tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post850983642110477324..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Okay, I turned vegetarian, almostUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger109125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-33038214238835330632012-03-21T13:29:21.773-04:002012-03-21T13:29:21.773-04:00actually there exists a jain community in india wh...actually there exists a jain community in india which doesn't consume any parts of a plant that would cause an end to the plants life..there are thousands of people in this community who have never had a potato,carrot ie roots stems or leaves.<br />if the real concern is preventing loss of life alone then the above diet would be best,but it wouldn't provide required nourishment.vegornonveghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04419285669513092675noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-23840696733572039892012-03-17T22:07:58.626-04:002012-03-17T22:07:58.626-04:00Well, you can go two ways. You can state an "...Well, you can go two ways. You can state an "axiom" as you put it, or something similar. Or you can ground ethics in instrumental rationality by stating that (e.g.) satisfying the preferences of sentient beings is a part of your goal-set, and that ethics is just instrumental rationality for people with relevantly similar goal-sets.<br /><br />I prefer the second approach, although when it goes wrong it tends to do so rather spectacularly.ianpollockhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15579140807988796286noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-32603733544458043602012-03-13T14:17:54.507-04:002012-03-13T14:17:54.507-04:00Perhaps a little off topic, but there is relevance...Perhaps a little off topic, but there is relevance:<br /><br />If a child has these three things in their life they are considered high risk for psychopathic harm to humans as an adult<br /><br />1) Persistant, non medical bedwetting to an age that is generally considered 'too old' (most cultures put this at at least 7yo)<br />2) Firesetting<br />3) Cruelty to animals - obviously this is an issue with empathy, which for many veggies and vegans is the reason for a childhood conversion.<br /><br />I know that not all veggies and vegans are empathic and non violent, but certainly many of the movements and religious beliefs that promote vegetarianism are also associated with non violence (Jains, Ahimsa, Buddhism etc)...https://www.blogger.com/profile/01091213938795498181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-72802410182551832862012-03-06T20:00:20.929-05:002012-03-06T20:00:20.929-05:00Peter Singer dixit: if given the choice, a chicken...Peter Singer dixit: if given the choice, a chicken or a lamb would rather be f*cked that killed and eaten. Hence, zoophilia is ethically preferable to omnivory.Huincahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16982673401388824986noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-27105376681759165112012-03-05T22:07:30.126-05:002012-03-05T22:07:30.126-05:00@chbiek: thanks; as I interpret it, the "reas...@chbiek: thanks; as I interpret it, the "reasonable expectation" of others just dovetails with the universal-law formulation of the categorical imperative.Timothyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04338789669131796827noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-80242814536384761622012-03-05T17:57:48.440-05:002012-03-05T17:57:48.440-05:00Massimo,
Nice post and good to see that we all con...Massimo,<br />Nice post and good to see that we all continue learning!<br />Ethical issues aside, I find it amazing what the science says. One of the best sources for interpretation of good, peer-reviewed, primary nutritional science literature is www.nutrionfacts.org<br /><br />Explore that site (lots of short 1-2minute you tube videos) and learn away!<br /><br />Also, isn't it just about minimizing harm to self, others, and planet? Any effort towards less harm is better than none. I think it's silly to argue about all or nothing or fear of being a hypocrite, etc.Derekhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18269165097820710953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-51686967992323693882012-03-05T14:27:44.806-05:002012-03-05T14:27:44.806-05:00This is what we are going to do.
What is my main a...This is what we are going to do.<br />What is my main argument, that I have acted ethicly?Heriberthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12313539396679600886noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-51930090199482006772012-03-05T13:59:52.396-05:002012-03-05T13:59:52.396-05:00Yes, eat them.Yes, eat them.michael fugatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01762576964110603209noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-40105014079700705332012-03-05T13:28:21.965-05:002012-03-05T13:28:21.965-05:00The post comes at the right moment.
Let me explain...The post comes at the right moment.<br />Let me explain: I live in the Italian countryside, a large park-like garden, in which have had chicken for the past 3 years, roundabout 7-10, variing numbers. They live free, sleep on the tree or in the shed (which we have to close at night and open in the morning), they eat what they find and we add some bio-food if the waste of our kitchen doesn't do.<br /><br />In this period about 12 had been eaten by the local fox. Eggs were partly eaten, partly used to raise new chicken after the foxes visit.<br />Among the last bunch we had 3 roosters. yesterday two of them started atacking the 3rd, the smalles one. They were rather nasty and did a lot of harm to him. So we had to make a decission. <br />Choice 1: let them go ahead and see who survives<br />Choice 2: don't close the chickenshed after 20.00 and let the fox do the job<br />Choice 3: slaughter two of the roosters to give these the most painless death possible.<br /><br />Question: What do we do with the slaughted roosters?<br />Is it ethical to eat them?Heriberthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12313539396679600886noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-71236004011123953392012-03-05T12:03:52.711-05:002012-03-05T12:03:52.711-05:00Certainly, from a self-interest standpoint (allowi...Certainly, from a self-interest standpoint (allowing for some loose interpretation of "self" to include family, friends, and virtually any other similarly "rational agent" on whom our well-being depends), it makes sense to evaluate the lives of some individuals or groups more highly than others. [I expect that even a sociopath or machiavellian can understand that his desires & goals will only meet with frustration if he does not publicly observe at least some part of the proverbial social contract.]<br /><br />However, I guess this formula still leaves a lot of marginal room for acts that many of us deem horrific (viz. violence towards any vulnerable individual deemed disposable or a member of a perceived out-group). The only response that I have to that valid objection is: Thanks goodness that only a few of us are <i>that</i> self-interested!mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-56551641069801477792012-03-05T10:19:45.918-05:002012-03-05T10:19:45.918-05:00PS: Having experimented with both ovo-lacto-vegeta...PS: Having experimented with both ovo-lacto-vegetarian and vegan diets in the past (I was a rebellious youth), I have some idea of just how difficult these diets are (at least for me!), relative to my ethical omnivorous ideal.mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-73863798631213247802012-03-05T10:11:26.039-05:002012-03-05T10:11:26.039-05:00Martine:
I'm loosely familiar with this argu...Martine: <br /><br />I'm loosely familiar with this argument (at least since having read Diet for a Small Planet many years ago). Suffice it to say:<br /><br />1) it's got its challengers in the fact-checking dept. (e.g. see <a href="http://theconversation.edu.au/ordering-the-vegetarian-meal-theres-more-animal-blood-on-your-hands-4659" rel="nofollow">this analysis</a> which I posted here earlier); and<br /><br />2) whichever empirical argument holds, it is still an open philosophical question as to whether or not we are <i>morally obliged</i> to reduce suffering in organisms (as opposed to being obliged to do so only for our in-group, as defined by the proverbial "social contract").<br /><br />That said, I personally find a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_sense_theory" rel="nofollow">moral-sense</a> (or sentimentalist) view of meta-ethics to be appealing, in which our strongest emotions (like empathy and disgust) deserve most of the credit for any particular moral stance or motivation (not that emotions are sufficient - we also need the instruments of rationality - in the cool-headed classical sense - so that we can develop behavioral guidelines and strategies for pursuing moral ends).<br /><br />If so, then pathos will almost certainly get you places in terms of moral persuasion (look at the effect that film Earthlings had on a sophisticate like Massimo!), but not necessarily as far as you might like, insofar as emotions vary, sway, and compete among and within individuals (some of whom, it's worth mentioning, are neurologically atypical). <br /><br />In my case, I'm self-aware enough to know that my emotional commitments to omnivorous culture (including livestock farming & culinary tradition) inhibits my concern for the well-being of livestock animals, but inhibition is not the same as erasure. In other words, the rational challenge for me is: How do I reconcile these conflicting emotions? <br /><br />The answer surely invokes concepts like animal welfare (as opposed to animal rights) and ethical omnivorism (as opposed to ethical vegetarianism or veganism), but just because they allow me to eat meat does not make them easy to live by.mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-88375352843345194842012-03-05T07:18:40.435-05:002012-03-05T07:18:40.435-05:00Congratulations Massimo! Giving up foods you love ...Congratulations Massimo! Giving up foods you love is not easy and requires a strong motivation. My partner and I have been vegetarian for a long time, so not eating meat is not very difficult for us. However, we recently started reading about the animals that suffer and are killed for dairy and egg production (male calves and chicks killed because they don't produce milk and eggs; female animals killed as soon as their production decreases after a few years; female cows impregnated every year and milked into exhaustion). If you are looking to have a diet that causes little cruelty to animals, don't fill the meat gap by eating more cheese and eggs. Since we are real cheese lovers, decreasing our dairy consumption has been rather hard for us, but after reading about the lives and deaths of the animals who produce these products, we felt compelled to do it nonetheless.Martinehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12672003931316796954noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-84210253836704804272012-03-05T07:00:07.907-05:002012-03-05T07:00:07.907-05:00Let's look at the eating plants versus animals...Let's look at the eating plants versus animals question from a practical perspective. Animals don't live on air alone. They eat plants, lots of them. So even if you would only eat animals, lots of plants would be killed for your food. Since it takes many kilos of plants to produce one kilo of beef, you can save many plants by eating them directly, instead of through animals. Also, as has been pointed out, plants don't suffer anywhere near as much as animals do when they are bred, killed and eatenMartinehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12672003931316796954noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-77647196347465292652012-03-05T04:37:26.851-05:002012-03-05T04:37:26.851-05:00Timothy,
the key why Eamon thinks the logic is fl...Timothy,<br /><br />the key why Eamon thinks the logic is flawless is the word "reasonably". Please correct me if I am wrong.<br /><br />Eamon,<br />I readily admit that I am only a dabbler in philosophy, which is why I like this blog - Massimo manages to make things quite understandable for a person of slightly above average intelligence.<br />So I really had no idea what you were talking about, but that's ok because it seemed to go both ways.chbieckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11038854944875543524noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-79414128949827186902012-03-05T04:06:45.608-05:002012-03-05T04:06:45.608-05:00Oh, I just couldn't resist since you substitut...Oh, I just couldn't resist since you substituted the angels for fairies ;-)<br /><br />Are you asking for this blog or in general? In the real world the latter, for this blog I am not so sure which one.<br />I personally am still agnostic as the whether there is a truth that can be discovered.chbieckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11038854944875543524noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-19792057589531936632012-03-05T00:50:38.948-05:002012-03-05T00:50:38.948-05:00Eamon, I'll reply to you here:
-"Then do...Eamon, I'll reply to you here:<br /><br />-"Then do not read it. However, you should considering many of the concerns you raise regarding preference orderings and the maximization thereof are addressed explicitly by Gauthier."<br /><br />Eamon, the questions I was asking you were exactly the crux of the matter. I don't understand why you'd raise the topic of metaethics and avoid discussing the metaethical question. So far you've given a sketch of what your ethics looks like, but haven't touched on the metaethical issue, and instead refer me to this book. I looked it up on the <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism/#3" rel="nofollow">Stanford Enc of Phil</a> and the Google preview; it's too aggressive to judge the book itself by the summary on SEP, so I won't except to say if the summary's representative then the book isn't going to be successful. Consider where the SEP says: <br /><br />"The idea of minimax relative concession is that each bargainer will be most concerned with the concessions that she makes from her ideal outcome relative to the concessions that others make...."<br /><br />Whatever happened to the agent's utility maximizing behavior, which the summary says he assumes? And a game of repeated prisoners' dilemmas has an infinity of equilibria; there's no indication at all of an equilibrium selection argument. Similarly, the hypothetical bargaining he posits has a multiple-equilibria problem even when you constrain the set of utility functions to be highly regular (e.g., some form of concavity restriction), which would be one thing in descriptive modeling and quite another in a real moral system. etc., etc.<br /><br />It's probably an interesting and though-provoking book, just as Rawls' was, but since these problems are the kind that plague the genre, if he's overcome them then I wonder why that aspect of his book isn't more prominent in the Stanford page and in the Preview and Chapter 1 of the book, which are on Google, since overcoming those difficulties would be the real novelty for a contractarian.<br /><br />"Nope. Not at all. At least, not anymore more question begging than regarding sentience per se as sufficient for moral consideration. ..."<br /><br />Well, I disagree since I think consciousness (like, say existence) is just a fundamental concept, unlike humanness (which as you say is "a collection of traits"), but even if you're correct that they're tantamount for arbitrariness purposes, I recall you indicating you could do better than the vegetarians. <br /><br />"The meta-ethicist needs not differentiate between exogenous / endogenous preferences. Rather..."<br /><br />If they're taken simpliciter, they're exogenous, but what that has to do with the quantification of ad hocery is unclear; perhaps this thread has wondered away from its origin?<br /><br />Also, I'd like to correct myself - where I wrote (2^n -1) I meant just 2^n. I was thinking of the set of possible maximal sets. To channel Perry, oops. ^_^<br /><br />"The logic is flawless, I think..."<br /><br />Here I really have to object! The argument isn't even logical - it's not even predicate conservative. If I assert, "I want others to respect my will but I refuse to respect the will of others," (which isn't even a negation of (1) and hardly the only alternative to either (1) or (2)) then ok, I'd possibly be a hypocrite, but there's no inconsistency.<br /><br />I can see why Kant would think that was an inconsistency, since in his day there was no serious logic as we have it now, but (and this is partly why I'm pressing you on this point - I really want to know) I can't see why it persuades so many people nowadays. (And this is taking "respect" as well-defined, something else I'd contest, but perhaps that's a debate for another day.)Timothyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04338789669131796827noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-68078043455758727932012-03-04T22:23:08.833-05:002012-03-04T22:23:08.833-05:00Massimo
When you use the words ethics, moral etc.:...Massimo<br />When you use the words ethics, moral etc.: do you mean this in the "kindly advice on how to live a life you will happily look back on when you're 80" / "how do we establish rules that allow us to live together harmoniously" sense? Or in the "truth claim / normative / "there exists an objective obligation to do X" sense? <br /><br />If it's the latter, how does reasonism get to any such obligation, starting from knowledge (or temporary assumptions) about human nature, psyche etc? Without an axiom like "we should minimise suffering" or the like, I mean. <br /><br />Am still catching up on last year's ethics series, and would be grateful if anyone could point me to the relevant place.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-58396854216174624532012-03-04T21:43:09.221-05:002012-03-04T21:43:09.221-05:00Eamon
The lamb may feel as you....but the Eagle ...Eamon<br /> The lamb may feel as you....but the Eagle may not.DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-67904641041939143102012-03-04T19:51:15.207-05:002012-03-04T19:51:15.207-05:00I should like to add this:
Re: "What is the ...I should like to add this:<br /><br />Re: "What is the nature of humans that both distinguishes them from non-humans and is morally relevant?"<br /><br />The nature that both distinguishes humans from non-humans and is morally relevant is precisely the collection of traits which distinguishes humans from non-humans. They are morally relevant for the already mentioned reasons and they are distinguishing for the obvious reasons.Cian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-45224210907064104962012-03-04T19:45:52.376-05:002012-03-04T19:45:52.376-05:00Re: "I'm reluctant to read a book entitle...Re: "I'm reluctant to read a book entitled "Morals by Agreement" because every contractarian metaethic I've seen has been unbelievably weak (although I'd characterize Rawls' contractarianism as an ethics-level one)."<br /><br />Then do not read it. However, you should considering many of the concerns you raise regarding preference orderings and the maximization thereof are addressed explicitly by Gauthier. <br /><br />Re: "I've never seen a respectable argument against the vegetarians' (best) arguments." <br /><br />Ironically, I have never seen a respectable ethical argument for vegetarianism. Odd how that is, eh? <br /><br />Re: '"humans qua humans" is question begging.' <br /><br />Nope. Not at all. At least, not anymore more question begging than regarding sentience <i>per se</i> as sufficient for moral consideration. One could press what is the nature of sentience such that it should warrant moral consideration? <br /><br />The meta-ethicist needs not differentiate between exogenous / endogenous preferences. Rather, she need only take the preferences as given <i>simpliciter</i> (this is not to say that the moral agent cannot revise one's preferences due to shifts in other factors, but any such revision is amoral). <br /><br />So, the vegan picks out some common feature and gives value to that. However, the non-vegan selects some collection of features and gives value to that ensemble (typified of course). Either assertion of value is given and no further qualification need be provided.Cian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-60172617026547395122012-03-04T19:19:22.310-05:002012-03-04T19:19:22.310-05:00Timothy,
I am not a Kantian proper, but I do not...Timothy, <br /><br />I am not a Kantian <i>proper</i>, but I do not need to be in order to avail myself of what is right about his moral philosophy. <br /><br />What is basically right about his moral philosophy is this: <br /><br /><i>Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction.</i><br /><br />The logic is flawless, I think: <br /><br />(1) If I treat others in some fashion, I cannot reasonably expect they would not treat me in a similar fashion. <br /><br />(2) Therefore, e.g., if I want others to respect my will, I ought to respect theirs. <br /><br />Consistency enters in at (1). To see it, think of one who asserts: "I want others to respect my will (not steal my property, not initiate acts of violence against me, etc.) but I refuse to respect the will of others." <br /><br />Of course, if one does not care how others act towards oneself, it does not matter how one acts towards others (this is one place where I differ from Kant). But in fact most do care and thus (1) applies.Cian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-89809094668185308932012-03-04T19:15:34.487-05:002012-03-04T19:15:34.487-05:00Eamon
Thanks for clarifying.When you refer to &#...Eamon<br /> Thanks for clarifying.When you refer to 'agents'...I guess that could refer to both individuals....in order to maximize their own utility...or groups acting cooperatively and forming consensus?<br /> And I guess is that they would first agree on some common ends for which to determine the means which would best maximize those ends?DJDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01634608128841501265noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-29467425794101393072012-03-04T18:39:59.316-05:002012-03-04T18:39:59.316-05:00Indeed, I did not know what you meant, but I wonde...Indeed, I did not know what you meant, but I wonder whether even Kant would have. Kant animated his theory using a dualist theory of mind that I just can't believe you'd buy, and absent that, it really is unclear what you could mean. (Besides, even on his own terms, I didn't think Kant was successful.) <br /><br />And you mention consistency, but what specifically are the contradictions you're avoiding? I think you could "consistently will that infants and toddlers do not receive the types of moral considerations which would prevent them from developing into the rational agents they will become ceteris paribus." It's easy to formulate consistent normative propositions to that end.Timothyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04338789669131796827noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-46998408193834911052012-03-04T18:21:55.125-05:002012-03-04T18:21:55.125-05:00Hey Eamon,
-I've had formal game theory at bot...Hey Eamon,<br />-I've had formal game theory at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. My point here is that you have made a number of ad hoc selections you don't seem to be aware of. When you say, "Morality is a set of rational norms which prescribe constraints on action (constraints on utility-maximization) which in turn bring agents into some stable, game-theoretic optimal state, such as Pareto efficiency," even if that claim itself is justified in same way (which I still don't see), it is still nonetheless extremely underspecified, making your specific choice arbitrary. Why pick Pareto efficiency rather than another of the available criteria (although I'm surprised to see such consequentialism from you)? Even if there are only two people, the set of Pareto-efficient choices will be uncountable in many settings, nonexistent in others, and I'll add that most voting rules (including majority rule) but are not Pareto efficient.<br /><br />Also, the problem I was touching on before is that combining individual's utility functions also requires selections, the choice of which you haven't justified. Do you maximize the sum of their additively separable cardinal utility, or minimize the total of the difference between the upper bound on their utility capacity and their actual utility (and note these two choices are not the same if people have different capacities, which they do)? And couching it in game theory creates the problem of multiple equilibria, which may or may not pose a problem depending on the specifics of your formulation, although I still can't be sure.<br /><br />I'm reluctant to read a book entitled "Morals by Agreement" because every contractarian metaethic I've seen has been unbelievably weak (although I'd characterize Rawls' contractarianism as an ethics-level one). When I say "unbelievably weak," I mean like, <i>breaking the is-ought-gap</i> level of weak. It's just a remarkably unreasonable class of arguments. Actually that was why I engaged you here - I've never seen a respectable argument against the vegetarians' (best) arguments, nor have I ever seen an adequate metaethical argument, and if you had succeeded (which I guess you still may) you'd have hit it out of the park and potentially thoroughly changed my outlook.<br /><br />- But on that point, I wasn't offering arbitrariness-minimization as a metaethic on its own. I think minimizing arbitrariness is a good rule of thumb, or at least better than anything else I've seen. As to your specific objections (although note we've wandered away from my original point a bit), a subjective preference is exogenous to the decision problem, it is not a choice variable, so endogenizing your preferences over paintings is beside the point (and isn't even consistent with the conception of morality as constraint on action, since preferences aren't actions). Even if a subset of "preferences" were endogenous (note they couldn't all be), preferences are defined over binary pairs, so there's nothing more or less arbitrary in picking ("painting 1 > $0" & "$0 > Thomas Kincaide") over ("painting 1 > Thomas Kincaide" & "TC > $0"). So, you're defining preferences over a space that has the cardinality of those numbers of objects, meaning you're going to have to make (2^n - 1) decisions, assuming n is finite. Since you evidently buy into cardinal utility, you'd accomplish this task implicitly by mapping the objects into the real line by picking a subset of an element of a sequence space.<br /><br />To bring it back to substance, "humans qua humans" is question begging. What <i>is</i> the nature of humans that both distinguishes them from non-humans and is morally relevant? You mention Kant, which I'll touch on in my reply to your comment below.Timothyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04338789669131796827noreply@blogger.com