tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post2425573190859686224..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: The question of belief, part IIUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger22125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-53426511882420654972012-08-03T09:22:28.974-04:002012-08-03T09:22:28.974-04:00Paul, thanks for your comments.
And Massimo, I...Paul, thanks for your comments. <br /><br />And Massimo, I meant my last line about you sincerely -- I wasn't trying to be sarcastic, but I now realize it could be read that way! Sorry! :-0Tom D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16005219519644708237noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-65535639406318602472012-08-03T00:51:24.584-04:002012-08-03T00:51:24.584-04:00Hi Tom, we dont know where our thoughts come from,...Hi Tom, we dont know where our thoughts come from, neurologicaly. they just pop into our awareness from unknown processing in generally sensible sequences. One pop might sequentially lead to another, or at times we might have something pop into awareness that is not strictly sequential (eureka, as opposed to mathematical steps). <br /><br />You might experience a pop of a vague suspicion as a thought, which has a basis in subtle sensations, and it might be stronger than an idea arising for no reason at all (let's assume it is, as it has some real basis). Anything can pop. The program would be to evaluate the thought, even if its a vague suspicion difficult to pin point reasons for, and find its basis so that we can be satisfied with it (or otherwise) and move on from it. We can move vaguely through life with greater or lesser strength of bases for our vague ideas, or we can attack them and understand how one as an individual tends to call up their passing ideas. <br /><br />Knowledge is actually just a level of satisfaction in reasoning about 'beliefs' that have any bases (nonsensical or otherwise), and when thoughts pop, our responsibility is to be satisfied with them if we can, or go with them if we trust ourselves from past self-analyses. So, I wouldn't worry about the greater or lesser bases for thoughts. And I don't worry about thoughts just popping from those basis so that we can be aware and work with them. The idea is to be satisfied with them, and that's at different levels for people who are more vague or less vague (an indicator). I try to be less vague but near the edges of knowledge, for example.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10010508932327837220noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-85512297755883360672012-08-02T12:41:29.202-04:002012-08-02T12:41:29.202-04:00Tom,
not sure whether your last comment about Daw...Tom,<br /><br />not sure whether your last comment about Dawkins and Coyne is meant as sarcasm or as a compliment, but I choose to interpret it as the latter!<br /><br />I never said I know for certain that there is 100% communication between the two hemispheres, all I said is that one needs to be careful about extrapolating from a clearly damaged brain to a normally functional one.<br /><br />I agree with your definitions of faith, disagree slightly with your definition of intuition (as I said, in cognitive science it is usually thought of as the result of massive subconscious parallel processing by the brain, which means that its results can be subjected to rational scrutiny, after the fact), and I definitely disagree with your definition of knowledge (again, for most philosophers the term applies to justified [likely] true belief, meaning that one has to be able to explain why one believes X, or believing in X does not count as knowledge).Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-37479626054009088642012-08-02T11:37:35.727-04:002012-08-02T11:37:35.727-04:00Well definitions are tricky (the ghost of Wittgens...Well definitions are tricky (the ghost of Wittgenstein smiles).<br /><br />I am using the following:<br /><br />FAITH: belief in the absence or even against the available evidence.<br /><br />INTUITION: knowing without the use of *demonstrable* rational processes.<br /><br />KNOWLEDGE: something perceived directly with the senses or the mind. <br /><br />* * * * <br />Under these definitions, couldn't faith be considered as a type of "knowing" (with or without scare quotes) that cannot be articulated but is none the less valid? That is, it is possibly a rational process, but not one that is *demonstrably* rational, and thus should not be dismissed as trash any more than the split brain subject's correct selection of "car keys" should be dismissed as trash simply because he cannot explain it? Faith may be a message sent to us by our right brains that knows something that it is unable to communicate in words. <br /><br />Massimo, you suggested that the left hemisphere (L.H.) has access to whatever the right hemisphere (R.H.) claims to know. But, is that really true? Has cognitive science conclusively shown that 100% of what the R.H. knows is transmitted via the corpus callosum? <br /><br />As a thought experiment, suppose that John (R.H.) is mute, but communicates via sign language to Mary (L.H.) who can speak to us. Mary tells us, "John is hungry and would like a chicken sandwich". But, does Mary know 100% of what John is thinking? Suppose John wants mayonnaise on his sandwich, but has no sign (that Mary understands) for "mayonnaise"? Suppose John wants "free range" chicken but John is too lazy to do the tedious symbols needed for "free range"?<br /><br />Since the L.H. is verbal and the R.H. is non-verbal, it's a good bet that a lot gets lost in the corpus callosum translation. The R.H. may know things that get communicated in other ways: by sending the L.H. a strong impression (faith?). <br /><br />To ask the R.H. to explain itself in L.H. terms is similar to Winston (an English speaking man) asking Kim (a Chinese speaking woman) the question "how much is 2+2"? If Kim fails to answer (in English!), then Winston concludes that "Kim is an idiot -- she doesn't even know how much 2+2 is"! But Kim may be a Ph.D. in Mathematics and she may know a great deal that she cannot communicate to Winston. Winston is simply applying standards that are arrogant, parochial, and pig-headed (Ah! Why do my thoughts go back to my first post about Dawkins and Coyne?).<br /><br />Dawkins and Coyne -- never you Massimo! You are always reasonable and open-minded.Tom D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16005219519644708237noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-46770078900341810552012-08-02T10:11:34.352-04:002012-08-02T10:11:34.352-04:00Tom,
we have all sorts of "knowledge" t...Tom,<br /><br />we have all sorts of "knowledge" that we cannot articulate, for instance the calculations necessary for a baseball player to hit a fast approaching ball. (The reason I put knowledge in scare quotes is because in philosophy typically knowledge means justified true belief, and the baseball player can't justify his belief, so we should probably use a different word, which may be the root of our disagreement here.)<br /><br />Still, no, I don't see any connection between intuition and faith, unless you are using the word faith in a much broader sense than James, which I would not advise, since the term has a standard meaning, sticking to which helps avoid confusion.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-82692228595382037782012-08-02T09:50:47.942-04:002012-08-02T09:50:47.942-04:00Moti,
Nothing I wrote avoids the regress problem ...Moti,<br /><br />Nothing I wrote avoids the regress problem because nothing I said was aimed at avoiding the regress problem.<br /><br />Re: the regress problem.<br /><br />First, it's a problem for traditional epistemology, which is in my view (and many other formal epistemologists') an idle intellectual activity unrelated to real issues concerning knowledge, inference, and rational decision making. <br /><br />Second, even if I were to want to enter into traditional epistemological problems, I would not concern myself with the regress problem because I am not a foundationalist. I find Hasok Chang's idea of epistemic iteration (which is essentially Peircean pragmaticism) much more congenial. <br /><br />To answer your question in a brief way, yes. S is justified in believing p if and only if S's evidence for p makes p > .50 (and S believes p on the basis of the evidence).Cian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-38167978205252443332012-08-02T09:05:27.617-04:002012-08-02T09:05:27.617-04:00Massimo:
While "split brains" are inde...Massimo: <br /><br />While "split brains" are indeed unusual and dysfunctional, I was only offering the experiment as a particular example of a more general principle: it is at least *possible* to have worthwhile knowledge without being able to articulate it or give evidence<br />for it. I went on to suggest that intuition *may* be something operating in a similar manner for the average<br />person.<br /><br />Here's a story from my youth: <br /><br />One time my older brother walked into the room and I was<br />suddenly struck with the strong impression that he had<br />been to the barber shop. This made no sense, as my <br />brother and I had both been to the barber shop only <br />a couple of days earlier -- so why should he go again? <br /><br />But he *did* go again: to buy a bottle of the hair oil<br />that the barber typically put on us after cutting our<br />hair. My older brother was staring to notice girls, <br />and went back to get a bottle of hair oil in order to <br />try and impress the ladies. This hair oil had a <br />distinctive scent -- I had smelled the scent, made the<br />association with the barber shop and came to my <br />conclusion that he had been there. All very logical<br />and Sherlock-Holmesian. Except that I wasn't conscious<br />of the chain of logic -- I merely had a strong intuition.<br /><br />*Something* (unknown to me) simply screamed "barber shop" to me. If you had asked me why I believed what I did I would have not been able to explain or give a reason any more than a split brain subject could explain why he selected "car keys". <br /><br />From this experience and the "split brain" experiments<br />I believe that it may be possible to have worthwhile <br />and accurate knowledge for which one cannot give evidence. Do you see *no* connection to faith? <br /><br />True, such intuition may lead us astray. But a wise man<br />once said that, "[epistemological] tools are [also] limited and faulty, which means that no human being can claim perfect knowledge of very much out there."Tom D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16005219519644708237noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-23235071776127506512012-08-02T08:49:57.285-04:002012-08-02T08:49:57.285-04:00I’m not sure that your definition really avoids th...I’m not sure that your definition really avoids the regress problem.<br /><br />You write: “S is justified in believing that p iff S’s evidence e for p makes p > .50.”<br /><br />Is S justified in believing e? If so, then S is justified in believing that e iff S’s evidence e2 for e makes e > .50. Is S justified in believing e2? If so, then S is justified in believing that e2 iff S’s evidence e3 for e2 makes e2 > .50. And so on, ad infinitum.<br /><br />Also, would you say that S is justified in believing that p when S’s evidence e for p is such that p = .51?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-85066543827484310792012-08-02T07:58:42.477-04:002012-08-02T07:58:42.477-04:00You mean like the "Atheist Mad Man" entr...You mean like the "Atheist Mad Man" entry by Nostradamus?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-15255129920761058932012-08-02T07:58:07.655-04:002012-08-02T07:58:07.655-04:00J.J.,
well, that's an empirical question, tho...J.J.,<br /><br />well, that's an empirical question, though there is evidence that suggests that certain types of beliefs cluster together. Yes, then there are people like Ken Miller, but remember that we are talking about a human social phenomenon, so we are bound to find all sorts of variations. At any rate, I have told Ken that he should apply the same intellectual rigor he uses to dissect Michael Behe to his own beliefs in Catholicism. He smiled.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-13651214495887834442012-08-01T22:13:03.529-04:002012-08-01T22:13:03.529-04:00hey massimo
search for "rationally speaking&...hey massimo<br /><br />search for "rationally speaking" on youtube<br /><br />some interesting resultsAnonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08609211507090160966noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-15370196447916913492012-08-01T22:12:36.545-04:002012-08-01T22:12:36.545-04:00I guess I should add that S is justified in holdin...I guess I should add that S is justified in holding p if and only if S's evidence makes p more likely to be true than false at t <i>and</i> S holds p on the basis of the evidence at t.Cian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-82819901791880625212012-08-01T22:05:38.770-04:002012-08-01T22:05:38.770-04:00Moti,
First, evidentialism is not committed to cl...Moti,<br /><br />First, evidentialism is not committed to classical epistemic foundationalism -- one can advance evidentialism and espouse a flavor of coherentism, neo-foundationalism, some admixture of some versions of the two, or even something like Peircean pragmaticism / epistemic iteration. <br /><br />Second, to address your (2) in reverse order, whatever "sufficient" means it seems it must at least mean "good enough". So, I take your final bit to be incoherent. <br /><br />Now many / most / almost all formal epistemologists want to define "sufficient evidence" in probabilistic terms. Thus, S is justified in holding p if and only if S's evidence e for p at some time t is sufficient :: e makes p at t > .50. <br /><br />Of course the evidentialist might want to unpack this in detail, but it suffices to present an at first pass plausible account for "sufficient". <br /><br />EvidentialismCian Eamon Marleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09070168038290681070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-63328681147093851632012-08-01T18:44:51.304-04:002012-08-01T18:44:51.304-04:00"You begin by accepting small bullshit, you e..."You begin by accepting small bullshit, you end up believing in big bullshit. You don’t question astrology and horoscopes, you end up believing an unscrupulous politician who tells you that we need to invade another country because it harbors invisible weapons of mass destruction..."<br /><br />Somehow that seems like a slippery-slope argument, and I've noticed that it doesn't necessarily work out in practice. Sometimes it does, and you see things like crank magnetism. Other times, well, you get people like Ken Miller and Pamela Gay, who have less than rational beliefs regarding religion, but are sharp people otherwise.J. J. Ramseyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00763792476799485687noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-16837122249317730402012-08-01T16:33:45.542-04:002012-08-01T16:33:45.542-04:00From Dawkins’ River Out Of Eden, A Darwinian View ...From Dawkins’ River Out Of Eden, A Darwinian View Of Life, (p.155):<br />“In a universe of blind forces and physical replication, some people are going to get hurt, others are going to get lucky, and you won’t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference.”<br /><br />Dawkins seems to have precise knowledge, although even though perfect is precise, precise might not for some be perfect.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07573847127040276949noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-15985967619064032612012-08-01T16:08:48.261-04:002012-08-01T16:08:48.261-04:00Tom,
good point. To begin with, however, please n...Tom,<br /><br />good point. To begin with, however, please note that split brains are dysfunctional brains, by definition. Normally, the whole brain would have perfectly good reasons to know what one hemisphere claims to know.<br /><br />Moreover, no, I don't think that's intuition, at least not in the sense in which cognitive scientists think about it. Intuition has more to do with the subconscious massive, parallel processing of information. And it certainly has nothing to do with faith...Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-90743339073558844532012-08-01T15:18:40.981-04:002012-08-01T15:18:40.981-04:00Massimo:
Would you agree that there is a case to...Massimo: <br /><br />Would you agree that there is a case to be made for belief in the face of the absence of *apparent*evidence? <br /><br />I'm thinking here of the "split brain" experiments, where the right brain is shown an item hidden to the left brain. When questioned, the person is unable to name the item (the right brain cannot articulate). Yet the person can select the item shown with the hand controlled by the right brain. <br /><br />In short, you can "know" something without being able to articulate it, or give evidence for why you know it. I suspect that intuition may be made up of this type of knowing.Tom D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16005219519644708237noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-58504500208020137822012-08-01T15:09:03.047-04:002012-08-01T15:09:03.047-04:00This comment has been removed by the author.Tom D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16005219519644708237noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-31141641437628326202012-08-01T13:40:34.961-04:002012-08-01T13:40:34.961-04:00Moti,
those are good considerations, but they are...Moti,<br /><br />those are good considerations, but they are addressed by Clifford. That is why he talks about the conditions under which we can trust other people's authority, or when he says that sometimes we need to talk about probabilities of belief.<br /><br />None of that, however, is any comfort to James, who actually refers to faith, i.e. belief in the absence or even against the available evidence.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-33628848960608516092012-08-01T12:22:15.019-04:002012-08-01T12:22:15.019-04:00When did Dawkins or Coyne ever claim to have "...When did Dawkins or Coyne ever claim to have "perfect knowledge" about anything? You are either being disingenuous, twisting their words, or both. As a scientist (geochemist), I would never claim to have perfect knowledge about my field. As a theist, you are observing the world through the lens of theism. Therefore, you seek "perfect knowledge" and you assume that everyone else does, as well. I seek knowledge, so that I can know more about the universe, but there is no such thing as "perfect knowledge". Those who claim that they have "perfect knowledge" about any topic are liars, fools, or both.Heath Wattshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17344160276173343465noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-80886819444973981302012-08-01T12:13:02.972-04:002012-08-01T12:13:02.972-04:00As admirable as this proposal is (i.e., that, for ...As admirable as this proposal is (i.e., that, for any p, one should believe p only if one has sufficient evidence for p), it has serious problems that need to be taken into consideration:<br /><br />1. When to stop? To believe p, I need sufficient evidence q. To believe q, I need sufficient evidence r, and so on, ad infinitum.<br /><br />2. What counts as sufficient? How much evidence is enough? Not an easy question to answer. I certainly do not want to defend James, but one could interpret him as arguing that, when the stakes are high, even insufficient evidence is good enough.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-87658935088075276092012-08-01T10:15:06.526-04:002012-08-01T10:15:06.526-04:00Quote: "These [epistemic] tools are limited a...Quote: "These [epistemic] tools are limited and faulty, which means that no human being can claim perfect knowledge of very much out there."<br /><br />Oh yeah? Then how do you explain Richard Dawkins and Jerry Coyne -- who claim perfect knowledge about nearly everything?Tom D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16005219519644708237noreply@blogger.com