tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post8145714326603540574..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Podcast Teaser: The Anthropic PrincipleUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger168125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-59807628633260950152010-05-22T19:34:23.182-04:002010-05-22T19:34:23.182-04:00jcm: "I can see how that conclusion might ups...jcm: "<i>I can see how that conclusion might upset some people - say, if they are strongly attached to a prior belief that consciousness is a manifestation of a disembodied (perhaps immortal) soul - also not a "thing" in the physical sense, but a real entity with independent existence.</i>"<br /><br />Previously, you implied that consciousness is <i>not</i> a "thing." If you do not believe that consciousness is "bits of matter in motion," then what is your basis for calling it <i>physical</i>?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-36535110154961142322010-05-22T18:43:16.838-04:002010-05-22T18:43:16.838-04:00jcm: "Neurologist Dr. Steven Novella claims: ...jcm: "<i>Neurologist Dr. Steven Novella claims: "The materialist hypothesis— that the brain causes consciousness — has made a number of predictions, and every single prediction has been validated." If one wishes to dispute that claim, then I recommend taking it to the source (viz. Novella). [This thread has already diverged far enough from the topic of the original post.]</i>"<br /><br />I wish to dispute that claim and I am taking it with you because you are the one who is presenting Novella's views as your counterargument. (By the way, whether consciousness is fundamental is the directly relevant to the AP - the topic of this thread).<br /><br />Novella has <i>no</i> evidence whatsoever that the "brain causes consciousness." Neuroscience has established <i>correlations</i> between <i>mental states</i> and <i>brain states</i>. But <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correlation_does_not_imply_causation" rel="nofollow">correlations do not imply causation</a>. And even if they did, all you would have established is that brain states <i>influence</i> mental states, not that the physical <i>generates</i> consciousness. Moreover, even if the physical generates consciousness, it does not logically follow that consciousness is physical (which is the assertion you are making).<br /><br />Also, Novella states the following (this is from that same article on his Neurologica blog - "<a href="http://www.theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=189" rel="nofollow">Intelligent Design of the Brain</a>"): "<i>Theories that are falsified are either modified or discarded. A “preponderance of evidence” cannot rescue a theory that has been disproven even by a single piece of incompatible evidence.</i>"<br /><br />The <i>deterministic</i> theory of materialism has been disproven by <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_indeterminacy" rel="nofollow">quantum indeterminacy</a>.<br /><br />jcm: "<i>But if one accepts the claim as a starting premise (as I do), then does it logically follow that "consciousness is physical" (to use Paisley's words)? As usual, it depends on one's definition of "physical".</i>"<br /><br />Okay. So, what is you definition of "physical?"<br /><br />jcm: "<i>For example, given that the brain is a physical entity and that consciousness is a function of the brain, then I think it is fair to say that consciousness is a physical function. But does that make consciousness a "thing", as in an object with independent existence? Of course not, and neither are other bodily functions (e.g. digestion or respiration).</i>"<br /><br />I am still waiting for you to define the "physical." Until then, I do not know what your basis is for asserting that anything is <i>physical</i>. Also, please state the <i>functions</i> of "awareness." IOW, what exactly does "awareness" do? Or, more specifically, what causal role does "awareness" play in the world?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-79856711288315230962010-05-22T12:19:56.470-04:002010-05-22T12:19:56.470-04:00But then (if I ever truly held that) I abandoned i...<i>But then (if I ever truly held that) I abandoned it a long time ago, and don't mind recommending it to others.</i><br /><br />I worded that poorly. That is to say: I don't mind recommending that others do as I did and abandon the belief in a disembodied soul (or to "give up the ghost", so to speak). It probably won't change your life as much as you think (e.g. you won't suddenly drop dead or turn to a life of crime and debauchery), although you might a gain a new appreciation for the meat between your ears (and all the rest of it, for that matter).mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-9693080386087655412010-05-22T07:11:10.041-04:002010-05-22T07:11:10.041-04:00Neurologist Dr. Steven Novella claims: "The m...Neurologist Dr. Steven Novella <a href="http://www.theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=189" rel="nofollow">claims</a>: "The materialist hypothesis— that the brain causes consciousness — has made a number of predictions, and every single prediction has been validated." If one wishes to dispute that claim, then I recommend taking it to the source (viz. Novella). [This thread has already diverged far enough from the topic of the original post.]<br /><br />But if one accepts the claim as a starting premise (as I do), then does it logically follow that "consciousness is physical" (to use Paisley's words)? As usual, it depends on one's definition of "physical". <br /><br />For example, given that the brain is a physical entity and that consciousness is a function of the brain, then I think it is fair to say that consciousness is a physical function. But does that make consciousness a "thing", as in an object with independent existence? Of course not, and neither are other bodily functions (e.g. digestion or respiration). <br /><br />I can see how that conclusion might upset some people - say, if they are strongly attached to a prior belief that consciousness is a manifestation of a disembodied (perhaps immortal) soul - also not a "thing" in the physical sense, but a real entity with independent existence. I sympathize with them to some degree (as a former adherent of a theistic religion, which features such a belief). But then (if I ever truly held that) I abandoned it a long time ago, and don't mind recommending it to others.mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-41818525373107896692010-05-21T02:13:54.702-04:002010-05-21T02:13:54.702-04:00jcm: "To restate, any philosophy of mind that...jcm: "<i>To restate, any philosophy of mind that ignores or dismisses what the most relevant sciences have to say on the matter is, in my opinion, a non-starter. In this case, of course, I'm talking about dualism.</i>"<br /><br />Why are you singling out <i>dualism</i>? Do you actually believe that materialists are incapable of dismissing scientific evidence?<br /><br />jcm: "<i>And, unless there is some third option that I'm unaware of, I think that leaves us with physicalism (or materialism*) as the reigning (i.e. scientifically validated) paradigm, from which all debates about its philosophical implications ought to begin.</i>"<br /><br />What kind of nonsense is this? To begin with, there is <i>no</i> physical evidence whatsoever that consciousness (subjective awareness) is physical...NONE. Your failure to acknowledge this point does not change the fact. Moreover, science has never proven that nature is fundamentally physical. Quite the opposite. Materialism was rendered obsolete long ago by the <i>theory of relativity</i> and <i>quantum physics</i>. I am simply throwing you a bone by allowing you to identify the <i>physical</i> as the <i>objective</i>. <br /><br />Incidentally, there are options besides <i>materialism</i> and <i>dualism</i> (e.g. <i>idealism</i> and <i>neutral monism</i>). Also, eminent neuroscientists have been dualists - notably C.S. Sherrington (Nobel laureate), John Eccles (Nobel laureate), and Wilder Penfield (pioneered neural stimulation with electrical probes).<br /><br />jcm: "<i>That said, I hardly think that I've demonstrated the causal efficacy of consciousness here.</i>"<br /><br />Agreed.<br /><br />jcm: "<i>In that same vein, here's one more quote, culled from the comments on that NeuroLogica post that I cited earlier - this one from the blogger himself:<br /><br />"...with regard to the “why are we all not just zombies” question, there may be a reason, but there does not have to be. Self awareness can be an emergent property – it’s just what happens when you have a complex nervous system that needs to pay attention and be motivated to take certain actions."</i><br /><br />This statement is question-begging. That is, it presupposes consciousness in order explain why there is consciousness. Having said that, Novella went on record and explicitly stated in the <a href="http://theskepticsguide.org/archive/podcastinfo.aspx?mid=1&pid=73" rel="nofollow">Wallace interview</a> that "<i>subjective experiences do NOT have a physical existence</i> (emphasis mine)" and that "<i>neuroscientists have characterize it [consciousness] as an illusion</i>." No further commentary is necessary.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-9236738563903968382010-05-20T13:37:20.554-04:002010-05-20T13:37:20.554-04:00It occurred to me, in my last reply to Scott, I co...It occurred to me, in my last reply to Scott, I could have been clearer. (In other words, it appears in retrospect that I restated what he said, and then went off on a tangent about the relationship between science and philosophy.) To restate, any philosophy of mind that ignores or dismisses what the most relevant sciences have to say on the matter is, in my opinion, a non-starter. In this case, of course, I'm talking about dualism.<br /><br />And, unless there is some third option that I'm unaware of, I think that leaves us with physicalism (or materialism*) as the reigning (i.e. scientifically validated) paradigm, from which all debates about its philosophical implications ought to begin. <br /><br />That said, I hardly think that I've demonstrated the causal efficacy of consciousness here, other than to restate what other folks have said before (e.g. Searle's idea of a multi-level description - mental/intentional and non-mental/neuronal - of the same causal system). <br /><br />In that same vein, here's one more quote, culled from the comments on that NeuroLogica post that I cited earlier - this one from the blogger himself:<br /><br />"...with regard to the “why are we all not just zombies” question, there may be a reason, but there does not have to be. Self awareness can be an emergent property – it’s just what happens when you have a complex nervous system that needs to pay attention and be motivated to take certain actions."<br /><br />Of course, we did not choose to be a species with "a complex nervous system." But just as it's a brute fact that we are, it also seems a brute fact that, unless we "pay attention" to our environments and motivate ourselves "to take certain actions" in response to them, that we will not survive for very long (given the familiar perils of life in human form). Consciousness, in this sense (i.e. attentiveness, dilemma resolution, and bodily coordination in novel situations), might just be a necessary, emergent property of complex forms like ourselves.<br /><br />Which begs the question: can a humanoid zombie accomplish the same tasks that we can? It seems easy to imagine so (as many writers have), but the reality may be quite different. Whatever the answer may be, and whatever its logical implications for one's preferred definition of "free will", wishful thinking cannot settle the matter.<br /><br />* I still think that "materialism" is a somewhat outdated term, but it's hard to avoid it in this context - especially since brains are composed of matter, although (like the rest of the body) it requires energy in order to function.mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-4078820521720557662010-05-20T11:47:40.533-04:002010-05-20T11:47:40.533-04:00Good links, based on initial scan and very helpful...Good links, based on initial scan and very helpful definitions from PaisleyDaveShttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15840516954793215700noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-28595397424308050092010-05-20T11:08:04.494-04:002010-05-20T11:08:04.494-04:00Here's another gem from NeuroLogica — not just...<a href="http://www.theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=1768" rel="nofollow">Here's another gem</a> from NeuroLogica — not just for Novella's post (which is more of a neuroscience report related to the study of consciousness), but also for the comments, which mirror (and, in some places, go deeper than) the discussion here (e.g. concerning the philosophical implications of physicalism/materialism).mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-28708019373610230362010-05-19T02:08:19.208-04:002010-05-19T02:08:19.208-04:00Nick Barrowman: "Is consciousness (understood...Nick Barrowman: "<i>Is consciousness (understood as subjective experience) causally inert?</i>"<br /><br />I believe consciousness is causally efficacious. This belief is based on my first-person experience of free will. Of course, there are those who assert that free will is purely illusory. However, the burden of proof is upon those who assert that free will is illusory, not on those who trust their first-person experiences. To date, I have never been presented with evidence that proves we have no free will. Having said that, if free will is illusory, then it logically follows that consciousness is causally inert. <i>Awareness</i> in and of itself has no causal role. <br /><br />Nick Barrowman: "<i>Does materialism (and related positions) imply that consciousness is causally inert</i>"<br /><br />Yes. Materialism does imply that consciousness is causally inert because materialism is a deterministic view which precludes the possibility of free will. <br /><br />Nick Barrowman: "<i>If consciousness is indeed causally inert, then how and why does it exist?</i>"<br /><br />This is a good question and one that I have posed on this thread. Hitherto, no response was forthcoming. <br /><br />Nick Barrowman: <i>As I see it, consciousness is unique in that it is a characteristic of (at least some) living things that is apparently not the product of natural selection.</i><br /><br />I basically agree. However, I would slightly qualify your statement. Consciousness is the characteristic of <i>all</i> living things. IMHO, materialism either implies "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism" rel="nofollow">eliminativism</a>" (the view that denies the existence of subjective experiences themselves) or "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism" rel="nofollow">panpyschism</a>" (the organic view of the world that posits consciousness as a fundamental aspect of nature.)<br /><br />Nick Barrowman: "<i>Do you know of any good references on these questions?</i>"<br /><br />Yes. I would suggest you view the website of PBS's television series "Closer To Truth" produced by Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn. It is basically a central repository of video interviews with prominent scientists, philosophers, and theologians on the topics of "cosmology, consciousness, and God." Here is the <a href="http://www.closertotruth.com/" rel="nofollow">link</a>.<br /><br />Also, there is a "Skeptics' Guide to the Universe" weekly podcast that I recently discovered on the "Neurologica Blog" site (courtesy of "jcm") in which Dr. Steven Novella (skeptic) interviews Dr. B. Alan Wallace (ex-Buddhist monk, author, and president of a consciousness studies institute in California). I am familiar with Wallace's work and he raises some of the same issues I have on this thread. Here is the <a href="http://theskepticsguide.org/archive/podcastinfo.aspx?mid=1&pid=73" rel="nofollow">link</a>.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-2647460625492759982010-05-19T00:09:32.667-04:002010-05-19T00:09:32.667-04:00Scott:
I would agree that the explanatory power o...Scott:<br /><br /><i>I would agree that the explanatory power of the assumption justifies its use. But there's really nothing to gain by claiming that the assumption validates itself -- why bother? Why not just make the assumption and get on with things?</i><br /><br />Well, if it is true that dualism makes predictions that continuously fail, whereas physicalism makes predictions that continuously succeed, then it seems to me that physicalism is a demonstrably safer assumption - if only on a pragmatic basis (e.g. insofar as it makes a difference in how medicine approaches mental disorders). Of course, the same logic would apply if the opposite were true, so it's up to science to verify the premises. <br /><br />I started to respond at length to your comment about falsification (inasmuch as it relates to my statements above), but then came to the conclusion that you're probably wiser to put it off.<br /><br />So, I'll just say that, however flawed a human endeavor science may be (which, by the way, Novella acknowledges elsewhere), I can't bring myself to ignore what it has to say about topics like these (particularly from those fields most relevant - in this case, neuroscience and cognitive science). As Massimo often suggests, it owes more to philosophy than many scientists seem willing to acknowledge, but then philosophy without science strikes me as ungrounded.mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-26936845166772686582010-05-18T11:28:09.760-04:002010-05-18T11:28:09.760-04:00Hi jcm,
"If we agree to accept the epistemo...Hi jcm, <br /><br />"If we agree to accept the epistemological view of methodological naturalism, then I think we also agree to accept the "physicalist assumption" to some degree - even if we personally reject the ontological view of metaphysical naturalism. (See here for some definitions.)"<br /><br />Yes I think that's so.<br /><br />"...one section of that blog entry that I linked to earlier, by neurologist Dr. Steven Novella"<br /><br />Yes, I didn't have a moment to read that earlier but I've read it now and I think you're right that there's a fair bit of compelling evidence that minds <i>are</i> brains. It seems to me that the advantage of making the physicalist assumption -- even just methodologically, as you say above -- is that you get to exert the full explanatory power of that evidence. There is, in other words, a compelling pragmatic reason to adopt physicalism -- at least if you're a neuroscientist!<br /><br />"More to the point, if Novella's claims are accurate, and continue to gain support in the future, then would you not agree that physicalist (or materialist) assumptions have been validated to some degree (if not ontologically, then at least methodologically)? and in a way that is significantly more impressive than a mere circular argument?"<br /><br />I would agree that the explanatory power of the assumption <i>justifies</i> its use. But there's really nothing to gain by claiming that the assumption <i>validates</i> itself -- why bother? Why not just make the assumption and get on with things?<br /><br />I also have a complaint about that post, in that I think it adopts a rather naive view of falsification that I just don't think holds up under close scrutiny. But that's a debate for another day.<br /><br />"Going a bit further than you might be comfortable with..."<br /><br />Actually I am pretty comfortable with what you say; and I think "metaphysical propositions that are <i>harmonious with</i> our knowledge" really captures the kind of justification I'm talking about above -- not a validation, but a concordance. As I've thought to myself several times throughout this conversation, there is an important aesthetic component to judgments like these.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11332828263550581927noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-57817212425753720132010-05-18T03:04:45.345-04:002010-05-18T03:04:45.345-04:00jcm: "Now I should stress that I...am not qua...jcm: "<i>Now I should stress that I...am not qualified to judge the full accuracy of Novella's claims above.</i><br /><br />I believe I am qualified to evaluate Novella's claims (at least some of those he made in his article "<a href="http://www.theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=189" rel="nofollow">Intelligent Design of the Brain</a>")<br /><br />He is claiming that there is evidence to establish that mental states <i>reduce</i> to brain states because there is evidence to establish that mental states are <i>correlated</i> to brain states. But this does not logically follow. <a href="" rel="nofollow">Correlation does not imply causation</a>, let alone <i>identification</i>. There is not a shred of evidence to establish that mental states are <i>identical</i> to physical states.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-23148491435233935602010-05-18T01:59:16.801-04:002010-05-18T01:59:16.801-04:00jcm: "There is some real-world overlap in thi...jcm: "<i>There is some real-world overlap in this analogy, epitomized by Dr. Michael Egnor, a neurosurgeon who rejects evolutionary theory and (like Paisley) has gone on the attack against "materialism" in the study of the mind. Perhaps his most vocal opponent is neurologist Dr. Steven Novella, whose blog I casually follow. For example, if you have some time, I recommend that you read this entry and see if you recognize any similarities to this thread.</i><br /><br />I read Novella's article on his blog entitled "<a href="http://www.theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=189" rel="nofollow">Intelligent Design of the Brain</a>." There Novella makes the following challenge: "<i>Name one prediction of strict materialism that has been falsified</i>."<br /><br />I will take that challenge. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines <a href="" rel="nofollow">materialism</a> as "<i>a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter.</i>"<br /><br />Materialism is making the prediction that "<i>all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter</i>." This claim has been falsified by experiments in quantum physics. Quantum jumps are physical events which have <i>no</i> physical cause and therefore <i>no</i> physical explanation. The <i>deterministic</i> theory of materialism has been falsified by <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_indeterminacy" rel="nofollow">quantum indeterminacy</a>. The prevailing scientific theory holds that nature is fundamentally indeterminate.<br /><br />Incidentally, Daniel Dennett (the philosopher whom you are endorsing) is an "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism" rel="nofollow">eliminative materialist</a>" who denies the existence of subjective experiences. Evidently, strict adherence to the materialist assumption (that only the objective is real) leads to some very irrational positions.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-56147586414348418172010-05-17T22:37:12.571-04:002010-05-17T22:37:12.571-04:00I asked Paisley, ""Do you know of any go...I asked Paisley, ""Do you know of any good references on these questions?"<br /><br />Paisley, you replied: "What are the questions?"<br /><br />I believe it was your statement that got the ball rolling here: "On the materialistic worldview, consciousness is causally-inert. With that in mind, I fail to see how consciousness was naturally selected since it could not have possibly conferred any survival benefit."<br /><br />The questions (and related arguments) that interest me are:<br /><br />* Is consciousness (understood as subjective experience) causally inert?<br />* Does materialism (and related positions) imply that consciousness is causally inert?<br />* If consciousness is indeed causally inert, then how and why does it exist?<br /><br />This last question relates, in part, to natural selection. As I see it, consciousness is unique in that it is a characteristic of (at least some) living things that is apparently not the product of natural selection.Nick Barrowmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11224940659269649220noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-83912332012142375732010-05-17T19:44:32.750-04:002010-05-17T19:44:32.750-04:00jcm: "Just for the record: I never stated the...jcm: "<i>Just for the record: I never stated the above as my view, whereas I did state my view plainly in my last reply:</i>"<br /><br />Just for the sake of clarity. <i>Did you</i> or <i>did you not</i> make the argument that consciousness is a <i>strong emergent</i> property and that it <i>supervenes</i> on the physical? If you did <i>not</i> make this argument, then what exactly is your objection to my assertion that consciousness is causally inert on the materialist view? (The supervenient theory of mind was specifically formulated to give consciousness "downward causation.")Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-25018935126077350512010-05-17T12:57:52.050-04:002010-05-17T12:57:52.050-04:00Scott:
The problem at hand really is whether or n...Scott:<br /><br /><i>The problem at hand really is whether or not to make that assumption;</i><br /><br />If we agree to accept the epistemological view of methodological naturalism, then I think we also agree to accept the "physicalist assumption" to some degree - even if we personally reject the ontological view of metaphysical naturalism. (See <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalism_%28philosophy%29" rel="nofollow">here</a> for some definitions.) <br /><br />That said, I just want to highlight one section of that blog entry that I linked to earlier, by neurologist Dr. Steven Novella:<br /><br />==================<br />If the mind is completely a product of the material function of the brain then:<br />- There will be no mental phenomena without brain function.<br />- As brain function is altered, the mind will be altered.<br />- If the brain is damaged, then mental function will be damaged.<br />- Brain development will correlate with mental development.<br />- We will be able to correlate brain activity with mental activity – no matter how we choose to look at it.<br /><br />All of these predictions have been resolved in favor of materialism. “Every single one!” Dualism makes predictions too – that some mental function will be documented to exist separate from brain function. The evidence for this? None. <br />=====================<br /><br />Now I should stress that I am only a casual consumer of science reporting, and am not qualified to judge the full accuracy of Novella's claims above. But I'll just say this much: it jibes with my lay person's knowledge of the relevant field(s) (e.g. neuroscience and cognitive science) from other sources.<br /><br />More to the point, if Novella's claims are accurate, and continue to gain support in the future, then would you not agree that physicalist (or materialist) assumptions have been validated to some degree (if not ontologically, then at least methodologically)? and in a way that is significantly more impressive than a mere circular argument?<br /><br />I would agree that there will always be gaps in our knowledge, and those who (for whatever prior ideological reasons) find physicalism upsetting will probably always find an excuse to insert mysterious and spooky forces into those gaps. But then I think we should feel no guilt in dismissing their special pleading in favor of theories that can generate testable and falsifiable hypotheses - especially if they pass the test - repeatedly. <br /><br />Going a bit further than you might be comfortable with, Scott, I also think we should feel no guilt in expressing preference for metaphysical propositions that are harmonious with our knowledge - so long as we bear in mind that they are highly speculative (e.g. that nature probably did not select us for our ability to glean metaphysical Truths), and that we should have the integrity and humility to let go of them should our knowledge prove to contradict them. (Yes, there is an ethical/normative overtone to that last clause.)<br /><br />Sorry for going on for so long. I guess you inspired me. :-)mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-5515528273658349122010-05-17T11:19:18.809-04:002010-05-17T11:19:18.809-04:00jcm: "Scott, if by "objective" Pais...jcm: "Scott, if by "objective" Paisley means "inter-subjective" - which is the meaning that (I think) you and I agreed to earlier..."<br /><br />Ha, yes, thanks for keeping me honest. That is indeed the definition that I'm inclined to accept, and I don't mean to back-track when I say I'm not disagreeing with Paisley on that point. But... <br /><br />"...and we look to those research communities who study subjective awareness (or the mind, in general) on the basis of physicalist assumptions..."<br /><br />This is the key point -- physicalism is indeed an <i>assumption</i> which then enables us to draw certain kinds of reasonable conclusions about consciousness. The problem at hand really is whether or not to make that assumption; and my argument is very simply that belief in the existence and causal efficacy of consciousness does not -- absent further evidence -- contradict the physicalist assumption. <br /><br />"...then I should think that there is quite a lot of objective evidence in this regard."<br /><br />But taken as evidence of physicalism, based on the assumption of physicalism, it counts as evidence only in a circular argument. <br /><br />To be as clear as possible -- and perhaps I have failed on this point heretofore -- I doubt there are <i>any</i> non-circular empirical (i.e. based on <i>experience</i>, subjective, inter-subjective, objective, what have you) arguments that can decisively resolve this problem. Even if we constructed machines that could fool the Voight-Kampff test (so to speak), people could still doubt that they had consciousness, because people can doubt that <i>other people</i> have consciousness. I just don't happen to think that the possibility of such doubt is grounds for an ontological conclusion.<br /><br />I would be more persuaded by Paisley's argument if we had been struggling to create objects that appear to be conscious and failing for centuries. (Even so, his argument wouldn't be any less circular.) But bona-fide attempts to model consciousness only began a few decades ago. So does it surprise me that we don't have conscious machines yet? No. In five-hundred years, if we don't, <i>then</i> I might be persuaded -- if I weren't dead. In the meanwhile, let the research money flow. <br /><br />BTW: Of the authors you mention I've only read Dennett -- another figure who, like Hofstadter, I think occasionally tries to have and eat his ontological cake. (For example: "substrate independence" is just another word for Platonism as far as I can tell.) I'll have to check out the others some time.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11332828263550581927noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-433484656055989812010-05-17T09:39:35.634-04:002010-05-17T09:39:35.634-04:00Your view (as stated previously) is non-reductive ...<i>Your view (as stated previously) is non-reductive supervenient physicalism - a view which is inherently self-contradictory.</i><br /><br />Correcting Paisley's strawman arguments has gotten really boring and frustrating, and I'm basically done conversing with him directly.<br /><br />Just for the record: I never stated the above as my view, whereas I did state my view plainly in my last reply: <br /><br />"Sentience does not occur outside of a physical (most likely animal) body."<br /><br />Furthermore, according to my view, mental events are physical events, in that they depend on a physical body capable of producing them (e.g. one with a brain) in order to occur. Take away the physical body capable of producing mental events, and no more mental events.<br /><br />Plain and simple.mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-79261036174264718982010-05-17T06:23:09.939-04:002010-05-17T06:23:09.939-04:00Still not hearing anything at all that makes sense...Still not hearing anything at all that makes sense of any phrase containing the word "objective".<br /><br />I'll tell you what I think it means. An object is a contract between 2 or more entities to define the borders of a third entity, or object. Only then do you get your tennis balls and other "real things" in the world.<br /><br />You get them via "senses" or ways one interacts with others. Ergo "nonsense" - that which one does NOT sense.<br /><br />But back to 'objective', the main reason objectivity cannot exist is because the "subject object" (if you will) can exist only in relation to one or more external objects. Making it impossible to talk about objects with no context whatsoever.<br /><br />Based on experiences in the East, Lennon (I think) was able to conclude that "nothing is real" in the Lucy song, and onboard these kinds of ideas into a 1960s and 70s consciousness. He may not have known it at the time, but work done in the West later proved his his thesis correct.<br /><br />And Shakespeare's birth? Without trusted observers or accounts, it is fair to say he may or may not have been born, and could be a figment of our imagination in the need to account for his works, or was even an alien life sent to us by literary gods.<br /><br />Not saying y'all are working through some important philosophical issues. me just thinks the ground doth shake too much when you tread on 'subjective' and 'objective'.DaveShttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15840516954793215700noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-38816364607253057252010-05-17T02:42:50.037-04:002010-05-17T02:42:50.037-04:00Scott: "But do you not see the analogy?"...Scott: "<i>But do you not see the analogy?</i>"<br /><br />No. There is no analogy. <br /><br />Scott: "<i>Likewise, we can place certain reasonable limits on what consciousness could be like, even in the absence of direct evidence. For example, we know that many behaviors previously thought of as signs of consciousness can be duplicated by physical computation systems. So if we apply the simplifying assumption that the remaining behaviors are "like" the others, at least in the very general sense that they do not require an entirely different ontological basis to function, then we can reasonably conclude that they can also be duplicated by physical computation systems.</i>" <br /><br />It is not reasonable to conclude that subjective awareness can be generated by a computer program. Those who believe that it can are simply deluding themselves.<br /><br />Scott: "<i>Are you saying there is objective evidence to establish subjective awareness is not physical?</i>"<br /><br />Yes. That there is no objective evidence to establish that subjective awareness is physical qualifies as objective evidence (in and of itself) to establish that subjective awareness is not physical. <br /><br />Scott: "<i>Is there even subjective evidence that subjective awareness is not physical?</i>"<br /><br />Yes. I have subjective evidence that subjective awareness is not objective (i.e. physical).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-11489635578450713682010-05-17T00:47:37.548-04:002010-05-17T00:47:37.548-04:00Nick Barrowman: "Do you know of any good refe...Nick Barrowman: "<i>Do you know of any good references on these questions?</i>"<br /><br />What are the questions?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-35655633421315248162010-05-17T00:39:46.190-04:002010-05-17T00:39:46.190-04:00jcm: "Sentience does not occur outside of a p...jcm: "<i>Sentience does not occur outside of a physical (most likely animal) body. That is my view.</i><br /><br />Your view (as stated previously) is <i>non-reductive supervenient physicalism</i> - a view which is inherently self-contradictory. If mental events do <i>not</i> reduce to physical events, then mental events are <i>not</i> physical. IOW, <i>non-reductive physicalism</i> is an oxymoron. <br /><br />jcm: "<i>I also trust that biologists and physicians know more of the details of how animal bodies produces sentience (and mental processes, in general), although I understand that their knowledge of the subject is far from complete.</i>"<br /><br />Richard Dawkins (probably the world's most noted evolutionary biologist) stated in his video lecture entitled "<a rel="nofollow">The Purpose of Purpose</a>" (link courstesy of Kristyana) that he believes whales are conscious but doubts that bats are. (I am not sure where he stands on cats and dogs.) Incidentally, he ascribes "neo purpose" (i.e. intelligence) to human beings, maggots, and computers. Evidently, he believes that intelligent behavior in living organisms does not require consciousness.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-37099983780339859792010-05-16T19:18:45.942-04:002010-05-16T19:18:45.942-04:00I said: Two popular books on the topic that readil...I said: <i>Two popular books on the topic that readily come to mind - partly because they explicitly address the metaphysical implications of this research - are...</i><br /><br />Actually, it's been a while since I've ready these books, and they may not have said anything explicit about the metaphysical implications of their work (i.e. even if I came away with that message). So, suffice it to say that these authors are no dualists (at least with respect to the causal explanation of mental processes).mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-2463858108705623442010-05-16T12:46:53.287-04:002010-05-16T12:46:53.287-04:00Scott in response to Paisley:
Paisley: "ther...Scott in response to Paisley: <br /><i>Paisley: "there is no objective evidence to establish subjective awareness is physical...none, zilch, NADA!"<br /><br />Scott: "You're saying that as though you think I would disagree with you."</i><br /><br />Scott, if by "objective" Paisley means "inter-subjective" - which is the meaning that (I think) you and I agreed to earlier - and we look to those research communities who study subjective awareness (or the mind, in general) on the basis of physicalist assumptions (e.g. scientists and some philosophers of mind) - then I should think that there is quite a lot of objective evidence in this regard.* Perhaps you will conclude (or already have) that these fields have yet to "establish" the physical basis of subjective awareness. But I think that depends on how high one sets the bar for "establishment." <br /><br />If one has a strong, prior objection to physicalism (e.g. a fear of determinism or human chauvinism), I expect the bar to be held very high indeed - perhaps impossibly high, as appears to be the case with creationists and evolution.**<br /><br />* Two popular books on the topic that readily come to mind - partly because they explicitly address the metaphysical implications of this research - are: The Blank Slate by cognitive scientist Steven Pinker and Descartes' Error by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio. Also, virtually any book by philosopher Daniel Dennett is relevant.<br /><br />** There is some real-world overlap in this analogy, epitomized by Dr. Michael Egnor, a neurosurgeon who rejects evolutionary theory and (like Paisley) has gone on the attack against "materialism" in the study of the mind. Perhaps his most vocal opponent is neurologist Dr. Steven Novella, whose blog I casually follow. For example, if you have some time, I recommend that you read <a href="http://www.theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=189" rel="nofollow">this entry</a> and see if you recognize any similarities to this thread.mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-33410899455570485362010-05-16T11:28:47.340-04:002010-05-16T11:28:47.340-04:00Paisley: "What is at issue here is Shakespear...Paisley: "What is at issue here is Shakespeare's DATE OF BIRTH, not whether Shakespeare's birth was a physical event."<br /><br />But do you not see the analogy? You keep asking me to name one physical property that consciousness has, and claim that because I can't, it must not be physical. But I can't name one physical property that Shakespeare's birth has -- at least not on the basis of any direct evidence. I can't say when or where it occurred; I can't say whether it began with a breech or a cephalic presentation; nor can I tell you how long it lasted or who assisted. Nor can anyone else, I expect, at least without guesswork. <br /><br />Nonetheless, we can place certain reasonable limits on what Shakespeare's birth <i>could</i> have been like. For example, we know that historically, most mothers in the sixteenth century died after giving birth by Cesarean section. So we can guess (without knowing for certain) that Shakespeare probably was not delivered by Cesarean section, given that his mother survived his birth. We cannot know this beyond a reasonable doubt, but if we apply the simplifying assumption that his mother was like most other mothers of the time, the conclusion is reasonable. <br /><br />Likewise, we can place certain reasonable limits on what consciousness could be like, even in the absence of direct evidence. For example, we know that many behaviors previously thought of as signs of consciousness can be duplicated by physical computation systems. So if we apply the simplifying assumption that the remaining behaviors are "like" the others, at least in the <i>very</i> general sense that they do not require an <i>entirely different ontological basis to function</i>, then we can reasonably conclude that they can also be duplicated by physical computation systems. <br /><br />"there is no objective evidence to establish subjective awareness is physical...none, zilch, NADA!"<br /><br />You're saying that as though you think I would disagree with you.<br /><br />Are you saying there <i>is</i> objective evidence to establish subjective awareness is not physical? Is there even <i>subjective</i> evidence that subjective awareness is not physical?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11332828263550581927noreply@blogger.com