tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post6813192018748318506..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: The Simulation Hypothesis and the problem of natural evil, part IUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger37125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-5756567129541012402012-05-01T10:07:15.658-04:002012-05-01T10:07:15.658-04:00Yeah, the world "logically" is probably ...Yeah, the world "logically" is probably too strong there--I should have said "rationally forced." Since, given their commitments, they are logically forced to conclude that someone else created our universe, and the simulation hypothesis is the most likely such scenario, the most rational thing to conclude is that we are in a simulation--but there are other logically possible scenarios where God is not the creator of our universe that they could chose if they are willing to be irrational by rejecting the most likely scenario. <br /><br />I didn't say we are certain that mental activity is the result of brain activity, but I think it is clearly beyond a reasonable doubt and thus I would say that we know it. No neuroscienist I know of would take whole body computation seriously. For sure, our brains interpret signals from our body to produce mental phenomena--but, as we have already seen, such signals can be produced artificially. You can take parts of the body away, and the mind will still function. This is not true of the brain--you take parts of the brain away, and the mental goes away with it. (Although, I guess, you could replace that part of the brain with something else and the mental activity would still likely arise--but it seems that the brain function, that interprets what the body sends to it, plays a more direct role in producing consciousness than the body that is sending the signals.) <br /><br />But even if you are right, this doesn't effect the argument--it just means that it is in virtue of the computer simulating our brain and whatever-else (central nervous system) that simulated persons are minded. The conclusion still goes through.David Kyle Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12507177877147216376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-23909937025507608572012-05-01T09:55:20.684-04:002012-05-01T09:55:20.684-04:00Yes, there can't be an infinite number of simu...Yes, there can't be an infinite number of simulated worlds, but the argument does not rely on there being an infinite number of worlds. Bostrom shows that a post-human civilization could simulate the entire universe using only a faction of a second and only a fraction of their computing power--clearly they could create a simulation capable of housing simulations themselves. That's all the argument need for the argument to work; that means that the fact that we create a simulation is not a reason to think we are not in one.David Kyle Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12507177877147216376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-427979074298785842012-04-27T17:28:27.836-04:002012-04-27T17:28:27.836-04:00Sorry, but this statement doesn't follow from ...Sorry, but this statement doesn't follow from any argument you gave in your paper:<br /><br />"...many theists, given their own philosophical and theological commitments, are logically forced to the conclusion that we live in a computer simulation."<br /><br />In fact, I believe your paper said as much that it doesn't follow that they are "forced" to such a conclusion. Theists are not "logically forced" to the conclusion that we live in a computer simulation because there are many other possibilities such as that the world is spontaneously created by natural processes (as physicists think) or that we are brain's in vats or we are dreaming, etc. Even if Bostrom is correct that there's a 20% probability we are living in a simulation (and I believe that's a too high) it would entail that your argument suggests we likely *don't* live in a computer simulation. It entails that there's an 80% probability we don't (1.0-.2=.8). <br /><br />I also don't know about this statement:<br /><br />"It is widely acknowledged that mental activity is a result of brain activity; neuroscience has confirmed this far beyond a reasonable doubt."<br /><br />I doubt it. I don't think it is a known fact that this is true. I think there are some philosophies of mind that suggests that consciousness (mental activity) is a product of a whole body computation (central nervous system working together with some other parts of the body) to produce consciousness. I think Antonio Damassio defended such a thesis too. I remember also reading a paper that argued that it's not only the brain but the immediate, external, physical environment that produces consciousness. The brain and the sensory system has to interact with the immediate environment in just the right ways to produce consciousness. Conscious mental activity "supervenes" on that whole system. <br /><br />I don't know, you might be right that the brain alone can do that stuff but it seems overstated to say that it's "far beyond a reasonable doubt" that mental activity is a result of brain activity. It's also overstated that theists are "forced" to the conclusion that we live in a computer simulation. It's more like they are "forced" (assuming Bostrom is right which is in itself a huge assumption) that we only have a 20% probability that we live in such a world.NChenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925449187109030870noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-10791564429190005512012-04-26T23:42:59.912-04:002012-04-26T23:42:59.912-04:00I completely agree with vasja.
it is similar to so...I completely agree with vasja.<br />it is similar to software emulation.<br />for example, virtualPC, where you can install another guest OS using the host OS. virtualPC emulates all the required hardware components.<br />But at some stage we might decide to install and emulate another sub-guest OS inside the guest OS, we might be able to do so,but this comes at a cost of much slower performance.<br /><br />computation slows down as the levels of emulation(simulation) go deeper.<br />and there is another problem as vasja mentioned, there can be multiple emulating softwares trying to emulate guest OS' running on the same host OS.<br /><br />as the guest OS tries to build computational systems(or software enough to emulate another subsystem), we see that there is a lag and this lag affects everything in the hierarchy.<br /><br />I guess we will never find such a lag(in our universe) when we actually build such simulations.EvNixhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09746886485210515771noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-43663809729965491882012-04-16T09:26:39.662-04:002012-04-16T09:26:39.662-04:00I do not know, if this argument against an infinit...I do not know, if this argument against an infinity of simulated worlds has already been put forward. Suppose that a scientist in the physical world manages to simulate reality. He does this on a hardware with a limited capacity of course. Then the simulated world evolves and a virtual scientist is born. He manages to simulate virtual reality in the first virtual world. For this to be possible the original physical hardware needs to have a capacity of simulating 2 virtual worlds. Of course the scientist in the first virtual world might share his invention with other scientists, or decides to simulate another world, and the same does the scientist in the virtual world inside the first virtual worlds. But all the new virtual world are being simulated on one original physical hardware, which is of limited capacity. This implies that the number of virtual worlds is surely finite, limited with the capacity of the original hardware. This breaks the line arguments of the simulation hypothesis that if there is a simulated world, we almost surely live in one. Not true anymore, since there is a finite number of simulated worlds, therefore the possibility that if there exists a simulated world, we live in one, is equal to 1-1/(n+1), where n stands for a number of simulated worlds. In this case, the (naive) likelihood of us living in a simulated world hinges on the capacity of the original hardware. For the result of infinity of simulated worlds to hold, the physical laws governing the original world need to be different than ours.vasjahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00275279763749474696noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-24645253919428932482012-04-12T00:29:05.196-04:002012-04-12T00:29:05.196-04:00This comment has been removed by the author.Andrewhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01508902911275544038noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-59188977813982176542012-04-12T00:23:04.931-04:002012-04-12T00:23:04.931-04:00This comment has been removed by the author.Andrewhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01508902911275544038noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-64574041645147086332012-04-11T18:35:03.785-04:002012-04-11T18:35:03.785-04:00I won’t rule out the possibility of a simulated wo...I won’t rule out the possibility of a simulated world being created in the far away future. But then, I guess, how would I know that the simulated world(s) had not already been started in the far-distant past?jrhshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01074853182840350306noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-70116923260461425612012-04-11T17:56:39.974-04:002012-04-11T17:56:39.974-04:00I am just following the rules of epistemic probabi...<i> I am just following the rules of epistemic probability here by assigning an each an equal value.</i><br /><br />Garbage in, garbage out.<br /><br />A good reason why many mathematicians and scientists can't take this kind of philosophy seriously.<br /><br />And you entirely missed my point. By adding more possible explanations (as I did), or combining the ones you have, you can <i>make the probability anything you want</i>,Jeffrey Shallithttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12763971505497961430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-45472873097270276682012-04-11T17:46:17.282-04:002012-04-11T17:46:17.282-04:00Huh, that would suck, but the possibilities it ope...Huh, that would suck, but the possibilities it opens about conscience and even ethical concerns is almost to big to wrap one's mind around. The thing about this to me is not whether it is possible but what if it is? So they might have to shut me down.sanchillihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13594473904077297441noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-8635138911750706532012-04-11T17:10:04.959-04:002012-04-11T17:10:04.959-04:00Eamon
If Bostrom were arguing that the simulation ...Eamon<br />If Bostrom were arguing that the simulation hypothesis is true, then yeah--you could not "prove" him wrong. Such skeptical conclusions are unfalsifiable by their very nature. But that is not what he is arguing, or what I am arguing. <br /><br />The last line in his paper (before the conclusion) captures his main thesis best: "Unless we are now living in a simulation, our descendants will almost certainly never run an ancestor-simulation." That is equivalent to: “if our descendants will run an ancestor-simulation then we are almost certainly living in one.” By laying down the (epistemic) odds of whether our descendants will run a simulation, he lays down the (epistemic) odds of whether we are in a simulation. But you could refute his argument by arguing that conditional is false. You also could refute it by arguing, as Sean tried above, that he is off about how likely it is that our descendant will run a simulation (by, for example, casting doubt on their possibility). Arguing against him Iis not about proving that we are not in a computer simulation (an impossibility) since that is not what he is claiming. <br /><br />But the simulation hypothesis is more likely that the dream or evil demon hypothesis because I have no reason to think the dream or evil demon hypothesis is true. I simply can’t prove them false. But the simulation hypothesis has more going for it than that. It’s not merely unfalsifiable. If our descendants will create one, we are most likely in one—and I at least have some reason to think that our descendants will create one. So I at least have some reason for thinking it's true. That’s the argument.David Kyle Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12507177877147216376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-17074239275771473422012-04-11T16:40:40.984-04:002012-04-11T16:40:40.984-04:00Yeah, I see what you mean about you and Bostrom be...Yeah, I see what you mean about you and Bostrom being in agreement--you can't simulate a whole universe down to the sub-atmomic level. I guess I am more optimistic about the possibility of a simulated universe, but even if my and Bostrom's optimism is misplaced, I still think I have some reason to think that a computer simulation is possible to some degree--more reason than I have to think that, for example, I am dreaming or being fooled by the evil demon. And, ultimately, that is what I am shooting for here. The simulation hypothesis is the most likely of the scenarios in which our universe is designed, but not designed by God.David Kyle Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12507177877147216376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-40837135667842765342012-04-11T16:35:07.667-04:002012-04-11T16:35:07.667-04:00If Professor Farnsworth was among the survivors—th...If Professor Farnsworth was among the survivors—that would fall under the option (1). My point is that the (1)-(5) seem to exhaust the possibilities. <br /><br />And I’m not jumping back and forth between talking about objective and epistemic probabilities. I am talking about epistemic probabilities—degrees of belief—how confident we should be regarding all this, the entire time. The fact that I mention frequencies or proportions does not mean that I am taking or defining probabilities in objective terms at that point. Objective probabilities can (and should) influence one’s degree of belief, but doing so does not switch one to talking about objective probabilities. For example, my degree of belief that the coin will come up heads is 50%, but that is because I know the objective probability is 50%--but I can still only be making a point about my degree of belief. In addition, ignorance of (or the non-existence of) objective probabilities does not prevent one from assigning epistemic probabilities.David Kyle Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12507177877147216376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-57425886252205849822012-04-11T15:40:50.626-04:002012-04-11T15:40:50.626-04:00We live in a universe that simulates itself. Get ...We live in a universe that simulates itself. Get used to it.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07573847127040276949noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-43314726993173342152012-04-11T01:25:09.151-04:002012-04-11T01:25:09.151-04:00All that said, the simulation hypothesis is intere...All that said, the simulation hypothesis is interesting! But I am suspicious of the suggestion that we know how such computers could be created already, much less that there are good arguments that it is plausible to run several simulations with nesting (there's a significant difference between simulating a universe, and simulating one that can simulate a universe, as Bostrom knows).<br /><br />I'm also suspicious of the idea that the level immediately "above" ours is significantly likely to resemble our level. Perhaps there are alternative laws of physics that are much more conducive to civilizations harnessing vast amounts of computing power than the laws of physics in our universe. In such a universe it might be trivial to simulate billions of universes like ours just for kicks; some beings might even be able to do it in "organic", evolved brains, the way we do mental arithmetic. What considerations make this more or less likely than a civilization like ours being the one to simulate our universe? The answer is not clear to me, other than that it is easier to imagine something more similar to ourselves.Sean (quantheory)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00094694851707164734noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-30539226312931597722012-04-11T01:13:02.823-04:002012-04-11T01:13:02.823-04:00(Simulating a functioning brain, even one very sim...(Simulating a functioning brain, even one very similar to a human brain, is a different problem from producing a population of such brains that are convincingly organic! Besides the physical structures, there are also a significant number of moment-to-moment chemical changes. We get tired or hormonal or drunk. Gene expression changes. Blood pressure fluctuates. Glucose gets used up. Neurotransmitter levels jump up and down. These are effects that are not nice and linear, but often synergistic with each other. None of these can be reasonably expected to affect every neuron, or even every neuron in a very large area, in the same way. At best this adds a few orders of magnitude to the complexity involved, and if you leave most of it out, even if the brain still functions and no one notices, you are no longer simulating something that behaves like a real human brain.)<br /><br />I'd also like to point out that I think the mass of computers and density of processors are unlikely to be the limiting factors in how large of a computer can be built. Thermodynamic considerations suggest that surface area is of considerable importance. Computers must be powered and cooled, and this must happen through the surface, or else the computer must have an extremely large battery. In either case the energy vented must be greater than that consumed, or else the computer heats up and degrades. Sufficiently large computers also suffer from larger and larger communications costs, though currently that's due to limits in parallelizability that might be surpassed, rather than physical limitations. The same cannot be said for, e.g., Dyson sphere sizes of computers.Sean (quantheory)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00094694851707164734noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-29804400697977049772012-04-11T01:11:45.166-04:002012-04-11T01:11:45.166-04:00His argument concedes exactly the point I was maki...His argument concedes exactly the point I was making, here:<br /><br />"Simulating the entire universe down to the quantum level is obviously infeasible, unless radically new physics is discovered. But in order to get a realistic simulation of human experience, much less is needed – only whatever is required to ensure that the simulated humans, interacting in normal human ways with their simulated environment, don’t notice any irregularities. The microscopic structure of the inside of the Earth can be safely omitted. Distant astronomical objects can have highly compressed representations: verisimilitude need extend to the narrow band of properties that we can observe from our planet or solar system spacecraft. On the surface of Earth, macroscopic objects in inhabited areas may need to be continuously simulated, but microscopic phenomena could likely be filled in ad hoc. What you see through an electron microscope needs to look unsuspicious, but you usually have no way of confirming its coherence with unobserved parts of the microscopic world."<br /><br />I should say, his attitude towards this fact is much more positive than mine. But I don't think we disagree on any particular fact here. As I was trying to get across, any simulation that can encompass the world we live in must fall somewhere upon the spectrum of "unconceivably vast resources" and "coarse simulation with a evil daemons hiding the coarseness from us". Of course these daemons would not be people, but part of the simulation itself (hence the pun, if you see it), but they must be good enough at understanding and predicting human capabilities and behavior to do their jobs. It's not outlandish to suggest that an entity that can understand and predict human beliefs just by reading brain states may need to be more intelligent in most ways than most actual humans are, in which case we might not even be the smartest or most complex entitities that need to be simulated here!<br /><br />The simulation must also either simulate, or fill in ad hoc, every part of the environment with a significant chance of significantly influencing human beliefs, whether it actually will so influence us or not, and whether we expect it to influence us or not. (After all, it would not be a very accurate simulation if the natural world never surprised us in highly complex and unlikely ways; that would be a very unlikely universe!)<br /><br />The main question, then, is how many resources can readily be saved by such daemons without degrading the quality of the simulation to an unacceptable or noticeable level, and without causing the resources used by the daemons themselves to exceed those of the rest of the simulation. Bostrom seems to think that there is a lot of leeway here, and I do not. A convincing simulation of human history has to replicate much of our environment down to a fairly fine level in order to avoid giving up the game, and matching the number of flops executed by the human brain gets you only part of the information necessary to reproduce its workings.Sean (quantheory)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00094694851707164734noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-70593385493972319152012-04-11T00:04:43.615-04:002012-04-11T00:04:43.615-04:00Kyle,
Re: "If you can refute his argument, I...Kyle,<br /><br />Re: "If you can refute his argument, I can guarantee you could get published by doing so."<br /><br />Since when have skeptically-themed arguments been 'refuted'? <i>Contra</i> G.E. Moore, philosophical skepticism, e.g., has never been 'refuted' -- though who among us takes global skepticism seriously? <br /><br />It is not that one must 'refute' Bostrom's argument. Rather, it is that Bostrom's argument falls, largely, upon our ears as <i>flatus vocis</i>, and for the following reason: It is an unfalsifiable hypothesis in much the same way other skeptical hypotheses are. <br /><br />You say the simulation hypothesis is more likely to be true than dream-state or evil genius alternatives, but I simply do not see how this is so.Cian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-41869665585419409502012-04-10T23:46:06.858-04:002012-04-10T23:46:06.858-04:00Kyle,
Re: Epistemic probabilities.
If probabil...Kyle, <br /><br />Re: Epistemic probabilities. <br /><br />If probability is defined (crudely) as the long-term proportion with which a certain outcome will occur in situations with short-term uncertainty, the principle of indifference is meaningless: ergo, Jeffrey's comment about the principle's silliness. <br /><br />Epistemic probabilities are instead understood to be some measure of an agent's degree of belief, explicated in terms, e.g., of fair betting odds. Setting aside other issues, the problem here arises when one (such as yourself) says this: <br /><br /><i> If we were dealing with objective probability, yes we probably should just admit that we don’t know what the odds are, and move on. But, when doing epistemic calculations, you assign values “given what you know,” and when you know nothing you assign an equal probability to each option—because, given what you know (nothing), each option is equally likely. </i><br /><br />If in one context you define probability in terms of frequencies or proportions (cf. "objective probability") and in another define probabilities in terms of measures of degrees of beliefs (or, in this case, ignorance), you must clarify in what way the epistemic probabilities, if they are to be coherent, should map onto the observed relative frequencies in the former case and then in what way we can say the epistemic probabilities in the latter sense are coherent if we have no empirical basis upon which to base the probability assignments in the latter. <br /><br />In other words, you shift perilously between two incompatible concepts of probability in one sentence. If you want to defend epistemic probabilities, fine: but you cannot defend at the same time a notion of objective probability, for you are then talking about two different concepts.Cian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-42277567903336915742012-04-10T23:32:19.881-04:002012-04-10T23:32:19.881-04:00Kyle,
Re: "Destroying all but 10, all but 11...Kyle,<br /><br />Re: "Destroying all but 10, all but 11 of us, etc. would fall under the last possibility ... "<br /><br />Nope. It is possible -- though not plausible -- that the remaining n number of humans have both the technical abilities and inclination to simulate a universe. (One of the survivors could be Professor Farnsworth, e.g.)Cian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-19117615401722585382012-04-10T22:26:23.710-04:002012-04-10T22:26:23.710-04:00Mark, I think you are either strawmanning my argum...Mark, I think you are either strawmanning my argument or is just misunderstanding it. The logic of my argument is this: “If A is true, then B is most certainly true. So, to figure out how likely it is that B is true, all we need to do is figure out how likely it is that A is true.” This is not fallacious; it does not contain a gaping logical hole. This is as deductively valid as you can get. If A entails B, then the likelihood of A reflects on the likelihood of B. The mere fact that I use the word “if” does not make it speculative. Mentioning a list of “mushy words” does not either. The point of that “mushily worded” paragraph is simply to argue that Strong AI (a very widely believed philosophical notion that entails that computer simulated persons would be conscious) is likely true, and if it is the possibility of computer simulated worlds follows. If strong AI is not true, then of course they are not possible—but we can just add that to our list of reasons we may never develop simulated worlds: strong AI might be false. And I consider that in the next to last paragraph. All that does is reduce slightly the likelihood of the simulation hypothesis (from 20% to 16%). But since I am not arguing for the truth of the simulation hypothesis—I am only arguing that it is more likely than you probably thought, at least more likely than other skeptical scenarios—this does not endanger my ultimate conclusion. Now, you declare that it is “hogwash” to suppose that this point can be used to make my ultimate point—but you have not even heard how I will use it to make my point. I’m hoping everyone can keep an open mind long enough to at least consider my argument.David Kyle Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12507177877147216376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-43811541276970321342012-04-10T22:24:03.392-04:002012-04-10T22:24:03.392-04:00Since, in this entry, I was just very quickly summ...Since, in this entry, I was just very quickly summarizing an argument that was published in Philosophical Quarterly (a very prominent philosophical journal), and it is an argument that has been very well received, I didn’t expect so much objection here. But, it might be my fault… I may simply have not been clear enough. So, that said, let me see if I can clear a few things up. Let me post a general comment below, and then I will respond individually to other comments above. <br /><br />Bostrom has an entire website devoted to this argument—where he has posted his original argument, many different iterations of it, and critical replies, and his responses. For those truly concerned with it, I suggest you check it out. He does a much better job of defending the argument than I ever could. If you can refute his argument, I can guarantee you could get published by doing so. <br /><br />http://www.simulation-argument.com/<br /><br />Now, for specific points, I replied above.David Kyle Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12507177877147216376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-36191985867351161032012-04-10T22:13:02.880-04:002012-04-10T22:13:02.880-04:00Some of suggested that speculating about the simul...Some of suggested that speculating about the simulation hypothesis is dangerous, because the programer may only find us useful if we don't know that we are in one. Once we figure it out, we'll be shut down. Then again, the programer may be waiting to reward those who figure it out.David Kyle Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12507177877147216376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-48054913986828792912012-04-10T22:10:56.012-04:002012-04-10T22:10:56.012-04:00Dirk, I do think that one could be an atheist and ...Dirk, I do think that one could be an atheist and adhere to the simulation hypothesis, at least in the classic sense. God, classically conceived, is all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful, and a computer programmer need not be any of these things to create a computer simulated world. Even if you equate “God” with “whoever designed our universe”, one who believes our world is a computer simulation need not believe that God exists—for whatever computer programmer designed our world could have died and not shut the simulation down first. If so, Nietzsche was right in a very literal sense—God is dead. But I should probably point out here that I am not arguing that the simulation hypothesis is true. In this entry, I am only arguing that it is more likely than you think. But, ultimately, I am arguing that theists who can’t answer the problem of natural evil are committed to believing the simulation hypothesis. Atheists are not committed to it at all.David Kyle Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12507177877147216376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-35644112270838460982012-04-10T22:10:27.599-04:002012-04-10T22:10:27.599-04:00Yes, and in it I don't have a goatee.Yes, and in it I don't have a goatee.David Kyle Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12507177877147216376noreply@blogger.com