tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post40091849590958301..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: What virtues, and why?Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger79125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-89072293427979433592014-01-22T16:07:25.339-05:002014-01-22T16:07:25.339-05:00Hello Mr. philosophy professor. I apologize in adv...Hello Mr. philosophy professor. I apologize in advance for any bad english. I am a practitioner of Nei kung and tireless researcher (not student) of what we call oriental philosophy. The concept of Virtue as you understand it for daoism has never existed. You are completely right when you say the christians translated the term to virtue but it means something like when you say "By virtue of his strength". Thats what the word means when used in conjunction with Dao, not in the christian sense as in purity or perseverance. <br />Secondly, i am no expert in Buddhism, but its not a doctrine, the four noble truths and the eight fold path as you mention are not Ideas to follow, they are only opening words of a dialogue. By this, i mean that Buddhism, at least in its origin , treats ideas as if they were a map of reality, but thats it, theyre not the territory and thus, concepts are not taken that seriously as in western tradition.<br /><br />Ty for your time.<br />And please comment on this , i'd love to get new insights.Yoy0https://www.blogger.com/profile/04959143708587805979noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-85836849204133962542014-01-21T12:55:14.115-05:002014-01-21T12:55:14.115-05:00
B?
And if A = B, and B = C, then A = C
But what...<br />B?<br /><br />And if A = B, and B = C, then A = C <br />But what about B?<br />They all look different to me, so what is truth,<br />What can it B?<br />Different or equal?<br />What should it B?<br /> To B or not to B?<br />That is the question. <br />The Nature of B,<br /> Aristotle, Shakespeare and Me.<br /> <br />=<br />MJA<br />= MJAhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01897595473268353450noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-51339371692983921502014-01-15T19:19:43.837-05:002014-01-15T19:19:43.837-05:00> ... science can't answer the contingency:...> ... science can't answer the contingency: "Should bystanders enter burning buildings to save people?" <<br /><br />We agree on this.<br /><br />> But more to the point: what are your views on who should be the moral authority? <<br /><br />My point is simply that I don't believe that anyone is or can be an authority on these matters in the way a scientist, say, or an historian can be an authority on (the facts relating to) his or her area of expertise.<br /><br />> What if I were to propose an academic theory based on practical reasoning that purports to be universally binding; would you be interested in my recounting it? I'm a beginner, but would appreciate the exercise. <<br /><br />I am extremely skeptical about such projects. Also I suspect from some other comments you have made that there may be a religious basis – or at least motivation – for your ideas, and I am not religious.Mark Englishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506844097173520312noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-28819745734346044022014-01-15T11:29:20.061-05:002014-01-15T11:29:20.061-05:00In my view, science can't answer the contingen...In my view, science can't answer the contingency: "Should bystanders enter burning buildings to save people?" <br /><br />But more to the point: what are your views on who should be the moral authority? What if I were to propose an academic theory based on practical reasoning that purports to be universally binding; would you be interested in my recounting it? I'm a beginner, but would appreciate the exercise.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-48633553059191134652014-01-14T19:31:40.187-05:002014-01-14T19:31:40.187-05:00>... I'd want to know in more detail what y... >... I'd want to know in more detail what you mean by the "intellectual" discipline that becomes an "academic" discipline at the end of your post. It seems you mean we should not pretend ethics is an enterprise of the speculative intellect, as are the natural sciences, which deal with the certain and the unchanging, conclusions deduced from premises.<<br /><br />I would not characterize science like this at all. This sounds more like a description of traditional metaphysics or logic.<br /><br />But we agree, I think, that normative ethical questions can't be answered satisfactorily by speculative reason or by science.<br /><br />Some sort of practical reason or judgment is required. Fair enough.<br /><br />>[A particular moral judgment is] not amenable to speculative thought, because of its contingent object.<<br /><br />Contingent object? Science can handle the contingent. I think rather that the problem is the complex social etc. nature of moral decision-making.<br /><br />>So I agree that this kind of question isn't subject to the tool of science, and I agree its answer cannot be taught in the academy, but I think discovering the objects that make practical principles intelligible for societies is academic, for example by anthropologists and psychologists. Those disciplines won't tell us right and wrong, but they will give clues as to what goods are reducible vs. irreducible, and from there the philosophers can argue right and wrong.<<br /><br />So they can. But with no special authority, I would say.Mark Englishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506844097173520312noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-55771334362560433962014-01-14T18:23:06.163-05:002014-01-14T18:23:06.163-05:00I think Massimo's description still doesn'...I think Massimo's description still doesn't fully address the libertarian concerns, and I still see virtue ethics as primarily descriptive. Per what I said before, I think one has to trot in something outside, lest the prescriptive side be not for "virtue ethics," but "MY virtue ethics."<br /><br />Massimo, as I've argued before for Hume supporting "something like free will," but without being a modern compatibilist (I reject that description of him), and with supporting "something like multiple drafts," or "something like subselves," I think he's somewhere in the vicinity of where I would describe myself on this issue, too.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-65678070428753192182014-01-14T09:05:07.801-05:002014-01-14T09:05:07.801-05:00Hi Vasco,
That's a good point about carrots a...Hi Vasco,<br /><br />That's a good point about carrots and sheep. It certainly seems that there is a carrot nature and a sheep nature, and if so there certainly must be a human nature.<br /><br />However I think that carrot and sheep nature is an illusion. Is a sheep/goat hybrid a sheep? How about an ancestor of a modern sheep from 100 years ago. 10,000 years ago. 1,000,000 years ago.<br /><br />There is no point at which we can clearly say a non-sheep has given birth to a sheep. Sheep, like all biological species (including carrots and humans), is a fuzzy category. It is a vague, useful concept which we can apply in day to day life because we don't come across too many individuals which don't fit cleanly into or outside of the set "sheep".<br /><br />There are things we can say all sheep have in common, sure. But to do that for humans would be to draw an impoverished description of humanity in such broad strokes that I imagine no useful morality could be derived from it.<br /><br />>As I argued before that one thinks that morality is subjective, but in reality we have to apply it as if it was in fact objective.<<br /><br />Sorry, I just don't understand this. You claim that living by a personal moral code is in effect living as if it was in fact objective. It seems to me that I could just as easily say that living by what you believe to be an objective moral code is in effect living by a personal moral code. I see no logical problem with living by a personal moral code and I don't see why you think that means effectively treating it as objective. One lives by a code - whether it is personal or objective has no logical bearing on the matter as far as I can see.<br /><br />>what we can observe is that even the people that deny the existence of free will, can’t fail form considering that it real (and not an illusion), and behave as if free will is real.<<br /><br />This is another example of the same disagreement. I don't believe in free will and I don't think I behave as if I do. Everything I do can be explained just as well in terms of not having free will. In particular, there are good arguments for moral responsibility even without assuming free will.<br /><br />Finally, on the New York thing: We have a semantic disagreement which I'm trying to clarify. I claim that being wrong is not the same as being incoherent, you seem to disagree. Being wrong may be a case of believing something which though plausible is inconsistent with reality. ("Incoherent with reality" is, I feel, an incorrect usage of the term).<br /><br />Being incoherent is another way of being wrong but it entails having beliefs which make no sense - i.e. they are internally inconsistent or vague to the point of nonsense. Something incoherent can be shown to be so from the armchair. If it's coherent, you can only show it to be wrong with empirical evidence. Of course, failing to find empirical evidence doesn't mean it's right.<br /><br />So, I understand you think that my position is wrong. Do you also think it is incoherent?Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-80424922857514995012014-01-14T08:23:06.469-05:002014-01-14T08:23:06.469-05:00Not to belabor the point, but I guess I'd want...Not to belabor the point, but I guess I'd want to know in more detail what you mean by the "intellectual" discipline that becomes an "academic" discipline at the end of your post. It seems you mean we should not pretend ethics is an enterprise of the speculative intellect, as are the natural sciences, which deal with the certain and the unchanging, conclusions deduced from premises. In this I again agree with you, but I notice also that Aristotle says the mean between the extremes is not found with the speculative intellect, but with the practical intellect. For example, "Do the equations predict the drag reduction in the new airplane wing?" is answered yes or no, with some margin of error. But the question, "Should a bystander run into a burning house to save people?" will never be answerable yes/no, even with 100% error margin; it's not amenable to speculative thought, because of its contingent object. So I agree that this kind of question isn't subject to the tool of science, and I agree its answer cannot be taught in the academy, but I think discovering the objects that make practical principles intelligible for societies is academic, for example by anthropologists and psychologists. Those disciplines won't tell us right and wrong, but they will give clues as to what goods are reducible vs. irreducible, and from there the philosophers can argue right and wrong.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-65512613820297459202014-01-13T20:36:00.852-05:002014-01-13T20:36:00.852-05:00My claim here is not about morality but about the ...My claim here is not about morality but about the possibility of encompassing normative ethics in – or seeing it as – an <em>intellectual discipline</em>.<br /><br />You can study real moral systems (historically etc.). You can make useful conceptual points and distinctions (meta-ethics). But deciding what human qualities or ethical or social values are most desirable or what the right thing is to do in a given situation takes us well beyond any academic discipline.Mark Englishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506844097173520312noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-86545861159086124202014-01-13T10:59:53.806-05:002014-01-13T10:59:53.806-05:00Disagreeble,
As I told you before, I can’t provid...Disagreeble,<br /><br />As I told you before, I can’t provide you any simple explanation for morality, even if it is the case that it is objective, which is my conviction, I can’t give a simple and undisputable explanation of it or provide any insight towards a simple understanding of it.<br /><br />«My problem with this is that I don't think there is a single, monolithic, objective human nature.»,<br /><br />I don’t know if anyone is capable of providing it also (I clearly am not). But that doesn’t deny that it is possible to see it that way, as it is not the case, there are plenty of people that consider morality to be objective, and have dedicated extreme efforts to support their case.<br />However to say that there is no “single, monolithic, objective human nature” is the same as to say that there is no “single, monolithic, objective carrot nature” or that there is no “single, monolithic, objective sheep nature”, but we know very well that it is not the case as we, in fact, pretend to know very well that we know what objectively is a “carrot nature” or a “sheep nature”, as in fact these are important activities that humans are committed to in growing carrots and raising sheep, and they are very well understood activities, insofar as we are capable of understanding what is objectively a carrot or a sheep (and we know very well that each carrot or each sheep is in itself unique and distinguishable from other carrots or sheep. I know that humans are different and more complex, but that just means that in case of humans the correct understanding of what is to be human is more complicated, nothing else. Again I never claimed this to be simple or easy.<br /><br />« What's wrong with living by a personal moral code?»<br /><br />I didn’t mean to imply that that was wrong by itself. If it is enough, or reasonable, to yourself, I wouldn’t advise you to change your perspective. For me it is wrong, as it departs from a wrong premise (that morality is subjective), and, in this sense, as it is wrong it will necessarily leads to incoherence. As I argued before that one thinks that morality is subjective, but in reality we have to apply it as if it was in fact objective.<br /><br />It is about the same thing that we observe in the matter of “free will”, which, as we know, there are a considerable number of people that think that there is no free will, or that it is just an illusion. In spite of thinking that free will exists and is real, and I don’t pretend to argue about that, what we can observe is that even the people that deny the existence of free will, can’t fail form considering that it real (and not an illusion), and behave as if free will is real. As in fact we know that people are morally responsible for their actions, and we don’t take allow ourselves from alleviating other people (or even ourselves) from that responsibility (and if we behave immorally we feel shame and experience remorse).<br /><br />«If I believe that New York is the capital of the USA, my belief is wrong but not incoherent. If I believe that Washington DC and New York are both the capital city of the USA, then my belief is probably incoherent.»<br /><br />The problem of something being false is that it will be incoherent with reality. What you are saying is that we are able to fool yourself into accepting falsehood, as if it was true, but you would find the incoherence and would recognize the falsehood, while trying to give it a meaning as trying to address it with someone else (that knew that in fact New York was not the capital) holding that claim. I would say that holding false believes would not bring anything good for you, in spite of being able to provide some comfort for a while.<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05113406033301115509noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-64842917922076203292014-01-13T10:01:29.426-05:002014-01-13T10:01:29.426-05:00I think purity does obvious eudaimonic work, if vi...I think purity does obvious eudaimonic work, if virtues are habits, and if a habit of monogomy can keep me from embarrassing public scandals. While faith might not be a virtue that Aristotle would have identified, perhaps Christian revelation makes it prudent for the culture to consider ever more deeply what the Prime Mover is up to.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-58475472973627710032014-01-13T10:00:37.743-05:002014-01-13T10:00:37.743-05:00Hi Vasco,
It seems your main argument is that the...Hi Vasco,<br /><br />It seems your main argument is that there is an objective human nature. Presumably we can even make this a subject of scientific study by anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, economists etc. We can therefore take objective morality to be the norms and rules arising out of this human nature.<br /><br />My problem with this is that I don't think there is a single, monolithic, objective human nature. I think each person has their own nature, and the nature of even an individual can change over time. What we regard as generic human nature is a rough amalgam of traits common to the population of humans, but I really don't think that individuals are approximating some Platonic ideal.<br /><br />If human nature is just a composite, an averaging out of the personalities and views of all individuals, then sampling different populations of humans at different times in history or from different cultures will lead to different views of human nature. This view of human nature might be used to argue that it is human nature to oppress women or to persecute homosexuals and other minorities. While this may be true, I fear the seemingly inevitable conclusion that it is objectively moral to do so.<br /><br />>Moral anti-realists are unable to be consequent with their positions.<<br /><br />I have tried to explain why I don't think this is the case. In what way do you think my behaviour is not consistent with my position? What's wrong with living by a personal moral code?<br /><br />>Moral anti-realism is wrong (incoherent)<<br /><br />I think there is a difference between being wrong and incoherent. Incoherent views are views built on some internal contradictions or rest on vague, fuzzy assumptions that cannot be clearly articulated.<br /><br />If I believe that New York is the capital of the USA, my belief is wrong but not incoherent. If I believe that Washington DC and New York are both the capital city of the USA, then my belief is probably incoherent.<br /><br />If you truly think that moral anti-realism is incoherent, I feel you ought to be able to point out a mistake in my reasoning, which so far I don't think you have. If you just want to say that it's wrong, that's fair enough.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-70364975583978764032014-01-13T09:44:35.284-05:002014-01-13T09:44:35.284-05:00Although you didn't ask me, I would venture &q...Although you didn't ask me, I would venture "no," for two reasons. First, because consequentialism purports to quantify the good, whereas Massimo denied that virtue is a calculated midpoint. Secondly, because the "relevant sphere" you mention would be calculated at one point in time for your analysis, whereas virtues are habit-forming and self-perpetuate through spacetime.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-20710697010986321282014-01-13T08:06:20.469-05:002014-01-13T08:06:20.469-05:00Mark, isn't your injunction 'don't pre...Mark, isn't your injunction 'don't pretend that morality is objective,' a moralization based on what you see to be the objective fact-value distinction? I think the remedy is to recognize that, as I agree with you, what _is_ accross cultures doesn't necessarily yield an ought, but what if we ask the question at the personal level: isn't practical reason rather concerned only with what is-to-be? In this sense, the is-to-be is the obvious ought, and virtues are just the habit for this ought.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-34887847385874747542014-01-12T15:28:34.164-05:002014-01-12T15:28:34.164-05:00
Disagreeble,
I think you understood what I said,...<br />Disagreeble,<br /><br />I think you understood what I said, which is good.<br /><br />I think that morality is objective, at least in the way that I can understand morality to exist. As a set of norms, rules, or laws that have the purpose of regulating our social interactions, or our existence as social rational beings. And that can be rationalized in a way to conform to what is objectively human nature.<br />I understand that this is not simple (and I don’t pretend that it is), and doesn’t provide us a predefined set of rules that we may use, as say the laws of physics, and in spite of what we call the human nature is something objective, we might disagree about what do we mean with that. As nobody provided us these set of rules we must find them, and believe that each and every one of us, in fact tries to do that (regardless the adequacy of the criteria we use).<br /><br />« So, just to clarify, which of these best describes your position?<br /><br />1) There is a difference in behaviour between moral realists and moral anti-realists,<br />2) Moral anti-realists are not behaving according to their beliefs.<br />3) Moral anti-realism is untenable or irrational»<br /><br />In response I think it doesn’t necessarily exists a difference in the behaviour of moral realists and moral anti-realists. Moral differences relate to distinct behaviors (which are not solely determined by the philosophical systems). Moral anti-realists are unable to be consequent with their positions. Moral anti-realism is wrong (incoherent), not necessarily irrational, just wrong as it departs from a wrong presumption (that moral is subjective or not objective).<br /><br />I don’t presume to prove that morality is objective, but I would say that many other people (much wiser than me) provided very good arguments (such as Plato and Aristotle). And the refutation of their arguments is not good enough (at least for me).<br /><br />Best regards<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05113406033301115509noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-67554231278468576152014-01-11T20:20:16.830-05:002014-01-11T20:20:16.830-05:00MJA,
And if a swallow falls in the forest, how ma...MJA,<br /><br />And if a swallow falls in the forest, how many apples does Susie have?Alex SLhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00801894164903608204noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-32058276781740132852014-01-11T16:56:02.471-05:002014-01-11T16:56:02.471-05:00Hi Vasco,
I genuinely don't think we need to ...Hi Vasco,<br /><br />I genuinely don't think we need to believe morality is fundamentally objective. If we need objective rules to live by, that function is provided by laws. More casually, we still have social customs and norms that govern how we live from day to day. No objective morality is required.<br /><br />Your argument is that most of us behave as if we believe in objective morality. I'm not convinced of this.<br /><br />Yes, it is probably true that most of us do in fact believe in objective morality. But how would our behaviour differ if we did not?<br /><br />Again, I don't believe in objective morality, yet I think my behaviour is much the same as anybody else's. I feel guilt and pride and I judge others to be morally lacking or praiseworthy. I don't see this as forgetting or pretending that there is no objective morality, I see it as taking my own subjective moral preferences seriously. <br /><br />So, just to clarify, which of these best describes your position?<br /><br />1) There is a difference in behaviour between moral realists and moral anti-realists,<br />2) Moral anti-realists are not behaving according to their beliefs.<br />3) Moral anti-realism is untenable or irrational<br /><br />Actually,.there are different types of moral anti-realist, so if you like you can assume we're talking about my position.<br /><br />Finally, I'd like to outline why I think we have a desire to believe that morality is objective.<br /><br />If morality is objective, then some causes are worth fighting for. Otherwise, everyone will just fight for what they believe, with no right side, which in effect means that might is right. This is rather depressing and goes against our sense of justice, that the weak should be protected against the strong.<br /><br />But the fact of the matter is that "might is right" regardless of whether objective morality exists. It doesn't matter if, say, abortion is objectively wrong, as long as the majority believe it is right. Those who have the power will do what they think is right, regardless of whether it is or not.<br /><br />Objective morality doesn't save us from this plight without a way to prove what is objectively right. Since there is no way to show what is objectively right, subjective morality is in some ways just a recognition of the facts. Even if there were some metaphysical objective morality out there, without any way to detect it it might as well not exist.<br /><br />Reality is what it is, not what we want it to be.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-23377417088429206722014-01-11T14:45:04.520-05:002014-01-11T14:45:04.520-05:00Disagreeble,
My arguments in defense of the exist...Disagreeble,<br /><br />My arguments in defense of the existence of objective morality (and not subjective) is based only on the perception of reality, which shows that we can't escape from considering moral as objective.<br />In the sense that we objectively assume a moral view, and act according to what you consider as objective morality (even if it is wrong and entirely subjective), we expect others to act in agreement with our notion of objective morality (even if wrong and entirely subjective), and if they don't we find reasonable to demand them to acknowledge that, as if it was obejctive (we don't understand the subjectivity of other people moral intuitions if they differ from ours).<br />And also the nearly universal (and convergent) moral behavior of human societies, which shows that we have a rational perpective of morality, and that we are able to improve our view about morality.<br /><br />In this sense the understanding of morality by humans, as realized from their behavior (in spite of different ideas and moral sistems), show a deep agreement with objective of morality.<br /><br />Of course there are a number of views that pretend to show that morality is either subjective or objective, and I don't dismiss those positions, what I said is that I would require a extraordinary argument in order to explain that the morality is subjective, while we treat it as objective, but even so I don't understand how we can escape from treating it as objective (even if we pretend that that is not the case).<br /><br /><br /><br />I am not pretending that I have indeed exposed a very strong case for objective morality. Probably not, as you said. But that is the way I see it, maintainig rationality (and assuming that humans are rational).Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05113406033301115509noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-18300140846865157182014-01-11T13:26:54.067-05:002014-01-11T13:26:54.067-05:00Hi Vasco,
Sorry, I didn't mean to offend, and...Hi Vasco,<br /><br />Sorry, I didn't mean to offend, and I did read your comments. I'm sorry if you took me to be pretending you didn't present arguments. That was not my intention. It did seem to me (and it still does) that you did not present arguments or evidence that could not just as easily be construed as evidence for a subjective moral intuition. You presented arguments for morality, not for *objective* morality.<br /><br />I'll try to explain why, mostly as an attempt to convince you I'm debating honestly rather than to persuade you.<br /><br />>I have to keep it simple, I claimed that I can’t fail to recognize that morality is objective, and humans do realize that good and evil are objective.<<br /><br />This to me is not really an argument. Firstly, claiming to recognise that morality is objective is either an assertion or an appeal to intuition. Secondly, I dispute that humans realise that good and evil are objective. Rather, humans debate whether this is the case, as we are doing now. I am an example of a human that does not realise or recognise that good and evil are objective.<br /><br />[paraphrasing your second point: humans feel the need to justify their actions]<br /><br />I don't see this as an argument for objective morality. It's an argument that there exists an intuition that morality exists. I agree with that, I just think the intuition is wrong.<br /><br />[paraphrasing third argument: we judge others according to an objective standard]<br /><br />But I don't! I judge others according to my own subjective morality, and I think that's what everyone else does too! You're asserting that this is irrational or meaningless, but I don't see an argument for this.<br /><br />Besides, even if it is irrational to judge others according to subjective morality, that may be an explanation for why we feel the need to invent a fictitious objective standard of morality in an attempt to rationalise our irrational behaviour. As with the previous point, I really don't see it as any kind of argument for objective morality, but as an argument for the existence of a moral intuition.<br /><br />[paraphasing fourth argument: morality converges over time]<br /><br />Ok, sorry, that is indeed an argument for objective morality.<br /><br />I think it's not a particularly strong argument, as there is also a convergence and sharing of a great many other cultural factors, e.g. fashion. It looks to me like human beings slowly reaching consensus via trial and error on how to live with each other in a global society based on what works best, but that doesn't mean that there is some Platonic ideal that is being approximated. Many disagreements remain, and I'm not too hopeful that they will ever disappear.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-15674446122138033272014-01-11T11:10:51.187-05:002014-01-11T11:10:51.187-05:00What and why?
Equal and One.
There is no greater...What and why?<br />Equal and One. <br /><br />There is no greater goodness than the equitable goodness of One is All.<br /><br />The proof can be found in Nature by answering this simple question:<br />What is the measure of Oneself?<br /><br />== MJAhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01897595473268353450noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-17023903231737936792014-01-11T11:03:37.532-05:002014-01-11T11:03:37.532-05:00Disagreeble,
«It wasn't clear to me that you ...Disagreeble,<br /><br />«It wasn't clear to me that you had no argument for objective morality beyond your intuitions.»<br />What do you mean by saying that I have no arguments for objective morality, did you even bother to read what I said in my comments? I seriously doubt it.<br />I have to keep it simple, I claimed that I can’t fail to recognize that morality is objective, and humans do realize that good and evil are objective. As:<br />+ we humans (except in case of pathological behavior or self-deception) act according to what is good and while acting in an evil way we are compelled to acknowledge it good (or at least as not evil), or this behavior doesn’t seem rationally justified.<br />+ in responding to the behavior of others we also see morality (or the sense of what is good or evil) as objective, and we expect the others to behave like if morality was objective. It is highly irrational to address the morality of others as subjective, it would have no meaning, and it wouldn’t be rational.<br />+ even if the perception of reality is distinct from person to person and conditioned somehow by cultural constrains, most of morality is essentially similar among human societies, and becomes more and more similar (as if there was a convergence of morality), as cultures develop and the world becomes more interconnected.<br /><br />This is clearly seen in the way humans consider murder (as the act of killing someone else), today in humans societies it is largely understood as wrong and evil. But this is not universal, in the sense that there are psychopaths (who are unable to understanding it), or that different people realize that in some special occasions it is justified, as in autocratic regimes, people may find murder reasonable by a sort of justifications as it is against the interest of the people, or against the interest of the nation, or of working class, or of the wellbeing of others, or the greater good, or whatever. The case is that it as to resemble some sort of objective good. But this only means that people are capable of fooling themselves and acting against reason.<br /><br />You might disagree with me, or pretend that my arguments don’t persuade you, but to claim that I didn’t present arguments is absurd<br /><br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05113406033301115509noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-34908281247893846472014-01-10T22:09:33.282-05:002014-01-10T22:09:33.282-05:00>> the post reads very much as if one can co...>> the post reads very much as if one can come up with whatever virtues one fancies<br />> I seriously don’t understand why you think so. Indeed, I would think that your moral naturalism would fit quite nicely with virtue ethics.<br /><br />Well yes, that is pretty much the point: it potentially "fits", which means that it cannot be an alternative box at the same level. Virtue ethics is *not* an approach that allows us to decide what is good to do, it is orthogonal to that question; it simply cannot answer that question!<br /><br />Only once you have already used another approach to deciding what is good can you say, "oh, and by the way, I think that the best way to achieve good in our society is if everybody individually aims to be a person that naturally behaves in a good manner."<br /><br />(You may, by the way, object to that sentence because the point of virtue ethics is achieving personal eudaimonia instead of achieving societal good. But if that is the case, then virtue ethics is quite simply not ethics but instead merely an egoistical self-help strategy on the level of "give up smoking and you will be less stressed.")<br /><br />I had previously assumed that you are a consequentialist because you seemed to argue that virtue ethics would lead to good outcomes. Your above comments, however, are argued from a contractualist perspective, so maybe that is what you are. The thing is that you cannot be only a virtue ethicist because your virtues have to come from somewhere else, contractualism for example.<br /><br />> Where does your decision to be a consequentialist (if that’s what you are) come from? Consequentialism?<br /><br />Not sure if I have analysed my own stance to the degree necessary to truthfully answer that question but I suspect that I am mostly a contractualist / naturalist: ethics come from negotiation and trial and error within the constraints of our (evolved) nature and environmental parameters. (E.g. a society that considers lying and cheating to be virtues won't work.)<br /><br />And I have that position because I realized three things: First, that is simply how things are, regardless of whether that is how it should be. Second, there is no way to get to a 'should' that isn't question-begging and/or human fiat. Third, because ethics are about how humans treat each other, it is humans who get to call the shots (collectively). We get to decide by fiat what our ethics should be because they are about us.<br /><br />Although I am aware of the problems with pathologizing opposing positions, I also suspect that schools of ethics are a question of personal maturity: we start out as borderline egomaniacs (child obeys rules only because it fears punishment or disapproval) and then move through deontology (child understand that there are rules to be followed by everybody), consequentialism (student grasps that rules were created for a purpose and can be broken if that serves the underlying purpose better) and finally contractualism (once the student starts wondering where the heck the underlying purposes come from and how they can be justified).<br /><br />And some people unfortunately got stuck in one of the immature phases of moral development: Psychopaths in the first one, conservatives and divine command theorists in the second, Sam Harris in the third...Alex SLhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00801894164903608204noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-47376596440140808732014-01-10T21:05:06.652-05:002014-01-10T21:05:06.652-05:00Hi Vasco,
Ok, sorry for going on about it. It was...Hi Vasco,<br /><br />Ok, sorry for going on about it. It wasn't clear to me that you had no argument for objective morality beyond your intuitions. Personally, I try to avoid basing beliefs on intuitions where possible. It should at least cause you to doubt your position.<br /><br />>Do you have any possible explanation that truth is distinct and might be objective while beauty or morality must be subjective (besides your intuition),<<br /><br />Sure, because truth is a mathematical concept. In mathematics, a statement is true if it is consistent. In ordinary speech, true statements are those which are consistent with some aspect of the state of the world. Different people may have different opinions on matters of fact, but if we assume the world has an existence independent of people, some people are simply wrong.<br /><br />Now, some statements are more ambiguous. Do we have free will? I think the answer is both yes and no, depending on what you mean by free will. Same thing goes for whether mathematical objects exist. As such, these statements have no truth value until clarified. This ambiguity might be construed as subjectivity of truth, but I think that is a mistake.<br /><br />Beauty, as the saying goes, is in the eye of the beholder. What is beautiful is clearly subjective. To a dog, a dog is sexy. To a dung beetle, dung is tasty. To a woodlouse, light is repellent. What is sexy, tasty, beautiful, enjoyable, desirable, etc, are all a function of who you are, and if that is true for members of different species I see no reason to doubt that it is also true for members of the same species, albeit to a lesser extent. These attributes are not simply not intrinsic to the objects in the world.<br /><br />>What do you mean, is that redness is subjective<<br /><br />I mean some aspects of "red" are subjective while some are not. If one person perceives an object as red but another perceives the same object as orange, there may be a sense in which neither are wrong, due to the circumstances under which the object is viewed and also due to where each person draws the line between red and orange. However, there is also the objective fact of the wavelength of the light, which is not subjective (unless you want to count doppler effects due to different frames of reference).<br /><br />>Well to be precise naturalism doesn’t account morality at all<<br /><br />On the contrary, I think it accounts for subjective morality very well. It's not hard to see how we might have evolved moral intuitions as an evolutionary aide. We can see altruism of a kind even in social insects. It's not hard to extrapolate from that to human morality.<br /><br />Similarly for aesthetics. We find different things attractive because they are in some way reminiscent of things that are evolutionary advantageous, or as a side effect of the evolution of something else.<br /><br />>I am sure I don’t misunderstand what is parsimony<<br /><br />Good, but if you argue against parsimony on the grounds that simple explanations don't always adequately explain what we see, then that looks very much like misunderstanding parsimony to me.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-13152557593906760032014-01-10T17:48:30.538-05:002014-01-10T17:48:30.538-05:00Disagreeble,
« I don't believe anything goes....Disagreeble,<br /><br />« I don't believe anything goes. Certain things feel right and wrong to me and I stand by those principles. I just don't claim to have objective truth on my side, because I reject objective truth with regards to moral questions.»<br /><br />I acknowledge that you rely on your moral intuitions (but this doesn’t entail that you believe that anything goes, and I was not suggesting that, although I think it is a risk, arising from subjectivism).<br /><br />« But why do you think it is objective?»<br /><br />As I explained to you that is what I can observe from my perception of reality, but since you claim that it is subjective, I clearly can’t pretend to be capable of showing that it is the case.<br /><br />« Truth is objective. Beauty is not.»<br /><br />Do you have any possible explanation that truth is distinct and might be objective while beauty or morality must be subjective (besides your intuition), after all it is quite common that people disagree about truth, as much as about morality or beauty (as you might realize by the arguing on anything that is posted here in Rationally Speaking).<br /><br />«I think this is possibly equivocating. There is the experience or qualia of redness, which is not objective, and there is a certain band of wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation, which is»<br /><br />What do you mean, is that redness is subjective, in a way that when I say red you imagine that it is any another colour. Or you are not sure about what I mean with red?<br /><br />« But so far there is nothing that naturalism fails to explain. Naturalism doesn't account for objective morality, but then there is no evidence for objective morality and so nothing to explain. »<br /><br />Well to be precise naturalism doesn’t account morality at all (even less if it is objective or subjective), just as it doesn’t account aesthetics (objective or otherwise), well it doesn’t account truth also.<br /><br />« I think you misunderstand parsimony…., so parsimony suggests rejecting the objective morality hypothesis. »<br /><br />I am sure I don’t misunderstand what is parsimony (it is not complicated). In this matter given the credit you give to your intuitions, parsimony is not able to contradict you.<br /><br />« Again, why do you believe in objective morality? «You are expending all your efforts to show me how belief in objective morality might be rescued against my criticisms, but why do you believe in it in the first place? »<br /><br />I tried to explain my reasons in my previous comments (apparently with little success) I can’t surmount your criticism and it makes no sense to insist on that.<br /><br />Cheers<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05113406033301115509noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-63158159033000858142014-01-10T14:57:23.811-05:002014-01-10T14:57:23.811-05:00Hi Vasco,
>it is the ultimate simplifications ...Hi Vasco,<br /><br />>it is the ultimate simplifications as it become entirely irrelevant (to the point where anything is acceptable).<<br /><br />You are confusing moral anti-realism with normative moral relativism. I don't believe anything goes. Certain things feel right and wrong to me and I stand by those principles. I just don't claim to have objective truth on my side, because I reject objective truth with regards to moral questions.<br /><br />>but in spite of this subjective nature our perception of reality indicates that the result, in this case morality, is objective.<<br /><br />But why do you think it is objective?<br /><br />>As I said this is no different than other values such as truth or beauty<<br /><br />Truth is objective. Beauty is not.<br /><br />>It also no different from the fact that we recognize the colour red, to be something objective<<br /><br />I think this is possibly equivocating. There is the experience or qualia of redness, which is not objective, and there is a certain band of wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation, which is.<br /><br />>But if naturalism fails to account reality, it fails, there is nothing mysterious about that and it is not the case that naturalism is capable of explaining everything,<<br /><br />But so far there is nothing that naturalism fails to explain. Naturalism doesn't account for objective morality, but then there is no evidence for objective morality and so nothing to explain.<br /><br />>I think that parsimony as a (metaphysical) criteria is quite overrated, <<br /><br />I think you misunderstand parsimony. Parsimony is not just a preference for simple theories. Parsimony is making explanations as simple as possible to explain what is observed, but no simpler. If reality is not explained by a simple theory, parsimony does not recommend adopting it. My position is that there is no evidence for objective morality, so parsimony suggests rejecting the objective morality hypothesis.<br /><br />Again, why do you believe in objective morality? You are expending all your efforts to show me how belief in objective morality might be rescued against my criticisms, but why do you believe in it in the first place? Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.com