tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post4255153118192566523..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: New 5-minute Philosopher video: Can science answer moral questions?Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger106125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-56187611310949033852010-12-10T12:08:23.783-05:002010-12-10T12:08:23.783-05:00Richard,
If I skipped over something you thought ...Richard,<br /><br />If I skipped over something you thought was important, I apologize, it wasn't my intent to duck any issues. I'm sure this will come up again and in the meantime I'll keep mulling over what you and Ritchie have said. Thanks.Adrianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08694840174170043470noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-15100714492061438102010-12-10T11:29:03.225-05:002010-12-10T11:29:03.225-05:00@Tyro
You didn't respond to my point about co...@Tyro<br /><br />You didn't respond to my point about communication of negative attitudes, and I'm afraid you haven't understood my argument about the racist case. It's not an easy argument to follow, and I probably didn't explain it well.<br /><br />I think we had some useful discussion in our first few posts, but it's been a while now since we've made any progress, so I think it's time to call it a day. Thanks for the discussion.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-68046647753499506802010-12-10T10:36:07.964-05:002010-12-10T10:36:07.964-05:00@Richard,
Consider an extreme racist who is passi...@Richard,<br /><br /><i>Consider an extreme racist who is passionate about the well-being of his own race and totally indifferent to the well-being of other races.</i><br /><br />Harris argues (and I'm inclined to agree) that we are not obliged to treat the moral claims of all people equally, just as we do not treat the scientific insights of all people equally. So yes it is true that some people may say that letting a black man marry a white girl is so immoral that the only moral response is to burn them both alive. However, instead of treating this with respect and considering this moral insight as somehow equivalent to other moral statements, we should instead dismiss this as harmful lunacy.<br /><br />This isn't just fancy word games. When most people (and all people with useful insights into morality) talk about what is moral, we are talking about what will increase well-being. If I were to present your example and ask if you thought it was moral, I'm guessing you would recoil in horror and say "no, of course not!"<br /><br /><i>If Harris is correct about the meaning of "moral", then this is a direct self-contradiction.</i><br /><br />I don't think you've fully read his argument as this is NOT what he is saying.<br /><br /><i>Moving on to moral "ought" claims. Compare telling a child each of the following:<br />O1. You oughtn't to hit your sister.<br />O2. Hitting your sister will reduce total well-being. (Assume the child fully understands those words.)<br />Do you think that those have the same meaning?</i><br /><br />Not necessarily but then I've agreed that psychopaths and villains can make "ought" statements. As bizarre as some of my examples of moral claims may seem, they're all real which just shows how wild some moral claims can get.<br /><br />It might be more accurate to say that Harris is saying that all valuable, useful discussions of morality and all useful moral claims are really about increasing well-being, not every moral belief held by all people is always about increasing well-being.<br /><br />As to your example, I don't have kids so I'll have to borrow from the experiences of my friends that do. I'm told that even children respond much better to being told "don't hit your sister, it makes her feel bad" rather than merely "don't hit". Even at a young age we respond better when we have the reasons.<br /><br />If you think the first statement is more compelling can you please tell me why?<br /><br /><i>But he meant that they have a distinctive quality, not that they have quantitatively more of something.</i><br /><br />I gave a few example for Ritchie and both he & I felt that the moral claims had next to no grip but the non-moral factual statements did. I think it showed well that adding "must", "ought" or "should" to a statement doesn't bring anything, it's the rationale behind the statement which does. Increasing well-being has the power to motivate, inspire, almost compel action that mere semantic flourishes do not.Adrianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08694840174170043470noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-28325169078473120062010-12-10T09:31:07.969-05:002010-12-10T09:31:07.969-05:00@Tyro
Set aside the question of obligation for no...@Tyro<br /><br />Set aside the question of obligation for now. You and Harris seem to think that the following sentences have just the same meaning, no more or less.<br /><br />C1. Action A is immoral.<br />C2. Action A tends to reduce total well-being.<br /><br />It seems to me obvious that they don't. C1 inherently communicates that the speaker has a negative attitude towards A. C2 _may_ communicate such an attitude, where the speaker has a desire to maximise total well-being and the listener knows it. But such an attitude is not inherent in the meaning of the words. If the speaker is indifferent (or even hostile) to maximising total well-being, then C2 may not be expressing a negative attitude to A at all.<br /><br />Consider an extreme racist who is passionate about the well-being of his own race and totally indifferent to the well-being of other races. He may honestly believe that enslavement of other races is morally acceptable (or even morally required), while frankly acknowledging that such enslavement reduces the total well-being of humanity. So he simultaneously asserts:<br />R1. Enslavement of other races is moral.<br />R2. Enslavement of other races reduces total well-being.<br />If Harris is correct about the meaning of "moral", then this is a direct self-contradiction. So either such a person is so stupid that he can't see he's directly contradicting himself, or else he's incompetent in his use of the word "moral", i.e. using it in an incorrect sense. But I see no reason to think that such a racist must be either stupid or linguistically incompetent. In the ordinary understanding of "moral", R1 seems like something an intelligent, linguistically competent person could possibly believe, even though we might judge the claim mistaken or abhorrent.<br /><br />Suppose you insist that he's not using the word in its correct sense. Then he and someone who asserts the contrary (that enslavement is not moral) are not in substantive disgreement. They don't disagree about any facts. They are just talking at cross-purposes, because they're each using "moral" to mean something different. I find this interpretation bizarre.<br /><br />Moving on to moral "ought" claims. Compare telling a child each of the following:<br />O1. You oughtn't to hit your sister.<br />O2. Hitting your sister will reduce total well-being. (Assume the child fully understands those words.)<br />Do you think that those have the same meaning?<br /><br />BTW If you'll excuse me for butting in on your discussion with Ritchie, I think you've misunderstood him. When he said that moral claims have an oomph that non-moral claims don't, you seem to have interpreted him as meaning that they have _more_ oomph, i.e. that they're stronger. But he meant that they have a distinctive quality, not that they have quantitatively more of something.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-20898090429963655532010-12-10T00:11:32.074-05:002010-12-10T00:11:32.074-05:00Tyro:
I don't mean to duck an argument, thoug...Tyro:<br /><br />I don't mean to duck an argument, though perhaps I am doing so at a subconscious level, but right now I am just becoming busy with some work. This discussion is becoming so complex that I think it's better if we went more in depth later. For now, I say that you have had the last word and that I have made claims that are not yet justified. If I cannot justify them later, that's my own failure. If this topic comes up again on this blog, I will present more thorough arguments for why I believe moral words are not interpreted as having literally meanings.Ritchie the Bearhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10249784344018510589noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-88491103143393999142010-12-09T23:07:29.727-05:002010-12-09T23:07:29.727-05:00Ritchie,
The trouble, Tyro, is that you're pr...Ritchie,<br /><br /><i>The trouble, Tyro, is that you're presenting moral commands that have never been even remotely considered equal.</i><br /><br />You just said, and I quote <i>'moral statements--statements that have some sort of "should" or "ought" or "good" in them--have a force or oomph that literal statements of fact do not.'</i> I was illustrating how very wrong that was and interestingly you don't even try to defend it. Indeed, in your haste to cut me down you undermine your own position.<br /><br /><i>But this is a little unfair, because we don't oppose working on Saturday, whereas we support saving lives. </i><br /><br />But one was a moral claim with a "should" statement and the second was just some dry facts. Could it be that merely saying "ought" or "should" has far less power than facts which inform us about human well-being? Maybe Harris is on to something...<br /><br /><i>Just add the detail from the second statement to the first and suddenly the moral terms seem important:<br /><br />"If you donate $100, my charity will get $98 to the needy in Haiti and will save the lives of over one hundred people from starving to death. Therefore, you ought to give me 100 dollars."<br /><br />"ought" still matters. </i><br /><br />I would say that you've proved again that saying "ought" doesn't mean squat. In fact, facts pointing to improving human well-being is so powerful that you seem irresistibly compelled to turn this neutral statement of fact into a moral call to action!<br /><br />Further more, you don't seem to give any weight at all to statements which do have an "ought", "should" or "must" in them - you casually toss this aside as unimportant even though this was the moral claim and the statement of facts was not.<br /><br />Why is this?<br /><br />Let me take a stab at answering and say that it is because, despite your claims and protests, you actually give next to no weight to an "ought" or "should" claim but you give a huge amount of weight to facts which can guide your actions towards improving well-being.Adrianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08694840174170043470noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-58376111921371934922010-12-09T22:19:20.407-05:002010-12-09T22:19:20.407-05:00Ritchie,
There are particular points that can be d...Ritchie,<br />There are particular points that can be discussed in isolation, but not those that are sides of the same concept - at least not effectively.<br /><br />And what we had here was not sequential separation; that phrasing seems oxymoronic. The more accurate phrase here, especially where our concern is with purposive behaviors, would be sequential connection.<br /><br />In any case, this whole thing has degenerated into a facsimile of a of contest to score debate points, which generally involves sequential rationalization.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-12281835080441564352010-12-09T19:54:40.294-05:002010-12-09T19:54:40.294-05:00Baron:
Sequential separation is a form of separat...Baron:<br /><br />Sequential separation is a form of separation. For example, if I argue, "A implies B, B implies C. A. Therefore C," we can assess whether A -> B holds without assessing whether B -> C holds. In practice, of course, we would wish to determine both. I am only pointing out that the question of terminology is the more fundamental question in this discussion. I am interested in the big picture when it comes to morality, but there are particular points which can be discussed in isolation or semi-isolation.Ritchie the Bearhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10249784344018510589noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-2536629604003540902010-12-09T19:21:56.098-05:002010-12-09T19:21:56.098-05:00"I think Harris is right - moral opinions lik..."I think Harris is right - moral opinions like this should be treated with the same degree of respect as scientists treat the opinions of Creationists."<br /><br />The fact that Harris believes this just shows how easily he convinces himself that he is right, through equivocation. Equivocation is the most common way of mis-arguing in intellectual life. I think it is more important than the straw man argument, but less frequently discussed.Ritchie the Bearhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10249784344018510589noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-76122017451936188592010-12-09T19:19:01.029-05:002010-12-09T19:19:01.029-05:00The trouble, Tyro, is that you're presenting m...The trouble, Tyro, is that you're presenting moral commands that have never been even remotely considered equal. In order to judge whether moral terms really add a certain sort of force to statements, we have to compare similar moral scenarios.<br /><br />If we intuitively believe that morality is just about the maximization of total human happiness, then statement 2 should add nothing to statement 1:<br /><br />1. "If you push the fat man off the bridge, you will sacrifice one person's life to save five."<br />2. "You must push the fat man off the bridge."<br /><br />I take it as obvious that even utilitarians will <i>feel</i>, reading these statements, that 2 adds something to 1. 1 reads a statement of fact, whereas 2 reads as a statement of moral requirement. Here, morality seems to be something more than a statement of fact; 2 adds to 1, rather than repeating it.<br /><br />You compare two statements:<br /><br />"1) You should never, ever work on a Saturday<br /><br />2) A child, Timmothy, will drown in less than a minute unless you jump into the pool to save him."<br /><br />But this is a little unfair, because we don't oppose working on Saturday, whereas we support saving lives. Let's instead compare different ways of saying the same thing:<br /><br />"The chance that you will save the drowning child's life is greater than 50/50 if you attempt it, meaning that, on average, there will be more human beings living if you try to save him than there will be if you don't."<br />"You ought to save the drowning child."<br /><br />I take it that the second statement is not a mere repetition of the first. But from a strictly utilitarian stance, the two should seem intuitively equivalent. They don't, and in fact, people would entertain the idea that individuals have rights that allow them to avoid risking their lives, even if they might help others greatly by doing so.<br /><br />You also bring these up:<br /><br />"1) You should give me $100.<br /><br />2) If you donate $100, my charity will get $98 to the needy in Haiti and will save the lives of over one hundred people from starving to death."<br /><br />Just add the detail from the second statement to the first and suddenly the moral terms seem important:<br /><br />"If you donate $100, my charity will get $98 to the needy in Haiti and will save the lives of over one hundred people from starving to death. Therefore, you ought to give me 100 dollars."<br /><br />"ought" still matters.Ritchie the Bearhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10249784344018510589noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-70474332635720764132010-12-09T16:22:46.020-05:002010-12-09T16:22:46.020-05:00You have not decided them separately, you have onl...You have not decided them separately, you have only decided them sequentially, one aspect of decision still dependent on the other.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-5838898355959634132010-12-09T16:20:09.672-05:002010-12-09T16:20:09.672-05:00Which actions are wrong? None are, because moral c...<i>Which actions are wrong? None are, because moral claims are delusional. </i><br /><br />I think Harris is right - moral opinions like this should be treated with the same degree of respect as scientists treat the opinions of Creationists. <br /><br />By your own admission you have nothing to add to this discussion.Adrianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08694840174170043470noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-60701802950071845582010-12-09T16:17:08.748-05:002010-12-09T16:17:08.748-05:00I was pointing out that moral statements--statemen...<i>I was pointing out that moral statements--statements that have some sort of "should" or "ought" or "good" in them--have a force or oomph that literal statements of fact do not.</i><br /><br />I would like you to substantiate that claim as I don't believe it.<br /><br />As an illustration, here are a few statements:<br /><br />1) You should never, ever work on a Saturday<br /><br />2) A child, Timmothy, will drown in less than a minute unless you jump into the pool to save him.<br /><br />(1) is a moral claim and has a "should", (2) is a statement of (hypothetical) fact. Is it really your contention that (1) has a greater force than (2)?<br /><br />How about:<br /><br />1) You should give me $100.<br /><br />2) If you donate $100, my charity will get $98 to the needy in Haiti and will save the lives of over one hundred people from starving to death.<br /><br />Again, is (1) really more powerful than (2)?<br /><br />Okay, I think all but the sociopaths in the audience can see that facts do matter and can be more powerful than moral demands.<br /><br />But are all morals equal? How about:<br /><br />1) If a child is disrespectful, you must severely beat or kill it.<br /><br />2) If you see someone drowning and you can save them, you ought to try.<br /><br />Point (1) says "must" but (2) says "ought", does that mean (1) is more forceful and important to obey than (2)? Are both of these moral rules equivalent or is one superior?<br /><br /><br />If you have a point I really can't see it as the contradictions are as easy to find as they are numerous. Please elaborate.Adrianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08694840174170043470noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-47939960000844424392010-12-09T16:10:10.895-05:002010-12-09T16:10:10.895-05:00I need to give an addendum. I did, in fact, answer...I need to give an addendum. I did, in fact, answer both questions. However, I did not have to settle the second question to settle the first, whereas I absolutely had to settle the first to settle the second. Therefore, the two questions should not be settled simultaneously. The question, "what do moral claims mean?" should be answered before the question "which actions are moral?" is settled.<br /><br />This is what I mean to say: the two questions should not be considered simultaneously. Rather, the question "what do moral claims mean?" is <i>prior</i> to the question "which actions are wrong?"Ritchie the Bearhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10249784344018510589noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-65762296833251613522010-12-09T15:54:50.294-05:002010-12-09T15:54:50.294-05:00Sure, I'll decide the latter without settling ...Sure, I'll decide the latter without settling the former.<br /><br />Moral claims indicate some sort of fuzzy-wuzzy, ill-formed notion in the speaker's head that their own preferences have some sort of broader, general instantiation in reality. For example, the statement "rape is wrong" generalizes the speaker's feeling that rape is bad into some sort of fact about the world at large.<br /><br />Which actions are wrong? None are, because moral claims are delusional. They are hinged on a misconception of what sort of qualities an action can have.Ritchie the Bearhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10249784344018510589noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-67739237685936113142010-12-09T15:34:22.805-05:002010-12-09T15:34:22.805-05:00The questions "which actions are wrong?"...The questions "which actions are wrong?" and "what do moral claims mean?" cannot be decided separately from each other. Try it.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-47851569192777735802010-12-09T15:22:26.336-05:002010-12-09T15:22:26.336-05:00I was pointing out that moral statements--statemen...I was pointing out that moral statements--statements that have some sort of "should" or "ought" or "good" in them--have a force or oomph that literal statements of fact do not. I was not making a point about the detail of the latter statement, but about the moral force of the former. Moral statements sound different from statements of fact, including statements of fact about happiness.Ritchie the Bearhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10249784344018510589noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-90791001067238561142010-12-09T15:16:09.419-05:002010-12-09T15:16:09.419-05:00It is simply not true that the statements "yo...<i>It is simply not true that the statements "you should donate money to Oxfam" and "money donated to Oxfam helps suffering people" are cognitively equivalent.</i><br /><br />Of course they aren't equivalent and the extra information - how effective our money is at helping people - is exactly the sort of information that Harris argues is something that we do value. Learning the outcome of our actions is key to deciding what is more moral than another act.<br /><br />It looks like you've flipped and are vociferously arguing Harris's point so unless something has changed, I must really be misunderstanding you. Can you elaborate?Adrianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08694840174170043470noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-91918682851565454362010-12-09T14:49:05.415-05:002010-12-09T14:49:05.415-05:00Baron is wrong; it is absolutely imperative that t...Baron is wrong; it is absolutely imperative that the questions "which actions are wrong?" and "what do moral claims mean?" be kept separate. Otherwise, we get ourselves into the awful muddle of asking "which actions have the quality of wrongness?" without having a full conception of that wrongness quality.<br /><br />Harris and Massimo think it suffices to <i>define</i> terms like "good," "bad," "ought," etc as "increasing of happiness," "decreasing of happiness," etc. Their way of dissolving the conundrum is to render the question "which actions are wrong?" empirical by supposing it to mean "which actions decrease happiness?" This, in my mind, is like rendering the question "which musicians are cool?" empirical by defining "coolness" as some single observable quality, like fame or sex appeal.<br /><br />Just because nobody can quite describe the feeling of obligation, and how it is different from apprehending an observable fact, does not mean that the feeling does not exist. It is simply <i>not</i> true that the statements "you should donate money to Oxfam" and "money donated to Oxfam helps suffering people" are cognitively equivalent. They do not make nearly the same impression on the thinking and feeling mind.Ritchie the Bearhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10249784344018510589noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-76398642034452559142010-12-09T14:48:38.205-05:002010-12-09T14:48:38.205-05:00Thus separating whim from whimsical?Thus separating whim from whimsical?Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-644547854359259182010-12-09T14:06:20.998-05:002010-12-09T14:06:20.998-05:00Baron, moderation has no "whims." I simp...Baron, moderation has no "whims." I simply let comments through in the order I received them (unless they are offensive or threatening). However, the Blogger system does mix the order a bit when several comments get through in a single batch.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-66345079037188988162010-12-09T13:45:47.969-05:002010-12-09T13:45:47.969-05:00To clarify a comment that has been subject to the ...To clarify a comment that has been subject to the whims of moderation, you can try to separate a definition of a concept from its purposes, but then you will have lost the purpose of defining it to begin with.<br />Just as someone here attempted to separate deductive logic from its purposes by suggesting ways it may be separate from intuition. Whereas its actual purpose will most likely be to supplement the thinking process which will remain in the intuitive realm - or as we like to call it, the unconscious.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-20643864619501287382010-12-09T11:47:31.222-05:002010-12-09T11:47:31.222-05:00"It's difficult, but unless you are vigil..."It's difficult, but unless you are vigilant in keeping these questions separate, you'll keep going wrong."<br /><br />You can't keep those two questions separate any more than you can separate two peas without breaking up the moral pod. Talk abut fallacies, we have now arrived at the supreme fallacy of the ridiculous - not to be confused with reductio ad ridiculum of course.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-64536023215718547632010-12-09T10:44:14.450-05:002010-12-09T10:44:14.450-05:00@Richard,
We were discussing the meaning of moral...@Richard,<br /><br /><i>We were discussing the meaning of moral claims. But now you've switched to asking what you morally should do, i.e. which things are moral.</i><br /><br />I beg to differ. You were talking about the "sense of obligation and prescription that they convey" which I don't think are a part of the definition (or, if they are, are a part of a bad definition) but something which arises because of a deeper feature of the subject and aim of moral rules.<br /><br /><i>In other words, like Harris, you're not keeping separate the questions of "what do moral claims mean" and "which things are moral?".</i><br /><br />The two are closely related but distinct and despite this accusation, I went to pains to give examples of how they're different (lying, adultery, murder). When we understand what moral claims mean, we can then decide which things are moral. Harris spent much more time at this than I did so I don't see why you think either of us failed to draw this distinction. Can you elaborate?Adrianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08694840174170043470noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-44406472400338628632010-12-09T06:19:01.643-05:002010-12-09T06:19:01.643-05:00Tyro wrote: "The question I found myself aski...Tyro wrote: "The question I found myself asking after reading Harris and I ask myself now is why do morals convey an obligation? How should I weigh these and which should I follow?"<br /><br />We were discussing the meaning of moral claims. But now you've switched to asking what you morally should do, i.e. which things are moral. In other words, like Harris, you're not keeping separate the questions of "what do moral claims mean" and "which things are moral?". (This is equivalent to the distinction I made above, between definition and substantive claim.)<br /><br />It's difficult, but unless you are vigilant in keeping these questions separate, you'll keep going wrong.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.com