by Paul M. Paolini
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| www.devincontext.com |
Scientism is generally taken to be something along the lines of a way of thinking in which the virtues, scope or benefits of science are exaggerated or extended to the point of cultishness, ideology or fanaticism. My aim in this essay is to make this general idea more precise, or, to put it another way, to explain how charging someone with scientism can be a meaningful criticism.
One way we might try to characterize scientism is in terms of belief in certain propositions relating to science. In particular, scientism might be defined as belief in propositions that take certain extreme pro-science positions (i.e., positions that evaluate science favorably), such as:
- Observation is the only source of genuine knowledge.
- Eventually, all fields of knowledge will be sciences.
- Human progress and scientific progress are identical.
- One day all humankind will hold the scientific worldview and no other.
- The question of how we should live can and should be answered by science.
But there is a problem with this. If we were to identify scientism with belief in such propositions, then the charge of scientism would merely be the charge of having certain beliefs that are false, and what it is that is supposed to be wrong with having such beliefs, beyond falsity, is left unspecified. To put this another way, identifying scientism with certain beliefs renders the charge of scientism merely of the form: such-and-such is believed and such-and-such is false — which gives no indication of the significance of using the word ‘scientism’ to begin with.
At this point we might be tempted to consider an inquiry into what is wrong with holding relevant propositions and revising our account of scientism accordingly. However, this too goes in the wrong direction. The reason is that there is nothing inherently wrong with holding relevant propositions, beyond possible falsity. Any one of them could be arrived at by a reasonable, truth-devoted thinker who has no special pre-existing enthusiasm for science. The thinker may be wrong in her belief, but even so her belief does not entail anything that could be considered scientism in any sense. This suggests that scientism does not reside in the content of relevant beliefs but elsewhere.
Where? My view is that if scientism does not reside in the content of certain beliefs then it must reside in reasoning that relates to a certain class of beliefs. In particular, I believe that scientism, rather than adherence to specific pro-science beliefs, is a kind of flawed reasoning that relates to pro-science beliefs as a class. This flawed reasoning consists generally, I think, in unjustified inferences from pro-science beliefs to beliefs in general. To be more precise, if this view is correct then the “enthusiasm” of scientism is manifested not by extremeness of positions about science but in a lack of rigor in reasoning about the significance of science.
We may sharpen this account with the notion of a scientistic belief; here I use the word ‘scientistic’ as simply an adjectival form of the noun ‘scientism.’ We shall say that a belief is scientistic just in case it is falsely justified by a pro-science belief; that is, if a belief appeals to a pro-science belief that does not in fact warrant it, then that belief is scientistic. Note that pro-science beliefs may themselves be scientistic, though they need not be. Also note that any belief that is justified by a scientistic belief is thereby also scientistic, even if the relation of justification connecting the two beliefs is sound. This means that a scientistic belief’s false justification can be mediated by other scientistic beliefs.
How about some examples of what might be called scientistic inferences? Below, while the premises are pro-science beliefs that may or may not be scientistic, the conclusions are scientistic beliefs that may or may not be overtly pro-science.
[Premise] Science is the greatest authority on human knowledge.
[Conclusion] If science says that consciousness does not exist, non-scientists should simply accept it.
[P] Science has been far more successful than the humanities in improving human life.
[C] Resources should be directed away from the humanities toward science.
[P] Science provides the truth about reality while religions do not.
[C] The scientific worldview should be preferred to any religious worldview.
In conclusion, what I like about this view of scientism as the phenomenon of scientistic belief, beyond its seeming to be a view that works, is that it divests the act of charging someone with scientism of anti-science connotations, renders the charge of scientism neutral on substantive debate regarding the merits of science — and questions of substantive truth generally — and clarifies the charge of scientism as a relatively simple and objective charge of flawed reasoning.
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Other RS posts on similar topics:
* Engineers vs intellectuals? How Timothy Ferris gets it spectacularly wrong.
* On the difference between science and philosophy.
* Why we don’t need transhumanism.
What a complete strawman. As someone to whom Massimo has directed the term "scientism", my only conclusion as to the definition was that he disagreed with me. Your definitional conditions are preposterous. Of the five "extreme pro-science" positions you identify, can you support, with evidence, anyone you believe operates with consistency across all five? This sounds to me like an extreme position of your own.
ReplyDelete"Scientism" doesn't exist. It strikes me as term invented by individuals who feel themselves exempt from evidential standards in discourse.
It looks as if Barry was so pissed off by the writer's project from the get-go that he didn't bother to read beyond the first three paragraphs--and didn't even read those with much care.
ReplyDeleteOf the five "extreme pro-science" positions you identify, can you support, with evidence, anyone you believe operates with consistency across all five?
Your objection misses the mark twice over. First of all, Paolini nowhere says or implies anything about anyone holding all five beliefs. Second, the statements are presented as examples of beliefs with which one might try to identify scientism. Paolini makes it about as clear as it can be made that he is merely setting up this way of understanding the term in order to criticize it and recommend another, according to which scientism is not a belief or a set of beliefs but a certain bias in reasoning, which he goes on to specify.
You attack a straw man to accuse the writer of attacking a straw man. You declare that there is no such thing as scientism without taking the least account of the writer's proposed definition of it. And you assert without evidence that the term is merely "invented by individuals who feel themselves exempt from evidential standards in discourse." It looks to me as though the shoe is on the other foot.
MKR, thank you for projecting my state of mind, but far from being "pissed off", which might imply that I thought there was something here to be of real significance, I am merely bemused.
ReplyDeleteOn the issue of the five exemplar belief propositions, we either use them as the thought experiments they are, or we believe them to represent commonly held views of those committing the crime of "scientism". Paolini, for the sake of brevity, doen't explain what these positions mean, or where they come from, but I don't know individuals who project these positions. Maybe you or the author could elaborate? For example, "Observation is the only source of genuine knowledge." We use "observation" as an important part of the scientific method, but who holds the position of "observation" in and of itself to be the only source of genuine knowledge? I understand that Paolini is using these positions illustratively, but they make no sense. As "examples of beliefs" they are so extreme as to exclude almost everyone from holding them, and particularly exclude scientists interested in following the scientific method. Strawman.
Paolini defines "scientism" as "...a kind of flawed reasoning that relates to pro-science beliefs as a class." He elaborates that "...if a belief appeals to a pro-science belief that does not in fact warrant it, then that belief is scientistic." In his three "scientistic inferences" he pairs a premise and conclusion as examples of "faulty reasoning" in the kind of simplistic way we would be critical of in Creationists. In order to demonstrate why the conclusion is the product of faulty reasoning from the premise - his definition of "scientism" - we need to hear his correct reasoning or at least an explanation of why the conclusion is false. Or is Paolini declaring the reasoning faulty sufficient for us to infer this? Strawman.
Scientism involves using the uncertainty of science as a certainty that all unscientific arguments are more uncertain.
ReplyDeleteBarry,
ReplyDelete> "Scientism" doesn't exist. <
Since scientism is an attitude that results in overextending science, are you seriously suggesting that that is never the case? That Jerry Coyne, Richard Dawkins, Alex Rosenberg, Sam Harris, the Churchlands, etc., just to name the usual suspects, have never incurred in this?
Take Jerry's famous statement that plumbing *is* science, for instance. Or Dawkins' contention that it is *science* (rather than a combination of science and philosophy) that refutes "the God hypothesis." Or Rosenberg's claim that *science* tells us that the consciousness, free will and morality are illusions (while in fact these conclusions are highly contentious and simply cannot be settled scientifically). Or Harris' bizarre idea that moral facts are scientific facts? Or the Churchlands' eliminativism about mental states (pain *is* the firing of C-fibers). And the examples could go on and on and on.
Barry - You wrote: 'In order to demonstrate why the conclusion is the product of faulty reasoning from the premise - his definition of "scientism" - we need to hear his correct reasoning or at least an explanation of why the conclusion is false.'
ReplyDeleteThe conclusion doesn't need to be false; scientism lies in the inference, according to the essay. To understand the examples as meant, one needs to imagine someone holding the conclusion on the basis of the premise. There may be other reasoning involved, but that can be taken an assumption of the inference. I do think all of the example inferences are flawed, but if I'm wrong, that's beside the point given that the concept is illustrated.
As to the straw man charge, I wasn't arguing against those who might take exception with my examples. Their purpose was merely illustration. They are less simplistic than deliberately silly as I didn't want questions of truth to distract. Generally straw man is a way of mistreating the position of one's opponents; my only possible opponents with this essay are those who would want to use the word 'scientism' differently--such as the many who try to start a definition of 'scientism' with "is the view that." Those who have been charged with scientism merely for holding extreme philosophical positions about science might appreciate my argument as it tries to show the problem with that, and to clarify a sounder kind of criticism.
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteYou do a disservice to those you mention by making the "scientism" allegation without specific reference to the source. I thought Jerry Coyne explained how his broader definition of science to include empiricism answered the "plumber" statement pretty well. If you disagree, which you seem to imply, then on what basis do you disagree? Furthermore, how is this an example of "overextending science" when he makes the basis of his assumption perfectly clear. The skills of deductive reasoning are evident.
I don't understand your comment regarding Dawkins. I doubt Dawkins would disagree that there are philosophical refutations of the God hypothesis, but he argues that science refutes the God Hypothesis. Is he wrong? Or is it just annoyance on your part that he fails to give the credit to philosophy that you think is die? How is this "scientism"? Where is the "false conclusion" as Paolini would put it? How is Dawkins" reasoning false? Is all reasoning false that doesn't include every possible explanation?
You reference, and dismiss, Rosenberg for his drawing of imperfect conclusions about consciousness. You fail to point out that scientific observations about consciousness are tentative, yet we still know scientific facts about human cognition which help us in the understanding of, for example, pre-cognition and how this might contribute to a discussion on "free will". Again, how is this "scientism"? On what basis do you claim that "...these conclusions are highly contentious and simply cannot be settled scientifically"? How are they going to be settled? Do you believe there is some other way through which we will settle "free will" for example? You have made a statement of fact more egregious than anything I have read in your misdirected attempt to validate the non-existent issue of "scientism". What term would we use to describe this false certainty? Faith? Are you saying science can never settle issues of consciousness? How is an argument that says the opposite of this "scientism"?
And you superficially describe Harris (and I am no defender of The Moral Landscape). He makes very clear the process through which he articulates the connection between "moral facts" and "scientific facts". I don't agree with him. but that's not the point...how is this an example of "scientism".
I can only conclude that "scientism" is a term used to discredit ideas you disagree with for reasoning you don't accept. I sense bias against the conclusion which de facto means false reasoning as you see it. Until you/ Paolini/others define the faulty reasoning in the examples you give "scientism" is just an "almost" polite ad hominem that can be deployed to dismiss ideas, or more specifically, those who hold them. And as you have now made clear that you see "scientism" as "overextending science", does this mean that every new area of scientific endeavour...such as string theory for example, is "scientistic"?
pmpaolini,
ReplyDelete"The conclusion doesn't need to be false; scientism lies in the inference, according to the essay."
"...if a belief appeals to a pro-science belief that does not in fact warrant it, then that belief is scientistic."
How do you decide whether an "...appeal to a pro-science belief...", "...does not in fact warrant it..."?
I also wondered what your thoughts are on Massimo's description of specific individuals he alleges to be guilty of "scientism"?
"I can only conclude that "scientism" is a term used to discredit ideas you disagree with for reasoning you don't accept.'
ReplyDeleteBecause that's the only inference you wish (or are able to wish) to draw?
Sorry, I meant Jason Rosenhouse in the above post and assume Massimo meant him also.
ReplyDeleteScience is a child of philosophy. It informs and is still informed by its philosophical parent. One which in turn is informed by and still informs its child. Neither at this point can get along that well without the other.
ReplyDeletejeremybee,
ReplyDeleteMassimo listed a number of individuals he believes illustrate "scientism". Do you agree? If you can answer that question, I probably don't need to respond to yours.
I agree with Massimo as to those individuals named, except that they not only illustrate their own versions of scientism, they see much of the philosophy that extends the meaningfulness of scientific research as no more than scientism.
ReplyDeleteMost of them see the research that questions the limits of the stochastic selection process as scientism, for example. And in my view (which may differ here from Massimo's) they can't seem to see that the possibility that organisms adapt some universal design strategies to newer sets of earthly circumstances has been enhanced by science.
I would tend to see scientism as first and foremost an attitude rather than either a set of beliefs or a mode of reasoning, though that attitude often leads to such beliefs or modes of reasoning. Scientism-ists may not necessarily hold any explicitly scientistic propositional beliefs, but will still tend to denigrate anything not perceived as being in the "realm" of science; e.g., rolling their eyes at anthropology as a career choice.
ReplyDeleteOf course the word is very problematic as a charge to level against beliefs because, for any X, if I think science cannot address X and you think it can, I'm liable to call you scientistic.
Nevertheless, to all those who are putting the word in quotes as if it were not a real phenomenon, I would say: look around you. Go read these YouTube comments (if you have a strong stomach!) and you will find it in abundance, along with many other terrifying vices of thought.
Whether Dawkins (or whoever) in particular displays this tendency may be debatable, but it is very real.
Barry,
ReplyDelete'How do you decide whether an "...appeal to a pro-science belief...", "...does not in fact warrant it..."?'
Good question. Given that there are beliefs that are not warranted by pro-science beliefs--which seems a safe assumption--that explanation is not essential to my argument. This is why I didn't lengthen the essay with detailed logical explanation of that.
But: there are two basic ways that an inference can be unjustified: 1) C (the conclusion) does not follow deductively from P (the premise) plus any added assumptions (C is an invalid conclusion); 2) C does follow deductively from P plus assumptions but at least one among P and essential assumptions is false (C is an unsound conclusion).
In saying that the charge of scientism is rendered neutral to substantive questions of truth I meant that charges of scientism can and must focus on questions of validity of relevant inference, and not soundness. If what is at stake in a charge of scientism is the truth of a premise (and not validity) then the debate is better called simply a debate on that premise, as if it is reasonable to debate that point of truth, then the position of the person charged with scientism cannot so be unreasonable so as to count as scientism. To put this another way, for an argument to be scientistic, it must be so weak that it can be dismissed on the level of validity. Of course, any scientistic argument can be made valid with the addition of more or less absurd assumptions, but the charge of absurdity preempts debate.
On the question of which well-known thinkers have scientistic tendencies, I would include Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris. I like a lot of what both of these fellows have to say but scientism is evident in Dawkins' differential treatment of science and religion--science is good, thus nothing bad is a proper part of science; religion is bad, therefore nothing good is a proper part of religion. This was a point made by Marilynne Robinson. Harris shows his scientism, among other areas, in his rather crass dismissal of moral philosophy.
If I understand correctly, this post argues that scientism is best identified with a type of inference. But in the three examples given, I think the inferences are, if not straightforward, at least arguable.
ReplyDelete1. We should accept claims made by disciplines with the greatest authority.
2. Resources should be redirected towards things which are better at improving human life.
3. Worldviews which provide truth about reality should be preferred to worldviews which do not.
If anything, I think the premises are more questionable than the inferences.
pmpaolini,
ReplyDeleteLet's just take Dawkins as one example of "...well known thinkers (with) scientistic tendencies."
"...science is good, thus nothing bad is a proper part of science." Dawkins does not hold this conclusion. It would be remiss of me to level confirmation bias in your direction (given that this is the only piece you have written that I have read), but there are two references in The God Delusion to the errors of science. One is the blind pursuit of atomic weaponry. The other (also referenced in The Greatest Show on Earth) is to those scientists who fail, through shoddy research or the pursuit of financial rewards, to adhere to the highest scientific standards. The self-correcting nature of scientific methodology is the way science recovers. Extolling these virtues whilst being clear about its limits is hardly "scientism" by your definition.
"...religion is bad, therefore nothing good is a proper part of religion." I don't know whether you have watched Dawkins discuss religion with the Bishop of Oxford, or with the former Archbishop of Canterbury, but when he references the legacy of the Church of England to English culture, architecture and music, I wonder what you think he is doing? When he describes parts of the New Testament "King James" as containing some of the most beautiful writing ever written, was he arguing "...nothing good (as) a proper part of religion"? Or do you think he is lying? Or is it just the imbalance you perceive? In which case, what is the objective assessment of balance that justifies "scientism"? What are you counting?
I guess your "get out" here is that you did say "...scientistic tendencies...", but I'd be interested to hear how you would explain these in the light of your definition. Because if your charge against Dawkins is accurate (tendency or otherwise), I ought not be able to cite these exceptions. I'm wondering what objectivity there is in "scientism" ("...a relatively simple and objective charge of flawed reasoning." is how you described it)? It seems it is something that rests in the mind of the beholder. The poster child of post hoc rationalization.
Hey Barry,
ReplyDeleteH. Allen Orr wrote a nicely written review of Dawkins’, "The God Delusion" in the New York Review of Books in which he pointed out that nothing Dawkins states was derived by way of scientific enquiry, "It’s just Dawkins talking". Do you understand what a scientific enquiry is? And why the results have to be written down and presented for peer review? That’s how we separate truly significant research from scientism. That’s how we build and develop this body of knowledge we call science. The only reason I ask is because you seem ok with Coyne broadening the definition of science to include plumbing.
You have a point about scientists and plumbers both using deductive reasoning; the basic things the scientist does are not unique to science. People experience the world and develop ideas and then they verify those ideas via further experience. This is what I think of when I think of "reason", making my thoughts conform to the world outside me. We all have our own personal body of knowledge and since we share common experiences a lot of this personal knowledge is also shared. What we call science is just a formalization what people had been doing all along. It’s a more controlled and precise way of finding things out about the world. When you go to school and learn science you don’t throw out everything you learned before you knew science. The things you pick up from science may cause you to rethink some things, but mostly it just adds a little to what you already knew. Science is general and abstract and because of this it is also incomplete. Science will never replace personal knowledge. We can live without science; we lived without it for thousands of years. We could not live, if all we had to go on was the type of knowledge that science gives us.
Kenan Malik wrote a thoughtful review of Sam Harris’s "The Moral Landscape". In it he pointed out that this isn’t science, it’s an attempt to co-opt the authority of science. Harris is changing the metaphor of the scientists as observer to the scientist as determiner. He says, "Science can determine how humans ought to behave". If this were true then there is no reason why scientists could not determine how other things, like objects moving through space ought to behave. In which case Max Planck could have legitimately written to the young patent clerk, "Albert, this is all well and good but we believe in Newton’s laws of motion and we’ve determined they are correct and they describe how objects ought to behave." Once science begins "determining", it has stopped "observing". We would never know what humans are capable of becoming, if idiots like Harris were ever allowed to have a say in determining our future. And Kenan Malik’s review is the only one that I read that underscores the hate that is dripping from Harris’s every word. He asks, "What makes Harris think that demonizing Muslims will move us to a higher level in the moral landscape?"
Rosenberg is a real piece of work. I read a couple pieces he wrote in The Stone. He wants to prove that the humanities (and what term did he use, "interpretation?") can somehow be translated into fMRI brain scans and then be understood and dismissed as not being true knowledge. I agree with Ian Pollock, scientism is more of an attitude than anything else. Rosenberg has copped this impersonal attitude toward people in the humanities. He is standing over and above them. They aren’t people with whom he wants to have a dialogue and maybe develop a friendship. He wants to observe them, look into their brains and see what makes them tick so he can dismiss them. If ethics is a social dialogue as Kenan Malik suggests in his review of Harris’s book, then it is this dialogue that Rosenberg is trying to avoid and make irrelevant. I can't help but wonder what motivates Rosenberg to pursue this. Has the guy ever been in love and ever felt like putting his feelings down on paper?
Paul,
ReplyDeleteEssentially, I take it that your thesis is the following: one is guilty of "scientism" only in the case when one invalidly infers [C] (an ostensibly "pro-science" proposition) from [P] (a similarly "pro-science" proposition), no?
If so, these next two sentences of yours seem problematic:
(1) "... I meant that charges of scientism can and must focus on questions of validity of relevant inference, and not soundness."
(2) "Of course, any scientistic argument can be made valid with the addition of more or less absurd assumptions, but the charge of absurdity preempts debate."
If a heretofore "scientistic" argument is now valid- though, not necessarily sound-, how can it still be "scientistic"?
If I make an argument valid by adding a premise(s), then either the added premise(s) or the initial premise(s) must be false, because, if not, then the argument would be sound, in which case reason obliges that you accept it.
I do not want to charge you with being inconsistent prematurely, but it sure seems that what we have here is a contradiction.
I wager that I am not following you or that you meant to omit 'scientistic' from (2). If the latter, though, I wonder the point of your post...
My last comment made me see that in the essay, 'unjustified inference' should be read as (replaced with) 'invalid inference'. This is what I had in mind but I see that use of the former term is too broad. If an argument is valid and reasonably debatable on the level of soundness, then I would say that it is too good to count as scientistic. This move also does away with the difficulties of the notion of justification. In saying that one of the ways that a valid inference can be unjustified is that one of the premises is false does not mean that all valid inferences with false premises are unjustified. Some hold, and I agree, that it is possible to draw a justified inference from a false belief.
ReplyDeleteBarry,
ReplyDeleteI was referring to Alex Rosenberg, not Jason Rosenhouse.
I have rehashed my criticism of Coyne, Dawkins, Harris and others so many times on this blog that I'm simply not interested in doing it again. Please read the relevant posts, if you are interested. I will address some of this in response to your general points, however:
> broader definition of science to include empiricism <
But empiricism is a philosophical, not a scientific notion. And if we extend "science" to includes any and all types of empirically-based learning about the world, it turns out that my ability to read a subway map is "science." The term is simply not used in that way by anyone without a Coyne-like ideological agenda, and loses its meaning entirely if so applied.
> he argues that science refutes the God Hypothesis. Is he wrong? <
Yes, he is, because supernatural "hypotheses" are nothing of the kind, and therefore cannot be refuted. Yes, one can refute specific empirical claims (e.g., the earth is 10,000 old), but because religions aren't in the business of producing hypotheses it is meaningless to say that science refutes "the god hypothesis" (although it does refute the specific claim that the earth is 10,000 years old).
> Do you believe there is some other way through which we will settle "free will" for example? <
Free will is a philosophical concept that needs to be analyzed logically. Volition, on the other hand, is a scientific operational concept, which can be studied empirically.
> Are you saying science can never settle issues of consciousness? <
No, I said that it is misguided to claim that science *has* settled the issue of whether consciousness is an illusion.
> Harris makes very clear the process through which he articulates the connection between "moral facts" and "scientific facts". <
No, he doesn't. He simply says in a footnote that he can't be bothered with the philosophical literature because it increases boredom in the universe. Very scholarly indeed.
> I can only conclude that "scientism" is a term used to discredit ideas you disagree with for reasoning you don't accept. <
No, it is a pretty clearly defined attitude, see for instance: http://goo.gl/OOsjz. Whether it can be applied reasonably to a specific individual's specific claims is, of course, a matter for reasonable debate, and the case needs to be made on an individual basis.
Look, its like the term "pseudoscience." Obviously, it is meant to be derogatory, nobody wants to actually do *pseudo* science (though, interestingly, Rosenberg in his latest book actually wishes to appropriate the term scientism to replace atheism — something that would hardly work even grammatically: someone who takes the atheistic position is an atheist; would someone who takes the scientistic position be a scientist?).
Paul,
ReplyDeleteI am not sure your response got to my question.
Initially, you say 'charges of scientism can and must focus on questions of validity of relevant inference, and not soundness.' I took this as committing you to saying that a valid argument with an overly enthusiastic, "pro-science" premise(s) and conclusion(s) is not a "scientistic" argument.
But then you write: "Of course, any scientistic argument can be made valid with the addition of more or less absurd assumptions, but the charge of absurdity preempts debate."
Do you mean to say here that, if valid, an argument is no longer "scientistic" (though it may be objectionable nonetheless)? Or do you mean to say that, even if valid, it is still a "scientistic" argument?
Eamon,
ReplyDeleteI don't see the problem you are referring to. Arguments can be repaired, and if they are in a sensible way then they would move from being scientistic to being reasonable; if they are repaired in a bad manner they remain awful arguments.
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteThe problem I am trying point out is that if Paul insists that 'charges of scientism ... must focus on questions of validity of relevant inference, and not soundness,' then ex hypothesi valid arguments with untenably "pro-science" premises and conclusions cannot properly be called 'scientistic'.
However, there are plenty of valid arguments which we might otherwise want to identify as "scientistic".
Personally, I do not think faulty inferences are sine qua non for "scientistic" arguments (though, people given to "scientism" make have a tendency to employ invalid inferences in their arguments).
I rather think that "scientism" of the sort of Sam Harris' results from an admixture of conceit, ignorance, and laziness of mind.
Massimo to Barry: ...because religions aren't in the business of producing hypotheses it is meaningless to say that science refutes "the god hypothesis" (although it does refute the specific claim that the earth is 10,000 years old).
ReplyDeleteWhich goes to show how religions tend to entangle themselves with such claims - such that an attack on the claim is often perceived - by insiders and outsiders alike - as an attack on the religion itself.
So, for example, we know that one can jettison a belief in biblical cosmology in favor of a more modern version and yet logically remain a theist. But we also know that one cannot easily do so openly while remaining a member in-good-standing of just any theistic community (e.g. fundamentalist Christian or ultra-orthodox Jewish).
More to the point, why would a religion favor one claim over another if its authorities (and perhaps lay folk) did not judge the one claim to be a better fit with their fundamental articles of faith? So, for example, while it's logically possible to reconcile evolution with theism, it seems highly dubious that the two concepts will ever be as good a match for one another as special creation and theism.
I'm not sure what to call this kind of mismatch (a cognitive mutual inhibition?), but it does seem at least partly responsible for the notion that science and religion are at odds with one another, or the scientistic claim that the former "refutes" the latter.
Eamon,
ReplyDeleteI am completely onboard with the sorts of concerns you have. We agree that it makes sense to talk about 'scientistic arguments', and now we're concerned about demarcating scientistic versus non-scientistic arguments.
The essay puts forth in effect that scientistic arguments are weak arguments that have at least one pro-science proposition as a premise. The question now is: how weak must an argument be to be scientistic?
My thought is that arguments with pro-science premises may be of three relevant types:
[1] Invalid
[2] Valid with at least one unreasonable premise.
[3] Valid with all reasonable premises.
My view is that [1] and [2] are scientistic arguments while [3] is not. What I mean by 'reasonable premise' is that the premise is worthy of debate; hence 'unreasonable premise' is a premise not worthy of debate. But of course whether a premise is worthy of debate can be a matter of debate, and in this way fine-grained demarcation between scientistic and non-scientist arguments is left to debate in particular contexts.
As another point of elaboration, I do not hold that to commit a scientistic inference is ipso facto to be guilty of scientism. Such inferences could be committed "accidentally" by anyone. Being guilty of scientism rather is a matter of more or less pernicious commission of scientistic inferences, or have a deeply scientistic belief system. So really the concepts of scientistic inference, argument, belief, etc., are reference concepts for defining concepts of scientism.
"He [Harris] simply says in a footnote that he can't be bothered with the philosophical literature because it increases boredom in the universe. Very scholarly indeed."
ReplyDeleteI don't mean to interrupt the "flow" of this discussion, but I really have to give Dr. Pigliucci a "thumbs up" on this remark.
It is so often a tactic of Coyne/ Dawkins/Harris/etc.
to make *no* argument at all, and take an arrogant stance -- acting as if their postition was a logical truism that needs no supporting evidence. I guess you win a lot of arguments that way: simply declaring yourself the winner without bothering to make an argument that can be criticized /refuted.
Scientism is extreme form of empiricism. Think about it, the sucess of scientific discoveries in this century is awesome, then all esoteric concepts are useless and pointless. Isn't that so simple?
ReplyDeleteThe parsimony is a atractive criteria for theories, I admit, but in terms of argumentations, don't serve as much. If you bring the kolmogorov complexity to light, in the hope of justification, this formalism will help you in situations when the variables are know. In another situations, this is only a unecessary jargon.
If one can be guilty of 'Scientism' - extending the methods or discoveries of science beyond its bound then is there also 'Philisophism' where philosophers extend there own discipline beyond its bounds?
ReplyDeleteThameron - "Philosophism" - flawed reasoning about the significance of philosophy due to an amorous view of it - seems possible in principle, but in practice I think philosophers generally think too carefully or at least too diversely for such a phenomenon to arise. Another thing is that most philosophers recognize the validity and importance of other forms of knowledge, such as science, and this checks that totalizing spirit, even if philosophy is undeniably the Queen of knowledge ;)
ReplyDeleteA further note to Eamon: note that a pro-science belief is not necessarily scientistic or overly enthusiastic about science. Many positive evaluations of science are true, and many extreme philosophical positions regarding science are reasonable, even if false. While there may be some pro-science beliefs that could only be held scientistically (ah, the adverbial form), what I've argued is that generally scientism resides in inference rather than belief content. That some contents can be held only via a scientistic inference is consistent with this; it's still the inference rather than the content that makes the belief scientistic.
Relatedly, a subtle amendment I would make to the essay were I to rewrite it is that 'scientistic' would be defined in terms of what I have called 'scientistic inferences' as opposed to taken as simply an adjectival form of 'scientism'. 'Scientism' would then be defined in terms of scientistic inferences.
Thameron,
ReplyDeleteno, there can't be a philosophical equivalent of scientism because philosophers can talk about anything while having no power or money to do anything about... ;-)
More seriously, I do think there is such thing as pseudo-philosophy, and of course a lot of simply bad philosophy. Just like there are pseudosciences and bad science. But philosophy is best thought of as a meta-discipline, where the goal is to train one's critical faculties and logical abilities to the analysis of pretty much the whole of human knowledge, science included (e.g., in philosophy *of* science).
It is not by chance that it is philosophy that span a variety of other modern disciplines, from the natural to the social sciences.
The problem that I see (admittedly from the outside) is that there isn't a 'philosophy' but rather there are 'philosophies' where the residents therein are semi-autonomous and not always in agreement on proper human motivations, goals or methods for achieving those goals. I am not sure that the many schools there make a college.
ReplyDeleteI do agree that there are those who are overly enthusiastic or optimistic about the timeline of scientific progress (Kurzweil et al), but I think a far greater problem are those who dismiss science and its findings altogether in favor of myth. I do realize though that you can't harp on them all the time lest you induce boredom. Just as the skeptic magazines occasionally do a story on Bigfoot.
According to Merriam-Webster scientism is
ReplyDelete2 : a thesis that the methods of the natural sciences should be used in all areas of investigation including philosophy, the humanities, and the social sciences : a belief that only such methods can fruitfully be used in the pursuit of knowledge.
We know that we are aware of our observations (consciousness), inquire about the relationship between things (intelligence), can marshal evidence and decide what is true (rational judgment), and can control our bodies (free will). This knowledge is not scientific knowledge. We do not learn this from our sense organs. We learn it because we can make ourselves the subject of our own knowledge.
There is no evidence supporting scientism. It is no more than a superstition.
Part of the problem with the whole scientism charge is that it's too easily and too often used as a "get out of jail free" card in discussions. Most of the time what people mean by scientism I cannot see a problem with it; it seems downright obvious to use the best science and reason available to understand the world. What's the alternative, making shit up?
ReplyDeleteIf a scientistic argument/belief must be premised on a pro-science proposition, then pro-science beliefs that are advanced as axiomatic can never be scientistic, can they? Ditto if they are premised on beliefs having nothing to do with science.
ReplyDeleteIn other words, I may believe that science is the best way of knowing, and that only scientists should be allowed to vote or own property, and that anyone who confesses to being religious should be shot as an Enemy of Science. But as long as my justification for these beliefs is "They're self-evident!" or "A leprechaun told me so!" or even "One must believe these things to be a good person!", I don't think I'm guilty of scientism qua Paolini.
Is this, then, a terribly useful term?
Massimo,
ReplyDelete"Yes, he is, because supernatural "hypotheses" are nothing of the kind, and therefore cannot be refuted. Yes, one can refute specific empirical claims (e.g., the earth is 10,000 old), but because religions aren't in the business of producing hypotheses it is meaningless to say that science refutes "the god hypothesis" (although it does refute the specific claim that the earth is 10,000 years old)."
Is part of the disagreement, I wonder, how to distinguish between general and specific empirical claims? As far as I can understand the argument, it does seem odd to exclude science as a means to determine whether or not there's some form of interventionist deity - a point also made by philosopher Michael Martin in Atheism, Morality & Meaning. What recourse is there to know whether or not there's an interventionist "deity" (which may or may not be supernatural) if not empirical investigation?
Excerpt from http://dokmaidogma.wordpress.com/
ReplyDelete...although many people in Sweden have left the churches, some still have problems with logical thinking, turning to astrology and unscientific medicine. Some simply change gurus, from priests to selected scientists whom they trust blindly. Being a scientist myself I do encourage critical thinking. The opposite to critical thinking is fundamentalism, where you ignore, ridicule or hide inconvenient facts rather than considering and testing them rationally. Scientists are also humans and some can not bear losing face by admitting that decades of research were wrong, and so they become fundamentalists of their own theses too.
However, critical thinking also means critical studies of scientific publications. It is a common misunderstanding even among students in natural sciences that a published and peer-reviewed scientific article has a divine stamp of correctness. It does not. It means the article passed the first filters of critical comments, and is now ready for worldwide criticism. Many old peer-reviewed scientific papers claimed that peptic ulcer was due to over-production of acid, but a brave Australian scientist challenged his colleagues and published experimental proof that in many cases it is due to a new organism, Helicobacter pylori. Others repeated his experiments and confirmed them. A terrible disease was suddenly wiped out in areas ready to change their minds, while some fundamentalistic doctors such as in Russia and Thailand still go on with the old beliefs, maintaining life-long pain (and medical bills) in their patients.
Many ex-religious people behave like the crowds in Monty Python’s ‘Life of Brian’, where they abandon the old prophets to follow a new one, and when told to think for themselves they repeat in chorus ‘yes, we shall think for ourselves’. Although a scientist might be completely right, the laymen who rush to his support to bless the world with his thinking may not have read or understood his articles, nor the articles of his scientific critics. They may have adopted an idea presented in a 30 minutes TV program by a journalist who simplifies, misunderstands and selects suitable theses, commonly pleading to emotions via artistic footage rather than reason. The phenomenon is not too different from religion. Religious and scientific models are both products of the brain, the difference is that the scientific models are based on information you can check, not sayings, and the scientific models keep changing as new information is obtained (see example above). If you do not check or compare scientific information, then the TV program is also just a saying, although hopefully with a core of truth which will inspire you to study the subject in more detail.
Eric Danell
www.dokmaigarden.co.th
Kel,
ReplyDelete> Part of the problem with the whole scientism charge is that it's too easily and too often used as a "get out of jail free" card in discussions. <
You know, I get that a lot, and I think that in itself is becoming an easy way to dodge the actual charges and dismiss one's critic. Every time I have made (and most of the times I have seen it made by others) a charge of scientism I usually back it up with reasons. To dismiss the charge out of hand is not what I expect from my fellow critical thinkers.
> What's the alternative, making shit up? <
There are plenty of types of knowledge where science has nothing or little to say, mathematics, logic and first person experience being the obvious examples. And then there are matters of taste, where also science cannot possibly settle anything.
> Is part of the disagreement, I wonder, how to distinguish between general and specific empirical claims? <
Good point, but no I don't think so. A better way to think of it is that science can address specific empirical claims (does intercessory prayer work?), but not the "hypothesis" behind those claims, for the simple reason that there is no "hypothesis" in anything like the scientific sense of the term.
> What recourse is there to know whether or not there's an interventionist "deity" (which may or may not be supernatural) if not empirical investigation? <
None. How could you tell an interventionist deity from a super-intelligent programmer who set up the universe as a giant video game?
Anton,
ReplyDeleteYou raise an interesting issue, and I did consider it in developing my view. Suppose someone makes an assertion that on the face of it sounds "scientistic." However, when we ask the person why the assertion is held, we find that none of the person's reasons are pro-science. As a result, though we may be able to say that the person's reasoning is unsound, we have no basis for saying that the belief is scientistic.
Generally, the purpose of my account is to try to capture in a useful way the over-enthusiasm about science that is suggested by the general use of 'scientism.' A scientistic belief in someone, i.e., a belief held on the basis of a weak argument that has a pro-science belief as a premise, allows suspicion of the relevant enthusiasm, though it is not decisive evidence in itself. Decisive evidence comes when scientistic beliefs adequately pervade a belief system. A person is guilty of scientism when the extent of scientistic beliefs in their belief system can only be explained by an over-enthusiasm for science.
Note that a scientistic belief system is not merely evidence of scientistic enthusiasm but reveals its content in a particular case; that is, from the belief system it can be gleaned why the person has enthusiasm for science. One of the reasons that moving from belief content to weak inference is a good move in defining scientism is that the content of scientism may vary form person to person, as opposed to being identifiable with specific contents.
That someone may hold scientism-sounding beliefs on the basis of weak arguments that have non-pro-science premises exclusively simply reflects the fact that not all bad reasoning pertaining to science is scientistic, and it hardly follows from this that 'scientistic' and 'scientism' are not useful terms.
Thanks for the response, Massimo.
ReplyDelete"You know, I get that a lot, and I think that in itself is becoming an easy way to dodge the actual charges and dismiss one's critic."
I tried not to dismiss the critique, but tried to highlight the challenge that the term brings. I've been charged with engaging in scientism while making an almost-entirely philosophical argument! So I do think it's worthwhile to point out that the term is loaded / misused, and done so with a greater frequency than legitimate criticism. It seems to me there's a lot of talking past each other with the scientism charge and I think that this is a factor.
"To dismiss the charge out of hand is not what I expect from my fellow critical thinkers."
I hope you don't think I'm dismissing the charge out of hand.
"There are plenty of types of knowledge where science has nothing or little to say, mathematics, logic and first person experience being the obvious examples. And then there are matters of taste, where also science cannot possibly settle anything."
Agreed. Though I wonder how much these are violated by those who are charged with scientism. If you put that to Jerry Coyne, for example, would he scoff at those as being either meaningless or ultimately scientific questions?
"None. How could you tell an interventionist deity from a super-intelligent programmer who set up the universe as a giant video game?"
But surely there's an empirical difference between interventionist deity / super-intelligent programmer / ETI than there being none at all. If intercessory prayer works, wouldn't that establish something at the very least?
Kel,
ReplyDelete> I hope you don't think I'm dismissing the charge out of hand. <
No, I was making the general comment that too often I see specific charges of scientism being dismissed out of hand. But you are also right that at least some of the times the charge is made a bit too lightly. Of course that goes for all sorts of attributes meant to convey dislike, like pseudo-science (which I've seen hurled at string theory, for example).
> But surely there's an empirical difference between interventionist deity / super-intelligent programmer / ETI than there being none at all. If intercessory prayer works, wouldn't that establish something at the very least? <
No, Yes.
No, I don't see what empirical way there would be to discriminate between a super-intelligent programmer of the universe and a god. Yes, if intercessory prayer worked we would know that there is *something* going on, but it wouldn't be a test of any hypothesis, because gods don't make for hypotheses, they are too vague and vacuous for that.
And of course you are certain that the universe does not (because it cannot) program itself.
ReplyDeleteI do wonder how much more receptive people would be to a reasoned criticism of the limits of science if it weren't for theologians who use what Stephen Law calls ratchet arguments - using science where it bolsters one's case and dismiss the importance of science where it's diminished; William Lane Craig was his example of a theologian guilty of this - or that there will be grand pronouncements about God's role in nature with any question of how they could possibly know that waved away with the charge of scientism and an appeal to NOMA. With that, it seems perfectly understandable to want such pronouncements grounded in something substantial; and that whether or not taste is a valid way of knowing outside of science doesn't really come into it.
ReplyDeleteMassimo,
ReplyDeleteSorry for the mistake on Rosenberg. I read his book on Causation back in the 80’s but haven’t “connected” well to anything he has put out since. I did see that NYT piece a few months ago that didn’t seem objectionable but will look up some of his papers.
I am a regular reader of your blog and I’m familiar with your views on Coyne, Dawkins and Harris…in the case of Coyne we have another recent exhibit. It’s actually a little puzzling because with each of them I can find posts where you say (and this is generalized, not a direct quote) that you find much to agree with them (on “X”) BUT…and then launch into an attack which borders on the personal, prompting in, for example, your “Coyne apology” which clearly still rankles. I never get the sense that you actually do agree with them except in the most superficial ways. Your last posts wrt Coyne suggest that you might have even got to the point where mutual animosity precludes even the semblance of superficial agreement on anything.
This is relevant for two reasons. First, if “scientism” exists, Paolini argues that it is about flawed reasoning regarding specific pro-science attitudes related to specific claims, yet you both move quickly from this to an attribution of “scientism” to individuals. Neither of you make clear how you do this other than to describe a “tendency”. I asked Paolini specifically to describe how assessment objectivity was reached that justifies “scientism” as a description of an individual, but he didn’t reply. Maybe he thought it was an unsophisticated question? In this sense the use of “scientism” is little more than a device (and a pejorative one at that) to ascribe a person to a class as a lazy label. And, Massimo, you often fail to balance the excellence of many of your comments with a resistance to the sense of superiority and smugness you do exude (such as criticizing individuals for being “unsophisticated”), which is extremely demeaning, indeed provocative. When others do it, well, they are “unsophisticated”, or they haven’t read all the relevant books (meaning the books you’ve read).
Second, the use of the term “scientism” in this general way is doing a great disservice to wider public perceptions of science (and particularly to individuals and specific science pov’s) that is quickly being picked up on anti-science forums, blogs and discussion boards. Of course, we would expect those with an anti-science agenda to grossly misuse any and all scientific terms, but in a private email exchange I had recently with the Discovery Institute, one of the responses I got was liberally sprinkled with the term “scientism”. The term might give pleasure to philosophers of science but it is potentially destructive to public perceptions of the term “science”.
“Scientism” isn’t a term that is even needed. If a person is projecting a pro-science attitude based on flawed reasoning then we already have a way of describing it. We call it “not science”. If we believe that individuals are making unscientific claims then it isn’t science.
Regarding the other points in your 24th Dec reply to me, there are many areas of our experience that utilize the scientific method. When EH Carr in “What is History” (1961) wrote “…the method by which science studied the world of nature was applied to the study of human affairs”, he was describing precisely this. Over at Evolutionblog Jason Rosenberg makes the same point about mathematics.
I agree it is impossible to scientifically refute the deistic God Hypothesis, but the narrowing claims of specific theistic gods to resist science provide more hope. We can use science to test the claims of an intervening god. I thought Sean Carroll's discussion of dark matter gave some sensible suggestions regarding the supernatural and where science can play.
Barry,
ReplyDelete> Rosenberg ... I did see that NYT piece a few months ago that didn’t seem objectionable but will look up some of his papers. <
I was referring to his new book on atheism, which I am reviewing.
> then launch into an attack which borders on the personal, prompting in, for example, your “Coyne apology” which clearly still rankles <
That apology was heartfelt, but it was meant to invite reciprocation, which did not come because apparently Jerry feels that his tone is always appropriate.
> the sense of superiority and smugness you do exude (such as criticizing individuals for being “unsophisticated”), which is extremely demeaning, indeed provocative. <
It is very hard to balance one's tone in writing, but I honestly try. And some people really do deserve a little bit of sarcasm. Again, I maintain that nothing I have written stoops down to the level of fart jokes and the like though.
> the use of the term “scientism” in this general way is doing a great disservice to wider public perceptions of science <
I don't think so, because there is a danger of over-selling science in some respects, and the public needs to be aware of it. The fact that ID proponents exploit one's intellectual honesty is their problem, not mine.
> EH Carr in “What is History” (1961) wrote <
I haven't read Carr, but my colleagues in the History Department do not think of what they do as science in any meaningful sense of the term.
Massimo,
ReplyDeleteI would be very interested in reading what you have to say about Rosenberg's new book, when and where will your review be posted?
I don't want to prolong this discussion on "scientism", because we clearly disagree. The only two points I would make relate, first, to the "overselling" of science. We don't need a pejorative term such as "scientism" to describe this. We already have very good descriptive language as in "not science" that does the job perfectly well. Moving from individual "scientistic" statements to the descriptions of individuals ( and neither you nor Paolini has defined precisely how you justify this) is deplorable and ad hominem in nature. You are giving legitimacy to a term that has marginally better social decorum than "idiot", but only just. It is in this sense that the damage you do to science is evident and you are clearly too close to the issue and wedded to it to see this.
Second, I didn't say history was science I said that the historian uses the methodology of science.
I see that Hutchinson has just completed his 3 part series on "scientism" over at BioLogos. He seems to equate "scientism" with "reductionism" and wondered where either you or Paolini think he is right and wrong? He seems to be talking about a completely different definition to the OP here.
Barry,
ReplyDeleteI take the question you've mentioned a few times to be: how do we move from the identification of scientistic beliefs in a person to charging that person with scientism? If you read the flow of my comments in this thread, which elaborates and subtly amends the OP, I think you'll know my answer. We can charge a person with scientism when prevalence of scientistic inferences in their reasoning precludes mere mistakes and evidences the "enthusiasm" for science ordinarily associated with the word 'scientism'. More precisely, my view defines 'scientism' as a tendency for scientistic inference; so if a person exhibits a tendency for scientistic inference, they're guilty of scientism.
Barry,
ReplyDeletethe review will appear in The philosopher's Magazine, it's due to the editor by mid-January, I'm still going through the book...
pmpaolini,
ReplyDeleteBut surely for "scientism" to have any value it is at the level of specific claims and arguments (where, in my view, we already have appropriate descriptive language), not people. Forgive me, but I am trying to swallow the presumptive arrogance that lies behind "We can charge a person with scientism when prevalence of scientistic inferences in their reasoning precludes mere mistakes and evidences the "enthusiasm" for science..." where "prevalence" is contingent on your subjective weighting. I already provided an example for Dawkins which challenged even your specific argument about this being "scientistic". As you engage in this superficial and contrived weighting of "prevalence", is there a credit and debit mechanism that cancel out each other? So, on the assumption you know all of what Dawkins says, is he being "scientistic" if more than 10% of his arguments are judged "scientistic"? 50%? Given the level of subjectivity involved I think you can see the problem in attaching the term to individuals, especially...to use my words above..."You are giving legitimacy to a term that has marginally better social decorum than "idiot", but only just."
I am sure you will wriggle about with pointers to the acceptance of generalized statements and labels in common usage - political labels leap to mind - but these tend to actually describe things that people themselves accept. "Scientism" is no such label. It's a derogatory smear which is already redundant in its application to specific ideas and propositions and entirely subjective (driven by the usual attribution biases that affect us all) in attempting to smear individuals. Attempting to give this term legitimacy in this way is, in my opinion, doing far more damage to science. Using it to smear specific individuals allows for a lazy dismissal of their opinions having already been tried and convicted in your court.
Barry,
ReplyDeleteI think you might possibly be right if the word 'scientism' were significant only in the realm of philosophical debate. In that realm, there may indeed be better ways of making the point than charging scientism. On a broader social level, however, I think the notion has important value, even if there is some gray area between scientism and non-scientism. I think "enthusiasm" for science has the potential to become an oppressive or otherwise dangerous force in our culture and politics, and I think we need a word like 'scientism' to meet such with critical resistance.