tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post2802686366412637697..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: The “meta” itchUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger101125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-37101365948761816032014-03-27T14:25:22.826-04:002014-03-27T14:25:22.826-04:00"we have no logical justification for pretty ..."we have no logical justification for pretty much any of our empirical knowledge, all scientific knowledge included! Oops."<br /><br />Thank you for saying this. Randyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06294841118508802764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-16314856688454669162014-02-14T06:12:36.604-05:002014-02-14T06:12:36.604-05:00Dear Massimo,
I would like to recommend to you th...Dear Massimo,<br /><br />I would like to recommend to you the following two essays, one short and one long, by Ted Trainer on ethical subjectivism. To my mind, it is one of the clearest pieces I have read on metaethics. I think it also shows that metaethics IS very important for normative morality. Or at least for making sense of the moral enterprise. I have only just discovered your (fantastic) website, but can see you probably more or less agree with the position Trainer argues. But, again, Trainer puts the case for subjectivism very clearly and, in a way that challenges most even philosophically trained ethicists. I would like to here your opinion on it sometime. <br />Short article: https://socialsciences.arts.unsw.edu.au/tsw/TNOM_sum.html<br /><br />Long article/book: https://socialsciences.arts.unsw.edu.au/tsw/D69.THE-NATURE-OF-MORALITY.html<br />Johnny Rutherfordhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04902212046697666678noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-23384021285210426472014-01-14T16:05:10.969-05:002014-01-14T16:05:10.969-05:00Hi NiqDan135,
I really think that's a poor ar...Hi NiqDan135,<br /><br />I really think that's a poor argument. I could just as easily turn your argument around and say that the pro-life crowd is really anti-choice.<br /><br />Pro-abortion sounds like the position of someone who actively encourages women to have abortions. Pro-choice is more accurate. The pro-choice viewpoint is that abortion is often a terrible, tragic event in a woman's life, but that she should have the right to make that choice if she feels it is preferable to the alternative.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-74761103249538637882014-01-14T15:34:05.541-05:002014-01-14T15:34:05.541-05:00Most interesting is her use of "pro-choice&qu...Most interesting is her use of "pro-choice" terminology to mask the victimization of women and kids. If she really thought abortion was rational, she should label herself "pro-abortion." Her very semantics betrays a reprehensible sort of hedging.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-24746621823254974882014-01-14T11:31:29.839-05:002014-01-14T11:31:29.839-05:00It's relevant because of cases where exterior ...It's relevant because of cases where exterior consequences don't matter at all (a millionaire who steals millions from another millionaire), as well as cases where duty doesn't matter at all (Auschwitz). At some point the virtue ethicists asks: Doesn't every decision at least affect what kind of person I habitually will become, and isn't that outcome open-ended, incalculable, and irrelevant to duty?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-48430185244211946222014-01-14T11:04:36.917-05:002014-01-14T11:04:36.917-05:00You could be right, Alexey, however if your oppone...You could be right, Alexey, however if your opponent is starting from a foundation that assumes that abortion is wrong, period, then you're not going to make much progress. Their foundation must be questioned first or else you move on.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-31202302390333852632014-01-14T11:02:47.204-05:002014-01-14T11:02:47.204-05:00Hi NiqDan135,
>There is no way to test that a ...Hi NiqDan135,<br /><br />>There is no way to test that a man loves his spouse<<br /><br />This may be a thorny issue if his spouse doubts his love.<br /><br />>or that he killed his neighbor<<br /><br />This is a thorny issue to the accused or the family of the victim.<br /><br />>nobody objects to bald, unprovable assertions of love<<br /><br />Except spouses who feel that those assertions are only words.<br /><br />>or to bald, unprovable assertions about what a line is<<br /><br />Unless you also assert that this is the only way a line can be defined. Axioms in mathematics are perfectly fine but not necessarily universal. Different geometries have different axioms, there is no one true geometry, just as there is no one true morality. If we are making mathematical statements it needs to be clear, whether implicitly or explicitly, what system of axioms we are working in. The same is true for morality, and that's why the meta-question arises.<br /><br />>Therefore, I think we have to admit that thorniness comes not from meta-factors<<br /><br />Since I reject your premises I'm not sure that your conclusion follows. However, I don't know what you mean by meta-factors and the rest of what you said is also meaningless to me due to my own ignorance on Grisez, Aristotelian synderesis etc, so I can't comment on whether I agree with it or not.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-47581351864305485422014-01-14T10:56:04.822-05:002014-01-14T10:56:04.822-05:00@Seth_blog
I agree with everything you said. My p...@Seth_blog<br /><br />I agree with everything you said. My point is, as you say, that there are no rigid absolute foundations.<br /><br />However, if we are trying to reach an agreement on a certain question, it is helpful to establish what foundational assumptions we share and where we disagree. If we share enough assumptions, it may be possible to show one point of view or the other to be superior through argument or evidence.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-16835446425182609452014-01-14T10:54:08.767-05:002014-01-14T10:54:08.767-05:00Hi Alexey,
This is a bit late, but...
>It see...Hi Alexey,<br /><br />This is a bit late, but...<br /><br />>It seems the language "approximation of the truth" is too strong in this case. We have no way of knowing how available information relates the truth, and the sample size of 1000 swans seems small. <<br /><br />Yup, the sample size is small. Our confidence in the inducted rule will be correspondingly weak. Add swans until confidence increases to the point when you're willing to (probabilistically) accept the rule.<br /><br />>Can we just say stuff like "created equal" and "life, liberty, pursuit of happiness", and get to work? How "meta" do we need to get? <<br /><br />We need to get meta when we disagree on the finer points. Is an embryo equal to a pregnant woman? Which is more important, my happiness or my liberty? Do I have a right not to be offended? If not, why not?<br /><br />Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-30305569253116952732014-01-14T09:57:57.787-05:002014-01-14T09:57:57.787-05:00I'm not sure why you identify ethics as a &quo...I'm not sure why you identify ethics as a "thorny" issue simply because "there is no way to test" what is right or wrong. There is no way to test that a man loves his spouse, or that he killed his neighbor; sifting evidence in the court of law can become "thorny," but nobody objects to bald, unprovable assertions of love, nor to bald, unprovable assertions about what a line is. Therefore, I think we have to admit that thorniness comes not from meta-factors, but from the stress one feels at trying to allow all humanity to share in all the Basic Goods, i.e. the stress of deference to Integrated Human Fulfillment. I speak as a novice Grisezian, but am referring to the actual good/apparent good distinction, and to Aristotelian synderesis. I don't think we can reject synderesis any faster than we can reject the unproven concept of a line in geometry. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-33811097569720075122014-01-07T20:59:44.496-05:002014-01-07T20:59:44.496-05:00Sure one can be a rational psychopath.
I think h...Sure one can be a rational psychopath. <br /><br />I think however that rationality cannot be divorced from feelings, emotions, intuitions or perceptions in general. You might argue that these processes are unconsciously informed in an inductive way, but I don't believe it is necessary to perform a conscious process of induction to hold an ethical position in this basic case and to be quite convinced and clear of that position.<br /><br />Ideally when faced with tricky ethical dilemmas we will combine our feelings, intuitions and emotions with a conscious logical process informed by the best available theories and empirical findings.<br /><br />Logical reasoning is not the only resource we have for constructing our ethical positions. We need to also rely on our various ways of actually experiencing the world to place any value or meaning or weight to the potential positions we might take. Those feelings, emotions etc... are just as real and important to the process. That is why a rational psychopath can potentialy be less ethical then a less rational person with better emotional awareness.Seth_bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14562316879162720028noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-45246592184017505582014-01-07T18:21:19.958-05:002014-01-07T18:21:19.958-05:00>Really? I would think the nearly universal rel...>Really? I would think the nearly universal reluctance towards being stabbed combined with any given persons personal experience of pain should be plenty convincing to that person.<<br /><br />Did you misunderstand, I wonder?<br /><br />Of course I know that I do not want to be stabbed through the foot, and also that others share the same attitude. But how does this extend to convincing me that I ought not stab other people? I know they won't appreciate it, but why should I care what they feel about it if it's what I want to do?<br /><br />I think we would all agree that a person who doesn't care about other people is not normal. Perhaps that person is a sociopath or psychopath. My argument is that one can be a psychopath but be rational. One cannot disregard induction and be rational.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-52137935998010383122014-01-07T18:10:35.011-05:002014-01-07T18:10:35.011-05:00"I think so, because though none of us want t...<br />"I think so, because though none of us want to be stabbed through the foot ourselves, that in itself doesn't necessarily persuade me that I ought not stab someone else through the foot."<br /><br />Really? I would think the nearly universal reluctance towards being stabbed combined with any given persons personal experience of pain should be plenty convincing to that person. I am certainly convinced without need for any experimental research.<br /><br />That's not to say that experimental research should play no role in how we form our ethics. Often in more arguable ethical dillemmas this clears up a bit of the fuzziness.<br /><br />"But that's an extreme case. The more typical moral agreements are more intractable, and rational people can disagree and be equally in the right."<br /><br />It's an extreme case because I was giving an example that approaches a foundation for ethics regarding suffering. Anything that approaches a foundation will be at an extreme. I am just not convinced the foundations for ethics are any more fuzzy than those for induction in general.<br />Seth_bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14562316879162720028noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-9402292628273633242014-01-07T16:14:11.227-05:002014-01-07T16:14:11.227-05:00>Are you sure our foundations for ethics can be...>Are you sure our foundations for ethics can be characterized as arbitrary in relation to our foundations for induction?<<br /><br />I think so, because though none of us want to be stabbed through the foot ourselves, that in itself doesn't necessarily persuade me that I ought not stab someone else through the foot.<br /><br />But that's an extreme case. The more typical moral agreements are more intractable, and rational people can disagree and be equally in the right.<br /><br />A rational person can ignore moral injunctions. Ignoring inductive reasoning, on the other hand, is irrational.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-3529688813038512362014-01-07T15:40:32.306-05:002014-01-07T15:40:32.306-05:00Are you sure our foundations for ethics can be cha...Are you sure our foundations for ethics can be characterized as arbitrary in relation to our foundations for induction? I think human beings have some fairly universal modes of suffering, and to a lesser degree of universality flourishing. Everything else being equal, most of us wouldn't want a knife stabbed deep into the bottom of our foot and then slowly twisted to explore any healthy remaining unsevered nerves every 30 seconds. I can say that without carrying out the experiment on 1000 subjects. I think it is fair to say that administering this experiment to an unconsenting subject would be unethical.<br /><br />The difference I think is not in the ability to conceive of probabilistic foundations, but in real world complexities of the many levels of competing 'fuzzy' foundations.Seth_bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14562316879162720028noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-22371970089261400862014-01-07T15:09:14.456-05:002014-01-07T15:09:14.456-05:00Hi Seth,
Indeed we are probably not too far apart...Hi Seth,<br /><br />Indeed we are probably not too far apart.<br /><br />Perhaps there is no absolute foundation, if that's how you define absolute foundations. My view is that induction can be justified as an approach which will usually work, but not that it will always work. Furthermore, I think we can quantify how confident we are in our inductive leaps, so in principle we should be able to work with the uncertainty.<br /><br />Now, that said, I'm not sure I see much of a problem with induction. This distinguishes it from ethics, which I view as entirely without objective foundation. My disagreement with Massimo then is that induction is not as arbitrary or without justification as, say, virtue ethics, and the meta-itch is of much greater significance in ethical questions than in philosophy of science.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-54365584767401974842014-01-07T14:59:15.207-05:002014-01-07T14:59:15.207-05:00DM, I don't think we are too far apart.
I don...DM, I don't think we are too far apart.<br /><br />I don't think a probabilistic foundation is an absolute foundation. I would suggest that even the confidence ranges that accompany well designed statistical inferences include a degree of uncertainty which is why replication becomes important. Regardless of how many replications studies we perform there will always be some uncertainty in the uncertainty we report. At some point we have to agree to accept a level of uncertainty and move forward. So I'm not sure it matters if induction can be philosophically justified at it's foundation. What matters is it's usefulness and how best we can interact inductive methods with theory to make progress. I think this is an open question where philosophy of science could have quite a bit of input. I think there is likely an optimum balance between theory and inductive methods. String theory in my view is an example of too much dominance on the theory side that cannot be supported by observation.<br /><br />I know you favor a foundationalist philosophy such as mathematical platonism but it seems to me these positions always involve some foundational assumption that makes for a tautology. So I'm just making an argument that we might be better off looking for ways to characterize optimal relations or interactions rather than absolute foundations.Seth_bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14562316879162720028noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-14347976334949421112014-01-07T13:49:41.018-05:002014-01-07T13:49:41.018-05:00@Seth, @Filippo
I wish I knew why Filippo deleted...@Seth, @Filippo<br /><br />I wish I knew why Filippo deleted his posts out of the blue. Anyway, he seemed to agree to me to a point that induction could be justified in certain circumstances but hadn't quite made the leap to a general justification. At least that was the interpretation I had of what he was saying.<br /><br />Seth, nobody doubts that theory and induction of empirical observations are complementary. I don't think that is the point, because it's uncontroversial, as is how science progresses.<br /><br />>I don't think it is necessary or possible to establish the absolute foundation at bottom.<<br /><br />This is precisely what is at issue. I agree that it isn't necessary, at least for science to proceed, but I disagree that it is impossible, and I would say that it is desirable to do so from a philosophy of science perspective.<br /><br />I do concede that it is not possible to establish a foundation if you are only interested in certainties. My argument is that the foundation can be established probablistically. This captures the scientific process quite well, I think. Scientific results or theories are never proven, they are only accepted provisionally until disproven or refined. The scientific process is not required to be infallible, nor should it be. The same is true of induction in general.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-62701679303381813212014-01-07T12:53:06.790-05:002014-01-07T12:53:06.790-05:00I think the point is that theory and induction of ...I think the point is that theory and induction of empirical observations complement each other. Theories are not just random speculations, they grow out of observation of multiple observed patterns that have some type of repeatable stability.<br /><br />When a theory brings together and unifies our understanding of different types of observed patterns that were not previously connected in our knowledge base, and when the theory is supported by observation and makes new predictions that hold true this is how science progresses.<br /><br />Each successful theory lays a foundation for new inductions which might in turn lead to new theories. I don't think it is necessary or possible to establish the absolute foundation at bottom.Seth_bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14562316879162720028noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-35808936900387257422014-01-07T05:18:28.182-05:002014-01-07T05:18:28.182-05:00Todd,
Remember that Greene is only arguing for th...Todd,<br /><br />Remember that Greene is only arguing for the usefulness of utilitarianism, not for its truth. (At least that's what I've read in a couple of reviews. I haven't read the book itself.)Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-34887412573772684612014-01-06T23:30:34.702-05:002014-01-06T23:30:34.702-05:00So Massimo, I'm guessing you're not a big ...So Massimo, I'm guessing you're not a big fan of Joshua Greene's attempt to articulate and defend utilitarianism as a meta ethic as outlined in his recent book Moral Tribes?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03745051204502042293noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-91677919084464713922014-01-06T20:17:37.878-05:002014-01-06T20:17:37.878-05:00Thanks for the response Massimo. I do think that a...Thanks for the response Massimo. I do think that a combination of both ideas is very fruitful and might be able to make some headway in epistemology. <br /><br />I definitely agree with you that more simplistic descriptions of reality should not be reduced to more foundational ones. That being said, I think one has to approach the problem by incorporating a bit of pragmatism. Hume was revolutionary in revealing to us the harsh fact that inductive methods could never give us certain knowledge of something.<br /><br />That being said, if we have a vast amount of evidence that something is real or that some pattern exists, it's inane to still hold some deep seated fear in your heart. Yes, its good to be cognizant of the problem as outlined by Hume, but it doesn't impede us from continuing our march towards understanding the true nature of reality.petehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12969621709127674152noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-88035316516457917762014-01-06T19:47:56.496-05:002014-01-06T19:47:56.496-05:00Hi Filippo,
That's great. I'll take your ...Hi Filippo,<br /><br />That's great. I'll take your calculations as correct, as they seem plausible and you seem to know your stuff.<br /><br />Of course theory based estimates are much better, but I'm trying to establish the foundations on which those theories can be built. So we're starting off with some simple, naive observations.<br /><br />So, given that we have observed the sun rising N times, the probability that it will not rise tomorrow has an upper bound of 1/N if N is very large. A theory based estimate might make that probability much lower, but we haven't justified induction yet so theory based estimates are out.<br /><br />But if N is really large, then even the probability of 1/N is low enough (negligible) that we are justified in adopting the heuristic rule that "the sun rises every morning". This is induction in action.<br /><br />And the same logic can be applied to induction of rules for other observations. Ultimately, we can justify the laws of modern astronomy and physics and come up with a much better estimate, as you have outlined.Disagreeable Mehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15258557849869963650noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-18323954533998990582014-01-06T18:41:56.471-05:002014-01-06T18:41:56.471-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Filippo Nerihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01910861498359320434noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-7301504621364592182014-01-06T17:52:57.546-05:002014-01-06T17:52:57.546-05:00>I do feel good about my theistic worldview. It...>I do feel good about my theistic worldview. It has a foundation.<<br /><br />A foundation in make believe.David Spanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08526621326232623478noreply@blogger.com