tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post1985307766518932276..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Gerard O'Brien On the Computational Theory of MindUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger209125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-72127306444044728652013-11-09T12:44:55.057-05:002013-11-09T12:44:55.057-05:00Philip,
Agreed for computers.
For biology I can ...Philip,<br /><br />Agreed for computers.<br /><br />For biology I can see some similar techniques as being possible in some areas.<br /><br />For humans uploading themselves I think the idea expressed is so vague I prefer not to have an opinion.<br />marc Levesquehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06779771196251323474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-8387977715186519152013-11-08T10:44:44.637-05:002013-11-08T10:44:44.637-05:00Hi DM,
Reality check.
Thanks for the above links...Hi DM,<br /><br />Reality check.<br /><br />Thanks for the above links and your post after your email exchange with <a href="http://www.adelaide.edu.au/directory/gerard.obrien" rel="nofollow">Gerard O'Brien</a>.<br /><br />I'm finally taking a look at his <a href="http://www.adelaide.edu.au/directory/gerard.obrien#Publications" rel="nofollow">papers</a>.<br /><br />I liked a lot of what I was hearing in the podcast but I don't know exactly why I went rambling on in my comments, making stuff up, and only focusing on the interview, and on a very small section of it at that.marc Levesquehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06779771196251323474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-2063086740269158602013-11-05T05:55:08.606-05:002013-11-05T05:55:08.606-05:00Nice one Filippo. Saving that one for later.Nice one Filippo. Saving that one for later.Louis Burkehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03583066162106331227noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-45993049712035138882013-11-04T09:03:58.427-05:002013-11-04T09:03:58.427-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.marc Levesquehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06779771196251323474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-42652413048044140342013-11-03T13:40:14.538-05:002013-11-03T13:40:14.538-05:00Philip,
> I would call this "substrate-in...Philip,<br /><br />> I would call this "substrate-independent" concept "Platonism".<<br /><br />I agree with you. Notice that I made the same observation earlier. Basically, on this question, we differ only on semantics. Your definition of "computation" is much wider than mine. Fundamentally, we agree that the "engineering" details are everything.<br /><br />I am mathematical Platonist, not a mystical one. Substrate-independent consciousness seems to be a revival of the (neo)platonic soul.<br />Filippo Nerihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01910861498359320434noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-72874264264137542252013-11-03T11:39:51.340-05:002013-11-03T11:39:51.340-05:00@ Disagreeable Me
> But if you understand my p...@ Disagreeable Me<br /><br />> But if you understand my position then you should understand why I don't think it is sensible to talk about the simplest possible form of consciousness, and why I prefer to discuss human consciousness. <<br /><br />But it is still more sensible to to fully understand simpler experiences before you attempt to tackle more complex experiences.<br /><br />> Not having a deterministic explanation does not mean it is explained with consciousness. I can't see how you could make that imaginative leap. <<br /><br />What exactly is your (nonphysical) explanation for how an electron in a superposition state (a state in which all possibilities exist simultaneously.) collapses or reduces to a single state?<br /><br />"<i>The idea that an electron...by its own free decision chooses the moment and direction in which it wants to eject is intolerable to me</i>." - Albert Einstein (source: pg. 574, "Albert Einstein" by Albrecht Fölsing, translated by Ewald Osers)<br /><br />> It's a good answer to my criticism of quantum free but I don't think it quite works. <<br /><br />Why doesn't it work?<br /><br />> Anyway, I don't believe in free will so I'm not going to persuaded that randomness is necessary to account for free will. <<br /><br />Okay. So, your disbelief in free will implies that your entire mental life is completely illusory because it is predicated on a belief in free will. <br /><br />> The results were often surprising and beautiful. All driven by pseudorandom numbers. <<br /><br />Pseudo-randomness generates pseudo-creativity, not true creativity, not true novelty.<br /><br />> I don't think Penrose's argument works. I tackle it on my blog. <<br /><br />I guess that settles it.<br /><br />> Any physical interaction constitutes an observation. The timing of splitting depends on your frame of reference. <<br /><br />Your view is based on the wrong assumption that quantum mechanics applies only to the microscopic, not to the macroscopic. <br /><br />> <i> He [John von Neumann] showed that if quantum mechanics applies universally - as claimed - an ultimate encounter with consciousness is inevitable..separation of the microscopic and the macroscopic is only a very good approximation...But whenever we refer to "observation," the question of consciousness lurks.</i>" (pp. 100-101, "Quantum Enigma" by Bruce Rosenblum and Fred Kuttner)<br /><br />> Any physical interaction with a particle in superposition constitutes an observation. No conscious observer required. <<br /><br />I disagree for reasons already stated.<br /><br />> Fair enough. I can claim no such experience. However I remain skeptical that it constitutes pure awareness with an absence of any information processing whatsoever. <<br /><br />Scientific studies in "delta wave" activity of the brain support my claim.<br /><br />"<i>Delta waves and delta wave activity are marked, in most people, by an apparently unconscious state, and the loss of physical awareness as well as the <b>"ITERATION OF INFORMATION"</b>. Nevertheless, some people who practice a type of deep meditation called Yoga Nidra (Sleep yoga) can remain conscious while in delta-sleep</i>." (source: Wikipedia: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_wave#Consciousness_and_dreaming" rel="nofollow">Delta wave</a>)Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-82706844408067424022013-11-03T09:20:27.461-05:002013-11-03T09:20:27.461-05:00While I largely agree with Brian's position, I...While I largely agree with Brian's position, I think the brain does more hybrid computations, which are both continuous and discrete, as spiking of neurons in time is a continuous process and spikes are somewhat discrete.<br /><br />Now, one thing that has not been mentioned in the podcast is that there is already immense explanatory purchase of computational models in cognitive science (I show it in detail in my recent book mitpress.mit.edu/books/explaining-computational-mind if you're interested) in that cognitive processes can be described and predicted with computational models. Sometimes, in neurocomputational psychiatry, we can even plan interventions thanks to models of say, delusions. So it's not only the matter of confirming the theories (which also goes a long way right now and definitely beyond qualitative intuitive hunches of the Turing test) but also of getting them to actual work.<br /><br />I don't go to consciousness myself, as I found out that there are too many ideological wars there, but note that there is no serious theory of consciousness (ones that are created with scientific rigor of experimental psychology) which is not computational. The global workspace theory, the higher-order thought theory, the multiple drafts theory, and even the panpsychist theory of Chalmers are all computational. This is also interesting for this discussion.Marcin Miłkowskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11617540925216664775noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-8900309899176999892013-11-03T09:10:24.491-05:002013-11-03T09:10:24.491-05:00>But it is sensible to talk about simpler forms...>But it is sensible to talk about simpler forms of experience if your intention is to artificially create more complex forms of experience.<<br /><br />True, but the only kind of consciousness there is really universal agreement on is that humans are conscious. For some people it's debatable whether animals are conscious at all. Humans are also interesting because only we have the ability to really understand abstract concepts and do useful intellectual work. It might be possible to make systems which behave like simpler intelligences without consciousness, but it seems more unlikely to me that an insentient machine could operate at a human level. So, personally I am interested in human level intelligence, but I don't have any objection to thinking about simpler minds also.<br /><br />>What other (nonphysical) explanation would you employ to account for how an electron in a superposition state (a state in which all possibilities exist simultaneously) collapses into one singular state?<<br /><br />I don't see why we need an explanation, any more than we need an explanation for why mass warps space, (or whatever the ultimate laws of physics turn out to be). Whatever the laws are, there can be no causal explanation for them, because that would presuppose more fundamental laws - that's just what the universe is. Quantum probability is like that. These things behave according to laws, and if you find the laws strange, that's tough luck! In the words of David Mermin, shut up and calculate!<br /><br />If you really do find indeterminism impossible to reconcile with a physical world, then there are interpretations of QM which can help you out. In many worlds, there is no randomness. All outcomes happen. They only appear random to us because of our limited perspective.<br /><br />I certainly don't think that consciousness is any kind of explanation. And I don't think Einstein was literally describing electrons as conscious agents with free will. He was speaking metaphorically. He was known to do that.<br /><br />>Pseudorandomness generates pseudo-creativity, not real creativity, not true novelty.<<br /><br />And if pseudorandom numbers are indistinguishable from random numbers, pseudocreativity will be indistinguishable from "real creativity". And so we don't need "real creativity", if that concept even makes sense.<br /><br />>If given sufficient resources, perhaps. HOWEVER, there isn't sufficient resources. <<br /><br />This has never been a point of contention. I'm talking only about matters of principle. I want to establish, for example, that the Chinese Room thought experiment does not defeat Strong AI. This thought experiment is already wildly impractical, so practical considerations have no bearing. If there is no strong argument against strong AI in principle, then it remains an open question on whether it will ever be feasible, or on what technologies might make it most practical. On these questions, only agnositicism is justified. I'm seeking to argue against your apparent certainty that it is impossible.<br /><br />If it turns out that quantum mechanics needs to be exploited to make AI feasible, then I would agree with you that quantum computers of some kind will be necessary. We just don't know that yet.<br /><br />>I guess that settles it. <<br /><br />That's unfair, Alastair. I wrote a very detailed account of my position on my blog, and gave you a link to it. Your sarcastic dismissal of my position -- as if I had simply just asserted Penrose was wrong -- is unwarranted.<br /><br />>That view is based on the wrong assumption that quantum mechanics applies only to the microscopic, not the macroscopic. <<br /><br />I made no such assumption.<br /><br />>Scientific studies on "delta wave" activity supports my claim. <<br /><br />Scientific studies may show you have delta waves while meditating. They don't show that "pure awareness" is a thing.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-33619869115159017442013-11-03T02:19:55.195-05:002013-11-03T02:19:55.195-05:00@ Disagreeable Me
> Of course. But if you unde...@ Disagreeable Me<br /><br />> Of course. But if you understand my position then you should understand why I don't think it is sensible to talk about the simplest possible form of consciousness, and why I prefer to discuss human consciousness. <<br /><br />But it is sensible to talk about simpler forms of experience if your intention is to artificially create more complex forms of experience.<br /><br />> Not having a deterministic explanation does not mean it is explained with consciousness. I can't see how you could make that imaginative leap. <<br /><br />What other (nonphysical) explanation would you employ to account for <i>how</i> an electron in a superposition state (a state in which all possibilities exist simultaneously) collapses into one singular state?<br /><br />"<i>The idea that an electron...by its own free decision chooses the moment and direction in which it wants to eject is intolerable to me. If that is so, I'd rather be a cobbler or a clerk in a gambling casino than a physicist</i>." - Albert Einstein (source: pg. 574, "Albert Einstein" by Albrecht Fölsing, translated by Ewald Osers)<br /><br />> I disagree. I built a computer system that composed music for my final year project in computer science. The results were often surprising and beautiful. All driven by pseudorandom numbers. <<br /><br />Pseudorandomness generates pseudo-creativity, not real creativity, not true novelty.<br /><br />> I don't think Penrose's argument works. <<br /><br />I guess that settles it. <br /><br />> A classical computer would be capable of doing everything a quantum computer can do.<<br /><br />If given sufficient resources, perhaps. HOWEVER, there isn't sufficient resources. So, a classical digital computer is NOT capable of doing everything a quantum computer can do.<br /><br />"<i>Given sufficient computational resources, a classical computer could be made to simulate any quantum algorithm; quantum computation does not violate the Church–Turing thesis.[9] However, the computational basis of 500 qubits, for example, would already be too large to be represented on a classical computer because it would require 2^500 complex values (2^501 bits) to be stored.[10] (For comparison, a terabyte of digital information is only 2^43 bits.)</i>" (source: Wikipedia: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_computer" rel="nofollow">Quantum computer</a>)<br /><br />> Any physical interaction constitutes an observation. The timing of splitting depends on your frame of reference. <<br /><br />That view is based on the wrong assumption that quantum mechanics applies only to the microscopic, not the macroscopic. <br /><br />"<i>He [John Von Neumann] showed that if quantum mechanics applies universally - as claimed - an ultimate encounter with consciousness is inevitable...separation of the microscopic and the macroscopic is only a very good approximation...But whenever we refer to "observation," the question of consciousness lurks</i>." (source: pp. 100-101, "Quantum Enigma" by Bruce Rosenblum and Fred Kuttner)<br /><br />> This sounds like a variant of my own view. However I reject that it has anything to do with consciousness. Any physical interaction with a particle in superposition constitutes an observation. <<br /><br />I don't agree for reasons already stated. <br /><br />> Fair enough. I can claim no such experience. However I remain skeptical that it constitutes pure awareness with an absence of any information processing whatsoever. <<br /><br />Scientific studies on "delta wave" activity supports my claim. <br /><br />"<i>Delta waves and delta wave activity are marked, in most people, by an apparently unconscious state, and the loss of physical awareness as well as the <b>"ITERATION OF INFORMATION"</b>. Nevertheless, some people who practice a type of deep meditation called Yoga Nidra (Sleep yoga) can remain conscious while in delta-sleep.</i>" (source: Wikipedia: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_wave#Consciousness_and_dreaming" rel="nofollow">Delta wave</a>)Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-91393396489077305752013-11-02T21:33:06.636-04:002013-11-02T21:33:06.636-04:00> >If the simulation incorporated all of thi...> >If the simulation incorporated all of this, then, sure, some kind of (virtual?) consciousness may be involved.<<br /><br />If so, what would be the difference between virtual consciousness and real consciousness? Would it feel qualitatively the same or could you tell the difference?<<br /><br />These are not questions I could even begin to address. I tried to make it clear that I am not convinced that any sufficiently sophisticated and extensive simulation – one capable of generating conscious experiences – is even possible (or whether, if it were, it would still be a 'simulation' in any significant sense of that word).Mark Englishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506844097173520312noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-19019570499921842202013-11-02T09:16:08.369-04:002013-11-02T09:16:08.369-04:00Hi Alastair,
>I understand your position. I do...Hi Alastair,<br /><br />>I understand your position. I don't agree with it.<<br /><br />Of course. But if you understand my position then you should understand why I don't think it is sensible to talk about the simplest possible form of consciousness, and why I prefer to discuss human consciousness.<br /><br />>The only explanation for a truly random event is consciousness. <<br /><br />Not having a deterministic explanation does not mean it is explained with consciousness. I can't see how you could make that imaginative leap.<br /><br />>the "two-stage model of free will" explains how indeterminism plays a part in freedom.<<br /><br />It's a good answer to my criticism of quantum free but I don't think it quite works. Anyway, I don't believe in free will so I'm not going to persuaded that randomness is necessary to account for free will.<br /><br />>Randomness is necessary for creativity.<<br /><br />I disagree. I built a computer system that composed music for my final year project in computer science. The results were often surprising and beautiful. All driven by pseudorandom numbers.<br /><br />>Penrose furnishes you with another argument against your thesis.<<br /><br />I don't think Penrose's argument works. I tackle it on my blog.<br /><br /><a href="http://disagreeableme.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/strong-ai-godel-problem.html" rel="nofollow">Strong AI: The Gödel Problem</a><br /><br />>Linking a random number function to a quantum event will not make a classical digital computer experience consciousness. <<br /><br />Agreed, but if you did that then your argument would no longer be relevant. A classical computer would be capable of doing everything a quantum computer can do.<br /><br />>Every interpretation of quantum mechanics involves consiousness.<<br /><br />Simply untrue.<br /><br />http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretations_of_quantum_mechanics#Comparison_of_interpretations<br /><br />>What constitutes an observation? When does the world split?<<br /><br />Any physical interaction constitutes an observation. The timing of splitting depends on your frame of reference.<br /><br />>Many minds interpretation<<br /><br />This sounds like a variant of my own view. However I reject that it has anything to do with consciousness. Any physical interaction with a particle in superposition constitutes an observation. No conscious observer required. The world splits from the point of view of the physical interaction. Please understand that I mean point of view in a sense that assumes no consciousness. I mean it in a sense similar to how reference frame is used in classical physics.<br /><br />Sometimes these physical interactions will take place in unconscious detector devices. Sometimes they will take place on the retinas of conscious scientists. Consciousness has nothing to do with it.<br /><br />From the point of view of Schrodinger's cat, the universe splits as soon as the cat interacts with the results of the release of poisonous gas. From the point of view of the scientist outside the box, the universe splits when he opens the box. But I could replace the cat with a detector and the scientist with a robot and the same would apply.<br /><br />>The experience of pure consciousness is a mystical state known as "turiya." Anyone who routinely meditates should understand what I am referring to.<<br /><br />Fair enough. I can claim no such experience. However I remain skeptical that it constitutes pure awareness with an absence of any information processing whatsoever.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-65388545574393237592013-11-02T06:25:00.631-04:002013-11-02T06:25:00.631-04:00"The main argument against the CTM is that br..."The main argument against the CTM is that brain functions are substrate-dependent."<br /><br />I define computation as being substrate-dependent. If one does define computation as being substrate-independent (which I think is very strange*), then one is setting up CTM to fail.<br /><br />* I would call this "substrate-independent" concept "Platonism".Philip Thrifthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03021615111948806998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-26712125537985884862013-11-02T00:03:08.662-04:002013-11-02T00:03:08.662-04:00@ Disagreeable Me
> Do you understand mine? &l...@ Disagreeable Me<br /><br />> Do you understand mine? <<br /><br />I understand your position. I don't agree with it. <br /><br />> That's actually a very good point. If you could demonstrate that true randomness is actually very useful for computation, you might even persuade me. I think for most purposes pseudorandomness is adequate. If something is indistinguishable from randomness I can't see any benefit from having it truly random. <br /><br />That's actually a very good point. If you could demonstrate that true randomness is actually very useful for computation, you might even persuade me. I think for most purposes pseudorandomness is adequate. If something is indistinguishable from randomness I can't see any benefit from having it truly random.<br /><br />I don't see randomness as being particularly helpful in the free will debate. <<br /><br />You're missing the point. The only explanation for a truly random event is consciousness. (It doesn't have any physical cause by definition.)<br /><br />Also, the "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-stage_model_of_free_will" rel="nofollow">two-stage model of free will</a>" explains how indeterminism plays a part in freedom. It incorporates the same basic principles as Darwinian evolution - <i>random variation</i> and <i>natural selection</i>, And the significance is not in the moral realm, but in the creative process. (Randomness is necessary for creativity.)<br /><br />> Roger Penrose thinks that quantum mechanics might grant us abilities beyond classical computation, but in my understanding this can only be true if quantum events are not truly random. <<br /><br />Penrose furnishes you with another argument against your thesis.<br /><br />"<i>The Penrose-Lucas argument states that, because humans are capable of knowing the truth of Gödel-unprovable statements, human thought is necessarily non-computable.[15]</i>" (source: Wikipedia: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orch-OR" rel="nofollow">Orchestrated objective reduction</a>)<br /><br />> But in any case it's pretty easy to add randomness to a classical computer if you really want to <<br /><br />Linking a random number function to a quantum event will not make a classical digital computer experience consciousness. <br /><br />> The collapse of the wave function has nothing to do with consciousness. I'll grant you that it certainly seemed that way to the pioneers of QM, but this view is now very much in the minority. There are many interpretations of QM now where consciousness plays no role, such as the many worlds interpretation. <<br /><br />"<i>Every interpretation of quantum mechanics involves consiousness.</i>" - Euan Squires<br /><br />"<i>There is an unresolved problem with many-worlds: What constitutes an observation? When does the world split?</i>" pg. 162, "The Quantum Enigma" by Bruce Rosenblum and Fred Kuttner) <br /><br />"<i>The many-minds interpretation of quantum mechanics extends the many-worlds interpretation by proposing that the distinction between worlds should be made at the level of the mind of an individual observer</i>". (source: Wikipedia: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many_minds_interpretation" rel="nofollow">Many-minds interpretation</a>)<br /><br />> I remain nonplussed about what "pure awareness" might mean. Awareness in the absence of thought, memory or perception doesn't make sense in my book. <<br /><br />The experience of pure consciousness is a mystical state known as "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turiya" rel="nofollow">turiya</a>." Anyone who routinely meditates should understand what I am referring to. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-11084709096255341562013-11-01T19:33:07.804-04:002013-11-01T19:33:07.804-04:00Hi Filippo,
It's really great to see it laid ...Hi Filippo,<br /><br />It's really great to see it laid out like that. I feel like I have a much better understanding of where you're coming from.<br /><br />I think you have identified a very fruitful point for further discussion - whether approximate simulations are enough. I obviously think they are, and I will try to explain why.<br /><br />Biological systems are messy and imprecise. Brains are subject to vibrations, temperature fluctuations, magnetic fields, effects of chaos in molecular interactions, quantum fluctuations, etc. There is no conceivable way that infinite precision could possibly be necessary for consciousness because there is no way to realise infinite precision in a physical system, especially in an analog system.<br /><br />Since infinite precision cannot be required, and since digital computation can offer us any degree of precision we like, digital computation must be able to approximate the workings of a brain closely enough that the same qualitative behaviours and phenomena will be observed.<br /><br />>differently from the errors in the digital simulation, obey the laws of physics<<br /><br />The problem with digital computation is one of precision, not of errors. Sure, programs can have errors or bugs. Any simulation of a brain which did not obey the laws of physics would be a bug. Let's assume our simulation is bug-free. If we're bug-free, I see no reason to doubt that approximations can be just as faithful to the laws of physics as physical systems, especially when we take quantum mechanics into account.<br /><br />For example, I don't think it is true to say that physical systems strictly conserve energy. They do over long periods and over large volumes, but this is statistical. On tiny scales they cannot conserve energy due to Heisenberg. Even without quantum mechanics, it's theoretically possible though statistically improbable that all the air molecules in a room could happen to converge on one corner, reducing entropy and so effectively producing energy.<br /><br />At tiny scales, energy does fluctuate. As long as our digital system approximates the physical system to within those kinds of scales, then the digital system can obey the laws of physics just as well as a physical system. These tiny imprecisions of approximation at quantum scales will even out at larger scales in much the same way as physical energy fluctuations, as long as we're bug-free.<br /><br />Even if this were not the case, it remains an unsupported hypothesis that consciousness depends crucially on absolutely faithful following of the laws of physics. I really don't see any reason to believe this is so, although I suppose it could be. If digital computations are enough to predict and reproduce diverse physical phenomena such as air turbulence, structural integrity, protein folding etc, then what is your reason for thinking intelligence and consciousness must be different?<br /><br />My own intuition is that it is likely to be possible to produce consciousness by simulating at far coarser levels of detail than quantum scales. I would even suspect that we might get away with modelling neurons directly rather than modelling the molecules that make them up. I could certainly be wrong. I think the only sensible position regarding the level of detail or precision required is agnosticism.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-25620586194349471222013-11-01T18:42:24.748-04:002013-11-01T18:42:24.748-04:00A summary of my position:
The main argument again...A summary of my position:<br /><br />The main argument against the CTM is that brain functions are substrate-dependent.<br /><br />The main counter-argument to substrate-dependence is that one can always simulate any physical system on a digital computer, so that the substrate is irrelevant.<br /><br />The simulation argument, however, fails for both quantum and classical physical systems because the simulation cannot be exact. The reason is that digital computers cannot do real arithmetic exactly and they require slicing time into discrete steps.<br /><br />The answer that approximate simulations are enough, is an assertion that the detailed behavior of the substrate does not matter. Because the simulation argument is designed to prove substrate-independence, allowing approximate simulations makes the simulation argument circular. It is not a logically or mathematically valid argument.<br /><br />There are more sophisticated arguments against approximate simulations. Approximate simulations of physical systems are problematic because they introduce violations of the laws of physics. It is true that there are errors and perturbations in the real system. But these errors and perturbations, differently from the errors in the digital simulation, obey the laws of physics. For instance, they strictly conserve energy, while the errors in a digital simulation do not.<br /><br />In conclusion, the simulation argument is invalid on logical and physical grounds. Substrate-dependence is not refuted, and remains a logical possibility.<br />Filippo Nerihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01910861498359320434noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-90858582804278753502013-11-01T15:43:30.194-04:002013-11-01T15:43:30.194-04:00Hi Seth_blog,
He does answer one of these questio...Hi Seth_blog,<br /><br />He does answer one of these questions, although if you really want to understand where he's coming from it may be best to read the papers I linked to above.<br /><br />"why 'conscious (analog) intelligence is easier for evolution'"<br /><br />Firstly, his main motivation is that he has developed a reasonably plausible account of how semantics (and thus qualia and consciousness) could arise in an analog computer.<br /><br />He then argues that the brain is such an analog computer. I'm not sure I totally buy this, but I'm willing to consider it.<br /><br />Finally, he assumes that given the messy, imprecise nature of biological components, it is simply easier for nature to evolve brains than silicon chips (as in legs versus wheels). Brains happen to be conducive to consciousness because they are analog while silicon chips are digital and so unconscious.<br /><br />"why the 'conscious' part is not crucial for the referred to intelligent behaviors to manifest"<br /><br />He has no argument that I've seen to support the hypothesis that p-zombies can exist. It's more of a suspicion of his than something he claims to have shown. I think it's because he acknowledges that it ought to be possible for a digital computer to do whatever an analog computer to do, but since his account of semantics doesn't apply to digital computers he feels digital computers must be unconscious.<br /><br />Does that clarify things?Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-16466704997858864102013-11-01T15:41:25.565-04:002013-11-01T15:41:25.565-04:00A film about two scientists trying to make a consc...A film about two scientists trying to make a conscious robot, just released for free for the public. Entertaining, at least.<br /><br /><a href="http://singularityorbust.com/" rel="nofollow">Singularity or Bust: the film</a><br /><br />"In 2009, film-maker and former AI programmer Raj Dye spent his summer following futurist AI researchers Ben Goertzel and Hugo DeGaris around Hong Kong and Xiamen, documenting their doings and gathering their perspectives. The result, after some work by crack film editor Alex MacKenzie, was the 45 minute documentary Singularity or Bust — a uniquely edgy, experimental Singularitarian road movie, featuring perhaps the most philosophical three-foot-tall humanoid robot ever, a glance at the fast-growing Chinese research scene in the late aughts, and even a bit of a real-life love story. The film was screened in theaters around the world, and won the Best Documentary award at the 2013 LA Cinema Festival of Hollywood and the LA Lift Off Festival. And now it is online, free of charge, for your delectation."Philip Thrifthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03021615111948806998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-34027283726640670482013-11-01T13:58:21.103-04:002013-11-01T13:58:21.103-04:00Disagreeable,
Thanks for the clarification - I st...Disagreeable,<br /><br />Thanks for the clarification - I still don't think he is answering why 'conscious (analog) intelligence is easier for evolution' or why the 'conscious' part is not crucial for the referred to intelligent behaviors to manifest.Seth_bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14562316879162720028noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-50388249946953831162013-11-01T13:26:35.163-04:002013-11-01T13:26:35.163-04:00Hi Alastair,
>You're talking only about a ...Hi Alastair,<br /><br />>You're talking only about a difference in degree, not in definition. <<br /><br />It depends on what kind of property "conscious" is. If it's like "big", then I'm right. If it's like "energy", then you are right. If it's like "heap", then I am right. If it's like "sand", then you are right.<br /><br />I think it's a relative term. You think it's an absolute term. I think I understand your position. Do you understand mine? Can you see, from my position, why I might not think it makes much sense to talk about the most basic element of consciousness?<br /><br />>A quantum computer can randomly 'choose' between "heads" or "tails."< <br /><br />That's actually a very good point. If you could demonstrate that true randomness is actually very useful for computation, you might even persuade me. I think for most purposes pseudorandomness is adequate. If something is indistinguishable from randomness I can't see any benefit from having it truly random.<br /><br />I don't see randomness as being particularly helpful in the free will debate. If what you do is determined by random chance, I don't think that constitutes making a choice in any meaningful sense. You have no more control over the way the quantum dice roles than you do over the other laws of physics that determine your behaviour.<br /><br />Roger Penrose thinks that quantum mechanics might grant us abilities beyond classical computation, but in my understanding this can only be true if quantum events are not truly random. There would have to be some underlying uncomputable order there for the brain to exploit, because true randomness is not really that useful.<br /><br />But in any case it's pretty easy to add randomness to a classical computer if you really want to. You just need to plug in a device that can generate random numbers from quantum noise into a usb port. Such devices already exist. If they prove to be necessary for consciousness I would be surprised, but this is not a serious engineering problem. In fact it is trivial.<br /><br />The collapse of the wave function has nothing to do with consciousness. I'll grant you that it certainly seemed that way to the pioneers of QM, but this view is now very much in the minority. There are many interpretations of QM now where consciousness plays no role, such as the many worlds interpretation.<br /><br />>It is not possible to engage in an intelligent debate with an individual who does not understand whether s/he is presently experiencing awareness.<<br /><br />Ok, I'm experiencing awareness. I remain nonplussed about what "pure awareness" might mean. Awareness in the absence of thought, memory or perception doesn't make sense in my book.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-69770389129951864292013-11-01T13:04:20.428-04:002013-11-01T13:04:20.428-04:00@ Disagreeable Me
> Because I don't think ...@ Disagreeable Me<br /><br />> Because I don't think there is a simplest experience. I think experience arises and develops gradually over evolutionary time.<<br /><br />You're talking only about a difference in degree, not in definition. <br /><br />> One grain of sand might have some primordial element of heapishness but I wouldn't describe it as a heap. <<br /><br />Whether you're talking about a grain of sand or a pile of sand you;re still talking about sand. To reiterate: You're talking only about a difference in degree, not in definition. <br /><br />> What I mean is there is no function a quantum computer can compute that a classical computer cannot. <<br /><br />A quantum computer can <i>randomly</i> 'choose' between "heads" or "tails." A classical digital computer cannot. IOW, a quantum computer can <i>truly</i> perform a random function; a classical digital computer cannot. <br /><br />By the way, the only possible function that consciousness can exhibit is the exercise of free will. And the only place in science where consciousness may have to be invoked in order to explain observed phenomena is in the "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mind%E2%80%93body_problem#.22Consciousness_causes_collapse.22" rel="nofollow">collapse of the wave function</a>." <br /><br />> Why? Anyway, I thought you said that even fundamental physical particles had awareness in panexperientialism. They're not alive, are they?. <<br /><br />"<i>Biology is the study of larger organisms, whereas physics is the study of smaller organisms</i>." - Alfred North Whitehead<br /><br />> I don't see it that way. I don't think sentience is binary, I think it's a matter of degree. <<br /><br />If it is a matter degree, then you are describing a difference in degree and not in definition. <br /><br />Your objection is tantamount to the following argument: "A small amount of energy does not really qualify as energy because it isn't large enough. Moreover, the "amount of energy" that qualifies energy as energy is completely arbitrary."<br /><br />> I'm not sure that I do. And I'm not sure that you do either. <<br /><br />I understand what "awareness" means. And if you do not, then there is not point to continue this debate because it would prove to be nothing more than an exercise in futility. (It is not possible to engage in an intelligent debate with an individual who does not understand whether s/he is presently experiencing awareness.) <br /><br /> Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-83197319167979350582013-11-01T13:03:20.237-04:002013-11-01T13:03:20.237-04:00Hi Seth_blog
>If a p zombie is coherent why di...Hi Seth_blog<br /><br />>If a p zombie is coherent why didn't any evolve?<<br /><br />This is my view and precisely why I asked him the question, because he does believe that p-zombies are possible and that consciousness plays no causal role.<br /><br />And his answer is pretty good for a position I am inclined to reject. He's saying that it was easier for nature to evolve conscious intelligence than unconscious intelligence, because conscious (analog) intelligence is easier for evolution than simulated (digital) intelligence.<br /><br />A good analogy might be wheels rather than legs. Engineers find wheels much easier to design and build than legs, but evolution found the reverse. Our digital computers are like wheels - easy for us to design and build but effectively impossible for nature to evolve.<br /><br />But don't take this as my agreeing with him. I do of course believe that digital intelligences would also be conscious.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-20476634235794459082013-11-01T12:54:35.432-04:002013-11-01T12:54:35.432-04:00'I think his views are interesting and do make...'I think his views are interesting and do make a though-provoking case for the natural semantics (and thus consciousness) of analog computers and how we might have evolved consciousness by accident.'<br /><br />If O'Brien indicated that evolution selected for intelligent behavior specifically (not for conscious), that is not at all the same as saying consciousness evolved by accident. It suggests to me the alternative interpretation that consciousness was the best way to achieve certain intelligent behaviors to maintain stability (fitness) in changing environments. If we frame consciousness as an accidental side effect then we can claim it has no causal role so I think the framing is important.<br /><br />It seems to me that living conscious agents display unique intelligent behaviors that would not occur without the consciousness. If a p zombie is coherent why didn't any evolve? I think because consciousness has a causal role in the process of producing certain types of intelligent behaviors.<br />Seth_bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14562316879162720028noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-32546408444793253342013-11-01T10:07:23.071-04:002013-11-01T10:07:23.071-04:00Hi Mark,
>If the simulation incorporated all o...Hi Mark,<br /><br />>If the simulation incorporated all of this, then, sure, some kind of (virtual?) consciousness may be involved.<<br /><br />If so, what would be the difference between virtual consciousness and real consciousness? Would it feel qualitatively the same or could you tell the difference?<br /><br />>If it's not practically possible, in what meaningful sense is it possible?<<br /><br />How about an analogy? Humans travelling at the speed of light or faster is fundamentally impossible. Humans travelling at 99.999999999999999% the speed of light is fundamentally possible, but in all likelihood practically impossible. This seems to me to be precisely analogous to how I view the AI problem.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-54657355006584211332013-11-01T10:02:23.437-04:002013-11-01T10:02:23.437-04:00Hi Alastair
>If this is precisely what you bel...Hi Alastair<br /><br />>If this is precisely what you believe, then why don't you ponder what the requirements would be to achieve the simplest experience rather than the most complex.<<br /><br />Because I don't think there is a simplest experience. I think experience arises and develops gradually over evolutionary time. Asking for the simplest experience seems to me like asking for the smallest possible big thing, or the smallest number of grains of sand that constitutes a heap. One grain of sand might have some primordial element of heapishness but I wouldn't describe it as a heap.<br /><br />>A quantum computer can process a qubit; a classical digital computer cannot.<<br /><br />That's an implementation detail, not an information processing task, like saying that my computer can process 64 bits at a time while my previous computer could only process 32 at a time. Even so, there is no task that my current computer can do that my old computer could not do, given enough time and memory. What I mean is there is no function a quantum computer can compute that a classical computer cannot.<br /><br />Same goes for superposition and entanglement. These are implementation details, not information processing tasks.<br /><br />>This evidence undermines the main argument against quantum mind theories - that quantum states in biological systems "would decohere before they reached a spatial or temporal scale."<<br /><br />That may be a common argument, but it is not mine (except perhaps with respect to Penrose's position, but that's another story). I'm open to the idea that the brain might exploit QM. I also maintain that a classical computer can do whatever a quantum computer can do.<br /><br />>Because I believe life and sentience are inexorably-linked.<<br /><br />Why? Anyway, I thought you said that even fundamental physical particles had awareness in panexperientialism. They're not alive, are they?<br /><br />>Either something is undergoing an experience or it is not. <<br /><br />I don't see it that way. I don't think sentience is binary, I think it's a matter of degree. What you have said seems to me to be akin to "either something is big or it is not".<br /><br />>You do not understand what "awareness" means?<<br /><br />I'm not sure that I do. And I'm not sure that you do either. Certainly not the concept of pure awareness, devoid of any thought process.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-83215315696359510022013-11-01T08:36:07.873-04:002013-11-01T08:36:07.873-04:00Here are two possibilities:
(A) Build a super-mas...Here are two possibilities:<br /><br />(A) Build a super-massively parallel computer with standard digital CPUs and programming that simulates consciousness in a simulated brain. It would be in effect a "conscious" game-world character in a game. (Good luck cooling this computer, and it may be difficult to achieve the right speed.)<br /><br />(B) Using emerging hardware chip designs, e.g., neuromorphic, probabilistic (analog), biomolecular, maybe even quantum, and accompanying programming technologies, build a conscious robot computer brain. The robot would move and learn in our world, not the game world of (A).<br /><br />So it's a matter of opinion if either (A) or (B) demonstrates consciousness. <br />Philip Thrifthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03021615111948806998noreply@blogger.com