tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post4798411893146774624..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Massimo’s PicksUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger74125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-41069519279770817692011-03-01T03:38:23.050-05:002011-03-01T03:38:23.050-05:00Several points:
1. I think that a simulated mind w...Several points:<br />1. I think that a simulated mind wouldn't have qualia. In a sidebar, Bryan Green e talks about a simulated multiverse in "The Hidden Reality." I think he stretches things too far on simulations.<br />2. Ian, only 40 percent of the locked-in patients in that article were responsive enough to be surveyed. If you're staking boxed happiness on that, you're reading way too much into that study.<br />3. Ian and Massimo, I have little dbout that at least some aspects of modern human consciousness are spandrels. But, as the old saying goes, it's the only game in town...Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-35897605273275747382011-02-28T21:33:38.116-05:002011-02-28T21:33:38.116-05:00I agree, I just wanted to make sure we were clear ...I agree, I just wanted to make sure we were clear that he will definitely claim qualia.<br /><br />Of course, there is no third person verifiable way to know whether <i>anybody</i> experiences qualia... Nonetheless I tend to err on the side opposed to solipsism when an entity claims qualia and has a "brain" functionally analogous to mine.ianpollockhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15579140807988796286noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-68864752066146934942011-02-28T21:22:25.699-05:002011-02-28T21:22:25.699-05:00Ian, but that's the crucial point: I don't...Ian, but that's the crucial point: I don't think that simulating a physical process is the same as the actual physical process. So your computer may say that he is feeling qualia, as part of the simulation, but there is no way to know whether it does actual feel them or not.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-22447831650352068582011-02-28T21:10:58.703-05:002011-02-28T21:10:58.703-05:00>how should I (or anyone, for that matter) know...>how should I (or anyone, for that matter) know whether a simulated brain might claim to have qualia?<br /><br />It would <b>have</b> to claim qualia, because <i>whatever physical process makes ME claim qualia</i> is (by hypothesis) being simulated there as well. If it doesn't claim qualia, then qualia must not have a physical cause; hence we know that either Descartes was right, or simulated me is a practical joker. This is the most crucial thing to be clear on in our entire discussion.ianpollockhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15579140807988796286noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-56004452357774327502011-02-28T20:01:48.332-05:002011-02-28T20:01:48.332-05:00Ian, how should I (or anyone, for that matter) kno...Ian, how should I (or anyone, for that matter) know whether a simulated brain might claim to have qualia? My bet is that it wouldn't have qualia, whether it claimed it or not.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-20824657853695326752011-02-28T18:43:34.795-05:002011-02-28T18:43:34.795-05:00Good points. However, you should answer the questi...Good points. However, you should answer the question I bolded above. :Pianpollockhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15579140807988796286noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-87081512721488047712011-02-28T10:02:48.645-05:002011-02-28T10:02:48.645-05:00Ian, what makes you think that the ability to refl...Ian, what makes you think that the ability to reflect on one's thinking *must* come with qualia? That begs the question, seems to me. It assumes that all types of consciousness are going to be like human consciousness.<br /><br />And how is this for a twist: it seems to me more likely that selection favored qualia (the subjective personal experience of the world) more than it favored the ability to reflect on one's thoughts. After all, a lot of species presumably have the first but not the latter, and the ability to reflect may significantly slow down one's speed of action in important circumstances.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-69964010323855584992011-02-28T09:58:24.337-05:002011-02-28T09:58:24.337-05:00I hope you didn't take me as arguing that qual...I hope you didn't take me as arguing that qualia are selected for. That's just the point - they almost certainly aren't.<br /><br />(For the record, I think "qualia" and "reflection on one's own decision procedure" are coextensive, but seen from different points of view. Kind of like "you" and "I" when both refer to Massimo Pigliucci.)<br /><br />You say that a simulated brain might not experience qualia. <b>Okay, but will a simulated brain CLAIM to have qualia?</b> Take a moment to convince yourself that it MUST claim to have qualia, unless substance dualism is true.<br /><br />Then ask yourself: what is the cause of that claim?ianpollockhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15579140807988796286noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-91833052456038569842011-02-28T08:32:21.970-05:002011-02-28T08:32:21.970-05:00Ian, I don't know whether qualia *have* to acc...Ian, I don't know whether qualia *have* to accompany consciousness or not. Perhaps they do. Either way, this does little for the evolutionary argument. Consider this: the thumping noise the heart makes *has* to accompany its blood-pumping operation. That surely doesn't mean that the noise making was selected for... So Occam's razor may cut, but not too helpfully here.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-63587019285289254982011-02-27T21:53:20.234-05:002011-02-27T21:53:20.234-05:00Oh, okay, well then my whole "evolutionary ar...Oh, okay, well then my whole "evolutionary argument" boils down to this:<br /><br /><b>Assuming <i>reflection on one's decision procedure</i> is enough for survival value, what would be the additional benefit of qualia?</b><br /><br />Thing is, if we define consciousness as the reflection AND the qualia, then we have a pretty plausible idea of how the reflection increases inclusive genetic fitness, but no idea of why qualia should accompany that reflection.<br /><br />So sure, one answer is "by-product," but don't you agree that that is a somewhat extraordinary claim when we're talking about two things so inextricable from each other? Surely we're into epicycle territory here...<br /><br />Why not just use the razor Ockham gave you and say: "since qualia always accompany such reflection, qualia are probably <i>indivisible from</i> and <i>implied by</i> reflective consciousness."<br /><br />Anyway, this is my last post of the night. Perhaps we will continue the Qualia Wars later.ianpollockhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15579140807988796286noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-74731649362429142352011-02-27T21:51:20.519-05:002011-02-27T21:51:20.519-05:00It seems to me that what has been selected for in ...It seems to me that what has been selected for in humans is the propensity to acquire, augment, and transmit culture as a means of survival rather than the more “hard wired” instincts of other animals (of course other animals, primates in particular, rely on learned behavior, but not to this degree). Since other intelligent species apparently possess some level of self-awareness, as evidenced by much recent research, then it follows that human intelligence would allow the highly developed consciousness we have. <br /><br />But the essential component, I think, is language, since this highly developed human consciousness is manifested as a dialogue between the “I” and “me” or others. Both this inner dialogue and the ability to communicate precisely are requisite for our cultural adaptive strategy to work. Everything else, from moral systems to the arts and science, might just be by-products of our innate need to write our own “rules” about how to be a human.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-17069122914970975342011-02-27T21:35:12.763-05:002011-02-27T21:35:12.763-05:00Ian, I'm sorry, but simulated consciousness se...Ian, I'm sorry, but simulated consciousness seems to me to be an oxymoron. Either the computer is conscious or is not, regardless of what it looks like from the outside. So, yes, the question boils down to qualia. Again, I am not claiming that necessarily qualia are possible only in carbon-based forms of a given complexity, but those are the only examples we know, and the burden is on those who claims that anything (including "patterns") can have qualia to show that that is indeed the case.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-22169439072333492912011-02-27T21:26:15.966-05:002011-02-27T21:26:15.966-05:00Yes, sorry, my language wasn't clear, I was eq...Yes, sorry, my language wasn't clear, I was equivocating between the feeling of consciousness and consciousness.<br /><br />But if consciousness just IS "the ability to reflect on one's own mental workings," as you claim, then haven't you conceded that an organic substrate is unnecessary?<br /><br />Maybe only carbon life can have consciousness in the <i>qualia</i> sense, but by the above definition, a computer program can definitely have consciousness in your narrower sense. All it has to do is reflect on its own operation in the right way. If a simulated human can compose poetry, it can definitely do that (or the simulation will be wrong).<br /><br />And again, while simulated photosynthesis doesn't make sugar, simulated ability to reflect on one's own inner mental workings is just as good as the real thing, to the extent that it affects further action.<br /><br />(At least in all 3rd-person verifiable senses; maybe you want to argue absence of qualia or something?)ianpollockhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15579140807988796286noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-89255928050416571812011-02-27T20:57:38.483-05:002011-02-27T20:57:38.483-05:00Ian, yes, this has been very productive. In respon...Ian, yes, this has been very productive. In response to your latest: first, I'm not convinced that consciousness is the result of natural selection, it could be a byproduct. There really is no way to know. But more importantly, when you say:<br /><br />> why natural selection would favour a creature that, independently of its ability to plan and reflect on its own decision procedure (which is what counts for survival), also has the additional and unnecessary-for-survival property of feeling conscious while it is reflecting? <<br /><br />I lost you. In order to reflect on its own decision procedure the creature has to be conscious. That's what consciousness is, the ability to reflect on one's own inner mental workings. So there is nothing *additional* there, as far as I can see.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-3138146568994710922011-02-27T20:11:44.178-05:002011-02-27T20:11:44.178-05:00Okay, I think this has been relatively productive....Okay, I think this has been relatively productive.<br /><br />>Nice analogy, but it won't do. The "product" here is the feeling of consciousness itself, not consciousness' ability to produce poetry.<br /><br />(Note: AND the claim to be conscious itself?!)<br /><br />But okay, let me see if I can convince you that this is wrong-headed.<br /><br />I think you would agree that whatever the precise nature of consciousness, it's probably a product or by-product of natural selection. I don't know exactly what the just-so-story would be, but I suspect it would have something to do with the survival value of reflecting on one's own decisions, behaviour and thoughts in realtime, as they were being made. After all, it is not clear than an entity incapable of thinking about its own thoughts can ever meaningfully plan, or know that it is mistaken, for example.<br /><br />Assuming you're with me so far, can you see any reason why natural selection would favour a creature that, independently of its ability to plan and reflect on its own decision procedure (which is what counts for survival), also has the additional and unnecessary-for-survival property of <b>feeling conscious</b> while it is reflecting? Chalmers' zombies would survive just as well as conscious humans! Why aren't we... them?<br /><br />If evolution does not plausibly select for "feeling conscious," then why on earth <b>do</b> we feel conscious?<br /><br />Possibility (a): Consciousness is a fluke or a spandrel or an epiphenomenon.<br />Possibility (b): Any entity whose behaviour is identical to a human's under all possible relevant conditions must necessarily be conscious just like a human.<br /><br />I strongly suspect (p~0.65) possibility (b). But perhaps my admittedly layman knowledge of evolution has led me astray here...ianpollockhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15579140807988796286noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-18156169717562141672011-02-27T17:45:39.126-05:002011-02-27T17:45:39.126-05:00That's why I don't try to make a living ou...That's why I don't try to make a living out of this. But it sure is fun.DaveShttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15840516954793215700noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-41474947564598132592011-02-27T17:32:19.314-05:002011-02-27T17:32:19.314-05:00Dave, I must say that what you just wrote makes pr...Dave, I must say that what you just wrote makes precisely no sense to me.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-46568958426177817932011-02-27T17:19:03.351-05:002011-02-27T17:19:03.351-05:00Massimo, I'm not thinking of information as a ...Massimo, I'm not thinking of information as a magic substance. Perhaps thinking of matter as an onion is useful. And let's say we are looking at a car for the first time. As the car's layers are peeled, they are initially very car-like (transmission, cooling system,...) But peel away a few more layers, and the car analysis has pretty much ended, and it's on to analyzing a type of metal, plastic, or oil.<br /><br />Without even getting to the subatomic level, its clear that the essence of the thing is in the eyes of the beholder, a la Wheeler's participatory universe. <br /><br />Let's say you are willing to concede non-carbon-based life forms, at least in theory.<br />Imagine really, really small forms. What possible difference can there be to them between a collection of things that make up a car, and a collection of things that make up a tree? I'd say they would both exist as patterns or ideas, and nothing more.<br /><br />Information is decidedly not magical - it is the view that stuff is best thought of only as information, and is useful only when it makes sense, consumed in some fashion by - other stuff.DaveShttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15840516954793215700noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-49892031421838715682011-02-27T16:12:56.410-05:002011-02-27T16:12:56.410-05:00James, good points, but let me clarify. Patterns a...James, good points, but let me clarify. Patterns are descriptions, therefore they need to be descriptions of *something*. So it's not quite right to say that patterns and matter are the same thing, but rather that patterns are a description of how matter (or energy, which really is the same thing) is distributed.<br /><br />The reason zombies are nonsensical is because everything we know about consciousness tells us that it is a type of biological process that requires certain materials and processes, organized in certain patterns. While the same outcome could conceivably be obtained with different patterns / materials / processes, it makes no sense to me to say that one can have the patterns / materials / processes that produce consciousness, and yet no consciousness.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-39008123487249952032011-02-27T15:58:04.265-05:002011-02-27T15:58:04.265-05:00"James, matter *has* to come with pattern. Th..."James, matter *has* to come with pattern. There is no such thing as a patternless matter, even if the pattern is random." - Massimo<br /><br />I agree. I may be completely misreading you here, but it sounded like you would concede that while matter cannot exist without pattern, pattern can exist without matter. I don't see why we should accept one and not the other. I've never encountered pattern without matter, or vice-versa.<br /><br />If I put that aside, and assume you mean that pattern and matter are ultimately just different words for the same thing, I can see why you would be skeptical of AI in general. Describing the difference between, say, silicon and human grey matter is not a difference in substance, but a difference in pattern (pattern and matter are the same thing, after all). So saying something like "we'll take the pattern from grey matter and encode it into silicon matter" is a suspiciously incomplete one because we don't know how much consciousness depends on the pattern we call grey matter.<br /><br />That seems to make sense, but I have creeping doubts. If a difference of pattern is enough to doubt consciousness, how can I reject philosophical zombies? Though my pattern may be the same as yours on the biological level, we certainly do have identical patterns of consciousness. And since difference is merely difference in pattern, wouldn't assuming that other people can be conscious be just as errant as assuming that a computer can be conscious?Just Some Guyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11306519568976890754noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-12382834239135475462011-02-27T14:52:25.590-05:002011-02-27T14:52:25.590-05:00@Massimo:
I can still use the Platonically cultiv...@Massimo:<br /><br />I can still use the Platonically cultivated image of Socrates as a "handle" without accepting its full truth. And, I like irony in general!Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-69197953196119677272011-02-27T14:04:02.371-05:002011-02-27T14:04:02.371-05:00James, matter *has* to come with pattern. There is...James, matter *has* to come with pattern. There is no such thing as a patternless matter, even if the pattern is random.<br /><br />Ian, I think your previous comment was just posted, sorry about that, the Blogger system isn't perfect. Anyway, with respect to your latest:<br /><br />> let's say (for example) composing poetry. Simulated photosynthesis doesn't give you sugar, but simulated poetry composition does give you poetry. Now apply the same principle to anything else minds do. <<br /><br />Nice analogy, but it won't do. The "product" here is the felling of consciousness itself, not consciousness' ability to produce poetry.<br /><br />> One is uploading whatever functional structure is necessary for the same input/output behaviour as was present in the biological person. <<br /><br />No, you are uploading only patterns of information, no structure at all.<br /><br />> Maybe now would be a good time to say why you think Chalmers' zombie idea is incoherent, because I can't think of a robust objection to Chalmers that doesn't lead straight to my position. <<br /><br />Good question. I think Chalmers' ideas are incoherent because if something has all the biological structures of a conscious being, and those structures function normally, then it seems to me that the thing *has* to be conscious.<br /><br />But, again, I suspect that consciousness - being a biological phenomenon - only occurs when certain particular combinations of materials and patterns are put in place, which I really don't think is dualism of any sort.<br /><br />Let's use the parallel of life itself, for instance. There has been much speculation in the exobiological literature about non-carbon life forms. These *may* be possible, but they are not likely for the simple reason that carbon has unique chemical properties that even silicon, the element most close to it, does not have. And some of those properties seem to be crucial for something to be alive.<br /><br />Again, I cannot exclude a priori that non-carbon life forms exist, or that consciousness can occur in things that are not made in a substantially similar manner to human beings and other primates. But it is a bit too quick to simply *assume* without argument or evidence that this must be the case, no?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-21787679962929730472011-02-27T13:32:26.068-05:002011-02-27T13:32:26.068-05:00Oh, I don't know, the pattern of me can drive ...Oh, I don't know, the pattern of me can drive the pattern of a car through the pattern of Neverneverland without much problem. It's the mixing and matching that gets troublesome. Though, isn't it just as impossible for the me that is matter and information to drive a merely information car, as it would be to drive a merely material car?<br /><br />Would you say that matter without pattern is also nothing?Just Some Guyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11306519568976890754noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-71266437793230713922011-02-27T13:28:02.317-05:002011-02-27T13:28:02.317-05:00@Massimo:
I think the comment of mine that you wer...@Massimo:<br />I think the comment of mine that you were responding to has disappeared into the void.<br /><br /> >There is a big difference between the description of X and X itself.<br /><br />Agreed, but again, a mind simulated on a <i>physical computer</i> is, as far as I can tell, "X itself."<br /><br />Take anything a mind does: let's say (for example) composing poetry. Simulated photosynthesis doesn't give you sugar, but simulated poetry composition <i>does</i> give you poetry. Now apply the same principle to anything else minds do.<br /><br />>what, exactly, is one "uploading"?<br /><br />I have to be careful here not to focus overly on the brain. One is uploading <i>whatever functional structure is necessary for the same input/output behaviour as was present in the biological person.</i><br /><br />And one is gambling (based on anti-zombie arguments & intuitions) that anything that walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, thinks like a duck. (Even a Giant Look Up Table, imho).<br /><br />In other words, if the simulated me claims to be conscious (because of a functional structure in his program that is isomorphic to whatever physical story makes ME claim to be conscious), then I am going to believe him. The alternative being Chalmers' zombieism.<br /><br />I am not sure I'm right, but I am <b>pretty</b> sure that these are the only two viable options outside of substance dualism, so I'm confused about why you seem to want to disagree with both Chalmers and me. Maybe now would be a good time to say <i>why</i> you think Chalmers' zombie idea is incoherent, because I can't think of a robust objection to Chalmers that doesn't lead straight to my position.ianpollockhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15579140807988796286noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-14590981193408814472011-02-27T12:27:26.619-05:002011-02-27T12:27:26.619-05:00Dave, you keep treating "information" as...Dave, you keep treating "information" as if it were some sort of magic substance. Patterns my themselves are nothing, they need to be implemented. Try driving the pattern describing a car, instead of the car itself.<br /><br />Ian, again, the problem is crypto-dualism: what, exactly, is one "uploading"? I find the idea incoherent because I think consciousness is more than just a pattern, just like everything else in the world. There is a big difference between the description of X and X itself.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.com