tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post2315014573181389060..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: A different kind of moral relativismUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger33125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-10208861665168701272011-03-19T02:15:21.192-04:002011-03-19T02:15:21.192-04:00aharrell,
Massimo and I have beaten this subject ...aharrell, <br />Massimo and I have beaten this subject near to a death experience so I don't know what to add except to say that I don't get my hypotheticals from Damasio, and I don't consider having confidence in one's working theory as necessarily dogmatic. I turn to Damasio and others such as Steven Rose for guidance, but my own approach involves the proper determination of biological systems' evolved purposes, for me a necessary part of understanding why and how they function.<br /><br />And if I'm dogmatic about anything, it's this, that all evolution is the proximate result of the entity or entities involved reacting strategically to their experience - acquiring and evolving their varieties of predictive purposes accordingly. Even though I sense that you're coming at this with the usual stochastic explanations for motivation of physiological functions, it's not my intention to debate these matters further in this particular forum.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-76098055763134887732011-03-18T23:07:23.912-04:002011-03-18T23:07:23.912-04:00I finally encountered a magnitude of time permissi...I finally encountered a magnitude of time permissive of perusing Prof Jesse Prinz's article (this post whetted my appetite and I've been looking forward to it). His assertions are logical. It seems to me that the biggest obstacle standing in the way of intellectual advancement, is the tendency of divergent groups to prejudice each other.Justinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17703912676685127907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-19015033750235564942011-03-18T20:02:15.442-04:002011-03-18T20:02:15.442-04:00Baron—many of your arguments are based on statemen...Baron—many of your arguments are based on statements of dubious neuro-scientific validity that are presented as if they were indisputable fact (what McGinn criticized Damasio for). First, it's not clear that emotion is an exclusively subconscious process, "primarily predictive . . . primarily inductive" Second, it's not clear whether "emotion" is rooted in specialized brain centers ( "thinking systems") as opposed to being implemented by continuous, instantaneous, patterns of neuro-modulation operating in numerous structures simultaneously. In light of the empirical literature and recent data, it remains merely dogmatic to assert that emotion is "generated by the subconscious processor referred to as the emotional brain" and that this processor serves a "predominantly predictive purpose"Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-20263240278456774882011-03-18T15:19:45.875-04:002011-03-18T15:19:45.875-04:00Naturally, and so we reach another impasse. Oh wel...Naturally, and so we reach another impasse. Oh well.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-86330414204241637982011-03-18T15:07:04.479-04:002011-03-18T15:07:04.479-04:00Massimo, from where I stand it's you that, whe...Massimo, from where I stand it's you that, when I get you cornered, re-designates the dimensions and locations of the corners. <br />And it's my emotional brain that does the writing while my rational brain reads it back and edits it for an emotional yet stoic rewrite.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-74031101491057674392011-03-18T14:57:32.658-04:002011-03-18T14:57:32.658-04:00Baron, I do wonder why is it that every time I bac...Baron, I do wonder why is it that every time I back you in a corner you result to either switching the subject or to crypto-language that simply obfuscates matters. Is it your rational self that is writing, or your emotional one?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-51486579098130061892011-03-18T14:53:10.704-04:002011-03-18T14:53:10.704-04:00Massimo, are you insisting that the emotional proc...Massimo, are you insisting that the emotional process does not involve intelligent assessments of both learned and instinctive strategically relevant possibilities for choosing among these available options, with predictive expectations formed accordingly? And do you really think that process is otherwise accomplished with conscious deliberation? Get real.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-85612854911526192692011-03-18T14:20:27.187-04:002011-03-18T14:20:27.187-04:00Baron, I insist: you are confused about both what ...Baron, I insist: you are confused about both what I said and what Damasio wrote. The Damasio quote you cited precisely makes my point that reason and emotion have to go together for a human being to function. <br /><br />When you say that I think of emotional processing as non-thinking you are playing on an ambiguity in the notion of thinking: *everything* the brain does, including controlling your heart bit, can be interpreted as "thinking" in the broad sense. But that's not interesting. By thinking I mean rational deliberation, which is distinct from - though not necessarily opposed to - emotional "thinking."Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-67545276048952209122011-03-18T12:30:06.516-04:002011-03-18T12:30:06.516-04:00Massimo, I was trying to clear up your confusion r...Massimo, I was trying to clear up your confusion regarding the emotional process as a non-thinking one, when in fact the bulk of our thinking is done by the subconscious processing that in the end (which is of course never ending) sends the emotional "feelings" to our more conscious processes for "advice." (Some argue that it's these feelings that best represent our consciousness but I'm not trying to go there just yet.)<br />Until these feelings are dealt with, there will be no decisions. Further, the subconscious process is primarily predictive, which is primarily inductive.<br />I made the mistake of assuming you knew this already, as I was not about to write a page or two about the matter here. And I'm still not about to.<br />I leave you with this quote from Damasio:<br />"My hope is that… the elucidation of some of the biological mechanisms of emotion and reason…may help others see emotion not as the evil twin of reason, but rather as a very natural and inextricable component of the nature of being rational, for better and for worse."Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-49450442139563044982011-03-18T07:55:32.654-04:002011-03-18T07:55:32.654-04:00Baron, I insist, Damasio says no such thing. Moreo...Baron, I insist, Damasio says no such thing. Moreover, you are confusing the distinction between emotional and rational systems with the one between induction and deduction - nothing to do whatsoever with each other, as the rational system uses both induction and deduction, while the emotional one doesn't really "think" in the same sense at all. You are also confusing the distinction between subconscious and conscious thought with the one between emotions and rationality (we can be and are conscious of emotions). Finally, modern neuroscience - including and particularly Damasio's - suggests that the two systems (which are themselves made up of a bunch of sub-systems) continuously interact to come up with the best decision making procedure.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-30710749021502838242011-03-18T01:09:57.461-04:002011-03-18T01:09:57.461-04:00Baron is making a valid point. The following anal...Baron is making a valid point. The following analogy will help to clarify.<br /><br />When a person's blood sugar drops, the sub-conscious is triggered to find a solution. It will find one such as, "snack machine", and present it the conscious. The conscious can then reason, "too expensive" or "unhealthy". The subconscious will search for another solution as the blood sugar continues to drop. At some point, as solutions become exhausted and the subconscious will start releasing hormones and proteins designed to suppress conscious reasoning while creating a sense of urgency. The emotion generally manifests itself in the form of frustration. Yes, conscious reasoning an overpower this, but most people do not have an iron will. Yes, emotions can overpower this, but it typically requires an extreme, such as an unhealthy phobia or a burning desire, both of which most people do not have.Justinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17703912676685127907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-31447097751607772302011-03-18T00:42:59.434-04:002011-03-18T00:42:59.434-04:00Massimo, you'd do well to get out that stuff f...Massimo, you'd do well to get out that stuff from Damasio and reread it. Emotions are generated by the subconscious processor commonly referred to as the emotional (as opposed to the rational) brain. Of course we know now that we have more than two such "thinking" systems, but we should also be aware that in concert they serve a predominantly predictive purpose. <br />That has little to do with the inductive functions needing to have primacy over the more recently evolved deductive thinking processes, any and all of which are rational, but each to a different purpose. <br />There can be what's known as a rational override of the the inductive system when the emotional signaling system freezes up, but other than that, the emotional brain acts as the executive.<br />That's its evolutionary purpose. <br />You don't agree that anything evolved to serve a purpose, so of course you won't and can't approach any of life's philosophical problems from that perspective. <br />Although if you could you should.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-30397871768389808072011-03-17T23:53:47.037-04:002011-03-17T23:53:47.037-04:00Baron — Massimo states my own view, albeit more su...Baron — Massimo states my own view, albeit more succinctly.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-58801845500985390812011-03-17T23:01:29.834-04:002011-03-17T23:01:29.834-04:00Baron, subconscious is not the same as emotional, ...Baron, subconscious is not the same as emotional, so it still doesn't follow that emotions have primacy over rational thinking. Also, just because a large portion of thinking is subconscious it does not mean that reason is subordinate, as it can act as a filter on subconscious thinking.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-84276899356722727312011-03-17T22:51:22.343-04:002011-03-17T22:51:22.343-04:00Re @aharrel
I thought I did address the question t...Re @aharrel<br />I thought I did address the question to Massimo's satisfaction - at least with my meaning, if not with my conclusion. Massimo's already aware that our logical processes are primarily subconscious and primarily predictive. That doesn't mean he has to agree with my analysis, but I'm fairly confident that it's in line with the current research on the subject. <br />But since aharrel was not addressing his complaint directly to me, I'll assume I'm not expected to go into further detail as to why I've presumed to understand a bit of what in his words "we do not properly understand."Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-21353260520759508662011-03-17T21:31:13.549-04:002011-03-17T21:31:13.549-04:00I just want to say -- in lieu of a reply from Mass...I just want to say -- in lieu of a reply from Massimo -- that the Baron has not addressed Massimo's question —" how does the idea that reason is not the final arbiter imply that emotions are?" In fact, the Baron's rigidly hierarchical view of what he takes to be emotion-driven choice is unfounded -- he conveniently does not mention that we do not properly understand the predictive power yielded by the neural factors underlying "subconscious" processes. Indeed, it is merely arbitrary to speak of "emotion" as the underlying base for decision-making -- even "the subconscious process that . . . does the predictive assessment" relies on different neural substrates —themselves not "emotional" precisely. And in any case, since the mechanisms of emotion and reason are tightly intertwined from early perception to reasoning, it is dogmatic of the Baron to assert an invariable predictive relationship.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-91756518430340149382011-03-17T20:03:44.924-04:002011-03-17T20:03:44.924-04:00Moral acts are not only to be justified by an asse...Moral acts are not only to be justified by an assessment of expected consequences under expected circumstances; there is also the objective aspect of purpose as it relates to these same circumstances.<br />Purpose is not defined or justified by consequence as much as consequence is defined and justified by purpose. And neither can be accurately assessed without considering the other.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-5444093213231606152011-03-17T17:02:53.577-04:002011-03-17T17:02:53.577-04:00Michael,
So long as we're clear that moral f...Michael, <br /><br />So long as we're clear that moral facts or truths are not mind-independent, and that moral reasoning assumes certain common human emotional inputs (like empathy and compassion), I'm on board with your argument. <br /><br />To put it another way, if we think in terms of the following spectrum:<br /><br />(1) subjectivity => <br />(2) intersubjectivity => <br />(3) objectivity<br /><br />then, at the very least, public discourse brings us from (1) to (2). And, the wider that discourse becomes, the more it is informed with other types of knowledge (e.g. from the sciences) and by rational analysis (e.g. by resolving logical contradictions and conflicts of interest) - then the closer we get to (3).<br /><br />But I use the term "objective" here with hesitation, given its connotation of absolute certainty. If that's the definition we bear in mind, then I don't believe that we ever actually attain (3) (in morality or in any other conceptual domain, for that matter).mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-79776408223028993832011-03-17T16:51:10.098-04:002011-03-17T16:51:10.098-04:00Well, that conditional is an obvious position to a...Well, that conditional is an obvious position to adopt. It could be contingently true (it's not a tautology). If you think moral objectivity is correct then you could say people's rationality will, as an empirical issue, lead them to it, and so their reasoned agreement can indicate its content - but then you would need a story as to why, when substantial reasoned disagreement exists, it does not indicate either that moral objectivity is rationally inaccessible or that it is not a matter of rationality at all. It's just that, to me, what that story would be is not particularly clear.Timothyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04338789669131796827noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-50890540098082770942011-03-17T13:45:26.333-04:002011-03-17T13:45:26.333-04:00@Timothy, would this sum up what you think?
"...@Timothy, would this sum up what you think?<br /><br />"If moral disagreement is not an argument against moral objectivity, then moral agreement is not an argument for moral objectivity."Michael De Dorahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16054469707295070655noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-62813611323552400252011-03-17T13:04:24.015-04:002011-03-17T13:04:24.015-04:00@Timothy, you wrote:
"It just seems to me th...@Timothy, you wrote:<br /><br />"It just seems to me that if you deny that moral disagreement is at least suggestive of moral objectivism being false, then taking moral agreement as indicative of moral rationality becomes problematic, and would require a stronger defense than I see here." <br /><br />Good point. I'll have to think this one over.Michael De Dorahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16054469707295070655noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-70484192018364059742011-03-17T10:27:10.453-04:002011-03-17T10:27:10.453-04:00It seems strange to me to argue on the one hand, &...It seems strange to me to argue on the one hand, "Difference of opinion doesn’t mean that there isn’t a true or rational answer," but suggest on the other that public moral discourse can improve morality's rationality. These two points aren't irreconcilable, but the essay says that opinions aren't necessarily informative while taking them as being informative when they're largely in agreement. It just seems to me that if you deny that moral disagreement is at least suggestive of moral objectivism being false, then taking moral agreement as indicative of moral rationality becomes problematic, and would require a stronger defense than I see here.Timothyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04338789669131796827noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-28105730291237155162011-03-17T09:58:23.313-04:002011-03-17T09:58:23.313-04:00Sam Harris's moral landscape doesn't solve...Sam Harris's moral landscape doesn't solve anything.<br /><br />The argument goes something like this. Imagine you’re in a hellish situation, say, you’re chained to a rock, and every morning a giant bird flies down and eats your liver, and every evening it grows back, so it can happen all over again, forever. I’m sure we would both agree, not getting one’s liver eaten would be a better situation to be in. This being the case, there are obviously situations that are ‘better’ than others, and by extension, actions that are better than others. Thus we have value in action and actions can be moral…<br /><br />Except, that is not the is-ought problem. Of course we can think of a better situation, that is trivial. But the question is, does the fact that one IS getting one’s liver eaten, mean that this OUGHT to be the case? Does the fact that something happens to us, mean that we deserve it? Should it be better, not, could it be. <br /><br />Relativism has nothing to fear from Sam Harris.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17845303601266125343noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-18856889267541062642011-03-17T07:25:46.238-04:002011-03-17T07:25:46.238-04:00[O]ne can judge some moral precepts as better than...<i>[O]ne can judge some moral precepts as better than others, yet remain open to the fact that there are probably many different ways to establish a good society. This is a pluralistic conception of objective morality which doesn’t assume one absolute moral truth. For all that has been said, Sam Harris’ idea of a moral landscape does help illustrate this concept. Thinking in terms of better and worse morality gets us out of relativism and into an objectivist approach. The important thing to note is that one need not go all the way to absolute objectivity to work toward a rational, non-arbitrary morality.</i><br /><br />Michael, I'm very much with you on this. I know that Massimo and Russell Blackford have raised important criticisms of Sam Harris's arguments in 'The Moral Landscape', but I share Harris's conviction that there are such things as 'beneficial-thus-better' values and 'harmful-thus-worse' ones.<br /><br />Yes, Harris assumes human well-being as a premise and therefore fails to solve Hume's is-ought problem. But in the context of <i>human</i> life, of human aims and aversions, surely this is an acceptable premise on which to construct a quasi-objective morality? Isn't this the pragmatic path to take, even if it means failing to address Hume's (perhaps insoluble) problem?Darrick Limhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13791236823584001938noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-41541021917784647522011-03-16T23:07:28.920-04:002011-03-16T23:07:28.920-04:00This quest for some ultimate universal morality st...This quest for some ultimate universal morality strikes me as rather Quixotic.<br /><br />Each of us is a process and collectively our race is a process (a story if you will). Times and conditions change. <br /><br />If one accepts the premise that human racial survival is 'good'. Then you have to accept changing morality. During one of the population bottlenecks one could reasonably argue that celibacy would be immoral and having as many children as possible would be moral. Today when there are seven billion humans and we are having an adverse effect on our environment the opposite is true celibacy and childlessness have become laudable. Times change and the story progresses. <br /><br />Morality depends on the premises you begin with (such as the one above), the environment you want to live in and how you want events to play out. There are human commonalities certainly, but no absolutes, no ultimate arbiter to whom one can appeal. One can simply shop among philosophers (typically in aisle 7 at the grocery store) until you find one whose ideas appeal to you, but as skeptics we are always told that arguments from authority sans confirming objective proof are suspect.Thameronhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05056803143951310082noreply@blogger.com