tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post2785693485647378200..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Experimental philosophy is not an elephantUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger44125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-39061317392538274412013-03-23T13:24:17.293-04:002013-03-23T13:24:17.293-04:00Perhaps it's in the cultural relativity rather...Perhaps it's in the cultural relativity rather than in the individual intuitions where you can find whole societies at fault. Otherwise you'll find rat fairness for example wrong for rats intuitively.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-69411353969299413542013-03-22T16:30:30.146-04:002013-03-22T16:30:30.146-04:00>But whole societies of humans may be wrong abo...>But whole societies of humans may be wrong about that.<<br /><br />Yup.<br /><br />No need for all the studies. I have no doubt that ideas about fairness are instinctual.<br /><br />As I said before, instincts are wrong all the time!<br /><br />I really don't see why you think it is relevant that rats or monkeys have a sense of fairness. Infanticide is common in the natural kingdom too, but you don't see anyone concluding from this that it is right to murder babies.<br /><br />Finally, I just want to emphasize that I am not making a positive claim that there is anything wrong with fairness as a concept. <br /><br />I am claiming that there is nothing nonsensical about the hypothetical claim that philosophers might be able to demonstrate that some people, perhaps even most people, have inconsistent or otherwise faulty intuitions regarding fairness.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-37714640431132316532013-03-22T15:55:16.540-04:002013-03-22T15:55:16.540-04:00So if fairness is instinctive, it can also be inst...So if fairness is instinctive, it can also be instinctively unfair?Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-61971247536655869022013-03-22T15:33:23.501-04:002013-03-22T15:33:23.501-04:00From Wikipedia: "Studies at UCLA in 2008 have...From Wikipedia: "Studies at UCLA in 2008 have indicated that reactions to fairness are "wired" into the brain and that, "Fairness is activating the same part of the brain that responds to food in rats... This is consistent with the notion that being treated fairly satisfies a basic need".[11] Research conducted in 2003 at Emory University, Georgia, USA, involving Capuchin Monkeys demonstrated that other cooperative animals also possess such a sense and that "inequity aversion may not be uniquely human"[12] indicating that ideas of fairness and justice may be instinctual in nature." <br />But whole societies of humans may be wrong about that.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-30624609478156540982013-03-22T14:24:39.001-04:002013-03-22T14:24:39.001-04:00Instincts are wrong all the time!Instincts are wrong all the time!Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-16000230862310857702013-03-22T13:58:48.942-04:002013-03-22T13:58:48.942-04:00It has been said that "ideas of fairness and ...It has been said that "ideas of fairness and justice may be instinctual in nature." If so, it's hard to see where whole societies could be instinctually wrong.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-19374519367447564922013-03-22T11:15:46.816-04:002013-03-22T11:15:46.816-04:00@Danny
All true, but in the sense we agree, a sin...@Danny<br /><br />All true, but in the sense we agree, a single individual can be wrong about fairness. What's true of an individual is true of many individuals, so if a great number of people share the same contradictory beliefs, I think it's fair to say that most people or (even whole societies) could be wrong about fairness.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-11921442845362372702013-03-22T11:08:33.347-04:002013-03-22T11:08:33.347-04:00@Disagreeable Me: Your question addresses fairnes...@Disagreeable Me: Your question addresses fairness at an individual level. I'm not sure there is such a thing as individual fairness. If only one thinking, living person was walking around a lifeless world, what would exist to be called fair or unfair to that person? There would just be the physical world, and unless there was some kind of cosmic karma there would be nothing to be effected by an individual sense of justice. <br /><br />So what does one person's opinion about fairness matter unless it is placed in context against the views of others? Yes, one person's ideas could be contradictory. But what does that matter if fairness or justice is only a state that arises between multiple people?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16450272474237157477noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-41673761296583057312013-03-22T08:27:22.381-04:002013-03-22T08:27:22.381-04:00Not sure if that was addressed to me, Baron P, but...Not sure if that was addressed to me, Baron P, but I was not saying that people were wrong about their feelings. They might however have inconsistent intuitions or beliefs regarding concepts such as fairness.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-43820271059245689402013-03-21T20:48:29.663-04:002013-03-21T20:48:29.663-04:00Wrong about how they subjectively feel, or wrong a...Wrong about how they subjectively feel, or wrong about the reason that they subjectively feel it, or wrong about an objective assessment of the purposes or intentions that gave cause to feeling it?Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-60015618150534526872013-03-21T09:54:58.863-04:002013-03-21T09:54:58.863-04:00Might it not be possible to show that the intuitio...Might it not be possible to show that the intuitions some people have regarding fairness is inconsistent or contradictory? In that case, might it not be possible for them to be wrong about it?Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-35005727265891700032013-03-21T07:45:59.316-04:002013-03-21T07:45:59.316-04:00>Once again, no. It is easy to show that many, ...>Once again, no. It is easy to show that many, perhaps even most, people are simply *wrong* about their concept of fairness.<<br /><br />On other topics, such as if the majority of people were wrong about their concept of courage or wisdom, I could readily agree. But with fairness I hesitate. My moral intuition says there is something wrong with this statement. It seems to me that what is fair is determined by agreement; less like courage and more like the meaning of a word. For practicality purposes it seems to me fairness goes in the opposite direction: it would be ideal if we all agreed what was justified and fair. But as a society we assert one particular law/justice system for practicality's sake, instead of taking in the opinions and values of all parties involved to determine what is a fair resolution. Not that any of this reflects on the discussion on Xphi, just a tangential thought from a layman.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16450272474237157477noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-74975226759255539482013-03-20T15:11:53.525-04:002013-03-20T15:11:53.525-04:00Hi Massimo:
>Well, then I failed to get my poi...Hi Massimo:<br /><br />>Well, then I failed to get my points across. Oh well. After all my explanations about what philosophy does and does not, and what XPhi does and does not, it is hard for me to imagine that you have come to the conclusion that we are talking about the same thing by different words. But I guess my imagination is limited... (Besides, let’s not continue this discussion here, it does belong to a separate thread.)<<br /><br />This was in response to a comment on another thread. You seem to have deleted my original comment on semantics, and I presume this was an accident due to the mixup between the threads about cultural evolution and XPhi. I'll continue the discussion here and try to make my position on "just semantics" clear.<br /><br />In the original post, I claimed that the question of whether XPhi counts as philosophy was one of those "just semantics" questions. I don't think this is because you "failed to get [your] points across" or because "we are talking about the same thing by different words". Rather, I have failed to communicate my point.<br /><br />In saying that it is a semantic question, I am contrasting two different definitions for philosophy. Your definition includes the criterion that "philosophical analysis is a matter of critical reflection on empirically underdetermined issues." By this definition, XPhi is clearly not philosophy.<br /><br />However, XPhi proponents are obviously using different criteria to determine what counts as philosophy. Perhaps for them philosophy is the study of concepts or beliefs, and XPhi would fall under this category.<br /><br />Whatever definition an XPhi proponent might use, it does not seem unreasonable to me to disregard your criterion of "empirical undeterminability". Few of the standard dictionary definitions of philosophy mention anything about this.<br /><br />For me, the debate between you and XPhi proponents is not that meaningful because there is no way to say who has the correct definition. It's a matter of preference. It's "just semantics".<br /><br />>No, not really. You (and others) seem to have a bad conception of “semantics.” If semantics is the study and clarification of meaning, then semantics is *crucial* to all our discussion, which means that nothing should be dismissed as “just” semantics.<<br /><br />Of course, semantics are crucial to all discussion, and agreeing on the semantics of terms is vital. However there is a difference between meaningful, substantive disagreements and those which arise *only* from differing interpretations of words. These are "just semantics" and often have no satisfactory resolution other than looking in a dictionary or at common usage.<br /><br />However, I would not count as "just semantics" reasoned arguments for adopting certain definitions of terms. Even though semantics are the subject of such discussions, they are not the cause of whatever disagreements might arise. If you can provide reasons to prefer your definition of philosophy over that used by XPhi proponents, then that would be interesting.<br /><br />Some examples of what I'm talking about:<br /><br />Whether Pluto is a planet depends only on how one defines a planet - "just semantics".<br /><br />The philosophical discussion about why we should or should not modify the definition of planet to include or exclude Pluto is not "just semantics" because there are presumably independent reasons backing up each side of the argument that do not arise from mere semantics.<br /><br />Whether XPhi is philosophy depends only on how one defines philosophy - "just semantics".<br /><br />However, whether the definition of philosophy *should* be such that empirical questions are outside of its purview is not "just semantics".<br /><br />I do feel that "just semantics" questions are intrinsically less interesting, however I will freely admit that it is important to ensure we have clarified any semantic confusion before we attempt to resolve any more substantive disagreements.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-1541312924960518922013-03-19T09:37:58.866-04:002013-03-19T09:37:58.866-04:00Disagreeable,
> perhaps this was not Plato'...Disagreeable,<br /><br />> perhaps this was not Plato's intention in which case my argument is misguided. <<br /><br />I think it’s safe to say it wasn’t, looking at the scholarship on Plato.<br /><br />> Is it not legitimate for a field of inquiry to pursue its own research goals? <<br /><br />None of the above discussion has to do with the legitimacy of XPhi qua novel field. The question concerns the legitimacy of calling such field “philosophy.”<br /><br />> I don't think anyone is proposing that XPhi can shed light on difficult philosophical arguments by harnessing the wisdom of the crowd. <<br /><br />Actually, that’s precisely what is frustrating about it. When called on that, XPhi practitioners deny it, but then they keep making statements in their papers that can only be interpreted that way...<br /><br />> I suppose I am willing to concede this point, but then whether it is considered philosophy or not is just one of those semantic questions without a correct answer. <<br /><br />No, not really. You (and others) seem to have a bad conception of “semantics.” If semantics is the study and clarification of meaning, then semantics is *crucial* to all our discussion, which means that nothing should be dismissed as “just” semantics. Also, I already outlined the practical reasons why this debate is relevant.<br /><br />> isn't it easier to do this when equipped with data from experiments which expose the nature of those conceptions? <<br /><br />Yes, if we were still in the time of Socrates. But professional academic philosophers (like all other academics) have now made a pretty sharp distinction between their practice as scholar and their practice as educators. At best, XPhi seems to be relevant to the latter.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-30701017886519587972013-03-19T08:11:28.077-04:002013-03-19T08:11:28.077-04:00"something that most lay people wouldn’t thin..."something that most lay people wouldn’t think of or know how to articulate"<br /><br />Victor J. Stenger once told me most physicists don't know or don't think about how to engage in the philosophy of their own subject. This statement may be a good definition of philosophy!<br />Philip Thrifthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03021615111948806998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-91473207887218027342013-03-18T17:57:58.134-04:002013-03-18T17:57:58.134-04:00>I meant that there is no *factual* definition,...>I meant that there is no *factual* definition, no standard, to match.<<br /><br />Agreed. However, if (and only if) Plato's definition of knowledge and other such definitions are intended to precisely capture shared intuitions, then the merit of those definitions can be judged by comparison to the facts about those same intuitions. That's all I was suggesting, and I don't think that should be controversial. However, perhaps this was not Plato's intention in which case my argument is misguided.<br /><br />>Then what’s the point of XPhi?<<br /><br />To answer XPhi questions! Is it not legitimate for a field of inquiry to pursue its own research goals? It seems to me that the point of XPhi is to examine the relationship between common intuitions people have and philosophical concepts, either to see how well they match, to characterise the differences, or to demonstrate the philosophical problems with human intuitions.<br /><br />I don't think anyone is proposing that XPhi can shed light on difficult philosophical arguments by harnessing the wisdom of the crowd. It has its own interesting questions to answer and might also provide data (not insight) for philosophers.<br /><br />Of course this doesn't mean it is actually philosophy. I suppose I am willing to concede this point, but then whether it is considered philosophy or not is just one of those semantic questions without a correct answer. If philosophy is necessarily a priori rather than empirical, then it isn't philosophy. If philosophy is the analysis of abstract concepts, then it arguably is (insofar as it analyses those abstract concepts intuited by human beings). We might as well have a debate about whether synchronised swimming is really swimming at all. :)<br /><br />>I mean ever since Socrates we’ve been in the business to show people that their conceptions about a number of issues are confused or misguided... ;-)<<br /><br />We're agreed on that. But isn't it easier to do this when equipped with data from experiments which expose the nature of those conceptions? In his practise of asking questions of ordinary citizens, Socrates was arguably not that far removed from an experimental philosopher himself.<br /><br />>Yes, a good example of something that most lay people wouldn’t think of or know how to articulate.<<br /><br />I think we should be clear on one point. XPhi does not ask lay people to articulate anything. Nobody is challenging the ability of philosophers to think and define terms clearly. Rather, XPhi asks people oblique questions that reveal their intuitions, and it is from these surveys that the intuitions are characterised by experts (philosophers).<br /><br />>there is no such thing as a generic “philosopher.”<<br /><br />Point taken.<br /><br />>That’s way outside of the scope of the post,<<br /><br />No problem, and I agree. However, as such I retain my skepticism regarding whether there is anything more than semantics at stake. Perhaps we can get into it if you ever post on something related to mathematical platonism again.<br /><br />Anyway, I feel like I've probably said all that I have to say on the matter. I'd like to reiterate that I enjoyed the post and the ensuing discussion. You made a lot of good points, and despite appearances I'm not sure I disagree with you on much of it. In the end, you can probably count me an agnostic on the question.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-19981911663806559992013-03-18T17:19:04.122-04:002013-03-18T17:19:04.122-04:00Disagreeable,
> Concepts can't be matched ...Disagreeable,<br /><br />> Concepts can't be matched to definitions? <<br /><br />I meant that there is no *factual* definition, no standard, to match. So it makes no sense to me that philosophers have to make sure that their concepts match lay concepts, as if the latter were some kind of arbiter of truth or accuracy.<br /><br />> I'm not sure that social scientists care if common intuitions match what philosophers publish papers about. Admittedly, philosophers possibly don't care either. <<br /><br />Then what’s the point of XPhi?<br /><br />> it might nevertheless be useful for philosophers to have data about how common intuitions might differ from their own, since common intuitions are sometimes pertinent to matters being considered. <<br /><br />Yes, and I acknowledged that. If a philosopher says “it is intuitive that...” and they mean commonsense intuitions, then yes their statements are amenable to empirical investigation, and should be empirically investigated. I just don’t see this sort of exercise as playing any major role in actual philosophical practice. I mean ever since Socrates we’ve been in the business to show people that their conceptions about a number of issues are confused or misguided... ;-)<br /><br />> When Plato defined knowledge as "justified true belief", was he not doing philosophy? <<br /><br />Yes, a good example of something that most lay people wouldn’t think of or know how to articulate.<br /><br />> It is my understanding that even trained philosophers have been shown to be susceptible to the effects shown by these experiments. <<br /><br />Not really, most XPhi is about lay people’s understanding of terms, not practitioners. Even when we are talking of “philosophers,” by the way, we should distinguish between the intuitions of, say, philosophers of mind (pertinent to phil-mind issues) from those of ethicists (pertinent to ethics). Modern academic specialization means that just as there is no such thing as a “scientist” anymore (there are physicists, biologists, etc.; and indeed, quantum physicists, solid-state physicists, evolutionary biologists, molecular biologists, and so on), there is no such thing as a generic “philosopher.”<br /><br />> Until you back this up with a precise definition of existence which would be accepted by both camps, I remain respectfully skeptical. <<br /><br />That’s way outside of the scope of the post, and indeed likely of the blog! But the literature on metaphysics and philosophy of mathematics that I have read (not my specific field!) tells me otherwise.<br /><br />Dark Star,<br /><br />> My take is that 'science' is a process of removing known sources of errors, biases, and illogic from conclusions. <<br /><br />Well, everyone is free to propose their own definitions, but that’s far too broad. Literary criticism would count as a science, according to that way of thinking.<br /><br />> our concepts either align with reality (to some useful/practical degree) or they do not. The only way to measure this is with empirical evidence. <<br /><br />To simple. What sort of empirical evidence is pertinent to the truth of Fermat’s Last Theorem, or of the principle of the excluded middle?<br /><br />> Philosophy and Science are two-sides of a single coin, not a dichotomy that can be split. <<br /><br />Neither, they are distinct fields of concern and inquiry, with many overlapping or mutually informing areas.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-64606754120903898922013-03-18T14:37:12.790-04:002013-03-18T14:37:12.790-04:00My take is that 'science' is a process of ...My take is that 'science' is a process of removing known sources of errors, biases, and illogic from conclusions.<br /><br />Any process that can follow this process IS 'doing science'. There are, of course, many domains of 'science' and different methodologies are going to apply to different domains (you don't apply the Historical Method to particle collision results, you don't need to because it doesn't have the same sources of errors as History does). Neither can we directly overlay Quantum Mechanics with History to get meaningful results (we can't even fully calculate a single atom over a few milliseconds yet).<br /><br />But these methodologies evolved into usage because sources of errors, biases, and illogic were found in earlier methodologies, based on philosophical reflection, so the snake is also swallowing its own tail.<br /><br />But, at the end of the day, our concepts either align with reality (to some useful/practical degree) or they do not. The only way to measure this is with empirical evidence. Sometimes that is REALLY hard to do, even sometimes impossible with our current level of technology and knowledge. But in every case, it is ultimately a matter of ignorance (lack of information) that causes the difficulty.<br /><br />Assuming we all accept the logical absolutes (at least to a useful degree) we still have to acknowledge that they were acquired by a very long process of observation, thinking about problems, looking for commonality, and ultimately forming an induction based on these, very much empirical, observations. They didn't just pop in our heads magically (in fact, it usually takes years of drumming them into a students head before they can root and flower :)<br /><br />So now consider an argument that some form of thought or experiment is consistently improved by leaving in errors, ensuring bias, and an application of illogic. It is a self-contradictory proposition.<br /><br />Philosophy and Science are two-sides of a single coin, not a dichotomy that can be split.Dark Starhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04356850749159919331noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-33583186552094943442013-03-18T11:45:58.036-04:002013-03-18T11:45:58.036-04:00>“Concepts” aren’t things out there that can be...>“Concepts” aren’t things out there that can be “matched.” They are human inventions.<<br /><br />Concepts can't be matched to definitions? So, if we share the concept of evil, and I attempt to define it as simply "evil is the absence of good", you don't think it's fair to say that this description matches or doesn't match the concept we share?<br /><br />>Yes, but whether that is or is not the case is simply not a philosophical issue, it’s a social science one.<<br /><br />Hmm, I'm not sure that social scientists care if common intuitions match what philosophers publish papers about. Admittedly, philosophers possibly don't care either. Which is arguably where experimental philosophy comes in?<br /><br />>so perhaps philosophers should refer to the common intuitions of philosophers<<br /><br />Point taken. However, it might nevertheless be useful for philosophers to have data about how common intuitions might differ from their own, since common intuitions are sometimes pertinent to matters being considered.<br /><br />>> Definitions of existing words can be tested by considering whether they match the usage of the words. <<br /><br />If that’s what you care about. I don’t, and neither should philosophers. If you do care, you are doing more something like linguistics than philosophy.<<br /><br />I disagree. When Plato defined knowledge as "justified true belief", was he not doing philosophy? If he had instead defined knowledge as "beliefs we value" would we consider that to be a good definition? If not, why not? I would argue that we would not accept this second definition because it does not capture the intuitive concept of knowledge in common usage as well the first.<br /><br />> I never said that philosophers should ignore empirical data, in this or any other case.<<br /><br />Nor did I ever suggest that this was your position. I take it for granted that you value empirical data, and propose XPhi as a source of empirical data of particular relevance to philosophy.<br /><br />>people are confused about concepts like persons and intentionality, which is to be expected, since these are not trained philosophers.<<br /><br />It is my understanding that even trained philosophers have been shown to be susceptible to the effects shown by these experiments. I suggest that we should be open to the possibility that there is something more interesting going on than mere confusion, although I am not arguing that this is in fact the case. In any case, XPhi brings these results to light and it is up to philosophers to interpret them.<br /><br />> and they disagree even when they do agree on what it means for X to exist.<<br /><br />Until you back this up with a precise definition of existence which would be accepted by both camps, I remain respectfully skeptical. I suspect that when such philosophers assert this agreement, they are in fact subtly misunderstanding each other or otherwise interpreting the agreed definition differently.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-27476844966918683222013-03-18T11:05:45.869-04:002013-03-18T11:05:45.869-04:00Disagreeable,
> I just think that it's que...Disagreeable,<br /><br />> I just think that it's questionable whether philosophy can give precise definitions of intuitive concepts if those definitions don't match the concepts. <<br /><br />“Concepts” aren’t things out there that can be “matched.” They are human inventions.<br /><br />> It tells us whether the arguments that philosophers make according to their precise definitions also apply to the intuitive common sense concepts. <<br /><br />Yes, but whether that is or is not the case is simply not a philosophical issue, it’s a social science one.<br /><br />> Philosophers are otherwise in danger of taking for granted that their concept of knowledge is the same as a layperson's <<br /><br />As I wrote in the main post, one good thing that XPhi does is to provide a check for some philosophers’ casual talk along the lines of “it is intuitive that...” But even so, it is not at all clear that when philosophers talk that way the class of relevant intuitions is that of lay people. Intuition is very domain specific, so perhaps philosophers should refer to the common intuitions of philosophers, just like mathematicians or physicists (when they engage in thought experiments) do.<br /><br />> Definitions of existing words can be tested by considering whether they match the usage of the words. <<br /><br />If that’s what you care about. I don’t, and neither should philosophers. If you do care, you are doing more something like linguistics than philosophy.<br /><br />> Much of philosophy concerns the clarification and justification or rejection of human intuitions. You might say that this is exactly what the field is about. ... XPhi gives philosophers data about those intuitions, giving them more fodder to be justified or rejected. <<br /><br />That is a good argument, and I never said that philosophers should ignore empirical data, in this or any other case.<br /><br />> Without this survey, philosophers might be tempted to define intentionality in one specific way such that a consistent judgement is applied in both scenarios. With this survey, we are prompted to consider whether there might be any way of reconciling the two judgements. <<br /><br />Actually, I think what the example shows is that people are confused about concepts like persons and intentionality, which is to be expected, since these are not trained philosophers.<br /><br />> I believe this is equivalent to my own view that the question reduces only to the semantic issue of how we choose to define "existence". <<br /><br />I’ll take a look at the review, the ideas sound interesting, but I keep not buying that this is “just a semantic issue,” unless you define semantics so broadly that any issue becomes a semantic issue. Platonists and anti-Platonists do deploy arguments in defense of their theses, and they disagree even when they do agree on what it means for X to exist.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-86800047681931514192013-03-18T09:36:55.334-04:002013-03-18T09:36:55.334-04:00Allow me to propose another argument for XPhi.
Mu...Allow me to propose another argument for XPhi.<br /><br />Much of philosophy concerns the clarification and justification or rejection of human intuitions. You might say that this is exactly what the field is about.<br /><br />XPhi gives philosophers data about those intuitions, giving them more fodder to be justified or rejected. It is philosophy because it concerns human intuitions, but it is experimental in that it is gathering data.<br /><br />So, in the example in the video linked to in Philip Thrift's comment, we find that people intuit that a corporation which knowingly harms the environment as a side effect of its policy does so intentionally, whereas a corporation that knowingly helps the environment does not do so intentionally.<br /><br />Without this survey, philosophers might be tempted to define intentionality in one specific way such that a consistent judgement is applied in both scenarios. With this survey, we are prompted to consider whether there might be any way of reconciling the two judgements.<br /><br />One such explanation might be that the intuitive concept of intentionality is bound to the concept of moral responsibility. <br /><br />We don't feel like we need to reward the corporation that benefits the environment because they were motivated by profit and so would have performed the action even with no recognition. However, we do feel like we need to punish the corporation that punishes the environment because this behaviour needs to be deterred. We justify this feeling by saying that the corporation harmed the environment intentionally.<br /><br />From this insight, we could derive a new definition for intentionality that captures the intuitive biases. "A side-effect of an action is deemed intentional if it occurs knowingly and is allowed to occur for morally relevant reasons".<br /><br />This little sketch shows one way that XPhi is philosophically relevant. Of course other fields (quantum mechanics for example) also provide material for philosophers, so this alone does not justify calling XPhi philosophy. However, the subject matter of XPhi so closely matches that of philosophy proper that calling it philosophy is perhaps not too much of a stretch.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-30086280819430629972013-03-18T09:12:31.946-04:002013-03-18T09:12:31.946-04:00Hi Massimo:
On whether it is reasonable to charac...Hi Massimo:<br /><br />On whether it is reasonable to characterise the debate on the existence of mathematical objects as mere semantic confusion:<br /><br />>But no philosopher would make the confusion that you attribute, in your example, to hypothetical Bob and Mary.<<br /><br />I think I have found one philosopher of mathematics who shares my views. This review [http://mally.stanford.edu/Papers/balaguer.pdf] explains the position of Mark Balaguer in his book "Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics".<br /><br />I haven't read the book, but from the description it seems that it matches my own views perfectly. Balaguer defends both "full bodied platonism" (all possible mathematical objects exist) and anti-platonist fictionalism (mathematical objects do not exist and mathematical statements are true only in the context of a mathematical fiction).<br /><br />Balaguer reconciles these two opposing view points by arguing that there is simply no fact of the matter. Both are true and both are false in their own way.<br /><br />I believe this is equivalent to my own view that the question reduces only to the semantic issue of how we choose to define "existence".<br /><br />I recommend that you read the review linked above as it gives a very good summary of the book and seems to articulate Balaguer's (and my) position quite well.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-72862645588377048012013-03-18T08:49:43.202-04:002013-03-18T08:49:43.202-04:00My own position is that of plenitudious mathematic...My own position is that of plenitudious mathematical platonism. All possible formal axiomatic systems exist whether or not any mathematician has discovered them. When Gödel's mathematician extends an axiomatic system with her insight, she essentially discovers a new axiomatic system from the space of possible axiomatic systems.<br /><br />For me, mathematical truths exist only in the context of a given formal system. There is no right or wrong way to formulate a formal system as long as it is consistent. Your example about parallel lines is a good one. The assumption that they do not meet gives us Euclidean geometry. Different assumptions give us different geometries, and all are just as valid to me.<br /><br />And so while I am probably not a classical Platonist, I do think that mind-independent mathematical truths exist (within the context of a given system).Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-54115574392010010072013-03-18T06:34:06.215-04:002013-03-18T06:34:06.215-04:00On X-Phi: I looked at the video from the Yale grou...On X-Phi: I looked at the video from the Yale group [ http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jk762/xphipage/Video_Release.html ]. (Apparently they had a show last Friday on "Experimental Philosophy in 3-D"). I don't know, X-Phi seems more social science than philosophy to me.<br /><br />On the book "Philosophy of Mathematics" (referred to): I notice from the TOC and Index it doesn't apparently cover the anti-Platonist mathematics of Lavine/Mycielski (finite mathematics of indefinitely large size sets). [ http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2273942, etc. ]Philip Thrifthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03021615111948806998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-62358053713459696722013-03-18T05:05:28.979-04:002013-03-18T05:05:28.979-04:00Perhaps Gödelian Platonism sidesteps the question ...Perhaps Gödelian Platonism sidesteps the question of existence, although I haven’t come across an unambiguously clear exposition by the man of his meta-mathematics. <br /><br />Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem shows that for a sufficiently strong logic, mathematicians cannot assert truth syntactically, i.e. exclusively by symbols and rules for their manipulation. This is a stronger version of what was known even before Gödel’s theorem, namely that lower order logics can be extended by new independent concepts and axioms. For example, geometry is equally consistent with parallel lines meeting or not. Even such an elementary concept as the infinity of natural numbers cannot be derived syntactically within a minimal “sufficiently strong logic”. It requires a new concept to be formed by a reasoning mind – the cardinality of the set of natural numbers – the validity of which depends only on its general acceptance by the mathematical community. Since first order logic is provably consistent and complete, no minds are needed to agree on the validity of its true propositions; given the propositional logic as input, a Turing machine will do. But any output the machine produces adds no new concept to what has been given; it remains within the tautology of the logic. If I’ve understood Gödel’s meta-mathematics correctly, his mathematical Platonism consists of the notion that for any mind capable of understanding a logic “sufficiently strong” to lead to the first incompleteness theorem, the logic, while not extendable syntactically, is in principle endlessly extendable synthetically by the mind, and furthermore, all reasonable minds will agree on the justification of the extensions. This is different from classical Platonism, which posits eternal truths. For Gödel, mind-independent mathematical truths do not exist. Only concepts synthetically formed by minds and universally agreed upon as valid are included in his Platonic mathematics.<br />Zalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12014580581375983716noreply@blogger.com