tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post3773166522575192106..comments2018-08-25T21:24:44.954-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Sean Carroll, Edge, and falsifiabilityUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger115125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-76096330453997183882014-02-09T09:26:22.909-05:002014-02-09T09:26:22.909-05:00Hi Robin,
My comment about absolute time was only...Hi Robin,<br /><br />My comment about absolute time was only directed at your postulation of a universe where some global event happens at regular intervals, which I understood was supposed to be a brute law of nature. If it's happening at the whim of a demigod I agree such a universe could exist. The same goes for my comments about what constitutes a head and what constitutes Seattle. All of these things are possible in a universe governed by a capricious mind, but probably not in a universe governed by simple laws.<br /><br />My view is that all universes which appear the same are the same universe. If there are two algorithmic strings which lead to identical universes in every way, then those are the same universe. Mathematical objects are built out of structure and relations, not mathematical notation. programming languages or machine code. Any two structures which are isomorphic are the same structure.<br /><br />Also, I do not think any mathematical universe needs a computer to run it. That computer would need some sort of reality to exist in, so why not let the buck stop at the universe itself. So, talking of registers and trigger ratios is beside the point. All we need to discuss is the mathematical relations of the universe itself.<br /><br />Now, with that said, perhaps you can understand while though I acknowledge that there are an infinite multitude of possible beings who could have designed this universe, as long as they do not intervene I regard them as not being part of this universe. They did not create it, they merely discovered the mathematical object describing it the same way any mathematician does when discovering any mathematical object. This universe exists independently of them and does not exist because of them.<br /><br />If they intervene, then this universe is no longer accurately described by the laws of physics, but is instead ultimately derived from the mathematical object describing the mind of a specific demigod.<br /><br />My contention is that an arbitrarily chosen mathematical object is much more likely to support conscious life through relatively simple laws of physics than it is to correspond to the mind of a digital demigod, because the latter is much more complex (perhaps "special") and less arbitrary than the former. Any algorithm describing a conscious mind is so complex, so intricate, so apparently designed or evolved, that it is inconceivable that an arbitrarily chosen mathematical object could describe it. Simple laws, on the other hand, often lead to complexity in surprising ways, and these are not particularly sensitive to how the original laws are chosen. Numerous cellular automata and other mathematical constructs demonstrate that there exists an inexhaustible supply of entirely different sets of rules that produce complexity and spontaneous organisation. Therefore I believe that universes determined by conscious minds exist in negligible quantities compared to those determined by simple laws.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-46630817319101958902014-02-09T06:48:02.164-05:002014-02-09T06:48:02.164-05:00The next issue is whether or not the digital demig...The next issue is whether or not the digital demigods can create miracles in their universes.<br /><br />Your objection appears to be that the miracles would contravene natural laws like relativity.<br /><br />But that is rather the point of miracles.<br /><br />The created universe does not need to be self consistent as it has a mind doing the adjustments.<br /><br />Why would enlarging heads every second Thursday require an absolute concept of time?<br /><br />Why would demolishing and reassembling Seattle cause a problem?<br /><br />If I create a simulation of a world and make it act according to some laws of physics then I can easily remove a building and replace it with another and the world will continue with the new physical configuration. I didn’t need to calculate any equations by which this worked - I just erased the building, replaced it with another and bob’s your uncle.<br /><br />The digital demigod might have a rather more complex set of adjustments to make but it would really be under much the same principle. There is no need for him to derive a set of equations to describe the reconstruction of Seattle - he can just make it happen in any crazy order, make adjustments to the sense data reaching the people and there you are.<br /><br />Time and matter are nothing but numbers in the digital demigod universe and he just needs to replace them all with different numbers.<br /><br />So, yes, under MUH a digital demigod can and will create a universe which instantiates any crazy state of affairs that our minds can envisage and quite a lot besides.<br /><br />He can make Godzilla appear in Central Park, New York tomorrow in red hot pants, a bowler hat and dancing the macarena. And under MUH, in an uncountable infinity of uncountable infinities of infinitely many infinities of universes, a digital demigod does just that. Robinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16015911138886238144noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-71011897032354373132014-02-09T06:34:51.732-05:002014-02-09T06:34:51.732-05:00So let’s deal with the probability thing.
The tro...So let’s deal with the probability thing.<br /><br />The trouble is that you have said nothing new. You are still relying on that unsupported assumption about the simplicity of universes.<br /><br />I have moved on and am showing that, even if you were right about that, you would still be behind the eight ball.<br /><br />Here is what we are comparing:<br /><br />1. Infinitely many ways to start a some sort of a natural universe<br />2. Infinitely many ways to start each specific digital universe<br /><br />So they are not really equal.<br /><br />And I am understating it. For a start, for each universal computer there will be infinitely many mathematically distinct strings which are equivalent algorithms for each specific universe.<br /><br />Any algorithm can run on top of a continuous system so there can be infinitely many machines with different trigger ratios (and since these are continuous this will be an uncountable infinity).<br /><br />And for each trigger ratio there can be an infinite variation of local fluctuations, again uncountable.<br /><br />There are just too many distinct mathematical structures which can implement any particular algorithm for the natural universe to compete.<br /><br />So let’s take an example - this universe we are both observing and having this discussion in. Under MUH there is, with a probability of 1, an uncountable infinity of uncountable infinities of infinitely many mathematically distinct digital demigods dedicated to the task of creating arbitrarily many universes of the type we are observing in order that we can have this discussion and arbitrarily many more digital demigods dedicated to the same task.<br /><br />And there are multipliers in the variations we can’t see, like teapots orbiting Aldebaran or sugar bowls orbitting Proxima Centauri.<br /><br />So yes, it really is overwhelmingly improbably under MUH that we are in a natural universe.Robinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16015911138886238144noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-19130470692188002462014-02-08T23:30:29.697-05:002014-02-08T23:30:29.697-05:00Lets deal with fhe time and matter thing. Of cours...Lets deal with fhe time and matter thing. Of course there is no absolute time, I can't see where you are getting that from. There is no time at all, only a mathematical construct which certain observers interpret as time. Same with matter. A pure algorithm is not going to be constrained by relativity. Why would it?Robinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16015911138886238144noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-76154001366425943522014-02-07T07:45:13.507-05:002014-02-07T07:45:13.507-05:00[Massimo: this is a repost as I fear that since pr...[Massimo: this is a repost as I fear that since previous comments turned up but this did not that it did not submit properly. Please delete this if it is a double post]<br /><br />>So the question of the relative complexity is subsumed by the fact that once we have our first digital demigod then there is zero improbability involved in any subsequent demigod or demigod-created universe.<<br /><br />Well, kind of, in that the existence of all these options is necessary, so therefore no improbability. But the chance that any individual observer exists in a Godly universe is still near zero, because there are vastly more ways for a universe to be Godless than Godly, because of the relative complexity of those universes.<br /><br />>Thus they will definitely outnumber natural universes.<<br /><br />Nope.<br /><br />Back to my number analogy. This is how I see your argument:<br /><br />For every number which is a multiple of a million, there are an infinite number of multiples of that number, and for each of those multiples, an infinite number of multiples ad infinitum. So, once we have our first number that is a multiple of a million, then there is zero improbability of there not being other numbers that are a multiple of a million. Therefore, for any arbitrarily chosen number, it is almost certainly a multiple of a million.<br /><br />>If you are right there will definitely be universes that are just like ours except that our heads will grow twice as big every second Thursday and return to normal size at exactly 7.26 that evening.<<br /><br />I'm not so sure about that. That implies an absolute concept of time, which according to relativity is problematic. The universe you describe is probably incoherent. You would also need to describe precisely what distinguishes a human head from any other arbitrary lump of matter. In short, you don't really get to let your imagination run wild and suppose that any kind of crazy universe exists because humans are good at imagining logically incoherent scenarios.<br /><br />>And there will be a universe that is just like ours except that, tomorrow at 2.33 pm Mothra will destroy Seattle and then Seattle will reassemble itself next day.<<br /><br />Maybe, but again, probably incoherent. How does the universe distinguish Seattle from other aggregations of matter in order to spontaneously reassemble itself? It seems unlikely that this scenario can be decomposed easily to a set of equations the way our universe can be.<br /><br />Finally, I would like to point out one subtlety in how I view things. Somewhere out there in the mathematical multiverse there is a creator being who has created a universe just like ours. As long as he doesn't interact with the universe, then that universe is identical to ours. In my view, this means that it *IS* our universe. But this doesn't mean that our universe has a creator any more than Mandelbrot created the Mandelbrot set. He discovered it. And in fact there must be an infinite number of 'creators' who 'discovered' our universe, so our universe can have no single creator, (as long as there are no miracles). I say that not to refute any of your points in particular but just to explain something important about my view.<br />Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-40035207312742074242014-02-07T05:04:41.900-05:002014-02-07T05:04:41.900-05:00>So the question of the relative complexity is ...>So the question of the relative complexity is subsumed by the fact that once we have our first digital demigod then there is zero improbability involved in any subsequent demigod or demigod-created universe.<<br /><br />Well, kind of, in that the existence of all these options is necessary, so therefore no improbability. But the chance that any individual observer exists in a Godly universe is still near zero, because there are vastly more ways for a universe to be Godless than Godly, because of the relative complexity of those universes.<br /><br />>Thus they will definitely outnumber natural universes.<<br /><br />Nope.<br /><br />Back to my number analogy. This is how I see your argument:<br /><br />For every number which is a multiple of a million, there are an infinite number of multiples of that number, and for each of those multiples, an infinite number of multiples ad infinitum. So, once we have our first number that is a multiple of a million, then there is zero improbability of there not being other numbers that are a multiple of a million. Therefore, for any arbitrarily chosen number, it is almost certainly a multiple of a million.<br /><br />>If you are right there will definitely be universes that are just like ours except that our heads will grow twice as big every second Thursday and return to normal size at exactly 7.26 that evening.<<br /><br />I'm not so sure about that. That implies an absolute concept of time, which according to relativity is problematic. The universe you describe is probably incoherent. You would also need to describe precisely what distinguishes a human head from any other arbitrary lump of matter. In short, you don't really get to let your imagination run wild and suppose that any kind of crazy universe exists because humans are good at imagining logically incoherent scenarios.<br /><br />>And there will be a universe that is just like ours except that, tomorrow at 2.33 pm Mothra will destroy Seattle and then Seattle will reassemble itself next day.<<br /><br />Maybe, but again, probably incoherent. How does the universe distinguish Seattle from other aggregations of matter in order to spontaneously reassemble itself? It seems unlikely that this scenario can be decomposed easily to a set of equations the way our universe can be.<br /><br />Finally, I would like to point out one subtlety in how I view things. Somewhere out there in the mathematical multiverse there is a creator being who has created a universe just like ours. As long as he doesn't interact with the universe, then that universe is identical to ours. In my view, this means that it *IS* our universe. But this doesn't mean that our universe has a creator any more than Mandelbrot created the Mandelbrot set. He discovered it. And in fact there must be an infinite number of 'creators' who 'discovered' our universe, so our universe can have no single creator, (as long as there are no miracles). I say that not to refute any of your points in particular but just to explain something important about my view.<br />Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-77275772266826305242014-02-07T05:04:27.264-05:002014-02-07T05:04:27.264-05:00>So you claim that the rules governing a Godles...>So you claim that the rules governing a Godless Universe are much simpler than the rules governing a Godly Universe.<<br /><br />The "laws of physics" for a Godless universe are much like those in our universe. Sure, there will be lots of arbitrarily complex universes with very complex laws of physics, but for reasons I won't discuss right now (unless you're interested) I think they are unlikely to support life. So take this universe as a sample of what a typical life-supporting universe might be like.<br /><br />The "laws of physics" for a universe created by and interacting with a God who did not evolve but simply exists of his own nature must account for that God. Now, instead of defining physical constants and the relationships between matter and energy, the "laws of physics" instead must comprise an algorithm corresponding to a perfect, infinitely intelligent, infinitely benevolent mind. This may just be my intuition talking, but I think such an algorithm is likely to be more complicated than the equations of the physics of this universe.<br /><br />>You have admitted that the simplest universal computer is one where the logic can be described in 32 bits.<<br /><br />Actually I think you'll find it only needs 8 bits. You don't need to specify the input combinations, they are implied by the ordering of the output bits.<br /><br />>In your conjecture there are infinitely many of these with infinitely many programs.<<br /><br />Well, OK, but I don't think you need the computers. I think you only need the programs. A computer is a way to process a program. But if the program *is* the universe then no computer is necessary. The mathematical structure of the program is all you need to define what happens in that universe. But yeah, infinitely many programs...<br /><br />>Personally I doubt whether anything simpler than Rule 110 will be capable of generating any sort of complexity.<<br />You're probably right.<br /><br />>your conjecture will, by definition, imply demigods capable of understanding the mathematics underlying our universe and therefore creating one because this is logically possible.<<br />Yup.<br /><br />>it is logically possible that they will create arbitrarily many of these universes and therefore this will happen in your conjecture.<<br />Yup<br /><br />>each spawned demigod will spawn arbitrarily many other demigods and arbitrarily many other universes.<<br />Yup.<br />Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-40216547904396650052014-02-07T04:32:58.371-05:002014-02-07T04:32:58.371-05:00Hi Robin,
It's great to have an opponent in d...Hi Robin,<br /><br />It's great to have an opponent in discussing ideas like the MUH specifically, as I don't think it's empirically testable and so the only way to test the idea is to have a discussion with someone who disagrees.<br /><br />I think one thing that is true of me is that I will argue about anything if I see a problem with it, whether or not it supports my cause. So don't be too surprised to see me arguing against the complexity of one specific computer but for it in another, it depends on how I see that case.<br /><br />I agree there is a certain inconsistency in my interpretation of Rule 110 as a computer and not of the GoL. I think this comes down to the fact that it is much more natural to interpret it this way because it is possible to do computation with Rule 110 by entering a program coded as a sequence of ones and zeros. It is not really possible to do that with GoL without first constructing an elaborate structure. Nevertheless, this structure is also composed of ones and zeros so it's hard to make a case that the difference is substantial. Nevertheless, I think it is certainly an unusual view to regard the GoL as a whole as a computer. But OK, let's shelve that and I will admit that the GoL can be considered to be a computer.<br /><br />>the difference between a mathematical description of an automaton that can, given the right program, can do any calculation whatsoever and a bag of atoms<<br /><br />However I do want you to understand where I'm coming from. I don't think the difference is as obvious as you seem to think. GoL can compute anything given the right structure and program. A bag of atoms can compute anything if they are arranged properly first. By default, neither are much use, but given some work each can be used to build a computing engine. To me the analogy seems reasonably clear, although perhaps it would be more direct if I said that this universe is a universal computer because it is possible to do computations in it. Now this analogy I think is perfect.<br /><br />>The more meaningful question is the difference between GoL and the rules by which atoms work. The answer is that it depends upon whether those rules are universal.<<br /><br />Well, they are universal. Obviously. Because the rules by which atoms work can be used to drive a physical computer.<br /><br />Anyway, what does it get you to show that there is a very very simple computer? OK, it contradicts what I said earlier, which was "The universe can essentially be defined by the laws of physics, which though currently not completely understood, are almost certainly much simpler than a computer.". When I said this, I was thinking of a physical computer, made of trillions of atoms arranged in a very specific way. I do view this physical object as more complex than the laws of physics of the universe. I agree with you that a mathematical abstraction of a computer is much simpler than the laws of physics.<br /><br />So, we are agreed that (logical) computers are simple. Indeed, let's go with that.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-13946512003489697702014-02-06T19:04:58.664-05:002014-02-06T19:04:58.664-05:00So, under the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis it ...So, under the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis it is vastly unlikely that I am not living in a universe created by a digital demigod who could alter the perceived laws of physics at will.<br /><br />So we have to think about the kinds of miracles that could conceivably happen to me. Too large to number, almost anything could happen. They will certainly outnumber the ways that my day could go if the apparent laws of physics continued to apply. <br /><br />So the number of universes where miraculous events are an every day occurrence vastly outnumber those where they are not.<br /><br />So it is vastly unlikely that I will get through today. or any day for that matter, without many miraculous events happening to me.<br /><br />But I get through every day without any event happening that was not according to the perceived laws of physics.<br /><br />So the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis is false.<br /><br />If Max Tegmark’s reasoning behind this hypothesis is sound then the external reality hypothesis is also false.<br /><br />Personally I think it is his reasoning that is false.<br />Robinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16015911138886238144noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-51333444475624909072014-02-06T18:18:45.403-05:002014-02-06T18:18:45.403-05:00So you claim that the rules governing a Godless Un...So you claim that the rules governing a Godless Universe are much simpler than the rules governing a Godly Universe.<br /><br />On what do you base that?<br /><br />You have admitted that the simplest universal computer is one where the logic can be described in 32 bits.<br /><br />In your conjecture there are infinitely many of these with infinitely many programs.<br /><br />We don't know the base complexity of the simplest rules that can create a natural universe. I doubt that they are simpler entities than Rule 110 but I don't know that and neither do you.<br /><br />Personally I doubt whether anything simpler than Rule 110 will be capable of generating any sort of complexity. We do not have any examples of this.<br /><br />However we do know that your conjecture will, by definition, imply demigods capable of understanding the mathematics underlying our universe and therefore creating one because this is logically possible.<br /><br />We also know that it is logically possible that they will create arbitrarily many of these universes and therefore this will happen in your conjecture.<br /><br />We also know that they will be capable of creating arbitrarily many other digital demigods and therefore this will happen under your conjecture and of course it is logically possible that each spawned demigod will spawn arbitrarily many other demigods and arbitrarily many other universes.<br /><br />If everything that can happen does happen in your conjecture then this will happen.<br /><br />So the question of the relative complexity is subsumed by the fact that once we have our first digital demigod then there is zero improbability involved in any subsequent demigod or demigod-created universe.<br /><br />Thus they will definitely outnumber natural universes.<br /><br />So, under your conjecture, we should expect to be living in a digital-demigod created universe and hope that it is not one that really is going to send to hell for not praying at it (since under your conjecture such universes must exist).<br /><br />And since the rules of a digital-demigod created universe will be entirely under the control of the digital demigod then it can alter those rules as it pleases and therefore there can be miracles in those universes.<br /><br />If you are right there will definitely be universes that are just like ours except that our heads will grow twice as big every second Thursday and return to normal size at exactly 7.26 that evening.<br /><br />Luck, then, that we don't live in that universe.<br /><br />And there will be a universe that is just like ours except that, tomorrow at 2.33 pm Mothra will destroy Seattle and then Seattle will reassemble itself next day.<br /><br />Under your conjecture that universe definitely exists and the people in that universe will be conscious just like you and me.<br /><br />Do you agree?Robinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16015911138886238144noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-10644927889200096812014-02-06T18:17:37.097-05:002014-02-06T18:17:37.097-05:00You admit that Rule 110 is a universal computer bu...You admit that Rule 110 is a universal computer but not Game of Life? Very peculiar But you have at least admitted that there is a very simple universal computer and our only disagreement is whether or not we consider the cell's current state as an input which is just semantic - two or three input depending on this definition.<br /><br />Rule 110 is obviously simpler than GoL and so our discussion of GoL is irrelevant. Nonetheless you say that the GoL evolves according to the rules of the GoL. The same can be said of any automaton including a Turing Machine.<br /><br />So would you then say that a Turing Machine is not a universal computer because it evolves according to the rules of a Turing Machine?<br /><br />Of course not.<br /><br />And how do you think that you can even emulate TM on GoL? By first giving it a program.<br /><br />The fact the GoL can implement a Turing Machine does not imply that it *must* implement a TM in order to do any calculation. That only serves as a proof that GoL is universal.<br /><br />A universal machine is an automaton that is capable of doing any calculation that any other machine can - and GoL satisfies that criterion.<br /><br />And you ask me to explain the difference between a mathematical description of an automaton that can, given the right program, can do any calculation whatsoever and a bag of atoms?<br /><br />The fact that you even ask the question seems to indicate that it is useless even trying to explain the answer.<br /><br />You have simply made a category error. The more meaningful question is the difference between GoL and the rules by which atoms work. The answer is that it depends upon whether those rules are universal. And I don't think anybody knows that.<br /><br />But never mind - you refuse to admit that a particular cellular automaton is a universal computer, but you have admitted that a simpler cellular automaton is a universal computer<br /><br />Let's go with that.Robinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16015911138886238144noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-32980852215539630812014-02-06T05:41:00.996-05:002014-02-06T05:41:00.996-05:00Hi Robin,
>A Mandelbrot set is no more complex...Hi Robin,<br /><br />>A Mandelbrot set is no more complex than the program which generates it by any known definition of complex.<<br /><br />Would you therefore say the Mandelbrot set is no more complex than the equation that defines it? I would not. Complexity has a meaning related to intricacy and number of parts working together in consistent yet not entirely predictable ways. The equation of the Mandelbrot set itself is very simple. It can be expressed with only 10 symbols. The intricacy and surprising patterns, whorls and curlicues we see in the set cannot be so easily described. The complexity only arises when we explore what the equation entails, that's what I mean by more complex.<br /><br />Yes, that complexity arises from the simple equation, so in a sense the set IS that equation, and so can be no more complex than it on that interpretation. But by that logic a human brain is no more complex than the laws of physics which gave rise to it, which to me seems untrue.<br /><br />>Your confusion is that GoL can and does run programs. <<br />It doesn't meaningfully run programs without first building a machine within it out of live and dead cells. It just evolves according to the rules of the GoL, which are not generally useful for computation without some design work first. If you think I'm wrong then a reference would be appreciated.<br /><br />>Similarly A Turing Machine could not run a program designed for a universal register machine unless it first implements a universal register machine.<<br /><br />Of course. No machine can run a program that was not written in a language it understands. A universal computer is any machine that can run a program written in a language for it. I suppose I can see how you could construe the GoL as a computer by counting the cells making up a computer within GoL as a part of the programming language, but again, that seems to be like saying that a bag of atoms is a computer because computers can be made of atoms. Perhaps you could tell me whether you think a bag of atoms is a computer and if not explain the difference between this and the GoL.<br /><br />>A cellular automaton which was not a universal machine could not implement a TM or a universal register machine<<br /><br />This is the problem. You're saying it *is* a universal machine and I'm saying it can *implement* a universal machine. Here you seem to be making both claims. Again, do you think there is any empirical difference between us or do we have different semantics?<br /><br />>I very explicitly stated that I was not saying that<<br />But you didn't explicitly state what it was you did mean, leaving me to guess.<br /><br />Woflram's Rule 110 is indeed a universal computer, but it is not a two input logic gate and I don't know where you get the idea that it is. Every step of the computation can take essentially infinite inputs across infinite cells, and locally every cell takes three inputs.<br /><br />> not every Turing Machine is a universal computer.<<br /><br />My bad. When I say Turing Machine I mean Universal Turing Machine.<br /><br />>without that enumeration then technically you are back to the maximally complex necessarily existing entity like the Abrahamic God.<<br /><br />I have said I believe all possible mathematical structures exist, so I'm not "without that enumeration".<br /><br />>we just have to work out the probability between being in one of the infinitely many god created versions of this universe and the infinitely many non-god created versions of it.<<br /><br />OK, as long as you remember that two infinities are not necessarily the same. There are infinitely many integers divisible by a million and infinitely many integers divisible by two, but an arbitrary integer is much more likely to be divisible by two than a million. Similarly, as the laws governing a Godless universe are much simpler than the laws governing a Godly universe, an arbitrarily chosen universe is much more likely to be Godless.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-49526075307829390372014-02-05T20:16:19.730-05:002014-02-05T20:16:19.730-05:00And I should point out that, without that enumerat...And I should point out that, without that enumeration then technically you are back to the maximally complex necessarily existing entity like the Abrahamic God.<br /><br />From there on I guess that we just have to work out the probability between being in one of the infinitely many god created versions of this universe and the infinitely many non-god created versions of it.Robinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16015911138886238144noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-90112040966214654832014-02-05T19:29:39.096-05:002014-02-05T19:29:39.096-05:00Oh, and by the way, not every Turing Machine is a ...Oh, and by the way, not every Turing Machine is a universal computer.Robinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16015911138886238144noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-14288270932665297642014-02-05T19:12:49.769-05:002014-02-05T19:12:49.769-05:00A Mandelbrot set is no more complex than the progr...A Mandelbrot set is no more complex than the program which generates it by any known definition of complex.<br /><br />And you are completely wrong and hopelessly confused about universality.<br /><br />Game of Life is universal. It does do calculations by itself. It runs programs directly.<br /><br />Your confusion is that GoL can and does run programs. <br /><br />It just could not run a program designed for a Turing Machine without first implementing a Turing Machine. <br /><br />Similarly A Turing Machine could not run a program designed for a universal register machine unless it first implements a universal register machine.<br /><br />That does not mean that it is not a universal computer.<br /><br />A cellular automaton which was not a universal machine could not implement a TM or a universal register machine or any of the other equivalent accepted definitions of universal computation, *no matter what program you gave it"<br /><br />That is the difference. The game of life is a universal computer.<br /><br />Now I did not say that any logic gate was a universal computer I very explicitly stated that I was not saying that. I said that a two input logic gate which used a particular rule was universal (Wolfram's Rule 110).<br /><br />And really, if you can't accept that then you are just talking complete nonsense.Robinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16015911138886238144noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-71683710660366952232014-02-05T18:27:02.210-05:002014-02-05T18:27:02.210-05:00Hi Robin,
>Conway's Game of Life *is* a Un...Hi Robin,<br /><br />>Conway's Game of Life *is* a Universal Computer. It has been proven to be universal - it can do any computation that any computer can.<<br /><br />Nope. It has been proven that you can build a universal computer in Conway's life. That's not to say that it *is* a universal computer, any more than it *is* a glider or it *is* a replicator or it *is* a spaceship.<br /><br />Game of Life *is* a universal computer in the same way that a random collection of quarks and electrons are a computer. You can use them to build a computer but they are not themselves the computer in their default state. <br /><br />This is a semantic debate only, surely. I just reject what you mean by "is a computer" because it's practically meaningless and ignores the difference between something that can actually do calculations by default and something that can be used to build something that can do calculations. I don't think there is any empirical disagreement, is there?<br /><br />>It would be just as meaningful for you to say that a Turing Machine is not a Universal Computer because it does not spontaneously generate lambda calculus or a universal register machine.<<br />A Turing Machine is ready to do calculations by default. All it needs is a program. The Game of Life needs an elaborate and complex structure to be designed and then it still needs a program.<br /><br />>And yes, a two input binary gate with just the right set of rules *is* a universal computer and has been proven to be so.<<br /><br />I think this is confused. I think you are possibly alluding to the fact that it has been shown that NAND gates are all you need to build any digitial logic circuit, but a single NAND gate is not a universal computer. It's a component, many of which can be used to build a universal computer. What you have said is analogous to claiming that an atom is a universal computer because computers are built of atoms. If that's not what you're talking about then a reference would be helpful for me to understand you.<br /><br />>I said that a Mandelbrot set is no more complex than a Mandelbrot set generator.<<br />I'm not so sure about that. The Mandelbrot set is arguably more complex than some of the quite short programs that can generate it.<br /><br />>So it is simply not an example of a few rules producing complexity. It is merely an example of a few rules producing intricacy.<<br /><br />Hmm, you might be right. Can you distinguish between complexity and intricacy so I can mull this over? It might be that it is a bad example.<br /><br />>This would not be complex if there was some simple operation which could generate all of these things.<<br /><br />No such operation is needed. On mathematical Platonism, all of these things simply exist. They couldn't not exist.<br /><br />You quoted me out of context. I'll assume this was down to a misunderstanding rather than deliberate misrepresentation.<br /><br />"Conway's life in itself does not usually spontaneously produce a universal computer within it. Universal computers have to be designed and built by hand."<br /><br />Clearly, in context, what I meant was "universal computers [in Conway's Game of Life] do not appear spontaneously but have to be built by hand. Now, universal computers might evolve in the GoL the way I evolved in this universe, but it seems unlikely, and you'd need to come up with some plausible mechanism for this evolution to get started spontaneously to change my mind.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-71107945308454189282014-02-05T17:30:27.034-05:002014-02-05T17:30:27.034-05:00By the way:
Disagreeable Me wrote: "Universa...By the way:<br /><br />Disagreeable Me wrote: "Universal computers have to be designed and built by hand. In my view,"<br /><br />Disagreeable Me wrote: "I didn't say all computers have to be built by hand."<br />Robinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16015911138886238144noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-74140837271140458012014-02-05T17:24:17.620-05:002014-02-05T17:24:17.620-05:00Hi Disagreeable Me,
You are just plain wrong. Co...Hi Disagreeable Me,<br /><br />You are just plain wrong. Conway's Game of Life *is* a Universal Computer. It has been proven to be universal - it can do any computation that any computer can.<br /><br />It would be just as meaningful for you to say that a Turing Machine is not a Universal Computer because it does not spontaneously generate lambda calculus or a universal register machine.<br /><br />And there are simpler universal computers than GoL.<br /><br />And yes, a two input binary gate with just the right set of rules *is* a universal computer and has been proven to be so.<br /><br />The stunning simplicity of a universal machine is hard to accept but it really is the case.<br /><br />Now to the Mandelbrot set. The confusion is all yours. I said that a Mandelbrot set is no more complex than a Mandelbrot set generator.<br /><br />So it is simply not an example of a few rules producing complexity. It is merely an example of a few rules producing intricacy.<br /><br />You are making the mistake of which you accuse me. Complexity is not simply more stuff.<br /><br /><br />DM said: "Ok, so why not embrace that and accept a staggering amount of error? "<br /><br />I never said we shouldn't. But don't pretend it does not cost anything in terms of complexity. Don't pretend it comes for free.<br /><br />As to your conjecture - if every "mathematical structure" existed then the block of marble would exist and every figure cut from it would exist and every single figure that could possibly be cut from the marble would exist.<br /><br />This would not be complex if there was some simple operation which could generate all of these things.<br /><br />If so then that same operation would have to generate itself or else it would represent some minimal level of complexity. I am assuming that you can see the problem with the former.<br /><br />So essentially you have just altered Krauss stochatic process to an enumeration and that enumeration represents the complexity of your proposal.<br /><br />So where does that complexity come from?Robinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16015911138886238144noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-28770127636294134412014-02-05T15:32:48.006-05:002014-02-05T15:32:48.006-05:00Hi Robin,
I didn't say a Mandelbrot set gener...Hi Robin,<br /><br />I didn't say a Mandelbrot set generator. I said the Mandelbrot set.<br /><br />I think I see one potential source of confusion. You imagine that a computational process needs a physical computer in order to exist. I disagree. For a self-contained mathematical object to exist outside of our universe, it needs no physical computer. It is identical to the 'laws of physics' of it's 'universe'. The Mandelbrot set is a wonderful example of staggering complexity arising from very simple rules.<br /><br />>Again, it is meaningless to talk about a Conway's Life implementation of a Universal Computer because Conway's Life *is* a Universal Computer.<<br /><br />No it isn't, not without distorting terms beyond meaning. By that logic, the universe is a computer, your brain is a computer, a bag of atoms is a computer and in fact anything with which you could conceivably build a turing machine is a computer. When Conway's Game of Life was shown to be Turing complete, that meant designing and creating an elaborate structure within it. Here is an <a href="http://rendell-attic.org/gol/turing_js_r.gif" rel="nofollow">example</a>.<br /><br />>The logic that describes Game of Life is the logic that describes a universal computer.<<br />Just wrong.<br /><br />> it is a simple binary gate.<<br />A binary gate is not a universal computer.<br /><br />>Any simple rules that create complexity either have to be programmed or else involve a massive amount of trial and error - mostly error before they will produce complexity.<<br /><br />Ok, so why not embrace that and accept a staggering amount of error? In any case, if all possible mathematical structures exist, then it doesn't matter how many are uninteresting. Complex, apparently designed structures are inevitable needles in the haystack.<br /><br />>If you say that all Universes simply exist, how does that not involve starting with maximal complexity?<<br /><br />Because complexity is not the same as "amount of stuff". More "stuff" is often less complex than less stuff. Which is more complex, a block of marble, or 100 intricate statues carved from it? Which would take more bits to communicate to you: the entire range of numbers between 10^6 and 10^9 or 1,000 specific such numbers, randomly selected?<br /><br />The idea that all possible mathematical structures exist is the block of marble. It is not maximal but minimal complexity. If there were a distinction between the real mathematical structures and the unreal mathematical structures that would be a more complex situation, needing either to enumerate which structures are real or define some rule to distinguish them.<br /><br />>You can implement the logic of a TM and therefore you are a Universal Computer - and you were not designed and built by hand.<<br /><br />I didn't say all computers have to be built by hand. I said that Conway's Life doesn't spontaneously produce Turing machines unaided and so is not itself a Universal Computer. The fact that I evolved is just an example of complexity arising from simple rules.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-50297843587491674912014-02-05T14:44:05.497-05:002014-02-05T14:44:05.497-05:00A Mandlebrot set generator is more complex than th...A Mandlebrot set generator is more complex than the simplest computer and could not be implemented without a computer and in any case a fractal is *not*, by definition, any more complex than the program which generates it.<br /><br />Again, it is meaningless to talk about a Conway's Life implementation of a Universal Computer because Conway's Life *is* a Universal Computer.<br /><br />The logic that describes Game of Life is the logic that describes a universal computer.<br /><br />And as I pointed out before it is not even the simplest Universal Computer. The rules of the simplest Universal Computer could be described in, as I said before, 32 bits - it is a simple binary gate.<br /><br />As you said, computers such as Life require programs - but there are no simple rules that create complexity without a cost.<br /><br />Any simple rules that create complexity either have to be programmed or else involve a massive amount of trial and error - mostly error before they will produce complexity.<br /><br />That is the point of Krauss's stochastic search - to find complexity amid the noise.<br /><br />Do you think that you can dispense with the noise?<br /><br />If you say that all Universes simply exist, how does that not involve starting with maximal complexity?<br /><br />And it is not true to say that Universal Computers have to be designed and built by hand. You can implement the logic of a TM and therefore you are a Universal Computer - and you were not designed and built by hand.Robinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16015911138886238144noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-37450196400694236412014-02-05T13:52:30.330-05:002014-02-05T13:52:30.330-05:00@Philip Thrift:
Thanks for link.
Max Tegmark’s p...@Philip Thrift:<br /><br />Thanks for link.<br /><br />Max Tegmark’s position is quite fair with his statement “If any of the attacks succeed, the corresponding multiverse evidence is discredited. Conversely, if all the attacks fail, then we’ll be forced to take parallel universes more seriously whether we like them or not – such are the rules of science.”<br /><br />But, I think that his argument can still confuse people as some theories being discussed are quite complicated and are not truly understood by the laypersons. Thus, I would like to clarify them here. He really talked about two issues here<br />1. Four levels of multiverse.<br />2. Is space a continuum? Most of layperson might misses this crucial point.<br /><br />There is nothing wrong with his four level description, but it can be very misleading. Thus, I will try to use a three categories description.<br />a. With different initial and boundary condition for each universe,<br />b. With different physics laws in each universe,<br />c. With different nature constants in each universe.<br /><br />This new classification is, in fact, more encompassing than the four level one, as it encompasses the cycling universes (with the same physics laws and nature constants but with different initial and boundary conditions). Then, for the level I, I will not see it as a different universe if it simply has an “event horizon”. If it is ‘infinite’ in size, then it could be viewed as a kind of multiverse as the current physics laws (especially the Standard Model) are unable to describe such an infinite size universe. So, we can reduce this issue one step further.<br />A. C-multiverse (cycling universes, with different initial and boundary condition but with the same physics laws and nature constants): it is the consequence of Alpha-physics, and the ‘inflation’ is the accrued result of all the previous universes before ‘this’ big bang. That is, I am the proponent of this C-multiverse.<br />B. S-multiverse (simultaneous universes or parallel universes, with different physics laws and nature constants): although by definition, this S-multiverse is unobservable from ‘this’ universe, it can still be falsified with four points.<br /><br /><br />In fact, Max Tegmark has mentioned one very important pathway, “… A third line of attack is to give a compelling explanation for the observed fine-tuning of physical constants that doesn’t rely on a Level II multiverse.” My previous comments in this thread is about this. Yet, I would like to summarize it in a better understandable way.<br /><br />First, S-multiverse ‘theory’ is a ‘failed’ theory, as it is unable to produce the known (this) universe from it thus far.<br /><br />Second, its argument (the only explanation for the rising of ‘life’, etc.) is useless, not needed.<br /><br />Third, we need one example to show that its argument is wrong. That is, the nature constants of ‘this’ universe are not bubble-dependent. <br /><br />Fourth, it has no relevancy to ‘this’ universe, as it has no impact of any kind on this universe since the boundary of this universe is not in contact with any other S-multiverses.<br /><br />Is S-multiverse already falsified? This is not truly important. But, the four points above show a clear pathway of how to falsify the S-multiverse.<br />Tienzenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05842156512465678309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-88155991846052757102014-02-05T13:32:51.436-05:002014-02-05T13:32:51.436-05:00Hi Mike,
Here is how I understand the experiment....Hi Mike,<br /><br />Here is how I understand the experiment.<br /><br />They placed the detectors not at the slit but at various locations past the slits where the particles could still have passed through either/both slits. The interference pattern they observed was co-located with the detector, not elsewhere. At no point did they detect particles at the slits themselves while still seeing an interference pattern.<br /><br />The paths they traced out were not for individual particles but extrapolated from measurements conducted at many points in space after the slits. These paths agreed with your interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, but also, crucially, with what is predicted by all the other interpretations given this experimental procedure. These paths are predictable from the equations alone and no particular interpretation is needed. It cannot be taken then as evidence for your interpretation.<br /><br />>When you detected an atom you are detecting a particle.<<br /><br />Well, not a fundamental particle. An atom is composed of quarks and electrons. I'm not sure it itself is a particle any more than a C60 molecule or a cat.<br /><br />>If a C-60 molecule was propagating as a physical wave in a double slit experiment then when you placed detectors within the slits you would detect a certain number of atoms within each slit.<<br /><br />I don't think this is right at all. Are you saying we should expect to see, e.g. 40 atoms in one slit and 20 in another? I really wouldn't think so, as in quantum mechanics we consider all the different ways things could go (e.g. passing through slit 1 or slit 2) with probability amplitudes for each way. The molecule spontaneously separating into a group of 40 atoms and 20 atoms and then recombining is not likely at all. The atoms are bound, or entangled or something (not sure what the correct terminology is). You don't consider them separately because they are interacting with each other as a single system.<br /><br />>To simply suggest a C-60 molecule propagates as a wave is refuted by the evidence.<<br /><br />No it isn't. We see an interference pattern. That's a wave effect.<br /><br />>nonsense such as many worlds.<<br /><br />Explain why you think it is nonsense? What about it is so self-evidently false, other than the fact that it is unintuitive?<br /><br />>because it always exists as a single entity, as 60 interconnected atoms.<<br /><br />Sure, 60 interconnected atoms which can go every possible path simultaneously between (observations/interactions), so through two slits at once.<br /><br />> the reason why the particle is always detected as a single entity, as a particle,<<br /><br />Because that's what the equations predict. We observe it as a single particle but that doesn't mean it is, or that it always is. In objective collapse theories the wavefunction collapses to a single particle. The MWI more elegantly proposes that it doesn't collapse. The particle continues to exist in a multitude of states, but when we observe it we also split into a multitude of states each observing the particle differently. It's a beautiful and relatively simple idea.<br /><br />>There is evidence of the aether every time a double slit experiment is performed; it's what waves.<<br /><br />I may agree that aether of some form exists. You could for example trivially define aether so as to mean the fabric of space, including all the various fields permeating it. That is indeed what waves. There are no electrons, just waves in the electron field which look like particles to us because of our limited ability to perceive reality directly.<br /><br />By your own example, you don't need a boat to have a wave. If everything we see can be explained by reference to waves, since all we can detect directly are the waves (as must be the case if we are detecting interference patterns), then there's no need to imagine that there is a boat at all.<br />Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-6013071729102552702014-02-05T13:02:23.390-05:002014-02-05T13:02:23.390-05:00Hi Mike,
I see you are new here. You are unlikely...Hi Mike,<br /><br />I see you are new here. You are unlikely to get a coherent answer from MJA. MJA never offers any contributions apart from meaningless <a href="http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Deepity" rel="nofollow">deepities</a> about the concept of equality.<br /><br />MJA:<br /><br />==, equals, =, ==== - is ===.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-49710670346825552392014-02-05T10:33:43.111-05:002014-02-05T10:33:43.111-05:00Waves and particles are not one or the same. When ...Waves and particles are not one or the same. When a double slit experiment is performed with a C-60 molecule the C-60 molecule is always detected as a single entity because it always exists as a single entity.<br /><br />'Interpretation of quantum mechanics by the double solution theory - Louis de BROGLIE'<br />http://aflb.ensmp.fr/AFLB-classiques/aflb124p001.pdf<br /><br />“When in 1923-1924 I had my first ideas about Wave Mechanics I was looking for a truly concrete physical image, valid for all particles, of the wave and particle coexistence discovered by Albert Einstein in his "Theory of light quanta". I had no doubt whatsoever about the physical reality of waves and particles.”<br /><br />“any particle, even isolated, has to be imagined as in continuous “energetic contact” with a hidden medium”<br /><br />The hidden medium of de Broglie wave mechanics is the aether. The “energetic contact” is the state of displacement of the aether.<br /><br />"For me, the particle, precisely located in space at every instant, forms on the v wave a small region of high energy concentration, which may be likened in a first approximation, to a moving singularity."<br /><br />A particle is a moving singularity which has an associated aether displacement wave.<br /><br />In a double slit experiment the particle travels a well defined path which takes it through one slit. The associated wave in the aether passes through both. As the aether wave exits the slits it creates wave interference. As the particle exits a single slit the direction it travels is altered by the wave interference. This is the wave piloting the particle of pilot-wave theory. Detecting the particle strongly exiting a single slit destroys the coherence between the particle and its associated wave in the aether.<br /><br />If you disagree with the above then explain what occurs physically in nature in a double slit experiment.mpc755https://www.blogger.com/profile/01146980751761812308noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-86809315480002981132014-02-05T09:40:53.298-05:002014-02-05T09:40:53.298-05:00Hi Robin,
The above post of mine was written befo...Hi Robin,<br /><br />The above post of mine was written before your latest was moderated. In that post I have made a few points that probably make much of your latest post irrelevant, in that I think the complexity of computers is beside the point and I reject the idea of a stochastic process producing universes (instead all universes simply exist).<br /><br />>So your starting simplicity is already as complex as the most powerful computer possible.<<br /><br />OK, so this is now beside the point. Nevertheless, I just want to point out that Conway's life in itself does not usually spontaneously produce a universal computer within it. Universal computers have to be designed and built by hand. In my view, they are more complex than the universe that contains them. It takes only a few words to describe the Conway's Life universe in terms of its rules. It takes a massive detailed diagram to describe a Conway's Life implementation of a Universal Computer.<br /><br />> In The Grand Design Stephen Hawking says that it has been estimated that the simplest self replicator on Game of Life would be approximately 10 trillion squares (based on work by Von Neumann).<<br /><br />It depends on what you mean by self replicator. There are plenty of simple self replicators, although I agree these would not evolve since they are entirely predictable and do not mutate.<br /><br />>the simplest source of complexity we know if really is a computer<<br /><br />The simplest source of complexity is not a computer. The Mandelbrot set for instance is described by extraordinarily simple rules but has breathtaking complexity.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.com