On banning the veil

By Massimo Pigliucci


Several European countries — including Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands — have banned the full-body Muslim burqa, or are considering doing so. In Spain a similar measure was narrowly rejected by the Catalonian assembly. In the United States this is not (yet) a live debate, though there are other signs of religious intolerance, such as what I think is a rather moronic discussion about whether to allow a Muslim cultural center near ground zero (the answer, I should think very clearly, ought to be of course yes, because 9/11 was not about the Muslims against us).

I was hoping to get my own ideas about the burqa issue a bit more clear by reading a contribution by noted philosopher Martha Nussbaum in the New York Times’ The Stone blog, but I must say it didn’t really help much.

Nussbaum is a sharp thinker, and arguably one of the most incisive public intellectuals active today. In her essay she introduced the issue in terms of two philosophical traditions concerning the rights of minorities, in particular religious ones. According to John Locke, the law should not penalize religious belief, and should not be discriminatory, that is it should be applied equally to all practitioners of specific religions. Nussbaum’s example is a Supreme Court decision that allows ritual animal sacrifice for religious purposes (yup, you read correctly!) because not allowing it would represent an instance of religious persecution against a specific group (in that case, the Santeria worshippers). I do wonder what the Supreme Court would say if a religious group petitioned to carry out human sacrifices...

A more strict criterion for religious equality was proposed by Roger Williams (the founder of Rhode Island), who maintained that the law has to be written in order to protect minorities, and in particular not to burden consciences by allowing special exemptions, known as accommodations, for religious practices. For instance, the US Supreme Court ruled that the state of South Carolina could not deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who lost her job because she refused to work on Saturdays, as this would amount to a financial fine against a matter of religious conscience. Again, it is easy to see how this line of reasoning could be pushed too far: what if my religion tells me that I need to dedicate most of my time to god, so that I can work only once a week?

Be that as it may, with the above as philosophical background, let’s analyze Nussbaum’s reasons for why banning burqas is a bad idea. They are framed as responses to common arguments in favor of the ban. I will append my own commentary to each entry.

1. Reasons for ban: for security reasons people have to show their faces when in public places; also, a proper relation among citizens requires transparency and reciprocity, i.e., we ought to be able to see who we interact with in the course of everyday life.

Nussbaum’s objection: this criterion would be applied inconsistently if a ban were passed, which means that it would be discriminatory against a minority. After all, we have no objection to people wearing ski masks or scarves when it’s very cold outside; also, many professionals cover their faces in special circumstances, e.g. doctors in operating rooms, football players on the field, etc.

My take: this strikes me as rather disingenuous of Nussbaum. First of all, she must recognize that the situations she describes (like, wearing a ski mask when it's cold) are very different in nature from the burqa problem. Yes, some of us cover our faces when going outside in the cold, but there actually is a problem if we keep doing so inside (for instance, after having walked into a bank). As for doctors and football players, again that is a clear case of special circumstances that pose no threat to transparency or security (indeed, they increase security of the patient and of the players, respectively), and they are temporary.

2. Reason for ban: the burqa is a symbol of male domination, so a ban protects women from objectification.

Nussbaum’s objection: society is rife with subtle ways of objectifying women, including “sex magazines, nude photos, tight jeans” ... “and what about the ‘degrading prison’ of plastic surgery?”

My take: again, disingenuous is the first word that comes to mind. Yes, western society still has plenty of more or less subtle ways to objectify women, but if Nussbaum seriously wishes to equate the entirely voluntary option of undergoing plastic surgery to please a man (or to gratify one’s own vanity) with the non-optional mandate to wear a burqa under the penalty of beating or death, she is way off the mark.

3. Reason for the ban: women wear the burqa only because they are coerced, so a ban is about asserting women’s rights to independence from male coercion.

Nussbaum’s objection: domestic violence is not limited to Muslim societies and “given the strong association between domestic violence and the abuse of alcohol, it seems at least plausible that observant Muslim families will turn out to have less of it.”

My take: this seems to me somewhat of a non sequitur. First off, Nussbaum cites statistics about domestic violence in the US, which are readily available, and then gingerly claims that the equivalent numbers for Muslim societies are likely lower. On what grounds? Does she really think that those societies have the equivalent of western monitoring and protection mechanisms to reduce domestic violence? Second, this strikes me as a “tu quoque” (you too) argument, which is an elementary logical fallacy. Nussbaum should instead be arguing both against male-imposed burqas and against alcohol-induced domestic violence, not use the second as an excuse for the first.

4. Reason for the ban: burqas are both uncomfortable and unhealthy for women.

Nussbaum’s objection: when she goes to India, she “wears a full salwaar kameez of cotton, because it is superbly comfortable, and full covering keeps dust off one’s limbs and at least diminishes the risk of skin cancer.” Also, “wouldn’t we have to begin with high heels, delicious as they are? But no, high heels are associated with majority norms (and are a major Spanish export), so they draw no ire.”

My take: okay, high heels are indeed “delicious,” but once again she seems to either miss the point or willfully ignore it. Nobody forces Spanish women to wear high heels, and nobody forces Nussbaum herself to wear a full salwaar kameez. Muslim women wearing burqas are in a different category altogether.

I must say that it is rather distressing to see a progressive public intellectual with a rigorous training in philosophy arguing so badly. It is in fact rather ironic that throughout her essay Nussbaum accuses her opponents of adopting a double cultural standard, while at the same time flagrantly doing the same herself, point after point.

I am not so naive as to seriously believe that politicians who are proposing bans against burqas do it because of their disinterested concern for women. Nor do I believe for a second that most of the proposed or enacted legislature is not in fact a thinly veiled attempt to validate public fears about Muslims in general. But it doesn’t help to pretend that there is a problem on the other side as well.

Muslim societies are male dominated to a degree that the West left behind (though not entirely abandoned) centuries ago. Correspondingly, Muslim women are oppressed to a degree that is not even remotely approached in western societies — high heels, tight jeans and sexy magazine covers notwithstanding.

I do believe that religious minorities have a right to wear specific garments and practice specific rites, within limits. The discussion is precisely about what those limits should be, and there is no clear cut answer. I also believe that total bans are counterproductive on pragmatic grounds because they reinforce — on both sides — the “us vs. them” mentality that has been so pernicious throughout human history. Better instead to provide ample opportunities for education coupled with strict enforcement of anti-domestic violence laws.

Still, living in an open society is not equivalent to being able to do whatever one wants, no matter whether the reason is secular or religious. We should not be as open as tolerating intolerance, for instance, at least when it manifests itself in specific actions (as opposed to just words). Moreover, progressives in particular should strongly come out to condemn the obvious symbolism and actual enforcement of male domination and oppression of women that is so clearly represented by the burqa and other practices. Not doing so while protesting against high heels and plastic surgery comes perilously close to intellectual dishonesty.