tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post2076717845407512342..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: Michael's PicksUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-90594174530139950042011-10-20T23:20:25.999-04:002011-10-20T23:20:25.999-04:00@Gadfly: Your statement confused me. Utilitarianis...@Gadfly: Your statement confused me. Utilitarianism has its flaws, but selfishness, individualism and solipsism seem to me to NOT be them, at all. Standard versions of U are totally impartial, meaning there is no privileging of me over my neighbour or over somebody I don't know. All minds capable of happiness are equal under the utilitarian calculus... and indeed this is often seen as a *flaw* of the theory - that it is too impartial, selfless and universal.ianpollockhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15579140807988796286noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-32153777040077140142011-10-09T22:17:15.304-04:002011-10-09T22:17:15.304-04:00For the people reading the article on utilitariani...For the people reading the article on utilitarianism instead of the paper it cited:<br /><br />Importantly, these results also give rise to a methodological concern in the study of moral judgment—namely, that<br />we should be wary of favoring a method that equates the<br />quality of moral judgment with responses that are endorsed<br />primarily by individuals who are likely perceived as less<br />moral (because they possess traits like callousness and<br />manipulativeness). In other words, adopting such a method<br />can lead to the counterintuitive inference that ‘‘correct’’<br />moral judgments are most likely to be made by the individuals least likely to possess the character traits generally perceived as moral.<br />We should note that our results do not speak to<br />whether utilitarianism (or deontology) is the correct normative ethical theory, as the characteristics of a theory’s<br />proponents cannot determine its normative status. In addition, favoring a utilitarian or deontological solution to a<br />sacrificial moral dilemma does not necessarily indicate<br />that a participant endorses (or understands) utilitarianism<br />or deontology as a full-blown ethical theory—just because<br />an individual responds like a utilitarian would is not suffi-<br />cient evidence that she is a utilitarian. Consider, for instance, a man who finds the thought of pushing a fat<br />man off of a footbridge to his death to be intrinsically<br />appealing—whether or not the action saved more lives.<br />Concluding on the basis of his response to a sacrificial dilemma that he must be convinced that utilitarianism is<br />the best ethical theory makes little sense.<br />Nor do our results show that endorsing utilitarianism is<br />pathological, as it is unlikely that the personality styles<br />measured here would characterize all (or most) proponents of utilitarianism as an ethical theory (nor is the measure of psychopathic personality traits we used sufficient<br />to conclude that any respondents reach clinical levels of<br />psychopathy). It is also possible that possessing these<br />sub-clinical psychopathic traits may be of moral value<br />insomuch as individuals who are capable of such emotional detachment, while appearing to possess a questionable moral character in some situations, may be better able<br />to act for the greater good in ways that would prove diffi-<br />cult for many (such as the very situations described in our<br />target dilemmas). Nonetheless the relative infrequency of<br />such events would seem, at the very least, to undermine<br />the validity of using these measures as a metric for optimal<br />moral judgment in everyday life.<br />Finally, our empirical demonstration points to the problematic nature of studying moral judgment by identifying<br />‘‘errors’’ in how subjects respond to moral dilemmas. As<br />Pizarro and Uhlmann (2005) argued, it may be sufficient<br />to simply document how, when, and why individuals make<br />the moral judgments that they do without relying on the<br />adoption of a normative standard.<br />3<br />We believe psychologists can make progress by developing accurate descriptive<br />theories that explain why individuals favor deontological<br />judgments in some situations and utilitarian judgments in<br />others (or whether moral judgment is even adequately captured by these philosophical frameworks; cf. Bauman & Skitka, 2009) without having to rely on the claim that<br />individuals are making an ‘‘error’’ in some cases.JoshJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13232627951659106765noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-17487714993197960212011-10-09T15:46:17.099-04:002011-10-09T15:46:17.099-04:00As to defining or redefining evil-
Evil is not a ...As to defining or redefining evil- <br />Evil is not a force of nature, it's a behavioral consequence, where said behavior may or may not have be intentional or consequentially intended, or deemed evil in another culture or set of circumstances. Whether or not, or the degree to which, we have free will is beside the point as long as we recognize we have some responsibility for behavioral consequences.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-65668110780861317452011-10-09T14:30:39.946-04:002011-10-09T14:30:39.946-04:00I've always understood utilitarianism as being...I've always understood utilitarianism as being the most selfish, individualistic, even solipsistic in some way, of moral philosophies. The findings don't surprise me a whit.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-71594306042057822172011-10-09T10:30:07.568-04:002011-10-09T10:30:07.568-04:00Regarding the finding about utilitarian behavior: ...Regarding the finding about utilitarian behavior: modern economic theory (even orthodox neoclassical economics) does NOT rest on the assumption that people behave according to utilitarian calculus. Examples:<br />1. Gary Becker (1962) proved that irrational agents behaving at random, or keeping their behavior constant in spite of changing prices, generate the same demand and supply curves generated by the assumption of self-regarding rational maximizing behavior.<br />2. Samuelson (in various works since 1937) discarded completely any reference to maximization of subjective utility and rational deliberation on the part of agents, to rely instead on "revealed preferences", i.e. actual behavior by consumers and firms.<br />3. Many authors starting with Herbert Simon (1956) replaced pure economic rationality with "bounded rationality" whereby actors just try to achieve a "satisfizing" solution even if it is not the maximally optimum one. See esp. Gigerenzer and Selten (2000).<br />4. John Nash (1950) proved that a set of competitive agents engaged in a "non cooperative game" may settle on a second-best solution in the face of uncertainty about the behavior of others; thus, "rational" behavior in uncertain waters may not coincide with "maximizing utility" behavior.<br />5. Evolutionary economics (Geoffrey Hodgson among others)analyze the process of change in economic behavior facing the selective pressure of a changing market and regulatory environment, finding that economic behavior not necessarily settles on a neoclassical maximally rational outcome.<br />And so on. The use of "utility maximizing" models is chiefly meant to be a useful "as if" metaphor, not a picture of actual economic behavior or actual economic motivations.Hector M.https://www.blogger.com/profile/10008738285159771679noreply@blogger.com