tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post1172161891413067243..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: The zombification of philosophy (of mind)Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger39125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-81398741190870632572013-02-25T18:01:09.684-05:002013-02-25T18:01:09.684-05:00Todd,
yes, but there is a difference between havi...Todd,<br /><br />yes, but there is a difference between having "addressed" the issue and having given a plausible answer. I don't think Chalmers did. And I'm far from being the only philosopher who thinks so. (Note also that the paper in question was not published in a peer reviewed journal, but only in an edited collection of essays.)Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-44981280920568656822013-02-25T17:53:08.257-05:002013-02-25T17:53:08.257-05:00Chalmers himself addresses this in a paper (publis...Chalmers himself addresses this in a paper (published six years before this post) entitled 'Does Concievability Imply Possibility?' It's available for free on his website here, http://consc.net/papers/conceivability.htmlToddhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07001233939919645105noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-21849305612293112042012-09-24T09:34:39.358-04:002012-09-24T09:34:39.358-04:00I forgot to mention, the end result is that the tw...I forgot to mention, the end result is that the two statements I gave are inconsistent with one another.Self_Obscurityhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18424384587431764885noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-11377494890402988742012-09-24T08:52:33.274-04:002012-09-24T08:52:33.274-04:00I think that the idea for the zombie problem comes...I think that the idea for the zombie problem comes from Kripke's "Naming and Necessity," where he suggests that conceivabilitly tells us something. Here is how I interpret the zombie problem:<br /><br />Let's say that you have two statements:<br /><br />(1) Mental processes and consciousness are the same thing.<br />(2) I can imagine a zombie.<br /><br />Conceivability is a test to see if something is internally contradictory. I can conceive of a ball that accelerates without being acted upon, because it breaks the rules of the universe without being a contradiction itself. However, I cannot conceive of a cup that has water but not H2O, because that is internally contradictory (it can be formulated by the statement P & not P).<br />If mental processes are the same as consciousness, then the zombie having mental processes without consciousness should be formulated as P and not P, a contradiction, and therefore be difficult to conceive of like a cup with water but without H2O. Instead, I find zombies easy to imagine, like a ball that accelerates without being acted upon. Therefore, mental processes and consciousness are not the same thing.Self_Obscurityhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18424384587431764885noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-85349614522949582002011-06-26T00:17:37.866-04:002011-06-26T00:17:37.866-04:00I'm a phenomenological anthropologist and not ...I'm a phenomenological anthropologist and not a philosopher. But even reading this post and skimming Hanrahan's article makes me wonder how did David Chalmers ever get to become so famous with his flawed thinking?thibault halpernhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06706722311593453930noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-62493967746800367672011-06-26T00:00:04.459-04:002011-06-26T00:00:04.459-04:00What do you make of the philosopher, Ken Wilber? W...What do you make of the philosopher, Ken Wilber? Would love to read a blog post from you about his ideas, debunking them or supporting them or anything in between.thibault halpernhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06706722311593453930noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-61205696869131761712008-08-10T03:53:00.000-04:002008-08-10T03:53:00.000-04:00I'll sound like a panpsycic - but I think the...I'll sound like a panpsycic - but I think the question of why we have consciousness is arse backwards. the question is if there is a situation where more or less the same processes occur as in our mind, except outside of it, why is it that that process would NOT have a subjective experience?<BR/>the obvious answer is that there is no reason. and the conclusion is that subjective experiences are not unique to humans even if complex (and interesting) subjective experiences are.<BR/><BR/>I.e. that having the equations that are a thought and having a thought are completely inseparable. And to say that you could have the equations that are a thought without actually having that thought is like saying you could have an arm without having an arm. Completely inconceivable if you aren't confused.<BR/><BR/>> Feynman' two-slit experiment requires an observer to collapse the probability wave-function. Is that observer found in the retinal rod-rhodospin molecules of the retina?<BR/><BR/>BTW, you've made a empirical mistake it IS in the rods. the rods will collapse the wave function before it reaches the brain. That could be demonstrated experimentally.Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-47426029319997142682008-08-07T00:10:00.000-04:002008-08-07T00:10:00.000-04:00For me, the best thing out of this discussion is a...For me, the best thing out of this discussion is actually the Zombie Food Pyramid. I'll do my best to follow it, but won't promise anything. Not very disciplined when it comes to edible stuff, y'know.J. Marcelo Alveshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09967299561849915314noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-70663647049607850062008-08-04T12:51:00.000-04:002008-08-04T12:51:00.000-04:00Ivan wrote: "I am curious, why you believe in som...Ivan wrote: "I am curious, why you believe in something that has not a rational support."<BR/><BR/>It is nothing so blind as faith. Dualism feels true to me for the same reason that Zen Buddhism feels true: it matches up nicely with the scientific evidence in a way that rises above mere logic and rationality—without ever contradicting them—and is itself beautiful. Everywhere you look, the world is circles within circles, the same processes and patterns repeated again and again—a beauty and symetry that is found in the natural world and mirrored in mathematics and physics. Mathematicians talk about formulas that are elegant. Truth often has an aesthetic beauty you can recognize without understanding why. <BR/><BR/>Feynman' two-slit experiment requires an observer to collapse the probability wave-function. Is that observer found in the retinal rod-rhodospin molecules of the retina? No, it is in the mind of the observer. The consciousness. Why would this be? Point a dead man’s eyes at the double-slit experiment, and what will you get? <BR/><BR/>David wrote: And, of course, we know of no beliefs most of humanity has held that turned out to be false.....<BR/><BR/>David, I get the sarcasm and agree with you. Many of the beliefs humanity has held have turned out to be false. But the more universal something is, the more seriously, I think, it needs to be looked at. The question becomes, why does every culture believe this? Even that wouldn’t convince me though, I admit. It was the study of physics that finally made me believe. Quantum mechanics and Buddhism are like different translations of the same parent text. If there is a Truth with a capitol letter, there should be more than one path to reaching it. At least that's how I feel.Kosmohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05156165962330239126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-33723268603736378842008-08-04T08:06:00.000-04:002008-08-04T08:06:00.000-04:00Dave,no, empirical verification is not necessary f...Dave,<BR/><BR/>no, empirical verification is not necessary for a philosophical argument (though philosophy is at its best, I think, when it takes empirical evidence seriously, which I don't think Chalmers does).<BR/><BR/>However, when an argument lacks both empirical verification and logical coherence, and/or is based on arbitrary and highly questionable assumptions, one begins to wander what sort of activity one is engaging in. Not good philosophy, I should think.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-16137555418613184302008-08-04T07:58:00.000-04:002008-08-04T07:58:00.000-04:00Is empirical verification a necessary requirement ...Is empirical verification a necessary requirement of a philosophical argument? It may be necessary for a scientific theory but I thought we talking philosophy here?Dave Smithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182481968584866354noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-42892667623615209982008-08-04T07:01:00.000-04:002008-08-04T07:01:00.000-04:00Dave,perhaps silly is not the best word, but we ar...Dave,<BR/><BR/>perhaps silly is not the best word, but we are presented with a notion that is a) empirically impossible to verify; b) logically inconsistent; c) based on the obviously dubious assertion that conceivability is a reliable guide to possibility and in turn reality.<BR/><BR/>If it ain't silly, it certainly makes for very bad philosophy, methinks.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-400631633097885612008-08-04T06:17:00.000-04:002008-08-04T06:17:00.000-04:00Thus dualism entails that we will not be able to p...<I>Thus dualism entails that we will not be able to physically detect a mental state occur independently of the presence of a physical brain!</I><BR/><BR/>But you should be able to <I>report</I> a mental state that occurs independently of the brain.<BR/><BR/>That is getting increasingly difficult to do.paul01https://www.blogger.com/profile/06306440944379183875noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-12127292555145274872008-08-04T04:47:00.000-04:002008-08-04T04:47:00.000-04:00Ian said,"those who reject materialism do not beli...Ian said,<BR/><BR/>"those who reject materialism do not believe that mental states are physical. Thus dualism entails that we will not be able to physically detect a mental state occur independently of the presence of a physical brain!"<BR/><BR/>Massimo replied,<BR/><BR/>"Do you even realize how silly this position is? Can't be defeated in principle, can it? And you call this good philosophy? A incredible castle built on thin air is what I call it."<BR/><BR/><BR/>Massimo, if Ian's statement is so silly, it should have been no problem to point out why. Or is Ian, in fact, correct and your series of rhetorical questions are just an expression of frustration?<BR/><BR/>If mental states are not physical, why would we expect to be able to use physical detection as a means of knowing about them?Dave Smithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182481968584866354noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-7882882126805178252008-08-03T17:28:00.000-04:002008-08-03T17:28:00.000-04:00Ian,I'm afraid you are engaging in the same sort o...Ian,<BR/><BR/>I'm afraid you are engaging in the same sort of sophistry that Chalmers likes so much, and which I maintain gives a bad reputation to philosophy:<BR/><BR/>"But Chalmer’s does not believe in the existence of mental substance."<BR/><BR/>Yes, that's what he says, but in what sense there can be dualism if there isn't some other stuff outside of physical stuff?<BR/><BR/>"Materialism stipulates that physical facts *entail* mental facts."<BR/><BR/>Says who? Materialism simply says that whatever exists must be made of matter/energy, so if mental phenomena are real, then they have to be grounded in matter/energy. You are conveniently reversing the logical order.<BR/><BR/>"These are false by the very meaning of the words we are employing. ... it is conceivable there are beings who exactly resemble us apart from an inner mental life."<BR/><BR/>I realize the distinction between a logical and a physical impossibility, but his example really blurs the distinction here: how does he know that his zombies are not logically impossible? Because he assumes dualism, as one of the other commenters pointed out, thereby begging the question.<BR/><BR/>"the onus is upon you to explain what is logically incoherent about such beings."<BR/><BR/>No the onus is on you and people like Chalmers, who are making extraordinary claims supported only by a bit of fuzzy language.<BR/><BR/>"We are not talking about physical possibility."<BR/><BR/>Maybe you are not, but to me that is the crucial question, since logical possibility isn't going to settle the matter.<BR/><BR/>"those who reject materialism do not believe that mental states are physical. Thus dualism entails that we will not be able to physically detect a mental state occur independently of the presence of a physical brain!"<BR/><BR/>Do you even realize how silly this position is? Can't be defeated in principle, can it? And you call this good philosophy? A incredible castle built on thin air is what I call it.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-57736901521224990252008-08-03T16:57:00.000-04:002008-08-03T16:57:00.000-04:00Unfortunately it seems to me that your criticism o...Unfortunately it seems to me that your criticism of Chalmer’s arguments are nonsensical from start to finish.<BR/><BR/>I guess by “mind stuff” you mean mental substance. But Chalmer’s does not believe in the existence of mental substance. So the first 3 paragraphs are simply an irrelevance.<BR/><BR/>Reading further on, and in regards to premise 1 you state:<BR/><BR/>“I suppose that it is possible that there may be living beings that are made like us but do not have conscious experiences, although they would be really strange beings. I find that possibility to be extremely unlikely, but I don’t see that it contradicts any known physical or logical law”.<BR/><BR/><BR/>If it is <I>logically</I> possible that there are beings who exactly physically resemble us except they have no inner mental life, then this is a straightforward denial of materialism. Materialism stipulates that physical facts *entail* mental facts. So if materialism is true then it is *logically impossible* for there to be beings who are made of the same type of stuff as us, and who are constructed identically to us, but yet lack any conscious experiences. <BR/><BR/>Of course presumably such beings are physically impossible. But <I>logically</I> impossible?? But no need to pursue this point at this juncture since you seem to agree with this.<BR/><BR/>You state:<BR/><BR/>“The real problem, of course, is with p2: conceivability is not a reliable guide to possibility. I can conceive of impossible things, such as the idea of squaring the circle, or of a god that is omnipotent and yet can make a mountain so big that she couldn’t move it, and so on”.<BR/><BR/>Here you are asserting that you can conceive of something being true, <I>but which, by the very meaning of the words, is false!</I>. If someone states they can conceive of a married bachelor, then they are simply failing to understand what the word bachelor means. The same goes for a square circle, or an omnipotent God which is not omnipotent. These are false <I><B>by the very meaning of the words we are employing</B></I>. <BR/><BR/>The above examples are entirely different from saying it is <I>conceivable</I> there are beings who exactly resemble us apart from an inner mental life. This is at least <I>conceivable</I> unlike a married bachelor or a square circle.<BR/><BR/>Now the crucial question here is whether conceivability implies logical possibility. It seems to me it does, and that therefore materialism is necessarily false. But even if you disagree with me that such beings are logically possible, the onus is upon you to explain what is logically incoherent about such beings? Unless you can provide any hint of an answer, then our default position must surely be that materialism is false.<BR/><BR/>You state:<BR/>“Moreover, although this is an unstated implication of the above deduction, possibility in turn is not a particularly good guide to reality. There are plenty of things that are possible but that are not in fact realized in the actual world”.<BR/><BR/>This is completely irrelevant. We are <I><B>not</B></I> talking about physical possibility.<BR/><BR/>You state:<BR/><BR/>“Remember that the question that Chalmers wishes to answer is whether human mental experience is compatible with materialism, as is strongly suggested by the fact that nobody has ever seen a mental state occur independently of the presence of a physical brain”.<BR/><BR/>This is question begging of the worst kind. If we could see, or at least physically detect, a mental state occur independently of the presence of a physical brain, then <I>by definition</I> that mental state would be physical. But those who reject materialism do not believe that mental states are physical. Thus dualism <I>entails</I> that we will not be able to physically detect a mental state occur independently of the presence of a physical brain!<BR/><BR/>But this is all by the by since Chalmer’s holds that mental states are ontologically dependent on brain states. Thus since Chalmer’s position is that brains *create* mental states, it cannot be a criticism of his position when you state that mental states cannot be detected in absence from a brain.Ian Wardellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-68991359036536441612008-08-02T22:52:00.000-04:002008-08-02T22:52:00.000-04:00A book recommendation for anyone interested in p-z...A book recommendation for anyone interested in p-zombies (and philosophy of mind in general):<BR/><BR/>BLINDSIGHT by Peter Watts.<BR/><BR/>Its a science fiction novel (and nominee for the 2007 Hugo award) about humanity's first contact with an alien intelligence---a species which turns out, despite being vastly smarter than us, to be nonconscious.<BR/><BR/>Terrific book, if you like philosophically inclined science fiction.David B. Ellishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09468191085576922813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-22019779748262553582008-08-02T22:47:00.000-04:002008-08-02T22:47:00.000-04:00That isn't scientific, I admit, but almost every c...<B><BR/>That isn't scientific, I admit, but almost every culture in the world has a history of beilief in a world beyond the physical.<BR/></B><BR/><BR/>And, of course, we know of no beliefs most of humanity has held that turned out to be false.....David B. Ellishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09468191085576922813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-4485734033521641202008-08-02T16:25:00.000-04:002008-08-02T16:25:00.000-04:00Kosmo,"That isn't scientific, I admit, but almost ...Kosmo,<BR/><BR/><BR/>"That isn't scientific, I admit, but almost every culture in the world has a history of beilief in a world beyond the physical."<BR/><BR/>I am curious, why you believe in something that has not a rational support, in your statement apparently you are completely aware of that. Just for deference to public opinion? (...every culture in the world has a history of beilief in...)<BR/><BR/>cheers.<BR/>ICAROICAROhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01011489587453349908noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-14627141095488358682008-08-02T09:11:00.000-04:002008-08-02T09:11:00.000-04:00"Uhm, no. Many things are logically possible but n..."Uhm, no. Many things are logically possible but not physically possible. <I>Everything that is physically possible must also be logically possible</I>, but it doesn't work the other way - as would be required for this premise to be true."<BR/><BR/>Is that really true, though? Not only is it physically possible to have a subatomic particle create an interference pattern by interfering with itself, but also on the smallest scales possible, we see tons of contradictions and ridiculous conclusions. Maybe I'm missing something important though - does using "logic" here imply situations where we know it applies, i.e. the relatively large physical world?<BR/><BR/>In unrelated news, there is a great argument over at Stephen Law's blog. I think everyone here would love it, and he'd love to have help, I'm sure.<BR/><BR/>http://stephenlaw.blogspot.comKyle Szklenskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03837443487933011691noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-5435643232789421082008-08-01T16:43:00.000-04:002008-08-01T16:43:00.000-04:00"I've read that psychologists think that at least ..."I've read that psychologists think that at least 5% of males are psychopaths. Perhaps they are people who think the rest of the human race are zombies"<BR/><BR/>Or THEY are the soulless zombies. :)<BR/><BR/>I strongly believe in dualism for this reason: it feels true to me. That isn't scientific, I admit, but almost every culture in the world has a history of beilief in a world beyond the physical.Kosmohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05156165962330239126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-27658775892651665712008-08-01T13:10:00.000-04:002008-08-01T13:10:00.000-04:00I wonder if Chalmers is familiar with Hume's Dictu...I wonder if Chalmers is familiar with Hume's Dictum? If a person is stating that because something can be conceived it must be possible to exist, that is one thing. However, that doesn't mean it exists until the evidence of such is put forth. As Hume would say, a relation of idea is only supported by that exact entity within its realm, and if one did put forth concrete - material - evidence to support it, the concept would change realms.<BR/><BR/>Thus unicorns and zombies exist by whatever abstract line of thinking you want to use to present them. If, however, concrete evidence came forth for the existence of such creatures, they would become concrete concepts, no longer abstract.t.k.fosterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07885392861916837443noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-13186816509253429942008-08-01T00:40:00.000-04:002008-08-01T00:40:00.000-04:00Conceivabiliy is not a reliable guide to possibili...Conceivabiliy is not a reliable guide to possibility. Any idea which can be expressed, including impossible ones, has been conceived.<BR/> Lack of logical inconsistencies is one guide to possibility, as is consistency with empirical physical observation.<BR/><BR/>Descarte's "I think, therefore I am" convinces me that I experience consciousness, but I cannot apply this test to anyone else. I have not yet thought of any way to confirm consciousness in anyone or anything except myself.<BR/><BR/>This problem comes up in Artificial Intelligence. How do we know when we've created a conscious computer? It strikes me as an impossible thing to test.<BR/> Interestingly, it seems to me we are a lot better off if our computers are zombies. If we did succeed in creating a computer that was conscious, we would then be ethically compelled to help it achieve happiness.<BR/> For example, if we simulated every particle in a human being and his or her immediate environment, this human being would show symptoms of all human emotions, including survival instinct. The damn thing would be begging us not to shut the computer off.<BR/><BR/>Conversely, if zombies do exist and some accurate test were determined that could identify them as such, they could be very useful to us in the we could exploit of enslave them without any moral qualms, or use them in medical experiments.<BR/><BR/>I've read that psychologists think that at least 5% of males (I have no data for females) are psychopaths. Perhaps they are people who think the rest of the human race are zombies.Bill Chapmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09567626612272361965noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-36699656127780372032008-07-31T21:42:00.000-04:002008-07-31T21:42:00.000-04:00Thinkmonkey, thanks for your reply. You write:You ...Thinkmonkey, thanks for your reply. You write:<BR/><BR/><I>You cannot simply assert the physical possibility of something which contradicts all of our collective and collected experiences of the world and its operations, although it is certainly logically possible.</I><BR/><BR/>But ultimately each of us can only really be sure of our own consciousness (this is how I interpret Descartes' "I think therefore I am"). A zombie would behave as if it had an inner life, and thereby <I>seem</I> to corroborate our "collective and collected experiences of the world". I don't believe this—who really does?—but to me it suggests that consciousness is something entirely unique.<BR/><BR/>If you're interested, check out my blog posts on <A HREF="http://logbase2.blogspot.com/search?q=consciousness" REL="nofollow">issues relating to consciousness</A>.Nick Barrowmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11224940659269649220noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-50525807349367269742008-07-31T21:38:00.000-04:002008-07-31T21:38:00.000-04:00I'm confused. Did Chalmers specifically state that...I'm confused. Did Chalmers specifically state that his zombies are physically the same as us, or just that they behave as we do? <BR/><BR/>In the first case, Data on Star Trek TNG could not be a zombie, in the second , he could. Dr. Pulaski's insistence that Data was not truly conscious, but merely mimics consciousness, reflects her commitment to dualism, as well as an insistence that only organic beings could have an immaterial aspect of their consciousness.John Krehbielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10078079001156415151noreply@blogger.com