tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post4847644866566341731..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: On the scope of skeptical inquiryUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger141125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-65919867914484776762009-12-11T11:55:55.754-05:002009-12-11T11:55:55.754-05:00perspicio: Like Massimo, I reject your principle ...perspicio: Like Massimo, I reject your principle (b) about science requiring non-belief for the non-empirical; I offer mathematics and logic as counterexamples that are very useful in science. External realism is possibly another, though I suppose it could be argued that isn't a supposition of science.<br /><br />Your talk of preserving the epistemological integrity of the boundaries of science doesn't seem to me to be consistent with the actual history of science, in which those boundaries have regularly been demonstrated to be quite flexible. Thomas Gieryn's discussion of John Tyndall's distinctions between science and religion, on the one hand, and between science and "mechanics" (engineering), in his 1983 paper on "Boundary work" makes the case pretty well, I think.<br /><br />Massimo: Reading your latest in _SI_ about pure vs. applied science made me also think of Gieryn's paper, and Plato's distinction between episteme and techne.Lippardhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16826768452963498005noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-19325259799195791052009-11-04T14:07:39.850-05:002009-11-04T14:07:39.850-05:00oops..the paragraph should read "difficult to...oops..the paragraph should read "difficult to resolve in a satisfactory way". Did I mention that to err is human as well? :}Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-81714502537371477882009-11-04T14:03:32.503-05:002009-11-04T14:03:32.503-05:00Massimo,
Thanks for the reference to what has bec...Massimo,<br /><br />Thanks for the reference to what has become known as the "Problem of Induction" (and another thank you to that Scottish troublemaker David Hume!)<br />As you've patiently explained, philosophers have continued to wrestle with this issue,for example, whether inductive logic, as Hilary Putnam has written "formalized like deductive logic", what it means to say a certain phenomenon is "law-like" and so on. These questions, (like much of philosophy?!!)appear simple on their surface, but may in fact, be quite gnarly and tangled, and difficult to resolve satisfactory way. Which reminds me, another pointer here might be Nelson Goodman's "Fact, Fiction and Forecast" (also cited, if I remember correctly in Rawls' book.) <br /><br />Much thanks for keeping the conversation going and on target.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-2622078990009040312009-11-04T07:42:41.543-05:002009-11-04T07:42:41.543-05:00Tully,
I appreciate the comments. A few additiona...Tully,<br /><br />I appreciate the comments. A few additional suggestions:<br /><br />On induction: "One, it works ... Two, it's tentative."<br /><br />Wouldn't disagree. But to say that it works is to use inductive reasoning, which is logically circular. To say that it is tentative doesn't add anything to its justification. Philosophy of science offers very interesting and intricate discussions of induction and other bases for science, and one learns a lot (and becomes more humble) by becoming familiar with them.<br /><br />"c'mon! Is anyone actually going to argue for that as a world-view?"<br /><br />No, that's not the point. The point is to show that by far the *biggest* claim to existence (i.e., the one that applies to the entire universe) cannot be substantiated by science. If *that's* not an example of "someone proposing that X exists and that X has an effect on the natural world" I don't know what is. Which undermines your third point.<br /><br />On the laws of nature: "you got me, I can't. But neither can anyone else."<br /><br />How do you know? There are sophisticated discussions in philosophy about what laws of nature are, and even whether they actually exist, and these discussion are completely unknown to most people, who nonetheless gingerly proceed with grand statements about the powers of science.<br /><br />This whole exercise was to show that science has pretty obvious limits, and that philosophical analysis is not hogwash. Remember that philosophy isn't supposed to solve scientific problems, we got science for that, and it works very well, even though we don't exactly understand why...Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-53013527418863773382009-11-03T21:16:55.817-05:002009-11-03T21:16:55.817-05:00Massimo,
Thanks. I do continually try to better ...Massimo,<br /><br />Thanks. I do continually try to better understand philosophy. Sometimes I just need it presented a little more directly. You did that and I am grateful.<br /><br />I'm getting there, so let me give you my take on the three foundations you cite:<br /><br />1)"try to justify the fundamental scientific principle of induction"<br /><br />Well, if you were discussing magnetic induction I would present volumes of evidence and ask for any refutations. But I assume you are asking about logical induction. I can justify it for two reasons. One it works (is that pragmatism?). If I drop a ball four hundred times and it falls to the ground, how could I not assume on the 401th time it won't fall to the ground again? Two, it's tentative. If on the 401st toss the ball rises, I either must establish possible uncontrolled variables or withdraw my theory of gravity (I would look for the variables). Either way, is there a methodology out there that has higher probability of describing the world as we see it and making successful predictions? Is there a way of knowing that says I should ignore the first 400 tosses and then base decisions on ignoring them?<br /><br />2) "to prove scientifically that there is a physical world out there"<br /><br />Got me there. We could all be living in the Matrix. Good enough. If Morphius comes to me on my computer I'll take that up for action. In the mean time, c'mon! Is anyone actually going to argue for that as a world-view? Let me see them live it first.<br /><br />3) "or try to tell me what exactly are the laws of nature"<br /><br />Again, you got me, I can't. But neither can anyone else. However, if you want to understand nature as it exists and make accurate predictions about what will happen in the future, the methods of science are MAGNITUDES more accurate than any competitor. Like I said, the laws we come up with are tentative. But that is what makes them so successful.<br /><br />Consequently, if someone wants to propose that being X exists and that being X has an effect on the natural world, science is still the best (although given not perfect) arbiter have that question.<br /><br />To deny that, is to deny such a large body of evidence that it is equivalent to expecting the ball to fall up.<br /><br />That is my take. It may very well be philosophically weak. Like I said, I'm not philosophically oriented. But in the world I live in, actions have consequences and there is no substitute for the data. If there is a better way, I'm willing to learn.M. Tullyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06056410184615941086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-28231173380807876802009-11-03T07:18:08.926-05:002009-11-03T07:18:08.926-05:00Tully,
I said science was epistemically limited, ...Tully,<br /><br />I said science was epistemically limited, I didn't say that we have a better way to go about studying reality. Moreover, examples of things that are simply not accessible to science, and yet are foundational to its function, are easy to find: try to justify the fundamental scientific principle of induction; or to prove scientifically that there is a physical world out there; or try to tell me what exactly are the laws of nature. And so on.<br /><br />K,<br /><br />please read what I wrote carefully before commenting: I never said atheism is an ideology (although it can be, for some people). I said it is a philosophical position, which it is. As for the role of science in atheism, I believe I have explained my position clearly and ad nauseam. If you don't agree you don't agree.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-55305138833990880242009-11-03T05:59:48.161-05:002009-11-03T05:59:48.161-05:00What a load of codswallop, or should I say, godswa...What a load of codswallop, or should I say, godswallop.<br /><br />First, atheism is not an ideology, it is an absence of one. It is scientific because it doesn't make claims, it tests them. Just as in science those who draw conclusions and only select evidence to fit are considered frauds, so it is with religious malarky.<br /><br />Second, atheism is predicated upon the same basic rule of logic is science and the law: <b>all propositions are deemed false until proven true</b>. Only verifiable data is collected, only things which are falsifiable are considered, and only theories which are testable are accepted.<br /><br />To talk of atheism as a philosophy is to lend false credence to religion. Such credibility has never been shown by any religion, and never be given.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16444343200066411038noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-60372181255864181102009-11-02T19:18:29.549-05:002009-11-02T19:18:29.549-05:00"Science is a very powerful but epistemically..."Science is a very powerful but epistemically limited activity."<br /><br />Alright Massimo, educate me here. Exactly what would/should I look at as existing in the universe, that I would apply some other epistemology beside empiricism to make a high probability prediction?<br /><br />I'm making case for empiricism, not science per se. If the scientific establishment decided tomorrow to adopt revelation as an epistemological standard, I'd drop it like a bad habit.<br /><br />To me existence, by definition, implies interaction. When it comes to understanding interaction, science by far has set the bar. If I should adopt a better definition for existence please point me in a direction that would change my mind.M. Tullyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06056410184615941086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-61769058328417832542009-10-30T01:05:34.485-04:002009-10-30T01:05:34.485-04:00@Massimo
"theism is not about (empirically v...@Massimo<br /><br />"theism is not about (empirically verifiable) facts"<br /><br />Massimo, you've defined the terms such that you can't be wrong. Your conclusion is ineluctable from your definitions. Perhaps you find some intellectual satisfaction from considering the least ridiculous form of theism, i.e. the "god of the shadows" who shuns empirically verifiable interactions. Fine, have fun with that. It is important. I understand why combating the ridiculous incarnations of theism (YEC, e.g.) would be entirely unappealing to you. Cada uno a su gusto.<br /><br />But it is hubris for you to declare that the target of your intellectual pastime is the "proper" understanding of religion. Not only that, it is flat out wrong unless you are willing to label a lot of people "improperly religious". If the only consequence of your advocacy were a peculiar convention that could be allowed in your seminars and only imposed a translation burden on your seminar guests, that'd be fine.<br /><br />But no, sitting as you do, on a perch of academic distinction, you spread your convention in a very damaging way. I am already beset by cries of "science can't speak to religion!" when I try to explain that the fit of any model to empirical evolutionary phenomena is worsened when the interlocutor's personal god is part of said model. This isn't philosophical. The fit doesn't improve AND I'm forced to add more parameters. Good scientific reason to reject inserting god into the model.<br /><br />Of course, such religious people don't pursue the nuance like you have here. Rather they just dogmatically assert the same perspective you are espousing here stripped of the nuance (ironic eh?).<br /><br />I have never had a debate with someone who believed nor have found the need or desire to struggle against a religious idea that fit your non-empirical standard that defines the way you see "theism".<br /><br />Now, just change your terms "theism" and "atheism" into "deism" and "adeism" then you wouldn't be running roughshod all over established conventions and I'd have no qualms with your post. And you wouldn't appear so <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19775" rel="nofollow">allenorresque</a>.J.J. Emersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06005635061756895272noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-51409542816700575042009-10-30T00:15:51.758-04:002009-10-30T00:15:51.758-04:00Massimo hoists belief in the rationality of morali...Massimo hoists belief in the rationality of morality on a slope above belief in the rationality of mathematics. So, he basically says, if you're going to reject morality, what next? Math?<br /><br />Acceptance of basic moral axioms is also on a slippery slope above acceptance of just about any obscure axiom anyone wants to invent. If one claims (by some axiom taken at face value) that some things really are right or wrong, you could also say that Miles Davis is cool in some realistic sense (not just a subjective sense). I find this slope much more dangerous and philosophically obtuse.<br /><br />I really find it suspect to compare an axiom like Modus Tollens to the belief that happiness is a fundamental good. One of them is a fundament of reason - there just is no reason without logic. The other one is not a key component of reason.Joseph Frantzhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09002838588050900281noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-39555413530478286002009-10-29T21:03:51.374-04:002009-10-29T21:03:51.374-04:00Blue Ridge,
hmm, I actually do think that much re...Blue Ridge,<br /><br />hmm, I actually do think that much religious argumentation is either incoherent or non rationally defensible. The part that is rationally defensible, like Augustine's, or better Aquinas', can very effectively be criticized on philosophical grounds.<br /><br />That's the problem with religion: if it's taken to be a matter of faith, then rationality just doesn't enter into it. If it is defended on rational grounds, it is pretty easy to show that it is not a tenable position.<br /><br />And I don't particularly care for Armstrong's ideas either, I find them rather vacuous and fluffy. But of course that would take a whole other post.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-64804183893843039692009-10-29T18:28:46.441-04:002009-10-29T18:28:46.441-04:00Massimo said: the main difference between religion...Massimo said: <i>the main difference between religion/faith and rational values as the object of moral philosophy is that in the latter case one builds arguments based on reason.</i><br /><br />You're not saying that religious argumentation is necessarily incoherent, I hope? The Vatican spends much effort making their discourse systematic. You may disagree with Karen Armstrong's ideas, but I haven't heard anyone criticize her scholarship. Augustine, "a towering figure of midieval philosophy". Not to mention the vast Buddhist literature, etc etc etc.<br /><br />"All arguments come from assumptions", quite so. And they can only be justified, as Mintman said, "by working consistently over centuries, by not disappointing us ever after the initial leap of faith taken to accept them." And Science has been uniquely successful in providing (...somewhat...) simple explanations about interesting topics such as the cladistic nature of the biosphere or how to build large, stable, affordable buildings. <br /><br />One of the assumptions or axioms of Science is Atheism... "no god" or demons in the Chem Lab jiggling molecules in extra-thermodynamic ways. When we are trying to have a Science discussion, we agree not to posit effects due to Divine Intervention. It would seem easy to stop arguing about this.... but sadly not.<br /><br />The relation of Science to "Reality" is fraught; not even whole generations of post-enlightenment philosophers have been able to work it out. For example, <a href="http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html" rel="nofollow">Quine</a>. But who cares? We know what we mean, and we get good results. <br /><br />More to the point, Science doesn't give results for <i>all</i> concerns, such as the moral or political as we already agreed. We have to add axioms to achieve a workable moral or political system. Of necessity, the added axioms will not be Empirical in the Scientific sense. Rawls' new axiom, previously quoted: "Each person possesses an inviolability...". Science will never be able to demonstrate an "inviolability", but Rawls proceeds <i>as if it were true</i> and gets good milage.<br /><br />It is not more incoherent or fatally flawed to add an axiom about the existence of a "God" having whatever nature and proceed <i>as if</i> it were true. Different ideas have different consequences; we should argue about consequences, not axioms. Axioms are not arguable. De gustibus non est disputandum. Having results in conflict with Science is a bad thing, even the Vatican agrees.<br /><br />Rawls' axiom seems completely secular, but we can easily reify it in different terms to read, "Every man has a Soul that God cares about". If the arguments after that are homologous and the results identical, or at least compatible, why argue about a choice of terms?<br /><br />As opposed to Science, the unique advantage to religious thinking in the ages since Lascaux was painted seems to be in its ability to nucleate group formation. In the current age of the world, it seems obvious to me that is something we really really need to know more about, not chase away with pitchforks.Marshallhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10215784276660875929noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-7245561217941863932009-10-29T13:00:55.292-04:002009-10-29T13:00:55.292-04:00I think I require a concrete example to parse this...<i>I think I require a concrete example to parse this appropriately (apologies if you've provided one previously), but on its face I'm not convinced that this is a scientific idea. In purely evidence-based analysis (aka science, at least as I am casting it), we cannot assess probabilities regarding non-evidential things - and in any event, no scientific process requires us to do so. Such things are off the scientific radar utterly. Provided we have a concept to describe the thing for which we have no evidence, the only thing we can say is that the idea exists, not that the phenomenon it describes does, does not, or might. As scientists, we allow for any of these possibilities, but favor none of them. As philosophers, we may have other ideas.</i><br /><br />Okay, to clarify with examples from empirical science:<br /><br />If we postulate the hypothesis of the historicity of the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt as described in the bible, the hypothesis calls for finding some traces of their wanderings in the desert. While archaeologists have unearthed traces from neolithic hunter-gatherer camps, nothing has been found that would indicate such a large number of Israelites wandering through the Sinai for 50 years at the right time. Thus we are justified to reject the hypothesis because evidence is lacking that should be expected to be present if the hypothesis were true. The example is actually taken from Stenger's book, as I am not an archaeologist myself and my biological examples would require too much exposition.<br /><br />Now suppose, as a second example, we hypothesize the existence of an immaterial soul that actually carries character traits and memories. If this hypothesis were true, then purely physical trauma to the brain should not change character traits or delete memories. Enter cases of people with brain damage or strokes. Some lose memories, some lose abilities, some people who were once sweet and gentle become complete sociopaths, etc. The evidence that should be there if an immaterial soul as described above existed is lacking, thus we are justified to reject it as a hypothesis.<br /><br />This is, by the way, one of these "of any use to the believer" issues. You can still postulate the existence of a soul that does not code for our character traits as unassailable by science. But how could this soul then be punished for evil or rewarded for good behaviour if it does not actually carry the good or evil character that is responsible for these deeds? You can still postulate the existence of a soul that does not contain memories as unassailable by science. But then what good is it for the believer who lives in terror of the annihilation of their personality that death brings?<br /><br />Now the same approach goes for gods in general. Evidence is lacking for the createdness of the universe; for souls; for an afterlife; for the feasibility of influencing your fate through prayer or sacrifices; for any special purpose or place of humans in the universe. And believe me, people have searched for such evidence. Thus we are justified scientifically to reject all god hypotheses except those that are completely irrelevant to humans.Alex SLhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00801894164903608204noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-84945797197950282542009-10-29T09:46:10.529-04:002009-10-29T09:46:10.529-04:00Finally,
> The point was that, donning scienti...Finally,<br /><br /><i>> The point was that, donning scientist garb only (I guess we're talking hats) you can advocate wide swaths of atheism. That's all. I'm not saying all facets of atheism are supportable by science.</i><br /><br />This is consistent with what I've maintained all along, which is in fact one degree stronger:<br /><br />In the absence of empirical evidence one way or the other, atheism is the <i>only</i> appropriate stance toward the theist proposition.perspiciohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04756832342990830938noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-10816834557507601902009-10-29T09:40:31.195-04:002009-10-29T09:40:31.195-04:00J.J.E.,
The reason I'm putting such a fine po...J.J.E.,<br /><br />The reason I'm putting such a fine point on this is because we know (empirically) that our beliefs can influence our observations, and our observations can even affect the phenomena they pertain to. So in constructing robust scientific models it behooves us not to introduce non-empirically-derived beliefs.perspiciohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04756832342990830938noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-61372136290423371942009-10-29T09:11:24.479-04:002009-10-29T09:11:24.479-04:00Well, I just got my 8th wind, such that it is, so ...Well, I just got my 8th wind, such that it is, so I think I'll crank through this. I hope I'm as coherent as I think I am.<br /><br />Mintman,<br /><br /><i>> Well, of course science works with non-scientifically derived concepts. These include "we can, at least in principle, trust our senses",</i><br /><br />Trust of our senses is our default position as humans, is reinforced by (most of) our experiences, and requires no cognitive formulation. For example, we trust that we will not fall through the ground when we endeavor to walk, whether or not we have ever thought about it. It is an emergent phenomenon. Only when our innate trust proves unfounded do we begin to employ reasoning faculties.<br /><br /><i>> "the universe is understandable",</i><br /><br />Avoiding ambiguous (to me) semantic connotations that might lead me off into a discussion of phraseology, and instead interpreting the words the way I think you mean them, I would argue that this belief results from direct experience, and is therefore empirically derived. When as infants things don't work out as expected (we fall when we try to walk, we cry and mom doesn't come, etc.) we start trying things. Eventually, mom arrives, we are able to our feet and take another step, etc., and we trust that whatever we tried works (whether or not it did), until it doesn't. At that point we try other stuff again, and so forth. The algorithm is self-assembling; hence also emergent. "The universe is understandable" is an embedded belief. It may only exist as a concept as a consequence of reflecting upon our experiences, hence it is an empirically derived concept.<br /><br /><i>> most importantly for this discussion "things for which evidence is lacking that should be there if they existed probably do not exist".</i><br /><br />I think I require a concrete example to parse this appropriately (apologies if you've provided one previously), but on its face I'm not convinced that this is a scientific idea. In purely evidence-based analysis (aka science, at least as I am casting it), we cannot assess probabilities regarding non-evidential things - and in any event, no scientific process requires us to do so. Such things are off the scientific radar utterly. Provided we have a concept to describe the thing for which we have no evidence, the only thing we can say is that the <i>idea</i> exists, not that the phenomenon it describes does, does not, or might. As scientists, we allow for any of these possibilities, but favor none of them. As philosophers, we may have other ideas.<br /><br /><i>> All of these are basic assumptions that were not originally developed with the scientific method itself, as obviously you have to start at some point and take some leap of faith.</i><br /><br />I agree with this, strictly speaking. What I don't think it accounts for, however, is the possibility that the assumptions are, as emergent phenomena, both the starting point and the leap of faith you describe, and that the scientific method results from conceptualizing them. (At least the 1st two. I wouldn't argue that the 3rd is emergent, but I also don't perceive a need for it in science. As such, your "probably don't exist" formulations that follow in your post seem perfectly reasonable to exclude from science.)<br /><br /><i>> We scientists do claim stuff like that all the time. You tell us we can't do that because we are not philosophers.</i><br /><br />Not true. You absolutely can, and if you do you are acting as a philosopher, not a scientist. You can't do it <i>as</i> a scientist.<br /><br /><i>> But that is silly, because we scientists are never saying anything more than that this is probable/not probable as far as our scientific evidence goes. And that is also, at least implicitly, all that those scientists are claiming who say "no evidence for god".</i><br /><br />Yes, scientific knowledge may quite legitimately inform philosophically grounded positions. No disagreement there.<br /><br />As I said, hopefully I am as coherent as I think I am. Let me know.perspiciohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04756832342990830938noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-36573596986750735822009-10-29T08:18:50.561-04:002009-10-29T08:18:50.561-04:00Blue Ridge,
the main difference between religion/...Blue Ridge,<br /><br />the main difference between religion/faith and rational values as the object of moral philosophy is that in the latter case one builds arguments based on reason.<br /><br />If you want to say that those arguments still have to come from certain assumptions (e.g., about human nature, or what makes humans flourish), that is true. But remember that not even mathematics gets off the ground without axioms that are not defensible within the system (Godel's theorem). Yet you are surely not going to conclude that math is a matter of faith...Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-73403965957217161252009-10-29T07:57:33.581-04:002009-10-29T07:57:33.581-04:00>I have no problem with scientists saying philo...<i>>I have no problem with scientists saying philosophical things, and vice-versa.</i><br /><br />Of course.<br /><br /><i>>So no matter what you say as a scientist, your saying it doesn't bring it into science's body of knowledge, even if it's true.</i><br /><br />Of course. But it is pretty wishy washy to say "I'll bet some scientists might say X!" when I could simply recall, "Wait, I'm a scientist! I say X!" In any event, the argument doesn't hinge on the identity of the person making the claim. The point was that, donning scientist garb only (I guess we're talking hats) you can advocate wide swaths of atheism. That's all. I'm not saying all facets of atheism are supportable by science.J.J. Emersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06005635061756895272noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-32141555942082209082009-10-29T07:39:30.648-04:002009-10-29T07:39:30.648-04:00Mintman,
I wondered whether anybody would take up...Mintman,<br /><br />I wondered whether anybody would take up those counterarguments. I'll respond, but not now - it's 6:30 AM and I've been up all night.<br /><br />J.J.E.,<br /><br />Ditto the above, except for this brief point...<br /><br />I have no problem with scientists saying philosophical things, and vice-versa. I encourage it, and all manner of scholastic cross-training in fact, as long as the statements are accurate. But I wouldn't agree that information that is extracurricular to a given school can imported into it. So no matter what you say as a scientist, your saying it doesn't bring it into science's body of knowledge, even if it's true.perspiciohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04756832342990830938noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-90364250580930827272009-10-29T07:28:57.337-04:002009-10-29T07:28:57.337-04:00Blue Ridge,
I really enjoyed reading your formula...Blue Ridge,<br /><br />I really enjoyed reading your formulations on values and politics. The subject matter is engaging, and had I not homed in on the atheist argument so exclusively, I might well have devoted a fair amount of time to this area of discussion. As it is, I'm glad you took it up.<br /><br /><i>> By focusing on Behavior, we can avoid worrying about whether a secret friend should be more like an invisible pink unicorn or a flying spaghetti monster.</i><br /><br />Yes! I remember a dull gleam of this concept shining through the extremely pitted and tarnished surface of mainstream religious sensibilities in the US now and then during the presidential campaign last year. Pretty much only on the Obama side, of course. Rick Warren's question about <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2TaGxB1n-U" rel="nofollow">how to handle evil</a> leaps to mind.<br /><br /><i>> collective values are derived from the values of all the people in the collective. So I don't see any reason why traditionally religious values (such as the Ten Commandments) should be excluded just because they are associated with evidence-free faith (such as Verbal Inerrancy).</i><br /><br />Me either, but it's not just because of that. Far from it.<br /><br />One major trouble lies with the appearance of an official recognition or sanctioning of a particular viewpoint by allowing a symbol of a certain constituency's values that specifically excludes another constituency's values into the public sphere. Some people believe that any symbol of a system that contains such exclusive values must be eschewed. Others feel that only explicit expressions of exclusive values are to be treated this way. (i.e. a crucifix might be okay while the 10 commandments are not, or the 1st 4 commandments are out but #s 5-10 are in). Of course, a lot of people would probably advocate elimination of all expressions of values from the public sphere entirely - with the exception of their own.<br /><br />Another issue is cultural precedent. Even egregious ideas and symbols that evoke them can get grandfathered into the public sphere if they were represented at the founding of the society's institutions of social order. And attempting to remove them typically causes a degree social discord that can perhaps be predicted with spectacular accuracy using this awesome equation I’m going to make up right now:<br /><br />Let<br />D = degree of social discord (0 = peaceful coexistence, 1 = civil war)<br />I = Percentage of population whose icons are being removed from the public sphere<br />$ = Percentage of society's wealth held by I<br />A = the degree to which I values explicit public sanction of its values (a number between 0 and 1)<br />B = the degree to which ~I (not-I, the everybody else category) objects to I's values being explicitly expressed in the public sphere (a number between 0 and 1)<br /><br />Then:<br />D = BIA$<br /><br />This equation might have broader applications. ;)<br /><br />Personally, I advocate locally equitable, reciprocal inclusivity, with a lower-limit-representation threshold. That is, if there is a place in the public sphere for one subset's values, then space must be made available in the same locality for any others that wish it - but only to the extent and degree of the original one, and only provided they represent a sufficiently large percentage of the local society's constituency - say 5%. So if any of <a href="http://sathyasaibaba.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/symbols-world-religions.jpg" rel="nofollow">these</a> mute symbols is welcome at, say, city hall, then so are all the others to the very same degree (one twelve-foot statue deserves another, maybe several) even if one symbol reflects 85% of the population's values and another only 10%. The reciprocity extends also to the nature of the symbol (a statue of the 10 commandments earns a statue of, say, The God Delusion), because it is not okay for one group to offend another's sensibilities without allowing that other to offend the first in a similar manner.<br /><br />Damn. Now I want a job in social policy. Or as a judge, so I could offend <i>everybody</i>.perspiciohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04756832342990830938noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-60674094138663534722009-10-29T06:43:55.838-04:002009-10-29T06:43:55.838-04:00>Science builds models to explain observed phen...<i><br />>Science builds models to explain observed phenomena. That's all it does, ever. Claiming a personal god probably doesn't exist because it is inconsistent with scientific models requires using logical tools that science doesn't possess to wring additional information out of the body of knowledge that it does possess.<br /></i><br /><br />I don't think the scientific "new" atheists make absolute claims about god's existence, although sloppiness of language may blur this distinction. If you were to ask them to compare the following two statements:<br /><br />1) a personal god probably doesn't exist because it is inconsistent with scientific models;<br />2) the most parsimonious scientific models that do not posit a god explain the data equally well (and sometimes better) as those less parsimonious models that do posit a god. Scientific models for many disciplines directly conflict with empirical claims about personal gods very frequently. In such cases, our observations are more consistent with the scientific models than they are with the theistic models.<br /><br />I suspect that they would say that they are basically paraphrases of each other, with the first being short but imprecise and the second being cumbersome. Hell, I'm a scientist, and I'll go that far.<br /><br />Anyway, if anyone is to start castigating scientists for saying things mirroring #1, then you'll have to do it with at least one article in practically every issue of every science journal. And for many of those journals (especially Science and Nature) every issue will likely be composed almost entirely of articles manifesting such "philosophical transgressions". Ultimately, both god and traditional models are abstractions that lack material basis. If we're careful with language (#2) we can quantify our uncertainty surrounding how well competing models fit the observations. But if we aren't careful with language (#1) we may very well say: "Phenomenon 1 (described by model 1), not phenomenon 2 (described by model 2), is the reason why we observe what we do."<br /><br />I wonder how many angels can dance on the head of such a fine point?J.J. Emersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06005635061756895272noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-27447007825547789492009-10-29T05:33:51.632-04:002009-10-29T05:33:51.632-04:00Perspicio:
Assigning additional evaluative capaci...Perspicio:<br /><br /><i>Assigning additional evaluative capacities to science that allow it to draw conclusions beyond those that apply directly and exclusively to empirical data amounts to attempting to smuggle non-empirically-derived belief values into science through a back door.</i><br /><br />Well, of course science works with non-scientifically derived concepts. These include "we can, at least in principle, trust our senses", "the universe is understandable", and, most importantly for this discussion "things for which evidence is lacking that should be there if they existed probably do not exist". All of these are basic assumptions that were not originally developed with the scientific method itself, as obviously you have to start at some point and take some leap of faith. They are, however, much more than "belief values", as you quip so postmodernistically. They are justified by working consistently over centuries, by not disappointing us ever after the initial leap of faith taken to accept them.<br /><br />Is that philosophy? Well, maybe, but then everything is.<br /><br /><i>Science builds models to explain observed phenomena. That's all it does, ever. Claiming a personal god probably doesn't exist because it is inconsistent with scientific models requires using logical tools that science doesn't possess to wring additional information out of the body of knowledge that it does possess.</i><br /><br />As always it is pretty illuminating to show how this sounds with something different:<br /><br />Claiming little green men from Andromeda probably didn't build the pyramids because it is inconsistent with scientific models requires using logical tools that science doesn't possess to wring additional information out of the body of knowledge that it does possess.<br /><br />Claiming phlogiston probably doesn't exist because it is inconsistent with scientific models requires using logical tools that science doesn't possess to wring additional information out of the body of knowledge that it does possess.<br /><br />Hooray for the weirdly privileged status of religion, no, where this patently ridiculous sentence suddenly sounds thoughtful? We scientists do claim stuff like that all the time. You tell us we can't do that because we are not philosophers. But that is silly, because we scientists are never saying anything more than that this is probable/not probable <i>as far as our scientific evidence goes</i>. And that is also, at least implicitly, all that those scientists are claiming who say "no evidence for god".<br /><br />This is going in circles, obviously. So in concise summary, I hope, my position one final time: Yes, philosophy is perhaps necessary to reject the penultimate shadow god a believer will retreat to if pressed (if you want to call cognitive assumptions supported by a history of working well philosophy). However, why bother calling in philosophical reinforcements? Firstly, even non-philosophically trained scientists can play the celestial teapot card, and that is all that is needed to deal with the shadow god. Secondly, such a shadow god is of no consequence anyway. Any god of any consequence can sooner or later be ruled out (or proven - now would that not be interesting if it ever happened) by science, even if the theists' whack-a-mole games may in principle go on for eternity. It won't, though, as the appeal of religion really lies in a few, easily and long refuted ideas, such as the wishful thinking of possessing an eternal soul. Religion does not persist because we foolishly failed to ask a professor of philosophy to step in, but because the believers do not want to stop believing no matter who steps in.Alex SLhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00801894164903608204noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-82671658873438417112009-10-29T03:56:55.696-04:002009-10-29T03:56:55.696-04:00@perspicio
Clarke. I can't believe I'm bl...@perspicio<br /><br />Clarke. I can't believe I'm blushing at an error I made in a comment thread, but I am.<br /><br />@MP<br /><br /><i>> there is no empirical proposition that can decide a matter of value (though empirical propositions can and should inform our understanding of values).<br /><br />> That's precisely the difference between philosophy and science that I've tried to make throughout this post.</i><br /><br />I find little to disagree with regarding this perspective. But I find it a little bit provocative for you to go that extra step and assert that "atheism is a philosophical position" unless you also claim that atheism's only proper stance is to reject the philosophical claims of religion.<br /><br />Like Mintman said "If all theists would stick to the god model that cannot be tested by science, there would in fact be no use in the approaches of atheists" like [insert your favorite "new" atheist here]. I wholeheartedly agree, but the transgression of the religious are quite diverse, and an atheist can spend all of his free time answering the purely material claims without ever once donning his philosophical hat.<br /><br />In fact, many atheists that circumscribe their arguments in precisely that way. There are very few attacks against many religious traditions which focus their energy (especially their social and political energy) on value judgments or other nonmaterial claims. (e.g. Dawkins doesn't discuss Daoism or Buddhism or Quakers very often and to my knowledge doesn't address biblical events without material consequences like whether or not Lucifer really is a fallen angel or whether a non-intervening super intelligence created a world that works in precisely the way we understand it on the timescales we have established, etc.)<br /><br />And the reason that the arguments of the "new" atheists tend to be so cumbersome is precisely because they don't usually seek to tackle the non-material claims of religion. On the contrary, they get deep into the empirical weeds of religion precisely because their critiques are grounded in those bits of religion that (probably inadvertently) impinge upon the scientific arena. Even though many theists will in fact retreat to defending the "god of the shadows" (I like that turn of phrase, thanks perspicio!) many are loath to do so any earlier than they deem necessary and will in fact play the empirical game for as long as possible. Thus, we atheists who are trained in science are well justified chasing those interlopers out of the scientific territory. If philosophers want to make a raid into the non-material Neutral Zone, by all means, have at it. I don't see many scientists willing to stake their scientific credibility on such endeavors (as worthy as they surely are). But just because philosophers CAN attack the religious (and are sometimes the only ones who can) doesn't mean that atheism doesn't find support in science at times, too.J.J. Emersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06005635061756895272noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-49531338081204252312009-10-29T02:58:39.166-04:002009-10-29T02:58:39.166-04:00Massimo, thank you for the pointer to Rawls' b...Massimo, thank you for the pointer to Rawls' book. I read the introduction online and ordered a hard copy from Amazon, and I look forward to digesting it more completely. <br /><br />He starts with a notion of "justice", taking as the central point:<br /><br /><i>Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others... justice [is] uncompromising.</i><br /><br />With this as anchor, he has quite a lot to say about how societies should be ordered; that is, using methods of critical thinking, he extends this simple premise into a "political philosophy" with various action programs. Note that there are incompatible alternative premises, eg, "Justice preserves the essential features of the State", or (explicitly denied) "Justice delivers the greatest good for the greatest number".<br /><br />Why does Rawls select this as his Value? As Perspico suggests, there could be any number of psychological sources, but al fundo this is a 'Credo', a personal assertion, a stake driven in the ground here and not there. The mechanism doesn't appear to be any different than a religious person's Faith in a god of a particular description. <br /><br />What would be the difference between Value and Faith? (I am attempting to use Massimo's vocabulary here) Apparently, Faith is not-true and Value is neither-true-nor-false. Belief, I suppose, starts off as a conjecture, a hopeful monster made of the same stuff as values and faiths, and becomes Belief when confirmed as true.<br /><br />What should we think about a particular religious system, such as Shinto or Orthodox Christianity? It starts with a more or less simple Credo, which gets elaborated into abstract philosophy and social action, just like Rawls' program. The process of elaboration would proceed by critical thinking and ratiocination. So I see the left inner circle on your diagram has been correctly relabeled "philosophy of religion" with various alternatives arising therefrom.<br /><br />Since religious systems typically produce a social action program, the religious philosophy circle should overlap with the political philosophy circle. Once we have got a religious sect as a political organism like others in the the social body, we can evaluate and treat it like any other. Practicing a religion should be seen as political behavior, subject to the usual rules of politics. By focusing on Behavior, we can avoid worrying about whether a secret friend should be more like an invisible pink unicorn or a flying spaghetti monster. <br /><br />Hitchen's <i>God is Not Great</i> is wonderful for speaking to the inappropriate abusive privileges that religion has often claimed for itself, which we should not tolerate any more than racism. However religious values are afloat in the social body because there are people that hold them, and the collective values are derived from the values of all the people in the collective. So I don't see any reason why traditionally religious values (such as the Ten Commandments) should be excluded <i>just because</i> they are associated with evidence-free faith (such as Verbal Inerrancy).<br /><br />Eg, Abortion is a serious moral issue which should be debated by religious and secular together. Eg, science should be taught in science classes; philosophy should be taught in philosophy classes.<br /><br />The distinction between Philosophy and Science seems to me valid and useful. The distinction between Faith and Value, not so much.Marshallhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10215784276660875929noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-27310987531743328182009-10-28T21:16:53.727-04:002009-10-28T21:16:53.727-04:00Of course there are scientists who know enough phi...Of <i>course</i> there are scientists who know enough philosophy to render the categorical mistake judgment. But, as you say, they are not doing it in their capacity <i>as</i> scientists, for the specific reason that science itself is not equipped with the requisite tools to render that judgment.<br /><br />As such, the categorical mistake claim is not a scientific one, even if it is made by a scientist.<br /><br />It is acceptable for people to doff one hat and don another. They can move in and out of different categories of thought. But the categories themselves do not move with them.<br /><br />This all goes to the importance of preserving the integrity of the epistemological boundaries of science, which is where this conversation of ours began, and it has very specific implications not just for the philosophy of science, but for its practice as well. Since beliefs inform our perceptions to some degree, failure to respect these boundaries risks introducing bias into our observations. If one scientist rightly claims categorical mistake but wrongly does so under science's banner, another scientist who does not understand the ontological basis of this claim might accept it as scientific fact, which may misinform him about other scientific matters. Over this time this can lead to a systemic bias that, by virtue of its ubiquity, is very difficult to perceive.perspiciohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04756832342990830938noreply@blogger.com