tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post3497588278635376963..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Michael Shermer on moralityUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger48125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-19363323403601537422014-01-17T00:02:26.605-05:002014-01-17T00:02:26.605-05:00Why on earth is it so surprising that there are hu...Why on earth is it so surprising that there are human races? Humans aren't unique amongst species in having patterns of variation arising as gene flow was restricted between groups. As Lahn & Ebenstein write in Nature:<br /><br />"Anatomically modern humans first appeared in eastern Africa about 200,000 years ago. Some members migrated out of Africa by 50,000 years ago to populate Asia, Australia, Europe and eventually the Americas9. During this period, geographic barriers separated humanity into several major groups, largely along continental lines, which greatly reduced gene flow among them. Geographic and cultural barriers also existed within major groups, although to lesser degrees.<br /><br />This history of human demography, along with selection, has resulted in complex patterns of genetic diversity. The basic unit of this diversity is polymorphisms — specific sites in the genome that exist in multiple variant forms (or alleles). Many polymorphisms involve just one or a few nucleotides, but some may involve large segments of genetic material2. The presence of polymorphisms leads to genetic diversity at the individual level such that no two people's DNA is the same, except identical twins. The alleles of some polymorphisms are also found in significantly different frequencies among geographic groups1, 5. An extreme example is the pigmentation gene SLC24A5. An allele of SLC24A5 that contributes to light pigmentation is present in almost all Europeans but is nearly absent in east Asians and Africans10.<br /><br />Given these geographically differentiated polymorphisms, it is possible to group humans on the basis of their genetic make-up. Such grouping largely confirms historical separation of global populations by geography5. Indeed, a person's major geographic group identity can be assigned with near certaintly on the basis of his or her DNA alone (now an accepted practice in forensics). There is growing evidence that some of the geographically differentiated polymorphisms are functional, meaning that they can lead to different biological outcomes (just how many is the subject of ongoing research). These polymorphisms can affect traits such as pigmentation, dietary adaptation and pathogen resistance (where evidence is rather convincing)10, 11, 12, and metabolism, physical development and brain biology (where evidence is more preliminary)6, 8, 13, 14."<br /><br />'Let's celebrate human genetic diversity' Bruce T. Lahn & Lanny Ebenstein Nature 461, 726-728(8 October 2009Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01133142115539961665noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-81389752523530029552014-01-11T23:08:59.736-05:002014-01-11T23:08:59.736-05:00I suspect that one day philosophy will just be see...I suspect that one day philosophy will just be seen as a subcategory of the study of language - Massimo, just about everything you talk about demonstrates that you're not really talking about much, except the limitations of human language as model for understanding subjective human experiences and their entanglement with the world. <br /><br />The beauty of psychics, biology chemistry, biology, economics is that they aren't strictly bounded by the limitations of language and this is why traditional bins of science are fields which tell us useful things about the world (where useful can mean how we got here or where we want to go). jefscotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16818842643842622828noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-41016887583847586742013-02-14T23:47:15.752-05:002013-02-14T23:47:15.752-05:00Thank-you MP, for this take-down of MS's over-...Thank-you MP, for this take-down of MS's over-reaching.<br /><br />Although I think the pro-Philosophy camp itself might also be confused about whether ethicists have excellent arguments for the way 21st century morality IS (right now), or excellent arguments for the way they (right now) would prefer 21st century morality to be.<br /><br />The rightwing seems not to "want to know whether a particular piece of ethical reasoning is logically sound or not". They don't even want to ask ethicists their well-reasoned preferences. Their are highly-compelling echoes around their chambers that confirm their gut instincts about the credibility of "liberal" academia. That is, their 2st century teachings of Ivy League philosophers, ethicists, scientists, etc.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-50741960226994807912013-02-13T20:40:23.924-05:002013-02-13T20:40:23.924-05:00I agree that Hume was saying that much care must b...I agree that Hume was saying that much care must be taken when deriving 'ought' from 'is'.<br /><br />I believe that most of the confusion about connecting 'is' and 'ought' comes from mixing of senses. <br /><br />I explain my position in this thread.<br /><br />http://www.project-reason.org/forum/viewthread/23940/<br /><br />I wish Shermer and Harris would at least try make their arguments using an existing moral theory such as Parfit's reason implying sense.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12545440293902796460noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-1232802430060679802013-01-24T16:16:07.688-05:002013-01-24T16:16:07.688-05:00Of course I'm "embracing" moral rela...Of course I'm "embracing" moral relativism. Because for one thing, and contrary to your opposite assumption, all criteria don't have the same epistemic status.<br /><br />And ethics don't have to be constrained to instrumental reasoning, but it would be a good place to start the determination process.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-88912504153345370122013-01-24T15:00:45.887-05:002013-01-24T15:00:45.887-05:00"Why would someone engaging in metaethics, sa..."Why would someone engaging in metaethics, say moral epistemology or moral ontology, be necessarily required to make comparisons with effective rules of other cultures? Can you please elucidate this?"<br />Because I must point out again that 'morality is a cuitural rules system that has evolved from the first social group of communicative animals (all animals in fact) to the newer human groups of animals with diversified cultures.'<br />And I'm presuming that the purpose is to discover which rules might work best for humans overall, and more importantly why they do well in one setting and not another. If scientists have found it helpful to make comparisons, why shouldn't philosophers use their analytical talents to make those scientific comparisons meaningful?<br />Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-59379638883569566622013-01-24T14:45:49.817-05:002013-01-24T14:45:49.817-05:00"I made no claim that any ethical framework w..."I made no claim that any ethical framework with its moral principles us true, that was the point."<br /><br />You're embracing moral relativism or skepticism, then? That's o.k., but these are philosophical stances as well, and nothing that is just a fact of the world.<br /><br />What I don't understand, in this case, is the following you have written:<br /><br />"If evolutionary biologists are intelligent members of a human culture, they might be an excellent source of information as to how gay marriage would improve the moral posture of that culture"<br /><br />If moral relativism or skepticism is correct, then there is nothing to say about a "improvement of the moral posture of that culture" (nothing that can be justified philosophically or scientifically, at least). For: what would be the "valid" criteria for "improvement" if all criteria have the same epistemic status, or the epistemic status of a criterion can generally not be assessed? <br /><br />And as soon as you say, for example, that anthropologists or evolutionary biologists are in a better position to say something about some "improvement" of "moral posture" in a certain culture, you seem to concede that there are better and worse ways of doing ethics (means: engaging in normative arguing, prescribing, not just in describing). <br /><br />Or would just say ethics has to be constrained to instrumental reasoning (= what are the best means for reaching a given goal in a given historical and societal setting)?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13996084240101778396noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-46327690372553297312013-01-24T14:25:25.322-05:002013-01-24T14:25:25.322-05:00"To 'not just want to interpret the rules..."To 'not just want to interpret the rules of the culture they grew up in' seems to be agreeing that in part at least they would"<br /><br />As there are many moral philosophers, of course some will do (perhaps those who prefer reconstructive accounts of ethical theories). You will seldom encounter a situation in any discipline where actually all members are doing and thinking exactly the same.<br /><br />Anyway, I don't see why exactly this is relevant. The crucial point is that most moral philosophers would say that their interest lies not in the interpretation of the rules of the culture they grew up, but for example in finding out what should be moral (and not only what is deemed moral in contemporary society). <br /><br />"And all of the rest of what you'd have them doing seems to require a comparison be made with effective rules of other cultures, not to mention the professional cultures within cultures that you've singled out."<br /><br />Why would someone engaging in metaethics, say moral epistemology or moral ontology, be necessarily required to make comparisons with effective rules of other cultures? Can you please elucidate this?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13996084240101778396noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-44983442981282373352013-01-24T11:34:14.090-05:002013-01-24T11:34:14.090-05:00You seem to be agreeing with me by showing why you...You seem to be agreeing with me by showing why you don't agree. To "not just want to interpret the rules of the culture they grew up in" seems to be agreeing that in part at least they would. And all of the rest of what you'd have them doing seems to require a comparison be made with effective rules of other cultures, not to mention the professional cultures within cultures that you've singled out.<br /><br /><br />Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-55385477103321929292013-01-24T11:20:11.808-05:002013-01-24T11:20:11.808-05:00"but the latter is miles away from the claim ..."but the latter is miles away from the claim that science alone will be able to show that a certain ethical framework with its moral principle etc. is true."<br />I made no claim that any ethical framework with its moral principles us true, that was the point.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-38713604177303346642013-01-24T10:56:34.018-05:002013-01-24T10:56:34.018-05:00Baron (#2)
"Do you really think a good anthr...Baron (#2)<br /><br />"Do you really think a good anthropologist would answer a question about morals as simplistically as you've put it?"<br /><br />Well, maybe she/he would also say something about the values and norms, rites, social structure and (possibly) also metaphysical beliefs of those cultures, and how they interrelate with the practice of genital mutilation of young women. So far, I would agree with you.<br /> <br />But I do not see how this could be a valid objection to Pigliucci's point. Even if we had this knowledge about the rites, the values and norms etc. these cultures embrace, it would not say much about the ethical question if genital mutilation is morally right or wrong, and why (especially since most anthropologists, like ethnologists, often accept moral relativism as part of their methodological self-understanding, i.e. do deny that there are moral principles etc. that can be universally true for all humans - or even for humans and animals, and so on). <br /><br />Then, the only thing one could say on basis of the "facts" is more or less what Pigliucci already pointed out: that some cultures do it and find it morally acceptable (because of this or that), and other cultures do not (because of this or that). How could this settle the systematic, not historical or hermeneutical question about the moral rightness or wrongness of the practice of genital mutilation? <br /><br />Facts alone do not say anything about that; you have to presuppose a moral principle or a hierarchy of values or the like before any facts may give answers to such a question. It might be that one is not really aware that one already presupposes such a thing without critically examining it beforehand (I think Harris is a good example for this). But that does not make a difference to the fact THAT such a framework is presupposed (and has to be logically presupposed, I may add). (In fact, one could further argue that also meta-ethical assumptions are regularly presupposed, such as the possibility of ethics altogether, for example). <br /><br />Of course, if you, for example, accept some kind of an utilitarian framework, say, preference utilitarianism, you are (among other things) interested in facts about preferences and their fulfillment, as you need them in order to decide which action will maximize utility (since the utilitarian moral principle says, simplistically summarized, that the action that most maximizes utility for all moral beings is the most moral action). <br /><br />But such a framework is not a "given" that you get just from looking at facts - it's a philosophical theory that has to be mainly philosophically justified (and philosophically criticized). Which is not to say that there is never empirical knowledge that might be of relevance for such a task; but the latter is miles away from the claim that science alone will be able to show that a certain ethical framework with its moral principle etc. is true.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13996084240101778396noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-91485015777679724562013-01-24T10:55:05.985-05:002013-01-24T10:55:05.985-05:00Baron (#1)
"Is it your argument then that mo...Baron (#1)<br /><br />"Is it your argument then that moral philosophers are not there for the most part to interpret the rules of the culture they grew up in?"<br /><br />If I may add my two cents to this question: No, most moral philosophers would arguably not just want to interpret the rules of the culture they grew up in - they possibly would leave such work to sociologists or the like - , but want to either (i) find out if morality can be universal, if moral knowledge and moral justification is possible and how, what is special about the language we use for moral claims etc. (so-called Metaethics), or (ii) they want to find out what's the "core" of morality, i.e. what makes actions or rules moral, according to what principle we can decide what is moral and what not (so-called Normative Ethics), or (iii) want to find answers to pressing ethical questions in different fields, such as medicine, climatic change, journalism, war etc.(so-called Applied Ethics) - e.g. they want to find out if active euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide is moral or immoral and should be done (allowed) or not be done (not allowed), respectively, and especially why it is so (= the reasons for it, incl. the evaluation of these reasons, means if they are argumentatively well-founded).Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13996084240101778396noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-57970851212983000302013-01-24T09:24:35.612-05:002013-01-24T09:24:35.612-05:00Massimo, we could go back and forth all day on thi...Massimo, we could go back and forth all day on this silliness, but clearly, although I admittedly can't read Harris without a brain freeze, he thinks he's better at moral philosophy than you simply because he doesn't believe yours is a useful exercise. The way you're summarily dismissing your critics here seems to make his case. Do you really think a good anthropologist would answer a question about morals as simplistically as you've put it? Because if you do, I've made my case.<br />Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-19760057289914685322013-01-24T08:09:18.254-05:002013-01-24T08:09:18.254-05:00Alex,
> The whole point is where do you get yo...Alex,<br /><br />> The whole point is where do you get your subjective morality from? It has to do with your experiences with the world, and that's all that matters. <<br /><br />No, it’s a bit more complicated than that. There is an unavoidable element of subjectivity in morality, because morality is something that pertains to and is articulated by human beings (i.e., it’s not a cosmic law). But then we need to reason about its many complexities, and that’s where philosophy comes in.<br /><br />> my point about oxytocin is that there might be other values that trump just being IV'd to an ecstasy drip. It's not irrational to think that we prefer a life of hardwork, fairness, and fulfillment. <<br /><br />Actually, that was precisely my point, so we agree! And thanks for your kind comments about the naturalism workshop.<br /><br />Baron,<br /><br />> you seem to be pumping out counterarguments with no real thought involved at all. <<br /><br />I know, I like to spend hours thinking up new ways of bullshitting my readers.<br /><br />> don't Harris and Shermer consider themselves as good or better at moral philosophy than you? <<br /><br />No, they — particularly Harris — reject the whole idea of moral philosophy as a useful exercise. You haven’t done you homework, obviously.<br /><br />> before I'd go to a poor philosopher for advice that a good anthropologist would have the facts about <<br /><br />And what would you do with those facts? The anthropologist would tell you that some cultures engage in genital mutilation of young women and other cultures don’t. Now what?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-77271987821306873762013-01-23T22:04:59.620-05:002013-01-23T22:04:59.620-05:00Massimo, you seem to be pumping out counterargumen...Massimo, you seem to be pumping out counterarguments with no real thought involved at all. Is it your argument then that moral philosophers are not there for the most part to interpret the rules of the culture they grew up in? Or do you really think you can all get together and somehow rewrite rules for a world full of other learned professional with facts at their disposal you've never known of? Kant tried it, Schopenhauer objected and neither have prevailed.<br />And so wasn't one purpose of this post to disagree with those who have also appointed themselves as cultural arbiters? And don't Harris and Shermer consider themselves as good or better at moral philosophy than you?<br />And again you come up with a nonsensical little homily to the obvious, as yes, I'd go to a good dentist for a toothache before I'd go to a poor philosopher for advice that a good anthropologist would have the facts about.<br />This one was equally cute: "No disagreement there, though no particularly deep insight either, as far as I can see." And yet you've continued to mix purposes with goals.<br /><br />Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-74829410458429721372013-01-23T17:45:30.440-05:002013-01-23T17:45:30.440-05:00The whole point is where do you get your subjectiv...The whole point is where do you get your subjective morality from? It has to do with your experiences with the world, and that's all that matters. Sure you can say "why is suffering bad?", but in relation to conscious creatures with the mental capacity to understand they are living among other conscious creatures that are flourishing, it is bad. Is this what you mean by empirically informed?<br />Also my point about oxytocin is that there might be other values that trump just being IV'd to an ecstasy drip. It's not irrational to think that we prefer a life of hardwork, fairness, and fulfillment.<br />On a side note, I enjoyed your talks especially in the Moving Naturalism Forward workshop. I can only hope for a future of moral experts such as yourself, Harris, etc. to help answer life's most important questions.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10839014289948835073noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-68555042574835270652013-01-23T17:05:14.895-05:002013-01-23T17:05:14.895-05:00Baron,
> If evolutionary biologists are intell...Baron,<br /><br />> If evolutionary biologists are intelligent members of a human culture, they might be an excellent source of information as to how gay marriage would improve the moral posture of that culture. <<br /><br />In a word: no. In more words: I don’t see why.<br /><br />> Or would you just ask those who purport to be gay marriage experts for an acceptable opinion? <<br /><br />I would ask moral philosophers, who have been thinking about the intricacies of ethical reasoning for a while. If you had a toothache who would you ask dentists or evolutionary biologists?<br /><br />> purposes are our reasons for goal seeking; goals are not usually the reasons for purpose seeking. <<br /><br />No disagreement there, though no particularly deep insight either, as far as I can see.<br /><br />Alex,<br /><br />> Harris is saying is that we need science to help us determine those variables. How else would we decide on such values? <<br /><br />It isn’t just a matter of (empirically determinable) “variables.” It’s also a matter of values, which are not empirically determined (though they better be empirically informed).<br /><br />> Of course complicated ideas require sophisticated conceptual analysis, but where do you get your analysis from? <<br /><br />Philosophy, which is *the* business of carrying out sophisticated conceptual analysis on complex issues, empirically informed, of course.<br /><br />> Ultimately it's science at the level of the brain. <<br /><br />No, it isn’t. Brain science can tell you how your brain thinks about values. It tells you precisely nothing about those values. Go back to my example of neuro-mathematics, the point should be clear.<br /><br />> we can find out how to best help maximize these values in relation to everyone. <<br /><br />If all you want is to maximize release of oxytocin you can simply hook people up to a drug machine. It has nothing whatsoever to do with morality.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-32685566304192457492013-01-23T12:00:56.457-05:002013-01-23T12:00:56.457-05:00I don't understand the confusion on Shermer or...I don't understand the confusion on Shermer or Harris's stance on morality. Sure there are going to be questions that science may never answer, but that doesn't mean there's no answer. Let's say for example that doctors now have the right to practice euthanasia. One might say it would be morally right to do it at any instance of suffering, because we want to relieve suffering and pain, but you also have to take into account every person associated with that practice. The families, the doctors themselves, and society as a whole. Would we want to live in a world where doctors have this power? The problem with determining moral values with science is that there's so many variables involved. And I believe what Harris is saying is that we need science to help us determine those variables. How else would we decide on such values? Of course complicated ideas require sophisticated conceptual analysis, but where do you get your analysis from? Ultimately it's science at the level of the brain. Our brains are the ones releasing oxytocin when we experience compassion and altruism. We may never find out the quantitative difference between the two, and which one is better, but we can find out how to best help maximize these values in relation to everyone.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10839014289948835073noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-52422805411778962172013-01-23T11:47:11.030-05:002013-01-23T11:47:11.030-05:00Massimo, If evolutionary biologists are intelligen...Massimo, If evolutionary biologists are intelligent members of a human culture, they might be an excellent source of information as to how gay marriage would improve the moral posture of that culture. Or would you just ask those who purport to be gay marriage experts for an acceptable opinion?<br /><br />Also, we choose particular goals to serve broader purposes, although we can't really do the opposite all that well. <br />So the difference can be that we serve purposes but we don't serve goals. In other words purposes are our reasons for goal seeking; goals are not usually the reasons for purpose seeking.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-77825367155681118722013-01-23T11:25:02.547-05:002013-01-23T11:25:02.547-05:00Julian,
> We could make the case for a algebra...Julian,<br /><br />> We could make the case for a algebra in which 2 + 2=5, but that would not correspond at all to what we see on the real world. <<br /><br />It is a common misunderstanding that math is grounded in its correspondence with the real world. Yes, that’s true for simple cases like the one you bring up, but it does not apply to the overwhelming majority of mathematical work, which is entirely abstract and independent of empirical correspondence. If anything, what seems “miraculous” is that mathematicians merrily go their theoretical way for decades and then suddenly it turns out that something they did does have applications for science. This phenomenon is often referred to as the “unreasonable” effectiveness of mathematics, and it’s perhaps the strongest argument in favor of mathematical Platonism.<br /><br />> those very axioms has to be in same way related to reality, and what better way that understanding reality, connecting the real world with our understandings by the means of words and formulas than science itself. <<br /><br />Correct, which is why no moral philosopher would dream of saying that science has nothing to say of interest to moral philosophy. The issue is, as I pointed out in my response to Shermer, that scientific facts grossly underdetermine human values, so that we still have to have philosophical discussions about how priorities and their implications. Facts are useful, but not exhaustive or conclusive.<br /><br />downquark,<br /><br />> Well don't you think that makes the accusation a little unfounded. Hawking said that philosophers haven't kept up with the science in cosmology, Ladyman makes a similar claim in "Everything must go" but about metaphysics <<br /><br />No, it doesn’t, in my opinion. Hawking statement is simply false, which indicates to me that he has not actually read the pertinent literature (either that or he is just lying...). Ladyman is attacking a particular subset of metaphysicians, not all of them, since he is himself a metaphysician...Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-16361852028350296262013-01-23T11:16:56.752-05:002013-01-23T11:16:56.752-05:00Well don't you think that makes the accusation...Well don't you think that makes the accusation a little unfounded. Hawking said that philosophers haven't kept up with the science in cosmology, Ladyman makes a similar claim in "Everything must go" but about metaphysics - although he then dedicates the book to explain why. Hawking has to spend 5 minutes wiggling his cheek to say anything at all.<br /><br />PS: I actually don't know enough about cosmology to judge that myself.downquarkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15154074859072874873noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-87038789805312945492013-01-23T11:13:09.362-05:002013-01-23T11:13:09.362-05:00Doctor Atlantis, I was unaware of that, too. That ...Doctor Atlantis, I was unaware of that, too. That still doesn't excuse Shermer for keeping him on the masthead so long, and for Miele still being there. <br /><br />For those not familiar with his background, his Wiki bio gives you a touch of it: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vincent_Sarich<br /><br />And, my review of "Race" gives you more: http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1647247.RaceGadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-4031499813243786252013-01-23T10:18:47.528-05:002013-01-23T10:18:47.528-05:00One thing that science do not do is to fall under ...One thing that science do not do is to fall under authoritative fallacies, i swear i love Nietzsche but philosophers are bound to just say things without necessarily corresponding that to reality.<br />Please let me make this review: Massimo compares morality to maths, and he makes the case for guys like Harris and Shermer better than they can, since maths (the one that we use since it is useful) is compulsory correlated, at least at it most basic axioms to real world. We could make the case for a algebra in which 2 + 2=5, but that would not correspond at all to what we see on the real world. In morality, we can state that beating people on the face every time you see one is a moral thing to do, but when we know by empirical thought that that does not correlates with morality in the real world. So, in synthesis, Is true that in the realm of morality we depend on axioms, and the coherent and congruent and logical consequences derived from them, but those very axioms has to be in same way related to reality, and what better way that understanding reality, connecting the real world with our understandings by the means of words and formulas than science itself. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10812636823677964665noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-6370582230646100742013-01-23T08:33:29.208-05:002013-01-23T08:33:29.208-05:00Looks like Vince Sarich died in October. I was no...Looks like Vince Sarich died in October. I was not aware of this.Doctor Atlantishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13126137832183057421noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-14274073656476495102013-01-23T08:23:15.401-05:002013-01-23T08:23:15.401-05:00Baron,
Remarkably, I *think* this time I understo...Baron,<br /><br />Remarkably, I *think* this time I understood what you meant, maybe. But I still think you are confusing evolutionary biology with moral philosophy. As I said in the post, the former can help answering the (interesting) question of how morality came about as a human practice. But try asking any evolutionary biologists whether gays should marry, or if universal health care should be a right or not. She would have no clue.<br /><br />And no, I don’t confuse goals and purposes, though whenever you talk about purpose I do get confused again...<br /><br />SK,<br /><br />I think you are correct about Pareto. My understanding is that it isn’t even quite as uncontroversial in economics as Ian makes it to be, but it wouldn’t really be very helpful in ethics because there are so many hard to quantify concepts, like “rights,” well-being, etc. Indeed, straight from the Wiki entry: “Pareto efficiency is a minimal notion of efficiency and does not necessarily result in a socially desirable distribution of resources: it makes no statement about equality, or the overall well-being of a society.”Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.com