tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post2676881558093852766..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Confessions of a Modal Realist, Part 2Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-9728966361966648162013-02-19T17:27:21.263-05:002013-02-19T17:27:21.263-05:00The critter on the pictures is supposed to be a Ta...The critter on the pictures is supposed to be a Tarbosaurus Bataar ;) Not a T-rex ;) Rogerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13975089388089734355noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-33456750619644353732013-02-15T17:06:24.814-05:002013-02-15T17:06:24.814-05:00And here is how a modal realist may find a date on...And here is how a modal realist may find a date on Valentine's Day:<br /><br />http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/14/everyone-has-a-date-this-valentines-day-just-maybe-not-in-this-world/Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-19240300731927935852013-02-15T03:15:46.328-05:002013-02-15T03:15:46.328-05:00Leonard,
Though it is a bit too metaphysically un...Leonard,<br /><br />Though it is a bit too metaphysically unseemly for my desert landscape tastes, I enjoyed your post. There are, of course, some problems with modal realism. <br /><br />First, if sets of propositions are to individuate possible worlds, they must be closed under logical entailment. E.g., if at W {P1, P2, … Pn} is true and if {P1, P2, … Pn} ⊨ Pn=1 , Pn+1 is true at W. However, logical entailment is defined in terms of possible worlds: P1 implies P2 iff for every W in which P1 is true, P2 is true. In other words, formal modal semantics were formulated in order to clarify what it means for an inference to follow validly from a set of premises. This admits an unacceptable circularity into our definition of possible worlds and valid inference.<br /><br />In any case, you write: "If the actual universe is the only real universe, then there would be nothing to make counterfactual propositions true (remember, fictional rearrangements of states of affairs prove nothing)."<br /><br />This is a stretch. In any case, it is not at all clear that personal identity is preserved across worlds. I just am *this particular* collection of particles, and any possible world counterpart would be some other distinct collection of particles. Thus, possible world semantics construed in modal realist terms cannot offer an account for the truth values of counterfactual conditions since the 'Leonard' denoted in a counterfactual conditional is eo ipso a different persona entirely. <br /><br />Cian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-37289306262473081172013-02-14T07:17:59.741-05:002013-02-14T07:17:59.741-05:00From a pragmatic perspective, there are no facts, ...From a pragmatic perspective, there are no facts, only (more or less) useful expressions. 'Snow is white' is more useful than 'Snow is blue'. So as there are no (Platonistic) facts, there are no counterfactuals. Language is for coping with the world, not for copying the world.Philip Thrifthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03021615111948806998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-16523324049986989262013-02-14T06:45:55.710-05:002013-02-14T06:45:55.710-05:00"“Tyrannosaurus rex” names a breeding populat..."“Tyrannosaurus rex” names a breeding population of organisms that died out millions of years ago, and so nothing living today could possibly be a T. rex"<br /><br />Really? Suppose aliens visited Earth, captured a small breeding population of T. rex, and then:<br /><br />Took them on a long round trip at nearly the speed of light<br />or<br />Put them in a time machine<br />or<br />Put them in suspended animation, with a timer<br /><br />Any of these could result in a living T. rex on Earth now.David Evanshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13590531184544289491noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-36780952685432062442013-02-14T04:37:43.828-05:002013-02-14T04:37:43.828-05:00Peter - I understand modal realism to be the claim...Peter - I understand modal realism to be the claim that those possible worlds are as real as this 'actual' one you refer to. <br /><br />Maybe an anti-realist position is not far off from Leonard's. <br /><br />In this case the similarities are:<br /><br />(1) All those possible worlds (even the subset of 'naturalized' ones) can each be mapped to conceivable worlds, the difference being that in the latter case, there is someone or something doing the conceiving.<br /><br />(2) Making statements about unobservable worlds has semantic implications. The facts in the 'other' world must mean something to someone in 'this' world.<br /><br />When I try to explain my brand of anti-realism to others, I'll get the argument that semantics are being butchered in order to make a point. <br /><br />Could be. Could also be that use of everyday language really stacks the deck in favor of realists. Last I recall, the following is a grammatical sentence. "There is a cat". Only a single copula/connector - "is". If anti-realists had written the linguistics playbook, there would be two connectors: i.e. "There IS a cat IN my estimable view" <br />DaveShttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15840516954793215700noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-38437569099545838352013-02-13T20:49:56.470-05:002013-02-13T20:49:56.470-05:00It seems to me that it would make more sense to ca...It seems to me that it would make more sense to call yourself a modal agnostic or to just a modal skeptic.<br /><br />[I]If counterfactual propositions are true at all, then other worlds would be the best candidates to make them true.[/I]<br /><br />I don't see why this is the case at all. I'm sure there are some philosophers who have promoted 'senses' of truth or something that can account for them without appealing to ontologically dubious other worlds we can't possibly have access to.SecularDadhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00311674165588139870noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-2543653667109384802013-02-13T14:46:22.188-05:002013-02-13T14:46:22.188-05:00"I don’t make counterfactual propositions tru..."<i>I don’t make counterfactual propositions true. Neither does the actual world</i>"<br /><br />I think you're underestimating the actual world here.<br /><br />What makes it true that if I were to drop this glass it would break? Surely, the <i>actual</i> fragility of the glass.<br /><br />And what makes the glass fragile? The fact that it is <i>actually</i> composed of molecules in a particular lattice structure with particular inter-atomic bonding forces.<br /><br />The actual world makes our counterfactual statements true or false. We can be modal realists without being realists about possible worlds.Peter Bokulichhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14902969236730985939noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-11448651726269706382013-02-13T12:26:04.739-05:002013-02-13T12:26:04.739-05:00There is only One truth
One Universe
One is
All th...There is only One truth<br />One Universe<br />One is<br />All the rest is only probable at best<br />Be One too<br /><br />== MJAhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01897595473268353450noreply@blogger.com