tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post2051429152983231777..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Rationally Speaking encore: Does empathy negate physicalism?Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger20125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-63100377349332636112012-01-13T21:29:40.890-05:002012-01-13T21:29:40.890-05:00the brain is needed for only physical consciousnes...the brain is needed for only physical consciousnesscspherehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07052628075358773353noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-27222292895065903492012-01-13T21:09:33.836-05:002012-01-13T21:09:33.836-05:00Qualia makes no sense with respect to empathy. Emp...Qualia makes no sense with respect to empathy. Empathy is felt through the recalling of the memory of a particular expression on the face on the other person or t=for example. If someone tells me that they hit their finger while hitting a nail. I can imagine (recall) the last time it happened and the neural networks corresponding to that memory of the feelings will be triggered. That is all. You can train yourself to unfeel such emotions by blocking the triggering of those paths over time, but not activating those networks but only thinking logicallycspherehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07052628075358773353noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-21621167032184634162012-01-10T20:46:23.896-05:002012-01-10T20:46:23.896-05:00I always found the substance dualist position to b...I always found the substance dualist position to be, at best, an economical nightmare and, at worst, hopelessly incoherent. <br /><br />Re the so-called problem of qualitative phenomenal experiences. <br /><br />If it is a problem, it is as much a problem for the substance dualist as it is for the physicalist. The dualist questions how purely physical processes can constitute qualia, but the physicalist can just as easily question how a non-physical whatever [enter your preferred entity here] can bring about so-called qualitative phenomenal experiences. <br /><br />Essentially, the dualist invariably resorts to postulating that [whatever non-physical thing] explains, in a manner nobody knows how, qualitative experiences. Russell sums up my view on this tactic succinctly: "The method of 'postulating' what we want has many advantages; they are the same as the advantages of theft over honest toil. Let us leave them to others and proceed with our honest toil."<br /><br />Re "Dualists agree that the mind is 'generated from' the brain."<br /><br />Jack Smart addresses this in a wonderful passage in his seminal work 'Materialism' ('The Journal of Philosophy' Vol. LX, No. 22, p 660): <br /><br />"It may be asked why I should demand of a tenable philosophy of mind that it should be compatible with materialism. How could a non-physical property or entity suddenly arise in the course of animal evolution. A change in a gene is a change in a complex molecule, which causes a change in the biochemistry of the cell. This may lead to changes in the shape or organization of the developing embryo. But what sort of chemical process could lead to the springing into existence of something non-physical. No enzyme can catalyze the production of a spook."Cian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-45452243188475834562012-01-10T17:30:28.400-05:002012-01-10T17:30:28.400-05:00Massimo - the "no ectoplasm" objection s...Massimo - the "no ectoplasm" objection seems to rest on a <a href="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2008/07/brain-damage-and-physicalism.html" rel="nofollow">misunderstanding of dualism</a>. Dualists agree that the mind is "generated from" the brain. (But our qualia might have been generated differently, or not at all, which is why we cannot take mental states to be identical to [even "types" of] physical states. Or so the dualist claims.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-729884958762287352012-01-08T18:32:38.772-05:002012-01-08T18:32:38.772-05:00Why wouldn't qualia qualify as physical proper...Why wouldn't qualia qualify as physical properties, especially as without some aspect of awareness, no energetic properties would intactly survive to react to the accidental encounters endemic to a chaotic yet probabilistic universe.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-74834603601961684302012-01-08T15:45:59.292-05:002012-01-08T15:45:59.292-05:00Yes, I think the idea he presents ignores enough b...Yes, I think the idea he presents ignores enough biology that is should be relegated to some type of philosophical history. If something such as mirror neurons do exist, which it seems they do, than empathy does not involve qualia at all. It is completely physical, and certainly no duality issues arise. Rather the empathetic experience is the same for the person being empathized with, and the one with the empathy (and therefore the one with the mirror neurons) doesn't negate the fact that it is purely biological. It just means that we need to quantify accordingly.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07835248533705400567noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-69343875955633476152012-01-08T12:27:27.862-05:002012-01-08T12:27:27.862-05:00>"The human brain evolved a module" s...>"The human brain evolved a module" seems to mean that it's uniquely a human module, which empathy clearly isn't.<br /><br />No, it would mean it's uniquely human if I added a qualifier like "only" or "uniquely" or "interestingly" and so on.<br /><br />>"It physically exists like the numbers outputted from a calculator exist."<br /><br />That may be self-evident to you, but it isn't to me, and I can't read your mind, now can I?JoshJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13232627951659106765noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-19364612206461446932012-01-08T08:49:32.267-05:002012-01-08T08:49:32.267-05:00For what it contributes to the empathy argument: L...For what it contributes to the empathy argument: Lack of 'working empathy" is analyzed in Kent Kiehls' work with "hard-core" (not my characterization) criminals in NM. J. Seabrook wrote about Kents work in New Yorker Nov 2008; when asked what is a salient aspect of being a sociopath, Kent said: "when you look unto their eyes, there is no one there.....".artikcathttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13077476175789463520noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-72354788083076046082012-01-07T21:18:15.681-05:002012-01-07T21:18:15.681-05:00"The human brain evolved a module" seems..."The human brain evolved a module" seems to mean that it's uniquely a human module, which empathy clearly isn't.<br />"It physically exists like the numbers outputted from a calculator exist."<br />That's simply meaningless.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-45037216920074600652012-01-07T20:44:00.363-05:002012-01-07T20:44:00.363-05:00Anyone using the existence of empathy to argue aga...Anyone using the existence of empathy to argue against physicalism is inevitably making some more complicated version of a fairly simple fallacy: "From certain physical observations, I speculate that there is an accompanying non-physical mental state--voilá, it ain't just physical."<br /><br />Of course, adherents to physicalism as described above are making the same kind of error, just with an additional addendum--"but these non-physical mental states are correlated with observable events in people's brains". Either way we're guessing about purported events in some non-physical and, more fundamentally, trans-linguistic realm. It doesn't work.aspidoscelishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13843632551571431432noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-68250234487969496702012-01-07T20:37:29.242-05:002012-01-07T20:37:29.242-05:00>human versus non-human mind processes.
This s...>human versus non-human mind processes.<br /><br />This shows you don't understand what I've written.JoshJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13232627951659106765noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-23792584670364187472012-01-07T19:25:58.263-05:002012-01-07T19:25:58.263-05:00http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/12/11120...http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/12/111208142017.htmAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-7234347926006892182012-01-07T19:09:54.879-05:002012-01-07T19:09:54.879-05:00Nah, you need to substitute a little theory of bio...Nah, you need to substitute a little theory of biological adaptation for that antiquated theory of human versus non-human mind processes.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-12249180132535420792012-01-07T18:20:22.060-05:002012-01-07T18:20:22.060-05:00jeremybee,
You need to review the literature on t...jeremybee,<br /><br />You need to review the literature on theory of mind and empathy.JoshJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13232627951659106765noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-55523957942883207762012-01-07T18:07:01.368-05:002012-01-07T18:07:01.368-05:00Nah, the human brain has an adapted empathy functi...Nah, the human brain has an adapted empathy function that's common to all social animalia. It's how social animals are able to learn from each other's experience and evolve as becomes necessary accordingly.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-82114740002636851032012-01-07T17:12:23.834-05:002012-01-07T17:12:23.834-05:00The human brain evolved a module that allowed for ...The human brain evolved a module that allowed for the input of other objects' external experiences with the output of the modeling brain's internal experiences. This is theory of mind and it outputs what we call empathy. It physically exists like the numbers outputted from a calculator exist. (Just thought I'd lay out the map and territory.)JoshJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13232627951659106765noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-82744108833750736542012-01-07T16:11:56.078-05:002012-01-07T16:11:56.078-05:00Empathy allows us to self induce a form of pain su...Empathy allows us to self induce a form of pain suggestive of the pain that the other party is presumed to feel or have felt. The fact that it doesn't happen to certain people is only relevant to the fact that it does happen to most of us. It's part of an anticipatory awareness function (of subjective qualia) that is common to all biological beings.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-3166905039041164692012-01-07T08:57:59.077-05:002012-01-07T08:57:59.077-05:00The statement of the "no ectoplasm clause&quo...The statement of the "no ectoplasm clause" is incomplete. It should state that if there is no brain, there is no consciousness [which can communicate with other material sentiences]. The presumption of no consciousness is predicated on a materialist's ability to know that there is no unbound consciousness, and subsequent presumption that it does not exist. But that is merely presumption. So due to the inability to actually know, the clause is false.Stanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14860850768269357636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-23117938931903089012012-01-07T08:51:52.106-05:002012-01-07T08:51:52.106-05:00If the brain is a platform upon which the mind dan...If the brain is a platform upon which the mind dances, then removing or damaging the platform changes the ability to dance. If a half-adder is damaged in the computer hardware, the software will not function to many of its expectations. The concept of duality is not damaged when one part or the other malfunctions. <br /><br />The reference to Apples and PC's on the one hand, running various software on the other hand, is a reference to duality, without which the entirety is useless.Stanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14860850768269357636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-23691974815352472682012-01-07T07:22:00.629-05:002012-01-07T07:22:00.629-05:00It is possible qualia result from the complex inte...It is possible qualia result from the complex interactions of several, key brain areas. The qualia do not arise from any specific combination of interactions; however, they depend on each of the participating brain areas to function properly. Therefore, qualia could still be an emergent trait(s) like the consciousness. At the same time, this trait can be stymied by damage to one section of the brain.Anthony Hopperhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708347177061466201noreply@blogger.com