By Michael De Dora
Last week, I had the good fortune of spending a couple days giving talks in Massachusetts, a beautiful state that is particularly gorgeous this time of the year. On Tuesday, I spoke about secularism to a humanist group in Worcester. On Wednesday, I participated in a panel discussion on religion at Tufts University, hosted by a student freethought group.
The event in Worcester marked the first time I was giving that particular talk, which was based on my Master’s thesis. I proposed that instead of focusing on religion, secularists ought to promote inclusive, robust, yet critical and naturalistic discussion on moral beliefs and values, within both our social and political discourse. I then addressed how we might go about doing that. This drew a good deal of constructive response – concerning the consistency of my message, points that need polishing, implications of my ideas, and their practical application. Much of this feedback was sorely needed, and will be incorporated into a revised and improved lecture. Yet one suggestion reminded me of an idea I had months ago, but never fleshed out: about the methodology of secularism as it might relate to a distinction in philosophy of science.
During the final part of my presentation, I proposed something called a public peer review. The public peer review is based on an analogy with academic peer review. In its simplest and broadest senses, academic peer review features learned people in a field continually refereeing each other’s work. This process encompasses three basic steps: (1) you conduct research and analyze its results; (2) you submit your ideas to others in the field; and (3) you receive feedback, get rejected, accepted, rethink and/or respond.
Put into the framework of public discourse, and with the focus on morality, an analogous public peer review would be the process through which people continually test their moral ideas against a community of others, and the ideas of others as well. The equivalent three steps are: (1) contemplate your moral views; (2) enter them into public debate; (3) receive feedback, rethink and/or respond. There is much more to this idea – it was an entire chapter in my thesis – but you get the point: I’m taking a cue from science and rational thought and applying it to public discourse. This is where the feedback I received in Worcester comes back into the picture. One fellow approached me and said, “I would be interested to see you apply more scientific ideas to discourse.”
I quickly remembered a thought that popped into my head when reading a seminal paper by philosopher of science Barbara Forrest, on the differences and connections between philosophical naturalism and methodological naturalism. In that paper, Forrest starts with a definition of methodological naturalism offered by philosopher Paul Kurtz:
“[Methodological] naturalism is committed to a methodological principle within the context of scientific inquiry; i.e., all hypotheses and events are to be explained and tested by reference to natural causes and events. To introduce a supernatural or transcendental cause within science is to depart from naturalistic explanations. On this ground, to invoke an intelligent designer or creator is inadmissible.”
Forrest continues in her own words:
“Methodological naturalism and philosophical naturalism are distinguished by the fact that methodological naturalism is an epistemology as well as a procedural protocol, while philosophical naturalism is a metaphysical position. … Methodological naturalism does exclude the supernatural as an explanatory principle because it is unknowable by means of scientific inquiry, whereas philosophical naturalism, both by definition and because of the methodological and epistemological inaccessibility of the supernatural, excludes the latter from its ontological scheme.”
In short, methodological naturalism means that for one to do science, one must look for empirical evidence and natural explanations, and not rely on faith and the supernatural. The point is that a scientist need not be without faith or belief in the supernatural whatsoever. Philosophical naturalism is the stronger view that nature is all there is (I subscribe to this). Yet one need not commit to this – to atheism or any other sort of nonbelief – to do science.
My immediate thought was this: put into the context of morality, religion, and political life, philosophical naturalism is to atheism as methodological naturalism is to secularism.
Philosophical naturalism, and hence atheism, are metaphysical stances or positions about the world. But methodological naturalism and secularism are more like “procedural protocols,” to epistemological views of the process. Just as one can believe in some form of the supernatural or God and do science, one could believe in some form of the supernatural or God and be a secularist. He or she just needs to deal with questions of morality and law not by recourse to faith or the supernatural, but through the use of natural reasons and evidence.
To illustrate the similarities in approach between methodological naturalism and secularism, consider the debate over abortion, specifically as it relates to the soul. Philosophical naturalism and atheism represent a lack of belief in such a religious and metaphysical concept. They posit that the soul almost certainly does not exist, and perhaps even offer reasons why it doesn't. However, methodological naturalism and secularism are less concerned with the soul’s existence, and more concerned with having people make arguments on the issue based on real world evidence. That is, one can believe in the soul, but he or she cannot point to that argument in the debate over abortion and expect it to carry the day. He or she must provide reasons we can all grasp and critically assess.
To be sure, there are differences between methodological naturalism and secularism. Methodological naturalism excludes the supernatural because it is unknowable by means of scientific inquiry. Secularism excludes the supernatural because in a pluralistic and democratic society, people cannot access others’ faiths. Reliable, shared knowledge and values in the political realm can only come from the natural world. Methodological naturalism and secularism are also supported by distinctive reasons, and address different spheres of concern. Methodological naturalism addresses empirical evidence and the rules of science, while secularism is about philosophical debate relating to religion, morality, and political life. But these do not invalidate the comparison, for my point is that the two seem to call for a similar procedure in reasoning and deliberating.
Illustrating the secular approach through methodological naturalism might allow us a deeper and richer understanding of the nature of secularism, and our engagement in social and political discourse. This has spawned a number of ideas in my mind related to, but broader than, the talk I gave in Worcester. But I suppose I should await your response before getting to work on that.
Michael,
ReplyDeleteYou wrote, "methodological naturalism means that for one to do science, one must look for empirical evidence and natural explanations, and not rely on faith and the supernatural."
Looking exclusively for "natural explanations" still reflects your philosophical/religious commitment to philosophical naturalism. This is a matter that goes beyond the immediate "empirical evidence." While we can see causal relationships, we can't see or measure whether these causes are natural or intelligently designed.
Michael,
ReplyDeleteGood post. I would even push the analogy further. You say, "Methodological naturalism addresses empirical evidence and the rules of science, while secularism is about philosophical debate relating to religion, morality, and political life." I would say that secularism is about governmental action/prohibition in the service of the protection of natural rights, where the justification for such action must have a basis in evidence or at least in evidence-based reasoning. I think the Founders punted when it came to the source of our inalienable rights (or maybe they just needed an effective counter to the divine right of kings), but beyond that I would assert that secularism IS methodologically naturalistic.
Michael,
ReplyDeleteOne more observation: We use "secularism" in such different ways. Your definition: "Secularism excludes the supernatural because in a pluralistic and democratic society, people cannot access others’ faiths."
The secular foundation of this country didn't marginalize the supernatural, but instead protected it from governmental interference. It insured the rights of speech and equal access to all participants and viewpoints in the Democratic process, something that atheism doesn't seem to want to allow.
Nevertheless, out of respect for you, I am not quoting verses, but instead, I'm trying to talk in a language that we can both understand. This is a matter of prudence and not legal proscription.
You continue, "Reliable, shared knowledge and values in the political realm can only come from the natural world."
I am as unwilling to share your natural presuppositions as you are my supernatural ones. Nor are our values the product of the material world. As Julia has pointed out, they are "oughts" and not the "is" of science. Nevertheless, I do think we can congregate around the facts, whether natural of supernatural.
By all means, get to work! You're on a fruitful path, I think. Think of how this concept could impact the "I'm an atheist, but those New Atheists are going too far" phenomenon epitomized by the Chris Stedman, for illustrations)
ReplyDeleteIf those anti-NA atheists could see that NA's enter the debate as Philosophical Naturalists, but are only insisting on the scope of the debate be Methodological Naturalist, I think misunderstandings could be lessened. (Does that make sense? If not give feedback)
Where can I read your thesis, or better yet, video-record your next presentation and link to it here.
Nice article!
ReplyDelete"The equivalent three steps are: (1) contemplate your moral views; (2) enter them into public debate; (3) receive feedback, rethink and/or respond."
This would definitely be a good way of fleshing out moral truth, provided the public debate was in relatively good faith.
"Yet one need not commit to this – to atheism or any other sort of nonbelief – to do science."
Agreed, although the key word here is "do" science (a very humdrum "9-to-5" way to describe scientific practice).
Scientific epistemology is to religious epistemology as pickup artistry is to feminism. A pickup artist can technically "do" women's studies research, but it would be a pretty odd sight. To put it mildly.
"He or she just needs to deal with questions of morality and law not by recourse to faith or the supernatural, but through the use of natural reasons and evidence... Secularism excludes the supernatural because in a pluralistic and democratic society, people cannot access others’ faiths. Reliable, shared knowledge and values in the political realm can only come from the natural world."
Absolutely correct, and beautifully put. But this is a REALLY hard sell, Michael. It sounds so reasonable from this side of the fence, so allow me to explain how it sounds to a genuine-article (belief-as-expectation) theist: "Guess what! You can talk about morality, but only if you do it on the atheists' terms."
Nonetheless, we might be able to bring liberal theists on board with this, since their moral reasoning is de facto nearly secular anyhow.
But a real, believing theist is going to react to a god-free abortion debate the same way as you would if you were forced to couch all your moral positions in scriptural language. They'll feel like you're forcing them to do sophistry. So proper theists are pretty much excluded from the getgo (maybe a good thing).
A tangential issue:
"[Atheism & philosophical naturalism] posit that the soul almost certainly does not exist, and perhaps even offer reasons why it doesn't."
I'd actually like to rescue the word "soul" from the irrationalist hordes. I have a soul; it's just very much mortal. My soul is written in meat.
-Pros: greater ease of expression; impression of being "more human" for having used the word.
-Cons: lots of metaphysical baggage.
I think the pros outweigh the cons. Who's with me?
I enjoyed reading this article. I especially liked:
ReplyDelete"philosophical naturalism is to atheism as methodological naturalism is to secularism."
The follow-on comments here also give food for thought.
How does Sam Harris' book "The Moral Landscape" relate to this? His book is also concerned with morality and suggests using "well being" and the yardstick and proposes a "science of morality".
One small suggestion - briefly explain what you mean by the soul. Re: ianpollack, I, along with Plato (ok, a bit debatable), Aristotle, Roman stoics, et al, think the soul dies with the body, or sometimes before the body (Terri Schiavo, etc.).
ReplyDelete@Mann's Word, you wrote:
ReplyDelete"Looking exclusively for 'natural explanations' still reflects your philosophical/religious commitment to philosophical naturalism."
" ... within a process." As I wrote, one can be dedicated to looking exclusively for natural explanations *while working within a certain process*, but he or she need not be committed to the stronger position that the supernatural most likely does not exist. I thought I made this clear in my article; am I missing something here?
@Chris,
ReplyDeleteI'd agree with you that secularism is also about "governmental action/prohibition in the service of the protection of natural rights, where the justification for such action must have a basis in evidence or at least in evidence-based reasoning." I suppose my focus here was more on discourse (and participation in discourse). That's always been my interest. Perhaps I should just be clearer about it. Thanks for the feedback.
@Mann's Word, you wrote:
ReplyDelete"The secular foundation of this country didn't marginalize the supernatural, but instead protected it from governmental interference."
True, but I think the secular foundation was also an attempt to protect the very foundation of our government from religion (ie, through establishment, taxes to support churches, etc).
"[The secular foundation of this country] insured the rights of speech and equal access to all participants and viewpoints in the Democratic process, something that atheism doesn't seem to want to allow."
Well, I think I agree here. I tend to disagree with people -- and I often hear this from atheists -- who argue religion (and to a lesser degree, morality) shouldn't be part of our political discourse. I don't quite want religious belief in there, but it is there, and I see no reason why it isn't allowed.
@Norwegian Shooter, you wrote:
ReplyDelete"Think of how this concept could impact the 'I'm an atheist, but those New Atheists are going too far' phenomenon (epitomized by the Chris Stedman, for illustrations). If those anti-NA atheists could see that NA's enter the debate as Philosophical Naturalists, but are only insisting on the scope of the debate be Methodological Naturalist, I think misunderstandings could be lessened. (Does that make sense? If not give feedback)."
Yes, this makes sense (at least to me!), and I appreciate you bringing this implication to light.
I should say -- as I do in my talk -- that I see at least two projects going on right now in the secularist world, as it pertains to belief and discourse. One tends to focus more on secularizing our discourse. The other tends to focus more on religious belief and faith in and of themselves.
I see no reason to believe either of these two projects are more or less important than the other. Rather, it seems they are serving the same sort of long-term goal in different ways. Perhaps the understanding you propose would lessen our disagreements. Or maybe we just need to realize that we have compatible and equally important roles to play in a larger cause.
Does that answer your question? Your thoughts?
As for my presentation, it was recorded, and I am told video will be up soon. Will keep you posted.
@NewEnglandBob,
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure if, or how, "The Moral Landscape" relates here. I'll have to think about it. Regardless, I might register a post here on that book rather soon.
A conversation where God cannot be evoked as an authority, or even a consideration, is an atheist conversation by definition. Or, to put it slightly differently, refusing arguments premised on the supernatural is a metaphysical position, not a methodological one. Isn't it?
ReplyDeleteAlthough I agree with everything that you say, I can easily imagine the response of a believer: "I can't invoke God when discussing the natural world (science) and I can't invoke God when discussing how humans should behave (morality). What is left? In essence, you are arguing that we should not invoke God... ever."
ReplyDeleteMichael,
ReplyDeleteFor no particular reason, I read your essay today in combination with this one by Frans de Waal. What struck me was de Waal's conclusion, as it relates to your thesis:
I doubt that science and the naturalistic worldview could fill the void and become an inspiration for the good. Any framework we develop to advocate a certain moral outlook is bound to produce its own list of principles, its own prophets, and attract its own devoted followers, so that it will soon look like any old religion.
To be fair, the above statement occurs at the end of a defense of the idea that morality has natural, pre-human roots. But still it begs many questions (at least for me). Perhaps they boil down to semantics; specifically, one's preferred definition of "religion" (in which case, de Waal's moral short-selling of a "naturalistic worldview" was sloppy, at best).
I personally don't mind when someone describes a type of naturalistic worldview, like secular humanism (or what Kurtz calls "eupraxsophy"), let alone religious naturalism, as a "religion." But then the history of "religion" has been so dominated by supernatural belief and/or fundamentalism that I can also appreciate why not everyone is equally comfortable with the term.
Anyway, nice job and good luck on your refinements.
Michael,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your responses. I think it’s very important for us all to recognize that we all wear religious lenses, which tend to construe the world in a certain way. For instance, here is what Paul Kurtz wrote about secular humanism in the secular Humanistic Manifesto of 1933: “[Secular] Humanism is a philosophical, religious, and moral point of view.”
Of course, the bit about religion has now been thoroughly expunged, but its manifest presence continues to stamp every stance atheism takes.
@James: I think that "methodological secularism" isn't just a sneaky name for a metaphysical position because I would expect that different religious people would be glad if religious worries were set aside in public discourse. For example, I'm sure no Muslim wants to hear (or would be persuaded by) a Christian defense for a certain policy any more than a Christian wants to hear (or would be persuaded by) a Muslim one.
ReplyDeletePerhaps the various religions would rather find common ground in their supernatural beliefs and stonewall secularists, but I think there is a wide enough difference between their assorted beliefs and related positions that if we can get them to understand "methodological secularism" they'd find it appealing.
Not that I'm at all confident of our ability to "get them to understand" mind you - I'm pretty pessimistic as to the chances of humanity's surviving, at least in any where close to the current population, for more than 100 years, but that's a whole different discussion.
@Camus Dude
ReplyDeleteYeah, there does seem to be a distinction there, but I think it relies on a queer, though common, misunderstanding of atheism.
Consider this: if person A objects to person B's proposition which relies on God's existence because God's existence is out of bounds, then person B is making an atheist objection regardless of whether or not they think of, or identify, themselves as an atheist. If they identify themselves as a theist in other cases, they are inconsistent, not some new kind of thing. The fact that theists will reject each other's positions because those positions favour different conceptions of God, is only secular in so far as it is atheist. If the theist rejects a theistic proposition because only their own God can underwrite propositions, then they aren't acting secularly at all, but merely advocating their own theistic beliefs. If they are rejecting theistic propositions because God is not an acceptable ground, then they are advocating an atheist position.
Methodological secularism is necessarily atheistic.
The queer part of the problem, I suspect, is the fallacy that atheism is a positive thesis of some sort, as if atheism make some sort of positive claim about the universe. It isn't. Atheism merely lacks a positive claim about a god or gods. Often this is confounded by the strange idea that atheism is inherently naturalistic. It isn't. Buddhists are atheists, but they don't necessarily reject supernatural and metaphysical grounds. Same for animists.
A definition of secularism I find more appealing is the much more general one; something like: secularism is a political ethic which holds that the necessity of reaching agreement trumps one's personal or cultural criteria for truth.
This rules out all criteria (even logic), unless participating parties agree. In other words, I don't think criteria for knowledge, or methodology, should or can ever be taken off the table. A secular attitude is the understanding that this is the case.
@ De Dora: "One tends to focus more on secularizing our discourse. The other tends to focus more on religious belief and faith in and of themselves."
ReplyDeleteMy crude thought is that the first is generally perceived as fine, even admirable, while the second is dickish. People's religious belief and faith is just too tied up in their self-image for them to ever be able to separate criticism of religion and criticism of religious people.
The project I want to see is reducing the fundamentalist name-calling that even atheists throw at NA's.
Chris Stedman link that messed up.
@Mann's Word, I think you mean the Humanist Manifesto II, which was published by Kurtz and Edwin Wilson in 1973. The original Humanist Manifesto was published in 1933, but by Raymond Bragg and Roy Wood Sellars.
ReplyDeleteAnyway, I'd object to the use of the world religion to define a secular philosophy, but that's not a debate I'm terrible interested in, despite often getting an earful from "religious humanists."
@James,
ReplyDelete"Methodological secularism is necessarily atheistic."
Perhaps, but even if you want to consider it that way, still only in process. The reason I did not write this is because methodological secularism would not demand a lack of belief in the supernatural of God (atheism); it would only ask for a naturalistic orientation on matters of law and politics (secular).
"The queer part of the problem, I suspect, is the fallacy that atheism is a positive thesis of some sort, as if atheism make some sort of positive claim about the universe. It isn't. Atheism merely lacks a positive claim about a god or gods. Often this is confounded by the strange idea that atheism is inherently naturalistic. It isn't. Buddhists are atheists, but they don't necessarily reject supernatural and metaphysical grounds. Same for animists."
I agree with you here.
@Ian,
ReplyDelete"Absolutely correct, and beautifully put. But this is a REALLY hard sell, Michael. It sounds so reasonable from this side of the fence, so allow me to explain how it sounds to a genuine-article (belief-as-expectation) theist: "Guess what! You can talk about morality, but only if you do it on the atheists' terms."
Well, I think it is important to remind others this is not about talking on "atheists' terms," but talking in secular terms for the benefit of everyone in this diverse society.
"... a real, believing theist is going to react to a god-free abortion debate the same way as you would if you were forced to couch all your moral positions in scriptural language. They'll feel like you're forcing them to do sophistry. So proper theists are pretty much excluded from the getgo (maybe a good thing). ... Nonetheless, we might be able to bring liberal theists on board with this, since their moral reasoning is de facto nearly secular anyhow."
Well, I would consider that an accomplishment. I've never suggested that my approach -- or any, for that matter -- would convince true believers :)
@Bill and James,
ReplyDeleteBut, firstly, I am not forcibly excluding God; I am making reasoned suggestions about his role in public debate. And secondly, I am not saying God and religion can never be mentioned, but that in specific debates He or it should not be the supporting reasons for claims.
No-one here appears* to have mentioned John Rawls. I find that surprising. (Or maybe not -- there aren't many political philosophers who read philosophy of science blogs and vice-versa.) What you're looking for is what Rawls called `political liberalism' and an `overlapping consensus': substantive normative ethical theory that makes no (or at least only uncontroversial) metaphysical assumptions. The breakout paper for this idea is his 1985 Philosophy and public affairs paper, `Justice as fairness: Political, not metaphysical'. (JSTOR link) He really develops these ideas in his book Political liberalism. While knowing a bit about his argument in A theory of justice would help put some of these later works in context, they're actually not essential.
ReplyDelete* I just followed a link from Wilkins, and don't have time to read all 23 previous comments. `Rawls' doesn't show up in a text search. Apologies if I somehow missed this.
@Michael De Dora
ReplyDeleteYou're suggesting that there is good reason for excluding God from political debate, and that the suggested exclusion should be institutionalized. I don't think that substantively differs from "forcibly exclude". Unless I've misunderstand, and you don't mean to institutionalize this sort of secular principal.
I think we're in agreement, that the need for political agreement trumps any requirement for epistemological coherence, but differ in that I apply the principal across the board rather than strictly against supernatural justifications.
Of course, I'll argue for what I think is right, which happens to be a naturalistic view, but I'm skeptical about a political institution that excludes non-natural justifications by design. I just don't think that anyone will sign on, except for those already convinced that natural knowledge is the only worthwhile knowledge.
@James, you wrote:
ReplyDelete"You're suggesting that there is good reason for excluding God from political debate, and that the suggested exclusion should be institutionalized."
"I'm skeptical about a political institution that excludes non-natural justifications by design."
What do you mean when you use the words "institutionalized" and "political institution"?