About Rationally Speaking


Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Thursday, October 06, 2011

The ethics of scientific inquiry and public discourse

by Massimo Pigliucci

The header of the Rationally Speaking blog says that we try to respect the principles of the Enlightenment, particularly the idea of the Marquis de Condorcet that a public intellectual is someone who devotes himself to “the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them.” Clearly, we are hoping to contribute meaningfully to society by means of our writings, which is to say that in a sense we are engaged not just in an intellectual quest, but an ethical one. And that is why I found a recent article by Lawrence Torcello (published in Public Affairs Quarterly, vol. 25, issue 3) particularly thought provoking.

Torcello addresses the ethics of scientific inquiry and public discourse about science. He starts out with a famous quote by W.K. Clifford that is often cited by skeptics: “It is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence” (from his essay on “The Ethics of Belief,” published in 1879). Strong stuff, and Torcello immediately — and rightly, I think — points out that while there is much to be commended in Clifford’s statement, it is a bit too absolutist and it requires justification. For instance, obvious exceptions can easily be found in aesthetic, and possibly even moral judgments. It makes little sense to say that my belief that Beethoven was the greatest composer who has ever lived is wrong because it is based on insufficient evidence, even if you happen to think that the one entitled to that honor is instead Mozart. Likewise, although I have made clear several times that I do not think moral judgments are arbitrary, I also do not think that they come down to straightforward matters of sufficient evidence.

Torcello, however, also defends Clifford by pointing out two possibilities: first, a tendency to believe regardless or in spite of evidence, even when it is concerned with trivial beliefs (e.g., astrology) may engender a habit of mind that leads to a similar lack of critical thinking in more important matters (e.g., Iraq has weapons of mass destruction). Second, beliefs are rarely just a private matter because we live in increasingly interconnected societies where people influence others’ opinions via a variety of means, from direct conversations to social networks (and, yes, blogs).

Torcello is particularly concerned with what he amusingly — and, again, rightly — calls “pseudoskepticism.” This is the abuse of the word skepticism to describe the activity engaged in by people who deny climate change, evolution, HIV causing AIDS, or who maintain that vaccines cause autism (all, except partially for the issue of evolution, are issues that are not simply academic or educational in nature, but have major import for the welfare of our society). Torcello points out that actual skepticism is about positive inquiry and critical thinking, as well as proportioning one’s beliefs to the available evidence (not to mention being willing to alter those beliefs if and when the evidence changes significantly). Pseudoskepticism, on the contrary, makes a virtue of doubt per se, regardless of other considerations, and is therefore irrational.

The centerpiece of Torcello’s article borrows John Rawls’ concept of public reason and extends it not just to matters of social justice (as Rawls originally did), but to the ethics of scientific inquiry and public discourse about science. Rawls was concerned with the negative influence of sectarian ideologies (religious or political) on deliberation in a multicultural society. He suggested that all discourse about justice and fairness should be conducted using a public, neutral, discourse, avoiding sectarian language or at least “translating” the latter into the former. For instance, you may be against abortion because of your religious beliefs, but to argue in the public square that abortion is immoral because god disapproves of it is a non starter, considering that people who believe in other gods or no gods at all (not to mention those who believe in your same god but interpret his mandates differently) will simply not engage at that level. This doesn’t mean that your ideological positions shouldn’t inform and guide your public positions, but it does mean that you need to translate your concerns into forms that public reason can deal with. For instance, you could say that it is immoral to take an innocent person’s life, and then you need to be prepared to argue the criteria for personhood, and so forth.

Torcello sees the principle broadened to public discourse about science, which is also often twisted by ideological commitments, again of a religious or political nature. This puts a moral burden of sorts on anyone engaging in discussions about science to get, at the very least, the facts right, which includes a fair representation of the degree of consensus among scientists themselves on whatever topic is at hand (e.g., no spurious list of signatures of “scientists” who reject evolution, or an acknowledgment that weather forecasters are not actually atmospheric physicists).

The paper ends with three recommendations that are worth careful consideration by the skeptic community. Quoting directly from Torcello (p. 208):

(1) Ethical obligations of inquiry extend to every voting citizen insofar as citizens are bound together as a political body;

(2) It is morally condemnable to put forward unwarranted public assertions contrary to scientific consensus when such consensus is decisive for public policy and legislation;

(3) It is imperative upon educators, journalists, politicians and all those with greater access to the public forum to condemn, factually and ethically, pseudoskeptical assertions without equivocation.

The latter point, of course, beautifully encapsulates what skepticism is at its best.

9 comments:

  1. Thinking of the many historical instances in which scientific consensus has been overturned by a stubborn individual with an original idea or an inconvenient finding, I am not sure that the existing consensus should be ethically preserved. In the same vein one should remember Max Planck (cynical?) observation that science does not progress as scientists change their views in the light of new evidence, but as old scientists gradually die off without changing their views, and are replaced by a new crop of scientists who adhere more easily to some new theory challenging established views. The essence of the "esprit scientifique" is a disposition to ruthless criticism, best summarized in the Royal Society's motto, Nullius in verba = On nobody's word (even if the "word" in question represents the majority opinion of scientists).

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  2. Massimo,

    "For instance, obvious exceptions can easily be found in aesthetic, and possibly even moral judgments. It makes little sense to say that my belief that Beethoven was the greatest composer who has ever lived is wrong because it is based on insufficient evidence, even if you happen to think that the one entitled to that honor is instead Mozart."

    Well, I think you could say, I like the most Beethoven or something like that, and even so, this is a pretty pointless statement. You can say it, right, but I find that the gain that you and the receptor/s gain by saying/listening to it is negligible.

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  3. Re Oscar's remark on Massimo's analogies with aesthetics, I also think that the analogy is misplaced and pointless. Aesthetic judgments are essentially personal and subjective, and are supposed to vary from one individual to the next without that causing any trouble, whereas scientific conclusions are supposed to offer rationally believable evidence and are thus aspire to be inter-subjectively valid. You may prefer Beethoven while I prefer Mozart, just as you may say potahto while I say potayto, and nobody cares because De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum. But any challenge to the law of gravity or to any such widely accepted scientific "law" or scientific "truth" is quite another matter.

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  4. Hector, Oscar,

    well, evidently I did not explain myself clearly, since that was my point: contra Clifford, there are statements for which one cannot even apply the criterion of "evidence," even though plenty of people would strongly defend the aesthetic judgment that, say, Britney Spears is a much worse musician than Bruce Springsteen.

    Hector,

    one can certainly find sobering examples of scientific consensus that turned out to be wrong, which is a good reason why scientists ought to study the history of their discipline. However, it is much harder to find examples where a pseudoscientific notion has replaced a solid scientific theory. The point is that the public is much off by betting on the consensus of experts than on the latest celebrity claiming that vaccines cause autism.

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  5. I remember something that Carl Sagan once said: “It pays to keep an open mind, but not so open your brains fall out.”

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  6. I'm reminded of a presentation that I attended earlier this week, in which the presenter (an HR person) extolled the wisdom of our company 401k manager for knowing that Social Security benefits will not be around when it comes time for most of us to retire. She stated this matter-of-factly, when in fact it is only a projection based on certain assumptions (which just happen to follow a conservative narrative). My immediate reaction was comparable to moral outrage, but then I calmed myself with the thought that she's entitled to her opinion.

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  7. The paper ends with three recommendations that are worth careful consideration by the skeptic community.

    I disagree, because you see I think the people in the skeptic community pretty much already accept the value of finding the best provisional truth and disseminating it. The people who need to carefully consider and pay heed to those points are the people who aren't presently doing the things suggested in them. Getting them to do that though is as always problematic because their loyalty is not to the best presently discoverable truth.

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  8. mufi,

    > My immediate reaction was comparable to moral outrage, but then I calmed myself with the thought that she's entitled to her opinion. <

    Hmm, in that case I would have stuck with moral outrage...

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  9. Hmm, in that case I would have stuck with moral outrage...

    Way to rile me up, again, Massimo!

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