tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post1690034449560414793..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Objective moral truth? Thoughts on Carrier’s take — Part IUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger65125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-57914410426835377022013-11-12T10:35:47.828-05:002013-11-12T10:35:47.828-05:00Hi James,
>Rationality is the root cause for m...Hi James,<br /><br />>Rationality is the root cause for morality.<<br /><br />I don't think I agree with this. I think it's possible to be perfectly rational while being entirely immoral. Do you disagree?Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-4597681371248246632013-11-11T17:02:16.036-05:002013-11-11T17:02:16.036-05:00I think Massimo Pigliucci definition of ethic is c...I think Massimo Pigliucci definition of ethic is closely related to my interpretation of philosophy. <br /><br />Rationality is the root cause for morality. One need not be a religious person or brought up with educated parents to have good morals. Our behaviors are the outcome of social relativism. Our actions are not always the outcome of our rational decisions, we sometimes act to fit in. But we use our rationality to draw a logical conclusion to evaluate what we deem possible and reasonable. <br /><br />He said " I think ethics is an exercise in applied rationality, specifically it is the activity that uses logic and general argumentation to explore the consequences of our actions toward each other in an attempt to provide us with guidance on the many occasions in which our values or intentions clash." <br /><br />Philosophy: <br /><br />Philosophy is the process of attaching reason to a proven logic for the purpose of delivering a message that is grounded in truthfulness or imply a supposition that is probable. In that sense, if the logic cannot be proven true, the message, no matter how attractive it may be is Not philosophy. <br /><br />Therefore, philosophy is time sensitive because ideas are influenced by events elevated by causation due to a change in time. In that sense, I conclude that philosophy is our time comprehended in thoughts when the proposed reason for the argument obeys the laws of logic. James Dubrezehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06543900405187156984noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-92215791813223898142013-10-31T09:52:38.573-04:002013-10-31T09:52:38.573-04:00I didn’t know we had to be so formal, but anyway.....I didn’t know we had to be so formal, but anyway...<br /><br />@Alastair F. Paisley<br /><br />The decision-making capabilities are the product of a physical brain, and brains operate causally. It isn’t separated from the physical web. No brain = no decision making (and no consciousness or mind more generally). Which sits fine with a physicalist account. No contradiction.David Spanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08526621326232623478noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-51731449044041585722013-10-29T09:49:52.828-04:002013-10-29T09:49:52.828-04:00@ David Span
> Why would an autonomous decisio...@ David Span<br /><br />> Why would an autonomous decision-making capacity of a human brain be seen as causa sui? <<br /><br />The term "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causa_sui" rel="nofollow">causa sui</a>" means "<i>something which is generated within itself</i>." So, if you believe that your <i>will</i> (decision-making capacity) is <a href="http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomous" rel="nofollow"><i>autonomous</i></a> (that it has the capacity to respond or react independently of the whole - the whole physically-determined causal web), then you believe it is something which is generated within yourself. (Massimo apparently subscribes in "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism#Non-reductive_Physicalism" rel="nofollow">non-reductive physicalism</a>" - which is inherently self-contradictory.) Alastair F. Paisleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15732723685886383829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-11672062539358403432013-10-29T01:07:49.474-04:002013-10-29T01:07:49.474-04:00@ brainoil,
Congrats, these are really brilliant ...@ brainoil,<br /><br />Congrats, these are really brilliant arguments. It will take me some time to adequately digest them.<br />Filippo Nerihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01910861498359320434noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-45949451082865298382013-10-28T23:34:42.429-04:002013-10-28T23:34:42.429-04:00Alastair
Why would an autonomous decision-making ...Alastair<br /><br />Why would an autonomous decision-making capacity of a human brain be seen as causa sui? The human brain and its capabilities have evolved, and the brain has a power supply. The capabilities are grounded in a physical structure – they do not appear sans that structure. Nor do they appear sans the power supply.<br /><br />To say that it ‘causes itself’ is quite naive.David Spanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08526621326232623478noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-17388139846916278782013-10-27T20:45:14.169-04:002013-10-27T20:45:14.169-04:00@ Filippo Neri
> Note that Kane does not say t...@ Filippo Neri<br /><br />> Note that Kane does not say that the "temporary violations of conservation of energy" are measurable. <<br /><br />No, Kane doesn't say that they are measurable. But that doesn't negate the fact he did say that "<b>Quantum mechanics ALLOWS, and indeed REQUIRES, TEMPORARY VIOLATIONS OF CONSERVATION OF ENERGY</b>,"Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-42220288010102249252013-10-27T17:37:24.127-04:002013-10-27T17:37:24.127-04:00The premises addressed above are Carrier's ref...The premises addressed above are Carrier's reformulation of Harris' argument. About them he wrote "But exactly what those premises assert is unclear in Harris’s hands (even as I have reworded them)." I suppose you could argue that Carrier is putting across his own views under Harris' more famous name. I suppose that is kind of obnoxious when you think of it, and therefore Carrier has indeed been refuted.S Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11610068751705809284noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-46197418426083372992013-10-27T15:07:29.964-04:002013-10-27T15:07:29.964-04:00Great article Massimo. And thanks for clearing up ...Great article Massimo. And thanks for clearing up what you meant about mathematical truths and how they need to be "understood" by thinking agents, despite being objective and mind-independent (which we Platonists take for granted). It's unfortunate that we can never really come up with a view on moral correctness that we can consider the objectively correct one, but I still hope that, in the same sense one can construct an objective prior in Bayesian statistics, we might be able to guide ourselves through rational inquiry and scientific data to the best possible moral edifice. You know I'm an advocate of a utilitarian framework myself, but I am very open to incorporating value ethics and other ways of thinking into the framework as well. petehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12969621709127674152noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-40044753689794889102013-10-27T14:56:37.363-04:002013-10-27T14:56:37.363-04:00I have a PhD in physics (NYU) and this issue is co...I have a PhD in physics (NYU) and this issue is covered in most elementary textbooks on QM under the heading "energy-time uncertainty principle." You are using an out-of-context citation from a SA article. Note that Kane does not say that the "temporary violations of conservation of energy" are measurable.<br /><br />Besides, this issue does not affect the first two laws of thermodynamics: the fluctuations average-out in the thermodynamic limit. In this sense, the first two laws are valid in all relativistic quantum field theories and even in most theories of quantum gravity, like string theory (because of the AdS/CFT correspondence.)<br />Filippo Nerihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01910861498359320434noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-25058458883234823802013-10-27T14:40:24.357-04:002013-10-27T14:40:24.357-04:00@ Massimo
> Moreover — and this is a point tha...@ Massimo<br /><br />> Moreover — and this is a point that provides me with constant amusement — if one really thinks that human actions are rigidly determined from the conditions that obtained at the Big Bang (which, unless I seriously misread him, is what Carrier is implying) then there is no coherent sense in which it is worth having any discussion at all about what is right or wrong: we will do whatever we are destined to do (I guess including the writing of pretentious philosophical posts and sarcastic responses!) and that’s the end of the matter. That, of course, is why I prefer to entirely sidestep the so-called free will debate and assume that human beings have a capacity of volition — we can make autonomous (which of course doesn’t mean a-causal) decisions. Otherwise, any talk of morality is empty gibberish. <<br /><br />What I find amusing is your oxymoronic belief in some kind of "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism#Non-reductive_Physicalism" rel="nofollow">nonphysical physicalism</a>." Your above post clearly suggests that you do not believe in physical determinism. It also suggests that you believe you have some kind of "autonomous" decision-making capacity - a capacity that is apparently <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causa_sui" rel="nofollow">causa sui</a>. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-78623644056383309242013-10-27T12:23:03.322-04:002013-10-27T12:23:03.322-04:00@Filippo,
>I am sympathetic with attempts to f...@Filippo,<br /><br />>I am sympathetic with attempts to formulate a realist, objective (in the sense of independent from people's opinions) version of ethics. <br /><br />That project, if I had to bet, is bound to fail. Besides, when people say they wish for such ethics, they imagine that that version of ethics would be close to their own. But that's not necessarily the case. But it's clear to me that no argument could ever convince me that killing innocent people for fun is right. If your objective version of ethics ends up telling killing innocent people for fun is right, I'd just reject it. I bet the people who want to subjugate women would feel the same way too if the objective version of ethics ended up saying subjugating women is bad. Both me and the guy who wants to subjugate women will happily choose to be morally wrong. It's that old problem with god given morality all over again.<br /><br />Frankly though, all this talk is irrelevant in real life because we all act as if we were moral realists.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-86496409654760261602013-10-27T12:11:38.680-04:002013-10-27T12:11:38.680-04:00Premise 2: There is a host of science research (so...Premise 2: There is a host of science research (social and biological) that suggests large groups of non-human kin could not have been formed if that had been the operating principle of members of the earliest human groups. And a rational calculus might override the interests of any individual. It might be objectively improve the quality of life and reproductive success of my relatives and long-term group continuity if I (let's say I am Emperor Atarxus the Loony Cannibal Pyromaniac) cease to exist right away.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12835949771894768931noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-27878120757582648332013-10-27T12:06:48.576-04:002013-10-27T12:06:48.576-04:00@ Filippo Neri
> I will try to answer for the ...@ Filippo Neri<br /><br />> I will try to answer for the last time. According to QM, it takes time to measure energy accurately. The “violations” of energy conservation are not observable because of this. <<br /><br />I will remind you that I cited a physicist to support my claim. <br /><br />"<i>Quantum mechanics <b>ALLOWS</b>, and indeed <b>REQUIRES</b>, <b>TEMPORARY VIOLATIONS OF CONSERVATION OF ENERGY</b>, so one particle can become a pair of heavier particles (the so-called virtual particles), which quickly rejoin into the original particle as if they had never been there</i>." (source: "<a href="http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=are-virtual-particles-rea" rel="nofollow">Are virtual particles really constantly popping in and out of existence</a>?" by Gordon Kane, October 9, 2006 edition of "Scientific American")Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-75555900821035403802013-10-27T09:35:16.393-04:002013-10-27T09:35:16.393-04:00Hi Filippo,
I'm actually reading Sense and Go...Hi Filippo,<br /><br />I'm actually reading Sense and Goodness Without God right now myself. I'm making very slow progress, because it isn't exactly a page turner, and often go for days without reading any of it, but I'll get through it. I'd be interested in discussing his moral ideas with you some time after we both finish it. Unfortunately, I understand from Carrier himself that his moral framework is only fully developed in The End of Christianity.<br /><br />So far, SaGwG is very methodical and clearly trying to be robust, however I find there are many points where I think he is wrong. I don't find his thoughts on cosmology particularly convincing. I also think he is underestimating and oversimplifying the problems facing AI, and too rooted in physicalism (as opposed to say, mathematical Platonism). I haven't got to chapters on morality yet, but I think I already understand his views from engaging with him online.<br /><br />Personally, I am not a moral realist, however I understand your sympathy with attempts to formulate a realist objective ethics. It would be very interesting if such a thing is possible, and a great discovery for mankind. However, I really think that such endeavours are doomed to failure, and just because it would be great if it were possible doesn't mean that it is.<br /><br />I do think that moral intuitions are pretty much on the same footing as aesthetic preferences, but that doesn't mean that we cannot hold and promote our own views with conviction, so moral and societal collapse doesn't have to follow from moral anti-realism.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-77918809343265200902013-10-27T09:14:56.426-04:002013-10-27T09:14:56.426-04:00Hi Korey,
Yes, all axioms are valid no matter wha...Hi Korey,<br /><br />Yes, all axioms are valid no matter what world we are in. However, some axioms will be more useful for describing that particular world. Axioms which actually describe the world perfectly essentially constitute the laws of physics for that world.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-26575803816837537072013-10-27T01:33:49.007-04:002013-10-27T01:33:49.007-04:00I will be interested to see your take on Foot. I w...I will be interested to see your take on Foot. I was recently fortunate to have taken a graduate seminar taught by a virtue ethicist close to Foot, in which we read Natural Goodness. The originality and depth of her thoughts continue to amaze me, and (I think) it can only be a good thing that Carrier recognizes that.<br /><br />I wasn't sure at first whether I agreed with his point about her position in NG being one of a system of hypothetical imperatives, but as I've thought about it more I can see that this is at least plausible; and Foot herself seems a bit on the fence (e.g., in Rationality and Goodness) about whether or not she really is committed to a virtue ethics. <br /><br />That she wants to ground her ethical position in facts about the natural world is not in question, I don't believe, but her way of going about this will be of no comfort to anyone in the vein of e.g. Harris or Shermer who is looking for support of an ethical position that is reducible to scientific facts. Her thoughts on what "natural" consists in (and rationality, for that matter) will be uncomfortable for that audience. <br /><br />(I don't know much about Carrier's thoughts nor where he wants to take his argument, so I'll reserve judgment on that matter.)Demonaxhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03645784209658799518noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-71773645686757743632013-10-27T00:38:33.212-04:002013-10-27T00:38:33.212-04:00@ brainoil, Massimo
>> I'd like a short...@ brainoil, Massimo<br /><br />>> I'd like a short answer from you to the following question. Killing innocent people is wrong. Why? <<br /><br />The answer depends on which ethical framework one adopts (e.g., deontological, utilitarian, virtue ethics, etc.). Since I am a virtue ethicist, I would say that killing innocent people is the mark of a badly flawed character, which in turn is likely the result of bad family and societal upbringing (or of a psychopathology).<<br /><br />This is a good question. The answer, however, is terrible. In fact, it is not an answer, but an attempt to change the subject from why killing innocent people is wrong to why some people do such evil things. At best, “virtue ethics” seems to assert that ethics is just a matter of good breeding, like etiquette: killing innocent people is a sign of poor upbringing, like using the wrong fork with dessert, only a little worst.<br /><br />I find the idea that ethics is simply a super etiquette strongly disturbing. Consequently, I am sympathetic with attempts to formulate a realist, objective (in the sense of independent from people's opinions) version of ethics. “Scientific ethic,” despite the obvious problems, at least tries to meet these objectivity requirements. As in the case of genital mutilation, I'd like to think that some things are wrong because they are wrong, independently from the rules of any particular society.<br /><br />I think that Carrier's ideas as expressed in the work “Sense and Goodness Without God” (I am presently reading it) deserve a fairer treatment that the one they receive in the present post. Nobody seems to have read Carrier's extended arguments.<br /><br />@ Alastair,<br /><br />>A temporary violation is still a violation. And if you seriously doubt that, then I suggest the next time you are pulled over by a traffic officer for a speeding violation that you use your above rationale and see how far that gets you.<<br /><br />I will try to answer for the last time. According to QM, it takes time to measure energy accurately. The “violations” of energy conservation are not observable because of this.<br />Filippo Nerihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01910861498359320434noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-79539477902686971542013-10-27T00:06:07.221-04:002013-10-27T00:06:07.221-04:00Hi, Massimo. Thanks for taking the time to post ab...Hi, Massimo. Thanks for taking the time to post about Carrier.<br /><br />I'm sympathetic both to the idea of "objective" moral truths and to the idea of hypothetical imperatives.<br /><br />The basic idea of objective moral truths is that being a complex system eligible for natural selection physically entails some set of values (survival being the most obvious one). My argument with Carrier is whether we can say with confidence that this set of values is both large and universal enough to do anything meaningful with. If science has to analyze each individual moral situation to come up with an answer, it's not going to be of much use.<br /><br />The benefit of hypothetical imperatives is that it provides a common way to express practical, aesthetic and moral propositions. This dislodges moral propositions from a pedestal that's been a hindrance (see Nagel's latest for a great example) and also helps make moral propositions more explicit. The question here is whether hypothetical imperatives aren't just side-stepping the meta-ethical question (i.e., how we decide what values we *ought* to hold).<br /><br />The maximizing of an individual's satisfaction thing is my biggest beef with Carrier. Beyond it's Randian-ness, and beyond the psychopath question (which I don't think he answered convincingly), I think there are real-world systems in which individual organisms are maximally satisfied by causing harm. Carrier argues that causing this sort of harm harms the entire system which makes the society worse, which comes back to reduce one's own satisfaction (he uses the example of a Mexican police officer deciding to take bribes and how that makes Mexico a supposedly low-satisfaction society). But I don't think this is true in practice. The fact that "defect-on-the-sucker" is the highest reward in the Prisoner's Dilemma is not arbitrary -- many real-life situations have this sort of payoff. If you're basing moral truth solely on your own satisfaction, thinking about how the world would be if everyone did the harmful things you do is irrelevant. If the consequences of your actions don't come back to harm you personally (If you're a Mexican cop living the high-satisfaction high-life off the bribes you receive) it doesn't matter how crappy society is for others.Asher Kayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04684052925980478870noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-30506330723668507342013-10-26T21:52:54.617-04:002013-10-26T21:52:54.617-04:00>But you, and others here, seem to equate physi...>But you, and others here, seem to equate physicalism with fundamental reductionism. That equation, as far as I’m concerned, is still very much open to questioning, and it certainly doesn’t follow from any empirically based scientific theory. <br /><br />Of course we do, and with good reason. You have questioned that, but whether that's correct or not is irrelevant here. The point is, given what we think is true (that actions of moral agents are rigidly determined by the conditions obtained at the Big Bang and the exception-less laws of physics), it still makes perfect sense to talk about right and wrong. You shouldn't find it amusing that determinists talk about right and wrong because given what they believe, it still makes sense to talk about right and wrong.<br /><br />>Do you not catch the oxymoronic meaning of that sentence?<br /><br />I think Disagreeable Me has clarified the determinist position here. When we say we decide, we mean something like, if (1 < x ){}.<br /><br />>mathematical truths cannot be perceived or understood other than by physical agents<br /><br />There's a huge difference between that statement and the statement you made earlier that "Mathematical objects and truths are physically dependent on the nature of any would-be mathematically thinking agent." There's even a bigger difference between that and saying "Morals and values are physically dependent on the nature of any would-be moral agent ". If you had physical-feature-X, and lived in another universe, you'd think "killing humans is right" and it'd be perfectly valid. But 1 + 1 would still be 2.<br /><br />Note here that nowhere I said that I'm a mathematical platonist. Nowhere I said that mathematical objects exist out there. <br /><br />>I tend to agree, but even that’s not settled at all (not if you are a moral realist in the same sense in which one can be a mathematical realist).<br /><br />Of course, if you are a moral realist, which brings us to,<br /><br />>The answer depends on which ethical framework one adopts (e.g., deontological, utilitarian, virtue ethics, etc.). Since I am a virtue ethicist,....<br /><br />I've read some of the other comments here and you are really confusing lot of people here, including myself. On one hand, you vehemently denounce postmodernists for being cultural and moral relativists and saying stuff like given our moral framework, killing Jews in gas chambers is wrong, but it might not be the case given another moral framework and no framework is more right or wrong than another. But then you go ahead say the exact same thing. <br /><br />So if it all depends on which framework you choose, why can't I develop a new, logically coherent framework that allows me to kill Jews, and kill Jews? Both you and the postmodernists would not want me to kill Jews, and both you and the postmodernists would say the exact same thing: "I know killing Jews is right according to your moral framework. But it's wrong according to mine. It's not that my framework is any more right than yours. But since it's the framework I have adopted, I'm going to have to lock you up to prevent genocide."<br /><br />Have I got that right, or would you say something the different to whatever it is that postmodernists say?<br /><br /> <br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-52139230705888351272013-10-26T18:59:26.631-04:002013-10-26T18:59:26.631-04:00I'm just baffled by his claim that most philos...I'm just baffled by his claim that most philosophers don't know or take notice of Philippa Foot. According to Kieran Healy's data, she's among the top cited philosophers of the past 20 years (and he wasn't even focusing on ethics journals).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-48020849266107675662013-10-26T16:04:06.626-04:002013-10-26T16:04:06.626-04:00@ Massimo
> No, it is possible in principle to...@ Massimo<br /><br />> No, it is possible in principle to demonstrate dualism on scientific grounds, so it is not a mystical notion by definition. <<br /><br />Interesting. <br /><br />Question: Is it possible to demonstrate physicalism (materialism) on scientific grounds? <br /><br />> Here we go again with your purposely obtuse understanding of what I write. The parallel with mathematics in this context is simply to show that one can think of other non-physical truths that do nonetheless require a physical brain to be understood. That, and only that, is the meaning of physical dependence in the quoted sentence. <<br /><br />Firstly, you might consider the very real possibility that my so-called misunderstanding was due to your failure to properly communicate. Secondly, if you do not believe in any objective moral standard or insight, then what is your basis to rationally argue for what is right or wrong. (You seem to tacitly presuppose some kind of objective basis every time you make a moral argument.)<br /><br />> Your own quote says “temporarily,” the balance *must* be re-established immediately. It changes nothing concerning my argument. <<br /><br />A temporary violation is still a violation. And if you seriously doubt that, then I suggest the next time you are pulled over by a traffic officer for a speeding violation that you use your above rationale and see how far that gets you. (By the way, these temporary violations are ALWAYS occurring everywhere in the universe. There are no exceptions.)<br /><br />> Not at all. First off, quantum mechanical theory is based on deterministic equations; <<br /><br />The indeterminism comes with the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wave_function_collapse" rel="nofollow">collapse of the wave function</a>.<br /><br />> second, there are perfectly deterministic *interpretations* of the theory itself. So, no, it’s an open question. <<br /><br />I cited the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen_interpretation" rel="nofollow">standard interpretation</a> (the one that is accepted by the majority of physicists). Which interpretations are you referring to?<br /><br />> I will keep ignoring your fixation with free will, since I have written plenty about it in the past, and it is just not productive to bring it up every darn time one talks about morality. <<br /><br />Translation: "<i>I can't articulate any kind of position on free will that doesn't presuppose some kind of dualism and/or final cause (teleology). Neither can I refute your argument that the moral implications are same, irrespective of whether <a href="http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/determinism" rel="nofollow">determinism</a> or <a href="http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indeterminism" rel="nofollow">indeterminism</a> holds true. Therefore, I will attempt to use this evasive ploy and hope that no one will notice</i>."Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07422653606947285608noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-18709054230092358332013-10-26T13:52:34.459-04:002013-10-26T13:52:34.459-04:00Disagreeable,
I think I understand what you are s...Disagreeable,<br /><br />I think I understand what you are saying. Would you say that all axioms are equally valid in every possible world?<br /><br />Massimo,<br /><br />That response seems fair. Just wanted to say I've really learned a lot from your blog, it's really helped me develop my thoughts on a lot of topics. And you chastising philosophically naive scientists and atheists is always fun :)Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04754623186861485220noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-60736961346385910002013-10-26T12:43:39.036-04:002013-10-26T12:43:39.036-04:00"
> What we decide to do might be ultimate..."<br />> What we decide to do might be ultimately predetermined <<br /><br />Do you not catch the oxymoronic meaning of that sentence?"<br /><br />It's not oxymoronic at all if you take a broader definition of decision than you seem to take. We can talk about a chess computer choosing a move. We can talk about an automatic trading algorithm deciding to sell some shares. When talking to free-will deniers, you should interpret them to be using these terms in this deterministic sense. There is no contradiction.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-21236229609505454722013-10-26T12:41:01.751-04:002013-10-26T12:41:01.751-04:00Hi Massimo,
"I disagree. If that’s all he me...Hi Massimo,<br /><br />"I disagree. If that’s all he means, then that is a trivial statement."<br /><br />I really think you're wrong here. Even if it is trivial, it is much less so than the interpretation you grant, which is that we need a brain to think about morality.<br /><br />What Carrier is saying is less trivial. Say we encounter aliens who eat their babies or reproduce through rape. Many moral realists would regard these aliens as immoral. Carrier would not. He would probably think that it makes more sense to assess the morality of those aliens in the context of their biology. This is not trivial and entirely reasonable to my mind.<br /><br />"Yes, he can state a personal preference for altruism, but it is not at all clear how it follows from what he actually writes."<br /><br />He's not merely stating a personal preference for altruism. It is his belief that for all humans happiness and fulfillment are only achievable through living good, moral lives with meaningful relationships and altruism. He's wrong, but this distinguishes him from Rand.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.com