tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post6702880102081015145..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: The future of philosophy of scienceUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger21125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-34439293931862424032010-04-20T15:22:18.863-04:002010-04-20T15:22:18.863-04:00Scott, yes exactly. This is my perception as well....Scott, yes exactly. This is my perception as well. I was simply responding to claims such as "so and so fatally undermines <i>any</i> useful falsification." When I hear the term "useful" I think of applied science, rather than theoretical. In the former, falsification is not only useful, it predominates.John Lhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05642239691210008441noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-82120877931525419002010-04-19T22:59:33.732-04:002010-04-19T22:59:33.732-04:00John,
I think there's an important distincti...John, <br /><br />I think there's an important distinction between falsification of hypotheses (easy) and falsification of theories (hard). Falsification of hypotheses often amounts to little more than modus tollens: <br /><br />x -> y<br />~y<br />therefore ~x<br /><br />But falsification in the Popperian sense has to do much more than modus tollens, because it's very easy to create a statement that's falsifiable by modus tollens but that doesn't come close to being a useful scientific hypothesis. For example:<br /><br />The world was created by an infinite unperceivable chicken and G=9.81m/s^2<br /><br />So once you start using falsification to think about larger aggregates of statements (i.e. theories), it becomes less useful.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11332828263550581927noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-24044742398112991242010-04-19T11:35:19.817-04:002010-04-19T11:35:19.817-04:00Fair enough. I work in technology, which might be ...Fair enough. I work in technology, which might be called an applied science in that we're constantly coming up with ideas (hypotheses) and testing them in hardware and software. The ideas that don't meet our objectives (most of them) are "falsified." We use all the -ductives in the process: inductive, deductive, and (perhaps most importantly to our work) abductive.<br /><br />I would disagree that the scientific method is "hardly deductive." I can think of very few hard science processes that do not embrace <i>all</i> the -ductives in some manner.John Lhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05642239691210008441noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-56301055515498148592010-04-18T03:40:01.644-04:002010-04-18T03:40:01.644-04:00John,
Scott is correct, I meant that it is hard t...John,<br /><br />Scott is correct, I meant that it is hard to find cases in the history of science where falsification has actually been used. For instance, the Copernican theory should have been falsified by several observations, including the apparent lack of stellar parallax, and yet scientists ignore that and forged ahead with the theory.<br /><br />You are right in a sense that falsification is embedded in deduction, that was Popper's idea. But the fact is that scientific hypothesis testing is hardly deductive.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-48767557069650843362010-04-17T12:57:38.352-04:002010-04-17T12:57:38.352-04:00Scott/Massimo, we must be talking about two differ...Scott/Massimo, we must be talking about two different definitions of the word. Falsification is as embedded into the scientific method as hypothesis, measurement, and deduction. In many (most?) cases, deduction IS falsification. The very nature of informed observation -implies- certain embedded logical attributes. <br /><br />I perceive a continuum of hard science that spans from realist-positivist to subjective-relativist (after Polanyi). Granted, in the latter, falsification becomes dicey for a number of reasons. If that's your argument, I get it. If not, sorry - you've lost me and I would appreciate some help.John Lhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05642239691210008441noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-16789979506161723302010-04-17T11:46:48.113-04:002010-04-17T11:46:48.113-04:00John,
I'm quite sure Massimo did not mean th...John, <br /><br />I'm quite sure Massimo did not mean that it's hard to find any case of a scientist invoking falsification in the history of science.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11332828263550581927noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-90260257626685178332010-04-16T18:07:36.491-04:002010-04-16T18:07:36.491-04:00No amount of experimentation can ever prove me rig...No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong. <br />-A. EinsteinJohn Lhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05642239691210008441noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-41741573879361581562010-04-16T15:56:26.576-04:002010-04-16T15:56:26.576-04:00John,
yes, I disagree. It is actually hard to fin...John,<br /><br />yes, I disagree. It is actually hard to find any case of falsificationism in the history of science. That's just not the way science operates.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-91331124035695273352010-04-16T11:45:11.330-04:002010-04-16T11:45:11.330-04:00"I think the Duhem-Quine thesis does fatally ..."I think the Duhem-Quine thesis does fatally undermine any useful falsificationism."<br /><br />Help me out here. Falsification is a cornerstone of scientific method. Duhem-Quine states that no theory can be conclusively falsified via empirical means if the background assumptions are not proven (note operative words: "proven" and "conclusive").<br /><br />The hard sciences approach reality through probability analysis, which is always <i>provisional</i> to new data. Plain old experimental theory. Falsification is <i>fundamental</i> to achieving increasingly higher probabilities towards any given theory. You disagree? <br /><br />Ironically, Duhem-Quine couldn't exist without homage to the correctives of falsification. What D-Q ultimately seems to say is that "nothing is certain." Their argument seems more applicable to philosophy and epistemology than conventional hard science. Hard sciences deal with successive probability, not philosophical certainty.John Lhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05642239691210008441noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-70703136234809590292010-04-16T11:27:18.829-04:002010-04-16T11:27:18.829-04:00Arjan,
you're welcome!Arjan,<br /><br />you're welcome!Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-12412784380297955842010-04-16T10:44:23.968-04:002010-04-16T10:44:23.968-04:00Dear Massimo, meeting you really made my day. I co...Dear Massimo, meeting you really made my day. I couldn't have wished for a better present for my 31th birthday.<br /><br />I will email you the details of the conference in NYC.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-17865107751614333862010-04-15T18:39:32.257-04:002010-04-15T18:39:32.257-04:00Fujaro,
you may be reading too much in my critici...Fujaro,<br /><br />you may be reading too much in my criticism. I think the best answer is indeed some sort of pragmatism (which Hume himself endorsed), together with the realization that science is a web of knowledge, not an edifice built on a foundation.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-33740536237811582472010-04-15T14:20:55.404-04:002010-04-15T14:20:55.404-04:00Great post Massimo. I can't get enough of the ...Great post Massimo. I can't get enough of the subject you address. <br /><br />What I would like to understand is how you would alternatively reconcile the problem of induction (and its lack of resolution) with the fruits of the empirical method of science. On the one hand you seem quite confident that there are scientific truths, i.e. that there is some definite meaning (at least to us as humans) to truth in this perspective. On the other hand you seem resolute to dismiss any rigorous undergirdings for this. How then can we not conclude that scientific truths should receive the same skepsis as any supernatural claim? I thought I knew the answer to disentangle that one (something like the explanatory and predictive power of science, which is in essence is a pragmatic take on things) but you made me question it again by suggesting that any pragmatism is bunk.Aren't you professing some sort of pragmatism yourself when you hail the fruits of science and philosophy by presenting benefits in real world cases?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-53190227301243826632010-04-15T09:15:11.532-04:002010-04-15T09:15:11.532-04:00Mintman,
yes, I do not overestimate the power of ...Mintman,<br /><br />yes, I do not overestimate the power of philosophy myself, still the example of Judge Jones' decision is a clear instance of practical help given by philosophers to a science education cause.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-16164473058842741622010-04-15T07:27:08.788-04:002010-04-15T07:27:08.788-04:00Completely agreed, and understood.
By the way, wh...Completely agreed, and understood.<br /><br />By the way, when the religious fundies or even only cost-cutting short-sighted politicians gain so much momentum that they manage to threaten this bird's habitat, I doubt they will be cowed by a bold philosopher of science stepping in front of them... both groups are inherently immune to these kinds of arguments. Intellectual curiosity about the underpinnings of science sounds like the more convincing reason to appreciate its philosophy.Alex SLhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00801894164903608204noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-73953287483972298422010-04-15T06:54:15.059-04:002010-04-15T06:54:15.059-04:00Mintman,
my point was not that the bird ought to ...Mintman,<br /><br />my point was not that the bird ought to care about ornithology (except when the ornithologist comes to the rescue to avoid extinction!), but simply that ornithology is worth pursuing in its own right.<br /><br />Tony,<br /><br />yes, I liked Feynman a lot too, and I appreciate the humor. But his quip was a perfect introduction to my point.<br /><br />John,<br /><br />I think the Duhem-Quine thesis does fatally undermine any useful falsificationism. There is still quite a bit worthy of consideration in Popper's general ideas, but the thesis does show that one cannot, in principle, zero in and falsify a theory independently of its corollary assumptions. And the history of science backs this conclusion up spectacularly (e.g., Copernican theory, Newtonian mechanics).Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-21157822150559969512010-04-14T23:40:25.988-04:002010-04-14T23:40:25.988-04:00"The issue of induction is not yet settled..&..."The issue of induction is not yet settled.."<br /><br />No kidding :-)<br /><br />Falsification works, within its limits. Popper was right, but tried to take falsification too far. I don't see an issue here. Scientific falsification and philosophy of science are not mutually exclusive realms. Each has a place - why try to undermine one with another? Seems counterproductive.John Lhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05642239691210008441noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-61849967580702159832010-04-14T23:16:40.951-04:002010-04-14T23:16:40.951-04:00Tony Lloyd wrote:
I'd like to see the philoso...Tony Lloyd wrote:<br /><br /><i>I'd like to see the philosophy of science expand its horizons and treat science not as "something done by people in lab coats" but any attempt to understand the factual nature of the world.</i><br /><br />I think many members of the general public think of science as "something done by people in lab coats". Yet when asked to name a famous scientist, people commonly cite Albert Einstein, a theoretical scientist who didn't spend much (any?) time in a lab coat. <br /><br />It is well known to philosophy of science that doing science doesn't necessarily mean taking measurements yourself (much less conducting experiments). However I disagree with including "any attempt to understand the factual nature of the world" under the umbrella of science. Such a broad characterization would admit all sorts of activities—certain religious practices, for example—that have little to do with what is generally understood as science.Nick Barrowmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11224940659269649220noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-48673368384947506262010-04-14T17:44:30.000-04:002010-04-14T17:44:30.000-04:00Great post.
-r.c.Great post.<br /><br />-r.c.Rob Cullenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14987563840947860899noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-12801010864635921432010-04-14T17:06:26.109-04:002010-04-14T17:06:26.109-04:00Tired, late hour, and of course for matters like t...Tired, late hour, and of course for matters like this my lack of education is philosophy is fatal, so I will only raise two very small points apart from first saying that this is a very nice, eloquent post that makes a good case for philosophy of science.<br /><br />Nevertheless, (1) I personally, in my daily research, feel like the bird does about ornithology. It is nice to know that there are philosophers working on the problem of induction, sure, but I simply don't care about this particular issue. Partly because I would never get anything done if I did, partly because I see science as a natural, only very formalized and sophisticated extension of how we also try to understand the material world privately on a daily basis, starting as toddlers, and we also never worry about the induction when we learn that stinging nettle hurts and that smiling at mommy makes her smile back.<br /><br />(2) The Dover issue leads us back to what I wrote a few threads back. If science cannot examine the supernatural, what would a scientist do if we were to discover that sacrificing frogs to the Mayan water god Tlaloc reliably but miraculously caused rain clouds to form, P < 0.0001 and all? Walk away and say, "not my business, epistemic limits, can't examine this in more depth, gotta go"? Or would that by definition not be supernatural any more because it is reproducible? (Well, admittedly not to me either, as I would also consider a god part of nature if it existed.) But what, then, <i>is</i> supernatural? Nothing, it seems, making that point one a bit weird - it must either forbid scientist to examine certain evidence, or it says the same as point three, that there is no evidence for ID. I'm not an American, so this does not touch me as much, but that argumentation from Dover seems a tad unwise to me. I would have simply have said point three is the killer, and that's it.Alex SLhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00801894164903608204noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-5873300828024958462010-04-14T16:15:14.394-04:002010-04-14T16:15:14.394-04:00It was also a witty thing to say, should we cut Fe...It was also a witty thing to say, should we cut Feynman some slack for being funny? A very odd thing to say, though, for someone who said:<br /><br />http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b240PGCMwV0 <br /><br />( or http://tinyurl.com/ykfvyz5)<br /><br />I can't fit a cigarette paper between that and Popper.<br /><br />Speaking of Popper (and drifting off topic, because I am a Popper obsessive) I don't agree that the Duhem-Quine thesis undermines him. I think it makes things a lot more complex than a nice dichotomy between existential and universal statements, but the base logic still holds. And just to secure my credentials as a crank: induction doesn't exist!<br /><br />The more on-topic point is that I think one of Popper's greatest errors was with the criterion of demarcation. Not the criterion itself (which is fabulous) but with the goal of distinguishing <i>science</i> from <i>non-science</i>. Far too limited! I'd like to see the philosophy of science expand its horizons and treat science not as "something done by people in lab coats" but any attempt to understand the factual nature of the world.<br /><br />That partly links into your "third area". Popper's criterion not only provides a great way of distinguishing rational factual assertions from irrational factual assertions (and so could help cut through the bullshit in public discourse) but also helps distinguish factual assertions from other assertions.<br /><br /><b>"But scientists themselves should not be the only guardians of the huge societal resources that go into science, nor the only ones to make decisions about how to use the outcome of their work."</b><br /><br />I agree and think much of the problem is with an idea that there is "science" which scientists know about and that this is "their territory". But they are only competent <i>qua</i> scientists on factual assertions, and science funding mixes up a load of non-factual assertions. <br /><br />In trying to demarcate science from other stuff we miss out on demarcating what we should: that there are factual assertions and non-factual assertions (as you pointed out Sam Harris could do with a refresher course in this).Tony Lloydhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03740295390214409286noreply@blogger.com