tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post3100040790527534248..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Surprise! Naturalistic metaphysics undermines naive determinism, part IUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger108125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-11744764373840062722012-09-02T19:04:39.935-04:002012-09-02T19:04:39.935-04:00Really? Dawkins said that? That's strange, he ...Really? Dawkins said that? That's strange, he is one of the people who have helped change and adapt darwinian theory. But, If he said what you say he said, he is clearly wrong. <br /><br />Sexto Empiricohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11176766042647292546noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-33200584668028226282012-08-31T12:12:05.716-04:002012-08-31T12:12:05.716-04:00I don't understand why people are saying that ...I don't understand why people are saying that the original meaning of "scientism" is negative. The original and literal meaning is "science + belief", or "some belief about science". The first person who used the word may very well have felt that those who have overly positive beliefs about science are fools, but such personal feelings do not dictate the meaning of the word.Paul Sakahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02794103061618068998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-55620416133737510852012-08-22T23:55:04.423-04:002012-08-22T23:55:04.423-04:00Massimo,
No problem, that's understandable; ...Massimo, <br /><br />No problem, that's understandable; btw, time was beginning to be an issue for me as well. <br />Thanks for trying to explain the antirealist position, anyway. <br />Also, and just to clarify, I get that you don't consider yourself an antirealist. I wasn't suggesting that you were one, btw. Rather, I was trying to explain some of the problems I see in the argument from underdetermination (as an argument for scientific antirealism) as best as I could too, and later – though in lesser detail – some of the problems in the argument based on the 'observable/non-observable' distinction. <br /><br />Also, thanks for the links (btw, I read the SEP articles, though I don't think any point made in them undermines the points I made above), and generally for the discussion. <br /><br />Regards, <br />AngraAngra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-43887193015211740342012-08-22T08:58:11.827-04:002012-08-22T08:58:11.827-04:00Angra,
I apologize, but I do not have sufficient ...Angra,<br /><br />I apologize, but I do not have sufficient time to continue this discussion, which now pertains to a post that is several days old (with two new posts having appeared meanwhile). I tried my best to explain the anti-realist position - and remember that I do not consider myself an anti-realist. If you wish to dig deeper into this, I suggest the following resources:<br /><br />http://www.amazon.com/Understanding-Philosophy-of-Science-ebook/dp/B000FBFFCW/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1345640111&sr=8-2&keywords=ladyman+understanding<br /><br />especially chapters 4,6,7 and 8.<br /><br />http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/<br />http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/<br />http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/<br />http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constructive-empiricism/Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-38772617756949878592012-08-21T22:41:33.678-04:002012-08-21T22:41:33.678-04:00AM: >But as I mentioned above, if the antireali...<br />AM: >But as I mentioned above, if the antirealist claims that the argument from underdetermination of the theory by the data undermines or defeats realism in the case of non-observables, but does not have that effect in the case of observables, then it seems to me that the antirealist in question has the burden to explain why underdetermination of the theory by the data would undermine or defeat realism in the case of non-observables, but would have no effect in the case of observables. <<br /><br />MP: >Because the latter are, ahem, observable! While the former are by definition theoretical entities.<<br />What do you mean by 'theoretical entities'? <br /><br />While you say 'because', that does <i>not</i> appear to me to explain why underdetermination of the theory by the data would undermine or defeat realism in the case of non-observables, but would have no effect in the case of observables. <br /><br />By the way, if by 'theoretical entities', you mean that they're posited by a theory, sure. The same goes for, say, a planet that hit the Earth billions of years ago. <br />The fact that a human with a normal visual system would have perceived the planet in question if she had been there looking (which she wasn't), but wouldn't see the supermassive black hole at the center of the Milky Way, does not appear to be in any way related to the issue of whether underdetermination of the theory by the data prevents making warranted claims of existence of such objects. <br /><br />In fact, personally I would say that the evidence for the supermassive black hole in question is at least as good as the evidence for the planetary impact in question. <br /><br />>I am not sure I can explain it any better than this, I'm afraid.<<br /><br />Ditto to that. I've been doing my best, but apparently, it seems we've been going in circles for a while, for the most part, and with some limited exceptions. <br /><br />That said, this exchange has been a lot friendlier than internet debates usually are, so thank you for that. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-78006953002474837782012-08-21T22:40:13.103-04:002012-08-21T22:40:13.103-04:00>2. and 3. are not alive at all, because not on...>2. and 3. are not alive at all, because not only they bring in unobservables, but a type of unobservable that we have no good reason at all to consider seriously. Both realists and anti-realists would reject 2. and 3.<<br />But 2. and 3. are empirically indistinguishable from 1., so my point remains that <i>if</i> whether an option is a 'live' one depends on empirical adequacy, they're as live as 1. <br />If whether an option is 'live' does not depend on that, then my questions would be: on what does it depend, and how is that even related to the issue of underdetermination of the theory by the data? <br /><br />AM: >If the antirealist claims that the argument from underdetermination undermines or defeats realism about non-observables but not about observables, my question would be: what's the justification for that claim? <<br /><br />MP > Empiricism. This has always been the problem with unobservables, empiricists since the Vienna Circle (actually, since Hume!) have always had a problem admitting into science things that are constructs of the human mind for which there is no way to make direct observations.<<br />A few points: <br /><br />1. That would not justify the claim that <i>underdetermination of theory by the data</i> is a problem in the case of non-observables. Even if the antirealist had good grounds to reject existential claims about non-observables, there remains no good reason to suspect that such grounds are related to underdetermination of theory by the data. <br />For instance: <br />a. Why can't we just have good reasons to think that some unobservable <i>very probably</i> exists, even if the data underdetermines the theory <i>as it does in the case of observables</i>? <br />b. Why can't we have grounds to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that some unobservables exist, even if the data underdetermines the theory <i>as it does in the case of observables</i>? <br /><br />If the antirealist said that we have good reasons to trust our eyes or something like that, but didn't make any claims about underdetermination of theory by the data, they would be in somewhat better shape to defend their claims against electrons (not in good shape in my view, but at least somewhat better), but the 'underdetermination' argument seems to undermine their own position, for the reasons I've been giving. <br /><br />2. Leaving aside the issue addressed in 1. (namely, the fact that that does not justify the claim that underdetermination of theory by the data is a problem in the case of unobservables but not observables), it seems pretty clear to me that we can make attributions of belief, intent, and mental states such as pain beyond a reasonable doubt and even if we can't see them. <br />But let's say that we leave minds aside. <br />Even then, why would we not be able to tell, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is a supermassive black hole at the center of the Milky Way? Just because we can't see it? <br />For that matter, we can't see any of the following: <br />1. Minds. That includes – for instance – belief that some entity is in pain, or has some desire, intent, etc. <br />2. Black Holes. <br />3. Radio waves. <br />4. Ultraviolet light. <br />5. Infrared light. <br />6. Gamma rays. <br />7. Generally, EM radiation that is not visible to the human eye. <br />8. Bird-colors (e.g., some object are the same human color, but not the same Z-color, for other species Z). <br /><br />A claim that human eyes are the standard for observations that properly allow realism ought to be defended, just as the claim about underdetermination of the theory by the data (though as I pointed out before, those are different issues and require different defenses). Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-62666870234435927442012-08-21T22:37:50.283-04:002012-08-21T22:37:50.283-04:00Massimo,
>I was describing the anti-realist p...Massimo, <br /><br />>I was describing the anti-realist position: "electron" may refer to something real, but for the anti-realist there is no way to know (because electrons are unobservable), so all they wish to say is that talk of electrons is empirically adequate.<<br /><br />I got that you were describing the antirealist position, but I was asking for clarification about that position. <br />So, based on the above, it seems to me that the antirealist in question is now saying what I labeled 'i', namely that there aren't sufficient grounds to conclude that electrons exist. <br />Further, you say that the anti-realist says it's because they're unobservable. <br /><br />If I understand your position correctly, I would say that that does not seem to have any relation to the issue of whether the theory is underdetermined by the data. It's underdetermined by the data in every case in which we talk about any concreta other than ourselves (at the very least). <br /><br />>There is no further burden for the anti-realist. Consider that anti-realism is an ontologically economical philosophy. They are saying that some things exist / are true (those we can observe, after they all they are empiricists!), while other things (unobservables) may or may not be true, but science uses them because they are empirically adequate. The burden, if anything, is on the realist to make a convincing case that unobservables too are real/true. <<br />There is a burden because they're making the claim that due to underdetermination of theory by the data, we shouldn't conclude that what they call 'unobservables' exist, whereas they also hold that underdetermination of theory by the data does not have that epistemic result when it comes to what they call 'observables'. <br /><br />While the categories remain vague at best, they would still have the burden of explaining that difference even if they clarified what those categories are. <br /><br />To put it in a different way, I would ask: why should one even <i>suspect</i> that whether the theory is underdetermined by the data causes any problems in the case of the category 'unobservables'? (whatever that category is). <br /><br />Based on what you're saying below (e.g., that viruses are now observables, and planets colliding with asteroids, etc., are potentially observable, but electrons are in principle non-observables), it seems that the question is not whether we've observed something, but whether we can actually see it, even if by means of a microscope or telescope, or whether we could see it if we had a microscope or telescope. That gives me a clue (though it's still vague) about what the categorization might be, but <i>still</i> does nothing to meet the burden of explaining why underdetermination of theory by the data would defeat or even undermine realism with regard to what they call 'unobservables', but not with regard to what they call 'observables'. <br /><br />In other words, the problem with the argument from underdetermination of theory by the data <i>does not depend</i> on whether there is a coherent observable/non-observable categorization, or if it is, even on whether the antirealist has <i>different</i>, good arguments that support skepticism about the existence of non-observables. <br /><br />That aside (but it's a <i>different</i> matter), it seems that the claim in question (i.e., about non-observables) is also problematic, and does not even seem to match what the antirealists in question believe (e.g., they seem to attribute mental states to others, and those are unobservables assuming the categorization is coherent), though as I mentioned, it's a problem that's different from the one I was focusing on, namely the problem with the argument from underdetermination of theory by the data. <br />Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-16900915007429743562012-08-21T08:31:29.675-04:002012-08-21T08:31:29.675-04:00Angra,
> I'm not entirely sure what you me...Angra,<br /><br />> I'm not entirely sure what you mean by saying that "there cannot be any guarantee that people talk about truth when they talk about unobservables"? <<br /><br />I was describing the anti-realist position: "electron" may refer to something real, but for the anti-realist there is no way to know (because electrons are unobservable), so all they wish to say is that talk of electrons is empirically adequate.<br /><br />> In any case, if the antirealist claims i., and claims that the reason is that theory is underdetermined by data, then that leads to the burden I mentioned above. <<br /><br />There is no further burden for the anti-realist. Consider that anti-realism is an ontologically economical philosophy. They are saying that some things exist / are true (those we can observe, after they all they are empiricists!), while other things (unobservables) may or may not be true, but science uses them because they are empirically adequate. The burden, if anything, is on the realist to make a convincing case that unobservables too are real/true.<br /><br />> if whether an option is 'live' depends on empirical adequacy, it seems to me that 1., 2., and 3., would be equally 'live', which would be a problem <<br /><br />2. and 3. are not alive at all, because not only they bring in unobservables, but a type of unobservable that we have no good reason at all to consider seriously. Both realists and anti-realists would reject 2. and 3.<br /><br />> If the antirealist claims that the argument from underdetermination undermines or defeats realism about non-observables but not about observables, my question would be: what's the justification for that claim? <<br /><br />Empiricism. This has always been the problem with unobservables, empiricists since the Vienna Circle (actually, since Hume!) have always had a problem admitting into science things that are constructs of the human mind for which there is no way to make direct observations.<br /><br />> I'd like to ask for a little clarification on the term 'non-observables'. For instance, is a virus observable? Is a black hole observable? A large object that collided with the Earth billions of years ago? <<br /><br />Good question, and there are philosophers (usually, realists) who reject that distinction. But I think that just because the status of some entities as observable / unobservable changes this is not enough to defeat anti-realism. Viruses are (now) observables, so they can be included in the empirical furniture of science. Other things are observables in principle (asteroids colliding with planets), but yet more are unobservable in principle (electrons, strings).<br /><br />> My question was meant to be: does the antirealist in question extends her antirealism to hypotheses (some of them scientific, not all) like the hypotheses that, say ... <<br /><br />As I said, she will extend it to any hypothesis that contains unobservables.<br /><br />> the antirealist in question has the burden to explain why underdetermination of the theory by the data would undermine or defeat realism in the case of non-observables, but would have no effect in the case of observables. <<br /><br />Because the latter are, ahem, observable! While the former are by definition theoretical entities.<br /><br />I am not sure I can explain it any better than this, I'm afraid.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-89693098447380633952012-08-21T01:39:10.276-04:002012-08-21T01:39:10.276-04:00Reading some threads here, and having now read par...Reading some threads here, and having now read part 2, I would suggest a key definitional issue (or one of many, as you wish) is "information". DNA may be a digital form that shapes and reshapes protein production or non-production by shifting nucleotide sequences. It is often compared to a computer tape, and that comparison might hold despite it being nucleotides of A C G or T rather than O or 1. However, as we know, those proteins can either build something workable that works in fact due to environmental support - far more complex than binary sequences in principle, but relying on the incredible flexibility of the binary in practice for evolution of organisms.<br /><br />How do we classify information of the sequential digital kind? Some like James Shapiro might say it is a basis for an "intelligent" process of evolution (the process itself, rather than the eventual outcome of higher order animals - so bacteria might qualify simply because they are more organized by information than a rock or a puddle). I would confine intelligence to the usual meaning for higher order animals (and exclude computers, even), but the issue of classifying binary DNA remains. It is perhaps a basal state of flexible regularity around which events change their natural flow (perhaps delicate and intricate enough to facilitate the naturalness of the flow).<br /><br />My classification is that it may be a real property of things, along with properties of electromagnetism or gravitation possessed by particles & fields as objects that have those properties, for example. It might remain so, even when particles and fields rise into to chemistry. It may provide the lowest level determination of interfaces between compounds, and in itself it might simply be sequential interfaces between A C G & T. Ideas about interface and 'root hub' come to mind. As mere sequences it might be a pure regularity of interface, shaping a practical level of chemical interface. It may be an example of where objects (A C G & T's) make an object (a strand of DNA) that exists entirely because the A C G & T interfaces have the regularity & flexibility to be of binary use. Binary information carrying as a real property of real A C G & T objects, applied to great effect.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14612283941807324298noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-50655043557073326042012-08-20T19:13:37.992-04:002012-08-20T19:13:37.992-04:00Massimo,
>(a) is a normative statement, whil...Massimo, <br /><br /><br />>(a) is a normative statement, while (b) is psychological. I doubt the anti-realist would make either. Rather, (c) he would say that there cannot be any guarantee that people talk about truth when they talk about unobservables.<<br />Given that Eamon meant to make a point about normative claims before (i.e., Eamon seemed to say that some antirealists would make a normative claim about the proper aim of science), and I didn't realize that, I considered both a normative and a psychological statement in my reply to your post above, to try to cover both possibilities. <br /><br />Your position seems to be different from Eamon's (or at least, you seem to be talking about a very different kind of antirealist), though I'm not entirely sure what you mean by saying that "there cannot be any guarantee that people talk about truth when they talk about unobservables"? <br /><br />Are you saying that he would say that: <br /><br />i. There aren't sufficient grounds to conclude that unobservables exist? <br />ii. When people talk about unobservables, they're not making ontological claims. <br /><br />My impression is that you mean i., but please let me know if I misunderstood what you meant. <br /><br />In any case, if the antirealist claims i., and claims that the reason is that theory is underdetermined by data, then that leads to the burden I mentioned above. <br /><br />>As for what counts as a "live" option, that depends on the available empirical evidence. Ether is no longer a live option in physics, nor is demonic possession in psychology. We have better theories, which the realists would say are closer to the truth, while the anti-realists would say are more empirically adequate. <<br /><br />Let's consider the following four hypotheses: <br /><br />1. The defendant committed the murder. <br />2. The defendant was framed by aliens that are so advanced that we don't have the means to empirically distinguish their frame from the hypothesis that the defendant did it. <br />3. The defendant was framed by an omnipotent being who is bent on persuading us that the defendant is guilty. <br /><br />4. The defendant was framed by a mobster. <br /><br />Empirically, we can plausibly distinguish between 1. and 4., between 2. and 4., or between 3. and 4. <br />However, 1., 2., and 3., appear to be empirically indistinguishable. <br /><br />So, if whether an option is 'live' depends on empirical adequacy, it seems to me that 1., 2., and 3., would be equally 'live', which would be a problem as well, in addition to the previous ones. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-73913426166659598212012-08-20T19:09:03.324-04:002012-08-20T19:09:03.324-04:00Massimo,
>
Remember that anti-realism is abou...Massimo, <br /><br />><br />Remember that anti-realism is about non-observables, it doesn't apply to the whole of empirical evidence. The Moon landing, for instance, is of no concern to the anti-realist, because the evidence for it does not appeal to hypothetical entities like electrons. <<br /><br />If the antirealist claims that the argument from underdetermination undermines or defeats realism about non-observables but not about observables, my question would be: what's the justification for that claim? <br /><br />Also, I'd like to ask for a little clarification on the term 'non-observables'. For instance, is a virus observable? Is a black hole observable? A large object that collided with the Earth billions of years ago? <br /><br />><br />Well, the hypothesis that electrons exist *is* a scientific hypothesis.< <br />Sorry, copy/paste error on my part. <br /><br />My question was meant to be: does the antirealist in question extends her antirealism to hypotheses (some of them scientific, not all) like the hypotheses that, say, the planet Gliese 581d actually exists*, that the Moon Landing happened, that humans and chimpanzees shared a common ancestor between 5 and 7 million years ago, that a defendant is guilty as charged in a murder case in which forensic evidence by scientists was crucial, that there are other minds, that it's not the case that 1 million apparent people are actually zombies, That Sai Baba of Shirdi didn't appear to some of his followers a few days after his death*, that AIDS is caused by the HIV virus, and so on? <br /><br />> But at any rate, as I mentioned above, the anti-realist has problem with truth-type statements only when applied to unobservables, not in general.<<br />But as I mentioned above, if the antirealist claims that the argument from underdetermination of the theory by the data undermines or defeats realism in the case of non-observables, but does not have that effect in the case of observables, then it seems to me that the antirealist in question has the burden to explain <i>why</i> underdetermination of the theory by the data would undermine or defeat realism in the case of non-observables, but would have no effect in the case of observables. <br /><br />It seems to me that it would be an adequate reply to say that (for instance) in the case of observables, we can see them because: <br /><br />a. That would leave aside many objects that no longer exist, are too far away, etc., like an asteroid that caused the KT extinction (or is that an observable? Please clarify what 'observable' means here). <br />b. Moreover, in most cases, it would also leave aside the Moon Landing, since people can't actually go to the Moon and see the evidence, video footage could be faked, etc. <br />c. It would leave aside belief in other minds, since we cannot see minds. <br />d. Much more generally, that would not explain why underdetermination of theory by data does not undermine our belief that our intuitive interpretation of our visual experience (e.g., I see a monitor in front of me and I believe there is one, not that I'm in a Matrix-like place) as it does undermine belief in unobservables. <br /><br />Perhaps, the anti-realist has a different answer, but I'd say she'd have to provide some justification for a claim that underdetermination of theory by the data undermines or defeats realism in the case of non-observables but not in other cases. <br /><br />I'll address the rest of your points in a moment. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-38492918491097309772012-08-20T17:39:30.355-04:002012-08-20T17:39:30.355-04:00Angra,
> Are you saying that the antirealist i...Angra,<br /><br />> Are you saying that the antirealist in question accepts the argument from underdetermination in the cases I've listed (e.g., whether the defendant did it) just as she accepts that argument in the case of, say, electrons? <<br /><br />Remember that anti-realism is about non-observables, it doesn't apply to the whole of empirical evidence. The Moon landing, for instance, is of no concern to the anti-realist, because the evidence for it does not appeal to hypothetical entities like electrons.<br /><br />> are you saying that the antirealist who accepts the underdetermination argument does not limit the application of said argument to the category 'scientific theories' but applies it, say, to hypotheses like the hypothesis that electrons exist <<br /><br />Well, the hypothesis that electrons exist *is* a scientific hypothesis. But at any rate, as I mentioned above, the anti-realist has problem with truth-type statements only when applied to unobservables, not in general.<br /><br />> does the antirealist claim that in all those cases: <br /><br />a. People shouldn't aim at finding the truth. <br />b. People in fact do not aim at finding the truth. <br />c. Other (please elaborate). <<br /><br />(a) is a normative statement, while (b) is psychological. I doubt the anti-realist would make either. Rather, (c) he would say that there cannot be any guarantee that people talk about truth when they talk about unobservables.<br /><br />As for what counts as a "live" option, that depends on the available empirical evidence. Ether is no longer a live option in physics, nor is demonic possession in psychology. We have better theories, which the realists would say are closer to the truth, while the anti-realists would say are more empirically adequate.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-44959817264465214012012-08-20T16:37:32.969-04:002012-08-20T16:37:32.969-04:00Massimo,
>
(btw, as you probably know, this d...Massimo, <br /><br />><br />(btw, as you probably know, this discussion has now moved to the second part of my post on Ladyman and Ross's book.)<<br />I'm afraid I don't have the time to properly take part in that discussion, and I prefer not to make comments without carefully considering them before posting (I wasn't expecting my comments here to result in such a long debate, by the way, but I guess I should have known better given my experience on internet discussions). <br /><br />>There is a confusion here. The anti-realist, I think, is committed to anti-realism across the board. The reason she will reject pseudoscientific notions, for instance, is because they are not even empirically adequate. In Eamon's terms, they are not "live" options. The realist, of course, will reject pseudoscientific notions because he thinks they are not true.<<br />I'm not sure I understand what you're saying here. <br />Are you saying that the antirealist in question accepts the argument from underdetermination in the cases I've listed (e.g., whether the defendant did it) just as she accepts that argument in the case of, say, electrons? <br /><br />As for 'live' options, that's not how I understood the meaning of the term. Could you clarify, please? <br />When is an option 'live'? <br /><br /><br />>It isn't, because it doesn't.<<br />So, are you saying that the antirealist who accepts the underdetermination argument does not limit the application of said argument to the category 'scientific theories' but applies it, say, to hypotheses like the hypothesis that electrons exist, but does not undermine (or defeat) other hypotheses in which the theory is also underdetermined by the data, like the hypotheses that, say, the planet Gliese 581d actually exists*, that the Moon Landing happened*, that humans and chimpanzees shared a common ancestor between 5 and 7 million years ago*, that a defendant is guilty as charged in a murder case in which forensic evidence by scientists was crucial*, that there are other minds*, that it's not the case that 1 million apparent people are actually zombies*, That Sai Baba of Shirdi didn't appear to some of his followers a few days after his death*, that AIDS is caused by the HIV virus*, and so on? <br /><br />If so, does the antirealist claim that in all those cases: <br /><br />a. People shouldn't aim at finding the truth. <br />b. People in fact do not aim at finding the truth. <br />c. Other (please elaborate). <br />Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-3159372307942295352012-08-20T14:58:47.791-04:002012-08-20T14:58:47.791-04:00Angra,
ok, this latest comment actually clarifies...Angra,<br /><br />ok, this latest comment actually clarifies (for me) the point of your analysis significantly. (btw, as you probably know, this discussion has now moved to the second part of my post on Ladyman and Ross's book.)<br /><br />> the antirealist who finds the underdetermination argument persuasive as an argument for antirealism in science (or more likely, some scientific theories) but finds it unpersuasive as an argument for antirealism outside science <<br /><br />There is a confusion here. The anti-realist, I think, is committed to anti-realism across the board. The reason she will reject pseudoscientific notions, for instance, is because they are not even empirically adequate. In Eamon's terms, they are not "live" options. The realist, of course, will reject pseudoscientific notions because he thinks they are not true.<br /><br />> if underdetermination of theory by the data undermines or even defeats some hypotheses, but doesn't affect others, why is it the case that only the former are affected? <<br /><br />It isn't, because it doesn't.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-49708848185062539992012-08-20T13:30:24.351-04:002012-08-20T13:30:24.351-04:00Massimo,
What the antirealist who finds the unde...Massimo, <br /><br />What the antirealist who finds the underdetermination argument persuasive as an argument for antirealism in science (or more likely, some scientific theories) but finds it unpersuasive as an argument for antirealism outside science (or more likely, also some scientific theories) ought to explain why underdetermination of the theory by the data undermines or even defeats hypotheses like the hypothesis that electrons exist, but does not undermine (or defeat) other hypotheses in which the theory is also underdetermined by the data, like the hypotheses that, say, the planet Gliese 581d actually exists*, that the Moon Landing happened*, that humans and chimpanzees shared a common ancestor between 5 and 7 million years ago*, that a defendant is guilty as charged in a murder case in which forensic evidence by scientists was crucial*, that there are other minds*, that it's not the case that 1 million apparent people are actually zombies*, That Sai Baba of Shirdi didn't appear to some of his followers a few days after his death*, that AIDS is caused by the HIV virus*, and so on. <br /><br />In other words, if underdetermination of theory by the data undermines or even defeats some hypotheses, but doesn't affect others, why is it the case that only the former are affected? <br /><br />Incidentally, the distinction is not between scientific hypotheses and hypotheses outside science, as long as the person who is an antirealist about, say, electrons, accept some other scientific hypotheses, like those about a common ancestor between humans and chimpanzees, exoplanets, the HIV virus, generally use of forensic evidence by scientists to solve criminal cases, establish parentage, and so on. <br /><br />That aside, Eamon did address my points (and I have to thank him for taking the time), and I've addressed his points as well. <br />He offered one potential way in which an antirealist might try to explain the distinction, namely the 'live' versus 'non-live' hypotheses; I gave reasons why in my assessment the argument from underdetermination would not work in that case, either. That would not mean that an antirealist about, say, electrons, wouldn't have other arguments for her antirealism. But that's another matter. <br /><br />* Unless they think it undermines or defeats that hypothesis as well. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-89064272704491923562012-08-20T12:38:34.698-04:002012-08-20T12:38:34.698-04:00OneDay,
I think your views on the practical use o...OneDay,<br /><br />I think your views on the practical use of skepticism and philosophy are a bit too pessimistic, as I've argued in the past. And that's besides the intrinsic intellectual interest of those exercises.<br /><br />But, I repeat, you are simply wrong in associating anti-realists with the positions you list. For one, I'm pretty sure that transhumanists are much more likely to be realists than anti-realists about science. And anti-realism has nothing to do with subjectivism, contra to what I think you are implying here.<br /><br />btw, this discussion has now moved to the second part of my post.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-1212836891224385092012-08-20T09:15:06.807-04:002012-08-20T09:15:06.807-04:00But also, let's consider the philosophy of sci...But also, let's consider the philosophy of science and what practical value it might have. We skeptics like to think that the Demarcation Problem is a worthwhile discussion, but it is, practically speaking, a moot point. Science doesn't seem to want a lot of help from philosophy (I'm not saying it shouldn't, but from its perspective, it's not in crisis over the demarcation problem). Pseudo Science, for its part, seems if not immune then highly resistant to the labors of skeptics. So why on earth do we pursue this problem which seems to either be ignored or to fix itself after sixty years anyway? It's because we are looking to import value from science into our everyday lives, and we want to know by what authority we can do this. It's because we want the promise of, in Alisdair MacIntyre's words, a "non-manipulative" value system. The real demarcation we want, and that we should want, is a distinction between the manipulative and the non-manipulative relationship. The realist, physicalist, neo-positivist stance is the best (and still shoddy) hope for getting this. The anti-realist, the idealist, the Transhumanist, these are all people who, in various ways, have given up on a non-manipulative world. Reality is the hope for objectivity. Objectivity is the hope for honesty. If any of these debates are worth having, if any of these distinctions are worth drawing, it is in the name of these values. Aaron Shurehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00837439765332783167noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-88348578217433714482012-08-20T08:55:53.120-04:002012-08-20T08:55:53.120-04:00My list is also, in my mind, a list of dualist or ...My list is also, in my mind, a list of dualist or idealist assertions. As I read ETMG with a hope of resurrecting positivism, these assertions are obviously on a hit list for positivist attack.Aaron Shurehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00837439765332783167noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-59145223304890523032012-08-20T07:18:07.714-04:002012-08-20T07:18:07.714-04:00Angra,
I think Eamon has actually done a very goo...Angra,<br /><br />I think Eamon has actually done a very good job at answering your points. But I am still a bit fuzzy at what exactly you are aiming at. None of your consideration can be interpreted as an argument against the anti-realist position, and we have agreed that of course is underdetermination applies to scientific theories a fortiori it applies to everyday hypotheses or to pseudoscientific ones. What exactly follows from that? What does the anti-realist have to explain as a result?<br /><br />And of course while the distinction between scientific and non-scientific hypotheses is an interesting one (in philosophy it's referred to as the demarcation problem, I have an edited book for Chicago Press coming out on the topic), it still is conceptually distinct from the debate between realists and anti-realists, which is what I was concerned with in this post.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-66549057290839074942012-08-20T02:53:34.598-04:002012-08-20T02:53:34.598-04:00Oh, I didn't mean to narrow it down to Philoso...Oh, I didn't mean to narrow it down to Philosophy of Science. However, I bet you anti-realists in that realm are also partial to my list of topics. In my mind realist = physicalist. I'm sure there might be some idealist realists (Platonists?), but I was shorthanding it.Aaron Shurehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00837439765332783167noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-40661216350593396372012-08-20T00:14:15.628-04:002012-08-20T00:14:15.628-04:00Eamon,
I'm not claiming or suggesting that s...Eamon, <br /><br />I'm not claiming or suggesting that scientific anti-realism entails metaphysical antirealism. <br />What I've been arguing about that <i>if</i> the argument accepted as supporting of scientific antirealism is the argument from underdetermination of theory by the data, then the antirealist should give some reasons as to why that does not apply to all of the other cases. <br /><br />The point you make about unobservables suggests one such potential reason: namely, that allegedly there are no 'live options'. <br /><br />However, I think the antirealist attempt to make a relevant distinction which would allow the application of the 'underdetermination' argument fails, for the following reasons: <br /><br />That there are 'no live options' seems to mean (in my view) that the alternatives are deemed extremely improbable – so much so that we can rule them out beyond a reasonable doubt. For instance, let's consider the case of a defendant on a murder case. Sure, he might have been framed by aliens from another planet with sufficiently advanced technology to fool us. But that's not a live option – that doubt wouldn't be reasonable. <br /><br />If that's not what 'no live options' means, please let me know what it means. <br /><br />But if that's what it means, underdetermination of the theory by data is not the issue in the case of the particles, either, since all we would need for realism would be to rule out the alternatives beyond any reasonable doubt, which <i>does not require determination of theory by the data</i>; furthermore, we wouldn't even need a "beyond a reasonable doubt" assessment if we only want to say that (for instance) electrons <i>probably</i> exist. <br /><br />So, the theory (scientific or not) is always underdetermined. That's never the problem, it seems to me. The question is whether we can rule out all other hypotheses beyond a reasonable doubt, or at least assess that a certain hypothesis is very probable, etc. <br /><br />A difficult issue is <i>how</i> we make such probabilistic assessments, and I recognized that that would require a more thorough discussion. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-87901685799451802192012-08-19T23:57:24.906-04:002012-08-19T23:57:24.906-04:00>
The matter of the proper aim of science does ...<br />><br />The matter of the proper aim of science does not turn on the psychologies of particular scientific practitioners. Rather, it turns on the logic of scientific practice itself: theories are accepted or rejected for many reasons (problem-solving ability, coherence with accepted theory, simplicity, etc.) all of which the anti-realist can defend on grounds which does not give a nod toward truth-tracking. <<br /><br />By the 'proper' aim of science, I guess you mean what scientists <i>should</i> aim at (in a rational sense of 'should', not a moral one), rather than what they actually aim at (if that's not the case, please clarify). <br />If so, then I wasn't talking about that. I understood your point being about what science aims at, not what it should aim at (i.e., about what scientists aim at, not what they should aim at). <br /><br />Scientific hypotheses are defended on many grounds, but so are hypotheses in general. I do not see the distinction on this matter (I'll address unobservables later, when I address your comments on the matter), but in any case, my original points were about the argument from underdetermination of theory by data, not about other arguments an anti-realist may make. <br /><br />>The anti-realist can (should?) say here that what is "true" may indeed be what "really" happened, but that what "really" happened is some significant sense immaterial since at any time what we consider "true" is entirely constituted in the evidence -- that is, insofar as the hypothesis (e.g. Professor Plum in the library with the revolver) better explains the evidence. The criteria via which we adjudge fitness are do not include "what really happened" but rather simplicity, coherence, predictive power, etc. <<br />I'm not entirely sure what you mean by 'true' in quotation marks, but that would seem to be an argument for anti-realism in that case as well (i.e., is that an argument that we should not aim at truth in that case, either?). <br /><br />In any case, the point I was making was rather a psychological point (people are trying to find out what happened), because of the way I understood your previous post (i.e., the difference is between 'aim' and 'proper aim').<br /><br />The new argument for antirealism you provide above (if that's what it is) would require further discussion, but in any case, it seems it also makes no distinction between scientific hypotheses and hypotheses in general. I'm not saying that that's a problem for anti-realism, but that that's not the issue I was trying to address. <br />Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-59737876298122528252012-08-19T22:51:16.462-04:002012-08-19T22:51:16.462-04:00Angra,
A few things here.
First, re: "... ...Angra,<br /><br />A few things here. <br /><br />First, re: "... different scientists aim at different things, so in that case, the issue of scientific realism vs. anti-realism would be a matter of psychology of the scientists."<br /><br />The matter of the proper aim of science does not turn on the psychologies of particular scientific practitioners. Rather, it turns on the logic of scientific practice itself: theories are accepted or rejected for many reasons (problem-solving ability, coherence with accepted theory, simplicity, etc.) all of which the anti-realist can defend on grounds which does not give a nod toward truth-tracking. <br /><br />Second, re: "For example, it seems clear that when people try to establish whether, say, a defendant is guilty, they usually aim at truth, even if the final conclusion will always be underdetermined by the data." <br /><br />The anti-realist can (should?) say here that what is "true" may indeed be what "really" happened, but that what "really" happened is some significant sense immaterial since at any time what we consider "true" is entirely constituted in the evidence -- that is, insofar as the hypothesis (e.g. Professor Plum in the library with the revolver) better explains the evidence. The criteria via which we adjudge fitness are do not include "what really happened" but rather simplicity, coherence, predictive power, etc. <br /><br />Cian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-33940846307740362512012-08-19T22:33:58.500-04:002012-08-19T22:33:58.500-04:00Angra,
Perhaps Quine or Nelson Goodman, e.g., wou...Angra,<br /><br />Perhaps Quine or Nelson Goodman, e.g., would not draw that particular line, but some anti-realists would, however. It is important to note that scientific anti-realism does not entail metaphysical anti-realism. Most scientific anti-realists are metaphysical realists, and are the latter because of the same reasons many scientific realists are; only scientific anti-realists don't include into their ontology various unobservable objects- e.g., elementary physical particles. So, in point of fact, most anti-realists (who are also metaphysical realists) draw a sharp distinction between observables and unobservables. The former get to be called 'real' whilst the latter do not. <br /><br />Now, the underdetermination argument is applied at this level -- the scientific level -- because the alternative explanatory hypotheses on offer are live options. According to this line, there are really no live options with respect to the existence of observables. Bas van Fraassen runs this argument, e.g. <br /><br />I really should have broached this in my initial response to you, and instead used the Quine quote to highlight another anti-realist line. Cian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-61907224731315908892012-08-19T21:47:39.460-04:002012-08-19T21:47:39.460-04:00Eamon,
Regarding Quine, I think I see your point...Eamon, <br /><br />Regarding Quine, I think I see your point. <br />In that case, it seems to me that the antirealist wouldn't be drawing a line between science and non-science, and would be an antirealist not only in the case of, say, electrons, but also in the case of, say, bananas – unless they think there is a particular problem with electrons and not with bananas, but my point is that there wouldn't be a science/non-science division in their antirealism. <br />Is that interpretation of what you're saying correct? <br /><br />If so, that would resolve the problem I was getting at. It might create others, though, but unfortunately, a full discussion of the matter would take more time than I'm free to dedicate to it. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.com