About Rationally Speaking


Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Tuesday, April 07, 2009

Philosophy never ends

Today I was forwarded by several people a really bad and confused op-ed piece by New York Times columnist David Brooks. It is entitled “The End of Philosophy,” which naturally raised my baloney detector level to yellow alert. Brooks’ main argument is that philosophy’s approach to ethics is “hyper-rational,” and that it does not appreciate the fundamental role of the emotions. Odd, considering that it was David Hume (the 18th century Scottish philosopher, 1711-1776) who famously wrote about how reason and emotion interplay to give meaning to our lives (a much, much earlier statement than the very similar sentiment attributed by Brooks to psychologist Jonathan Haidt).

Brooks tells us that according to cognitive scientists “moral thinking is like aesthetics” and invites his readers to consider an analogy with food. We do not engage in much rational thinking to decide whether we like a dish or not, we simply have — almost literally — a gut reaction to it. Similarly with moral “intuitions,” where people “feel” whether something is right or wrong and act accordingly. So much for two and a half millennia of philosophical thinking, how could Socrates not realize such a simple truth? It apparently didn’t occur to Brooks that perhaps philosophy started out as a reaction to the then prevalent reliance on gut feelings in matters of ethics, and to the violence and injustice that it was bringing to the human lot.

The problem, Brooks continues, is that philosophy ignores science, and in particular Darwin. Evolutionary biology has begun to show how emotions, as well as reason itself, evolved over time, largely to maximize the individual’s survival in a challenging environment (I say largely because evolution is also characterized by contingent events, like meteors striking the planet and wiping out most life forms regardless of how well adapted to their environment they happened to be at the moment of the impact). Moreover, human beings, like some other species, evolved in a situation where a great part of their environment was defined by their social relations, which means that biologists expect a mixture of selfishness and cooperation to have resulted from the continuous shaping of behavior by natural selection.

There are so many problems with this view that I can hardly do it justice here. Let us start with the evolutionary view of morality. I am an evolutionary biologist, and I have no problem with a naturalistic understanding of the roots of moral behavior. But Brooks is happy that the evolutionary view “entails a warmer view of human nature,” because cooperation among individuals is one of its results. However, biology predicts cooperation and other niceties to evolve within groups, not among groups, because different groups are typically in competition with each other. Which means that a natural instinct to help members of your group (good) also comes with an equally natural instinct to slaughter members of other groups (presumably, not so good).

Let us consider further Brooks’ praise for moral intuitions. It is certainly true that science is demonstrating that humans, and likely other primates, have a strong innate sense of right and wrong. Yet, moral intuitions — just like any kind of intuition — can easily lead us astray. Many conservative Christians, for instance, have a strong moral intuition that homosexual relations are evil and should be forbidden by law. They report having precisely the same kind of instinctual revulsion that we experience for poisonous food. The difference is that a good moral philosopher can explain why such moral intuition is, in fact, wrong: it violates other people’s rights to associate as they please while not harming anyone else. That right cost us thousand of years of cultural evolution, as well as countless deaths, to achieve and defend. Do we really wish to part with it on the strength of a bad analogy?

Brooks himself seems to vacillate on this, as he states that “there are times, often the most important moments in our lives, when in fact we do use reason to override moral intuitions.” Ah, and when we do — and remember that these are often “the most important moments in our lives,” where do we turn to in order to figure out whether something is right or wrong? May I suggest a good philosopher, perhaps?

What Brooks flagrantly commits is something known as the naturalistic fallacy, which was first discussed by the above mentioned David Hume. Hume famously said that one cannot seamlessly go from matters of fact (what is) to issues of value (what ought to be) because the first does not entail the second. It is a fact that most people feel or behave heterosexually, i.e. heterosexual behavior is “natural.” It does not at all follow that homosexuality is immoral and therefore should be banned from society. More trivially, reading New York Times columns on a computer screen as I did this morning certainly does not qualify as “natural” behavior (and arguably does nothing to increase my chances of survival and reproduction), but I doubt Brooks would argue that it is therefore wrong.

The point is not that science has nothing to tell us of interest about morality. On the contrary, cognitive science is discovering how human beings make moral decisions and evolutionary biology is unraveling the long and complex history of how we came to develop a moral sense of right and wrong to begin with. This is important stuff, and philosophers would be ill advised to ignore it while developing their own theories. But it is an invaluable aspect of being human that we don’t rely just on instincts, we try to reason things through and talk to each other to see if we can reach a compromise on complex issues about which we disagree. Brooks concludes his column by chastising scientists for having their own limits, often forgetting that “most people struggle toward goodness, not as a means, but as an end in itself.” Kant (a philosopher) would have approved.

38 comments:

  1. Great response - I only wish you could get it in the NYTimes or get Brooks to read and respond.

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  2. It is certainly true that science is demonstrating that humans, and likely other primates, have a strong innate sense of right and wrong. Yet, moral intuitions — just like any kind of intuition — can easily lead us astray.

    So... which is it? Do we have an innate sense of what is right, or do we not?

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  3. Nick, it's not an "either/or". We have innate moral intuitions, but we also have the capacity to reason about those intuitions and determine if they accurately reflect moral facts (if there are such things as moral facts). So, innate factors might be responsible for a whole range of (sometimes conflicting) moral intuitions, but this doesn't mean we have to act on them unreflectively.

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  4. "What Brooks flagrantly commits is something known as the rationalistic fallacy"

    or naturalistic fallacy?

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  5. thanks for responding to this piece by the way!

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  6. Monkey's point is spot-on. Hume for example regarded out "moral intuitions" as just "sentiments" like any others -- emotional reactions we happen to have.

    BUT, and it is a big but, we can reflect on our sentiments, and decide how we wish to act on them. We can recognize, for example, that while we have different reactions to 'in group' and 'out group' cooperation, that the 'in group' and 'out group' people have the same kinds of desires, preferences, etc., as we do, and that any *reasons* we can give for our being worthy of respect apply equally well to the members of the 'out group' (ceteris paribus anyway).

    Similarly, as Mill famously noted, we can come to recognize that some of our "moral intuitions" lack moral standing. We can recognize that despite our feeling "moral disgust" at some action, that the action in fact hurts no one and is properly thought of as a private matter.

    Without any intuitions regarding the behavior of the physical world, it is hard to imagine how we could live long enough to maneuver around it. But if we are to successfully manipulate the world, at some point we need to stop relying on our intuitions and start reasoning about mechanics, physics, etc.

    jk

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  7. What I also thought was rich in Brook's pieces was the barrage of straw man assertions and non-sequitors in the last two paragraphs. You would think one of the most famous commentators for one of the country's most read newspapers would have an elementary grasp of critical thinking skills.

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  8. Hilzoy also has a good post on the Brook's essay over at Obsidian Wings:

    http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/obsidian_wings/2009/04/philosophy-not-dead-yet.html

    And the Obi-wings community as usual provides a highly intelligent, interesting and civilized follow up discussion.

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  9. Unfortunately, Pigliucci appears to be another one of many scientists who believes that Moral Realism can somehow be defended rationally. It can't, because all theories of the "good" rely on fundamental assumptions that break down upon closer inspection. Utilitarians say that pleasure is good - but why? Where is the "good" in great sex? Is there some hidden "ought" that Philosophers see clearly, but Physicists find elusive?

    This, of course, does not mean that I think Philosophers are "hyper-rational", as our misguided NYT columnist argues. On issues of morality they are hyper-irrational, since they believe in "should" and "good" for no reason. But scientists such as Haidt can at least be credited for performing research on our moral beliefs and attitudes, which is all there really is to know about morality anyway.

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  10. Brooks may be commiting the naturalistic fallacy - although I'm not quite sure that is a fair description - but I must agree with Joseph, that you Massimo are commiting the "rationalistic fallacy" when you suggest that moral philosophers can tell os what is right and what is wrong. There are no objective moral truths. Moral judgements are made by individual human beings and are therefore subjective.

    Hence, I think that Brooks' analogy with aesthetics is fine. Of course moral intuitions aren't hardwired, but neither are aesthetic preferences. You can learn to appreciate art (even opera in some cases) and strange kinds of food and likewise your moral preferences can be influenced by input from e.g. parents, teachers, well even moral philosophers.

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  11. Joseph, Morten,

    I don't think I ever said that philosophers have an exclusive and privileged access to universal moral truths. I simply said that they have been thinking about moral issues for some time, and that thinking is better than acting by instinct alone.

    I also don't believe that anyone really subscribes to moral relativism, as the two of you imply. If you do, then you have to admit that there is no way for you to argue that anything that anyone may do to you -- steal, injure, or even kill -- is wrong. As a result of that, please refrain from ever calling the police or filing a lawsuit.

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  12. I'm in a rush so I don't have a chance to read Brooks' columan (and I really only had a chance to skim this post) but at first glance, I find Brooks' position a bit ironic considering the review he gave Drew Westen.

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  13. Massimo points out that "nobody really subscribes to moral relativism". He points out the practical difficulties of living one's life without making moral arguments or tacitly endorsing moral theories.

    His point is right in so far as it goes, but it doesn't go so far as to actually challenge Moral Relativism at a theoretical and conceptual level.

    Consider the difficulties of living one's life without invoking the concept of absolute time. One would have to stop thinking of others as doing things at the same time as oneself, and one would therefore have to stop thinking of events as occurring simultaneously or plan tasks as though time exists as some fluid stream.

    Nevertheless, the difficulties of living one's life in such a manner does not in any way serve as a challenge to the scientific theory of General Relativity (or is it Special?).

    Speaking scientifically, Moral Relativism (or Moral Skepticism) has to be evaluated without regards for the practical difficulties of living one's life without invoking notions of moral reality. It is my contention that no philosopher or scientist can offer a truly rigorous defense of Moral Realism as the term is generally understood.

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  14. I´m glad Hume is mentioned here. For Hume reason has a crucial role in his account of justice: it corrects the original sentiments and enlarges our naturally limited sympathy. Perhaps we would now say that our brains have evolved for small and simple group cooperation (tribalism), not for larger more complex societies (civilization).

    ¨...tho’ this (natural) generosity must be acknowledg’d to the honour of human nature, we may at the same time remark, that so noble an affection, instead of fitting men for large societies, is almost as contrary to them, as the most narrow selfishness.¨

    ¨The remedy (to partiality, narrow natural sympathy), then, is not deriv’d from nature, but from artifice; or more properly speaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections¨

    David Hume, Treatise III, sec. II, Of the Origin of justice and property

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  15. Joseph,

    interesting point, but I find the analogy with time/relativity unconvincing on two grounds.

    First, more narrowly, I don't think we need a concept of absolute time to function in everyday life. An approximation that for all effective purposes *behaves* as absolute time is good enough. So our everyday behavior does not and cannot constitute a challenge to relativity.

    Second, and more broadly, I find direct analogies between moral issues and physics rather beside the point. I don't think of "moral truths," whatever they are, as equivalent to the laws of physics. If anything, they are more akin to mathematics. Once you start with certain assumptions (e.g., that no individual is entitled to special rights), all sorts of pertinent, rational consequences can be derived. And if one is bothered by the fact that one has to start with certain assumptions, let us remember that the same is true of math (or science, for that matter).

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  16. Massimo's response to Joseph strikes me as pointing in the right direction. The assumptions that moral reasoning are based on include of course assumptions about human preferences, some of which are broadly unavoidable (our preference for survivable temperatures, broadly sufficient caloric intake, freedom from pain, ability to partake in a social world, etc.) and some of which are constructed/created through our development.

    Even Kant's moral theory -- a "hyper-rational" account if ever there was one -- relies as a starting point on the fact that value in the world is generated only by beings (rational being, he thought, but anyway) *wanting* things. So to get off the ground we need beings with *preferences* -- like Hume (in some ways), Kant recognized that *desire* was and had to be prior to moral reasoning. He just didn't think it got you as far as Hume did towards the specifics.

    So, does this view generate a single objective moral theory, if by that we mean an account of morality that will for any possible action in any possible circumstance uniquely determine whether the act is morally required, morally forbidden, or morally permissible? No, of course not. But it does provides grounds for arguing about the adequacy or lack thereof of a number of different approaches.

    jk

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  17. Regarding moral relativism - There's a big difference in my eye between someone saying "that is wrong" and someone saying "I don't like that."

    The former is opinion, debatable, subjective and the second is fact. I would think scientists and philosophers would prefer to deal with facts than opinions.

    Regarding Massimo's argument that a moral relativist should never call the police... This sounds insane to me. If I feel an injustice has been committed, a law broken, I can say so without being hypocritical while still being a moral relativist. Sure I will admit that the crime seemed good to the criminal and bad to me, but I've got the law on my side.

    murder is disagreeable to so many people that laws are made, but this doesn't stop it from being opinion - merely an opinion shared by *most* people. I don't see how any scientist can argue otherwise (although I fully expect religious people to do so).

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  18. me,

    "I can say so without being hypocritical while still being a moral relativist. Sure I will admit that the crime seemed good to the criminal and bad to me, but I've got the law on my side."

    Nope, you would be hypocritical. On what grounds does a relativist feel that a law stopping "criminals" from doing whatever they want is justified? Indeed, does the concept of "criminal" make sense for a relativist?

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  19. Massimo recommends an approximation of absolute time that works in virtually all situations be used for practical purposes. This is a makeshift system to make human life easier - just like a moral belief system.

    He also states that Mathematics and Science have to start with certain assumptions, and we therefore cannot hold it against Moral Realists that they start with certain assumptions. The problem here, for Massimo's approach, is that Mathematicians and Scientists start with the principles of deductive and inductive reasoning as their starting points. Mathematics is nothing more than extremely advanced, formalized deductive reasoning, and Science uses nothing more than a combination of induction and deduction.

    By contrast, the assumptions that necessarily underlie a moral theory are not part of what is generally recognized as the framework of reason. Statements like "sentient beings have rights against coercion" do not need to be accepted at all in order to perform scientific research or philosophical inquiry.

    Since moral theorists begin with assumptions that aren't considered part of the framework of reason, namely our assumptions regarding the validity of induction and deduction, labeling Moral Realism as "irrational" seems okay to me.

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  20. Massimo,

    On what grounds does a relativist feel that a law stopping "criminals" from doing whatever they want is justified?

    Simple answer: on the grounds that a majority of community members support that law. Do you argue that only laws that can be shown philosophically (by whose philosophy) or religiously (by whose religion) should be considered justified?

    PS, nice post as usual. Brooks does seem off on much...

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  21. Joseph,

    philosophy also works by deduction and other common tools of reasoning, and it does/should take into account scientific knowledge, when appropriate (see one of Jonathan's comments earlier). But science itself doesn't get off the ground without assumptions that simply cannot be tested within a scientific framework -- most obviously the very existence of a physical reality. Would you consider that irrational?

    me,

    thanks for the kind words about the post. The problem with your response to my question about laws and justice is that by those terms it wouldn't make sense to say that some laws are unjust, a conclusion that I'm sure would make most people feel pretty uncomfortable. But on what grounds can anyone say that a given law is unjust, if not on the basis of philosophical discourse? (I do not even consider religious motivations, because religion is not about arguing by reason.)

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  22. I recall my first day at university. First lecture. Economics 100. The professor began by making some general statements. One was that there was a distiction, always to be remembered, between positive and normative statements.

    Isn't this the basic assumption of moral philosophy- that there is such a thing as a normative statement, or that it is legitimate to speak of a normative sphere? What seems queer about extreme relativism is the apparent denial that the normative even exists, which seems to be a more radical statement than denying a foundation for morality. To press an analogy, we may argue that induction is ultimately unfounded without denying that it is a legitimate field of inference. So why not the same for morality?

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  23. It is interesting how long people have tried to say morality is something that is discovered. The Stoics of the ancient Hellenistic and Roman world created the concept of Logos, an eternal rational principle to be discovered through reason. Logos made one thing in fact be good and another thing bad. Later, ethical monotheism purported that God said this was good and this is bad so he makes there be moral truths. In either case there were deep moral truths that we could know. It is ironic that something so fundamental to the god of any ethical monotheistic religion was started with an appeal to rationality. Today, science shows us that we are accidents in history so there is no reason for there to be moral truths. Morality is purely human-made concept.

    This means even the values we hold most dear, like the equality of everyone, are ideas purely made up. In ethical monotheism others have worth because God says they do and under rationality (informed by science) we know others have worth because we say they do. Moral relativism is true in this regard; morality is whatever we make it.


    Morality can be a system with “truths”. To say something is moral or immoral we first have to start with an understanding of where we ourselves are coming from, of what the values that our society has are based off of. With a base established we can say something is good or bad but it all relies on the assumptions of the base. This is of course basic reasoning. If posit one and posit two are true than the conclusion follows naturally. We can say that there are moral truths as long as we do not question the basic assumptions we made to get to that point. We can argue that something is wrong because we have all made some basic assumptions and as long as we all agree and them that act is wrong. It is just like words. You can’t communicate unless you both agree on the meaning of the words you are using. Nothing is wrong in the sense that morality is made up but if we want some actual social order we create assumptions that we build our morality around and that everyone has to adhere to them.

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  24. “Once you start with certain assumptions (e.g., that no individual is entitled to special rights), all sorts of pertinent, rational consequences can be derived.”

    My apologies, I posted my comment before I read every other comment. I think it’s cool that I arrived at the same conclusion; I must be doing something right.

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  25. it wouldn't make sense to say that some laws are unjust,

    Correct, a moral relativist would instead say "I don't like that law."

    If that person could convince enough other people by listing things they don't like about the law then the whole system works fine without any reference to an external justice / morality. I'm convinced that this is how everything works and people who justify their decisions based on some external system of morality are just doing that after the fact, perhaps because it makes it easier to explain to others why they feel the way they do.

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  26. Derek,

    so for you justice is really a matter of taste, like a preference between dark and milk chocolate? Hard to believe, but in that case I will vehemently argue that dark chocolate is much better than the milky variety... :)

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  27. Massimo,

    On dark chocolate I agree. I can't go as dark as some people (many will eat pure chocolate), but 70-80% is the sweet spot. 65% is okay if it has some sort of added flavor, like coffee or jalapeno.

    But on morality, I'm afraid that you're taking a very oblique route of contesting my claim. If you do not mind, I will formalize my argument:

    P1: "Reason" refers collectively to deduction and induction.
    P2: The existence of moral truth cannot be deducted.
    P3: Empirical evidence for the existence of moral truths isn't to be found.
    C: Belief in moral truth is not grounded in reason.

    (If I am not phrasing my argument properly, forgive me - I only took PHIL 120, and I took it at North Seattle Community College)

    You make two points, one of which I agree with and one of which I do not.

    The one I agree with is that Philosophy involves the consideration of empirical evidence. At least, it usually does - and thank goodness.

    But you say that science needs to assume that a physical reality exists to get off the ground. Is that so? Are we not able to simply induce the existence of a physical reality?

    Even if you disagree with my last assertion, however, I must probe you further. You seem to believe that accepting certain moral axioms without prior basis is fine, and is no less justified than our assumption that a physical reality exists.

    The difference I find between the belief (or assumption) that physical reality exists and that moral truth exists is that the prior explains phenomena. Our everyday experiences are made more coherent by physical explanations of sensory phenomena.

    By contrast, I do not see how moral theories make any data, even our subjective "sense-data", more lucid. I have no subjective experiences which moral theories will help to explain.

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  28. Joseph,

    I'm enjoying this exchange, so thank you, though I'm soon going to have to work on the next blog entry, probably while eating some 65% cocoa chocolate, flavored (not jalapeno, though).

    OK, to your arguments:

    "P1: "Reason" refers collectively to deduction and induction.
    P2: The existence of moral truth cannot be deducted.
    P3: Empirical evidence for the existence of moral truths isn't to be found.
    C: Belief in moral truth is not grounded in reason."

    Very nice try, but several things can be disputed. As you know, all I need to show is that one of the premises doesn't hold and the whole thing crumbles. So let's pick on P1: while deduction is reasonably well defined, induction is a vague term that includes a variety of modes of reasoning, many of which are employed by moral philosophers (who also employ deduction, of course). In other words, your definition of reason is not tight enough.

    "you say that science needs to assume that a physical reality exists to get off the ground. Is that so? Are we not able to simply induce the existence of a physical reality?"

    Nope. There is no empirical piece of evidence that can possibly contradict the radical skeptic idea that physical reality is an illusion. The only way out is to ignore the possibility and *assume* that it does.

    "You seem to believe that accepting certain moral axioms without prior basis is fine, and is no less justified than our assumption that a physical reality exists. The difference I find between the belief (or assumption) that physical reality exists and that moral truth exists is that the prior explains phenomena."

    So do assumptions about human morality. The assumption (derived from empirical evidence, by the way) that most human beings dislike pain, for instance, is one of the elements that leads you to some sophisticated forms of utilitarianism, such as Peter Singer's (I'm not saying that I am a utilitarian, or that I agree with Singer, it is just an example).

    Moral philosophers have the option to start from some empirical evidence (e.g., concerning the basic needs of humans, as well as their behavioral tendencies once these needs have been satisfied) and argue that it is fair to build societies in a way that most if not all people have access to those basic needs and can then flourish beyond that. Look, for instance, at John Rawls' theory of justice and his idea of a veil of ignorance. Again, just an example.

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  29. Due to lack of time, I cannot write a proper response, so I will apologetically cheat and just post this link:

    http://humainism.blogspot.com/2006/08/ethics.html

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  30. What happened to Hume of the frontispice?

    If citing him was out of season I hope this is not punishment to him.

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  31. Don't worry, I'm still a huge Hume fan. But the graphics as it was didn't really go with the new color scheme of the site. And I feel like from time to time I have to change things around to keep the look of the blog fresh...

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  32. Massimo, why should it matter whether physical reality exists or the whole thing is a (damned good) simulation? If the latter is true, the simulation is the only world we can know, and we are forced to live our lives and can of course do science within the simulation.

    Another thing is, that nobody really believes the world is a simulation - and if somebody should insist, it's easy to get rid of him: just ask him to prove it by jumping off a cliff.

    Maybe you could give a few other examples of assumptions that you think are needed to get science off the ground?

    I would guess that these assumptions could be characterized as fact-claims about the world and our ability to perceive it. They would be claims about how the world is.

    You mention that a moral system could also start from fact-claims (e.g. the basic needs of humans), but I would argue, that it is impossible to base a moral system exclusively on fact-claims. You cannot derive an ought from an is, so the premisses of a moral system would have to include claims about how the world ought to be (e.g. every human being ought to have his basic needs satisfied).

    Hence there is a fundamental distinction between science, which tries to figure out how the world is (independent of the human mind), and moral philosophy, which tries to figure out how the world ought to be (certainly mind-dependent).

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  33. Morten,

    I never claimed that philosophy is exactly like science. But the parallels are deeper than most people think. To get to some of your points:

    "why should it matter whether physical reality exists or the whole thing is a (damned good) simulation? If the latter is true, the simulation is the only world we can know, and we are forced to live our lives and can of course do science within the simulation."

    That wasn't my point. The point is that science cannot *tell* whether we live in a simulation or not. It has to assume we don't.

    "Another thing is, that nobody really believes the world is a simulation - and if somebody should insist, it's easy to get rid of him: just ask him to prove it by jumping off a cliff."

    Nope. This is a common misunderstanding of the skeptic's claim. Even if the world were a simulation, someone jumping off a cliff would still "die," just like a character in a videogame...

    "Maybe you could give a few other examples of assumptions that you think are needed to get science off the ground?"

    Another one is naturalism, the assumption that nature and natural laws are sufficient to explain the universe.

    "You mention that a moral system could also start from fact-claims (e.g. the basic needs of humans), but I would argue, that it is impossible to base a moral system exclusively on fact-claims. You cannot derive an ought from an is, so the premisses of a moral system would have to include claims about how the world ought to be (e.g. every human being ought to have his basic needs satisfied)."

    A moral system can get off the ground by looking at facts about human nature, and then reason its way beyond it. Similarly, science has to start with empirically untestable assumptions and work its way up based on empirical discoveries. There is a parallel between the two, not an identity.

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  34. "A moral system can get off the ground by looking at facts about human nature, and then reason its way beyond it. Similarly, science has to start with empirically untestable assumptions and work its way up based on empirical discoveries. There is a parallel between the two, not an identity."

    "reason its way beyond it" is ambiguous. I think Massimo is implying something untrue: that certain facts about human nature imply certain "oughts". It is my contention, and the contention of every moral skeptic, that this is false.

    The problem is that Moral Realists seem unable to detach certain facts about human psychology from normative claims. Let's begin with a correct truth-claim: being raped really, really sucks. I deny this to no extent. But how is it rational (keyword: "rational") to make the jump from "it is extremely unpleasant to be raped" to "one ought not to commit rape"? Hume's is/ought seems as solid as ever...

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  35. Massimo, my point was, that we don't have to assume that the physical reality exists because it makes no difference. If we can jump off a cliff and die within a simulation, we can certainly also do science (the jumping off a cliff thing was a joke by the way).

    However, my main point was, that you can't go from an is to an ought, and you haven't really adressed that except by asserting that you can ("looking at facts about human nature, and then reason its way beyond it). Like Joseph Frantz I don't agree, so it would be nice if you could explain exactly how you propose to reason from is to ought (say in Joseph's rape-example).

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  36. Linguistically speaking, extreme relativism amounts to abolishing modal auxiliaries like "should" and "must", and reducing all instances of their use to the indicative mood.

    And yet all languages (at least the ones that I know) have these modal auxiliaries. Not only that but they are deeply enshrined in the language, since thet are usually amongst the irregular verbs, and are treated apart from all the other verbs.

    From this point of view, I would say it is not a question of deriving an ought from an is, it is more a question of allowing the ought to function in its own sphere alongside the is.

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  37. Guys,

    I reiterate the point of my example about the assumptions of science, because it seems to keep getting missed: whether it makes a difference in practice if the world is real or not is not the issue. The point is that science can't tell us, which means it also (just like math, logic and philosophy) has to start with assumptions that are not testable within its systems or by its methods. But that doesn't mean we reject science as unfounded, and by the same token we shouldn't reject math, logic, or philosophy.

    As for the is/ought issue, please remember that Hume never said that one *cannot* connect one with the other, he only said that if one does, one needs to provide an argument for the connection. Let's take the example of rape: it is unpleasant (to say the least) and it is of course an instance of imposing violence on another human being. We know (fact) that human beings do not like violence being done to them. So it makes sense to establish laws/moral rules that prohibit that violence, because we'd like to see a peaceful society where humans can flourish to the best of their abilities (another reasonable assumption). These "ought" are not equivalent to laws of nature -- which I think is the root of the misunderstanding with Joseph and Morren -- they are of course human decisions. But they are human decisions that are not arbitrary and can be well defended by a combination of factual observations and reason, and that's all moral philosophy needs.

    By the way, since Joseph correctly points out that we probably all agree that rape "sucks," how is the relativist going to deal with it, other than hoping it won't happen to him/her because it "sucks"? Relativism is as much of a non starter in ethics as radical skepticism is in science: if you accept it, you find yourself stuck in a nihilistic hole, so you should reject it at least on pragmatic grounds, if nothing else.

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  38. Massimo, I'm unclear whether you're a moral realist or not. Do you think that moral values have an objective truth, independent of what anyone thinks, or are they subjective opinions? It seems like you're closest to the latter view, but you don't want to accept that moral values are entirely arbitrary. That's OK. I don't think a moral anti-realist has to treat moral values as entirely arbitrary. (I call myself a moral anti-realist, as I haven't settled on any particular variety of moral anti-realism.)

    Massimo wrote: "Once you start with certain assumptions (e.g., that no individual is entitled to special rights), all sorts of pertinent, rational consequences can be derived."

    But why start with that assumption, and not the assumption that Englishmen are entitled to special rights, or that Richard is entitled to special rights?

    I would agree that, if one has certain basic moral attitudes and a sense of moral consistency, one can be rationally led to other moral attitudes. But why pick one set of basic moral attitudes rather than another? I say we pick the ones that nature and nurture have inculcated in us.

    Massimo wrote: "By the way, since Joseph correctly points out that we probably all agree that rape "sucks," how is the relativist going to deal with it, other than hoping it won't happen to him/her because it "sucks"? Relativism is as much of a non starter in ethics as radical skepticism is in science: if you accept it, you find yourself stuck in a nihilistic hole, so you should reject it at least on pragmatic grounds, if nothing else."

    How is anyone (relativist or not) going to deal with the possibility of rape? They are going to vote for laws against it, promote respect for other people and revulsion against rape, etc.

    Perhaps the denial of objective morality makes inculcation of desired moral attitudes more difficult. But that's no argument for the existence of objective morality, any more than the possible advantage of religion in inculcating desired values is an argument for the existence of God. Are you asking us to accept a "noble lie"?

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