
DaveS,
ReplyDeleteOK, but do we believe all Gods look alike in the dark?
I would argue that Harris commits serious fallacies of equivocation which completely undermine his argument for the existence of moral facts, quite apart from his misuse of the word "science" (which I consider relatively unimportant).
ReplyDelete1. He claims that moral actions are those which maximise total well-being, but he equivocates over whether he considers this a definition (of "moral") or a substantive moral claim. He sometimes calls it a definition, but other times he argues for its truth as if it was a substantive claim. (To put it another way, he equivocates over whether "moral" and "maximises total well-being" are equivalent in meaning or have the same extension without being equivalent.)
2. Taken as a definition it leads to a fallacy of equivocation, because this is not what the word "moral" actually means. In the case of his use of the word "science" one might plausibly claim that he is consistently using the word in his new sense, and so not committing any fallacy in his own mind (though he is misleading his readers). But this cannot plausibly be claimed in the case of this redefinition of "moral", because his sense is so radically different from the ordinary meaning that, if has this meaning throughout, then he has completely changed the subject of discussion. He would not be talking about morality at all. He would merely be talking about what maximises total well-being. He would have said nothing about whether people have a moral obligation to maximise total well-being. To be fair, this fallacy isn't Harris's alone. It's a common fallacy among "moral naturalists". (And it's one that Massimo has committed in the past too, as pointed out by Julia.)
3. He makes vague and ambiguous statements like "morality relates to well-being", and then jumps from such relatively uncontroversial vagueries to the much more specific and controversial claim that moral actions are those which tend to maximise total well-being. "Morality relates to well-being" is ambiguous in a number of respects, but the most serious one is that "morality" here could refer either to people's moral values/beliefs or to what actually is moral. One may unwittingly accept the claim by reading it in the former sense, which makes it relatively uncontroversial, but then fail to notice that it is being used in the latter sense to justify the more specific claim.
The equivocation between people's moral values and actual moral facts crops up throughout the book, even in the subtitle: "How science can determine human values". The term "human values" strongly implies the values that humans hold. But I doubt that anyone questions that empirical enquiry (or even science in the standard narrower sense) can determine these, e.g. through statistical surveys. The main claim of the book is that science can determine facts as to what actually is moral, not just what human beings _think_ is moral.
@Richard
ReplyDeleteHe claims that moral actions are those which maximise total well-being, but he equivocates over whether he considers this a definition (of "moral") or a substantive moral claim. He sometimes calls it a definition, but other times he argues for its truth as if it was a substantive claim.
Are you sure that this is equivocation? He explicitly argues that when we talk about morals we are talking about what leads to the good life (definitional) and that the people who use alternate definitions are as irrelevant to the discussion as Creationists are to the discussion of evolution so when we talk about how we should act morally we can just focus on well-being (claim).
I understand that this is not how most people thing of morality and it's certainly one of his most controversial and interesting arguments. I can see people disagreeing (and am not sure how I feel about this claim yet) but I have a harder time seeing this being a logical fallacy. After all making an unpersuasive argument is not a fallacy and he was very open about what he was doing and he frequently talks about well-being and the Good Life instead of just morality in order to make this point clear.
As an analogy, I'm reading a book by Sean Carrol about time. He spends the first chapter building an empirical/observational definition of time which abstracts out all mention of time and the colloquial & intuitive aspects yet, he argues, maintains all of the important physical characteristics. I think that Harris is trying to do something similar. Instead of getting a definition that everyone can agree upon, he builds an empirical/observational definition that we would apply to the work of moral experts. I think that's a part of his wider work to argue that we shouldn't give equal weight to all moral claims.
@Ritchie
ReplyDeleteHarris indeed is using the word "science" two different ways, because he uses the word so that readers interpret the word to mean what it usually means, unless they happen to read the footnote.
Can you give some examples of where he uses different definitions? How does this affect his argument?
(Yes yes, you keep saying you disagree with his definition and I keep saying that the dictionary and other scientists agree with Harris and not you. Let's agree to disagree unless you've got some new evidence. For the moment can we just focus on the 'fallacy' part of your & Massimo's claims?)
On reflection, I'd like to retract my assertion that Harris's use of the word "science" is a "misuse". I don't have much problem with his use of the word. If memory serves, the footnote in question implies that he is using the word to mean all of rational empirical enquiry (including history, for example), but doesn't specifically say that he is defining it that way. Anyway, I would disapprove of such a broad definition, but as far as I'm concerned Harris doesn't need such a broad definition in order to justify his usage.
ReplyDeleteTyro, I don't really understand your objection to my point #1. I suspect you're not seeing how the same sentence can be interpreted as either a definition or a substantive claim. It can be a difficult point to see, especially where moral terms are concerned, so let me give you a non-moral example.
S1. A bouyant object is one that floats.
S2. A bouyant object is one that's less dense than the fluid it's in.
S1 is a definition of "bouyant" (or a semantic claim about the meaning of "bouyant"). S2 is a substantive claim about bouyant objects. But both have the same structure, and we can only tell which is which because we already know the meaning of "bouyant". If you showed S1 to someone who didn't know the word "bouyant" and asked whether it's a definition or a substantive claim, he wouldn't be able to say. Now consider:
S3. A moral action is one that tends to maximise total well-being.
Someone who's confused about the meaning of "moral" might take this as a definition when--given the ordinary meaning of "moral"--it should be interpreted as a substantive claim. I say that this is the error that Harris (and other moral naturalists) have made.
Having decided to make this a definition, Harris sometimes uses the word "moral" in the sense implied by it. At other times his natural feeling for the meaning of the word takes over, and he uses the word in its ordinary sense. At those times he treats S3 (or sentences like it) as a substantive claim. Hence, he equivocates between the two meanings without realising it.
This really covers my points #1 and #2, which you could argue are two sides of the same error.
P.S. Suppose Harris was completely consistent, i.e. he (a) always always treated the statement as a definition, and (b) always used the word in his defined sense. That would avoid the charge of equivocation, but it wouldn't save his argument. If he's using the word to mean something completely different from its ordinary sense, then he's changed the subject. Instead of talking about morality, he would be talking about some other subject, and just calling it "morality".
ReplyDeleteThis is seen more easily if we take a definition which is obviously wrong. Suppose he defined "moral" to mean "green", and then argued that grass is moral. Would you say, "that's fine, because he's applied his definition consistently"? No, because he promised to talk about morality, but is talking about greenness instead.
@Richard,
ReplyDeleteS3. A moral action is one that tends to maximise total well-being.
Someone who's confused about the meaning of "moral" might take this as a definition when--given the ordinary meaning of "moral"--it should be interpreted as a substantive claim. I say that this is the error that Harris (and other moral naturalists) have made.
My copy of The Moral Landscape is in another room (and I don't want to bother the cat by getting up) so I'll have to go by memory...
I think that you're right, that if he just presented that as a definition then we would be justified in crying foul. However he didn't just present the definition, he worked to show why he uses it and why he thinks it's superior to other definitions in encapsulating what we already feel is distinctive & important in morality.
As I recall, to start Harris talked about what we mean by "morality" and tossed about several possible definitions, some conventional and some less so. Many people think that morals are what individuals think are right or wrong, period. If one person thinks it's best to beat children then we may say we don't share their morals but we'd still say that this would be their moral code.
Harris argued that just as we don't respect everyone's opinion in medicine or astronomy, we don't need to respect everyone's moral opinions either. If that's the case and we are free to say that some people's views can be dismissed, then to find a good definition we should be asking instead: what makes morals distinctive and important above other rules for behaviour? He argues that what all rules we call "good morals" share is that they are intended to increase well-being, to lead us towards The Good Life and away from The Bad Life.
He didn't merely present the conclusion but went through several potential counter-examples such as religious morals and showed how these are either bad morals or fit his definition (provided we accept some religious claims). In the end, he tried to show that his definition is necessary (without this criteria, a rule would not be called moral) and sufficient (it covers all cases we're interested in).
You're free to say his argument wasn't persuasive (I'm not sure how I feel about it, tell the truth) but I think his methodology was sound and he did everything necessary to show that his definition was valid and perhaps superior to colloquial definitions.
This is seen more easily if we take a definition which is obviously wrong. Suppose he defined "moral" to mean "green", and then argued that grass is moral. Would you say, "that's fine, because he's applied his definition consistently"? No, because he promised to talk about morality, but is talking about greenness instead.
I agree, absolutely.
Is Harris doing that with "moral" or "science"?
I think that his work to argue that morality actually means "actions to promote well-being" is more akin to an argument than a redefinition but I do understand how right-thinking people can disagree with his use of "science". In the end, what's important is whether he clearly conveyed his message and argument and I think that even people who disagreed still followed his book so I don't think Harris was re-greening.
That said, his TED Talk and some shorter pieces are much more troubling. Without the background and introduction it is much more likely to be confusing.
"S3. A moral action is one that tends to maximise total well-being."
ReplyDeleteOne major problem with this statement is that it neglects to recognize we do not have control over everything. We can put forth the best effort possible to maximize well-being, and yet still the consequences can go awry -- and not necessarily because of anything we have done, but because external factors are either unpredictable or unforeseeable.
@Michael - is that a problem with the definition or a problem with our predictive abilities?
ReplyDeleteWould you prefer to see something like "A moral action is one that attempts to maximise total well-being"?
Tyro wrote: "However he didn't just present the definition, he worked to show why he uses it and why he thinks it's superior to other definitions in encapsulating what we already feel is distinctive & important in morality."
ReplyDeleteBut in fact his definition entirely ignores what is distinctive and important about moral claims, the sense of obligation and prescription that they convey. "Action A is immoral" tells me that I have an obligation not to A. "Action A reduces total well-being" doesn't tell me that.
Harris's focus on moral "is" claims makes it easier for him to lose sight of this. I suggest you temporarily set aside moral "is" claims and think about moral "ought" claims, i.e. claims of moral obligation. Given Harris's approach, how would you define "moral obligation", as in "he has a moral obligation to A"? I think you'll find you can't.
Also, if you follow my explanation about definitions and substantive claims, thinking it through carefully in conjunction with what I've just said, hopefully you will see that Harris has mistaken a substantive claim for a definition. If you accept that, then it's only a small step to seeing that his definition must be wrong.
What Richard said. Moral claims are always made with a certain force or oomph, and that oomph comes from the feeling that people just, like, should do certain things. By defining "morality" as the mere study of "well-being," he ignores the actual point of morality completely.
ReplyDeleteAs for equivocation: Harris does not have to literally state two separate definitions of "science" in order to equivocate with the term. He just has to manipulate its ambiguity in order to advance an argument. Imagine this scenario.
Person A: Let's go in the other room and get funky.
Person B: What do you mean by "get funky"?
Person A: I mean, "play chess."
Person A is equivocating even though he never defined "get funky" to mean "have sex." Harris does the same thing here. It's like this:
Harris: Science can solve moral dilemmas.
Pigliucci: What do you mean by "science"?
Harris: I just mean, like, whatever makes sense, you know, man.
It's the same trick.
As for how this affects his argument: it nullifies it, as equivocation almost always does.
Also, let's not agree to disagree on the use of the term "science." You and Coyne are wrong. Massimo is right. The term "science" is usually not understood to refer to any sort of rational activity. The definition you brought forth does not even help you in arguing against Massimo's understanding of the term "science" and its usage.
Ritchard,
ReplyDeleteBut in fact his definition entirely ignores what is distinctive and important about moral claims, the sense of obligation and prescription that they convey.
That's interesting and I agree that this is important. The question I found myself asking after reading Harris and I ask myself now is why do morals convey an obligation? How should I weigh these and which should I follow? Do they precede the morals or do they arise from them?
Those are important questions especially as we're barraged with multiple, competing moral claims. Are the obligations attached equally or is there some deeper reason that we should be feel obligated to follow a moral guideline? Is there something which can distinguish between opposing moral claims or which can help us weigh them? Maybe we think it's wrong to lie and it's wrong to let someone die but are they equally important? By saying simply that morals place obligations on us seems right but isn't very helpful.
AFAIR, Harris was saying that the sense of obligation in a moral rule arises because we want to increase the well-being for ourselves, our family and feeling beings as a whole. Morals are ways that we've learned can help us work towards this goal (and if you don't care about improving well-being then we all naturally disregard what you have to say on the subject of morals).
When seen in this light, we can - indeed ought to - ignore the claims of obligation and instead look at the intent and effectiveness of the moral rule and then derive/infer obligation from that. We don't need to accept someone's assertion that their moral rule places an obligation on us or anyone, we can look at the rule itself and see how valuable it is. Someone may tell us that lying is worse than murder or that lust is equal to committing adultery but now we can accept that lying and lust are bad without accepting their weighting and we may decide to reject these moral claims entirely. When we learn how harmful (or not) an action can be, this definition gives us insight into how we can weight it, something other definitions failed to do.
So I don't think that his definition does away with this sense. Rather, like your example of buoyancy does away with float/not float and gives us a firm value "displacement", Harris's definition gives us an insight into a vague, emotional concept and so gives us the tools to better manage the strong emotions.
Well, that was my reaction anyway :-)
@Ritchie,
ReplyDeleteThose analogies are fine to elaborate on a point but only after you've made a point and I don't see anyone doing that. Where, specifically has he manipulated any ambiguities?
I'm happy to acknowledge that many people may see Harris's definition of science as being more expansive - indeed, Harris himself implies that he feels the same way. But expansive doesn't mean that he's redefining it out of all recognition, he certainly isn't defining it to be "getting funky".
So now you've pointed to potential problems. Fine. What are the actual problems?
Tyro wrote: "The question I found myself asking after reading Harris and I ask myself now is why do morals convey an obligation? How should I weigh these and which should I follow?"
ReplyDeleteWe were discussing the meaning of moral claims. But now you've switched to asking what you morally should do, i.e. which things are moral. In other words, like Harris, you're not keeping separate the questions of "what do moral claims mean" and "which things are moral?". (This is equivalent to the distinction I made above, between definition and substantive claim.)
It's difficult, but unless you are vigilant in keeping these questions separate, you'll keep going wrong.
@Richard,
ReplyDeleteWe were discussing the meaning of moral claims. But now you've switched to asking what you morally should do, i.e. which things are moral.
I beg to differ. You were talking about the "sense of obligation and prescription that they convey" which I don't think are a part of the definition (or, if they are, are a part of a bad definition) but something which arises because of a deeper feature of the subject and aim of moral rules.
In other words, like Harris, you're not keeping separate the questions of "what do moral claims mean" and "which things are moral?".
The two are closely related but distinct and despite this accusation, I went to pains to give examples of how they're different (lying, adultery, murder). When we understand what moral claims mean, we can then decide which things are moral. Harris spent much more time at this than I did so I don't see why you think either of us failed to draw this distinction. Can you elaborate?
"It's difficult, but unless you are vigilant in keeping these questions separate, you'll keep going wrong."
ReplyDeleteYou can't keep those two questions separate any more than you can separate two peas without breaking up the moral pod. Talk abut fallacies, we have now arrived at the supreme fallacy of the ridiculous - not to be confused with reductio ad ridiculum of course.
To clarify a comment that has been subject to the whims of moderation, you can try to separate a definition of a concept from its purposes, but then you will have lost the purpose of defining it to begin with.
ReplyDeleteJust as someone here attempted to separate deductive logic from its purposes by suggesting ways it may be separate from intuition. Whereas its actual purpose will most likely be to supplement the thinking process which will remain in the intuitive realm - or as we like to call it, the unconscious.
Baron, moderation has no "whims." I simply let comments through in the order I received them (unless they are offensive or threatening). However, the Blogger system does mix the order a bit when several comments get through in a single batch.
ReplyDeleteThus separating whim from whimsical?
ReplyDeleteBaron is wrong; it is absolutely imperative that the questions "which actions are wrong?" and "what do moral claims mean?" be kept separate. Otherwise, we get ourselves into the awful muddle of asking "which actions have the quality of wrongness?" without having a full conception of that wrongness quality.
ReplyDeleteHarris and Massimo think it suffices to define terms like "good," "bad," "ought," etc as "increasing of happiness," "decreasing of happiness," etc. Their way of dissolving the conundrum is to render the question "which actions are wrong?" empirical by supposing it to mean "which actions decrease happiness?" This, in my mind, is like rendering the question "which musicians are cool?" empirical by defining "coolness" as some single observable quality, like fame or sex appeal.
Just because nobody can quite describe the feeling of obligation, and how it is different from apprehending an observable fact, does not mean that the feeling does not exist. It is simply not true that the statements "you should donate money to Oxfam" and "money donated to Oxfam helps suffering people" are cognitively equivalent. They do not make nearly the same impression on the thinking and feeling mind.
It is simply not true that the statements "you should donate money to Oxfam" and "money donated to Oxfam helps suffering people" are cognitively equivalent.
ReplyDeleteOf course they aren't equivalent and the extra information - how effective our money is at helping people - is exactly the sort of information that Harris argues is something that we do value. Learning the outcome of our actions is key to deciding what is more moral than another act.
It looks like you've flipped and are vociferously arguing Harris's point so unless something has changed, I must really be misunderstanding you. Can you elaborate?
I was pointing out that moral statements--statements that have some sort of "should" or "ought" or "good" in them--have a force or oomph that literal statements of fact do not. I was not making a point about the detail of the latter statement, but about the moral force of the former. Moral statements sound different from statements of fact, including statements of fact about happiness.
ReplyDeleteThe questions "which actions are wrong?" and "what do moral claims mean?" cannot be decided separately from each other. Try it.
ReplyDeleteSure, I'll decide the latter without settling the former.
ReplyDeleteMoral claims indicate some sort of fuzzy-wuzzy, ill-formed notion in the speaker's head that their own preferences have some sort of broader, general instantiation in reality. For example, the statement "rape is wrong" generalizes the speaker's feeling that rape is bad into some sort of fact about the world at large.
Which actions are wrong? None are, because moral claims are delusional. They are hinged on a misconception of what sort of qualities an action can have.
I need to give an addendum. I did, in fact, answer both questions. However, I did not have to settle the second question to settle the first, whereas I absolutely had to settle the first to settle the second. Therefore, the two questions should not be settled simultaneously. The question, "what do moral claims mean?" should be answered before the question "which actions are moral?" is settled.
ReplyDeleteThis is what I mean to say: the two questions should not be considered simultaneously. Rather, the question "what do moral claims mean?" is prior to the question "which actions are wrong?"
I was pointing out that moral statements--statements that have some sort of "should" or "ought" or "good" in them--have a force or oomph that literal statements of fact do not.
ReplyDeleteI would like you to substantiate that claim as I don't believe it.
As an illustration, here are a few statements:
1) You should never, ever work on a Saturday
2) A child, Timmothy, will drown in less than a minute unless you jump into the pool to save him.
(1) is a moral claim and has a "should", (2) is a statement of (hypothetical) fact. Is it really your contention that (1) has a greater force than (2)?
How about:
1) You should give me $100.
2) If you donate $100, my charity will get $98 to the needy in Haiti and will save the lives of over one hundred people from starving to death.
Again, is (1) really more powerful than (2)?
Okay, I think all but the sociopaths in the audience can see that facts do matter and can be more powerful than moral demands.
But are all morals equal? How about:
1) If a child is disrespectful, you must severely beat or kill it.
2) If you see someone drowning and you can save them, you ought to try.
Point (1) says "must" but (2) says "ought", does that mean (1) is more forceful and important to obey than (2)? Are both of these moral rules equivalent or is one superior?
If you have a point I really can't see it as the contradictions are as easy to find as they are numerous. Please elaborate.
Which actions are wrong? None are, because moral claims are delusional.
ReplyDeleteI think Harris is right - moral opinions like this should be treated with the same degree of respect as scientists treat the opinions of Creationists.
By your own admission you have nothing to add to this discussion.
You have not decided them separately, you have only decided them sequentially, one aspect of decision still dependent on the other.
ReplyDeleteThe trouble, Tyro, is that you're presenting moral commands that have never been even remotely considered equal. In order to judge whether moral terms really add a certain sort of force to statements, we have to compare similar moral scenarios.
ReplyDeleteIf we intuitively believe that morality is just about the maximization of total human happiness, then statement 2 should add nothing to statement 1:
1. "If you push the fat man off the bridge, you will sacrifice one person's life to save five."
2. "You must push the fat man off the bridge."
I take it as obvious that even utilitarians will feel, reading these statements, that 2 adds something to 1. 1 reads a statement of fact, whereas 2 reads as a statement of moral requirement. Here, morality seems to be something more than a statement of fact; 2 adds to 1, rather than repeating it.
You compare two statements:
"1) You should never, ever work on a Saturday
2) A child, Timmothy, will drown in less than a minute unless you jump into the pool to save him."
But this is a little unfair, because we don't oppose working on Saturday, whereas we support saving lives. Let's instead compare different ways of saying the same thing:
"The chance that you will save the drowning child's life is greater than 50/50 if you attempt it, meaning that, on average, there will be more human beings living if you try to save him than there will be if you don't."
"You ought to save the drowning child."
I take it that the second statement is not a mere repetition of the first. But from a strictly utilitarian stance, the two should seem intuitively equivalent. They don't, and in fact, people would entertain the idea that individuals have rights that allow them to avoid risking their lives, even if they might help others greatly by doing so.
You also bring these up:
"1) You should give me $100.
2) If you donate $100, my charity will get $98 to the needy in Haiti and will save the lives of over one hundred people from starving to death."
Just add the detail from the second statement to the first and suddenly the moral terms seem important:
"If you donate $100, my charity will get $98 to the needy in Haiti and will save the lives of over one hundred people from starving to death. Therefore, you ought to give me 100 dollars."
"ought" still matters.
"I think Harris is right - moral opinions like this should be treated with the same degree of respect as scientists treat the opinions of Creationists."
ReplyDeleteThe fact that Harris believes this just shows how easily he convinces himself that he is right, through equivocation. Equivocation is the most common way of mis-arguing in intellectual life. I think it is more important than the straw man argument, but less frequently discussed.
Baron:
ReplyDeleteSequential separation is a form of separation. For example, if I argue, "A implies B, B implies C. A. Therefore C," we can assess whether A -> B holds without assessing whether B -> C holds. In practice, of course, we would wish to determine both. I am only pointing out that the question of terminology is the more fundamental question in this discussion. I am interested in the big picture when it comes to morality, but there are particular points which can be discussed in isolation or semi-isolation.
Ritchie,
ReplyDeleteThere are particular points that can be discussed in isolation, but not those that are sides of the same concept - at least not effectively.
And what we had here was not sequential separation; that phrasing seems oxymoronic. The more accurate phrase here, especially where our concern is with purposive behaviors, would be sequential connection.
In any case, this whole thing has degenerated into a facsimile of a of contest to score debate points, which generally involves sequential rationalization.
Ritchie,
ReplyDeleteThe trouble, Tyro, is that you're presenting moral commands that have never been even remotely considered equal.
You just said, and I quote 'moral statements--statements that have some sort of "should" or "ought" or "good" in them--have a force or oomph that literal statements of fact do not.' I was illustrating how very wrong that was and interestingly you don't even try to defend it. Indeed, in your haste to cut me down you undermine your own position.
But this is a little unfair, because we don't oppose working on Saturday, whereas we support saving lives.
But one was a moral claim with a "should" statement and the second was just some dry facts. Could it be that merely saying "ought" or "should" has far less power than facts which inform us about human well-being? Maybe Harris is on to something...
Just add the detail from the second statement to the first and suddenly the moral terms seem important:
"If you donate $100, my charity will get $98 to the needy in Haiti and will save the lives of over one hundred people from starving to death. Therefore, you ought to give me 100 dollars."
"ought" still matters.
I would say that you've proved again that saying "ought" doesn't mean squat. In fact, facts pointing to improving human well-being is so powerful that you seem irresistibly compelled to turn this neutral statement of fact into a moral call to action!
Further more, you don't seem to give any weight at all to statements which do have an "ought", "should" or "must" in them - you casually toss this aside as unimportant even though this was the moral claim and the statement of facts was not.
Why is this?
Let me take a stab at answering and say that it is because, despite your claims and protests, you actually give next to no weight to an "ought" or "should" claim but you give a huge amount of weight to facts which can guide your actions towards improving well-being.
Tyro:
ReplyDeleteI don't mean to duck an argument, though perhaps I am doing so at a subconscious level, but right now I am just becoming busy with some work. This discussion is becoming so complex that I think it's better if we went more in depth later. For now, I say that you have had the last word and that I have made claims that are not yet justified. If I cannot justify them later, that's my own failure. If this topic comes up again on this blog, I will present more thorough arguments for why I believe moral words are not interpreted as having literally meanings.
@Tyro
ReplyDeleteSet aside the question of obligation for now. You and Harris seem to think that the following sentences have just the same meaning, no more or less.
C1. Action A is immoral.
C2. Action A tends to reduce total well-being.
It seems to me obvious that they don't. C1 inherently communicates that the speaker has a negative attitude towards A. C2 _may_ communicate such an attitude, where the speaker has a desire to maximise total well-being and the listener knows it. But such an attitude is not inherent in the meaning of the words. If the speaker is indifferent (or even hostile) to maximising total well-being, then C2 may not be expressing a negative attitude to A at all.
Consider an extreme racist who is passionate about the well-being of his own race and totally indifferent to the well-being of other races. He may honestly believe that enslavement of other races is morally acceptable (or even morally required), while frankly acknowledging that such enslavement reduces the total well-being of humanity. So he simultaneously asserts:
R1. Enslavement of other races is moral.
R2. Enslavement of other races reduces total well-being.
If Harris is correct about the meaning of "moral", then this is a direct self-contradiction. So either such a person is so stupid that he can't see he's directly contradicting himself, or else he's incompetent in his use of the word "moral", i.e. using it in an incorrect sense. But I see no reason to think that such a racist must be either stupid or linguistically incompetent. In the ordinary understanding of "moral", R1 seems like something an intelligent, linguistically competent person could possibly believe, even though we might judge the claim mistaken or abhorrent.
Suppose you insist that he's not using the word in its correct sense. Then he and someone who asserts the contrary (that enslavement is not moral) are not in substantive disgreement. They don't disagree about any facts. They are just talking at cross-purposes, because they're each using "moral" to mean something different. I find this interpretation bizarre.
Moving on to moral "ought" claims. Compare telling a child each of the following:
O1. You oughtn't to hit your sister.
O2. Hitting your sister will reduce total well-being. (Assume the child fully understands those words.)
Do you think that those have the same meaning?
BTW If you'll excuse me for butting in on your discussion with Ritchie, I think you've misunderstood him. When he said that moral claims have an oomph that non-moral claims don't, you seem to have interpreted him as meaning that they have _more_ oomph, i.e. that they're stronger. But he meant that they have a distinctive quality, not that they have quantitatively more of something.
@Richard,
ReplyDeleteConsider an extreme racist who is passionate about the well-being of his own race and totally indifferent to the well-being of other races.
Harris argues (and I'm inclined to agree) that we are not obliged to treat the moral claims of all people equally, just as we do not treat the scientific insights of all people equally. So yes it is true that some people may say that letting a black man marry a white girl is so immoral that the only moral response is to burn them both alive. However, instead of treating this with respect and considering this moral insight as somehow equivalent to other moral statements, we should instead dismiss this as harmful lunacy.
This isn't just fancy word games. When most people (and all people with useful insights into morality) talk about what is moral, we are talking about what will increase well-being. If I were to present your example and ask if you thought it was moral, I'm guessing you would recoil in horror and say "no, of course not!"
If Harris is correct about the meaning of "moral", then this is a direct self-contradiction.
I don't think you've fully read his argument as this is NOT what he is saying.
Moving on to moral "ought" claims. Compare telling a child each of the following:
O1. You oughtn't to hit your sister.
O2. Hitting your sister will reduce total well-being. (Assume the child fully understands those words.)
Do you think that those have the same meaning?
Not necessarily but then I've agreed that psychopaths and villains can make "ought" statements. As bizarre as some of my examples of moral claims may seem, they're all real which just shows how wild some moral claims can get.
It might be more accurate to say that Harris is saying that all valuable, useful discussions of morality and all useful moral claims are really about increasing well-being, not every moral belief held by all people is always about increasing well-being.
As to your example, I don't have kids so I'll have to borrow from the experiences of my friends that do. I'm told that even children respond much better to being told "don't hit your sister, it makes her feel bad" rather than merely "don't hit". Even at a young age we respond better when we have the reasons.
If you think the first statement is more compelling can you please tell me why?
But he meant that they have a distinctive quality, not that they have quantitatively more of something.
I gave a few example for Ritchie and both he & I felt that the moral claims had next to no grip but the non-moral factual statements did. I think it showed well that adding "must", "ought" or "should" to a statement doesn't bring anything, it's the rationale behind the statement which does. Increasing well-being has the power to motivate, inspire, almost compel action that mere semantic flourishes do not.
@Tyro
ReplyDeleteYou didn't respond to my point about communication of negative attitudes, and I'm afraid you haven't understood my argument about the racist case. It's not an easy argument to follow, and I probably didn't explain it well.
I think we had some useful discussion in our first few posts, but it's been a while now since we've made any progress, so I think it's time to call it a day. Thanks for the discussion.
Richard,
ReplyDeleteIf I skipped over something you thought was important, I apologize, it wasn't my intent to duck any issues. I'm sure this will come up again and in the meantime I'll keep mulling over what you and Ritchie have said. Thanks.