tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post1108258652055603498..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Krauss does it again, so soon!Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger72125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-7864597259248112762012-10-06T16:08:33.368-04:002012-10-06T16:08:33.368-04:00“if we want to know why someone made a sacrifice f...“if we want to know why someone made a sacrifice for a person close to them, a purely neurological answer would not be a complete one. The full truth would require saying that there was a ‘why’ at work.”<br /><br />The ever-receding "why"...slinking steadily away from animism, theocratic religiosity, and now into the blogs and articles of philosophers doing their best impressions of Atlas.<br /><br />The "full truth" would require no such "why" anymore than it would if the person had died in a car accident. Indeed, this is not apparent to many people to this day who ask "why" when a loved one dies unexpectedly. It's fundamentally little different from the "why" early peoples asked about bolts of lightning or gusty winds.<br /><br />It's teleological.<br /><br />It is, of course, the wrong question; "how," not "why." Your loved one was hit by person B who was intoxicated, and person B was intoxicated as a result of drinking X alcoholic beverages...<br /><br />That doesn't mean that "why" isn't necessarily worth asking, but "why" is ultimately as illusory as the "self." In the sense that an illusion is a "thing," then we can play make-believe with a consistent set of make-believe rules and arrive at conclusions ("truths") consistent with those rules. Our brains evolved to do just that. Human life as we know it would be difficult without the "why" (as it would be without the "self").<br /><br />Your shockingly ill-conceived statements about mathematics would put it into the same category, but you don't seem to grasp that math is abstraction of empirical quantification. Nobody born and raised as a brain floating in a vat would be capable of generating mathematical abstractions if they had no capacity for empirical investigation.Taurushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01875271699331453835noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-57497399338554493992012-09-27T11:51:19.913-04:002012-09-27T11:51:19.913-04:00Ladyman might reduce to an abstraction as mathemat...Ladyman might reduce to an abstraction as mathematical platonism in the final paragraph of the Blog Essay about him a month or so ago. But the best view is that he's just interested in the various properties of particles & fields that make patterns (spatial, temporal etc) and their mathematical forms. His removal of "everything" in "everything must go" would be a shift in emphasis to the forms of things, and it would be impossible to banish the things from existence. Not particularly useful in my view, but it at least recognizes that physicals are known by their forms.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14612283941807324298noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-22556010959177057212012-09-27T04:06:58.863-04:002012-09-27T04:06:58.863-04:00Alastair
A common theme or background to your com...Alastair<br /><br />A common theme or background to your comments on this blogspot is supernatural intelligence and supernatural design (teleology) – or should I just say ‘god’. So no, I did not present a straw man at all. And I was referring to teleology, which you did not respond to. In “Life. What a Concept!”, a discussion on the Edge website, Lloyd says “I'm not imputing any kind of actual intent to the universe as a whole."<br /><br />According to Lloyd's model, physical systems register information by existing. The laws of physics determine the amount of information that a physical system can register. And the univers is a physical system. How is information not mass/energy in this context? You might also want to read an article on this blogspot from a couple of years ago - "What About Information?" - in which informatin is presented as mass/energy.<br /><br />And what’s the point of referring to an article on OSR where the title includes "Naturalistic Metaphysics"? A metaphysics informed by physics. About a natural world. OSR doesn’t reduce everything to abstractions. The structures might be described mathematically. But don’t make a category mistake. As the article says: “...structures generate patterns, and science is in the business of describing such patterns.”<br />David Spanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17493626335486327169noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-22772420144041089272012-09-23T20:28:26.578-04:002012-09-23T20:28:26.578-04:00A 'bit', for example, would be a formalism...A 'bit', for example, would be a formalism used to bundle information about physicals. It relates to physicals (presumably accurately) to describe properties (perhaps at a basic level if used universally for all physicals). It doesn't exist except in application, or as an abstract of the mind without application to reality.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14612283941807324298noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-73854578275349936142012-09-23T20:17:06.308-04:002012-09-23T20:17:06.308-04:00On information, I agree with David Span's fair...On information, I agree with David Span's fairly basic interpretation of 'Physical' as being, by definition, something material. Information should be seen in that context as nothing more than a type of description of physicals, as information 'about' physicals. Information can be defined broadly as giving form to something, which means explaining it in language that identifies its properties. Thus the quantity of mass-energy of something is information about it. Information does not exist in some immaterial realm any more than mathematical platonism.<br /><br />In itself, 'information' would merely be a word we use to bundle descriptions of any properties, conveyed in words or math. It can be reduced to digitization as DNA or computers, but those are merely sequences of physical things as a base level for utility attached to a regime (in natural selection, or in a computer.) In itself digitization is nothing but a sequence of physical things and loses it value entirely as information, beacuse information is entirely about something else rather than being a thing in itself. You are pushing a platonic line in saying information exists in a immaterial realm, whether or not you agree with that idea or are merely pushing it for contradication points against Massimo.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14612283941807324298noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-1395649934215458182012-09-23T12:36:23.506-04:002012-09-23T12:36:23.506-04:00So it has become a debate about information. One c...So it has become a debate about information. One can see various definitions, such as including it within the truths of physics, but that would not define it, merely give it a context. I read another definition earlier about 'giving form to', which will do for me as it captures the idea of something basic required to understand something. Information would be 'about' something, and not a thing in itself. It is constituted by terms that describe a thing. <br /><br />It would include spatial, temporal, interactive, mass-energy 'forms' of something, and so on. In the absence of things, it is abstract, and in politics it is sometimes an outright lie. It never exists as a thing in itself (except maybe in the imaginings of mathematical platonism). In a digitized sequence in the absence of utiliy as information about things, it is nothing but a string of things.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14612283941807324298noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-28694121656014528192012-09-23T12:10:40.423-04:002012-09-23T12:10:40.423-04:00No, selection acts on fitness, which includes repr...No, selection acts on fitness, which includes reproductive fitness, as the entity must survive to reproduce by more means than altruistic nurturing, by dealing with its entire surrounds (environment). Altruistic nurturing might be advantageous and thus selected along with everything about the entity (its gender, its species behavior, even its inheritance mechanisms themselves). Selection determines all functions (including all behavior) by saying yes or no to them.<br /><br />Consequently, selection operating from the surrounds of an entity (including population or species behavior) provides whatever rules it might provide, including social rules. If humans drive to group morality, it is because it is allowed by selection whether or not it is rational by your definition. Rationality, which you equate to being a science of morality, is no science at all. At best it is Epistemology, or no more than an ongoing exercise in evauating (and using) secure knowledge based on logic and observation.<br /><br />The science would exist in defining the neuro-physical bases for behavior via psychology securely connected to biology, securely connected to chemistry, securely connected to physics. I don't mind your narrative morality, as long as it is understood as no more than a rational construct entirely open to debate as to its specifics and their continuing usefulness. Don't confuse it with science. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14612283941807324298noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-71879999893406808742012-09-23T11:51:19.259-04:002012-09-23T11:51:19.259-04:00It's gratifying to know that abstractions prec...It's gratifying to know that abstractions preceding reality are eventually useful to accurately describe reality, but it doesn't remove them from being mere abstractions, imaginings, unrealities and so on (even though self consistent and constructed from bits of logic & number usefully applied elsewhere). Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14612283941807324298noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-88238452082744430232012-09-23T11:48:52.860-04:002012-09-23T11:48:52.860-04:00@ David Span
> How could you interpret a Wikip...@ David Span<br /><br />> <i>How could you interpret a Wikipedia article on phsyicalism, i.e. that there are only PHYSICAL things, that specifically includes information as one of those things, to say that information is immaterial?</i> <<br /><br />Because <i>information</i> (in the context of physics) does not reduce to "mass/energy." Therefore, it can<i>not</i> be defined as materialistic. <br /><br />By the way, the author of this blog post (Massimo Pigliucci) has already made an argument for "<a href="http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com/2012/08/surprise-naturalistic-metaphysics_20.html#comment-form" rel="nofollow">ontic structural realism</a>" (OSR) - the view that everything reduces to <b>IMMATERIAL</b>, mathematical structures. Informational physics is simply another component of OSR. (And I have already furnished documentation to support this claim.)<br /><br />> <i> Lloyd never sees his hypothesis about the universe being a qauntum computer as anything but natural. He certainly doesn't see it as teleological, explicitly saying it doesn't have any intent. So I don't see how Lloyd's hypothesis helps you.</i> <<br /><br />You're making a straw man argument. I never invoked Lloyd to support some kind of teleological argument; I invoked Lloyd to support my claim that information (as it relates to physics) is well-defined. That being said, your straw man argument doesn't even hold water. Lloyd was not necessarily opposed to ascribing the universe with a "cosmic intelligence.'<br /><br />"<i>Now that we are aware of the computational nature of the unvierse as a whole, it is tempting to ascribe to it a kind of cosmic intelligence...There is nothing wrong with thinking of the universe itself as some kind of gigantic intelligent organism, any more than it is to think of the Earth itself as a single living being (an idea known as the "Gaia hypothesis")</i>."<br /><br />(source: pp. 210-211, "<a href="http://www.amazon.com/Programming-Universe-Quantum-Computer-Scientist/dp/1400033861/ref=sr_1_cc_1?s=aps&ie=UTF8&qid=1348414885&sr=1-1-catcorr&keywords=Programming+the+universe" rel="nofollow">Programming the Universe</a>" by Seth Lloyd)Alastair F. Paisleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15732723685886383829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-61544766871581876412012-09-23T11:03:51.063-04:002012-09-23T11:03:51.063-04:00Sharkey,
> I've never seen you give an exa...Sharkey,<br /><br />> I've never seen you give an example of a branch of math that has "nothing whatsoever to do with modeling physical reality." Which branch, exactly, are you talking about? <<br /><br />Everything that falls under non applied math, from set theory to topology to the kind of work at the border between logic and math that eventually led to computer science. The point is that much of this was developed independently of applications and certainly without regard to empirical evidence and only *later* (in some cases) mathematicians found surprising ways to apply their notions to physical problems.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-9668526149860019242012-09-23T03:31:05.454-04:002012-09-23T03:31:05.454-04:00Gill,
In all honesty, I should say that the sheer...Gill,<br /><br />In all honesty, I should say that the sheer number of imprecisions and conflations (and, at times, equivocations) in your response (and the fact that I have other things to do) compel me to ignore this exchange after I highlight this bit which highlights where you go (horribly, horribly) wrong:<br /><br /><i> Science also tells you how *that* body of evidence supports *that* hypothesis (it certainly does, if not very explicitly; otherwise it would be inexplicable why anyone bothers reading science papers).</i><br /><br />If you mean simply that research papers have paragraphs wherein it reads 'Our evidence for x' or 'The evidence for x' (or some other similar phrase), then you are equivocating: Questions concerning the logical nature of 'evidence' to propositions or hypotheses is not a material issue -- it is a *logical* issue. In other words, "science" (whatever you mean by that utterance) employs various forms of <i>logical inference</i> in order to deduce consequences, test, and confirm in all the appropriate probabilistic ways. Now whether and to what extent those forms of inference are valid is not determinable (solely by or even in large part by) "science". <br /><br />As for the rest of your "reply": Oy vey. <br /><br />(I should end by saying that I view philosophy (to include formal logic) and mathematics as being continuous with the physical sciences.) Cian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-55181647658946393032012-09-23T00:25:24.008-04:002012-09-23T00:25:24.008-04:00Alastair
How could you interpret a Wikipedia arti...Alastair<br /><br />How could you interpret a Wikipedia article on phsyicalism, i.e. that there are only PHYSICAL things, that specifically includes information as one of those things, to say that information is immaterial?<br /><br />Lloyd never sees his hypothesis about the universe being a qauntum computer as anything but natural. He certainly doesn't see it as teleological, explicitly saying it doesn't have any intent. So I don't see how Lloyd's hypothesis helps you.David Spanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17493626335486327169noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-83154455508703270872012-09-22T17:21:18.740-04:002012-09-22T17:21:18.740-04:00@ Massimo
> Thanks for the lesson in Academics...@ Massimo<br /><br />> <i>Thanks for the lesson in Academics 101. Perhaps you didn't notice that this is a blog, not a technical journal, and that you are likely not a "peer" (unless you are a professional philosopher, which you may be, for all I know).</i> <<br /><br />What I have noticed is that you yourself are guilty of the very same thing you are accusing me - namely, seeking to identify the flaws and inconsistencies in the views and beliefs of others. <br /><br />> <i>I think even Wikipedia will readily show you that there are many competing conceptualizations of "information."</i> <<br /><br />Physicalism itself holds that information (as it relates to physics) is non-material (i.e. it is not mass/energy).<br /><br />"<i>The ontology of physicalism ultimately includes whatever is described by physics — not just matter but energy, space, time, physical forces, structure, physical processes, <b>INFORMATION</b>, state, etc.</i>"<br /><br />(source: Wikipedia: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism" rel="nofollow">Physicalism</a>)[/quote]<br /><br /><br /><br />Alastair F. Paisleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15732723685886383829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-5140663087404047352012-09-22T15:00:45.848-04:002012-09-22T15:00:45.848-04:00Mark,
> I expect that you will not agree with ...Mark,<br /><br />> I expect that you will not agree with me that understanding morality as an evolutionary adaptation as part of a “science of morality” is critically important to moral philosophy’s cultural utility. <<br /><br />Your guess was correct. I think that an evolutionary understanding of the origins of morality (to the extent that it is possible, given the difficulty of hypothesis testing for that sort of human trait) is intellectually pleasing, but of next to know help in modern moral decision making. It would be like expecting that an evolutionary account of our ability to do arithmetics will be helpful in understanding Fermat's theorem.<br /><br />> If you desire to maximize the experience of durable well-being, then based on the science of morality, your group ought (instrumental) to select and enforce norms (moral standards) that advocate the most effective altruistic cooperation strategies for achieving durable well-being. <<br /><br />That is precisely the sort of reasoning I reject. You have outlined the (possible) evolutionary logic there. But to simply assume that that translates into the right thing to do in modern society is a straight derivation of ought from is, thus making a leap of logic. As you yourself point out, people may want to maximize other things (or not go for maximization at all, perhaps balancing different criteria, such as respect for certain rights). That's why anything written by Michael Sandel is a much better example of useful moral reasoning than anything any evolutionary psychologist will ever come up with.<br /><br />> I would like to directly link to your sensible discussion of the logical errors in Krauss’s position. What would that direct link be? <<br /><br />Thanks, the full link should appear at the top of your browser.<br /><br />Alastair,<br /><br />> Academic philosophy itself is a "gotcha" game, played according to the rules of the "peer-review" process. <<br /><br />Thanks for the lesson in Academics 101. Perhaps you didn't notice that this is a blog, not a technical journal, and that you are likely not a "peer" (unless you are a professional philosopher, which you may be, for all I know).<br /><br />> Seth Lloyd (professor of computer science at MIT and author of "Programming the Universe") identifies exactly what constitutes a bit of information in physics <<br /><br />I think even Wikipedia will readily show you that there are many competing conceptualizations of "information."Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-46559490092380455192012-09-21T19:08:57.356-04:002012-09-21T19:08:57.356-04:00Massimo, I accept that science is only descriptive...Massimo, I accept that science is only descriptive, not prescriptive, and it can provide only instrumental oughts (which I expect we agree on, but what Lawrence Krauss thinks may be another story). <br /><br />However, based on your posts concerning Lawrence Krauss, I expect that you will not agree with me that understanding morality as an evolutionary adaptation as part of a “science of morality” is critically important to moral philosophy’s cultural utility.<br /><br />Perhaps you might be willing to comment on the following:<br /><br />With your background, you are doubtless well aware of arguments that morality is a biological and cultural evolutionary adaptation for increasing the benefits of altruistic cooperation in groups. The selection force for our biology that motivates altruistic cooperation is obviously only reproductive fitness. The selection forces for enforced cultural norms (moral standards) that advocate altruistic cooperation are whatever benefits of altruistic cooperation that people find attractive which may not include reproductive fitness. <br /><br />Herb Gintis has shown, at least to my satisfaction, that maintenance of altruistic cooperation in groups requires punishment of agents who exploit altruism. That is, punishment of exploiters is the key to altruistic cooperation strategies that solve the universal cooperation-exploitation dilemma caused by exploitation of altruism often being a winning strategy.<br /><br />Biological evolution has implemented these altruistic cooperation strategies in the form of 1) empathy, loyalty, and other emotions, such as the experience of durable well-being, that motivate or reward altruistic cooperation and 2) our emotion indignation that motivates the idea that other people who violate moral norms ought to be punished (external punishment) and shame and guilt when we act contrary to our conscience (internal punishment). <br /><br />Cultural evolution has implemented these altruistic cooperation strategies by 1) cultural norms that advocate altruism such as “Do to others as you would have them do to you”, accept the rights of all people to “life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness”, and accept the burdens of “Do not steal, lie in court, or murder” even when you really want to do these things, and 2) enforcement by social disapproval and reputation harm and, as a backup to that, rule of law. <br /><br />Much of our social psychology and emotional experience of durable well-being was arguably selected for by the benefits of cooperation and association as social animals. Thus it seems to me at least possible that science could offer something like the following instrumental ought:<br /><br />If you desire to maximize the experience of durable well-being, then based on the science of morality, your group ought (instrumental) to select and enforce norms (moral standards) that advocate the most effective altruistic cooperation strategies for achieving durable well-being. <br /><br />Of course, groups may have different goals than maximizing the experience of durable well-being, but “maximizing the experience of durable well-being” is a common enough goal to make this instrumental ‘ought’ culturally useful. (Groups also must decide, without help from science, who ‘ought’ to be in in-groups and the morality of exploiting out-groups, but that is another story.)<br /><br />I could not resist asking because your areas of expertise make you unusually qualified to comment on this science of morality’s potentially critical importance to moral philosophy’s cultural utility.<br /><br />Also, I would like to directly link to your sensible discussion of the logical errors in Krauss’s position. What would that direct link be? <br />Mark Sloanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13812687521755850478noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-27674917798465844382012-09-21T16:03:12.861-04:002012-09-21T16:03:12.861-04:00Massimo: "Once again, that is certainly histo...Massimo: "Once again, that is certainly historically true, but most math done these days has nothing whatsoever to do with modeling physical reality."<br /><br />You have made that statement numerous times, Massimo, but I've never seen you give an example of a branch of math that has "nothing whatsoever to do with modeling physical reality." Which branch, exactly, are you talking about?Sharkeyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04175556830248883005noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-30112898094989763832012-09-21T13:53:13.494-04:002012-09-21T13:53:13.494-04:00@ Massimo
> Silly me, I thought this was about...@ Massimo<br /><br />> <i>Silly me, I thought this was about mutual intellectual growth, not scoring points.</i> <<br /><br />Academic philosophy itself is a "gotcha" game, played according to the rules of the "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer_review" rel="nofollow">peer-review</a>" process.<br /><br />> <i>Depending on how you define information, itself not an easy task.</i> <<br /><br /><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seth_Lloyd" rel="nofollow">Seth Lloyd</a> (professor of computer science at MIT and author of "<a href="http://www.amazon.com/Programming-Universe-Quantum-Computer-Scientist/dp/1400033861/ref=sr_1_cc_1?s=aps&ie=UTF8&qid=1348236934&sr=1-1-catcorr&keywords=programming+the+universe" rel="nofollow">Programming the Universe</a>") identifies exactly what constitutes a bit of information in physics. In fact, he is able to quantify the number of bits in the universe (approximately 10^90 bits). Everything reduces to bits. (For more details, see the two video links listed below. Each one is relatively short, only running about five minutes long.)<br /><br />"<a rel="nofollow">Does information create the cosmos? (Part 1) </a>"<br /><br />"<a rel="nofollow">Does information create the cosmos? (Part 2)</a>"<br /><br />(source: interview between Seth Lloyd and Robert Lawrence Kuhn - host of PBS's "<a href="http://www.closertotruth.com/" rel="nofollow">Closer to Truth</a>" program).<br /><br />> <i>Tipler is a hack when it comes to metaphysics, with his Omega point rescuing Christianity and related nonsense.</i> <<br /><br />Tipler's argument for informational physics is still valid, despite his dabblings into science fiction and space-age theology.<br />Alastair F. Paisleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15732723685886383829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-77078999642142081962012-09-20T19:49:18.802-04:002012-09-20T19:49:18.802-04:00Replace the words "my ideas" with "...Replace the words "my ideas" with "ideas expressed in plain english with real examples".Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14612283941807324298noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-708789386234736692012-09-20T19:48:24.279-04:002012-09-20T19:48:24.279-04:00I doubt it about intellectual growth more than sco...I doubt it about intellectual growth more than scoring points. I would say the general trend is about equal on this blog.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14612283941807324298noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-63893670181951932852012-09-20T18:51:37.502-04:002012-09-20T18:51:37.502-04:00Eamon,
> Science, insofar as it is conceived b...Eamon,<br /><br />> Science, insofar as it is conceived by Krauss, does not and in fact cannot address many / most / all of the questions I listed (and more) <<br /><br />Maybe it does not yet, but let me sketch a way in which it can. Take the first two questions on your list: "What is 'evidence'? How does 'evidence' support hypotheses?" Well, pick any hypothesis — say "smoking causes lung cancer". Science tells you what the evidence is: animal experiments, epidemiological data, etc. Science also tells you how *that* body of evidence supports *that* hypothesis (it certainly does, if not very explicitly; otherwise it would be inexplicable why anyone bothers reading science papers).<br /><br />Obviously science can in principle do this for every hypothesis, and let's suppose this done. Now you come along and ask, but what is EVIDENCE? The answer is: that which all the particular bodies of evidence have in common, *if* they have anything at all in common. Go find out.<br /><br />And the way to find out is by forming hypotheses and testing them against the data, the data — surely empirical — being science itself; specifically, what science says about particular hypotheses and their supporting evidence.<br /><br />If this way of doing things could not address your questions, then I doubt that anything could. Moreover, I don't see how, if anything is left unanswered by this way of doing things, that thing could be of "fundamental importance to our scientific world view" as you asserted.<br /><br />I won't go over every question you raised (except to say they are not all in one boat). Just let you see where I'm coming from: I hope one day philosophers of science will, like the prose-speaking guy, realize that they have been doing *science* of science all along, or at least should have been. (If naturalized epistemology sounds like a good idea to you, this idea, naturalized philosophy of science, should too.)<br /><br />Krauss, I imagine, is a little too unsophisticated for that. But even blind people are sometimes onto something, and I think Krauss is onto something (maybe for the wrong reason, expressed in the wrong way, sometimes toward the wrong people — I can agree with all of that).Gillhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08069227990262369386noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-29071583700343653112012-09-20T18:10:04.566-04:002012-09-20T18:10:04.566-04:00Alastair,
> Such is the nature of debating. &l...Alastair,<br /><br />> Such is the nature of debating. <<br /><br />Silly me, I thought this was about mutual intellectual growth, not scoring points.<br /><br />> Your metaphysics is also populated with "informational objects" <<br /><br />Depending on how you define information, itself not an easy task. At any rate, yes I like my ontology a bit richer than Quine's desert, as I mentioned. Ladyman and Ross calls it "rainforest" ontology (i.e., a bit more lush than a desert).<br /><br />> Frank Tipler (professor of physics at Tulane University) explains this in his discussion of informationsl physics and consciousness. <<br /><br />Tipler is a hack when it comes to metaphysics, with his Omega point rescuing Christianity and related nonsense.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-19524675933387125212012-09-20T15:02:18.526-04:002012-09-20T15:02:18.526-04:00Gill,
You miss my point. I do not insist that th...Gill, <br /><br />You miss my point. I do not insist that the above questions are 'real' (curious term this since they are certainly 'real' questions, even if they might resist, even in principle, a definitive answer) on the basis that they cause 'a state of wondering' in me (to be sure, some of the questions I outline don't cause me to wonder). <br /><br />My point is this: Science, insofar as it is conceived by Krauss, does not and in fact cannot address many / most / all of the questions I listed (and more), which is problematic for Krauss because they are of fundamental importance to the scientific view of the world. <br /><br />Think of matters in a simple way: Science, broadly construed, itself depends upon, e.g., standards of evidence, inferential techniques, and primitive concepts such as 'causation', 'identity', and 'truth', which are not defined or clarified via observation and experimentation. If Krauss or anyone else thinks that they are, and they must be if they are to fall under the purview of science, I would very much like to hear for it. Cian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-50187126478575480132012-09-20T12:53:24.818-04:002012-09-20T12:53:24.818-04:00@ Massimo
> I'm not sure why you keep up t...@ Massimo<br /><br />> <i>I'm not sure why you keep up this "gotcha!" game, but nonetheless:</i> <<br /><br />Such is the nature of debating. <br /><br />> <i>Software is, obviously, not physical in the same sense as the hardware in which it runs onto. As should be clear by now, my metaphysics is a bit more populated than Quine's famous "desert." Still, your question makes a category mistake, in my opinion: "minding" is what the brain does just like "breathing" is what lungs do. Is breathing physical in your sense? If yes, then so is minding, but "physical" usually refers to nouns, not verbs.</i> <<br /><br />Your metaphysics is also populated with "informational objects" (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_physics#Digital_vs._informational_physics" rel="nofollow">informational physics</a> is a variant of "structural realism.") And the point is that the "information" in the "information processing system" is <i>immaterial</i>.<br /><br />Frank Tipler (professor of physics at Tulane University) explains this in his discussion of <i>informationsl physics</i> and consciousness. He also explains how this relates directly to the Aristotelian doctrine of "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism" rel="nofollow">hylomorphism</a>." (See video below. It's only five minutes long.)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.closertotruth.com/video-profile/Is-Consciousness-an-Ultimate-Fact-Frank-Tipler-/802" rel="nofollow">Is Consciousness an Ultimate Fact</a>?" ("Closer to Truth" interview between physicist Frank Tipler and host Robert Lawrence Kuhn)Alastair F. Paisleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15732723685886383829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-81981554387949706512012-09-20T07:39:13.405-04:002012-09-20T07:39:13.405-04:00All,
a new post is out, so I'll probably wind...All,<br /><br />a new post is out, so I'll probably wind down my contribution to this (fun as usual) discussion soon...<br /><br />Alastair,<br /><br />I'm not sure why you keep up this "gotcha!" game, but nonetheless:<br /><br />> Is the "verb" (the mind, the software), as opposed to the "noun" (the brain, the hardware), physical? <<br /><br />Software is, obviously, not physical in the same sense as the hardware in which it runs onto. As should be clear by now, my metaphysics is a bit more populated than Quine's famous "desert." Still, your question makes a category mistake, in my opinion: "minding" is what the brain does just like "breathing" is what lungs do. Is breathing physical in your sense? If yes, then so is minding, but "physical" usually refers to nouns, not verbs.<br /><br />Attlee,<br /><br />> Nor is one needed since "free-will" is a paradigm example of a self-contradictory proposition. <<br /><br />Yes, and the fact you just can't stop repeating that is a result of your luck of free will. Oh well.<br /><br />Gill,<br /><br />your comments are deserving of more time than I have this morning (about to leave for Lexington to give a couple of talks), but briefly:<br /><br />> Whether math and logical problems are f-answerable as opposed to merely d-answerable is, as far as I can tell, still as controversial as ever. <<br /><br />I'm really not sure I need to buy into that distinction. Math problems have (largely) nothing to do with empirical evidence, so their existence (together with that of logical problems) defeats Krauss' contention. That's all I need.<br /><br />> I believe (with Coyne — not sure about Krauss) that there is a more or less unified and distinct set of methodological principles (may not be the best word, but I hope you see what I'm getting at) which you're supposed to abide by whether you're doing science, plumbing, or riding subways, or fixing cars, etc <<br /><br />Yes, I get it, but they are still using the word "science" ambiguously, and they can't have it both ways, on penalty of the absurdities I point out at the end of the post. I understand what they are saying, I am suggesting that it is obviously self-serving, historically incorrect and conceptually muddled.<br /><br />> I don't get what you meant by "artificial construct" if that was supposed to be a damning label. Surely all constructs are artificial? <<br /><br />Yes, some more so than others. If you read my comment in context it should be clear what I meant.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-76316495499879740282012-09-20T05:25:37.435-04:002012-09-20T05:25:37.435-04:00Perhaps for a slightly more adversarial conversati...Perhaps for a slightly more adversarial conversation, you could get Krauss on the podcast?Khttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12460075520187803334noreply@blogger.com