I want to thank Julia, our new regular contributor to Rationally Speaking for an honest and clear presentation of her doubts about the possibility of moral philosophy. Judging from the comments to her post, a good number of our readers seem to agree with her position, which is essentially one of moral skepticism, inevitably leading to a morally relativistic position (although she says that she gets her own moral sense from the way she is wired as a social primate, she also admits that she could not honestly blame someone who acted differently and had no inclination to be kind to others or help human welfare).
First off, then, let me suggest that I don’t think anyone is really a moral relativist, not even Julia. Moral relativism, or moral skepticism, is akin to skepticism about the existence of the world: it may be ultimately impossible to conclusively refute in an air-tight logical manner, but no one actually lives in this way, and no one really believes it. (Bertrand Russell once famously said that he wished that all those people who deny the existence of a wall would get into a car and drive straight into the wall at a speed proportional to their lack of belief in the existence of said wall. I am not aware of the actual experiment ever having been carried out, but of course, as any good skeptic knows, even if the people in the car all died this would not prove the existence of the wall — though as Russell remarked rather drily, we would get rid of a number of bad philosophers... But I digress.)
Second, although this discussion is fascinating and I think useful for our readers, neither Julia nor I can possibly hope to settle in this context a complex issue that defines a whole field, that of metaethics, or the rational justification of ethical thinking. Despite the fact that both Julia and several of our readers are dismissive of philosophy as a type of inquiry (a rather curiously anti-intellectual position, in my opinion), I urge the rest of you to read this excellent introductory essay in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy to begin to dig deeper.
All of the above said, let me finally get to the meat of Julia’s essay. Let’s start with this business of “axioms.” During one of our discussions over dinner I brought up the idea of axioms in ethics to refute a point that moral skeptics never fail to bring up, despite its obvious weakness: ethical reasoning is fluff because there are no moral empirical facts. But the skeptics curiously seem to miss an obvious case study which reveals the hollowness of their position. There are in fact well established and unquestionably serious areas of human endeavor for which “facts” are irrelevant. Consider the entire field of mathematics, for instance. I hope no one here will suggest that mathematical reasoning is arbitrary or without foundations. And yet mathematical theorems are valid / invalid regardless of any empirical fact abut the world.
This example should not be taken lightly, because it is a devastating objection to the moral skeptic, although we need to understand exactly what I am saying here. I am not suggesting that ethics and math are on the same footing, far from it. Rather, I am demonstrating beyond doubt that lack of empirical facts per se in no way precludes the ability of the human mind to reason rigorously about certain entities. It is an interesting philosophical (imagine that!) discussion whether mathematicians discover mathematical truths or they invent them, but in either case such inventions or discoveries are both rigorous and non-arbitrary.
It is of course true that the early 20th century quest for an ultimate, self-contained logical foundation for mathematics failed (see Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica) and was ultimately shown to be a mirage by Godel with his incompleteness theorem. Still, no one would argue that because of that mathematics is an arbitrary castle built on clouds. (Indeed, if we take that sort of skeptical position, then even Julia’s much touted empirical science gets into deep trouble, as rather ironically shown by Hume himself with his problem of induction.)
Indeed, I think that ethics is in some sense on a firmer foundation than math, because we can use empirical data from evolutionary biology and cognitive science to provide us with relevant empirical facts in which to ground our enterprise. As I will argue in a minute, this is not at all an instance of Hume’s naturalistic fallacy.
To begin with, I define ethics as that branch of philosophy that deals with the maximization of human welfare and flourishing. I’m sure this will disappoint Julia and others, but I simply don’t understand what else they might possibly wish to include in a talk about ethics. Neither Julia nor I believe in morality as imposed by a god, for a variety of reasons, including the fact that there is not a shred of evidence in favor of the existence of any gods, but more importantly because of the decisive (again, philosophical!) argument known as Euthyphro’s dilemma, in which Plato showed that gods are simply irrelevant to the question of morality.
So yes, for me morality is neither arbitrary (the relativist position) nor absolute (the typical religionist position, though Kant also famously attempted to arrive at a logically necessary ethics via an entirely secular route — and failed). Rather, I think of morality as something that makes sense only for human beings and other relevantly similar species. By relevantly similar, I mean social animals with brains complex enough to be able to reflect on what they are doing and why they are doing it (that is, being able to philosophize!). As far as I know, Homo sapiens is currently the only such species on planet Earth, though of course there may be others elsewhere in the cosmos.
By definition, then, something is moral in my book if it increases human welfare and flourishing (I am leaving aside for the moment the issue of animal rights, which would be an unnecessary distraction at this point. Interestingly, consequentialists like Peter Singer have tackled that problem, and Julia presented herself to me once as a consequentialist — apparently without realizing that a moral skeptic cannot also coherently endorse a particular school of ethics. For the record, I incline toward virtue ethics.)
It is at this point that Julia accuses me of committing the naturalistic fallacy, that is of deriving an “ought” from an “is.” There are several issues to be considered here. First, contrary to what Julia maintains, it is not at all clear that Hume argued that the is/ought connection is impossible, he may simply have been saying that if one wishes to make that connection the project has to be pursued by explicitly unpacking how said connection works or can be justified. Second, of course, as much as I myself love Hume, I don’t think the guy was infallible, and generally speaking invoking authority truly is a logical fallacy.
To be as clear as possible, then, I define as moral an action that increases human welfare and/or flourishing (and yes, I’m aware that the latter two also need to be discussed and unpacked, but this is a blog post, not a treatise), and then ask biologists and cognitive scientists to provide me with some empirical points of reference so that my concept of human flourishing is based as much as possible on the so highly valued empirical data.
Here is where Julia makes a subtle, but revealing, shift: she writes that “science can tell me that if I want to make other people happier, then treating them in certain ways — giving them health, freedom, and so on — will accomplish that goal. But science can't tell me whether making other people happier should be my goal.” But ethics is not about what an individual may or may not want, it is about the species as a whole (and possibly beyond, see my comment on Singer above). Julia of course may reject the idea of behaving herself so as to increase human flourishing, but then she is by definition acting immorally (or at least amorally). She may shrug her shoulders and keep going with her life, of course, but most of us are going to think of her as immoral (she isn’t, by the way, she is one of the nicest people I’ve met).
What I’ve got so far, then, is a working definition of morality and some empirical evidence (from science) of what helps human beings flourish. Why do I need philosophy? Because biology provides us only with a very limited sense of morality, an instinct that there are right and wrong things. But that instinct was shaped — slowly and inefficiently — by a blind natural process that simply maximized survival and reproduction. Once human beings became able to reflect on what they were doing they immediately developed an enlarged sense of flourishing that is not limited to personal safety, food and sex. We also want to enjoy life, be free to explore opportunities, to speak our mind, to admire art, to pursue knowledge, and so on.
Our instincts become a less and less reliable guide when the circle of flourishing is thus enlarged. For instance, it is a universal moral intuition among human cultures that randomly killing members of your group is bad (psychopaths, or to put it as Julia does, people with a different wiring, are not exceptions, they prove the rule: we put them away whenever we encounter them). But natural selection probably also bred into us an instinctive distrust of outsiders. It has taken thousands of years of moral progress (not an oxymoron!) to slowly realize that there is no rationally defensible distinction between in-group and out-group, which means that we need philosophical reflection to build on our natural biological instinct and come up with the humanity-wide rule that it is wrong to randomly kill anyone, regardless of which group s/he happens to belongs to as a matter of accident of birth.
To summarize, then, I think that:
1. The objection that moral reasoning is not based on empirical facts is irrelevant, since there are other non-arbitrary human endeavors that are also so characterized and yet we do not reject them on those grounds (mathematics, logic itself).
2. I define ethics/morality as concerned with exploring the sort of behaviors that augment human (and possibly beyond human) welfare and flourishing. Since this is a definition, it cannot be argued for, only either accepted or rejected. And yes, definitions are tautologies, but they are nonetheless very useful (all of math can be thought of as a tautology, and so is every single entry in a dictionary).
3. Some empirical facts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science inform us as to where and why we have a moral instinct to begin with, and also about what sort of behaviors do in fact increase human flourishing. It is because of this that I can confidently say, for instance, that genital mutilation of small girls is wrong regardless of which culture practices it and why.
4. To move beyond the narrow sense of flourishing that generated our moral instincts we need to be able to reflect about these issues in a rational and empirically-informed manner. That is, we need to do science-informed philosophy (or what I call sci-phi).
One more thing: I really don’t think Hume would be upset with any of the above, and I believe he would invite me over for a meal (he enjoyed dinner parties) to amicably explore our differences of opinion. As he famously put it: “Truth springs from argument amongst friends.”
Massimo,
ReplyDelete"I define ethics as that branch of philosophy that deals with the maximization of human welfare and flourishing."
I'm not sure this formulation can work as a definition of ethics. It seems to define away de-ontological and at least some versions of consequentialism as viable options.
I think of ethics as the branch of philosophy that provides prescriptions for action, and metaethics as providing foundations for ethical theories and reasons form deciding between competing theories.
I think the quid of the matter is, as The Monkey point out, your definition of ethics. I would argue that ethics in general is the branch of philosophy that distinguishes between "good" and "bad" actions. Then I would define "good action" as an action that "maximizes human welfare and flourishing".
ReplyDeleteBut, as you noted yourself, science can't tell me if I should or not accept this idea of "good"
Maybe my first definition is what The Monkey calls "methaethics" (I've never thought about that concept) and the second definition is "ethics".
Your line of reasoning could be explained as
"Science can tell us witch actions maximize human welfare and flourishing"
"We ought to act in order to maximize human welfare and flourishing"
Therefore
"Science can tell us witch actions we ought to do".
I think no one would argue that your reasoning is invalid, but no empirical reality about the world can make the second premise true. Either you accept it or you don't.
Well said. I particularly agree with your comment about moral skepticism being similar to skepticism regarding the external world (or other minds, for that matter). There seems to be something almost disingenuous in such skepticism, as it seems to require a disregard or denial of how most of us live our lives. Dewey was right, I think, to point out the futility of the "quest for certainty."
ReplyDeleteMassimo,
ReplyDelete"Since this is a definition, it cannot be argued for, only either accepted or rejected."
I don't entirely agree with this assertion, as perhaps has become clear in other posts of mine. In this case, I see two objections.
The first is simple and general: if a definition can be rejected or accepted, then why can't we argue about whether to accept or reject it?
The second is more specific, and has to do with the way your definition sidesteps the very issues that make morality difficult (and interesting!) to reason about. At the center of the notion of morality is the question "what ought we do?" Your definition defers that question and gives priority to a different one: "what ought we do to increase the welfare of human-like beings?"
That second question automatically rules out the possibility that the welfare of human-like beings might not be a good thing! I think it's a good thing, but I'm not willing to rule out the possibility that it's not without a good argument; I think we should be able to consider, in a reasoned way, the possibility that, morally speaking, the human race shouldn't exist.
In the end, I think that your definition is pragmatic and useful, and it will do in most cases. But it also forecloses certain interesting questions, which is why I can't accept it as the only way to define morality.
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteConsider a group that claims moral acts are not exactly those that lead to increased flourishing (Hedonists or Stoics--or even Christians).
Do you believe your disagreement with them is one of language or of the external world? If only the latter, what empirical test would resolve your difference?
"Neither Julia nor I believe in morality as imposed by a god, for a variety of reasons, including the fact that there is not a shred of evidence in favor of the existence of any gods, but more importantly because of the decisive (again, philosophical!) argument known as Euthyphro’s dilemma, in which Plato showed that gods are simply irrelevant to the question of morality."
ReplyDelete'DOING THE RIGHT THING' REQUIRES EXAMPLES and a standard independent from a human standard that could shift all the time. A measuring cup or ruler that changes measurements all the time is worthless.
For instance, Massimo has suggested that it might be considered pathological to kill members of ones own group but it would not be considered pathological to kill ones own offspring? Why not? And who says? I don't buy that. I THINK ITS PATHOLOGICAL x 2. And that's why shifting standards made up by man have very limited stability and thus credibility. Standards for morals cannot shift all the time and still be called "moral". Moral ought to imply that one standard can be counted upon.
Andrew,
ReplyDeleteI think that an ethics that doesn't seek to increase human flourishing is not an ethics at all. If that cuts out some forms of deontology, particularly religious ones, so much the worse for them.
(For instance, several of the infamous Ten Commandments are about god's narcissism, and therefore not about morality at all, though of course even most deontological dictates can be seen as seeking to improve flourishing.)
As for my definition of ethics, people, too many of you seem to want something either magical or completely and absolutely logically self-consistent out of this discussion. But remember that setting the bar that high also invalidates *both* science and math. Why would you hold ethics/philosophy at a higher standard than those two? (And that goes for you too, Julia... ;-)
Judging from the comments to her post, a good number of our readers seem to agree with her position, which is essentially one of moral skepticism, inevitably leading to a morally relativistic position...
ReplyDeleteOuch, no. Just because somebody thinks that the is/ought gap cannot be bridged rationally does not mean that we automatically have to consider all possible moral systems as equally valid. Outside of understanding the world and learning factual truths, we can of course use non-rationally derived input for our decisions. I, for example, do not let my ratio decide when I "decide" whom to love. (I like to imagine it hovering in the background, letting the hormones and the animal-part of my being do their job, but ready to override them if prudent or necessary.) Similarly, it does not appear contradictory to me base our morals on, for example, a preference for the greatest welfare for the largest number of people, just because we are evolved to be compassionate towards our fellow humans, while at the same time acknowledging that this is not an objectively, rationally, universally defensible reason. And this is what I thought this was about. Of course I would find a system of morals demanding the killing of everybody above 60 years of age abhorrent, but not because I think that can be rejected by going from some evidence-is to a normative ought not.
I am demonstrating beyond doubt that lack of empirical facts per se in no way precludes the ability of the human mind to reason rigorously about certain entities.
Hume did not doubt the existence of empirical facts that could be considered relevant for morals, but a way to get from their observation to a moral imperative, or did I get that wrong?
By definition, then, something is moral in my book if it increases human welfare and flourishing
Ah yes, that solves the problem, of course. So if I define philosophy as dealing with irrelevant fluff, then I can go ahead and ignore it, and consider your life's work being irrelevant? No, wait...
I would say that moral is simply what we ought to do, listo, and the question is how to know this. Who went ahead and said that we ought to increase human welfare, and with what intellectual justification? We can freely decide to do so, and a good decision it is, but where does the ought enter?
I must say, this disappoints me, even in comparison to other posts with which I strongly disagreed before. Your entire gimmick is to define the word moral in a way that makes you right, well, by definition, without addressing the problem that was meant to be the point of contention.
1. How can you compare morality to mathematics when morality refers to humans actions (i.e. empirically observable facts) rather than abstract objects? An action is construed as moral or immoral not by definition but by applying it the real world with an infinite number of possible conditions, which in turn suggests morality cannot be expressed in a few neat axioms.
ReplyDelete2. That's an inadequate definition because the human welfare and flourishing can be construed to mean many things. For example, does human flourish refer to being able to procreate in great numbers, or to exploit the Earth equitably, or to live in balance with nature? Each of these require a different approach to morality.
3. Nature is a poor guide for human morality because there's nothing about it inherently moral or immoral. Pain and suffering are biological methods of avoiding death, but avoiding death in a world which relies on animals killing each other is unavoidable and perhaps even necessary. Therefore I would argue pain and suffering are unavoidable and (perhaps) necessary, on the whole.
4. Some of the worst horrors of the 20th century were perpetrated by people who claimed to have been motivated by scientic principles: euthanasia of disabled people, eugenics, shock therapy for homosexuals etc... This is perhaps not very surprising as science itself is amoral and merely describes the world rather than tell us what we should do.
Julia said "I agree with Massimo that moral reasoning is possible, given a set of initial axioms".
ReplyDeleteMassimo, why do you say she is a moral sceptic?
The question, if I understood well, was 'Which axioms do we choose and on what basis?'. In other words, one would need to give sufficient reasons for being moral. While Massimo's point that biological facts are absolutely essential, they remain non-necessary: They would NOT convince a sociopath even if he understands the science and even if he has a degree in biology. I think that is the point Julia was making and remains convincing for me.
To avoid a blog-post let me point to my post in Julia's thread, which I sent before reading Massimos response. By serendipity or "empathy" --who knows, it contains many of the points he makes. I love moral philosophy but think it needs limits; be a philosopher but be a man and all this.
Let me take another swing at this. It sounds like you are claiming that any purportedly ethical theory that does not ground its reasoning in considerations about human welfare and flourishing isn't doing ethics at all. I don't want to get involved in a frivolous debate about terminology, but there isn't a lot of historical precedent for defining ethics in that way, and thinkers like Kant and Mill certainly thought of themselves as doing ethics. Your definition potentially excludes their moral philosophy as non-ethical. This seems weird to me.
ReplyDeleteUltimately, I don't think anyone wants anything magical in the way of metaethical considerations, but it seems that it should be possible for you to give reasons as to just why you've chosen the definition you have, especially since it is a nonstandard definition.
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteSo you believe your disagreement with the Christians is only of language? If you agree with them on the physical world, doesn't the energy in this debate about "morality" make you suspect a conflation of the arbitrary activity of definition and some social emotion?
Separately, I think your condemnation of science and mathematics as inconsistent overreaches. The mathematics that are commonly used, for example, do not suffer from Godel's problems. And aren't scientists perfectly content deferring the problem of induction to distributional assumptions?
Monkey, I've given reasons for my entire view of ethics, but again, one has to start with some axioms that are simply not up for debate, you have to either take them or leave the. Again, no difference with science and math.
ReplyDeleteJulia is a (closet?) relativist because although she agrees that one needs axioms she also goes on to say that she sees no reason why she can condemn anybody else's actions. I do.
As for Kant and Mill, I think much of what they say can be rephrased in terms of human flourishing. Do not equate that term just with virtue ethics.
(renumeratedfrog, I think you missed my point: the comparison with math simply shows - beyond question, I think - that the objection that ethics is about fluff because it is not based on empirical data simply cannot stand. That's all.)
Mintman, sorry for disappointing you once more. At east you ain't paying for the service...
Andrew, my disagreement with Christians is that they base their ethics on god's mandates, and their god is immoral, by my standards (he also doesn't exist, but that's beside the point).
As for overreaching, I don't think so. The point isn't that most math is not invalidated by Godel's theorem, it is that there is no ultimate foundation for math because of it. Similarly, most everyday ethical reasoning doesn't require a discussion of metaethics, but you do get into murkier territory once you ask to justify ethics (or math, or logic, or science) itself.
Oh, and psychopaths don't need to be convinced by ethical reasoning, they need to be locked up and treated with the best that medical science can do. People, c'mon, saying that ethical reasoning is invalidated by the existence of psychopaths is like saying that math is wrong because of widespread innumeracy...
Thanks Massimo. That's helpful. I actually favor Aristotlian/virtue ethics myself, but basically as a default position after finding religious, deontological and utilitarian methods unsatisfying for one reason or another. I haven't quite given up on the search for the (or some) objective grounds for ethical prescriptions.
ReplyDeleteMintman: "Similarly, it does not appear contradictory to me base our morals on, for example, a preference for the greatest welfare for the largest number of people.."
ReplyDeleteSounds good on a superficial level but if one does not define what kind of welfare one may arrive at a system that could harm and even do away with people who cause the so-called "greater good" high medical costs or just some kind of other discomfort. I think ,otoh, one starts with the least defensible little individual and if you defend his rights all people are better served and safer.
I heard a story today about a little Haitian boy who was tossed into an outdoor toilet by his mother. A man walking by hears the baby's cries and has some other people lower him by rope into the filth to pull the baby boy out. Today that little guys name is Moses, he's about 5 or 6 and he is being raised in a Haitian orphanage by an older couple that have "adopted" about 60 children into their orphanage.
If everyone had that attitude towards the most indefensible and most innocent among us, (being willing to reach into the worst places just to SAVE ONE!) the world would be an entirely different place!
Massimo:
ReplyDeleteBut remember that setting the bar that high also invalidates *both* science and math. Why would you hold ethics/philosophy at a higher standard than those two? (And that goes for you too, Julia... ;-)
I hold ethics to a higher standard because it is about what I should and should not be allowed to do, not "only" about value-neutral facts. Then again, the justification for science is that it works. I have explained in a previous discussion on this blog how I am convinced that science, if done correctly, is the one valid way of learning about the world we find ourselves in, and that it is basically the same approach everybody takes in their daily lives, if they are honestly trying to navigate their way through the world, instead of taking a superstition or groupthink shortcut. In other words, if I am searching my lost keys, I do science, if my daughter nibbles on her bunny plushie or tries to learn how to crawl, she is doing science; it is the one obvious self-validating approach to approximate empirical truth, and comes naturally.
Developing an ethical system through rational discourse does not - as opposed to developing an ethical system through trial and error, competition of societies, and negotiation, which is how we actually do it. The point is, if we admit that we actually do it that way we do not pretend that what we do is rationally defensible except through the justification that it suits our desire to build a functioning society, and that desire is also only a decision but not an ought. We should be aware of that, and the claim that ethics are absolute should have a really good and convincing justification, simply because of the potential for oppression that it carries.
Mintman, sorry for disappointing you once more. At east you ain't paying for the service...
I have enjoyed many other posts, but this simply seems like a let-down after expecting a convincing counterpoint to Julia's arguments. These kinds of discussions are how I can hope to learn and grow (something I miss in the largely intellectually uncurious and argument-avoiding world around me) but bowing out by redefining the entire point helps nobody. That reminds me slightly of this randroid, in the discussion to the first post I ever read here, who argued that you should have the right to keep all money you earn in a capitalist system, i.e. you should not have to pay taxes. Did he demonstrate why he should have that right? In a way, yes: he simply defined wealth earned in a capitalist system as deserved, simple as that, without bothering to address such details as inheritance, bad luck, exploitation of employees, economic plight or other asymmetries between contractual partners, or services rendered by the state.
By the way, it also reminds of a joke I once heard: an engineer and a mathematician (dare I say, philosopher?) are asked to build an enclosure for sheep using the least amount of fence material they can manage. The engineer goes ahead and builds a circular enclosure just large enough to fit all the sheep in, reasoning that this is the perfect shape. The mathematician takes a tiny piece of fence, circles it around himself and declares "I define myself to be outside".
Caliana:
Sounds good on a superficial level but if one does not define what kind of welfare one may arrive at a system that could harm and even do away with people who cause the so-called "greater good" high medical costs or just some kind of other discomfort.
That was just a popular example, not necessarily the basis of my own ethical system in its entirety.
Massimo, I favour a naturalistic ethics.
ReplyDeleteI wasn't saying that moral reasoning is invalidated by the existence of psychos. I only meant to say what you already have conceded, that morality --like any other discipline-- ultimately faces a matter of choice. Or, tu put it, as someone else has in the discussion, the quest for absolute certainty is futile.
It is to the emotions that we ultimately appeal in our moral reasoning but we can go no further. Quoting yourself, quoiting Hume:
"David Hume famously predicted, without emotions "It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.""
http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com/2009/11/incoherence-of-free-will.html?showComment=1258667440495
If this is right then the question that you set to answer is unanswerable: there are no moral universals, no moral maxims we can agree with psychopaths. As I say in the other post, it is a question that is posed in a way that can only be answered by theology, which anyway fails to take us anywhere, given Euthyphro.
Mintman,
ReplyDeleteI certainly didn't mean to dismiss your points, so let me try again, especially because they are obviously recurring in this sort of discussion:
Ethics vs. Math: yes, ethics has more important consequences for human lives than math, but my point was different. Math is held pretty much universally to be the quintessential example of logical rigor. Ethics is by necessity much more murky (after all, it deals with real human beings, not with perfect abstractions of thought), so it seems to me grossly unfair to dismiss the entire ethical project on grounds that, if accepted, would get rid of math too. (I'm not saying this is what you do, btw, that was one of Julia's moves.)
I know that science "works," but consider Hume's problem of induction (which often crops up on RS, as you know). "It works" is an inductive argument, and so provides no *ultimate* justification at all. Ethics too "works," more or less, because we seem to be able to build societies that many of us consider reasonably just, some of which do further human flourishing for sustained periods of time. But the question raised by Julia is one of ultimate foundations, not of practical morality (which per se is not a metaethical issue).
I disagree that we actually develop ethical systems by trial and error. We do it very much like science develops its theory, through a *combination* of reflection and trial and error (hence my reference to sci-phi). It is on the reflective part that philosophy comes in.
I absolutely never ever claimed that ethics are absolute. ;-)
I also did not define away the problem, I simply gave readers an honest starting point for my essay, because every discussion has to start somewhere. We could have a metadiscussion about my starting point, but the fact that I avoided that route does not mean that my entire post reduces to "I define X so that I win."
I hope this helps, the point of this blog is indeed, as you say, for everyone (including Julia and myself) to learn and grow.
Massimo, thanks for this thorough and well-written rejoinder!
ReplyDeleteBut I agree with the commenters who object that you're essentially trying to define away the problem. You say "I define as moral an action that increases human welfare and/or flourishing," a descriptive definition that does not match the way most people use the term. As Scott says (and other commenters like The Monkey and Mintman have echoed): "At the center of the notion of morality is the question 'what ought we do?' Your definition defers that question and gives priority to a different one: 'what ought we do to increase the welfare of human-like beings?'"
When other commenters point to ways that people have historically answered the question "how ought we behave?" that contradict your answer of "to increase human flourishing," your response is: "I think that an ethics that doesn't seek to increase human flourishing is not an ethics at all. If that cuts out some forms of deontology, particularly religious ones, so much the worse for them."
... which basically just begs the question.
And as I've argued to you in the past, I don't buy your analogy between ethics and math. There are many different starting axioms one could pick to build an internally consistent system of math, and no mathematician I know believes that one set of starting axioms is the "right" one -- just that some lead to more useful (for modeling our world) forms of math than others do. One mathematician friend of mine just read this debate and emailed me saying, "I can give you thousands of notions of geometry, only a couple of which will help you draft a house." In other words, we pick our goal (usually, modeling the physical world around us) and then we pick the set of starting axioms that helps us accomplish that goal. But what's our goal in ethics? Different people could pick different goals and I couldn't tell them why one goal is "right" or "wrong".
So, to quote one of my emails to you: "Math isn't telling me I ought to accept P as a starting premise, just that if I do, then Q follows. You however are telling me that I ought to accept your starting premise that I should care about other people's wellbeing for its own sake."
On that math point:
ReplyDelete"ethical reasoning is fluff because there are no moral empirical facts." is certainly refuted by mathematics, but that statement is really unnecessarily strong. Take a slightly less flip phrasing:
s1: "If something is not grounded in empirical facts, then it has no value"
Math is a fine counter example. But all we really need for the present discussion is
s2: "If something is not grounded in empirical facts, then it has no basis to inform decisions made in every day life."
Math passes this test. Pure math cares nothing for practicality. As for applied math -- I can give you thousands of distinct notions of geometry. Only one or two will help you draft a house. You can do this because of claims like "Under the constraints a house builder has to worry about, space-time is well modeled by euclidean geometry", which can be backed or refuted empirically.
In short, "moral philosophy has as much authority to tell us what we ought to do as pure mathematics" seems shaky ground on which to build.
Aside-
Even s2 is pretty strong. It has a necessity claim that seems awfully strong to just assert.
s3: "Grounding in empirical facts is a sufficient basis to inform decisions made in every day life."
Which opens the door to other ways to ground things.
Also, just for the record, let me clear up two misrepresentations of my viewpoints in your post:
ReplyDelete(1) You say: "Julia presented herself to me once as a consequentialist — apparently without realizing that a moral skeptic cannot also coherently endorse a particular school of ethics."
You may have misunderstood me, or perhaps I was being sloppy in my language that day; what I meant to say was that my preferences are usually similar to consequentialism. Sometimes they diverge from it. I don't claim to have a rational justification for the validity of my preferences -- neither when they adhere to consequentialism, nor when they diverge from it.
(2) Regarding my quotation of Hume, you say, "generally speaking invoking authority truly is a logical fallacy."
I absolutely didn't mean to suggest that just because Hume said it, it must be true! That's exactly the opposite of my views, in fact. I just quoted him because I liked the way he expressed the problem (and because his "is/ought" terminology is used by most philosophers nowadays when discussing this issue).
You however are telling me that I ought to accept your starting premise that I should care about other people's wellbeing for its own sake.
ReplyDeleteAnd what is problematic about that? Is it really so difficult to think that love might be an intrinsic good--something worth valuing in and of itself?
The fact that a sociopath is constitutionally incapable of understanding this no more invalidates the idea than does the fact that a chimpanzee is incapable of doing trigonometry invalidates that branch of mathematics.
Wow, tough one. You (Julia & Massimo) both make such convincing points. If I seem to lean in Julia's direction, it's only because I seem to share her intuition that asserting a definition of morality is not quite the same as providing a rational argument for it -- or, if it is, it is a particularly weak form of it.
ReplyDeleteIt may be the best that we can do in matters ethical, but it still seems to assume way more persuasiveness than can safely be relied upon -- even if we exclude certified sociopaths from the equation.
To begin with, I define ethics as that branch of philosophy that deals with the maximization of human welfare and flourishing. I’m sure this will disappoint Julia and others, but I simply don’t understand what else they might possibly wish to include in a talk about ethics.
ReplyDeleteYou are begging the question. You feel that human welfare and flourishing is good, and therefore you define it as ethical. Yet other people would disagree with this fact, and many people do live their lives counter to this. Yet there is no scientific evidence to support either position. You are simply trying to argue against moral relativism by saying that everyone should accept your definition of morality.
I could go on for pages about how morality doesn't exist, but in the face of Massimo's unambitious reply, why even bother? Once he's done falsely accusing Julia of making an argument from authority (as though to quote somebody is to idolize them), Massimo repeats his irrelevant comparison between Mathematics and Ethics. It basically works like this:
ReplyDelete"Mathematics is accepted as rational by most people, yet its axioms aren't empirically justified; therefore, you can't say that Ethics is fluff just because it isn't empirically justified."
But pure Math makes no claims about reality-at-large; Moral Realism does. Moral Realists claim that there are some actions which are superior to others. This means that superiority is supposed to be an actually existing trait, which means that it's not some abstraction being used to prove a theorem (like the square root of negative one) or being proved itself. Ethics requires empirical justification because it makes claims about the real world. Massimo comparison fails, then, because Moral Realism demands that some behaviours have a trait of goodness, while the Riemann Hypothesis is not even about a really existing thing at all.
But wait, Massimo isn't even really trying to defend the notion of morality! Phew. I was worried he would try to argue that some actions are good, or that some actions should be done and that others should not be done. Turns out, he feels content to just redefine his terms and declare himself victor. Massimo isn't trying to say that there are imperatives to do certain things, or that it isn't rational to kill abortionists. He's just Humpty-Dumptying, postmodernism-style.
Julia, I really don't understand why you and others have such a hard time getting my point about math. One more time: I do *not* claim that ethics is "just like" math. I simply refuted your point that ethics has no rational basis because it is not grounded in empirical facts. btw, your friend's example only strengthens my point: yes, there are many types of math that yield bizarre and useless results, and there are many types of ethics that don't work for human beings. So?
ReplyDeleteAs you put it, what I am saying is *exactly* that "If we care about human welfare then X is moral/immoral." This is not at all begging the question, it is simply a straightforward deductive argument which, like all deductive arguments, has to start with premises. My premise is that everyone except psychopaths do care about human welfare (an empirical fact, by the way), and furthermore that there is no logical reason to prefer *your* own welfare to anyone else's (from the point of view of society, which is the ethical perspective). The fact that some people reject that premise is - as someone put it here - just as relevant as a monkey not understanding geometry, not at all an argument against ethics, or geometry.
Julia, so you are not a consequentialist, ok, do I have it right then that you are a moral relativist?
As for my point about arguments from authority, I brought it up because you simply quoted Hume without actually explaining why you think the is/ought divide in unbridgeable. Moreover, as I pointed out before, you are probably taking an extreme and debatable view of Hume. Several commentators have argued that what he meant was simply that *if* you want to go from is to ought *then* you need to provide reasons. I have done so in my essay.
David, there is no fundamental distinction between "pure" and impure math. It's math all the way. The distinction rests on the fact that some of it is relevant to practical things and some isn't, but the type of reasoning is the same, and the whole enterprise is still not rooted in any empirical facts.
As for "grounding in empirical facts is a sufficient basis to inform decisions made in every day life," there is a huge literature in ethics about every day life, it's called applied ethics. And I never said that it is independent of empirical facts, only that empirical facts do not fully determine it.
Which brings me to a more general point: seems to me that several people here keep equivocating between metaethics and applied ethics. Julia's critique is about metaethics, and it does not make things any clearer if we keep jumping between the two. Do you want to have a discussion about the ultimate foundations of mathematics, or do you want to talk about a specific type of mathematical theorems? Not the same thing.
Tanner, there is no begging of the question, I don't "feel" that human welfare is what grounds ethics. Most people on the planet agree, for good reasons. If someone really doesn't then that person is a psychopath, and talking to them abut ethics is just about as fruitful as talking to a creationist abut evolution.
Ritchie, see above for why I brought up the argument from authority with Julia, it was not a false accusation. Second, math *does* make claims about reality, again see above. Third, please get off this "he redefine terms and declares himself victor" nonsense. Read the essay, I provided 2,000 words of arguments. And it really takes balls to accuse *me* of postmodernism!
Perspicio, your comments are always thoughtful, but occasionally I have a hard time figuring out where you come down to. However, math is most certainly *not* grounded in empirical facts, although part of it does affect the way we do things in the real world. And once again, I'm *not* redefining anything as an edict, for crying out loud. My *understanding* of a moral ought, as you put it, is inextricably connected to human welfare. Why else would we even be talking about ethics?
Massimo,
ReplyDelete"My premise is that everyone except psychopaths do care about human welfare (an empirical fact, by the way)"
I have an empirical counterexample for you. I know people who feel that it would be morally appropriate for the human race to die out, and who choose not to have children on that basis.
I don't agree with their position because I do care about human welfare, but they aren't psychopaths.
Scott,
ReplyDeletesorry to hear about your friends, but if they are not psychopaths they are morally challenged. And if they act on trying to end the human race (not by not having children, but by, say, planning the end of the world) then they *are* psychopaths.
Incidentally, "morally appropriate for the human race to die out" is close to an oxymoron, considering that morality, on planet earth, only makes sense *if* there is such thing as the human race.
First off, good debate, thanks everyone.
ReplyDeleteMassimo, it seems you have moved the relativity of ethics (through redefinition) to another point, to human flourishing. Christians/Muslims would probably claim they have "human flourishing" in mind, its just that they see flourishing as heaven instead of earth.
With those in make-believe-land aside, the question of human flourishing is still going to be contentious (or uncapable of being settled beyond societal agreement, such as through empirical evidence) for those who hold similar beliefs about what exists in the world, some of the similar arguments that dog consequentialist positions.
On to the supposed best of the moral relativist, Nietzsche. I think it can be argued that he had a very succinct and oft repeated morality, the morality of the higher man. For Nietzsche, the creation of the higher man is the best indication of human flourishing, and the old moral system that allowed for higher men was the best moral system. Of course, higher men are created to the detriment of many other individuals, something most of us find contradictory to flourishing and morality in general. (Dismissal of Nietzsche as a psychopath would be disingenuous here, by the way.)
Trying to determine what counts as human flourishing leads once again to arbitrary choices being made, where, despite the aid of empirical studies and of philosophical reasoning, the moral system we choose to live by will contradict the traditional view of morality as standing outside the relativity of the values of a society.
Hi,
ReplyDeleteI don't agree with your definition of ethics (not in the sense that I would prefere a different definition, but in the sense that some prominent ethical theories don't fall under it). I'm obviously thinking about Kantian ethics, according to which the point of morality is not what is what makes us happiest, but what is what makes us DESERVE to be happy.
.
On the other hand, I also do not see any special problem in being a moral relativist, not in the sense of denying that you can make moral judgments, but in the sense of claiming that those judgments have exactly the same subjective ground than judgments about tastes (i.e., that there is nothing objectively and intrinsically good in action X, but only that it is possible that action X is judged as morally compulsory by an agent, and as morally forbidden by other, or as indiferent for another one).
Hi Massimo, in response to your comment:
ReplyDelete"""As you put it, what I am saying is *exactly* that "If we care about human welfare then X is moral/immoral." This is not at all begging the question, it is simply a straightforward deductive argument which, like all deductive arguments, has to start with premises. My premise is that everyone except psychopaths do care about human welfare (an empirical fact, by the way), and furthermore that there is no logical reason to prefer *your* own welfare to anyone else's (from the point of view of society, which is the ethical perspective)."""
Suppose that on another planet somewhere in our universe intelligent alien life formed and, due to the strange conditions on that planet, evolution caused these creatures to not care at all about each other's welfare. Furthermore, let us suppose for the sake of argument that what these alien creatures really value is harming each other as much as possible. Under those circumstances, would you say that it is "ethical" for these creatures to harm one another? If not, then would you still argue that it is ethical for them to treat each other well (as you argue for us humans)? I ask because in these circumstances, your premise that everyone (except psychopaths) cares about the welfare of others would not seem to apply.
Thanks.
You told me to read the essay, so I read Julia's and then yours once again. This is what I come away with, once again:
ReplyDeleteSome statements have a strong sense of gravity to them even though none of the individual words are gravity-laden; it is the image conveyed by the statements which conveys gravity. Take, for example, this statement:
“Roger lifted the knife and, in a quick stroke, ended the life of his former lover.”
The statement carries with it a huge gravity; sane humans do not read this and feel as though this is of no consequence. Yet none of the individual words have strong moral connotations. Now consider an alternate version:
“Roger murdered Juliette.”
Now, the sentence evokes moral sentiments not merely because of what it describes. The word “murdered” itself is morally loaded: it is defined as “wrongful killed”. Anyone using the word “murdered” can expect readers or listeners to understand the moral connotations of the term.
I believe that you are trying to preserve the moral connotations of our moral language while giving them denotations that would not spark nearly the same feelings on their own. Consider these statements:
“John bought himself a fancy dinner instead of donating the same money to Oxfam; in doing so, he reduced the net flourishing of the species as a whole.”
“John acted immorally.”
Can’t you see that, to the vast majority readers, the prior statement is not going to evoke nearly the same feelings as the second one? The reason for this is precisely that you are doing what I have accused you of: you are taking words laden with gravitas and giving them denotations that would never have earned the gravitas.
Why wouldn’t they have earned the gravitas? Because people do not, by and large, get worked up over a failure to maximize the flourishing of the human race. They have a big problem with murder in the direct sense – ie stabbing – and theft, deceipt, etc. But few operate under the moral principle that the entire species is one’s family.
If you think I’m wrong, just imagine if you had to write a treatise on the maximization of human welfare but could not use moral language. Instead, you had to use your own terms for the behaviors and attitudes that maximize flourishing. What if you had to use totally wacky words, like “wattil”, to refer to actions that maximized happiness? Would people think you were talking about an issue with extreme gravity? I don’t think so; I think that you’re trying to seize the gravity of words like “morality” while changing their denotations.
Secondly, I think you’re still leaving something that you believe in out of the definition of morality. It would have been quite straightforward (though I would still have my Error Theorist objections) for you to define “morality” as “the sphere of what one should or should not do, of what is right and wrong” and that something qualifies as right or wrong solely by virtue of its effect on mankind’s welfare. But this you certainly did not do! Your definition does not leave hints of imperative, does not leave hints of “good” or “bad”. Yet I know that you believe these things.
I am not trying to be provocative or accusative when I suggest that you are using a postmodern-style form of writing. I certainly don’t mean that you write like Judith Butler. What I was referring to in my last reply was the method of Humpty-Dumptying outlined by Shackel in an article that was referenced somewhere in your blog some time ago. It is likely, in my view, that you have allowed a convenience of phrasing to block your vision of what you are actually claiming. I think that, if you had to examine your phrasing more closely, you’d realize that you’ve failed to live up to the conceptual legacy of morality.
ClcoBackward,
ReplyDeleteah, arguing by counterfactuals, now that's philosophy!
First off, I said that I think of morality as a human issue, adding that it may apply also to relevantly similar conscious beings. Hence your experiment does not create a problem, since those beings would not be relevantly similar.
Moreover, the evolutionary reason for a sense of moral right and wrong in humans is that we are interdependent social creatures. I expect evolution to favor the same on other planets if the ecological situation is similar. If the species is made of conscious but non-social animals, then I would not expect evolution to favor a sense of morality.
An interesting question does arise, then: since those creatures would be capable of reflecting on their actions, would they realize that it is in some sense wrong to, say, inflict pain on other similar creatures, even though they are not part of a society? They may not have an evolved sense of moral duty, but reflective reasoning may still get them there. I don't know.
Oh my goodness, I wrote that last post in Word and it removed the spaces between paragraphs. If it would not be inconvenient, might Massimo, Phil, or Julia insert them? I don't imagine it would take more than a few seconds; if it would take much time, forget about it.
ReplyDeleteRitchie,
ReplyDeletethanks for not comparing me to Judith Butler. You are talking about the rhetorical force of language on human emotions, and I certainly see the difference. But ethics in philosophy is about reason, not rhetoric, so there is a profound distinction between reasoning about morality and finding the best way to convince a majority of people that something is right. If you will, think of the difference as similar to a scientist talking rigorous technical language with her peers, and using florid if imprecise language in a public lecture.
As for definitions, I *define* good as increasing human flourishing and bad as decreasing it. Again, you are free to reject such definition, but it isn't arbitrary at all, it is grounded on my understanding of human nature.
And by the way, I reject the suggestion made by others that talk about flourishing is too vague and subjective. There are quite a few human universals or quasi-so that can be invoked here: nobody (except psychopaths) likes random killing, their property stolen, their daughters raped. And most people, if given a chance, appreciate freedom of thought and speech and personal liberty.
Reposting my previous response, *without* extraneous info that somehow got spliced in. (Sorry for the confusion this causes.) I'll bat the ball back later.
ReplyDelete"1. The objection that moral reasoning is not based on empirical facts is irrelevant, since there are other non-arbitrary human endeavors that are also so characterized and yet we do not reject them on those grounds (mathematics, logic itself)."
Actually, reasoning as it pertains both to math and to morality is grounded in empirical facts, even though it's possible to engage in abstract reasoning about them even to the exclusion of those facts. Reasoning about how things could be invariably begins with recognition of how things are.
An action is construed as moral or immoral not by definition but by applying it the real world with an infinite number of possible conditions, which in turn suggests morality cannot be expressed in a few neat axioms.
Yeah, that. At least initially.
There are many different starting axioms one could pick to build an internally consistent system of math, and no mathematician I know believes that one set of starting axioms is the "right" one -- just that some lead to more useful (for modeling our world) forms of math than others do.
Yeah, that too.
By the way, Mintman, this goes directly to my overarching point in Julia's thread. If we're having a conversation about morality with the idea that it might have anything meaningful to say about a facet of reality as we experience it, then it behooves us to make understanding that facet a priority no matter how abstracted a mental journey we wish to take with respect to it. (Therefore, for example, we should understand what we experience as a moral "ought" rather than redefine it as an edict.) You seem to be making a similar argument in your posts: that a meaningful philosophical discussion of morality addresses its realities, and doesn't just diverge into abstract contrivances according to personal whims. In other words, the sociobiology of morality matters to the philosophical discussion about it. (And by the way, my prose is no more dense than I am.)
If, on the other hand, we're merely endeavoring to construct moral systems without regard for how they might apply to the real world, then why argue about choosing arbitrary definitions? They're perfectly valid in the abstract. As he says, we can accept or reject them. Likewise, we can expand on them, examine them for logical consistency, or develop our own.
Personally, however, when it comes to morality I find pursuing an understanding of the genuine article far more interesting than developing abstruse logics. If, in the end, we're talking about morality on terms that are both inconsistent and irreconcilable with its actual terms, then to any conclusions that might be drawn I am strongly tempted to respond, "So?" Or maybe, if I'm not feeling as gracious, "Wish in one hand, poop in the other, and see which one fills up first." But that's just an expression of my personal feelings. Regardless of them, moral reasoning in the abstract is every bit as valid as mathematical reasoning in the abstract. It's even potentially useful. More power to people who like to do it. But it's not where I'd stake my claim or start panning for gold.
Alright, let me see if I have this right.
ReplyDelete1. You define good as increasing human flourishing and bad as decreasing it.
2. Most people would agree with you, therefore that is probably the correct definition.
3. If someone does not agree with this definition, they are a psychopath and/or morally challenged, and therefore have no say in matters of ethics.
4. Therefore there are no valid competing definitions of morality.
Do you see how absurd this argument is? This reminds me of an argument I've had with a friend (a psychiatrist) about depression. Generally depression is considered a mental illness, but people with depression often claim that their pessimistic world-view is really the more accurate world-view, and people that are optimistic and not depressed are really the ones with the mental illness. Now society would disagree with this stance, but it doesn't mean it is not true. Maybe we really all suffer from mental delusions and illnesses? Who is to say what is a correct and incorrect mental outlook on life? We can use a clinical definition in order to at least settle the matter somewhere, but to claim that this is the right definition is just an appeal to authority --- a logical fallacy.
Similarly, maybe you are the psychopath for valuing human flourishing. If, for instance, I valued minimizing suffering, then finding a way to end the human race painlessly in it's sleep is really the most ethical action. I could argue that your choice to value human flourishing comes at the cost of so much suffering and pain. The continuation of the human species will include untold amount of torture, rape, murder, etc. I could call you a barbarian --- a psychopath --- for choosing to condemn these people to a life of misery and suffering simply so you can experience the trivial pleasures in life.
Now I could formulate my stance on ethics this way:
1. I define good as that which minimizes human suffering.
2. If someone does not agree with this definition, they are a psychopath and/or morally challenged because to disagree with it is to want others to suffer. Therefore they have no say in matters of ethics.
3. Therefore there are no valid competing definitions of morality.
So now I have concluded that you are a psychopath, and you conclude that I am one. But this all hinges on which definition we choose to begin with. You claim your definition must be right because most people would agree with it. But do I really need to enumerate all of the past belief systems that humans have employed that we now view as ridiculous? Do we also have to believe that God obviously exists because 99% of the human population believes it to be so? Of course not. An appeal to authority is not a valid stance in a rational argument.
Tanner,
ReplyDeletesorry, your example makes my point: a permanently depressed human being is in fact the anomaly, it makes people unhappy, which is why they seek cures or relief. Same with morality.
ReplyDeleteAs for definitions, I *define* good as increasing human flourishing and bad as decreasing it. Again, you are free to reject such definition, but it isn't arbitrary at all, it is grounded on my understanding of human nature.
It seems that the issue of whether this is a useful definition revolves around the question of whether valuing human flourishing as an intrinsic good is rational. Massimo seems to tacitly assume this (I think he'd be better off to state it explicitly in his definition).
My own approach favors ideal observer theory. I tend to suspect that an ideal observer would, in fact, value flourishing as one of the most basic of intrinsic goods. And that no ideal observer would find being a sociopath intrinsically more worthwhile than being a person with a desire for connection with others and concern for their well-being.
I'd be glad to hear a case for the contrary though if anyone cares to mount one.
"There are quite a few human universals or quasi-so that can be invoked here:"
ReplyDeleteYou sound assured of yourself. Now, are they universal or are they "quasi-so" or both. As you know, the examples you list afterwards have to be set off, narrowly understood, given certain contexts, defined, given "all things being equal," in a "normal" social setting, etc. It is noteworthy, that your article is more an attack of "scepticism" rather than a defense of even one universal or "quasi-so" universal, or explaining some mechanism upon which to reach one.
The concept of human flourishing is vague, although I agree we do a pretty good job of achieving it, at times, and it is subjective. The fact that at least part of human flourishing rests on our "reflection," perhaps of what exactly human flourishing is (can we have a definition, please?), necessitates subjectivity.
Hello,
ReplyDeleteIf you believe that the universe is not a morally neutral whole, then you need read no further. I believe that it is morally neutral. I am a staunch non-believer in even the Anthropic Principle. The evolution of the universe has gone on for 13.5 billion years of which the evolution of life on Earth has taken up the last 3+ billion years. Probably it has been only in the last 50,000 years that we have been able to talk about the rules that supposedly govern our societies and only in the last 8,000 years did we begin to have the excess time to have the luxury of time for in depth discussions about them.
Morals (or ethics) are a cultural adaptation that allowed us (homo sapiens) to survive the ice ages and populate all of the continents without destroying ourselves. I agree with with Stephen Jay Gould that adaptations are adaptations, not progress. So has there been moral progress? I think not. There have been many adaptations as societies become more complex, but that is not necessarily progress.
I take issue with moral relativism being equated to moral skepticism as if morals don't exist. I'm a moral relativist who certainly believes in and practices morals. The society I live in demands that I do so and specifies the rules. It does not prevent me from observing that other societies could make different demands upon me, make me follow other rules. Which set of rules is correct? Depends on which society you live in (When in Rome ...).
I also object to the characterization of morals as being arbitrary to a moral relativist. I did not get to choose the moral environment I live in and it depends on whether the society I live in is tolerant of deviation from whatever norm imposed. Even the absolutists (religious or not) get to pick and choose in a tolerant society like ours.
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteYou quoted Hume to say that “Truth springs from argument amongst friends.” Although truth might be revealed or elucidated in this manner, it certainly isn’t created in this manner, no more than a team of scientists creating the truth that the sun revolves around our moon by simply agreeing upon such.
Although I applaud the fact that you don’t relegate morality to the netherworld of subjectivity, you, in a manner similar to the Hume quote, seem to CREATE the basis for morality simply by definition or argument. I’m afraid that you must still navigate the “is-ought” cleavage created by Hume’s guillotine from your “is” to the “ought” of morality.
Sadly, you have burned the only bridge that provides a possible passageway. God is the only “is” that also entails the necessary “ought” – the purpose and meaning that elevates transcendental and authoritative truth above us derivative beings.
You invoke Euthyphro’s Dilemma to dismiss the relevance of God from this equation. However, I think you have to demonstrate that this argument truly represents a knock-out punch.
Not everyone in a psychiatric ward is there by choice --- many don't feel as though they have something wrong with them. Either way, that was just an example --- the 'anomaly argument' is still an appeal to authority. It is not solid grounds when discussion truth. (should I also stop being an atheist because most people worldwide view such a life-stance as a mental illness?)
ReplyDeleteMore importantly, you didn't address the entire second half of what I wrote. What is wrong with my competing definition of morality? Though keep in mind, since you are arguing for the continued rape, torture, and killing of humans, I have trouble giving your arguments on morality much credibility.
It's interesting that moral skeptics tend to invoke the mentally ill, or aliens, or Hitler, or in any case something or someone unusual or odd when debating their position. What may we infer from this?
ReplyDeleteTanner, I'm sorry, I'm arguing for what?? Are you on some sort of drug?
ReplyDeleteThe second part of your original post is completely subsumed by my way of looking at morality, since diminishing human suffering is one of the key components of human flourishing.
Mann'sWord, Euthyphro's dilemma is decisive. If you don't buy it, it's up to you to counter it. Many have tried, all have failed.
Lyndon, I cannot keep giving definitions of terms at every turn. Look it up. Both flourishing and reflective reasoning are well defined and understood within the philosophical literature. The entries in the Stanford Encyclopedia linked from my essay are a good starting point. Beyond that, a good course on ethics should do it.
I really have little patience with people who invoke cultural relativism so easily. Yes, I'm pretty assured of my understanding of the basics of human flourishing. Note that my view of ethics only applies to a fairly minimum number of things that affect flourishing, lots of what goes under the rubric "moral," especially in religious circles, is indeed cultural veneer.
To make it even clearer: I'm talking about murder, rape, freedom of speech and the like; I'm not talking about observing ridiculous divine commandments about what to do or not to do on certain days, what sort of sex you have with whom.
Okay, let's do a little thought experiment. Suppose you were given then ability to end the human race tonight, peacefully (as in, people being dead before they even know what was happening).
ReplyDeleteYour two choices are:
a) End the human race, and all of the torture, rape, murder that goes along with it.
b) Let the human race continue, and let all of the torture, rape, and murder that goes along with it continue as well.
We could make this thought experiment even more pointed. Suppose there was some sort of natural disaster, and there were only 5 people left on earth. There is you, your 10 yr old daughter, a married couple 20 yrs old, and a rapist/murderer. Furthermore suppose that the rapist/murdered captured the four of you, and gave you two options. Either he would torture and rape your daughter for several weeks before killing her, you, and himself --- but he would let the couple live. Or he would kill all of you (and himself) quickly and painlessly.
Now what is the ethical action? If you choose to let everyone die, you are putting an end to human flourishing, as you are ending the human race completely. If you let the couple survive, they will be able to maximize human flourishing (and we could make an additional stipulation in this thought experiment that technology is at an advanced enough stage that they will be able to do so without significant risk of failure). But in maximizing flourishing, you also have to sacrifice your daughter, and let he be tortured and raped for weeks.
This is the dilemma. It is unclear what the ethical action is. Minimizing suffering would be to let everyone die, and maximizing flourishing would be to let your daughter be raped and tortured.
I think you would have a hard time successfully arguing that only a psychopath would let everyone die. I think it's equally valid to call someone a psychopath for willfully letting his daughter be raped and murdered.
Tanner,
ReplyDeleteall your little sick thought experiment does is to show that there are situations in which ethical dilemmas are hard to solve. Duh. Any student of ethics 101 could do better than that. How does that amount in any way to the very tall order of showing that it is impossible to articulate a rational ethics is beyond me.
ReplyDeleteIt's interesting that moral skeptics tend to invoke the mentally ill, or aliens, or Hitler, or in any case something or someone unusual or odd when debating their position. What may we infer from this?
That's pretty much the nature of thought experiments. They test the boundaries of our theories by seeing how the theory holds up in an atypical situation.
It shows that someone can argue against defining ethical action as "that which maximizes human flourishing" and still be a perfectly normal person, and that their competing definition (minimizing suffering) is a perfectly valid counter-definition (i.e., people are not psychopaths that disagree with 'maximizing flourishing'). In fact, most people would agree in certain circumstances that 'minimizing suffering' is a superior definition to 'maximizing flourishing'.
ReplyDeleteIn other words, there is no objective standard which can be applied in all situations to judge the morality of an action. And your definition is just one of many definitions that different people would use in different situations --- and different people will come to different conclusions about moral activity. But this is exactly moral relativism. In the thought experiment, each person will bring to it their own set of value preferences, and I find it hard for you to argue that there really is some 'correct' way to parse the situation, or that there is some overriding definition of morality that we will all agree should be applied in this setting. As far as I see it, it's no just a matter of this thought experiment being "hard to solve" --- the problem is that there is no global solution. The solution in this instance is relative to each person's values and their own psychology. There is simply no right or wrong in this thought experiment, and thinking so doesn't mean I doubt the existence of the external world or any such extreme skeptical hypotheses, it just means that I believe people value things differently.
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteWhile I agree that Tanner's thought experiment is unnecessarily personal and twisted, I think that his point is essentially valid. Your ethical system clearly points to one decision, yet we wouldn't really think that anyone who makes the opposite choice is a psychopath.
The issue at hand is most certainly not that some moral scenarios are ambiguous within your definition of morality. That is true, of course. What matters here, however, is that there is a contrast between how clearly your definition of morality labels one option as "good" and the actual ambiguity that the vast majority of educated, reasonably intelligent people would see in the scenario.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteJust wanted to respond to a few of Massimo's recent points:
ReplyDeleteMassimo: "Your friend's example only strengthens my point: yes, there are many types of math that yield bizarre and useless results, and there are many types of ethics that don't work for human beings. So?"
Well, it depends how you define "work". Certainly the other types of ethical systems don't maximize human flourishing, which is what you've chosen as your goal, so if that's what you mean then they don't work -- but that argument's a circular one. They surely work according to their own goals (which you don't share).
[In response to ClockBackward's hypothetical species that does not care about each other's welfare]:
Massimo: "First off, I said that I think of morality as a human issue, adding that it may apply also to relevantly similar conscious beings. Hence your experiment does not create a problem, since those beings would not be relevantly similar... An interesting question does arise, then: since those creatures would be capable of reflecting on their actions, would they realize that it is in some sense wrong to, say, inflict pain on other similar creatures...?"
Massimo, at first it sounds like you're arguing that morality is not relevant to this hypothetical race since they do not care about each other; yet at the end of your comment you ask if they would "realize" that it's wrong to hurt each other, which seems to imply that it is wrong even if they're not aware of it. Isn't that a contradiction?
Massimo: "As for my point about arguments from authority, I brought it up because you simply quoted Hume without actually explaining why you think the is/ought divide in unbridgeable."
Well, I tried to explain it, in saying that telling me empirical facts doesn't tell me how to act on those facts (which is allegedly the point of moral principles). But it's really tricky to figure out how to explain why a premise does not entail a conclusion.
Massimo: "Moreover, as I pointed out before, you are probably taking an extreme and debatable view of Hume."
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy calls my view the orthodox one: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#io
... and wikipedia says, "Hume is usually assigned the position that such a derivation is impossible." But of course it doesn't really matter what Hume himself thought, as you noted; this is a side issue.
Massimo,
ReplyDelete"sorry to hear about your friends, but if they are not psychopaths they are morally challenged."
It seems to me that this response proves my point. You've defined morality in a way that precludes a reasoned counterargument in this case, so you've fallen back on an ad hominem attack.
It's worth mentioning that these people aren't "planning the end of the world" as you put it, but are simply refusing to reproduce and encouraging others to do the same. They see this as a morally-justified attempt to preserve the world from the depredations of humankind. Merely insisting that they are "morally challenged" won't persuade them or anyone who agrees with them, and it probably won't do anything to prevent them from persuading others.
If I'm right about that, then a different definition of morality might serve human welfare better, don't you think?
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ReplyDeleteAs for my point about arguments from authority, I brought it up because you simply quoted Hume without actually explaining why you think the is/ought divide in unbridgeable. Moreover, as I pointed out before, you are probably taking an extreme and debatable view of Hume. Several commentators have argued that what he meant was simply that *if* you want to go from is to ought *then* you need to provide reasons. I have done so in my essay.
ReplyDeleteYou can see one such interpretation of Hume at Siris here. However it doesn't so much matter (as Julia responds) what Hume thought. The problem can be (and is) well handled outside of Hume's perorations on it.
It may not be correct to say that is and ought are "unbridgable." Obviously in certain places they must be linked. The correlation between what we desire and what we valorize is not arbitrary. But it is not a simple relationship, as the pages of any half-decent novel remind us. We have a strong capacity for self delusion and rationalization when it comes to "what we want."
This is why a simple reduction to "human welfare" is not sufficient. What is human welfare? Long life span at the price of anomie from reduced risk of injury or illness? Maybe. Perpetual peace and harmony at the price of loss of the urge to self-assertion? Again, maybe, but an argument can be mounted (and has been mounted, vigorously) for the opposite regimes. The ancient Greeks, for example, would not be too impressed with our triumphs. Is that because they lacked a sufficient science of desire? Does human welfare proscribe a specific tension between society and the individual? Is our environment utterly instrumental, with no moral worth whatsoever? Would it be ethical to poison a lake we knew no human would ever have to drink from?
We can always appeal in the end to "human welfare;" it's that wiggly a concept. For this reason it has a way of entrenching the status quo. (Though I realize this is not your intention). We need something a little more fine-grained to help us understand what sort of order to make out of all our conflicting ideals and impulses.
Massimo,
ReplyDelete"I'm *not* redefining anything as an edict, for crying out loud. My *understanding* of a moral ought, as you put it, is inextricably connected to human welfare. Why else would we even be talking about ethics?"
My commentary about the redefining of an "ought" as an edict was in reference to Julia's statement in her post that, "the alleged point of moral principles is to tell me how to act." If her usage of the term "moral principle" in this manner was not intended as equivalent to a moral "ought" as discussed subsequently, then I have misunderstood her view, which is entirely possible. But in any case, that particular comment of mine was not directed at the case you made. I thought I made that clear, and I apologize if I did not. I didn't mean to make you cry out loud. :P
My point does pertain to your response to Julia as well, however. It is that humans experience moral "oughtness" as impulses (whether or not they act on them) no matter how such impulses are instilled - and I mentioned several possible ways: biological imperative, individual experience, cultural conditioning, codified consequences for non-abidance, and ideology - but in any event they are *grounded* in non-rational aspects of biology.
Because of this, a rational understanding of a moral "ought" can only ever be a shadow of what a moral "ought" actually is, experientially. In certain key regards, rationality can describe, but not express, morality.
But also note that I draw a distinction between ethics and morals, whereas it appears to me that you are using these terms interchangeably. Perhaps this, along with my "complicated prose", as Mintman put it, is the source of the confusion. Ethics is well understood to fit neatly into the realm of rational inquiry, but morality, at least as I understand it, is a much less clearly bounded area of behaviorism that includes, significantly, innate emotional triggers, and that furthermore needn't necessarily involve rational thought at all. Both of these aspects place morality at least partially out of ethical bounds. In this light, I would characterize your model as an ethical one, but not a fully fledged moral one.
To highlight this, I previously used the example of both humans and chimpanzees (and I could add elephants, and probably a handful of other species) caring for their sick and old. While we might be tempted to believe that such acts result from rationally considerations, in most individuals an honest self-evaluation will reveal emotive processes that guide such behavior without the need to think it through.
As another example, consider a familiar type of mentally retarded individual who generally loves all those around him ebulliantly, but who rises quickly to aggression against anyone who he feels mistreats a loved one. Is this not an innate moral sense requiring no rational thought?
In my view, this behavior constitutes morality, and demonstrates that it may emerge in individuals whether or not they think about it at all. In short, no matter the strength of any rational argument, in the end we engage in moral behavior in response to emotive impulses, no matter how such impulses are instilled. Practically speaking, these are the only meaningful moral "oughts".
You may argue that these examples do not denote morality, but if it were you, would it not feel morally "wrong" to simply ignore such impulses?
In closing, I would only add that this illustrates what I meant when I said that "reasoning as it pertains both to math and to morality is grounded in empirical facts." I won't get into the parallel arguments about math here, but suffice to say we can only reason about morality (or math) because we have an innate sense of it. Neither sprang like Athena from the rational mind of man. The rational mind can do amazing things, but it must work with the raw stuff of reality as its starting point.
I'm not sure if my last comment was deleted or it just never went through, so I am going to try to rehash it:
ReplyDeleteWhat my thought experiment shows is that there are situations where the definition of 'maximizing flourishing' can no longer be easily applied to define moral activity. In the thought experiment I gave, it would be hard pressed to really fault a person for either choice --- it's not that the situation presents a dilemma that is hard to solve, rather it's that there is no 'correct' solution. Each person's choice in such a situation comes down to their personal values and their personal psychology. This is precisely moral relativism. If a person thought that it was completely immoral to let a child be raped and murdered, this would guide their activity, and if a person though it was immoral to let two people needlessly die, even at the cost of rape and murder, then this would guide their activity. And no matter how much you try to argue, there is no way to measure the correctness of either decision --- you would be hard pressed to come to a consensus about who is and who is not a psychopath in such an instance (and I'd bet that a huge majority of people would say that maximizing flourishing would be psychopathic in this case). Whether one decides to minimize suffering or maximize flourishing is simply a personal choice, with very different results. This is moral relativism, and to agree with it does not mean that one denies the existence of an external world, but rather that they think people have different values and different psychologies.
People (and particularly Roy), let me be clear on one thing: I don't "moderate away" anything. But I have been forced to turn comment moderation on because of an asshole who has made a threat to my life. So be patient, all comments are published (except death threats), but it may take minutes to hours, depending on what else I have to do during the day, ok? Thanks for your patience.
ReplyDeleteOk, back to the meat. Tanner, your little (still sick) thought experiment shows precisely nothing. From my point of view the rapist/murderer is clearly immoral regardless of which option is chosen. The fact that someone else is being forced to choose between a bad and a worse option doesn't establish any general point about ethics at all. And yes, any good students of ethics 101 could do a hell of a lot better than that (more nuanced, and broader, if you will).
Perspicio, yes, in this context I do not distinguish between ethics and morality. If you do make the distinction you suggest, I agree with your take on the difference.
Julia, I'm not sure what you are getting at in your response. I really don't think that human flourishing is *my* goal, it is the goal of any sensible society, and by the way I think you share that goal, or you wouldn't be so active in promoting critical thinking to begin with (I mean, what's the point?). Besides, don't you care about *your* flourishing? If so, what makes you think it is rational to deem it more important than anyone else's?
My response to the hypothetical species example is perfectly coherent. That species, if it were not social, would likely not have an evolved moral instinct. But, if conscious, would be able to reflect on morality more broadly. Where's the contradiction?
You keep saying that empirical facts don't compel you to act one way or the other. Julia, empirical fact never compelled anybody to do anything, witness creationists, vaccine deniers, holocaust deniers and global warming deniers. It is just a matter of someone understanding the force of ethical reasoning, and acting accordingly, or not. If someone doesn't understand it, it is not ethics' fault.
Scott, there was no ad hominem attack at all on my part. I truly think your friends are immoral if they wish the end of the human race. If, on the other hand, they merely abstain from having children to *reduce* population growth, that I actually think they are acting morally. My own reproduction rate is below replacement, on purpose.
Chris, I really am getting tired of defending pretty damn straightforward notions, such as human welfare. I think some people on this forum really enjoy sophistry for sophistry's sake, which doesn't help the discourse. Yes, it is about life span too, but mostly quality of life. It includes survival, reproduction, safety, health, education, and freedom of speech. Pretty darn widespread human values, seems to me, including probably among everyone who has contributed to this forum.
Perspicio, I would agree that "oughtness" is experienced as an impulse, as I said, this is probably the result of evolution. But philosophical discourse can build on that and both broaden it and make it more coherent.
Alright, since you keep just running around the point of the thought experiment, I'll be a bit more straight forward. You claimed initially that:
ReplyDeleteTo begin with, I define ethics as that branch of philosophy that deals with the maximization of human welfare and flourishing. I’m sure this will disappoint Julia and others, but I simply don’t understand what else they might possibly wish to include in a talk about ethics.
So I came up with a competing definition or moral action: that of minimizing suffering (note, while I am aware that your definition includes an aspect of minimizing suffering, they are not identical, as the thought experiment shows). And it simply seems that you don't agree with such a definition because it does not lead to actions that you think should be considered moral actions. You furthermore try to defend this as the only valid definition because it is what most people try to do with their lives. This latter argument is barely an argument at all --- as I've said before, does this mean that we should all believe in God simple because most people do? Unless you simply want to come up with a definition of descriptive moral relativism, this will not hold, and it appears that metaethical moral realism is really the topic at hand anyway.
So my thought experiment is really just an attempt to elucidate Scott's argument about his friends not wanting having children because they want to end the human race. Most likely they deem the human race as a species prone to committing atrocities and acts of extreme violence against its own kind, and so if one is appalled by such things, the easiest solution would be for such a species to no longer exist. My thought experiment was gruesome, but this is really a microcosm of existence, despite how much us fortunate intellectuals of this world try to pretend otherwise. We can choose to have kids and to perpetuate this species, with all of its tendency towards violence, or we can make a personal decision that the human species is simply an immoral civilization, and it is not something worth perpetuating. While I would not go so far as to call someone unethical for perpetuating such a species, I do think it is a bit delusional and selfish (and yes, I just called the majority of the human race delusional, but as a fellow atheist in a primarily theist world, I think we can agree that such a claim is not so outlandish in respect to certain beliefs held by the majority).
Overall, the fact remains that I have a competing definition of morality that I think is perfectly justifiable and perfectly valid, and you have a competing definition. There are groups of people whose goal in life is to minimize suffering (think Buddhists), and there are those that think it is to maximize flourishing (think humanists). There are groups of people that also have even weirder concepts of morality. I think either outlook is perfectly valid, because I'm willing to conclude that people simply value different things. So the burden of proof is on you to successfully argue that there is only one rational way to define ethical action, without appealing to your own personal values (or to the values of what you think a rational person should hold).
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ReplyDeleteMassimo,
ReplyDeleteDon't Phil and Julia also have moderating privileges for this blog?
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteWith all due respect, all the pertinent moral debates of our time have to do with defining just what human welfare is, hardly a closed or settled question (thankfully). Even if you want to lop off the "religious" ones, you are still left with a number of political and philosophical problems that need an answer, one I don't see as self-evidently arising in the sciences.
Let me agree with you, for example, that compulsory genital mutilation of minors is wrong. But surely neither one of us thinks this because of "evolutionary biology or cognitive science." The elements of "human flourishing" that genital mutilation infringes have their basis in enlightenment values of universal human rights that long predate the genesis of either. If you think that biology or cog sci have contributed to our abhorrence of this particular practice, I think you need to demonstrate how this is so.
You make broad generalizations about "humanity-wide" ethics in this essay that are not borne out by history. Killing people for "accidents of birth" is an age-old human tradition. Within living memory there have been arguments for such killings in modern secular society, sometimes even rationalized as having a scientific basis. Perhaps we can agree that Francis Galton (or John Watson, who made the "scientific" pronouncement that young children should not be held by their parents) was a "psychopath," but this is a socially contingent definition that would not be shared by all people everywhere and everywhen. What we do know about human nature--historically, if not scientifically--would suggest that ideas like Galton's or Watson's are always ripe for embrace if they are not specifically polemicized against.
It would take great pains to show how everyday moral decisions in each of our lives (and the lives of our elected/appointed decision-makers in government) can be easily settled by appeals to scientific discovery. Perhaps such pains have been taken by other philosophers, but I don't see them taken here, and this should give us pause before we try to pass off "human welfare" as something that only pedants don't know the shape of.
There's also the question of to what degree each of us are called to "behave [ourselves] so as to increase human flourishing." The amount of sacrifice each of us can make is vast, as made clear by the disparities we are all so much more aware of since the earthquake in Haiti, one of the poorest societies on earth. How much do we need to do or not do before we are judged "immoral/amoral" in a given situation? Is giving money enough? What proportion of our income? The devil is in the details, and so it happens that every "ought" is specific to a context. You write that Julia is anti-intellectually dismissive of philosophy by raising such details but the opposite seems the case to me. Moral philosophy requires that we recognize a complexity to the human condition that cannot be reduced to generalities about the statistical historical tendencies of our species.
Massimo:
ReplyDeleteI really don't think that human flourishing is *my* goal, it is the goal of any sensible society
Again, begging the question: on what basis did you decide they are more sensible if they increase human flourishing? Because you decided that it is sensible to increase human flourishing; which it is, because obviously all sensible people and societies... and round and round the circular reasoning goes.
Sorry, but you have basically admitted the central point, not least with your plea to recognize science and math as equally unfounded, so to say. Yes, what's the point ... in promoting critical thinking to begin with? Well, we decided that it would be sensible to approximate factual truth of the world out there, and now we can all acknowledge that we humans have, on the whole, decided that it would be sensible to increase human welfare. This is our decision, not something that follows from rational discourse and can be defended as the one necessary, only possible decision, and that I thought was the whole point.
Thanks to Julia and Massimo for these wonder post.
ReplyDeleteI still can't get over that I'm getting this stuff for free and beyond easy to access.
The highly readable text also needs praise I believe.
The thoughtful comments, pro and con have been good reading also.
All around - nice job!
Tanner, reducing human suffering is a crucial component of increasing human welfare, hence the lack of contradiction. Your example of believing in god is specious, you are comparing a belief to a state of being - a category mistake.
ReplyDeleteRoy, I have no idea why you keep insisting that increasing human welfare is my personal preference, as if it were on the level with liking dark chocolate over the milk variety.
Chris, you are referring to specific issues that arise within the broad area of human welfare. Of course there are discussions and disagreements there. Ethics is an open field. But this is yet another instance of confusing metaethics with applied ethics. Nobody, except psychopaths, would deny that increasing human welfare is a fundamental good, then we can have an (applied ethical) discussion about what that means and how to go about it.
As for genital mutilation, that's correct, it is our ability to reflect on human suffering (and on the fact that we wouldn't want others to do it to us) that is decisive. The other questions you raise, for instance about how much money one should give to charity, etc. again are not a matter of metaethics, the answer depends on which ethical system one adopts and how one approaches individual issues. Not the topic of this discussion.
Mintman, your definition of circular reasoning is quite bizarre. Human flourishing properly construed is an undeniable goal of pretty much every human being that has ever lived, and that's an empirical fact. Yes, different people and culture have a range of meanings for the concept, but once again, it seems really bizarre to me to argue that human flourishing or welfare is just a personal taste of mine. What sort of life do *you* want to live, and why?
As for furthering critical thinking because we *decided* to do so. Yes, but did we decide that randomly? As just a matter of taste? Or are there *reasons* why I am spending countless hours of my life trying to better equip my students and society at large so that we can live on a planet where people do things more sensibly than by listening to religious zealots and political demagogues?
Since you keep nitpicking my argument (are you really even reading what I write?) I'll just be short and sweet:
ReplyDeleteAs I've said several times, while human flourishing includes an aspect of minimizing suffering they are not identical definitions. As I keep trying to illustrate over and over again, the easiest way to minimize suffering would be to end the human race, which you agree does not fit into your values of maximizing flourishing. They are not identical, they are similar, but they lead to very different actions.
Even if you choose to continue to nitpick this difference, the fact remains that there are different definitions of moral action (I know, this might be hard for you to believe). Everyone on this blog keeps asking you the same basic question, which you keep avoiding. So again, I have (or other people do, if nothing else) a competing definition of morality that I think is perfectly justifiable and perfectly valid, and you have a competing definition. So please explain why your definition is the only right one? You have yet to give any real solid justification of such a claim.
Tanner,
ReplyDeleteyes, I assure you that I do read comments before replying. I just find your objections bizarre.
The fact that X is part of Y, I'm sure you realize, makes my focus on Y broader than yours, since your concern is subsumed in mine, no?
To end the human race in order to decrease suffering is simply an idiotic proposition, akin to killing a patient so that the doctor can declare that the patient is no longer diseased. You really call this an argument?
Many people here keep asking for what they already got: I still have to find a good example of an ethical concern that is not subsumed by thinking of human welfare as an ultimate good (yours doesn't even come close). Yes, of course this definition is broad and general, on purpose. Yes of course we are going to disagree on the specifics, but as I keep repeating, that's NOT a metaethical discussion!
For those interested in digging in deeper, here is an interesting article abut what philosophers refer to as "well being," which is similar to the idea of welfare that I brought up in this discussion:
ReplyDeletehttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being/
Of course, I remain at core a virtue ethicist, which means that to me it is flourishing, the ancient Greek concept of eudaimonia, that is at the basis of human morality. Here are a couple of pertinent links:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/
http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtue/
Based on Massimo’s definition, is homosexuality ethical?
ReplyDeleteLuke,
ReplyDeletethanks for your comment, it is entries like this that make the whole enterprise worth it. (Of course, be careful putting in my mind ideas about charging people for the service... Just kidding!)
"At the center of the notion of morality is the question 'what ought we do?' Your definition defers that question and gives priority to a different one: 'what ought we do to increase the welfare of human-like beings?'"
ReplyDeleteAs I am brand new to this blog, there is a risk that I have missed previous discussions about this, but.....
It seems to me that any valid definition of moral or ethical behavior must have reference to outcomes of that behavior upon other individuals. The real issue seems to be how one defines those outcomes as "good" or "bad". If one is isolated on a desert island, without other human contact, it seems to me that there are no ethical/moral questions of any moment, inasmuch as one's behavior can only affect oneself. I realize that this may be a simplistic view, but, whereas the "truths" and relevance to reality of mathematics exist even in the absence of human presence or observation thereof, moral "truths", it seems to me, can only be relevant in the presence of some Human interaction.
In my opinion, the question of "What ought we do?" should really be stated with the addition "under these circumstances" or "when faced with these choices". If one then fills in the blank with "to increase the welfare of human-like beings?", I think Massimo's definition is right on the money.
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ReplyDelete"Thought experiments" can be useful in some circumstances, but when one is compelled to rely on the fantastic in an effort to argue contrary to a position, I think it tells us something about that argument, and the position it seeks to refute, particularly when the question being addressed is not purely academic, but has relevance to how we do and should conduct ourselves in "ordinary day to day life." It seems prima facie unreasonable to make any inferences or conclusions intended to have general application based on the weird, or unusual.
ReplyDelete"Scott, there was no ad hominem attack at all on my part."
ReplyDeleteI'm sorry to get bogged down in a quibble, but how can you say that it wasn't an ad hominem argument? (Attack was too strong a word; I didn't mean to imply that I was somehow offended.) It was literally an argument "against the person" rather than against the person's position.
"your friends are immoral if they wish the end of the human race. If, on the other hand, they merely abstain from having children to *reduce* population growth, that I actually think they are acting morally."
Here again, you say they "are immoral" themselves, unless they're doing something you agree with, in which case they are "acting morally." It seems to me that they are acting immorally (so in that sense I agree with you) but they are not themselves immoral.
To reiterate what I said before, I think your definition of morality prevents you from arguing against their position, and that is a flaw. I would like to see a more generalized definition of morality. My overall point is that you can't bridge the is-ought gap, but the more robust and complete you can make your initial "axioms," the stronger your system of morality is. (So to be metaphorical for a moment: you're offering the "peano axioms" of morality, but I want all of analysis!)
perspicio "Personally, however, when it comes to morality I find pursuing an understanding of the genuine article far more interesting than developing abstruse logics. If, in the end, we're talking about morality on terms that are both inconsistent and irreconcilable with its actual terms, then to any conclusions that might be drawn I am strongly tempted to respond, "So?" "
ReplyDeleteYeah. What you said! The important thing is how ethics and morals are understood (believed)and how it causes each person to ultimately live his life. I feel that a lot of the discussion, in its somewhat impractical nature, attempts to distance people from the fact that such ideas in fact start with beliefs.
One of mine (ethic, or what have you) is that people in the middle of these kinds discussions SHOULD NOT touch other people's children. Especially in the context of a negative or demeaning example.
Children are sacred, off limits, if even to make what YOU consider a "good" point, Tanner.
One day you may have a little girl of your own. How would you feel?
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure why you would argue that meta-ethics is off-topic. The is/ought problem (or lack thereof) is one of the primary meta-ethical debates. We are attempting to determine how we know what is good. If it is from observing nature, we get one meta-ethical stance. If it is from reasoning from first principles we get another. (Though perhaps in each case the normative ethics would be the same. You and Julia do not appear to significantly disagree in your applied ethics.)
I don't take issue with the idea that most of us equate morality with some furthering of human "flourishing," especially since that can mean almost anything short of extinguishing the species or of giving no thought whatsoever to other people's concerns. But this doesn't address Julia's argument as far as I can see, which is about how we come to the actual ethical conclusions we come to--the "oughts." You are trying to establish that we generate our oughts from an appeal to human welfare, based on empirical observation, but where does that get us? Except for a general ban on obliterating human kind it gets us nowhere very interesting. It does not tell us how to approach genital mutilation (traditional Arab and African societies are not nihilistic, after all), or war, or eugenics, or abortion, or scientific exploration, or ecology, or diet, or politics, or sexual conduct, or putting old people on ice floes to die. All moral arguments appeal to human welfare, and yet moral debates within those confines are inexhaustible.
What I think you mean is that your precise notions of human welfare (largely normative secular modernist values) are supported by empirical observation. That would be a harder case to make than the one you make here, though perhaps not impossible. But if these conceptions of human flourishing were truly universal (excluding psychopaths), as you argue here, the world would be a much different place, one without any need for moral philosophy, or for this very conversation. And think how boring dinner with friends would be then.
Chris,
ReplyDeletefor the record, I am arguing precisely the opposite: I think this *is* a discussion on metaethics, and *not* a discussion about what do to when particular ethical dilemmas present themselves. Which is why a lot of the thought experimenting that has gone on here is irrelevant.
Massimo:
ReplyDeleteWe probably have quite the same set of morals, but I think one of us at a minimum, maybe both, does not understand the other.
I too think it is a good idea to base a system of morals at least partly on human welfare, but just because that is my, your, and the majority of the world's personal taste does not make it an objective basis in the same way as things falling down is an objective basis for developing a theory of gravity. There is no way around it: morality is not about what is, nor what pleases us to do, but what ought to be done or not.
What you need to get an ought, is, in my eyes, a sentient agency that has the authority to declare what ought to be done or not. The thorniest issue would then of course be how to justify this authority, but let us for a moment assume that would be no problem. We then have to ask us, which agency would there be that could define the morals, that could be the wielder of this authority? Gods, if they existed, would be the obvious candidates (again, excluding the oft-neglected question why we should follow their whims), but they are firmly ruled out by what we know by now about the universe. But they would, pretty much by definition, be the only objective agency from outside that could be imagined. We are left with ourselves - we humans are the only ones who can possibly have the authority to decide what is moral. Morals come from ourselves because we want them to be there, but notabene that this is no ultimate justification. I want five million Euros now, but that is not a justification for me to actually get them. More to the point, most humans wish to continue existing after bodily death, but that is also no sufficient justification for their survival as disimbodied souls.
We as humans, collectively and individually, freely decide to pursue increased human welfare - or not, by the way. I very much doubt, for example, that the first civilized societies that made morals applying to people beyond your own clan necessary were built on that idea, more likely some thugs with spears just said to hand over part of the harvest, and only over the centuries was it found that they could get more legitimation for their taxation and less peasant uprisings if they actually organized projects for the common good. But if we think about our morals rationally, we can decide otherwise. We could decide that the planet would be better off without us. We could decide that all people with an IQ of less than 80 should be shot to increase our evolutionary fitness, if that were our goal. It luckily isn't, but how does science inform me that it should not be? Who is to tell us it would be a bad goal if we wanted to achieve it? It all depends on what goals we set. You simply take the apparent majority vote on human desires as the starting point for developing morals, and that is intuitively a sensible idea, but that simply is not the same as having an ultimate, rational justification. Any four year old can knock it over with their half cute half annoying routine of repeating "and why is that?" after every explanation you gave to the previous "why". It is no shame to admit that we may reach a point where the "why" has to be answered with "because I just like it that way", that there is no ultimate justification, that you have to start somewhere (although it is generally much farther down the chain of "whys" than the patience of the average parent lasts).
Ultimately, I also end up not bashing my neighbor's head in for the giggles, but not because I imagine it being derived from some universally demonstrable principle. I am fine with it being derived from human fiat, with morals being a purely human invention that have no objective foundation. Having to pretend they have one seems like an interesting parallel to the theist's insistence that we must believe in a god otherwise we will all rape and kill each other.
Mintman,
ReplyDeleteah, I believe we are finally getting somewhere! Here is the crucial sentence from what you posted:
"the majority of the world's personal taste does not make it an objective basis in the same way as things falling down is an objective basis for developing a theory of gravity."
But I said very early on in my essay that I do *not* seek a universal basis for morality. I think that's a fool's essayed because morality *is* a human related affair, and therefore does depend on contingencies about humanity, some of which are evolutionary.
Nonetheless, this still is not a matter of "taste" because there are both empirical facts (about human welfare) and reasons (about what follows given certain assumptions - just like in math) that can be brought in. Hence my conclusion that ethics is neither relativistic/arbitrary nor universal.
(As for god-given rules, I think Euthyphro's dilemma easily dispatches of those, even if gods existed, which they don't.)
We could indeed decide that the planet is better off without us, but that would be a rather peculiar and certainly not moral decision: "the planet" is not a conscious agent, so in what sense "it" would be better off once we are gone? Again, without conscious agents capable of reflection there is no morality to speak of (which is why, for instance, I don't think a human on a deserted island can possibly commit immoral acts - against whom?).
Finally, early human societies probably had a very embryonic type of morality, but they did have some nonetheless. Firstly because they inherited a sense of right/wrong from our closest ancestors (you can see it in bonobos punishing members who act against the interest of the group); second because if they had language they had an ability to reason as well. Yes, modern societies have developed much more sophisticated and expanded concepts of ethics. Indeed, philosophy makes progress!
OK, having already thrown Julia some love, I'm now going send some Massimo's way...
ReplyDeleteWhether or not Hume would have consented to your precise formula (e.g. to define morality as "well being"), Massimo, I like your approach of arguing rationally for some kind of bridge between "ought" and "is".
After all, from what I know about Hume — in particular, the problems of induction and causation in the scientific domains, and practical reason (i.e. reason is "the slave of the passions") as it pertains to the moral/ethical domain — it seems apropos to argue that Humean skepticism is neither limited to morality nor completely destructive of its rational basis — any moreso than it is for science. And most of us here seem to be pretty "realistic" about science, despite its shared dependency on flawed human subjects. So why (at least in the name of Hume) would we be any less "realistic" about morality?
Mintman: "We could decide that all people with an IQ of less than 80 should be shot to increase our evolutionary fitness, if that were our goal. It luckily isn't, but how does science inform me that it should not be? Who is to tell us it would be a bad goal if we wanted to achieve it?"
ReplyDeleteThe arrangement of the question itself proving that evolution really is just a differently oriented religion. As such evolutionary philosophy would make an attempt to inform us where we have been (presumes to at least) and thus where we are going. A pretty standard definition of religion I think.
If philosophical evolution (not operational science) does not inform many secular folks ethical decisions, what exactly does cause one to know that it is never right to take the lives of people with low IQs?
"Yes, modern societies have developed much more sophisticated and expanded concepts of ethics. Indeed, philosophy makes progress!"
ReplyDeleteCompared to what? Societies that seem to consider themselves sophisticated and progressive are becoming far less ethical than ever before! I'm thinking mainly about some Scadi countries and the UK. Amsterdam has been giving free needles, certain drugs and permitted for an open sex trade market for many years.
Anyone still seriously thinking that sort of society would be considered more ethical than the alternative?
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ReplyDeletecaliana,
ReplyDeletePutting aside your debatable claims about the policies of some Western European countries (which would take too long to correct or qualify and would be irrelevant to the topic), it's logically possible for them to include what Massimo called "sophisticated and expanded concepts of ethics" and for them to ignore or fail to apply those concepts in practice or, even more likely, to arrive at normative conclusions that differ from your own.
On the other hand, if (as I suspect) your real intent here is to discredit secular philosophy in general (e.g. by slandering largely secular societies or individuals), then perhaps you can at least appreciate that the only reason you have a voice in this discussion is because the secular-minded moderators are tolerant enough to publish your ignorant rants and your trollish behavior.
It seems to me that Mintman's last post nicely summarizes my own views. I believe that all humans make choices (whenever one is possible) that they calculate will either result in the most "good" for them or avoid the most "bad". I am aware that this viewpoint has been labled "Egoistic Hedonism" by philosophers. When I first took a course in philosophy, the professor stated that even if this observation of how human beings have evolved to behave is true, it does not count as an ethical or moral system, since, perforce, if we have evolved to behave this way there is really no "decision" to be made and, therefore, there is no "ought" involved. I think that over the years (over 70 at this point) I have become ever more certain that we are "hard wired" by evolution to behave precisely this way (allowing of course for errors in judgement or insufficient information). If so, any "ethical/moral" set of rules do not derive from anything more mysterious than societal evolution having learned that if you treat your fellow man with kindness and respect, he/she is much less likely to enslave or kill you and, in the best of all worlds, may even behave towards you with similar respect. This ethical worldview does not require any external "guidelines". It only requires societal agreement that this sort of behavior is beneficial/accepted to the group in question.
ReplyDeleteIn that case, Massimo, it looks like you and Julia are having two different conversations. I read her as arguing not that empirical observation and reason can never inform our moral judgments, (that is, I don't perceive her argument as a kind of extreme relativism), but rather that we must maintain some moral distinction between what is and what might be--otherwise we are powerless to usurp the status quo. She isolated the dispute as over "[your] belief that it is possible to use scientific facts to justify selecting one particular set of initial axioms over another." I taker her to mean we cannot use scientific facts alone; I doubt she could mean that scientific facts are entirely severed from value, especially since what we value has helped us determine just what scientific facts are important to us in the first place.
ReplyDeleteIn practice, we can agree that some facts about the world--like our mammalian disposition to nurture and sacrifice--are aligned with positive values. But there are nnmerous contrafactuals to this alignment. Not everything in nature is good. We are wired to care for each other, but unless we want to be Rousseauian romantics, we also have to allow that we are "wired" to murder each other too. We have to be careful not to let the part of nature that is in alignment with The Good stand for the whole; otherwise there is no limit to rationalization.
This is what I take to be Julia's argument, and your comments here seem to concur with it. Is it possible the two of you actually agree on the relationship between is and ought after all?
Massimo:
ReplyDeleteAh, then we are probably agreed, and I have either misunderstood you or else we put the emphasis on different points: I consider it more important to make clear that morals are not universal, out of fear of absolutism and oppression, you want to stress the point that they are not arbitrary, probably because of concerns of what might result from moral relativism.
Of course the planet has no moral rights as such; but I meant that if we prefer to commit suicide as a species, there is also nobody with the authority to tell us that we really ought not to.
Caliana:
The arrangement of the question itself proving that evolution really is just a differently oriented religion. As such evolutionary philosophy would make an attempt to inform us where we have been (presumes to at least) and thus where we are going. A pretty standard definition of religion I think.
Not at all. I was merely making the point that science, including evolutionary biology, does not tell us what we should do, only facts about the world we find ourselves in. We can include scientific data into our moral decisions to weigh different opinions, but the facts themselves are completely value-neutral. We are, for example, entirely free to ignore climate science if we consider maintenance of our current wasteful lifestyle more desirable than leaving behind an inhabitable world for future generations. If but only if we consider the latter more desirable, climate science informs us that we have to change something. Similarly, my education as a biologist tells me that we will genetically degenerate if we were to maintain for long enough a status where the average couple has 1-3 children, all of which reach reproductive age due to the elimination of most disease, hunger, wars and accidents, so that we have basically eliminated most selection. But this fact alone does not compel me to desire an eugenicist society; maybe I simply weigh this fact against my desire for a humane society without eugenics and am willing to pay the price that the nature of this world is going to demand for that.
But quite apart from this, no, evolutionary biology does not equal religion. Science, of which biology is a discipline, is how we build a coherent, evidence-supported, constantly improving model of the world based on critical thinking. Religion is how we invent an unsupported, counter-factual, dogmatically fixed model of the world based on wishful thinking. The first looks at the world and tries to understand it as best as possible, the second decides what would be nice to believe first and then ignores all that contradicts it. Not the same.
Societies that seem to consider themselves sophisticated and progressive are becoming far less ethical than ever before! I'm thinking mainly about some Scadi countries and the UK. Amsterdam has been giving free needles, certain drugs and permitted for an open sex trade market for many years.
What is a Scadi? Anyway, that is your definition of ethical. I, for example, prefer a country that tries to help addicts lead a decent life instead of pushing them to the brink of society and criminalizing them for their problem. And for the latter, let me cite George Carlin: "I don't understand why prostitution is illegal. Selling is legal. *---ing is legal. Why isn't selling *---ing legal? You know, why should it be illegal to sell something that's perfectly legal to give away? I can't follow the logic on that one at all. Of all the things you can do, giving someone an orgasm is hardly the worst thing in the world. In the army they give you a medal for spraying napalm on people. In civilian life you go to jail for giving someone an orgasm!"
Roy, I disagree. I think most individuals know exactly what the right thing is, they just don't like to take the time and disciple to do it. (much like remaining ones whole life with child's brain and thought processes-perpetually unchallenged and immature)
ReplyDeleteAND...If the punishment actually cost people enough, the jails would not be that full at all. As a for instance, in the UK there is one completely smoke free prison. Now one would not think that is such a big deal, but crime in that immediate area has dropped 30%. Apparently going smokeless is considered a high cost to some people.
Chris,
ReplyDeleteJulia's point about ethical axioms being provided by science was a bit of a mischaracterization of my position. I simply mean that facts (about what it is to be human) provide boundary conditions, or starting points, for ethics. One can call them axioms, but Julia's presentation of my point made it seem like a flaunted the is/ought boundary without reasons and in a bigger way than I actually do.
But no, the overall conversation is about metaethics, as Julia does not believe that there is *any* justification for a moral position, other than personal taste. That makes her a relativist, a position that, as Mintman as pointed out, I wish to fight as hard as the equally extreme, indefensible and ultimately dangerous opposite position of moral absolutism.
JCM: "..it's logically possible for them to include what Massimo called "sophisticated and expanded concepts of ethics" and for them to ignore or fail to apply those concepts in practice.."
ReplyDeleteAnd those ethics would be what exactly?
"On the other hand, if (as I suspect) your real intent here is to discredit secular philosophy in general (e.g. by slandering largely secular societies or individuals)"
That's is mostly correct. Feel free to point out tho where I slandered anything or anyone. The truth about a matter is the truth.
Secular society's are not truly tolerant. You are a good example of that. The Catholic church, btw, was the first to separate (wrongly) sacred things from the secular. This is not an originally secularist idea.
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ReplyDeleteMintman: "I was merely making the point that science, including evolutionary biology, does not tell us what we should do, only facts about the world we find ourselves in.."
ReplyDeleteOperational science is about 90-95% evolution FREE. How can you draw such conclusions when evolution (inside of science) only covers a fraction of the scientific landscape?
And evolution, as and idea, does CERTAINLY inform peoples decision making. I see it all the time. Its is the singular alternate to the religion that includes creation in it after all.
To your last comment. The sex trade hurts women and children VERY MUCH. Don't most THINKING men have ethics formed over those kinds of issues at all or is it just all about Napalm and the other things you mentioned?
We womenfolk would like to think better of you than that.
Secular society's are not truly tolerant. You are a good example of that.
ReplyDeleteI'd put it like this: Some secularists (like the moderators of this blog) are evidently more tolerant of trolls* than I am.
* As in: A person who posts to a newsgroup, bulletin board, etc., in a way intended to anger other posters and to cause drama, or otherwise disrupt the group's intended purpose.
Caliana:
ReplyDeleteI can draw my above conclusion because it is part of science; whatever operational science means, by the way. At the risk of trollfeeding, what do you dislike about evolution, anyway? Do you believe it does not happen and virtually all the world's biologists who say it does including myself are part of a satanist conspiracy, or do you think it happens but we should pretend it did not because acknowledging it has negative moral impacts? I would truly have to think hard to decide which is the more idiotic position of the two, so maybe it is something else?
A lot of science informs decision making, but that does not mean that a scientific fact taken on its own already has a moral imperative.
If you are talking about child and forced prostitution, I was not aware that this was legal in the Netherlands as you imply, and would be surprised to learn that, coming from its neighboring country and all that. I was therefore, obviously wrongly, assuming that you were referring to prostitution as such as unethical.
Julia does not believe that there is *any* justification for a moral position, other than personal taste.
ReplyDeleteI'd rather not take your word for it, given the extremity of the debate. If Julia is following this thread, perhaps she could confirm the assertion?
The name of G.E. Moore has not come up in this discussion, but it is his, rather than Hume's, position (resulting in a retreat to moral skepticism) that you seem to object to. I see important differences between Julia's and Moore's stance, which I have outlined here. But we are just getting a snapshot of what has been an ongoing debate between you two, so perhaps there are other signs that betray Julia's "moral skepticism" that we aren't privy to here?
Mintman asks caliana: At the risk of trollfeeding, what do you dislike about evolution, anyway?
ReplyDeleteThis turn in the discussion got me thinking more about the relationship between religious skepticism of science (e.g. creationism) and religious skepticism of secular ethics, both of which caliana demonstrates here. (Perhaps there is value in troll tolerance after all!)
Both science and secular ethics share a certain dependency on human nature, or on our mutual abilities to learn facts about the world and to negotiate ways to relate to one another, based on shared values, goals, or sentiments, irrespective of particular metaphysical beliefs. (In other words, religious folks can play, too!) But for a religious proselytizer, trying (however subtly) to preserve roles in rational discussion for a mythical Creator or Absolute Moral Authority, skepticisms of these kind must seem like useful tools (especially if the proselytizer has thick skin that is impervious to criticism).
To be sure, there are secular counterparts (e.g. relativists) to be found in these discussions, as well. But at least they are more consistent in their skepticism, insofar as they do not except the dogmatic claims of some particular faith while attempting to cast doubt on this or that theory.
So, Massimo you admit the tautology.
ReplyDeleteThen why not disambiguate your statement "genital mutilation is wrong" by rephrasing it as "genital mutilation fails to promote human welfare and flourishing"
Sure there are more words but then people will know what you mean. Obviously there are so many different definitions of what is moral that using the words 'right' and 'wrong' conveys no precise meaning without the addition of your particular definition.
This is my biggest problem with this issue and the solution is so obvious to me but others insist that we can keep our definitions in the background and communicate effectively by simply using terms like "good" and "evil" etc. I disagree. [Sorry if others have already said this, I didn't have time to read all 94 comments!]
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ReplyDeleteMassimo,
ReplyDeleteSince it seems we understand each other thus far, I'll take another timid step in presenting my view.
You acknowledged in your article that "some empirical facts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science inform us as to where and why we have a moral instinct to begin with," and more recently said,
I would agree that "oughtness" is experienced as an impulse, as I said, this is probably the result of evolution. But philosophical discourse can build on that and both broaden it and make it more coherent.
I most certainly agree with both statements. I think we just take two different approaches toward a similar end.
You appear to lean much more heavily toward a "clean" philosophical approach, and as a result have proposed a, in my view, mostly rational definition of ethics to build upon and are interested in sussing out as coherent an ethical vision as possible on this basis.
For my part, I focus on triangulating/deducing the "hidden rules" embedded in moral impulses, because I believe this has very deep implications for the potentials and limitations of individual flourishing, in the sense of what constitutes coherency/integrability from the moral side. In other words, how, and to what extent, may a rationally coherent ethics percolate into the broader moral architecture? After all, a perfectly rational ethical system that can't be widely deployed is of little use. And while philosophy, like mathematics and art, needn't be "of use" in practical terms, when it comes to ethics I would like it to be.
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteTo be honest, I'm not reading all these post, so forgive me if these has been pulled out already (especially if I missed it in the initial post somehow).
Massimo you wrote in a comment:
~"Julia's point about ethical axioms being provided by science was a bit of a mischaracterization of my position. I simply mean that facts (about what it is to be human) provide boundary conditions, or starting points, for ethics. One can call them axioms, but Julia's presentation of my point made it seem like a flaunted the is/ought boundary without reasons and in a bigger way than I actually do."~
I think that is a BIG problem and one I thought was happening. It was something that nearly literally jumped out at me. I was surprised in a way, since Hume was used, you didn't bury that argument more directly. Am I getting that wrong?
Though, I do find myself agreeing with you both a great deal and a little surprised by some of the comments I have read, as good as they are. Perhaps the complication of these debates gets people itchy to blast.
I'm also kind of excited post like these could elicit such attention, awesome!
jcm,
ReplyDeleteYou Wrote: ~ "* As in: A person who posts to a newsgroup, bulletin board, etc., in a way intended to anger other posters and to cause drama, or otherwise disrupt the group's intended purpose." ~
Let me second that. During several series post by David Sloan Wilson while he was Huffpo he turned into a major nuisance with his tactics. It was extremely frustrating since substance was lacking, except when offering links to papers. I and a few others I know pulled our comments due to the disrupting approach. There's much to be said for self educated understanding, but many times it leads to a "know it all" attitude which goes beyond skepticism and falls into incoherent, smart alecky, cynicism.
It saddened me when I saw him show up here.
Derek,
ReplyDelete> Then why not disambiguate your statement "genital mutilation is wrong" by rephrasing it as "genital mutilation fails to promote human welfare and flourishing" <
I don't see the tautology, but yes, that's exactly what I mean.
Roy,
> it further occurs to me that what you've done here is fail to present your definition of morality in terms of its evolutionary purpose <
Evolution, of course, doesn't have a purpose. But more to the point, to me evolution enters into the picture only early on, in endowing us (and probably other primates) with an innate sense of right/wrong and justice (as seen in the behavior of bonobos, for instance). After that, it's our ability to reflect on things that really gets ethics off the ground.
perspicio,
yup we agree on much, but our emphasis is a bit different. I am not for a minute thinking of an abstract, completely rational moral system to impose on our instincts. But I do think that our ability to reflect about moral issues can both build on our moral instincts and get us to overcome them when they go wrong. (For instance, we have a moral instinct to treat well members of the in-group; philosophical reflection can rationally convince us that we ought to do the same with outsiders.)
Luke,
I'm not sure what you are getting at, but my position about the is/ought divide is as follows: a) it is a fallacy only if one does not provide reasons to connect facts with values; b) no reasonable ethics can do without taking seriously facts about human nature.
One key difference in your maximizing of human flourishing and my minimizing suffering, is that in evaluating suffering I am including all species, not just humans. In other words, I think our moral obligation is not just to humans, but to all sentient creatures. This is why I find it perfectly valid to make valuations on the human species.
ReplyDeleteNow, I'm sure you will argue against such a stance, but there is nothing terribly controversial about such a claims (in case you haven not read the SEP entry on such a topic, here it is).
You are welcome to disagree over such a stance, but while raising some very difficult (and possibly unanswerable) questions the exact nature of animals' moral rights, it would be fairly groundbreaking work if you could rationally prove that such a stance is not an acceptable moral framework.
Tanner,
ReplyDeleteI don't have a problem with (limited) animal rights, so long as we understand that "rights" is a human concept that wouldn't exist without humans.
I explicitly set that problem aside in my essay (I did mention it) because it isn't really an issue of metaethics, but rather of how far we extend ethical reasoning.
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteYou Wrote: ~ "I'm not sure what you are getting at, but my position about the is/ought divide is as follows: a) it is a fallacy only if one does not provide reasons to connect facts with values; b) no reasonable ethics can do without taking seriously facts about human nature."
Yikes, I apologize.
I almost see you as make a scientistic argument :)
The debate on human nature and what evolution tells us is still hot. It is others you chasticed, like E.O. Wilson that wants to connect our understanding of human nature via evolutionary sciences to areas such as ethics etc., into the humanities.
Frankly, I think you are a stubborn relativist :) Here's why. I think you made a minor mistake in labeling Julie's argument in terms of "skeptical morality/ethics". Moral Sketpicism has a fairly well defined parameter (I know you know this, for others, see wiki "moral skepticism"). I don't think Julie is holding that moral claims are inherently "untrue" or that we can not know them to be untrue. It is here we seperate a scientific truth from human created understanding of morality and ethics, thus "is/ought" is not a myth as someone like Sam Harris blanketly holds.
An example of how others have made this mistake in framing others arguments was Austin Dacey categorizing Michel Shermer's "provisional ethics" to "Moral skepticism" (Shermer's argument is laid out mainly in his book, The Science of Good and Evil). In a way, ethics is provisional by its very nature, in a way related to Dawkins' idea of an evolving moral Zeitgeist. I don't see how we escape this fact.
I'd like to pose a stupid question that just occurred to me to all you "Moral realist".
ReplyDeleteIs nature unethical in that all that is born, dies? Humans, and human nature, are part of how we view naturalism, the facts of nature. Death, as some of phrased it, is an inherent disease of nature that at one end we wish to overcome, then on the other hand without it we would not have evolved in the first place.
Luke, Nature - not being conscious and capable of reflection - is neither moral nor immoral, the category simply does not apply. (It's what philosophers call a category mistake.)
ReplyDeleteIncidentally, people keep asking why I think Julia is a moral relativist. In conversations with me, if not in print, she stated that morality is like taste. While both taste and morality can be investigated empirically (we can determine what it is in our brains or gustatory cells that makes us feel outrage or prefer dark chocolate), there still is no rhyme or reason for one preference over another, according to her.
It should be clear by now that I am most definitely *not* a moral relativist (though I do like dark chocolate...).
Right, but :) we are natural (brought about by natural means), natural "beings" that has become aware. Nature has now become conscious, we even have theory of mind (the universe becoming conscious looking out to understand the universe - to paraphrase Sagan).
ReplyDeleteI still think you are a stubborn moral relativist :) sorry. Like I said, it goes beyond questions of a "pure" relativism in that we can not judge moral/ethical claims. That is dogmatism, as you state noone actually lives that way. However, "is/ought" is still a problem in that it we, the conscious natural being, that is deciding on the moral correctness. We are again stuck with a kind of "provisional ethics", it evolves as we have both as animals and conscious beings.
We may call what we see elsewhere nature "altruistic" (though some rationalist deny this and see all such acts as "selfish" which adds another dimension to these debates - that Objectivistic point of view is not shared by Shermer obviously). However, we are the ones through our understanding to recognize it as beneficial "altruistic" behavior and can relate it to us. The entire of a "human nature" came from understanding the nature of other animals. The denial of "human nature" (as it was in some quarters as laid out by E.O. Wilson) is no longer a tenable position, but how far we carry such arguments to how we create ethical systems are.
A quick note on Julie's analogy of "taste". It's a poor analogy and I'd advise her to reconsider. That does cut close to being unable to state if a moral claim is untrue. Perhaps she should have added that somewhere, but she needs to think that one a little deeper.
ReplyDeleteWe can have agreed upon taste, and different taste, and we are left with problems on how we decide what is in fact "evil", we are non-the-less complete blank slates unable to find rational consensus built upon level of empiricism. However, this empiricism is a useful tool, we become scientifically informed, not told what to do, as in the mistaken "realism" ideal.
BTW, again, I'm honored you're addressing my less than educated post. Thanks.
Correction.
ReplyDeleteWe are *NOT* complete blank slates.
I apologize. dammmmmmm.
I have a correction to my last post in moderation.
ReplyDeleteMassimo,
I'd like to pose a question to you. Would you hold that through empiricism that when we come to an ethical "truth", or what is "morally correct" etc., that this is outside of empericism itself which tells us that scientific truths in fact provisional? Would you consider then that our scientifically informed ideals of ethics then are provisional in nature? If this is true, we are then left we are relativism, not in that we can not say what is untrue, only in recognition that we are faced with knowing we must moderate or change our ethical position as we would with other scientifically derived theories based on facts of nature?
Luke,
ReplyDeleteI think of ethics as *contingent* on human nature, so my answer would be that ethical "truths" are not relative, but they ain't absolute either.
Ok, I understand a little better. But, how are you not make a scientistic argument about ethics? I think again, perhaps in how you have discussed this with Julie, you have taken "relative" in ehtical discorse as an "anything goes", long as you have a taste for it.
ReplyDeleteI don't read Julie this way, but perhaps she has overstepped the bounds, which maybe since I thought that argument was essentially dead and mainly the postmodernist lexicon only.
Does Julie know she is being interpreted as a postmodernist, by you I think? BTW, you have now basically simplified an understanding of "provisional ethics" to which we must face a certain level of relativism. Unless, you think it was all going in this direction to begin with, that evolution saw us coming, had forethought of our evolving "human nature" (just half kidding here, but g's)?
It's Julia, not Julie.
ReplyDeleteI don't see why my argument is scientistic: for me ethics *builds* on natural morality, and the building is done by philosophy, not science.
It's Julia, not Julie.
ReplyDeleteOh, I'm terribly sorry, honestly. I knew that. Sorry, Julia.
Yes, but :) You are going beyond in a certain respect being on scientifically informed ground, in arguing against a "pure" relativism and stating a "realism" position you have relied primarily on an empirical basis, to which you understand must rest on a certain level of relativism, even more so when we are essentially "transcending" our natural instincts to decide what is right and wrong in certain respects.
Of course, the above must follow what I've already said.
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ReplyDeleteRoy,
ReplyDeleteI have no idea what you are talking about. Evolution does not have a purpose because purposes are things that are characteristic of conscious beings - so that's out unless you subscribe to intelligent design.
Evolution "endowed" us with a moral instinct simply because natural selection apparently favored such instinct in a limited form in certain species of social primates. So?
Hmmm,
ReplyDelete~ "Evolution "endowed" us with a moral instinct simply because natural selection apparently favored such instinct in a limited form in certain species of social primates. So?"
If you want to call it a "moral instinct" in this case. What I thought we had was an understanding of cooperation (some argue based on selfish ground only). We have a "moral instinct" with regards, to what I said about not being completely blank slates, in the cooperation has worked for in-group species. That "moral instinct" does not always transcend to other out groups, including other species. A more universal "moral instinct" in recognized only in that we recognize a "human nature" (such as Wilson's argument to say otherwise would be akin to saying there is no "ant nature").
I think that is more the empirical ground to which you rest your argument. Still, how we decide on ethics transcends our "moral instincts" in many regards, we have evolved with our big brains to create ethical systems which evolve (unless of course once again you think evolution is planning our course).
The fact we have evolved moral and ethical systems, even with our innate sense of cooperation for survival, must at some point (even with my arguments on scientific provisionalism) add some thought that we must accept a certain level of relativism. A complete "realism" argument is simply untenable. We can be realist, and accept scientific realism and still understand the need to accept relativism on certain issues and in certain respects.
BTW, I don't know how it couldn't be a philsophical argument you're making, which is part of my point. It appears scientistic because of your previous arguments. If you want to say it's scientifically informed, to me great, to argue simply because of our innate understandings that your "realism" isn't scientistic, you may reconsider.
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ReplyDeleteRoy,
ReplyDeleteThe use of "purpose" requires you to know the two senses it can be used express ideas about it. Teleology is the most used form and most commonly understood form. I call it: purpose before the fact. There is a goal and to have a purpose is to attempt to achieve that goal.
Teleonomy, on the other hand, is the appearance of purpose: purpose after the fact. Jacques Monod (Nobel in medicine (biology)) described in "Chance and Necessity".
The eye did not evolve to allow organisms to see (teleology), but it was a useful function and became a wide spread adaptation (teleonomy).
The universe as science describes it is universally teleonomic. Unless of course you are a creationist or ID'er. In my view, morals are teleonomic, adaptations, socials adaptations, but adaptations nonetheless.
Mintman: "Do you believe it does not happen and virtually all the world's biologists who say it does including myself are part of a satanist conspiracy, or do you think it happens but we should pretend it did not because acknowledging it has negative moral impacts? I would truly have to think hard to decide which is the more idiotic position of the two, so maybe it is something else?"
ReplyDeleteI think it was the part about Evolution informing your (or my) decisions and attitude about everything. Its quite clear to me that it informs yours. Your comments to me here reveal that you think anyone who knows anything would or ought know this.
Kind of like a moral imperative to believe Evolution "happened", isn't it. How ever could that be? Morals matter only in Evolution? Well they don't, so it cannot be "wrong" in any way of me to not "believe". Right?
To Jcm. Am I trolling thro trying catch a few on the way? YOU BETTER BELIEVE IT! Be subtle about it? No way! Why should I be? I frankly think that you are worth the hassle. Remember the story I told about the man pulling the Haitian baby (whose mother discarded him) out of the bottom of the outhouse? ....
ReplyDeleteFrom now on, think of my trolling in that context.
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ReplyDeleteRoy, God is neither directly or indirectly responsible for Evil. Tho there is NO limitation on His sovereignty He places limits on His power to allow for us to have freewill or the ability to choose.
ReplyDeleteLike the man who took the lives of four of our family members (3 being children) some time ago on Christmas eve, I am sure that tho his mother and father are entirely responsible for his birth they are in no way directly or indirectly responsible for the deaths of our family members. Each person by Gods will and plan is a free moral agent.
Its a really weak position to presume to blame God on one hand for the sins of others (essentially blaming Him for freewill) but yet having no intention of taking responsibility for what we do.
In the end when we meet God the Creator that excuse "you gave me the will and the power to do what I wanted and ultimately my sin is your fault" just isn't gonna fly.
Well Roy
ReplyDeleteI can and will not speak for Massimo, but I don't think you understood what I wrote. Perhaps I was not clear enough
The evidence of "purpose", both teleological and teleonomic, is everywhere. It's like being out in a driving rain without an umbrella. You cannot avoid it. All my children went to college or university with the purpose (teleological) in mind to get an education. They succeeded to various levels of excellence. On the other hand, believing in a teleologically driven evolution I find oxymoronic, hence teleonomic.
Living organisms live in local environments. When those environments change, they already have the necessary variations to survive the change or else they perish (do not "flourish"). With humans, cultural evolution has sped up the process. Morals are just a part of the cultural adaptations. As cultures have varied from environment to environment, so have the morals.
Now I'm losing it.
ReplyDeleteBill Wallace didn't you just make Roy's argument?
That appears what he's saying, it is Massimo who seems unclear in his understanding of the evolving ethical systems, or what constutes such arguments from our innate nature of cooperation, the same we can put forth even outside of primates.
I'd like to see him give some substantive examples of the "moral instinct", see if we can extrapolate out from there, makes no sense to me to just state these things and say, I'm no relativist. He appears like those that argue against fundamentalist, though in this case a dogmatic anything goes relativism, which outside of the taste test, I don't see Julia make. If she is, like I said, she needs to reconsider.
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ReplyDeleteMassimo Wrote:
ReplyDelete~ "But natural selection probably also bred into us an instinctive distrust of outsiders. It has taken thousands of years of moral progress (not an oxymoron!) to slowly realize that there is no rationally defensible distinction between in-group and out-group, which means that we need philosophical reflection to build on our natural biological instinct and come up with the humanity-wide rule that it is wrong to randomly kill anyone, regardless of which group s/he happens to belongs to as a matter of accident of birth."
Right, as I've made the argument for him and he seems to understand, what he's talking about is a "provisional ethics". However, Massimo is going further, I believe. The biological bases of such argument does not create an out "relativism". As I've noted a few times, we have transcended the "moral instinct". The "moral instinct" then can't cut both ways with what we may find now to be unworkable as cooperative on a larger scale. The cooperative nature is more conducive to his argument, but he slipped into scientism and doesn't seem to care.
If we accept the basic idea of evolving cooperative systems and culturally derived ethical systems, then you are accepting relativism, no matter how much we understand killing the in-group of humans are (this has nothing to do with vegetarianism, just the scientistic argument Massimo makes).
Wilson's examples of "ant nature" help us understand this. They have not evolved cultural ethical systems, do not deal in relative ideals of creating "moral ideals", the right and wrong is genetic and allows the group to behave cooperative with each "doing their part". We thus, again, transcend such make-up, unless Massimo really does believe in a directional evolution which saw our big brains coming.
"So I'm influenced by no such assumptions pro or con or maybe."
ReplyDeleteRight. Though, Massimo simply says we have discovered understanding of our "Moral instinct", but once again nothing substantive to provide an argument beyond basic relativism, or "provisional ethics". The knowledge of how and why, does not tell us to do so. And accepting scientific understanding as provisionally correct, he's really bowling for "purpose". In a way I'm starting, after this last glass of beer, to wonder if some can tell the difference between arguments here.
We can almost get away with asking, why is it not wrong to kill? Well, because science tells us not too, it's worked for us. Yes, but what you're actually talking about is a cooperative instinct that only makes sense in terms of survival, evolution didn't give a shit if we survived or not, it is not a mechanism with forethought of changing environs or adaptive intuition.
Luke, I'm sorry but I don't think you have a clear picture of my argument. If you re-read the essay and my scattered comments you will see that:
ReplyDeletea) I am not at all being scientistic;
b) I am most certainly not a relativist.
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ReplyDeleteRoy, I don't think this is what Luke is talking about at all. As for purpose in evolution, as I said, unless one believes in ID it's nonsense. Come to think of it, even if one *does* believe in ID it's nonsense.
ReplyDeleteI have absolutely no idea what the phrase "purposive expectations endemic to the mechanisms of all living and choice making entities" could possibly mean.
Luke,
ReplyDeleteI apologize if I seemed to make Roy's argument for him. I didn't mean to. It must be me showing that I cannot express myself adequately.
Roy,
I'm no mind reader so I can only infer what you mean by "purpose" from sentences like:
"Well Bill perhaps you, and Massimo as well, believe that no purpose exists without evidence of its commensurate achievement."
It wasn't clear to me what you meant by "purpose" so I merely pointed out that I found "purpose" everywhere, even in my perspective. Language usage is quite nuanced so your precise meaning may have eluded me. Although, whenever there is a philosophical discussion and an unqualified usage of "purpose" occurs it will usually get me to offer my distinctions. It's how I think about it. It's certainly different from yours.
One further note. I, unlike Massimo, am a relativist. Linguistic, cultural, moral, ontological, epistemological, conceptual, etc. Since this is a discussion of morals/ethics. What is the answer to the meta-ethical question: Is there a criteria by which we can adjudicate working moral/ethical systems or parts of them as being correct or incorrect? My answer is no. Moral relativism is not about "anything goes", but about that question. Even I cannot act the way I want to if I were so inclined. Besides, I acquired my moral sensibilities long before I ever heard that question.
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ReplyDeleteMassimo,
ReplyDeleteI hope it's not too late to enter the conversation, but I am a bit confused about your stance.
Using what I find to be a pretty good definition of moral skepticism (for lack of a better source we can use the SEP):
Dogmatic skepticism about moral knowledge is the claim that nobody ever knows that any substantive moral belief is true.
So it seems to me that you have to first argue against epistemological skepticism of any sort before you can meaningfully argue against moral skepticism. If one is a complete epistemological skeptic (i.e., one claims that any and all knowledge is impossible) then clearly it entails that moral knowledge is impossible. Are you really intending to tackle the skeptical hypothesis in this essay, or are you trying to attack this from a different angle?
If you are simply intending to argue against skepticism of justified moral belief, or against moral nihilism, then I think that should be a bit more clear on this (as I think many of the people posting here are confused on this matter as well). It is common for one to be skeptical of moral knowledge but not be skeptical of justified moral belief, nor be a moral nihilist. Does this make sense?
Rublyow,
ReplyDeleteI have no patience with radical skepticism of any sort. As I said in one of my comments, it may be logically unassailable, but it is also sterile, and not even its proponents actually believe it. So, yes, this essay is meant as a response to a specific type of criticism to the possibility of ethical discourse, along the lines raised by Julia.
Actually,
ReplyDeleteI do think: ~"I have absolutely no idea what the phrase "purposive expectations endemic to the mechanisms of all living and choice making entities" could possibly mean."~
Does cut close to being commiserate to what I'm saying and what my questions may imply to the arguments.
It would appear Roy is gearing (correct me if I'm wrong) towards basic behavioral (behaviorism) ideas fairly well steeped in empiricism.
Asking ~"As for purpose in evolution"~
From what is said, would lend credence to my idea that an understanding of my post is going pretty well unheeded.
It's not saying "evolution has purpose", the purpose is derived out of observed reactions to changing environs. It is done beyond a psychological "going over", it is endemic to what biological forms do.
In my mind, it is yet another basis that you can't escape certain levels of relativism, right down to basic make up of biological forms.
Massimo, it would appear you're reading these things quite the opposite of intention. Your argument, to me, is what cuts close to "bowling for purpose". Of course your argument must be philosophical, that doesn't take away from my idea that it's cutting into scientism.
Ok, with apologies. Let me try this again with a question.
ReplyDeleteMassimo: ~"So, yes, this essay is meant as a response to a specific type of criticism to the possibility of ethical discourse, along the lines raised by Julia."~
Since I dealt with this to some extent and told others to look up "moral skepticism" - it again appears you're arguing against an idea Julia is holding we can not judge moral claims. Is that true?
I think the taste test may testify to this and I really would like Julia to address this issue, cuz this is fun stuff!
Or are you arguing that an inevitable outcome of Julia's argument leads to the dogmatic ideal we can not judge "moral claims"?
Just a note here. What I say above does not depart from a basic understanding of ENS, whereas the surviving "species" (or part of) is the one best adapted to the environment.
ReplyDeleteThere is no foresight here, no plan that gave purpose to the changing environment to favor a particular "species" (or part of).
Since I've mentioned Michael Shermer's "middle ground" which he terms "provisional ethics", allow me to quote from his book, The Science of Good and Evil and why others, such as Austin Dacey have simple got their interpretation wrong. Which has become dismaying since the difference between "provision ethics" and "moral skepticism" could not be more clear.
ReplyDelete~ "in "provisional ethics, moral or immoral means confirmed to such an extent it would be reasonable to offer provisional consent" [Shermer pg.167]
This of course follows Stephen J. Gould's "In science, "fact" can only mean 'confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional consent"
"Provisional moral principles are applicable for most people in most circumstances most of the time, yet flexible enough to account for the wide diversity of human behavior, culture and circumstances. [..] These principles are not absolute (no exceptions), nor are they relative (anything goes" [pg.168]
"Moral sentiments evolved as part of our species; moral principles therefore, can be seen as transcendent of the individual, making them orally objective. Whenever possible, moral questions should be subjected to scientific and rational scrutiny.." [pg.168]
This mirrors in many ways the "humanistic ethics" as argued by those such as Paul Kurtz. What Shermer offers is in no was "moral skepticism", if one bothers to understand what "moral skepticism" means. Nor does "objective morality claims", "provisional ethics" or a "humanistic" type system deny relativism at some level. They can't, no one can. :) Certain Objectivist have tried and fail miserably.
Now the way I see, Massimo is falling somewhere in the above, making him, Shermer, Dacey, Kurtz at some level accepting of moral relativism.
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ReplyDeleteMassimo,
ReplyDeleteIt seems that you've created a straw man of radical skepticism. An epistemological skeptic still finds justified belief possible, he just claims that one is unable to confirm that this justified belief is indeed true (in other words, no matter how probable it is that a knowledge claim is true, one can never know with absolute certainty that such a claim is in fact true). So, for example, while I am pretty damn sure what will happen if I drive my car into a wall, I still would not claim that I know with complete certainty what will happen.
Why is such a stance impossible? I personally would say that I take up such a stance; how exactly do you argue that I do not actually believe such a thing?
Rublyow: In the abstract you may believe in some result of driving your car into a wall that is contrary to all evidence, but what is being "pretty damn sure" if not a belief in its own right?
ReplyDeletePeople who actually act on such beliefs are few & far between, and are almost invariably proven wrong. They are the exceptions that prove the rule.
Part of the problem here is that the "is/ought" issue is that it is clumsily phrased. One can easily point out that one can argue from empirical facts whether the claim "In order for A to achieve goal B, A ought to do C" is true or not, so there is some trivial connection between "is" and "ought." The catch is that no empirical argument can tell us that we ought to have goal B. Given a set of values, empirical arguments can tell us what we ought to do. It's just that empirical arguments can't tell us what we ought to value. That, however, isn't necessarily a big problem.
ReplyDeleteSure, in principle, it is arbitrary to value human flourishing. In practice, though, most of us do value it, and from that shared value, one can develop a working ethical framework. One might say that ethical values are analogous to the parallel postulate in geometry. Different treatments of the parallel postulate lead to different internally consistent geometric systems, but as Massimo noted above, only one of those is useful for building a house. One can also in principle develop an ethical system centered on values unrelated to human flourishing, but again as Massimo noted, it would be useless for fostering the shared value of human flourishing that we do happen to hold.
Roy,
ReplyDeleteThanks for the reading material, beat listening to the news this morning (I wake around 4am).
When I wrote that my mind was generally thinking towards what I did Google, but moreover my understanding of Radical Behaviorism.
A book I recommended to Massimo not long you may enjoy: Radical Behaviorism, The Philosophy and The Science, by Mecca Chiesa.
As a side note, I think an unfortunate confluence of events have taken place over the past two decades which has unjustifiably maligned some basic premises of Behaviorism. These have lead to a backlash of sorts, even by those that employ the fundamentals.
One of these events was reintroduction of "mind" in scientific writings, the other is more strange. Consciousness, the once poison pill of researchers emerged with a vengeance, that's fine, except, even with best intentions, including Dennett's, we have ended up with reams of garble.
I like to make fun of Dennett's, Consciousness Explained, only because the title is a misnomer. Dennett of course does not explain consciousness, nor did/has he really put "mind" in proper scientific sense. Nor I may add has Pinker. Pinker is more of a special case, departing much like Dennett from a Chalmers, what they are actually agreeing apon is the excape from "mind" having any real scientific meaning. Thus, liike Henry D. Schlinger (who also wrote the article, The Almost Blank Slate), we need to get "mind" out of scientific literature so we have a clearer understanding of what is actually being talked about.
In an above post I say; "not completely blank slates". Pinker and others arguing against a "purest" form of "blank slate" have gone to far in certain respects. In my thinking, Massimo is arguing against a "purest" form of "moral skepticism". Useful enterprises, they expose what are fundamentally wrong, but they also go to far, even if they don't intend to. That's the problem, perceptually they get lost in a way because they can not fully explain (like Dennett) what they claim they are nearly fully explaining.
Massimo can't escape "relativism", Dennett and Pinker with their "minds" and consciousness will not escape the brain. The mystery mongers such as Chalmers and radical anti-behaviorist will not escape basic principles of behaviorism.
Skinner didn't deny the role of genetics, he did formulate a theory of behavior beyond "guess" and "speculative" approaches.
To add to my last post, in case anyone is reading between the lines, which is what is basically needed, especially when extrapolated out to "moral discourse". I also apply lots of skepticism to words such as "belief" in scientific writings. The usefulness of words such as "belief", "mind" and "consciousness" in science writing is fun (often "pop" to get press or ride a wave of fashion) and admittedly helpful at times, but underneath they tend to fall away in explanation. This is *not* argument that we go back to treating them as pariahs, only that we've gone to far the other way now, even while it appears to me that genetics and behaviorism (consistently reinforced by current understanding in evolutionary sciences, psychology etc.) retain and strengthen ground. Now it's just fashionable to throw in those words when talking about something else, either by retro-fitting or misapplying the words, which both Dennett and Pinker do on regular basis.
ReplyDeleteLet me add to my last two post by using an argument by Sam Harris, who argues much like Massimo in this case.
ReplyDeleteSam makes a categorical mistake (a term not surprising first introduced in a book titled; "The Concept of Mind") in arguing against forms of moral relativism. How he frames the discourse is to say how could others be right when of course we can judge the incorrectness of others moral claims. The examples he loves comes from religion. Goes something like this: Can we not judge the moral correctness of a religious behavior such as killing someone for adultery (there are other extremes he uses for this argument). In this he has said others such as Jon Haidt are supporting political correctness if they attempt to justify a "moral relativism" (he once said, without Jon in the audience after applying one of those examples; "it would be a masterpiece of political correctness).
What should be easy to see is that of course Jon would and does judge "ethical systems" and will say what is right and wrong. The power of Harris' argument rest on an idea that any concept that holds a "relative" concept would allow by it's nature what is essentially "evil" by standards adopted by such a system.
He is making a categorical mistake since it is not "either/or". There is not a semantic mistake or a division in that if we accept at some level "moral relativism" then we must not judge, moderate or evaluate (scientifically or otherwise) "moral claims" of others.
In the end, such arguments by Sam and others are a disservice but are carrying a huge amount of weight these days since the "science vs. religion" wars are hot.
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ReplyDeleteCorrect to my post [January 24, 2010 5:09 AM - third paragraph up from end]. Needed!
ReplyDeleteI wrote: "Massimo is arguing against a "purest" form of "moral skepticism".
Correct: ..."form of "moral relativism"
Very unfortunate, and unintentional mistake.
Also, the point with Harris and Haidt that I outline is more pernicious then I portray (many have read the Edge.org exchanges, which also did little to help an awful situation).
Let me put it this way, and how I think Harris is arguing like Massimo's and the real danger here when creating false divides.
Sticking with the situation I presented in my post. What Harris is arguing then is that Haidt and others would be unjustified in judging the acts of the religious example of killing for adultery. His "objective morality" and "Moral realism" doesn't stop at argument, nor do I think Massimo's would. And I find a danger here that must be finally confronted.
Should Haidt answer Harris by saying something like; of course it's wrong to kill someone for adultery? The answer is yes and no. Why no? Because nothing in Haidts argument justifies the question. It's what happens when the "realism" or "objectivist" actually don't make their arguments outside of opposition to a position. Of course, yes as an answer because it 'should' not be allowed.
You see, the set up is a no win. Since the question has no justification, then you either move on, which appears to be ignoring or unable to answer, or you answer and the questioner gets to say it doesn't fit with the system outlined, which is *not* true in a real sense. Thus, we end up with Harris saying the answer to the question of replying to outrageous immoral behavior by Haidt, done in the name of religion would be a "masterpiece of political correctness" is both a set up and ignorance.
Harris was asked by Dacey, (in fact during the above talk Harris was giving at BB) if he saw a place for non-science, like philosophy, literature, art (you think I'm exaggerating - look it up on the BB's). Now, was Austin Dacey setting up Harris with a soft-ball, or did he really not know the extent of such arguments. Which leads us back also to why someone like Dacey would characterize Shermer's "provisional ethics" (and partly why Massimo doesn't seem to recognize when he makes it argument with a simplistic type definition for it).
Roy,
ReplyDeleteYes, good Haidt paper, thanks, though I'll have to go through it completely later, the themes look very familiar. I do greatly appreciate Jonathan's work and so do many others, fortunately. I was simply attempting to illustrate a point in bringing him up with connection to something Harris has said, who argues much like Massimo. What Harris did leads to an extension of Massimo argument in *certain* respects.
Well, again, I don't think you can escape levels of determinism. I think middle ground arguments are ok, but they can be sneaky, like I've tried to illustrate with how we end up going beyond what we claim to be explaining. We can extend my word list out to where this happens; so we have "consciousness", "mind", "belief" and I will now add "self". A small part of my point in bringing this in, outside of replying to your ideas which struck me as grounded in behaviorism (and the careful language within - i.e. "agents" and understanding "behavior") is because what we are talking about to a large degree is, behavior. A well designed scientific theory of behavior is fairly well established. The anti-determinist, anti-behaviorist etc. sometimes argue vigorously while accepting the basic framework, what they essentially are railing against is a Walden type ideal, the Utopia not arriving because of fixed points.
Another example, which I'm not going deeply into. In certain debates over twin studies, the near genetic determinist argument is opposed to environmental learning and the learning often associated with a form of environmental determinism. However, time and time again what I notice is the twin studies overplayed and the behaviorist anything but "pure" determinist in the sense of denying the role of genetics. Mecca is a determinist in that sense, their is no denying the roles of other "agents", just like Massimo can't escape facing the contingent world and accepting ground in "relative" territory.
Correct to post [7:06 AM]
ReplyDeleteLast sentence should read:
"Which leads us back also to why someone like Dacey would *mis*characterize Shermer's "provisional ethics" (and partly why Massimo doesn't seem to recognize when he makes an argument with a simplistic type definition for it).
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ReplyDeleteRoy,
ReplyDeleteProduce for me any scenario that you wish, that I can not find determinism within, or part of?
You've already gone beyond what I say by stating: "To be a determinist, in my view, means accepting that one has no free will at all.."
That is simply *not* true. Free will, as such, normally accepted, can not get away with producing something with absolute set points of beginning and end.
The point of the adultery scenario is that we would not be able to judge if we accepted a part of a "relativistic morality" - a false dichotomy is what I present.
As a side note, and a somewhat lame example that extends these debates. "We" have, to some extent, a cultural understanding of incest avoidance, and the implying moral dilemma imposed (a popular example of purest type "objectivist"). Now, as in the idea of belief and idea have consequence, also belief and idea comes before behavior in accordance with "much" of behavior, then how, the question would follow did we determine the immorality of incest without action?
Roy,
ReplyDeleteAs to the second post. It is you that must come up with a reasonable counterfactual. In short, how would it lead to functional success? Saying it was the "best way" does not resolve the problem. Also, "only or best" is not a supplement for an argument, you have not supplied a "best" for me to determine anything, you are stating facts without me determine what is "best", "best" then only becomes a word without substance. The alternatives then are only in your behaving brain.
Luke, to the extent that incest avoidance is instinctive, and that instincts are in the end a heritable result of some accumulation of behavioral experience, and that cultures are also the beneficiaries of past experience, the combination of lessons leaned and preserved in these repositories of experience, which at some point reached the critical mass required for heritability, resulted in fixing us with the instinctive knowledge that incest could have dangerous consequences.
ReplyDeleteA warning that of course then piques the interest of many in the nature of such consequence. Perverse disregard of biologically based standards ensues.
For someone who argues across biological boundaries, be weary of your argument. Since this "instinct" is relative to certain biological forms and the "instinct" is not absolute even in us human animals. The fixed point for incest avoidance is cultural only, unless you can show me otherwise. I could use your argument against you, we transcend the "moral" argument, if not with adultery, then why so for incest, would not trial and error be "best" is left with such?
ReplyDeletePerverse regard gets me to go out for a smoke whilst reading yer replies.
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ReplyDeleteRoy,
ReplyDeleteWhen I said: "Perverse regard gets me to go out for a smoke whilst reading yer replies."
Is only meant that I know the act of smoking is ill for my health, I still choose to smoke. I think of it as a delusion, I am feeding an addiction which may kill me (knowing stats and family history). I am an addict in more ways than one.
You wrote: "Further as to free will and determinism, much silliness is generated through the contemplations thereof.
Of course in some fashion all acts have determinant causation"
Good and fine.
However, the rest of your quote still has me think you may pose something for me.
I ask again, give me a scenario to which that I can not find determinism within, or part of?
I don't have to say determin"ism", but we at least a have an understanding. Railing or arguing apposed to "isms" is no less then my point against Massimo's argument as he explains it - again, it is not understanding you are actually making my argument for me, in certain respects.
You have stated something "concrete", yet you have shown it not to be so, in response comes an opposition to a position to which you label, that's what Massimo is essentially doing.
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ReplyDeleteRoy,
ReplyDeleteI was going to avoid this, but I can't help to notice if you understood. I will submit, you Massimo and pretty much everyone here is smarter than I.
However, what I mean by "trial and error" and the action, is beyond "adultery", even given the killing for as illustrated above, in moral discourse. The action produces something grotesque and unworkable in many case. The belief and idea to which I elude is only to illustrate a non-ignorance of such argument. To put it another way, how would I judge such an act without action? The "moral dilemma" arises only out of outcome. Would I then condemn someone for incestuous thoughts, or call those thoughts immoral (by extension of the argument)?
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ReplyDeleteRoy,
ReplyDeleteTo put it simply, I do think that if we follow Massimo, Harris and others of their argument we end up with a sticky situation.
How would we not condemn someone for the "belief" or "idea"? This I believe can be extended out, to where we would persecute, its been done before, it's only got the shine of science guiding it yet again.
I do not trust it, nor "Massimo's morality" because he doesn't even seem to understand the extent of the argument he makes.
What Austin Dacey asked Harris at BB is not new, we've seen it before. Dacey is a young pup, he, if you asked me, is applying the set up and ignorance and hoping it's ignorance.
You see, those like Singer, who will argue the residue of theological morality (which I've argued is no less then "postmodern" in some respects) aren't calling others out for doing the same, including himself.
An excuse is given is all. I'll finish by saying be weary of Massimo now, Harris and all those that rail unyielding to what they seem not to understand the extent of, they may soon have "others" knock on your door, out of nothing but ignorance.
I'm done here.
Roy,
ReplyDeleteSomething I wanted to be clear since our post appeared out of order when posted at times, so you may have missed this.
I Wrote:
"When I said: "Perverse regard gets me to go out for a smoke whilst reading yer replies."
Is only meant that I know the act of smoking is ill for my health, I still choose to smoke. I think of it as a delusion, I am feeding an addiction which may kill me (knowing stats and family history). I am an addict in more ways than one."
I don't want you to think that I had a "perverse disregard" for what you were saying. I appreciate the conversation, however it's obviously doesn't really work when post are held and posted in unpredictable ways.
Thanks for that paper on inbreeding. Though, I'm fairly well aware of the argument, it's actually part of my point, I could have pointed out single celled organisms etc. etc.
Since I'm not sure why you posted the paper, let me repeat again what I said.
I Wrote:
"For someone who argues across biological boundaries, be weary of your argument. Since this "instinct" is relative to certain biological forms and the "instinct" is not absolute even in us human animals. The fixed point for incest avoidance is cultural only, unless you can show me otherwise. I could use your argument against you, we transcend the "moral" argument, if not with adultery, then why so for incest, would not trial and error be "best" is left with such?"
The Human animal is a "biological form". It may have been an almost "imperative" in certain human groups to inbreed at times. Still, there is a recognized, across cultural, incest avoidance.
Like I said on this thread, I'm fairly well uneducated, I'm certain most if not all are smarter than I on this and many subjects like it.
I did post another one before bed last night but I don't see it.
Luke, Roy,
ReplyDeleteperhaps you two should get a (chat) room... ;-)
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ReplyDeleteThe mule train from Ashland has broken through the snow on the Siskiyou passes with a copy of the Searle paper that Julia recommended. Also I've been busy. Also I've been thinking. I thought so much Blogger won't let me post the whole thing. But I have to get it off my chest, so I cheat. Sorry all around.
ReplyDeleteFirst off, I don't think moral relativism is the same as moral skepticism in the sense that it doesn't exist or can't be reasoned about. (And while on the subject, the suggestion that some people try driving through a wall if they "don't believe it exists" is not a philosophical argument but an incoherent expression of violent anger that I consider unworthy of Russell, Massimo, or anyone else (Bill). But never mind.) Morality certainly exists, and can be reasoned about like any other human activity. It is also certainly relative in the sense that different cultures or individuals have quite different ideas about what it consists in, precisely. Massimo has been kind enough to provide his idea, and I have no doubt he conducts himself consistently with it.
One point here is that Morality (vis a vis Metaethics) requires a commitment to some particular moral principles; otherwise, as I believe Wittgenstein claimed, reasoning doesn't affect anything. A moral person should ideally be able to "step back" and address their own and others positions impersonally, but even if a "neutral background" is possible (which I personally doubt), the point for each person is to "take a particular stand".
Searle's point as I understand it is that a moral feature, such as the obligation to keep promises, exists relative to an "institution", such as the "institution of promising", which exists empirically. It seems to me that this goes to show that "oughts" are all necessarily relative: to subscription to relevant institutions. Searle goes on to say, "If I am right, then the alleged [!!] distinction between descriptive and evaluative utterances is useful only as a distinction between two kinds of illocutionary force, describing and evaluating, and it is not even very useful there..." It is confusing about Searle that in other places (eg, NYRB 9/24/2009, "Why Should You Believe It?") he is quite the dedicated foe of such postmodern relativist blurring between the synthetic and the analytic.
To be continued.
Massimo, I take your point, similar to Searle's, to be that evolutionary biology and generations of philosophizing... "thousands of years of moral progress"... have built a rational moral "Institution" which presents itself as an empirical external "fact" to the individual attempting to formulate a moral policy. That is quite an interesting thought, and I thank you for it, hoping I am not putting words in your mouth.
ReplyDeleteSo we start our moral reasoning from the facts of human psychological and physical nature and the historically existing institutions that surround us. The existing facts arose by a natural process of darwinian evolution, biological and cultural, and so must be considered "natural" and not "arbitrary" and are a legitimate basis for reasoning. Results that contradict those facts can be considered "false", at least in a sense like "unworkable."
Then thinking further, the existing institutions are unique because they are the ones that exist, but one can imagine different others, different (as Gould, Wonderful Life). In fact the existing institutions are by no means universal or mutually consistent. One devoutly wishes they were more so. Thinking to a more desireable future, we should not see moral institutions as fixed and immutable as if they were chemical compounds... ammonia will always be ammonia, but which possible medical interventions are permissible may change. A certain flexibility is required that doesn't apply to physical reasoning. As philosophers I assume our first purpose is to have some fun, but an important secondary purpose would be to "improve" the available institutions... say, "in a direction that increases the flourishing of all sentient beings". This is a commitment to an active bootstrapping program, not to a "neutral background".
Another point is that the existing moral institutions have evolved over the entire span of human existence, which was prepared by the evolution of sapient apes, which was prepared by... the emergence of life... the origin of the cosmos. Since all this has occurred by a completely natural process of evolution, it seems inescapable that the Universe possesses a "moral nature"... I am not speaking of a moral intention, but simply a nature built into the scheme of things that starts with a sea of very hot ions from which emerges beings with moral behavior. A moral arrow that naturally flows along with the temporal arrow. Would you agree with this point?
I am new to this blog so excuse the delay in responding.
ReplyDeleteYou speak of morality as "By definition, then, something is moral in my book if it increases human welfare and flourishing." This implies an absolute moral standard for all. How then do you deal with an action that may increase the welfare and flourishing of one group of humans at the cost diminishing another group. I do not think morality can be defined without the envelope of a particular social group. Morality for a fundamentalist religious group, may be substantially different from morality in a university community. Both may locally increase the welfare of the group and by your definition be moral. But how do you define a morality that increases the welfare of both groups?