tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post5576470199583373736..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Bow ties are coolUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger33125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-48395951947365929832013-04-12T10:30:01.257-04:002013-04-12T10:30:01.257-04:00now i'm as bad as a liberal pundit? make up yo...now i'm as bad as a liberal pundit? make up your minds! ;) <br /><br />funny thing: i was on campus one day, and i happened to be wearing a bowtie. someone with a petition walked up to me and asked me to sign it. after i learned what cause i would be signing a petition for, the person said to me: "i thought you'd be a good person to ask to sign this petition, because you're wearing a bowtie. bowties are very serious." i was a little surprised by this, as i kind of view bowties as a rather silly piece of clothing, especially in contrast to much of menswear offerings today. Hollywood Foreheadshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00841986519856353220noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-28173204840664522882013-04-11T13:48:34.924-04:002013-04-11T13:48:34.924-04:00Paul,
all I'm trying to establish is that the...Paul,<br /><br />all I'm trying to establish is that the word "true" has significantly different meanings in math and in science, because the former is grounded in logic, the latter in empirical evidence. I see ethical "truths" (no, I'm not using the scare quotes to invoke relativism!) as somewhere in between: empirical facts (about human nature) are crucial, but they underdetermine ethical conclusions, which is why we need to deploy philosophical resources and ethics is a branch of philosophy, not science. I hope this helps.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-54014990627698072272013-04-10T20:44:39.730-04:002013-04-10T20:44:39.730-04:00Scott,
Regarding the notion of objective truth -...Scott, <br /><br />Regarding the notion of objective truth - in whatever sense of 'objective' - I think of this less as the highest standard of knowledge than as an indispensable concern of workaday linguistic communication. The notion of truth arises from the capacity of language to represent the world accurately or inaccurately and 'objectivity' is used to make ontological or epistemological points about truth. <br /><br />Historically philosophical ethics has had two levels of discourse: ethics proper, i.e. actual questions about what is ethical and unethical; and metaethics, i.e. concern with fleshing-out the meanings of ethical concepts. One kind of skepticism arose from metaethical concerns; e.g. that it isn't coherent to say that ethic predicates are true or false of anything. <br /><br />With the maturing of scientism, it seems a new kind of discourse is entering philosophy. This is the discourse of philosophers who think that it has become primarily the task of science (brain science, evolutionary biology) to tell us the nature of ethics. We need to find out our ethical wiring and discover the "moral molecule." <br /><br />An second kind of skepticism is built-in to this third discourse, think. This exists in the implied view that the best vantage point to understand ethics is a third-person empirical one - i.e., treating ethics as a feature of certain evolving organisms - as opposed to that of an ethical subject or agent. The idea seems to be that ethics from the agent's point of view is unscientific and no longer worthy of taking seriously. This is effectively the elimination of philosophical ethics in favor of new areas of science and hence new areas of philosophy of science. What is lost - or at least at risk of being lost - is the sense that ethical concerns are real concerns, i.e. about something real. <br /><br />While some might praise philosophy's newfound scientificness, all I see is ideology that is easing the collapse of philosophical culture into the pharmaceutical industry. In the future rather than sharp ethical thinkers like Michael Sandel and Peter Singer, we'll simply have Walmart, endless Walmarts. <br /><br />Okay - I know I'm being way over the top, but hopefully interestingly so ;)<br /><br />Regarding the position I intended about math, I suppose I am an anti-realist about math if this means denying the mind-independent existence of mathematic entities. <br /><br />I think mathematic entities exist but I think they exist in virtue of being stipulated to exist. My view of existence is that it is not incompatible with a univocal notion of existence to say that some sorts of entities are such that they exist simple because we say they do. I think what confuses Platonists is the assumption that we must be able to figure out how e.g. numbers fit in with broad philosophical reality. Arguments I have heard (ostensibly intelligent) Platonists give include noting that if each person has the number 7 in their minds, that's too many 7s! Hence the number 7 can't be in our minds. I think the flaw of such thinking is the assumption that it makes sense to talk about where the number 7 is, or how many there are. When we read a development of fundamental math where math entities are put forth to exist, it's just silly to as where it is. Math entities have and only have the properties they are stipulated to have and those that follow logically from relevant definitions. <br /><br />Paul Paolinihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04580285404702244031noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-9301277552437744012013-04-10T14:25:05.148-04:002013-04-10T14:25:05.148-04:00Paul, I'm sympathetic to your argument in this...Paul, I'm sympathetic to your argument in this way: I think it's a problem that, given two contradictory ethical systems, it's unclear how to adjudicate between them unless we adopt some higher standard that "trumps" both of them. And given a chain of such disagreements, we seem to keep seeking higher and higher standards, so it seems reasonable to posit some hypothetical "highest" standard. I think we're accustomed to thinking about "objective truth" as that highest standard in many disciplines (even if our knowledge of that objective truth will always be partial, and so we will never finally reach that standard).<br /><br />But Massimo's point seems to be (and correct me if I'm wrong, Massimo) that in the case of morality, that highest standard may not be the kind of objective truth that follows from realism. It seems reasonable to suggest that we could continue seeking higher standards in a way that doesn't necessarily reach towards a final objective truth, but that leads to a set of standards that resolves our disagreements effectively. In this sense the highest standard is simply the highest standard that we have reached so far. There's still a universalizing impulse in this way of thinking about morality -- it still entails a kind of truth-seeking behavior -- but I don't think it's necessarily moral realism.<br /><br />A last note: you say "my view is that mathematical truths are true simply definitionally, tautologically, or in virtue of the meanings of words." But it seems that this view makes you an anti-realist about mathematics. Is that what you intend?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11332828263550581927noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-30984918968336212272013-04-10T09:40:12.499-04:002013-04-10T09:40:12.499-04:00"Some years ago, while giving a lecture to an..."Some years ago, while giving a lecture to an international audience of elite mathematicians in Berkeley, I asked how many of them were Platonists. About three-quarters raised their hands." (Jim Holt, NYTimes)<br /><br />That sounds about right. I would have believed even higher. (I, of course, am not.)<br /><br /><a href="http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05E7D7133DF930A25752C0A96E9C8B63" rel="nofollow">query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05E7D7133DF930A25752C0A96E9C8B63</a><br />Philip Thrifthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03021615111948806998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-77881373312320207342013-04-10T09:16:13.863-04:002013-04-10T09:16:13.863-04:00Okay, so I just wonder what you meant by "tru...Okay, so I just wonder what you meant by "true in the strong sense" in the statement below.<br /><br />>No, it doesn’t, because there are infinite combinations of axioms, premises, and so forth, and no way to really establish that any particular subset is true in the strong sense above.<Paul Paolinihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04580285404702244031noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-33804534308773760332013-04-10T08:22:45.674-04:002013-04-10T08:22:45.674-04:00Paul,
> My point has been that we must regard ...Paul,<br /><br />> My point has been that we must regard ethical statements as having the properties of truth/falsity and objectivity if ethics is to be a coherent concern. <<br /><br />I understand, I think, and I was arguing that you are constraining the options too much.<br /><br />> I was reacting to a sense I got from earlier comments that ethics is just a matter of conventions <<br /><br />Which I’m pretty sure I never argued for.<br /><br />> that it doesn't make sense to think of "ethical rules" as "out there" in some "cosmic" sense to be a denial of ethical objectivity <<br /><br />If by objectivity you mean that ethical truths are on par with, say, truths about physics, yes. But I was also arguing that the objective-subjective dichotomy is too strict. I think ethics is, to a point, non-arbitrary, in a sense similar to (but not identical) the way in which mathematics is non-arbitrary, and yet mathematical truths are also not on par with physical ones.<br /><br />> I think the Platonist idea that such truths are "about" a mind-independent reality is a confusion <<br /><br />I think that’s an open question, really, and as you know there is an interesting literature on mathematical Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics.<br /><br />> The main difference is that while extra-linguistic reality bears on ethical statements (including ethical axioms) it does not bear on mathematic statements. <<br /><br />Yes, which is why the analogy is partial. But that extra-linguistic reality is made of the facts of human evolution as a social species, it’s not “cosmic” in the sense of being independent of the only contingent beings (that we know of) to which ethical reasoning applies at all.<br /><br />> It seems you assume that there's a distinction between math that is merely play with symbols/meanings and math that captures some feature of extralinguistic reality (a la the speed of light). <<br /><br />No, I don’t, sorry for the confusion. The speed of light example was to differentiate physical from mathematical truths.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-84050927356248457502013-04-10T04:16:36.342-04:002013-04-10T04:16:36.342-04:00On the other side, liberal pundit Jonathan Capehar...On the other side, liberal pundit Jonathan Capehart is noted for occasionally wearing bow ties.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.mediaite.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/jonathan-capehart-cain.jpg" rel="nofollow">www.mediaite.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/jonathan-capehart-cain.jpg</a>Philip Thrifthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03021615111948806998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-6693938123481225772013-04-10T02:00:05.256-04:002013-04-10T02:00:05.256-04:00p.s. Above I should have said 'error' rath...p.s. Above I should have said 'error' rather than 'confusion' as the latter has a needless ad hominem quality and harshness to it. That said, I think Platonism is involved in confusions of the kind Wittgenstein tried to clarify.Paul Paolinihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04580285404702244031noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-27270704255430413722013-04-09T18:59:21.152-04:002013-04-09T18:59:21.152-04:00I like bowties... so i'm as bad as a conservat...I like bowties... so i'm as bad as a conservative pundit?Hollywood Foreheadshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00841986519856353220noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-72645477953404794662013-04-09T14:53:31.857-04:002013-04-09T14:53:31.857-04:00Massimo,
>But my point is that it isn’t clear ...Massimo,<br /><br />>But my point is that it isn’t clear what you mean by “true” here. <<br /><br />I mentioned that I'm not claiming to know exactly *how* ethical claims are true. My point has been that we must regard ethical statements as having the properties of truth/falsity and objectivity if ethics is to be a coherent concern. I was reacting to a sense I got from earlier comments that ethics is just a matter of conventions that are best looked at e.g. anthropologically, as opposed to as a domain of truth that can be approached as such. I took the claims by you, Mark, Chis, and perhaps others, that it doesn't make sense to think of "ethical rules" as "out there" in some "cosmic" sense to be a denial of ethical objectivity (and hence truth) in slightly mocking way. My point regarding this was that ethics must be "out there" at least in the sense that there's a language independent reality that ethics is about and which makes ethical statements true/false.<br /><br />But regarding truth, I think any analogy between math and ethics on the matter is very limited. My view is that mathematical truths are true simply definitionally, tautologically, or in virtue of the meanings of words. I think the Platonist idea that such truths are "about" a mind-independent reality is a confusion (to put is mildly). At any rate, while a view of ethics might be developed in the style of a deductive system, this doesn't mean that ethical definitions and "axioms" are logically akin to mathematical definitions and axioms. The main difference is that while extra-linguistic reality bears on ethical statements (including ethical axioms) it does not bear on mathematic statements. <br /><br />>> (my statement) If one thinks of mathematical statements such that mathematical definitions, axioms, and premises are parts of full mathematical statements, the arbitrariness you allude to goes away, I think. <<<br /><br />> (your statement) No, it doesn’t, because there are infinite combinations of axioms, premises, and so forth, and no way to really establish that any particular subset is true in the strong sense above.<<br /><br />It seems you assume that there's a distinction between math that is merely play with symbols/meanings and math that captures some feature of extralinguistic reality (a la the speed of light). I think the latter idea is a confusion. While math can be used to model reality, external reality does not bear in a true/false sense on math at all.<br /><br /><br /><br />Paul Paolinihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04580285404702244031noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-42638111646286400562013-04-09T10:39:33.890-04:002013-04-09T10:39:33.890-04:00Paul,
> we cannot believe ethical statements w...Paul,<br /><br />> we cannot believe ethical statements without believing they are true; we cannot believe that someone else is wrong in denying an ethical claim without believing that the ethical claim is true. These are just general logical facts about ethical language. <<br /><br />But my point is that it isn’t clear what you mean by “true” here. Again, consider the analogy with math: the Pythagorean theorem is true IF we begin with the axioms of plane geometry. It would be better to be that it is a logical entailment of those axions. So for ethical systems: IF (for instance) we agree that whatever increases the happiness of the majority of people is good THEN certain things follow logically. But these things are not *true* in anywhere near the same sense that it is true that the speed of light is approximately 299 792 458 m/s.<br /><br />> I've come to view that any view of ethics other than (not-necessarily-Platonic) moral realism is a kind of moral skepticism. <<br /><br />And I think you are wrong about that, see example above.<br /><br />> If one thinks of mathematical statements such that mathematical definitions, axioms, and premises are parts of full mathematical statements, the arbitrariness you allude to goes away, I think. <<br /><br />No, it doesn’t, because there are infinite combinations of axioms, premises, and so forth, and no way to really establish that any particular subset is true in the strong sense above.<br /><br />Chris,<br /><br />> I hope you are right that slavery will never come back (I probably read too much dystopian SF). Still, I was referring more to the bigger schools of thought - your own position of virtue ethics seems to me to be an example of a cyclical recurrence in ethics. <<br /><br />Ah, but now we are talking meta-ethics, which I do think is a different kettle of fish. And as you point out, virtue ethics never really went away. Even so, I wouldn’t call fluctuations in meta-ethical preferences “fashion.” There is genuine disagreement based on good reasoning about which framework is better, and ultimately I do think that there are multiple defensible positions in the vast logical landscape that describes meta-ethical stands.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-65908341397945150402013-04-09T05:54:29.529-04:002013-04-09T05:54:29.529-04:00Yes, but then nobody was disputing that, were they...Yes, but then nobody was disputing that, were they (we)?chbieckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11038854944875543524noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-90695921686554270902013-04-08T19:12:55.899-04:002013-04-08T19:12:55.899-04:00Chris,
No, I don't mean to claim that there&#...Chris,<br /><br />No, I don't mean to claim that there's a completed ethical code floating about in Plato's heaven. I mean to say only that there must be some reality that ethical claims are about or else anything goes. <br />Paul Paolinihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04580285404702244031noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-15190375422456592072013-04-08T17:15:37.481-04:002013-04-08T17:15:37.481-04:00Paul,
now I really don't know what you mean wi...Paul,<br />now I really don't know what you mean with ethical truth. Are you saying there is an objective set of ethics that "exists" (whatever that means) beyond the context of us being human? I.e. that Daleks (highly intelligent non-benign non-humans aliens), paperclips and humans would agree on as true? I seriously doubt that - and I also don't see why it's necessary. Just because bow ties and ethics are degrees of "arbitrariness" doesn't mean that talking about ethics is "just talking about bow ties". Humans aren't just amoebe just because both are life form, are we?<br /><br />Cheers<br />Chrischbieckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11038854944875543524noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-58175084555912373092013-04-08T13:45:29.659-04:002013-04-08T13:45:29.659-04:00Chris,
Interesting observation about the senses o...Chris,<br /><br />Interesting observation about the senses of 'arbitrary'. Yes, I was using 'arbitrary' to mean roughly a lack of necessity as opposed to open to choice. <br /><br />My main point has been that while ethical *understandings* - e.g. our particular concerns, terms, and framings of issues - is at least to some extent arbitrary (in both relevant senses), ethical *truth* is not at all arbitrary in either sense. I began my criticism here with the charge that ethical understanding and ethical truth are here (in comments prior to mine) being conflated. <br /><br />This conflation is a special case of conflating what is believed with what is true, i.e. between ways of thinking and the reality as it bears on that way of thinking. There are many different ways we could have thought about ethics, but in each case there's a reality that distinguishes truth and falsity in that way of thinking. <br /><br />My other main point was that if we don't acknowledge a non-arbitrary ethical truth above and beyond particular ways of understanding, then ethics as a whole collapses into complete arbitrariness, in the sense that no ethical view is any more right than any other. It becomes like tie fashion. <br /><br />In recent history, the notion of absolute truth has been derided as cultural imperialism in disguise and based on the metaphysically dubious view that etched into reality is one and only one correct way of thinking. I think this is an unfortunate confusion. That there are many different ways that our understanding of the world has been, or could have been, validly constructed is not ruled out by the notion of a single reality that bears on whatever way we think. So, to emphasize my main point, I think it's important to maintain a clear distinction between how we have come to think about ethics, on the one hand, and ethical truth or reality, on the other. Without that latter, we're just talking about bow ties. <br /><br />Paul Paolinihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04580285404702244031noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-80522761824612347792013-04-08T11:33:02.298-04:002013-04-08T11:33:02.298-04:00Massimo,
> I see your point, but I doubt it. O...Massimo,<br /><br />> I see your point, but I doubt it. On the contrary, roughly speaking morality seems to make progress while fashion is definitely more recurring (and even that, within limits: do you think we’ll see a return of togas any time soon? ;-)<br /><br />Think of slavery: once abolished in a society, as a result of that society arriving at the moral decision that slavery is wrong, I don’t think there is any going back. <<br /><br />@Togas - that's what I meant when I said _more_ cyclical ;-)<br /><br />I hope you are right that slavery will never come back (I probably read too much dystopian SF). Still, I was referring more to the bigger schools of thought - your own position of virtue ethics seems to me to be an example of a cyclical recurrence in ethics. (Sure it never went away, but neither did bow ties.)<br /><br />Cheers<br />Chris<br /><br />chbieckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11038854944875543524noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-9540139109307098672013-04-08T07:45:52.880-04:002013-04-08T07:45:52.880-04:00This last discussion inspired me to collect all I&...This last discussion inspired me to collect all I've written about or referenced regarding intentionalism (Jan Mycielski: "The term intentionalism is chosen for its contrast with extensionalism which accepts actually infinite sets and leads naturally to Platonism.") in one page (or "bow tie!"):<br /><br /><a href="http://poesophicalbits.blogspot.com/2013/04/intentionalism.html" rel="nofollow">poesophicalbits.blogspot.com/2013/04/intentionalism.html</a>Philip Thrifthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03021615111948806998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-50513128133854935552013-04-08T07:07:19.887-04:002013-04-08T07:07:19.887-04:00Paul,
from your post and Massimo's answer, it ...Paul,<br />from your post and Massimo's answer, it seems that you and he (and me, I'm with Massimo here) are using different meanings for the word arbitrary. Checking Merriam-Webster, you are using the third meaning while we are using the first.<br /><br />By the definition you are using, you'd have to say that all laws and customs are arbitrary, even when they are based on solid principles that every member of a given society agrees on, simply because they are not determined by the intrinsic nature of anything.<br /><br />In that sense, yes, human ethics are arbitrary, and they can hardly be anything else, because they are based on our individual preferences and reasoning as humans. The Daleks probably have a system of ethics, too, only that includes consideration for humans in a way that ours includes consideration for trees. Can we "discover" a system of ethics that includes both? No, we'd have to agree on it - starting with updating our premises (assuming the goal is still some form of flourishing: what does that mean and for whom?)<br /><br />Cheers<br />Chrischbieckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11038854944875543524noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-44713208870638667622013-04-08T00:23:06.005-04:002013-04-08T00:23:06.005-04:00Massimo,
>Ethics can also be a human construct...Massimo,<br /><br />>Ethics can also be a human construct and yet not being arbitrary, because connected to human needs and to the unique ability of humans to reflect on those needs.<<br /><br />I don't disagree with this point, in fact I think I made it in my post.<br /><br />>Why not? Unless you are a mathematical Platonist (a position that, as you know, I actually take seriously) you should say that there are no objective mathematical truths either, only non-arbitrary statements that follow logically from certain premises. Change the premises, and different statements will follow. Why can that not be the case in ethics, where I think the case for moral realism is far weaker than the one for mathematical realism?<<br /><br />I'm not claiming (here at least) to know how ethical statements can be true. My point really centers the coherence of our language regarding ethical statements: we cannot believe ethical statements without believing they are true; we cannot believe that someone else is wrong in denying an ethical claim without believing that the ethical claim is true. These are just general logical facts about ethical language. I believe therefore that if ethical language is coherent at all, there must be a way in which ethical claims have truth values. Btw, after writing my post I realized that I've come to view that any view of ethics other than (not-necessarily-Platonic) moral realism is a kind of moral skepticism. <br /><br />On the matter of whether mathematics requires Platonism for objectivity, I think not. If one thinks of mathematical statements such that mathematical definitions, axioms, and premises are parts of full mathematical statements, the arbitrariness you allude to goes away, I think. <br /><br /><br /><br />Paul Paolinihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04580285404702244031noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-84881758816276016642013-04-07T10:46:01.886-04:002013-04-07T10:46:01.886-04:00Paul,
> The only thing that can elevate ethica...Paul,<br /><br />> The only thing that can elevate ethical statements above statements about fashion and other sorts of statements that we would regard as more or less subjective, is appeal to objective truth. <<br /><br />I disagree, this seems to me a false dichotomy. Ethics can also be a human construct and yet not being arbitrary, because connected to human needs and to the unique ability of humans to reflect on those needs.<br /><br />> the statement that women should have equal rights is not coherently defensible unless it is objectively true. <<br /><br />Why not? Unless you are a mathematical Platonist (a position that, as you know, I actually take seriously) you should say that there are no objective mathematical truths either, only non-arbitrary statements that follow logically from certain premises. Change the premises, and different statements will follow. Why can that not be the case in ethics, where I think the case for moral realism is far weaker than the one for mathematical realism?<br /><br />> I don't think there's any general logical difference between ethics and physics. Truths of physics aren't "out there" any more than truths of ethics are; both are constructs (understandings) that allow us to capture objective truths. <<br /><br />I agree with the first part, but I don’t see any good reason to believe that ethical truths are “out there” in the same sense as physical truths. (On math, as I said, I’m agnostic with a sympathy for objectivity...)Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-42157196304719229882013-04-06T17:30:49.599-04:002013-04-06T17:30:49.599-04:00chbieck, Björn, Mark, Massimo,
To me it seems all...chbieck, Björn, Mark, Massimo,<br /><br />To me it seems all of you, in your own ways, conflate or identify ethical understanding with ethical truth and thereby are more or less unwitting ethical skeptics. <br /><br />If there is nothing to ethics but evolving understandings of a certain kind, then ethics is as arbitrary as tie fashion. The only thing that can elevate ethical statements above statements about fashion and other sorts of statements that we would regard as more or less subjective, is appeal to objective truth. There's no way around this fact and ignoring it doesn't help either.<br /><br />To illustrate, the statement that women should have equal rights is not coherently defensible unless it is objectively true. If one does not think this statement is objectively true, asserting it is a nonsensical or empty act, as it claiming that someone who disagrees is wrong. <br /><br />I know that most people here have studied enough ethics to know that I'm talking about classic issue in ethics, so it seems to me there is a sort of slippage into something that only seems non-skeptical due to avoiding the difficult questions.<br /><br />I would agree that our ethical understanding is a cultural construct. But so are physics and math, yet they manage to pick-out objective truths. So talk of "human invention" or "layer of culture" etc. as a way to try to limit the possible veracity or objectivity of ethics is misguided. Personally, I don't think there's any general logical difference between ethics and physics. Truths of physics aren't "out there" any more than truths of ethics are; both are constructs (understandings) that allow us to capture objective truths. <br /><br />As a final point, that our ethical understandings are in some sense and degree contingent and arbitrary doesn't mean that our understandings do not capture some domain of objective truth. Paul Paolinihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04580285404702244031noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-75064918167409197762013-04-06T11:25:56.860-04:002013-04-06T11:25:56.860-04:00Bow ties, cosmic law, ethics, and gay marriage,
Ha...Bow ties, cosmic law, ethics, and gay marriage,<br />Have you lost your Way?<br /><br />= = MJAhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01897595473268353450noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-18882745728939111892013-04-06T08:12:54.824-04:002013-04-06T08:12:54.824-04:00Chris,
> Fashion is more cyclical (I would lik...Chris,<br /><br />> Fashion is more cyclical (I would like to believe some things never come back, though ;-) ) - not sure how much ethical views cycle back. <<br /><br />I see your point, but I doubt it. On the contrary, roughly speaking morality seems to make progress while fashion is definitely more recurring (and even that, within limits: do you think we’ll see a return of togas any time soon? ;-)<br /><br />Think of slavery: once abolished in a society, as a result of that society arriving at the moral decision that slavery is wrong, I don’t think there is any going back.<br /><br />Björn,<br /><br />> Is aesthetics wholly ruled by arbitrary conventions, or might there be some non-arbitrary factors that should inform our aesthetic reasoning in the same way that there are non-arbitrary factors that inform our moral reasoning? <<br /><br />Good question. I don’t think aesthetics either is entirely arbitrary. For instance, I see how studies on the physiology of human perception may explain — very broadly speaking — why we like paintings with symmetrical features, or (most of us, anyway) dislike atonal music. But I don’t think those explanations go very far. As philosophers say, they drastically underdetermined our aesthetic preferences.<br /><br />Mark,<br /><br />> I only have one quibble here. And that is about the 'equal rights' talk. <<br /><br />Oh yes, let me clarify: like Bentham, I think that talk of “natural rights” is, as he put it, nonsense on stilts. For me rights are entirely human constructions, reflecting certain agreements we have reached within a society about morality. Even so, it makes perfect sense to say that a society that gives the right to marry to heterosexuals should give it also to homosexual, because to do so would be to discriminate against a group of people on the basis of their sexual orientation. And that is something we have already decided is not acceptable in other areas, like employment.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-79947128995970434022013-04-06T05:16:12.448-04:002013-04-06T05:16:12.448-04:00Leaving aside the question of whether bow ties are...Leaving aside the question of whether bow ties are cool (they seem to suit you, Massimo, which is the main thing), I only have one quibble here. And that is about the 'equal rights' talk. You can argue that we should allow gay marriage because it enhances social harmony and the individual pursuit of happiness and fulfilment or whatever, but talk of 'equal rights' introduces what I see as unnecessary abstraction and even, possibly, metaphysical presuppositions.<br /><br />Ethics is not about abstraction and nor, as you say, are moral rules somehow 'out there' in a cosmic or metaphysical sense.Mark Englishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506844097173520312noreply@blogger.com