tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post722789332485732602..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: On the species of speciesUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-31631574157221111672012-10-05T23:32:33.722-04:002012-10-05T23:32:33.722-04:00Before it comes to that, let’s review the issues i...<i>Before it comes to that, let’s review the issues involved and see if we can’t pull Massimo back from the Dark Side.</i><br /><br />Perhaps you both need rescuing from the dark side. (Or, more likely, you will see me as already lost there).<br /><br /><i>first, that species are natural kinds if and only if species selection is possible; second, that (some) species are natural kinds; third, that species selection is possible.</i><br /><br />You seem to be making this metaphysical. Why does it matter whether species are natural kinds? As a metaphysical atheist, I tend to take the view that there are no natural kinds. I see species as conventional, rather than natural. If there is a disagreement between taxonomists and evolutionary theorists, I would see that as a disagreement over conventions due to the fact that they are working on somewhat different problems so have different pragmatic requirements to be resolved by whatever conventions they adopt.<br /><br /><i>For all the Lawrence Krausses out there (as if one wasn’t sufficient): the preceding conceptual analysis is precisely the sort of thing that philosophy can do and science can’t.</i><br /><br />This is probably true. And I am inclined to count that in favor of Krauss.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-78073408600482052212012-10-05T20:24:27.716-04:002012-10-05T20:24:27.716-04:00[10]: The tendency here on this blog is to simply ...[10]: The tendency here on this blog is to simply define every activity that is not a formal hypothesis test while wearing lab coats as philosophy, and from that perspective you would be right that this is what philosophy can do an science can't. However, that is the philosophicism equivalent of defining plumbing as science because it uses empirical evidence; if one is overreach, so is the other.<br /><br />Species are human concepts with some communicative or explanatory value just like "continent", "star" or "forest". Whether, say, the biological species concept, the cohesion species concept or the phylogenetic species concept have explanatory value, are accurate descriptions of biological reality, and are useful as elements for building workable classifications of biological diversity are predominantly empirical questions and thus part of science.<br /><br />Of course you can, if that is what makes you feel better, spend a few years writing a philosophical dissertation about the concept of a "star" in astronomy, but you will find that the astronomers can ignore you and they will ignore you and just get on with the practice of astronomy without any problems for their practice arising from that ignorance.<br /><br />Likewise, I am a plant taxonomist and systematist, and while I have had many controversial and fruitful discussions about species concepts with many different colleagues, I have yet to take anything of value away from a discussion about whether species are individuals or classes. That question is about as relevant for my work as the question of the number of angels able to stand on the tip of a needle would be for the work of a seamstress.<br /><br />And, sorry to be so blunt, I would rather trust those evolutionary biologists who have demonstrated mathematically that species selection cannot possibly work than a philosopher who arrives at the conclusion that species selection happens by shuffling definitions around; not that that particular question is of any relevance for my work either. Seriously, I have never understood what actually turns on it for anything.Alex SLhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00801894164903608204noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-17368128068758268992012-10-05T10:49:22.955-04:002012-10-05T10:49:22.955-04:00I think Leonard is right. As soon as you permit mu...I think Leonard is right. As soon as you permit multi-level selection you have to permit that it is possible above the species level as well. This, I think, is so because the question whether it can or cannot appear above the species level is a question for for biologists. It is an empirical question. And, as shown in the sexual species example, this question is sometimes answered in the affirmative.Hieronimushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00581956837169133565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-85980750472581280862012-10-05T00:14:37.976-04:002012-10-05T00:14:37.976-04:00I have a couple of questions:
In this sense, is ...I have a couple of questions: <br /><br />In this sense, is it possible to extent multilevel selection "upward" from species to social species? <br /><br />Is human kind an example of "species selection"? I mean, we are the only bold hominids I've seen hanging by here lately. <br /><br /><br /><br />Sexto Empiricohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11176766042647292546noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-14202349659241717262012-10-04T15:38:12.727-04:002012-10-04T15:38:12.727-04:00Leaving aside the question of how you define speci...Leaving aside the question of how you define species (if you said, I missed it), this seems to be your argument:<br />1. Selection targets only individuals.<br />2. Philosophically, individuals are characterised by division of labour and intrinsic functional integration. <br />3. Sexual species have division of labour as males and females carry different bits of the genome.<br />4. Sexual species have functional integration. No argument proposed.<br />5. Therefore sexual species are - philosophically speaking - individuals.<br />6. Therefore selection can target sexual species.<br />Please correct me if I've misunderstood your argument.<br /><br />I don't believe that even in principle this kind of argument leads anywhere. That is because the statement "selection targets individuals" is not about individuals <em>in a philosophical sense.</em> Really, selection targets the smallest unit that carries the mutation which necessarily lives and dies as one, <em>whatever</em> you may call that unit. I can die and you can go on living, or vice versa. That means that the mutations in my genome will be selected for or against independently of those in yours, and the ones we have in common will be selected for or against independently in you and in me - two chances. <br /><br />And wouldn't an analogous argument show selection can target nations? OK, you might argue about the "intrinsic". But families and geographically isolated communities would fulfill both conditions. <br /><br />I think the deeper issue is that whether or not a unit is targeted by natural selection is a scientific question, not a philosophical one. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-7512188397957025042012-10-04T12:22:09.113-04:002012-10-04T12:22:09.113-04:00I don't understand the distinction that you ar...I don't understand the distinction that you are drawing between "sorting" and "selection". You say: "In the first experiment above, volunteers select individual MandMs, and the association of colors with flavors leads to the sorting of flavors. In the second experiment, volunteers select a whole bag of candy, leading to the persistence of one flavor; the individual MandMs are just along for the ride."<br />As your own words indicate, selection is occurring in both cases. Perhaps you are trying to distinguish between "selection of" and "selection for"? There is selection "for" a trait if the values of the trait causally affect probabilities of survival and reproduction while there is selection "of" a trait if the values of the trait do not causally affect such probabilities, but are correlated with some other trait that does.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03656986237035629231noreply@blogger.com