About Rationally Speaking


Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Saturday, July 02, 2011

The meaning of “theory” in biology

by Massimo Pigliucci
I’m spending a long weekend at the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research (KLI), where I have co-organized (with Kim Sterelny and Werner Callebaut) a workshop on the meanings of “doing theory” in biology. The basic idea is to ask questions about the (large and diverse, as it turns out) variety of activities that go under the rubric of theoretical biology, how they relate to each other, and what it is they are trying to accomplish.
My own talk got things started by highlighting some recurring trends in biological theory, and proceeding to discuss examples of different ways of engaging in theoretical biology. Let’s start with the trends. A pretty obvious and long-standing one is represented by what I think of as an obsession on the part of some biologists and philosophers of science to look for “laws” in biology. The literature is fascinating, but I am ultimately unconvinced that there are any such things as biological laws. Hell, I don’t think there are laws in physics, necessarily (only empirical generalizations). I think a good argument can be made that this search for biological laws is the result of the idea (put forth with the complicity of early 20th century philosophers of science) that physics is the “king” of sciences, and since it always strives for the broadest possible generalization (of which laws are the epitome), then biology has to do the same in order to be taken seriously. I sincerely hope we are getting away from that kind of thinking and toward a more flexible and pluralistic way of what it means to do good science.
The second trend I noticed is more recent, though related, and it deals with attempts at producing “general” theories within the biological sciences. One of the best examples is Stephen Hubbell’s “unified neutral theory of biodiversity and biogeography,” or Sam Scheiner’s “conceptual framework for biology.” The first one is an attempt to set a general null hypothesis for community structure in ecology, while the second is an ambitious attempt at nothing less than the biological equivalent of a theory of everything. I tend to be skeptical of these grand plans as well, in Hubbell’s case because I don’t really have a high opinion of null hypotheses to begin with (and because data can too easily fit a null model even when there is quite a bit going on in the system), in Scheiner’s case because I think of “biology” as an inherently heterogeneous discipline that is ill suited to grand unifying schemes. But, of course, I could be wrong.
The central part of my talk — which was meant to be introductory to the workshop — quickly surveyed various modes of doing theory in the biological sciences, all legitimate in their own right, though of course all characterized by specific limitations and interesting problems.
To begin with, there are classical mathematical-analytical models, often explicitly inspired by theoretical physics. Fisher’s fundamental theorem of natural selection is an obvious example, and so is the Hardy-Weinberg “law” (really a mathematical truism that can be applied to describe the genotypic frequencies of a population at equilibrium if no evolutionary processes are at work disturbing that equilibrium). Typically, these models are rigorous but quickly become intractable because the number of variables affecting actual biological systems is very large.
Which brings us to the second type of modeling, statistically based (the analogy with physics here would be models in, say, statistical mechanics). This is the realm of quantitative genetics, where parameters such as means, variances and covariances are used to describe both the current state and foreseeable future of evolving populations. Quantitative genetics is extremely valuable for descriptive purposes but, I have argued in print, much less so as a predictive or explanatory approach to understand long-term evolutionary processes. Which doesn’t mean there aren’t people who (sometimes vehemently) disagree with me...
The third type of theoretical biology is the one relying on intensive computer modeling (the equivalent in physics here would be, say, climate science models). There is an increasingly fascinating literature using this approach, for instance Sergey Gavrilets’ modeling of very highly dimensional “adaptive landscapes,” or Andreas Wagner’s models of the relationship between robustness and evolvability — two fundamental properties of evolving biological lineages that are playing an increasingly significant role in what some of us refer to as the ongoing Extended evolutionary Synthesis.
Finally, there has always been a role in biology for conceptual/verbal theorizing, beginning of course with Darwin’s own “long argument” in the Origin, and continuing with the foundational books that established the Modern Synthesis during the 1940s. This non-mathematical approach, however, also includes visual models like those predominant in molecular biology — think of the kind of diagram used to summarize complex data sets concerning metabolic pathways and gene networks. Part of this heterogeneous group are also verbal/visual models of how the bio-physical properties of living cells and tissues generate organismal form, as in the work of Stuart Newman and Gerd Muller.
The very last part of my talk was then devoted to the role of philosophy of science in its particular incarnation as — in the felicitous phrase by Hasok Chang — “the continuation of science by other means.” According to Chang, history and philosophy of science, besides being independent disciplines in their own right, can interface with science itself in the pursuit of common knowledge objectives. Chang calls this “complementary science” that “identifies questions that are excluded by specialist science. The primary aim of complementary science is not to tell specialist science what to do, but to do what specialist science is presently unable to do. It is a shadow discipline, whose boundaries change exactly so as to encompass whatever gets excluded in specialist science.” Examples in the philosophy of biology include discussions of species concepts and the ontological status of “species", the role of alternative (epigenetic) systems of inheritance in evolution, and analyses of the logical structure and foundations of evolutionary theory.
Below is a brief rundown of the full list of speakers and topics featured at the workshop. The proceedings will be published either as an MIT Press volume or as a special issue of the journal Biological Theory.





Speaker
Affiliation
Topic
Bruggeman, Frank
Netherlands Institute for Systems Biology
Systems biology and the meaning of “theory”
Callebaut, Werner
Konrad Lorenz Institute
What does it mean to do theory in biology?
Cleland, Carol
University of Colorado
Is a General Theory of Life Possible: Understanding the origins and nature of life in the context of a single example
Collins, Jim
Arizona State University
Role of theory in biology
Depew, David
University of Iowa
Rhetoric of evolutionary theory
Griesemer, Jim
University of California at Davis
Conceptual foundations of the “inexact” sciences
Gross, Lou
University of Tennessee
Selective Ignorance and Multiple Scales in Biology: Deciding on Criteria for Model Utility
Hammerstein, Peter
University of Berlin
Evolutionary game theory and the interface between evolution and economics
Kaplan, Jonathan
Oregon State University
Social impact of scientific theorizing
Leonelli, Sabina
University of Exeter, UK
Is there a difference between data-drive and theory-drive research?
Longino, Helen
Stanford University
Sociology of scientific theorizing
Love, Alan
University of Minnesota
Theory is as theory does...
Millstein, Roberta
University of California at Davis
Population genetics as the theoretical backbone of evolutionary biology?
Pigliucci, Massimo
City University of New York
Toward a broader concept of “theory”: back to Darwin?
Roughgarden, Joan
Stanford University
What might a general theory of ecology look like
Sterelny, Kim
University of Wellington, Victoria, NZ
Controversial theories in biology
Vorms, Marion
Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques
Theorizing and representational practices in Classical Genetics

84 comments:

  1. I don't see how "the role of alternative (epigenetic) systems of inheritance in evolution" is a philosophical question. That sounds like an empirical one to me. Admittedly an empirical question that can only be studied within a theoretical context, but in that respect it is no different from traditional genetic systems of inheritance.

    Also, I don't see why only quantitative genetics counts as statistically based. What do you mean by statistically based? Involving probabilities? Or ignoring them by taking infinitessimal limits? And isn't Fisher's theorem, which you count in a separate class, part of quantitative genetics?

    What I do agree with wholeheartedly is the corrupting influence of physics envy in biology theory, in fact in biology, in fact in all the sciences, even including physics.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Law of biology: Functions choose reactions, forms follow.
    Law of physics: Functions react, forms follow
    Lawful purposes: To serve as a consequence of some theoretically initial universal set of strategies forever lost in sequential time.
    Or not.

    ReplyDelete
  3. I should have added that one purpose seems to have been to develop useful options for surviving the vicissitudes of change.

    ReplyDelete
  4. Joanna,

    the meeting is for biologists and philosophers to talk to each other, so there is no sharp distinction between philosophical and biological questions.

    My claim is most certainly not that only QG uses statistical approaches, it was just an example.

    Good point about Fisher's theorem, I guess I was treating it more as a theoretical / a priori statement that is analytically true (even though it treats co-variances) than as the standard QG fare whose parameters tend to be empirically determined.

    ReplyDelete
  5. http://philpapers.org/rec/AGUFOB

    It never ceases to amaze me that not even in a conference like this does anyone have any interest in what is seen by prominent biologists, as referenced in the title of the cited paper,
    THE PROBLEM OF “PURPOSE” IN BIOLOGY IN RELATION TO OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE DARWINIAN THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION

    ReplyDelete
  6. Baron P, I don't see how anyone can rival the words of JBS Haldane on that topic: "Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but he's unwilling to be seen with her in public".

    More seriously, I am not sure what the article you link to adds to Monod. I thought he dealt with that issue pretty nicely and conclusively.

    ReplyDelete
  7. While I rarely engage in the theoretical biology literature, I am eager to read the conference proceedings.

    The identification of the philosophy of science as “the continuation of science by other means” comports with the general Quinean thesis (a thesis to which I subscribe) that philosophy is continuous with the sciences and indeed a part of science, differing only in the level of abstraction.

    In fact, at the more abstract end of the scientific continuum, in, say, theoretical physics and theoretical biology, as Massimo and others have previously pointed out, philosophy and the sciences are more or less indistinguishable.

    Some may push the Quinean thesis even further and contend that even as the sciences are concerned with broadly empirical problems, insofar as scientists employ inferential frameworks with which they deduce observational consequences and test hypotheses, the distinction between philosophy of science and science becomes less than clear.

    To amend Norwood Russell Hanson's famous quote, I would say: 'Science without philosophy is blind and philosophy without science is empty.'

    That aside, I am glad Chang's work has found acceptance and application outside of the narrow philosophy of physics world. His work on epistemic iteration has importance for the philosophy of science broadly and his book 'Inventing Temperature' is a must read.

    ReplyDelete
  8. Baron P
    Do you differentiate between 'purpose' and function'? How do they differ in your opinion?

    ReplyDelete
  9. Joanna,
    Here's a quote from the paper where the authors feel they have more to say on the subject than was previously dealt with by Monod:

    "Our line of argument in this paper follows that of Mayr [4] and can be traced back to Monod’s essay [3]; teleonomic entities, i.e. objects
    “endowed with purpose”, can be understood by virtue of the theory of evolution by natural selection. In this regard, we accept the position of many modern philosophers of biology. But our starting point is this: function-statements in biology are problematic because biologists perceive them to be problematic in a way that non biologists do not [8]. This could be born of mechanistic materialism, and its tendency towards a reductionist approach, i.e. that biology
    (life) is ultimately reducible to physicochemical explanations [9]."

    I am personally in awe of what you have accomplished, and I hope you don't mind that I've lifted this from your site:
    "I am most interested in models that explicitly capture mechanistic constraints, whether from biochemistry, molecular biology, cellular biology or physiology, and work out their evolutionary consequences."
    What has long concerned me however is that these models, as some biologists have conceded, cannot determine now these consequences might have varied had they been able to add an organisms' apparent motivating purposes to the mix.

    ReplyDelete
  10. Baron,

    people at these conferences don't take up the problem of purpose because nobody seems to think there is a problem to take up.

    ReplyDelete
  11. Massimo, Why haven't you posted my response to Joanna then which showed more of what some prominent biologists think that problem is.

    ReplyDelete
  12. And so Paul S. Agutter and Denys N Wheatley are nobodies.

    ReplyDelete
  13. Baron, I keep having to remind you: this is not my full time job. I am in Vienna and have actually asked one of the collaborators to the blog to moderate comments. But you know, it's the weekend, and I don't pay him enough to be checking his email every few minutes. In fact, I don't pay him at all...

    ReplyDelete
  14. Discussing 'purpose' reminds me of the Scholastics that sat around debating how many angels could fit on the head of a pin.....without discussing whether angels exist....or how to recognize an angel from a non-angel..and what significance there would be, if in fact angels did exist

    ReplyDelete
  15. What they failed to ask each other was why angels would congregate on a pin on purpose.

    ReplyDelete
  16. So that people could ask silly question a thousand years later?

    ReplyDelete
  17. So that the same class of people could still get together and count naturally selected angels.

    ReplyDelete
  18. Massimo
    For instance "what would be the case if the universe did have "purpose" compared to not having purpose?" Or "what significance is there to "the universe has "purpose being true?" Or "how can we test for 'the universe has purpose'?"

    ReplyDelete
  19. meaning |ˈmēni ng |
    noun
    what is meant by a word, text, concept, or action : the meaning of the word “supermarket” | it was as if time had lost all meaning.
    • implied or explicit significance : he gave me a look full of meaning.
    • important or worthwhile quality; purpose : this can lead to new meaning in the life of older people.

    The Meaning of “Theory” in Biology.
    Might that title possibly or at the very least mean that the purpose of the conference is related to the purposes that those theories serve?

    ReplyDelete
  20. DJD,

    Re: "what would be the case if the universe did have "purpose" compared to not having purpose?" Or "what significance is there to "the universe has "purpose being true?" Or "how can we test for 'the universe has purpose'?"

    I cannot imagine what a satisfactory answer to these and similar types of questions would look like.

    ReplyDelete
  21. Para
    I agree. But...if the universe had a purpose, or if evolution had a purpose, and that fact did not change reality or people's beliefs about reality in any way...other than being able to repeat "evolution has purpose", then one has to wonder why some individuals assert vigorously that these statements are true. Also...if "significance" of the statements being true was identified....we might be able have a more clear understanding of the meaning of the assertions.....what was actually being asserted.

    ReplyDelete
  22. Evolution doesn't have a purpose, it's not a function, or a force of nature; it is, in hindsight, a somewhat predictable consequence of universal change. We have observed that there's a consistency to change, however, that seems to us to serve some lawful purpose.
    It would be interesting to know what such a purpose, or set of purposes, might be, but it won't change the nature of the universe to have us "find it out."

    ReplyDelete
  23. DJD, right, there is no, ahem, purpose in asking those, ahem, meaningless questions...

    Baron, obviously it is legitimate to ask what are the meanings of theory in biology, given that theorizing is a human activity, and humans (unlike, say, universes) are capable of purpose and meaning.

    ReplyDelete
  24. Humans are capable of purpose and meaning, and "lower" forms of life are capable of communicating meaning, but not for any purpose?

    Of course evolution has no purpose, as I commented earlier, which doesn't mean the process doesn't serve some. But in a way it's gratifying to know you and your colleagues haven't so far caught on to what.

    ReplyDelete
  25. Massimo
    If a person asserts that "X is brittle"..we may ask what the case would be if that were true, or similar questions...such as what is the significance of "X is brittle"...if indeed true.
    If the answer was, for instance, If "X is brittle"
    is true...then it would shatter if you dropped it from more than ten feet, the we would have a better understanding of the speakers meaning. It would also provide a method for testing the assertion. The Logical Positivists may not be popular nowadays, partly because people don't like being told that if they cannot think of a way of testing the assertion, that it is nonsense, but, some of their ideas should not have been thrown out with the rest. Such is the case of the universe having a purpose.

    ReplyDelete
  26. The Universe does not need to have a purpose of its own to contain functional apparatuses that serve a myriad of purposes within its boundless space. That there are apparently some systematic laws within the universe does not mean they exist to perform some duties that the Universe as King has imposed upon the subjects of its realm.

    ReplyDelete
  27. Baron P
    Regarding your statement that the universe "contains functional apparatuses that serve a myriad of purposes within its boundless space".
    1)What would be the significance of that being true?
    2) Would our believing it was true have any significance or implications?

    ReplyDelete
  28. Massimo's implication that I've proposed the universe itself is purposeful is his way of dismissing the questions raised in the paper I cited as unworthy of his or anyone else's time.

    The authors of the paper have not proposed a universal purpose, and neither have I. That functional entities exist that serve purposes should otherwise be quite obvious.

    ReplyDelete
  29. Baron P
    The question I posed to you above is regarding your own assertion that the universe "contains functional apparatuses that serve a myriad of purposes within its boundless space".
    1)What would be the significance of that being true?
    2) Would our believing it was true have any significance or implications?

    ReplyDelete
  30. I agree with Massimo, however, that otherwise your questions are meaningless.

    ReplyDelete
  31. Baron P

    If a person asserts that "X is brittle"..we may ask what the case would be if that were true, or similar questions...such as what is the significance of "X is brittle"...if indeed true.
    If the answer was, for instance, If "X is brittle"
    is true...then it would shatter if you dropped it from more than ten feet, the we would have a better understanding of the speakers meaning. It would also provide a method for testing the assertion. The Logical Positivists may not be popular nowadays, partly because people don't like being told that if they cannot think of a way of testing the assertion, that it is nonsense, but, some of their ideas should not have been thrown out with the rest. Such is the case of the universe having a purpose.

    ReplyDelete
  32. Baron P
    "That functional entities exist that serve purposes should otherwise be quite obvious."
    Whose purposes do they serve?

    ReplyDelete
  33. Baron P
    If these entities of yours do not serve someones
    "purposes", to use your term, do the serve some 'things' purposes'?

    ReplyDelete
  34. Did you ever pick your feet in Poughkeepsie?

    ReplyDelete
  35. Baron
    Is that where you hide those "things" have purpose? There is no purpose in the universe or in Poughkeepsie.

    ReplyDelete
  36. Baron..
    There is also no intention in the universe or Poukeepsie

    ReplyDelete
  37. Why would anyone take a word like'purpose' out of it's normal context (folk psychology, and drag it into discussions regarding biology and similar naturalistic, deterministic contexts? What does it add to the concept of 'function'?

    ReplyDelete
  38. http://www.philosophynow.org/issue71/Purpose_Meaning_and_Darwinism

    "what does it mean to say that the universe contains ‘no design, no purpose’? This can scarcely be right, because human beings – who, again, are a natural part of the universe – plainly do have purposes, among which Dawkins’ purpose of removing religion is just one example. And purposiveness is not a peculiarly human trait. It is one we share with many other animals. Of course (again), the special, articulate, highly conscious form of planning we use is uncommon, being a faculty of our especially-developed brains. But purposiveness itself – persistent, systematic striving till a particular end is achieved – plainly is not unique to us. A human trying to get out of a trap doubtless uses different means from a fox or a rat, and thinks differently about them. But the striving itself – the intense, persistent effort directed to that end – is surely applicable to all. Human observers watching the animal will have no doubt about what it is doing, nor about its close relation to our own striving. Similarly, seeds that germinate under paving stones go to incredible lengths to grow round or through them, or even to lift them out of place, if necessary. As Aristotle noted, there is a remarkable continuity here that runs from our own fully conscious purposes right through the realm of life. The fact that Dawkins represents the Selfish Gene itself as relentlessly purposive shows how impossible it is to describe the workings of life without using such language."

    ReplyDelete
  39. Baron
    The concept of 'purpose', that humans are supposedly capable of, is merely a fiction that serves as a heuristic that allows one human to understand and predict another. "Purpose" does not actually exist. There exists a built in tendency of humans to interpret human behavior in terms of "folk psychology" (intention, purpose, etc.). There is no purpose anywhere....it is a fiction.
    There is no "first cause"....whether one refers to a god or a human.

    ReplyDelete
  40. Baron...I am unaware that Dawkins has used anthropomorphic language in the context of genes....other than metaphorically.

    ReplyDelete
  41. Baron
    Regarding your statement "Human observers watching the animal will have no doubt about what it is doing, nor about its close relation to our own striving."
    Humans may use "folk psychology" to describe many actions or events in addition to the actions of other humans.....but, in all cases, including human behavior...the use of concepts such as 'purpose', 'intention', 'striving' are all the result of our having evolved the tendency to interpret human actions in those fictional terms. It is erroneous to describe the process of water rising up a tree as "the tree is striving to get water".Purpose is a fiction. We use the concept as a heuristic device...but there is actually no actual existence of 'purpose'....anywhere.

    ReplyDelete
  42. Baron
    We used to anthropomorphise almost everything. Humans had 'purpose','intention', etc. We projected those qualities on everything around us. Our gods...the universe...animals, and on and on.
    We now know that we were likely mistaken. Humans are now the very last piece of nature that we use folk psychology to describe. It works....it is heuristic...but a fictional heuristic. The word 'function' is likely a more accurate term for describing evolved behavioral traits as well as physical traits.

    ReplyDelete
  43. Massimo, could you explain a little bit more what do you mean by this part of the text?

    -------------------------------------------------
    A pretty obvious and long-standing one is represented by what I think of as an obsession on the part of some biologists and philosophers of science to look for “laws” in biology. The literature is fascinating, but I am ultimately unconvinced that there are any such things as biological laws. Hell, I don’t think there are laws in physics, necessarily (only empirical generalizations).

    -------------------------------------------------

    What I understand by a physical law, is something, a principle let's say, that allows you to make predictions and describes the change of a system in a given sense (the realm of the law let's say).

    Could it be that it is just a matter of definitions? If so, things become tricky.

    Regarding the role of theory in biology and the influence of physics, I think that we are not talking really of physics, but of the mechanical view of physics, the program that started with Newton, but that in the last century changed. Even in physics, it is clear that the reductionist approach is not the last word in physics. In biology this is even more obvious than in physics. However it is a young science which has to go over its different stages.

    About philosophy of science and science, they can not be separated I think. They overlap quite a lot. Philosophy comes over and over again when you are dealing with "practical science".

    ReplyDelete
  44. Oscar,

    a natural law is supposed to be more than just a generalization, the idea is that it is without exceptions. Hard to imagine something like that in biology, and even in physics if one considers, for instance, a multiverse view of things (where laws change from universe to universe in a contingent fashion).

    As for physics' influence on biology, I was talking mostly about the idea - imported from physics - that pretty much the only way to do theory is by way of analytical (as opposed, to say, statistical) mathematics. Even in physics that is not the case, and it certainly doesn't hold in biology.

    Philosophy of science: yes, some areas have a large overlap with science itself, but philsci is also an independent discipline with aims distinct from those of science: it doesn't have the goal of discovering new empirical things about the world, for instance, but rather to better understand how science does that (or fail to, when it fails).

    ReplyDelete
  45. Oscar,

    Re: "What I understand by a physical law, is something, a principle let's say, that allows you to make predictions and describes the change of a system in a given sense (the realm of the law let's say)."

    That is certainly an aspect of physical laws, yes, but physical laws are commonly understood to be counterfactually resilient inferences which lead to deterministic state descriptions (Newtonian laws of motion, e.g.). Empirical generalizations which admit of probabilistic treatment are *not* counterfactually resilient and do not lead to deterministic state descriptions (statistical fluid mechanics, e.g.).

    Of course, a probabilitic view of laws of nature fulfills the inferential utility which you rightly identify as an essential element of laws of nature.

    P.S. Why is not reductionism the last word in physics?

    ReplyDelete
  46. DJD said...

    Baron
    Are you OK?
    July 06, 2011 11:45 PM

    What was your function for asking?

    ReplyDelete
  47. @Massimo,
    "As for physics' influence on biology, I was talking mostly about the idea - imported from physics - that pretty much the only way to do theory is by way of analytical (as opposed, to say, statistical) mathematics. Even in physics that is not the case, and it certainly doesn't hold in biology."
    Because of what fundamental difference between the subjects under study? Is there a reason biological forms evolve that is unconnected to the ways that non-biological formations evolve?

    ReplyDelete
  48. Baron,

    The difference has primarily to do with the complexity and contingency of biological systems compared to the relative simplicity of standard objects of study in physics. And as far as I know, non biological systems do not evolve in the same sense of evolution that is used in biology, they just change over time (e.g., there is no role of things like mutation, natural selection, drift, etc.).

    ReplyDelete
  49. Yes Massimo. My last comment on philsci was more like an emphasis on that aspect.


    Regarding laws, I would speak of weak laws and strong laws. Strong are the ones that are not probabilistic and weak the probabilistic ones, since both of them exist. For instance, there is no exception to the gravitational force done by the earth. All the objects on the surface of the earth fall due to this gravitational force. I try to be careful with statistics.

    Paraconsistent,

    I think that there are things that can not be explained in a reductionist way.

    ReplyDelete
  50. Oscar, okay, but then it becomes a matter of pure semantic. I call statistical trends generalizations, you call them probabilistic laws.

    This, btw, still doesn't address the possibility that even the "strong" laws are actually only contingent.

    As for reductionism, I think it depends on what you mean by "explained."

    ReplyDelete
  51. Ah, but the reasons that things change over time must have a lot, if not everything, in common - whether these things have yet changed to the complexity of biological formations or not.
    Unless of course your position is that change doesn't happen with any consistency to its reasons, even though we've found reasons for the predictability of its future consequences.

    And, as one of many questions one might ask here, how do you know to any scientific certainty that the biological strategies that respond to mutational forces, drift causation, selection mechanisms, etc., are not derived directly from the strategies that hold all complex molecular systems together, and/or allow us humans to strategically construct ways to destroy those structures with predictable consistency?

    ReplyDelete
  52. Baron, no, there is no reason why things have to change in the same way. And most change doesn't have a "reason," it has causes. As for how do I know the above, because I understand biology and I think I know what the difference is btw a physical-biological and a physical-non biological system: reproduction, metabolism and evolution (in the Darwinian sense, not just in the sense of change).

    ReplyDelete
  53. Maybe it is just a matter of taste, but I prefer to highlight the difference, since I think it is important. To me it makes a difference, but maybe it is personal.

    How could they be contingent? By definition they are strong, namely, they hold always. Can you give an example?

    What do you mean by explained? I put an example. Some phenomena can not be "explained" in terms of the basic physical laws. They are emergent phenomena.

    ReplyDelete
  54. The example would be *if* the multiverse version of quantum mechanics is correct. Then it would turn out that "strong" laws would only be local.

    btw, laws can't be such by definition, it is an empirical, not a logical matter, whether they truly do hold universally or not.

    Yes, emergent properties are fine, but they also emerge precisely because their fundamental constituents have certain properties in turn. It's quarks all the way down, right?

    However, higher levels of explanation may be more appropriate, because we don't / can't come up with a quantum mechanical model of, say, macroscopic structures like the Brooklyn bridge.

    ReplyDelete
  55. Yes, but just the idea of a multiverse is quite strange. And as far as I know, so far there is no trace of any other universe, so...you say *if*...

    Well, if you prove it for an infinite number of times then yes, the universality of the law is empirical, otherwise, I'm afraid it is not.

    Yes, you are right, and you said it later.

    ReplyDelete
  56. @Massimo.
    "And most change doesn't have a "reason," it has causes."
    And causes in turn don't have reasons either?

    ReplyDelete
  57. Also evolution in the Darwinian sense or any other sense is neither a function with a reason or a force of nature. But there are clearly forces of nature that act with a computational consistency of change, and with the consequential outcome that all things that experience those forces will change accordingly, and be, for want of a better term, evolved.

    ReplyDelete
  58. Not unless there is agency. Do you subscribe to intelligent design?

    ReplyDelete
  59. Also you skipped over this comment:

    Massimo:
    "And most change doesn't have a "reason," it has causes."

    My reconstituted response:
    And those causes in turn don't or did not have reasons?

    Also this stuff about reproduction, metabolism etc., having no mechanistic counterparts in the non-biological world is equally silly.

    ReplyDelete
  60. Baron, I did not skip the comment at all, my answer was: no, causes don't have reasons unless you believe in agency.

    And there is nothing silly in what I wrote. Please provide an example of a mechanistic counterpart in the non-biological world of reproduction, metabolism, etc. While you're at it, please explain *clearly* what do you mean by counterpart.

    ReplyDelete
  61. What makes you think that the regulatory systems that operate within our universe have not evolved over time to act effectively in unison as their own form of agency? That this evolving system cannot have incrementally, and with its forms of mathematical logic, engineered its own designs?

    ReplyDelete
  62. Nice skipping entirely over my questions, Baron! And the appropriate question here - given who's making what claim - is what makes *you* think that?

    ReplyDelete
  63. Oscar,

    You said: "Even in physics, it is clear that the reductionist approach is not the last word in physics."

    It is not at all clear to me that reductionism in physics is not the last word. As Massimo notes, it's quarks all the way down. But seriously, at present the aim in fundamental physics is to reduce physics to the interaction of a basic set of fundamental particles through which forces are mediated and matter constituted, and subsume their interactions under general laws. So, in what manner has reductionism failed in physics?

    ReplyDelete
  64. Crystal growth.
    http://www.pnas.org/content/96/20/11069.full

    counterpart |ˈkountərˌpärt|
    noun
    1 a person or thing holding a position or performing a function that corresponds to that of another person or thing in another place

    ReplyDelete
  65. Baron,

    Re: "What makes you think that the regulatory systems that operate within our universe have not evolved over time to act effectively in unison as their own form of agency? That this evolving system cannot have incrementally, and with its forms of mathematical logic, engineered its own designs?"

    I honestly haven't a clue what you are talking about here.

    ReplyDelete
  66. Sorry, not sure what I skipped.
    But what makes me think that the universe contains evolving systems that act as their own agencies?

    Because of the consistency of sequential changes that over the centuries we have otherwise found need to explain as theistically ordained, etc.

    We have an energetic universe. It has all the potential for evolving life within its systems and we don't need the supernatural to explain it.

    I can go on for pages, but in short, it's obvious that I find more convincing evidence for my views than I do for yours, and obvious I won't convince you that I've actually found it. Or that I know it when I see it.

    ReplyDelete
  67. @paraconsistent,
    "I honestly haven't a clue what you are talking about here."

    Are the so-called laws of nature regulatory, or simply suggestive? Or if mandatory to an irresistible certainty of execution, then there must be some level of determinism there that brings us back to the supernatural, no?

    Oops, did I leave out another clue?

    ReplyDelete
  68. I had this in my notes from somewhere, so I'll throw it at the wall here, and watch it slide down and out.

    "Life forms have found a way to use chemically reactive forces of nature to construct themselves with trial and error methods that suit their needy purposes.
    They constantly assess the results of incremental steps toward the fulfillment of a series of strategic plans, the templates that by now are part of nature's materialistic "genotype."
    They use available pre-patterned molecular structures as building blocks, expectations for their use fueled by the ways these material entities consistently "try" to fit themselves together.

    Even if such patterns were somehow consistently zapped at the processes by the random accidents of nature, something has to do the procuring, building and the fitting processes.
    So if something like the mind of our imaginary "gods" is needed to supervise, then the closest things we can realistically visualize are the collective "minds" of nature that are in control of all its materialistically formed structures."

    ReplyDelete
  69. Paraconsistent,

    I talked about emergent phenomena, but even in fundamental physics, the picture is becoming complicated. Anyway, it was an example of physics and reductionism. Not all physics is reductionist. Physics is not reductionist per se.

    ReplyDelete
  70. Baron
    Regarding your question "What was your function for asking?"

    (10) The function of a hawkmoth’s sex pheromone is to attract
    mates
    (10a) = Sex pheromone does attract mates
    (10b) + Nothing that is not sex pheromone is sufficient to attract
    mates
    (10c) + If mates are not attracted, a hawkmoth’s chances of
    reproduction areprejudiced
    (10d) + Sex pheromones are results of evolution by natural
    selection
    There are subtle differences in the last example, but the form of the
    argument is unchanged and, most important, the wholly mechanistic
    and purposeless character of the analysis remains intact.

    ReplyDelete
  71. Your functions have a goal but no purpose. Who knew. Certainly not the Funk and Wagnalls.

    ReplyDelete
  72. Baron
    You must have misread.You missed the point:
    There are subtle differences in the last example, but the form of the
    argument is unchanged and, most important, the wholly mechanistic
    and purposeless character of the analysis remains intact.

    ReplyDelete
  73. "With a false premise, you can prove anything." - Bertrand Russell.

    ReplyDelete
  74. Baron
    That was not a proof. It was an example of using an alternative description for the first sentence (10). (10a,10b,10c,and 10d) is simply a description that substitutes for (10). This was not meant to be a logical proof.

    ReplyDelete
  75. If it was an argument by logical analysis supposed to make a point, then one would expect that some attention be paid to the accepted rules of logic, the systems of which don't work at all without at least one premise - and here you come with two assertions representative of both premise and conclusion of an essentially missing argument.

    All logical arguments are inferential by definition. You started with the asserted inference that a function has a goal, and ended with the asserted inference that by the nature of its evolution that function has no purpose. So your "argument" does nothing but present two opposing inferences that by that measure ere supposed to make the point that, by assertion, both must be true and thus be proof that there can be goals without a purpose.
    Worst argument/analysis ever made for any purpose would be my assertion.

    ReplyDelete
  76. baron
    You stated "You started with the asserted inference that a function has a goal, and ended with the asserted inference that by the nature of its evolution that function has no purpose."
    I did not assert that a function has a goal. The idea that a function has a goal is preposterous.

    ReplyDelete
  77. "(10) The function of a hawkmoth’s sex pheromone is to attract mates"
    There's a goal in there somewhere, no? Maybe in the hawkmoth that accidentally happened onto that full-blown function?
    Or is the moth accidentally attracting mates that also have no interest in the means of their attraction or its ends? Biological functions then working as a feedback series of accidentally managed accidents? Not preposterous?
    (Not that there's anything wrong with that.)

    ReplyDelete
  78. Baron....That (10) sentence is the one that is typical of the descriptions that can suggest to some that there are goals and purpose in biology.
    The following sentences are designed to show how the same phenomenon can be describes without suggesting any purpose or goals. I'm sorry that I did not make that more clear. This was a demonstration of how we don't need explanatory descriptions that might suggest purpose or goal.

    ReplyDelete
  79. "(10c) + If mates are not attracted, a hawkmoth’s chances of reproduction are prejudiced"

    Aattract |əˈtrakt|
    verb [ trans. ]
    cause to come to a place or participate in a venture by offering something of interest, favorable conditions, or opportunities :

    Apply that metaphorically to a moth and it loses any meaning? What appears to be attraction is just naturally selected coincidence?
    And then how or why did nature, as you suggest, select the sex pheromones, if not to be coincidentally useful for sex.

    ReplyDelete
  80. Baron
    The word attracted can be used to describe a subject acting to attract, OR it can be used to describe a subject that is attracted, or drawn towards....for instance "The cat was attracted by the smell of the food". It is the latter instance that was used in (10c).
    Regarding your statement "And then how or why did nature, as you suggest, select the sex pheromones, if not to be coincidentally useful for sex."....Nature does not "select" in the sense you are applying the word "select". You use the word as it is used to describe human action in the context of folk psychology or folk language. In the scientific context, the word "select" is used differently. It carries no connotation of intention or purpose. A trait is not chosen....If having the trait in some way causes the organism to replicate and/or survive better than organisms without the trait...then there are more and more organism that end up with that trait. You are apparently, as Wittgenstein has said, having your mind "bewitched" as a result of using a word out of it's normal context of usage, and using it in a different context in which it doesn't make the same sense. "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." (Wittgenstein). Sometimes scientists use words from one context, and apply it as "shorthand" in another. Such is the case for "selection" Nature does not 'intend'. It has no 'goals'. It has no purposes'. It does not "do things" All there is...is a chain of purposeless cause and effect. There is no "nature does this or that" Nature does not "do".

    ReplyDelete
  81. "All there is...is a chain of purposeless cause and effect." No shit, that's how it happens?

    ReplyDelete
  82. Baron
    Your welcome...glad I could help you overcome "the
    bewitchment of your intelligence by means of language."

    ReplyDelete

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.