tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post7439880163948922028..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: You don’t really exist, do you?Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger74125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-81851728722011552992013-12-29T10:19:46.955-05:002013-12-29T10:19:46.955-05:00Reminded me of what Morpheus said in the Matrix mo...Reminded me of what Morpheus said in the Matrix movie … If real is what you can feel, smell, taste and see, then 'real' is simply electrical signals interpreted by your brain <br /><br />AKA FayeAnonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00225523580446520538noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-24326784629302406862012-07-20T20:23:11.135-04:002012-07-20T20:23:11.135-04:00Yes! When I read the lengthy comments below, I am ...Yes! When I read the lengthy comments below, I am reminded of how our minds create false substance out of nothing to give the illusion of productive thinking. Nowhere do I find a decent examination of ourselves as sensory systems and as meaning-creation systems (or other fundamental questions.) I do believe the highest knowledge is that of the self. Assuming the self is 100% OK and going out to "learn" something of "reality" is simply going to yield nothing of real value without understanding the processing system. We humans are a system with a basic purpose: procreate and die. The rest are interesting details, but have no meaning beyond that which we give them. I don't think anyone should become a monk and waste life in self-contemplation, but a good amount of doubt would be a good start, then ask meaningful questions about how we sense, how we create meaning, how we are ruled by emotional systems, etc. Until the instrument of detection is well-investigated, any "knowledge" acquired is of little value. Everything I've stated is open to be corrected at any time. Thanks for your wise comment, and your time!Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10267311653730083589noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-37963240287176490522011-12-20T10:44:24.562-05:002011-12-20T10:44:24.562-05:00Massimo,
"But symbolic engines don't &q...Massimo, <br /><br />"But symbolic engines don't "interpret" anything. And they need to be built by conscious beings. (No, I don't count molecular biological machinery as a symbolic engine.)"<br /><br />I follow you here. Well, actually, I do feel that symbolic engines <i>could</i> interpret things with the right kind of programming; but setting aside that established point of disagreement between us, I agree that the kind of symbolic engine I am describing wouldn't interpret anything. My feeling is simply that, even so, the symbols it manipulates <i>are</i> numbers, at least by a formalist account, because by a formalist account, formal equivalence is all we have. Furthermore, I think formalism is the best account of numbers we physical beings have, <i>even if MP is true</i>. <br /><br />Now I could be wrong about that. Indeed there's lots of evidence that Goedel felt that "the human mind... infinitely surpasses the powers of any finite machine," the alternative being the unlikely (in his opinion) conclusion that "there exist absolutely unsolvable Diophantine problems." (Kurt Gödel: Collected Works, III, ed. Feferman, Oxford, 1995, p. 310. Quoted <a href="http://users.ox.ac.uk/~jrlucas/Godel/turn.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>.) This claim is essentially what I was describing as "naive Platonism" above. But the formulations of mathematical platonism (note the small p now) that I find most persuasive are those that deny such "special access," which as I understand it amounts to access to an <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real_computation" rel="nofollow">uncountable infinity</a>. In other words, I am sympathetic to versions of platonism that hold that mathematical statements do have "truthmakers," but that the finite nature of our physical world prevents us from accessing some of those truthmakers. <br /><br />Finally... <br /><br />"Again I think fictionalism is incompatible with Platonism."<br /><br />Definitely -- but it seems to me that, adopting fictionalism for a moment, the fiction that mathematics tells is precisely the fiction of platonism.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11332828263550581927noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-64841333092549564382011-12-19T16:30:19.813-05:002011-12-19T16:30:19.813-05:00Scott,
well, I don't necessarily disagree wit...Scott,<br /><br />well, I don't necessarily disagree with at least some of the points you make, but there seem to be some contradiction, and at any rate I don't think they contradict my position:<br /><br />> "For any x to be a number in any sense, x must be thought about by a consciousness as a number." Setting aside the naive Platonic view that we conscious beings have some kind of special access to Platonic heaven not granted to other physical beings, I think this amounts to a flavor of mathematical fictionalism (MF). <<br /><br />Fictionalism and Platonism are mutually exclusive, in my understanding. And while I am agnostic about the latter, I don't think it is naive. (It doesn't have to imply that only we have access to mathematical objects, any being in the universe with similar or more advanced cognitive abilities would have access.)<br /><br />> it's not clear to me that our false representation of numbers, as thinking beings, is in any way preferable to the false representation of numbers given by any appropriately powerful symbolic engine. In other words, if formal equivalence is the best criterion available for determining whether x is a number, then lots of things outside our heads are numbers. <<br /><br />But symbolic engines don't "interpret" anything. And they need to be built by conscious beings. (No, I don't count molecular biological machinery as a symbolic engine.)<br /><br />> if numbers are fictions anyway, and we are free to define them however we want, isn't it reasonable on a pragmatic basis to adopt a view of numbers as existing outside our own heads? <<br /><br />Again I think fictionalism is incompatible with Platonism.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-50244846182529048212011-12-19T11:45:05.013-05:002011-12-19T11:45:05.013-05:00Massimo,
"Last time I checked only consciou...Massimo, <br /><br />"Last time I checked only conscious beings can think, and brute-force theorem proving machines require thinking beings to be designed and built."<br /><br />True; I think we misunderstood each other, and I could have been clearer. There are a few possible interpretations of the statement that I purported to doubt: "numbers require a consciousness to think about them." One interpretation goes like this: "for numbers to be thought about, a consciousness must do the thinking." This is probably true, since it's unclear what "thinking" is if not done by a conscious being. But I didn't mean to raise doubt about this statement.<br /><br />Another goes like this: "For any x to be a number in any sense, x must be thought about by a consciousness as a number." Setting aside the naive Platonic view that we conscious beings have some kind of special access to Platonic heaven not granted to other physical beings, I think this amounts to a flavor of mathematical fictionalism (MF). Numbers, according to this view, are only "in our heads"; they are false representations, representations of things that don't really exist. Therefore the only way something outside our own heads could "be" a number is by being thought of by us as a number.<br /><br />I have doubts about this claim on two fronts. First, since it is a fictionalist claim that would be refuted by mathematical platonism (MP), and since I am agnostic about MP, I must also be agnostic about it. <br /><br />But second, even if numbers <i>are</i> fictions, we can give a stringent account -- most likely a formalist account -- of what a number is. This account is always false, strictly speaking, in the sense that there exists nothing that satisfies it. It is our best false representation of numbers. But at this point, it's not clear to me that our false representation of numbers, as thinking beings, is in any way preferable to the false representation of numbers given by any appropriately powerful symbolic engine. In other words, if formal equivalence is the best criterion available for determining whether x is a number, then lots of things outside our heads are numbers. <br /><br />More generally, if numbers are fictions anyway, and we are free to define them however we want, isn't it reasonable on a pragmatic basis to adopt a view of numbers as existing outside our own heads? Isn't that, in fact, the whole point of imagining numbers?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11332828263550581927noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-41657219294856909962011-12-16T17:18:29.286-05:002011-12-16T17:18:29.286-05:00Gadfly,
I didn't mean my "trick" co...Gadfly,<br /><br />I didn't mean my "trick" comment in a derogatory manner. I find Ericsson's work fascinating, but it is a trick in the same sense as optical illusions of the Gestalt type are tricks: they tell us something about how our senses work by "tricking" them under unusual circumstances.<br /><br />And to me it makes little sense to say that a unitary consciousness is an illusion. It's an obvious fact that needs to be explained. Just because we can break that sense of unity under unusual circumstances it doesn't mean it ain't real when consciousness functions the way it is supposed to. It would be like causing a mutation to disrupt a phenotype (a useful "trick" in genetics) and then claim that the mutant shows that the wild type is an illusion.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-38754278821043382092011-12-16T15:49:24.519-05:002011-12-16T15:49:24.519-05:00Massimo, I wouldn't call Ericsson a "tric...Massimo, I wouldn't call Ericsson a "trick." First, denotatively, using that particular word seems to cheapen what's he's found in his research.<br /><br />True, it requires a functional brain, indeed a more functional one than drug-induced OBEs. Which underscores why what we call consciousness is, in some degrees, a construct.<br /><br />Now, per things like Dennett's heterophenomenolgy, or Hume's problem of induction, we act "as if" we have a robust unitary consciousness. But, maybe that itself is the "trick," if anything.<br /><br />That said, we can't all join Buddhist monasteries to try to unlearn ideas of consciousness; besides, the only good Buddha is a dead Buddha.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-3349778723412674302011-12-16T09:52:15.603-05:002011-12-16T09:52:15.603-05:00Gadfly,
> Ericsson shows ... the sense of self...Gadfly,<br /><br />> Ericsson shows ... the sense of self, under the right conditions, is quite "fungible." <<br /><br />I'm not sure what you mean. He showed that one can be tricked in spatially locating the self outside of one's body. But it is a trick nonetheless, and of course it still requires a functional brain and sensory system, without which, no consciousness or self.<br /><br />Joachim,<br /><br />> What do you think of Robert Trivres's idea that consciousness in not an illusion but a tool for self-deception, in order to make the deception of others more convincing? <<br /><br />Trivers is a smart guy, but I think he takes his self-deception hypothesis far too seriously. Among other things, it's pretty close to being untestable.<br /><br />Dave,<br /><br />> It is quite simple. Anything that can be said to exist actually exists as information to other things <<br /><br />Obviously you subscribe to a notion of "existence" that is pretty out there. Sure, in that sense both unicorns and Spiderman exist, but I find that somewhat trivial and utterly uninteresting.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-74965392664024441992011-12-16T08:22:09.757-05:002011-12-16T08:22:09.757-05:00@Scott - you have now raised two issues, will try ...@Scott - you have now raised two issues, will try to address.<br /><br />(1) You say:<br /><br /><i> You're claiming that Massimo thinks that information isn't physical? But in the post you cite, I understood him to be saying the very opposite.</i><br /><br />We may need quotes from the post to be really clear, but my understanding of his position is that he agrees with 99% of the world who thinks the world is made up of matter, mayyyyybe energy, but certainly not information. He implies, not says, that information may be a property of either matter or energy. But he certainly does not say information is a physical thing. If you provide the quote where he says that, this will help my confusion about your confusion.<br /><br />(2) You say, paraphrased by Massimo: <br /><i> I have no idea where he gets the physicalism implies truth relativism. And I certainly never wrote anything of the kind. </i><br /><br />Lots of room for confusion here, and I can help out. First off yes, I think something like physicalism implies truth relativism. And no, I never thought Massimo agreed here. I am uncomfortable with the definition of physical and/or physicalism, because I believe both matter (and energy, too) are composed of information. Not the finely sliced non-conceptual information some talk about, but just plain old info, just like matter is plain old stuff. This idea does not sit well with thoughts of either dualism or physicalism, as per this comment from 4 RS posts ago:<br /><br /><i>@Sharkey, Massimo: I love it, y'all are getting to root of the problem and Sharkey is correctly steering this to to the 'left' of dualism. Ya got yer physicalists on the right, saying everything is physical in nature. Your dualists to the left saying there is both a non-physical and a physical, and further to the left, the tables turn. Nothing is physical, numbers, tables, emotions, gods, same shit different clothing.<br /></i><br /><br />What is unsound about this position to you? It is quite simple. Anything that can be said to exist actually exists as information to other things.DaveShttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15840516954793215700noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-70880013783570796112011-12-16T05:52:03.131-05:002011-12-16T05:52:03.131-05:00What do you think of Robert Trivres's idea tha...What do you think of Robert Trivres's idea that consciousness in not an illusion but a tool for self-deception, in order to make the deception of others more convincing? <br /><br />Illusion would become delusion and deception but be none the less real for that.<br /><br />[Trivers 2000. The elements of a scientific theory of self-deception. Annals NY Acad Sciences 907: 114-131]Joachim Dagghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00985198925581721229noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-8598210383092592982011-12-16T00:42:15.833-05:002011-12-16T00:42:15.833-05:00Massimo, have to disagree with you. That said, as ...Massimo, have to disagree with you. That said, as I've posted here before, I agree with folks like Wegner that we probably don't have either the degree of free will or of consciousness that we'd like to believe.<br /><br />Ericsson shows, I think, that consciousness is in part a construct based on our minds normally interacting with the world through a set of senses coming to us in expected means and fashion. Had he done what he did with drugs, it would be easier to say his experiments had little bearing in the "big issues" of mind because of all the different effects of drugs. <br /><br />But, by doing what he did without drugs, to use a good economics term, he showed the sense of self, under the right conditions, is quite "fungible."<br /><br />To some degree, I think "consciousness" is, if you'll allow me to coin, or Quine, an idea, a construct of "bootstrapped feedback loops." Our primitive agency detectors feed off the agency detectors of others with whom we interact. It's all Dennett's heterophenomenology turtles, all the way down, but the turtles aren't conscious in the way he believes.<br /><br />And, yes, I like slicing and dicing metaphors.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-72950171890437496692011-12-15T23:11:40.975-05:002011-12-15T23:11:40.975-05:00DJD,
If you could understand my position, you'...DJD, <br />If you could understand my position, you'd have been able to answer my previous questions. Since you clearly can't, we're done here.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-91510253310038065072011-12-15T21:47:07.072-05:002011-12-15T21:47:07.072-05:00jeremybee
My choice is to try and understand yo...jeremybee<br /> My choice is to try and understand your position. I suspect that you are a defender of both free will and morality....and possibly a believer in a supernatural being. The three often go together. But, I am not sure about my interpretations of your statements. Am I correct about one, two, or all three?DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-42404208883935483872011-12-15T18:09:00.201-05:002011-12-15T18:09:00.201-05:00DJD
None in your world. Wasn't that your poin...DJD<br />None in your world. Wasn't that your point?<br />If not, please explain the basis used to select your choices. <br />If you can.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-41752302299879030312011-12-15T17:46:48.218-05:002011-12-15T17:46:48.218-05:00jeremybee
>" But of course, as your uni...jeremybee<br /> >" But of course, as your universe requires, I'm just obliged to guess, as rightness or wrongness is not a real issue"<br /> What role does "rightness and wrongness" play in having a desire to make a choice?DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-54733846875230776332011-12-15T16:29:02.009-05:002011-12-15T16:29:02.009-05:00DJD,
Why would we desire to make choices? Because...DJD,<br />Why would we desire to make choices? Because they weren't made for us in advance? But of course, as your universe requires, I'm just obliged to guess, as rightness or wrongness is not a real issue.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-13680013375882506442011-12-15T14:54:32.508-05:002011-12-15T14:54:32.508-05:00jeremybee
I believe you stated the following....
...jeremybee<br />I believe you stated the following....<br /> >"So free will needs to be exerted against the logical ends of the causes, not against the prior causes themselves."<br /> Why would we desire to do so? Because there were causes of our desire to do so. You seem to be simply transferring from one 'action' to another.DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-42217510916556559152011-12-15T10:12:26.355-05:002011-12-15T10:12:26.355-05:00"You seem trapped into a false dichotomy here..."You seem trapped into a false dichotomy here, and I don't know how to explain myself any better. Think back to my example that breathing doesn't require anything more than lungs, rib cage, etc., but that it still makes no sense to say that breathing *is* the sum total of lungs, rib cage, etc. There is a difference between the outcome of a process and the process itself."<br /><br />So if consciousness isn't what neural processes are doing, but it's an outcome of what they're doing, how would you describe it? Is it something physical, functional, or what? Consciousness, I think we agree, consists in qualitative phenomenal experience, so the basic question is whether it is, or is not, the same thing as something we can locate in the world as described by science, for instance a set of neurally realized functions carried out in the brain.Tom Clarkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08414754510736349472noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-39062415566169083482011-12-15T08:20:20.410-05:002011-12-15T08:20:20.410-05:00Scott,
> I remain uncertain that numbers requi...Scott,<br /><br />> I remain uncertain that numbers require a consciousness to think about them. <<br /><br />Last time I checked only conscious beings can think, and brute-force theorem proving machines require thinking beings to be designed and built.<br /><br />But you are correct in your criticism of Dave, I have no idea where he gets the physicalism implies truth relativism. And I certainly never wrote anything of the kind.<br /><br />Tom,<br /><br />> Since you decline dualism, your bet about consciousness has to be that phenomenal experiences like pain aren’t anything over and above what certain neural processes are doing <<br /><br />We've covered this. You seem trapped into a false dichotomy here, and I don't know how to explain myself any better. Think back to my example that breathing doesn't require anything more than lungs, rib cage, etc., but that it still makes no sense to say that breathing *is* the sum total of lungs, rib cage, etc. There is a difference between the outcome of a process and the process itself.<br /><br />Thanks for the extended excerpt from your paper, but I don't see how it makes your point. It seems very clearly to make mine...<br /><br />Not sure also where you got that I am committed to standard physicalism. I certainly am no dualist in the common sense of the word, but I do see problem with physicalism, which as you know comes in a variety of flavors. I'm reading more about it as we speak, hopefully I'll expand in a future post.<br /><br />Derek,<br /><br />> I don't think you can support an argument that free will is NOT an illusion simply because we haven't yet explained how it could have evolved. <<br /><br />First, my comment there referred to consciousness, no free will, the two are related but not identical. Second, I make other arguments for the non-illusory status of both free will and consciousness throughout my recent posts.<br /><br />But I agree with your other comments about degrees of consciousness and volition in other animals.<br /><br />Gadfly,<br /><br />Ehrsson's research is fascinating, but I don't see how it bears on the point at all. That would be like arguing that vision doesn't exist because you can trick people into seeing things that are not there.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-57157046978681487592011-12-15T01:01:47.500-05:002011-12-15T01:01:47.500-05:00What about research in Henrick Ehrsson's lab, ...What about research in Henrick Ehrsson's lab, Massimo? If consciousness does exist, the fact he can induce an OBE without drugs on 4 of 5 people says it exists on thin ice. http://www.nature.com/news/out-of-body-experience-master-of-illusion-1.9569Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-76661332197571466372011-12-15T00:06:55.408-05:002011-12-15T00:06:55.408-05:00DJD, that wasn't my argument, that was another...DJD, that wasn't my argument, that was another person's example, but not a bad one. It could "only" be circular in your deterministic universe. Was that your point?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-12233382576119748732011-12-14T20:04:12.272-05:002011-12-14T20:04:12.272-05:00jeremybee
>"We can, however, prevent suc...jeremybee<br /> >"We can, however, prevent such causes from occurring again in the future"<br /> Only if we have been caused to desire to prevent such cause from occurring again. It seems that you have created a circular argument.DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-21556759641664089152011-12-14T18:58:13.835-05:002011-12-14T18:58:13.835-05:00From: http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=...From: http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20090714044625AAW0ybM<br /><br />What does "contra-causal" mean in relationship to "free will"?<br /><br />Best Answer - Chosen by Asker<br /><br />Determinists like Tom Clark of Naturalism.Org use the phrase to mean that free will cannot exist because it is not free of the causes that create the need to exert will against those causes.<br /><br />But free will isn't supposed to be free of causes. We wouldn't exist without causation. So free will needs to be exerted against the logical ends of the causes, not against the prior causes themselves. We can, however, prevent such causes from occurring again in the future (like learning to design buildings that withstand hurricanes instead of letting the weather take down buildings.)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-3027700547748294652011-12-14T18:39:01.535-05:002011-12-14T18:39:01.535-05:00Animals that are awake at some level make consciou...Animals that are awake at some level make conscious decisions at that level when optional assessments are required. They don't necessarily assess their options consciously beforehand to the same degree that we do, but neither do they think entirely unconsciously where some assessment of their sensory apparatus is involved. Only the "non-living" elements of nature assess their environment with completely programmed reactively.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-42745628746206559652011-12-14T16:41:41.590-05:002011-12-14T16:41:41.590-05:00Massimo,
Since you decline dualism, your bet abou...Massimo,<br /><br />Since you decline dualism, your bet about consciousness has to be that phenomenal experiences like pain aren’t anything over and above what certain neural processes are doing. Whatever functions these processes have are the functions of consciousness too, so it isn’t as if on your account the experience of pain per se adds to what its neural correlates do, since on your view they are one and the same. <br /><br />About these functions you ask “Would you mind elaborating? What neural structures, doing what?” I elaborate considerably in section 10 of my Journal of Consciousness Studies paper, “Killing the observer,” at http://www.naturalism.org/kto.htm#Neuroscience Here’s a taste (see the paper for references cited):<br /><br />"...a positive account of sensory consciousness as informational states is emerging from neuroscience and neurophilosophy (see for instance Dehaene, 2002; Metzinger, 2000a, 2003). Defined methodologically, consciously available information is just that embodied in representations that participate in functions subserving the empirically discovered *capacities* conferred by conscious states as opposed to unconscious states (Baars, 1999). For instance, conscious states have the capacity to make information available over extended time periods in the absence of continued stimulation; they permit novel, non-automatized behavior; and they allow spontaneous generation of intentional, goal-directed behavior with respect to perceived objects (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). Studies of neural activity which contrast conscious and unconscious capacities indicate that phenomenal experience is associated with widely distributed but highly integrated neural processes involving communication between multiple functional sub-systems in the brain, each of which plays a more or less specialized role in representing features of the world and body (Kanwisher, 2001; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Jack & Shallice, 2001; Parvizi & Damasio, 2001, Crick & Koch, 2003). Such processes, it is hypothesized, constitute a distributed, ever-changing, but functionally integrated ‘global workspace’ (Baars, 1988; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001).” <br /><br />Re your physicalism (the majority view these days), I think it’s difficult to maintain the literal identity of phenomenal experiences like pain with their neural correlates since pains are categorically private, whereas their correlates are in principle publicly observable, see “Respecting privacy” at http://www.naturalism.org/privacy.htm The entailment from the neural correlates of phenomenal experience to the existence of experience itself is, I suspect, a matter of being a complex, recursive, but limited representational system, details at http://www.naturalism.org/appearance.htm#part5 The adaptive, functional aspects of this entailment (I list 7 of them, somewhat overlapping), likely have to do with information integration and other representational functions instantiated by the neural structures such as the global workspace referenced above.Tom Clarkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08414754510736349472noreply@blogger.com