tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post4427606234872196117..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Consciousness and the InternetUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger77125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-21464578760105922372013-11-27T15:19:55.903-05:002013-11-27T15:19:55.903-05:00The point that Koch misses is that complexity of a...The point that Koch misses is that complexity of a system is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the phenomenon of consciousness to arise.<br /><br />He is not alone in this. Bamber and most others who concern themselves with this issue, whether agreeing or disagreeing with the proposition that the Internet can, or will, become conscious, fall into the same trap.<br /><br />Along with those who consider consciousness to be mystical or metaphysical, they overlook the fact that consciousness is a product of evolutionary processes.<br /><br />Within the context of modern science, particularly evolutionary biology, there can be no question but that consciousness is a feature of most, if not all organisms.<br /><br />Firstly, and most importantly, from our understanding of biological evolution by natural selection it becomes quite clear that the provision of a navigational feature that involves some degree of self awareness is required for an organism to interact optimally with its environment. <br /><br />It is a measure of its fitness for the prevailing environment and subject to selection pressure accordingly. <br /><br />There is, of course, a great gulf between the level of consciousness exhibited by our species in comparison to any other. <br /><br />Simply because the level of interaction with the environment required by our particular ecological niche is incomparably higher. As evidenced by the billions of artifacts and systems that have resulted from human activities.<br /><br />Furthermore, there is a good case to be made for the proposition that, from what we at present call the Internet it is probable that we will, quite soon, have a new cognitive and consciousness entity on this planet that will greatly surpass those of the human.<br /><br />A product of the observed autonomous evolution of technology within the collective imagination of our species.<br /><br />This topic is part of the broad evolutionary model very informal outlined in "The Goldilocks Effect: What Has Serendipity Ever Done For Us?" (free download in e-book formats from the "Unusual Perspectives" website)Cognosiumhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14556412288134268451noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-68669610954413364332012-11-19T16:39:45.586-05:002012-11-19T16:39:45.586-05:00The obvious crucial example of how human awareness...The obvious crucial example of how human awareness is more than automatic tabulation is that is it as much a product of our environment as ourselves (nature - nurture, and so on). We might need some automatic tabulation in neuronal processing, but that serves an interaction between oneself and one's environment, and is adaptive. Soldier on, tech people, but a reproduction of a human is a long way off.DaveKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10588445807090485179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-77812096711881850512012-11-18T09:16:08.326-05:002012-11-18T09:16:08.326-05:00Good reply about memory. What complex computation ...Good reply about memory. What complex computation is needed for automatic flow through past patterns by chemical commonalities (or some such thing)? If there is automatic tabulation or pattern matching at a basic level, it might be by basic commonalities in a flow through past patterns. Maybe that can be reduced to an algorithm, or is better defined as chemical affinities, or chemical affinities can be defined algorithmically. We shall see in time. DaveKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10588445807090485179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-71238741434190091082012-11-18T09:05:13.311-05:002012-11-18T09:05:13.311-05:00The reply above is more or less correct, but a sim...The reply above is more or less correct, but a simpler way of putting it is to say that human awareness is more than automatic tabulation (or computation) per se. The room is just a tabulator and no more. A human might be a tabulator in some ways in neuronal processing, but is more than that. It doesn't mean that a human isn't computational in some ways, only that we are more than an automatic tabulator of the chinese room variety.DaveKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10588445807090485179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-83449950979573375262012-11-17T23:09:07.042-05:002012-11-17T23:09:07.042-05:00Tom, I didn't read your post as hostile at all...Tom, I didn't read your post as hostile at all. I think we both find the China room argument flawed, but for different and perhaps equally valid reasons. I'm trying to be as fair to Searle as possible as I'm sure you are. The best of my ability to interpret his argument is that the man is the only intelligent component in the room, the room "behaves" as if it understands Chinese, but the man knows no Chinese whatsoever, so any appearance the room presents as an intelligent Chinese-speaking entity is can't be true awareness. The instructions in the book might be so cryptic (If the input character looks like such-and-such then write the number 772 in column 55 of Table 37, then if column 91 of Table 107 has a 6 in it, go to step #5934266, else go to step #6823449) that the man has no hope of ever figuring out what he is doing. Unless he follows the instructions blindly to the letter, he fails utterly at this job. The same man when it comes time to file his tax returns might follow the line-by-line instructions and fill out a perfectly accurate return without ever understanding a thing about the tax code.<br /><br />So you are right that intelligence can't be judged on whether the man actually does know the Chinese symbol for hamburger, etc. And the China room argument may have a flaw based on that issue alone, but the flaw has a dodge in the form of "but you can replace the man with a microprocessor that only knows machine code, and the instructions are so mechanical that they could be rewritten in the microprocessor's machine code. Repeat the thought experiment and you have to conclude, since the microprocessor is just an unintelligent automaton, that this time there really is no intelligence in the room, but there still is an appearance of it." I have a strong suspicion that this dodge is also flawed, but the flaw is more subtle and difficult to articulate. Perhaps you put it best by pointing out where the burden of proof should fall.<br /><br />But I do think the Chinese room argument is flawed on the basis that a single example of an automaton displaying fake intelligence, if that *is* the case, does not refute the concept of intelligence being created on a non-biological substrate. There could be routes that lead to actual intelligence, which emerges from the system as a whole and not from a single component.Richardhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10042619745483254124noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-38504304571523887962012-11-17T12:57:45.454-05:002012-11-17T12:57:45.454-05:00Richard,
Thanks for your reply.
What I have a ...Richard, <br /><br />Thanks for your reply. <br /><br />What I have a hard time understanding is that Searle speaks of processing the symbols without "knowing" what the symbols mean. But it seems to me that properly responding to the symbols demonstrates knowledge. What other evidence is there of "knowing" beyond behavior? How do we know that you or I understand what a hamburger is other than our behavior will link the word hamburger to the characters or the sound or the picture -- we see the picture and say "that is a hamburger". <br /><br />Searle seems to me to cheat a bit about the man in the room processing Chinese characters for hamburger, then entering the outside world and not recognizing a real<br />hamburger. That is unfair. It is as if I taught a group of young students about geometry, then tested them about trigonometry. I would say, "all the students failed so that proves you cannot teach them mathematics". Unfair. You have to match the testing to the teaching. The man in the room was taught only about linking characters to characters. He was never taught about linking visual data of an object to the character, or linking the character to the word sound, <br />taste, texture, etc. of a hamburger. If he WAS taught these things, his behavior (or a computer's behavior) would be indistinguishable from someone who "knows" what a hamburger is. <br /><br />If there is some other "knowing" or "understanding", then Searle is being pretty vague about exactly what it is. I saw some talk about "intentionality", but I really didn't understand what he was getting at. Thomas Nagel writes in "What is it Like to be a Bat?" that it is very difficult to say what provides evidence of consciousness. I can understand that we cannot say<br />"we have achieved consciousness in a computer" if we do not know exactly what consciousness is. But on the other hand, we also cannot say "it is impossible to achieve consciousness", as Searle seems to say. If the definition is vague, it seems to me that we are obliged to stick to observable behavior. The burden of proof is on those who claim that there is something beyond that. <br /><br />Richard, thanks again for your reply. Please know that any anger/hostility/impatience that you might detect in the lines above is not directed towards you.<br />Tom D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16005219519644708237noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-32785775569060204512012-11-17T10:04:52.855-05:002012-11-17T10:04:52.855-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Tom D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16005219519644708237noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-41048328347273588792012-11-17T05:05:33.647-05:002012-11-17T05:05:33.647-05:00Hi Nonzero,
I agree. :) I was probably a bit vagu...Hi Nonzero,<br /><br />I agree. :) I was probably a bit vague with the, in quotations, "leave". I don't think that consciousness is like a spirit that can leave the body and independently experience the world.<br /><br />I was working with a definition of consciousness where there is a distinction between the functions of the brain that give rise to consciousness and the awareness and subjective experience of consciousness that emerges. <br /><br />It may be a stretch, but I would say that consciousness extends to wherever sensory signals come from. Of course, in normal situations that only extends to the sensory receptors in the body.<br /><br />However, we could, for example, imagine a living brain in a jar receiving all of the sensory signals from, and sending all the motor signals to, a distant human body. Or, we could use the real examples of implants (cochlear and artificial retinas) that allows us to be aware of signals from sensors (sound or vision) outside of the body. <br /><br />I would say that "consciousness" extends to the site of these sensors. So consciousness could, in this sense, "leave" the body.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-4904078457173416772012-11-17T00:07:35.737-05:002012-11-17T00:07:35.737-05:00Tom,
I think we are supposed to imagine that the ...Tom,<br /><br />I think we are supposed to imagine that the man in the room is just like a microprocessor, taking inputs and processing a list of instructions. We aren't allowed to equate the man's own consciousness with the idea that the room + list + man is a conscious system. The room + list + man is a system that presents to the outside world as an apparently conscious system that understands the inputs it is taking. But if the man does not know Chinese, he does not have an understanding of those inputs, he just understands the language that that book of instructions is written in, just as a microprocessor in an apparently aware computer only understands its own machine code.<br /><br />I think the argument is flawed. It is meant to imply that no simulation of consciousness ever can develop real consciousness. That might be true if our consciousness were some mystical aspect of our minds, but Searles' argument doesn't refute the idea that our own consciousness is material in its origin -- it just gives an example of a material system that presents as conscious but isn't.<br /><br />Computers might become conscious if sufficient criteria are met -- richness of algorithms, amount of memory, coherence of sensory data, ability to interact with the environment (for example, to perform experiments that yield interpretable results), etc.<br />Richardhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10042619745483254124noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-72508419445347237452012-11-16T16:29:42.391-05:002012-11-16T16:29:42.391-05:00Peirce might then have had to say that God invente...Peirce might then have had to say that God invented ladders for our purpose..Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-37249444024122538382012-11-16T02:32:06.132-05:002012-11-16T02:32:06.132-05:00Yes, Tom D, Hawkins is fascinating.
Note that he ...Yes, Tom D, Hawkins is fascinating.<br /><br />Note that he is very clear in saying that he is NOT creating some sort of artificial consciousness.<br /><br />Even so, if our brain is a memory system it is interesting to speculate on how our consciousness relates to this and how it could work as a memory system instead of as a computing system. Where does this rabbit hole go? If only I could do a couple of PhDs on that as well :).Johan Viklundhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00261559581598492066noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-14979705169112004302012-11-15T21:41:30.405-05:002012-11-15T21:41:30.405-05:00Now that's nonsense on a step ladder. If you ...Now that's nonsense on a step ladder. If you could invent a stepladder to solve a problem by memory of some ancient version of a ladder.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-44968017560748353742012-11-15T20:29:52.892-05:002012-11-15T20:29:52.892-05:00Interesting item from the book "Human", ...Interesting item from the book "Human", by Michael S. Gazzaniga:<br /><br />"They [computer scientists] reason that once computers can match the amount of parallel connections in the brain, they will have the equivalent of human intelligence. But [Jeff] Hawkins points out a fallacy in this reasoning, which he calls the hundred-step rule. He gives this example: When a human is shown a picture and asked to press a button if a cat is in the picture, it takes about a half second or less. This task is very difficult or impossible for a computer to do. We already know that neurons are much slower than a computer, and in that half second, information entering the brain can traverse only a chain of one hundred neurons. You can come up with the answer with <br />only one hundred steps. A digital computer would take billions of steps to come up with the answer. So, how do we do it?<br /><br />"And here is the crux of Hawkins's hypothesis: 'The brain doesn't "compute" the answer to problems; it retrieves the answers from memory. In essence, the answers were stored in memory a long time ago. It only takes a few steps to retrieve something from memory.<br />Slow neurons are not only fast enough [to] do this, but they constitute the memory themselves. The entire cortex is a memory system. It isn't a computer at all. [page 366].<br /><br />Tom D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16005219519644708237noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-50198595948767870252012-11-14T20:04:08.254-05:002012-11-14T20:04:08.254-05:00Whoops Gadfly, that was my profile with the Peake ...Whoops Gadfly, that was my profile with the Peake reference, not Baron P's. I like to read interesting ideas and Peake sure concocted some interesting onesDaveShttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15840516954793215700noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-78154702648547905742012-11-14T19:46:16.750-05:002012-11-14T19:46:16.750-05:00Heck, even within natural sciences, Hawking can ha...Heck, even within natural sciences, Hawking can have "issues." He's an overly enthusiastic touter of manned space travel to Mars, having seemed to overlook things such as the problem with cosmic rays, which Moon voyagers don't have to face.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-86895331130409662072012-11-14T15:51:04.771-05:002012-11-14T15:51:04.771-05:00Gardner,
Well, the friendliness thing is an ideal...Gardner,<br /><br />Well, the friendliness thing is an ideal. I don't always live to ideals... Everyone else, sorry, but I'm traveling now, so I'll be able to check in the discussion only from time to time.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-75755628191087418132012-11-14T15:19:51.329-05:002012-11-14T15:19:51.329-05:00Which part of this exchange is the "with frie...Which part of this exchange is the "with friends" part? I'm afraid the language of dismissiveness in the original post, compounded by the relentlessly combative tone of the comments on all sides, makes it difficult for me to see the conviviality implied in that inspiring tag line.Gardnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13298202257401928048noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-27214582047775441642012-11-14T11:41:23.377-05:002012-11-14T11:41:23.377-05:00Massimo (or anyone else),
Can you help me to unde...Massimo (or anyone else),<br /><br />Can you help me to understand Searle's "Chinese Room"? In particular, I'm puzzled by the "semantics/syntax" thing.<br /><br />Searle suggests that computers just process syntax and so can never truly "know" things. But in the example of the person (in the room) who internalized the rules for manipulating Chinese characters -- can we not say that he will come to know Chinese? He can certainly reply to any question posed in Chinese. To an outside observer, he will appear to be a speaker. To say (as Searle does) that he does not understand what a "hamburger" is would surely just be a temporary obstacle. That is, as the man walked around and experienced things outside the room, he would come to note that the Chinese character (let's call it #32) is constantly associated with a hamburger. He would see pictures of hamburgers with #32 underneath it. From there, he may make associations of someone reading character #32 with a particular sound and learn to associate the sound with the character, etc. (Edgar Rice Burroughs's first "Tarzan" story describes Tarzan teaching himself English -- solely from Tarzan looking at picture books and the dictionary!) <br /><br />Of course, coming to understand what a hamburger is requires making inferences and generalizing beyond what one is specifically taught. I'm not sure to what extent computers are able to do this. But the man in the Chinese room certainly could. Indeed, how else could a foreigner come to know the language of another land (other than by making inferences from a large group of experiences)? In short, I don't see the barrier of obtaining semantics from syntax. I also wonder why Searle focuses on syntax, since I am assuming here that the information received by the computer or the man in the Chinese room is not only syntactically correct, but consists of accurate and meaningful examples from which to generalize. (i.e. syntactically correct, but meaningless statements like "The water is triangular" are excluded). It seems to me not so much a question of semantics/syntax, but of receiving accurate examples/information and being able to make inferences and generalizations. <br /><br />For example, if a computer is taught that a red ball is a ball, a green ball is a ball, etc. is it able to generalize that the color is irrelevant and it is the shape that gives us the category of "ball"? If so, it <br />would seem to me that links could be made from symbols to objects that would qualify the computer as "knowing" what a hamburger is. <br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Tom D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16005219519644708237noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-75548981097309946422012-11-13T13:19:49.519-05:002012-11-13T13:19:49.519-05:00Massimo, you've agreed that Peirce was a great...Massimo, you've agreed that Peirce was a great logician, yet argue that his capacity for logic was somehow perverted, as it did not prevent, but in fact was causing him, to see purpose in everything because he illogically believed there must be a god out there in some amorphous form. <br />Now you'll say I've twisted what you've written so that it no longer makes sense. Exactly. Although I'd call it parsing or dissecting. Because it doesn't make sense logically that a great logician based perhaps his most important logical proposition on superstition. And I've found nothing in his writings that says otherwise, even though in "context" you have.<br /><br />What we usually find is that these people are prompted and confounded by their superstitions with the compulsion to make rational sense of them, but true greatness won't ordinarily ensue from that. More like Chopraesqueness. Or perhaps Dawkinsistics.<br /><br />And regardless of your reading of my quote from Russell, in that there's no evidence he believed in cosmic purpose, the fact is that he clearly did, and in his case it came from his disbelief in a god that he had once believed in. (He threw out the baby but not the bath, it seems.) His pal, Whitehead, was similarly inclined, as you'll recall.<br /><br />And then you wrote: "Of course DNA is the basis (I’m not sure about “quintessential”) for our capacity to be aware." <br />But now you say DNA is not in itself aware; but it gives us that ability. <br />Does awareness thus spring from non-awareness? I find it hard to think so - it's a lot like saying that life's intelligence sprang from non-intelligence. <br />But then you have your pure nonsense and I have mine.<br /><br /><br /><br />Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-1707917678278252872012-11-13T08:33:06.780-05:002012-11-13T08:33:06.780-05:00Baron,
you really need to make an effort not to t...Baron,<br /><br />you really need to make an effort not to twist what others write. I’m ok debating things almost ad nauseam, but sometimes it looks like you are not even trying.<br /><br />> Peirce does not get his belief in purpose from belief in God. <<br /><br />Yes, he did, as it’s clear from the context of the quote we were discussing.<br /><br />> other philosophers such as Russell haven't. <<br /><br />Except that absolutely *nothing* in the Russell quote you gave hints at the conclusion that Russell himself believed in cosmic purpose. C’mon, man, that’s just reading other people through incredibly thick ideological glasses.<br /><br />> So your argument now is that DNA is aware but its molecules aren't. <<br /><br />NO, IT ISN’T! Please re-read what I wrote. I agreed that DNA is part of what gives *us* the ability to be aware. I never agreed that either DNA or any of its constituent molecules are themselves aware. Because that is pure nonsense, as far as the available empirical evidence and theoretical foundation of biology are concerned.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-34109658639532624892012-11-12T19:57:21.004-05:002012-11-12T19:57:21.004-05:00I do, I did, hence the questionI do, I did, hence the questionDaveShttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15840516954793215700noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-65910878519097621842012-11-12T17:05:30.361-05:002012-11-12T17:05:30.361-05:00No, Peirce does not get his belief in purpose from...No, Peirce does not get his belief in purpose from belief in God.<br />But even if he, as you'd like to imagine, had, other philosophers such as Russell haven't.<br />Russell wrote: "Has the universe any unity of plan or purpose, or is it a fortuitous concourse of atoms? Is consciousness a permanent part of the universe, giving hope of indefinite growth in wisdom, or is it a transitory accident on a small planet on which life must ultimately become impossible? Are good and evil of importance to the universe or only to man? Such questions are asked by philosophy, and variously answered by various philosophers. But it would seem that, whether answers be otherwise discoverable or not, the answers suggested by philosophy are none of them demonstrably true. Yet, however slight may be the hope of discovering an answer, it is part of the business of philosophy to continue the consideration of such questions, to make us aware of their importance, to examine all the approaches to them, and to keep alive that speculative interest in the universe which is apt to be killed by confining ourselves to definitely ascertainable knowledge."<br /><br />As to DNA, you now say, "But that is not even close to what we were talking about, since the discussion was about the awareness of molecules like DNA."<br /><br />So your argument now is that DNA is aware but its molecules aren't. Well in fact the argument was also about atoms that make up molecules, so apparently your use of DNA as an example was only arbitrarily relevant, as you could have used the example that brains carrying information are not aware on the level of their atoms.<br />Except that Wheeler says they, the atoms, are aware, and other than doing the name dropping you've accused me of, you haven't made an argument to refute that.<br /><br />So we can leave the argument at that or not. But probably not.<br /><br />Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-53849121084771417382012-11-12T15:42:18.843-05:002012-11-12T15:42:18.843-05:00Baron,
golly, you truly are unbelievable. If you ...Baron,<br /><br />golly, you truly are unbelievable. If you could only step back and examine the logic of what you write, and how nicely you twist what I write, you might pause for just one second and reconsider. But you won’t, which is why I — as you do — write for the benefit of the broader audience, not because I have the slightest hope of changing your mind.<br /><br />On Pierce:<br /><br />> Aristotle was much more wrong in his beliefs in Gods, yet you still admire his more sustainable discoveries as to how his God has worked the world. And if I'm not wrong, you still have great respect for the believer, Kant. And of course the agnostic, Russell. <<br /><br />I never said, nor will ever say, that belief in gods is a litmus test for rejecting *everything* someone says, so your list is entirely irrelevant. But Pierce gets his belief that everything has a purpose from his belief in god, regardless of which particular kind of god he believed in. As such, I consider his argument flawed and irreparable. But he was still a great logicians in other respects.<br /><br />On Wheeler:<br /><br />> Yet DNA is the quintessential site of our awareness functionality. I can name a dozen modern biologists who would laugh you out of the whole building for not knowing that. <<br /><br />That is not at all what I wrote, is it? Of course DNA is the basis (I’m not sure about “quintessential”) for our capacity to be aware. But that is not even close to what we were talking about, since the discussion was about the awareness of molecules like DNA. And I repeat that in that case you are the one that would be laughed out of the room.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-238024677353495682012-11-12T15:13:23.211-05:002012-11-12T15:13:23.211-05:00Oh, and having clicked Baron's blogger profile...Oh, and having clicked Baron's blogger profile ... wow. If you agree with 10 percent of what this Anthony Peake claims, Massimo has been far more than generous on the amount of time he's spent responding to you.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-25403173072883930852012-11-12T15:04:25.364-05:002012-11-12T15:04:25.364-05:00Re Peirce:
First, there's more than one use of...Re Peirce:<br />First, there's more than one use of the word "purpose." Second, people as reductionistic as Dennett and Dawkins have used words such as "purpose" in an anthropomorphic way about evolutionary processes. I would say, rhetorically, that "surely you don't believe that means the process of evolution itself is conscious," but I'm not sure that you just maybe you DO believe that.<br />Third, what Massimo said.<br /><br />Re Wheeler:<br />If you can show me a statement by Wheeler supporting your original claim that hammers are sentient, I'll eat my hat.<br />As for Wheeler's actual statement, as cosmologists around the world know, nobody knows what is the "correct" interpretation of what wavefunction collapse really means. Is it Everett's Wheeler-inspired multiverses? Greene's string theory? Some neo-Einsteinian quantum realism?<br /><br />And, taking a shot at Dave while here: <br />If this is just about "playing word games" and a change in games would let us talk about the consciousness of a hammer or thermostat, as soon as a hammer or thermostat can read Wittgenstein, understand linguistic game-playing and "deal itself in," call me back. (Or ask Nagel to write, "What Is It Like To Be a Thermostat?")<br /><br />Per Massimo, our "returns" are diminishing to marginal status indeed.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.com