tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post1040990922333442367..comments2023-10-10T08:02:18.073-04:00Comments on Rationally Speaking: One more take on the role of intuition in philosophyUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger24125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-58609956101541309872011-11-24T22:50:23.784-05:002011-11-24T22:50:23.784-05:00Attlee,
I have the rational illusion that I cannot...Attlee,<br />I have the rational illusion that I cannot be reliably certain of anything. <br />I'm aware, more consciously than such as you, that we and all other life forms have evolved to rely on the advantages of uncertainty.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-76721235204139999412011-11-24T21:34:16.804-05:002011-11-24T21:34:16.804-05:00The logical deduction of an unjustifiable posit as...The logical deduction of an unjustifiable posit assented to by intuition is precisely transparent (even if not resonant); what a "non-circular certainty" is neither you nor Baron have explained, nor could you, for the phrase "non-circular certainty" is a mindless self-contradiction -- how could one be "certain" of anything, given the impossibility of a non-circular justification of the reliability of any experience whatsoever (perceptual, introspective, memorial, inferential, testimonial, (so-called) "intuitional" etc.)?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-38339925721038341152011-11-24T18:23:29.293-05:002011-11-24T18:23:29.293-05:00Attlee,
get over it: there is none, and yet induc...Attlee,<br /><br />get over it: there is none, and yet induction works. C'mon man, how do you get out of bed in the morning without non-circular certainties, I wonder?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-21974578989313099882011-11-24T17:29:38.963-05:002011-11-24T17:29:38.963-05:00What is the non-circular justification for inducti...What is the non-circular justification for inductive modes of inference?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-82505532271752725942011-11-23T17:54:57.087-05:002011-11-23T17:54:57.087-05:00Sorry Attlee, but we (you being the exception) can...Sorry Attlee, but we (you being the exception) can avoid the circularity paradox through inductive logic, regardless of Hume's alleged problem with it. <br />Since obviously - all things to some degree illusional - most of us can get from is to ought. Life forms seem to have been doing that their way for eons. <br />You won't understand that, but then you're just a foil at this point.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-79518562776955484772011-11-23T16:34:53.031-05:002011-11-23T16:34:53.031-05:00Baron,
You throw logical fallacies about like co...Baron, <br /><br />You throw logical fallacies about like confetti, but you don't explain what sources of belief are such that we can logically infer their reliability without lapsing into epistemic circularity. Until you do this, dignified silence is your best pose.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-8500200842005042882011-11-23T16:32:24.289-05:002011-11-23T16:32:24.289-05:00"we've already had this discussion, and e..."we've already had this discussion, and even though you don't realize it, you lost. I'm not going to rehash the same points over and over. That would indeed be an example of (vicious) regress..."<br /><br />Where would philosophy be without the art of ignoring objections? Possibly we had a discussion -- it was hard to tell what with all the logical fallacies flying around. More to my point, the rehashing of points was rather one-sided since you couldn't be bothered to actually confront any and all of the arguments put to you. You say that intuitions cannot and ought not be used as data to test hypotheses or draw conclusions -- what in Hume's name would be the alternative? <br /><br />"70% of philosophers think that intuitions are not essential to justification" <br /><br />Since 70% of philosophers have failed to provide a non-intuition-based theory of justification we must conclude that their collective dishonesty is merely yet another indictment of the irrepressible intellectual hucksterism that passes for "thought" at this pivotal stage in the pre-history of mankind.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-62368808236150296122011-11-22T20:44:11.848-05:002011-11-22T20:44:11.848-05:00Attlee,
we've already had this discussion, an...Attlee,<br /><br />we've already had this discussion, and even though you don't realize it, you lost. I'm not going to rehash the same points over and over. That would indeed be an example of (vicious) regress...Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-53680974377860273362011-11-22T18:19:32.553-05:002011-11-22T18:19:32.553-05:00Attlee,
Except that intuitions are quite logical t...Attlee,<br />Except that intuitions are quite logical to the extent that they are based on predictive probabilities and not your personal form of "deductive non-inference." The problem with intuition is beliefs, and with the ability of those such as yourself to rationalize them with your own delusive premises. You've been somehow left with those intuitive premises bereft of any insight into the subconscious logic that has used them as propositional, i.e., neither true nor false.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-42682079421480901242011-11-22T17:21:39.694-05:002011-11-22T17:21:39.694-05:00"However, intuitions cannot and should not be..."However, intuitions cannot and should not be used as data to test hypotheses or draw conclusions, because they are not epistemically reliable . . . 70% of philosophers think that intuitions are not essential to justification . . . philosophers of science seem to be particularly skeptical of the role of intuition in the context of justification. Kudos to ourselves, my dear colleagues . . . Here, I am with Henri Poincaré (quoted by the Kuntz’s) when he wrote back in 1908 that “It is by logic that we prove, but by intuition that we discover.” Which is true also for formal logic and math. Substitute “empirical evidence’ for “logic” in the quote, and you get science."<br /><br />Contra 70% of philosophers, the buck stops with intuition. "Empirical evidence" is relative to brute posits that are lent credulity on the basis of intuition (we must accept this on pain of infinite regress or vicious circularity). What precisely the counter-possibility is to this logical conclusion, no one knows. Until he thinks one up, Massimo would do best to maintain a dignified silence.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-74779760521889461282011-11-21T12:11:00.956-05:002011-11-21T12:11:00.956-05:00"3) A propositional attitude that is held wit..."3) A propositional attitude that is held with some degree of conviction, and solely on the basis of one’s understanding of the proposition in question, not on the basis of some belief.<br />Our subconscious thinking is likely more based on belief than our conscious."<br /><br />Seems contradictory to me, as well as to some as cited on Wikipedia:<br />"2.Intuitions are a species of belief, and based ultimately in experience. This view holds that intuitions are not especially different from beliefs, although they appear subjectively to be more unrevisable than other beliefs. Unlike the previous view, these intuitions are liable to differ between social groups. Evidence for this is shown in various psychological studies (e.g. the one by Stich, Weinburg and Nichols)"Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-87958446991466038382011-11-21T11:59:41.123-05:002011-11-21T11:59:41.123-05:00Baron,
don't be silly about "this is my ...Baron,<br /><br />don't be silly about "this is my blog." As you know, that applies only to posts that I think are out of bounds in terms of courtesy, not to content. I didn't dismiss your points by example, I simply had time to only show where you went wrong in one of your cases, I think you are wrong on the others for similar reasons. And your latest is yet another example:<br /><br />> our subconscious thinking is likely more based on belief than our conscious. <<br /><br />Indeed, and how is that contracting any of the above definitions?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-77077067986125612482011-11-21T11:50:33.095-05:002011-11-21T11:50:33.095-05:00Well, Massimo, you picked on my most debatable arg...Well, Massimo, you picked on my most debatable argument, and pronounced the rest of them wrong by that example. However, I could cite numerous references for those in the field that agree with me, especially that our subconscious thinking is likely more based on belief than our conscious. <br />But as you like to remind us, it's your blog, and your say so.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-75193042180396882072011-11-21T10:46:49.653-05:002011-11-21T10:46:49.653-05:00Does the context of discovery also include perseve...Does the context of discovery also include perseverance? I think intuition can be a strong motivation to persevere, when discoveries remain elusive (results inclonclusive).Joachim Dagghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00985198925581721229noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-86265037426800969722011-11-21T07:09:15.566-05:002011-11-21T07:09:15.566-05:00Baron,
I don;t find your objections to the variou...Baron,<br /><br />I don;t find your objections to the various concepts of intuition compelling at all. In most cases you are making a statement that is perfectly compatible with the definition you intend to criticize, only phrase differently.<br /><br />For instance:<br /><br />"1) Judgment that is not made on the basis of some kind of observable and explicit reasoning process.<br /><br />We subconsciously use a predictive reasoning process similar to Bayesian induction. As explicit a process as any logical system and observable by the clarity of its inference."<br /><br />We may or may not think in a Bayesian fashion (this is far from being an ascertained fact), but even if we do the process is certainly not observable to our consciousness, by definition of "unconscious." And so on for the others.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-38292765137082505792011-11-20T19:04:48.111-05:002011-11-20T19:04:48.111-05:00Massimo,
Of course my question isn't specific...Massimo,<br /><br />Of course my question isn't specific to philosophy, and I didn't mean to imply that it was. You say non-rational approaches to knowledge aren't atypical, and I, of course, agree. But that wasn't my point. However, a corollary of my point is that the approach is unimportant if it doesn't significantly affect the quality of the output. <br /><br />You say the question is if the field makes progress when practiced at its best. I don't agree. I'm confident that's obviously true, and I'm puzzled that anyone that could claim the opposite. I say the question is: how do irrational participants affect the quality of the output produced by a progressing system (such as philosophy, science, and so on). <br /><br />This is the question because it's the only question where irrational elements, such as intuition in the context of justification, matter.JoshJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13232627951659106765noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-58745515051145489682011-11-20T18:31:05.208-05:002011-11-20T18:31:05.208-05:00As to how I would redefine intuition, I wouldn'...As to how I would redefine intuition, I wouldn't, except to point out that it's the more abstract product of our unconscious processing.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-41093870358408063012011-11-20T18:23:36.315-05:002011-11-20T18:23:36.315-05:001) Judgment that is not made on the basis of some ...1) Judgment that is not made on the basis of some kind of observable and explicit reasoning process.<br /><br />We subconsciously use a predictive reasoning process similar to Bayesian induction. As explicit a process as any logical system and observable by the clarity of its inference.<br /><br />2) An intellectual happening whereby it seems that something is the case without arising from reasoning, or sensorial perceiving, or remembering.<br /><br />It doesn't seem that to anyone who is aware that the bulk of our reasoning is done subconsciously, and arises from sensorial perceiving and memory as much or more as does conscious thought.<br /><br />3) A propositional attitude that is held with some degree of conviction, and solely on the basis of one’s understanding of the proposition in question, not on the basis of some belief.<br /><br />Our subconscious thinking is likely more based on belief than our conscious.<br /><br />4) An intellectual act whereby one is thinking occurrently [sic] of the abstract proposition that p and, merely on the basis of understanding it, believes that p.<br /><br />We subconsciously prepare as many analytical arguments as we iterate consciously.<br /><br />5) An intellectual state made up of (1) the consideration whether p and (2) positive phenomenological qualities that count as evidence for p; together constituting prima facie reason to believe that p.<br /><br />We do much more subconsciously and intuitively than introduce the prima facie to our consciousness. (And the subconscious is seen by some as the final arbiter.)<br /><br />6) The formation of a belief by unclouded mental attention to its contents, in a way that is so easy and yielding a belief that is so definite as to leave no room for doubt regarding its veracity.<br /><br />Doubt is the reason we have evolved our conscious thought processes.<br /><br />7) An intellectual happening that serves as evidence for the situation at hand’s instantiation of some concept.<br /><br />It only seems to the conscious part of the mind that the unconscious process is instantaneous.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-82803734252655385732011-11-20T17:36:21.846-05:002011-11-20T17:36:21.846-05:00Baron,
first off: why exactly are all the definit...Baron,<br /><br />first off: why exactly are all the definitions of intuitions given above wrong? They strike me as all (partially) correct. Second, what's your definition of it?<br /><br />Eid,<br /><br />that is a good question, but hardly specific to philosophy. Non-rational approaches to knowledge are well known in all field, science included. The question is: does the field make progress when practiced at its best? I have argued on RS that the answer is yes, though of course progress in philosophy cannot and should not be measured by the standards of science (because the disciplines have different aims and methods):<br /><br />http://goo.gl/a8moG<br />http://goo.gl/du1lPAnonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-78271332478463194072011-11-20T15:43:26.134-05:002011-11-20T15:43:26.134-05:00You've torn down Julia's empirical claim t...You've torn down Julia's empirical claim that the majority of philosophers accept intuition in the context of justification, but you and her have missed the broader claim: Philosophy should be judged by its output rather than its participants (thereby progressing), and if those participants hold irrational beliefs the quality of the output will be reduced. You're both sort of skirmishing on the edges of that claim.<br /><br />So, in which areas of philosophy could intuition affect the output? In those areas, what percentage of philosophers irrationally think intuition is useful in certain contexts? For intance, if the use of intuition for justification is significantly less accepted in Philosophy of Science, and that's the only relevant field, then Julia's criticism would be almost meaningless.<br /><br />Does a field with irrational participants produce lower quality output? Maybe a field with 10% irrational participants generates more competition and thereby higher quality output. On the other hand, if the percentage goes above some threshold (say 51%) does the field become effectively useless? Maybe not given the incentive structure for academia.JoshJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13232627951659106765noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-35968499106426627802011-11-20T13:57:16.981-05:002011-11-20T13:57:16.981-05:00All seven of those "conceptions of intuitions...All seven of those "conceptions of intuitions" are wrong. We do almost all of our thinking subconsciously, and consciously when we have need to examine, re-examine, and make use of it. <br /><br />The dictionary tells us that intuition is the ability to understand something immediately, without the need for conscious reasoning. Which is also wrong. We simply think unconsciously much much faster than when we consciously use symbolic language to examine the results.Baron Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04138430918331887648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-19791845636975782402011-11-20T12:34:57.973-05:002011-11-20T12:34:57.973-05:00Massimo,
The link to Rebecca Hanrahan's paper...Massimo,<br /><br />The link to Rebecca Hanrahan's paper in your 2008 post on Zombies you mention above is broken. This URL works: http://www.philosophynow.org/issue67/The_Problem_With_Zombies.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-77088148214842323152011-11-20T10:42:10.169-05:002011-11-20T10:42:10.169-05:00Scott, because "occurrently" is not a st...Scott, because "occurrently" is not a standard English word, and I wanted to highlight that it was being used in a technical sense, it wasn't a typo.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099460671669064269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15005476.post-52341526813387906822011-11-20T09:52:05.771-05:002011-11-20T09:52:05.771-05:00A very minor point: why is there a '[sic]'...A very minor point: why is there a '[sic]' after 'occurrently'? Doesn't that simply refer to the distinction between <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/#2.1" rel="nofollow">"occurrent" and "dispositional" belief</a>?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11332828263550581927noreply@blogger.com